\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL CENTER, P.S.C., on Behalf of Itself, Its Staff, and Its Patients; Ernest Marshall, M.D., on Behalf of Himself and His Patients; Ashley Bergin, M.D., on Behalf of Herself and Her Patients; Tanya Franklin, M.D., on Behalf of Herself and Her Patients, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Andrew G. BESHEAR, Attorney General (17-6183); Adam Meier, in His Capacity as Secretary of the Cabinet of Health and Family Services (17-6151), Defendants-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0062p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P.S.C., on behalf ┐\\n of itself, its staff, and its patients; ERNEST MARSHALL, │\\n M.D., on behalf of himself and his patients; ASHLEY │\\n BERGIN, M.D., on behalf of herself and her patients; │\\n TANYA FRANKLIN, M.D., on behalf of herself and her │\\n patients, │\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees, │\\n │\\n > Nos. 17-6151/6183\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n ANDREW G. BESHEAR, Attorney General (17-6183); │\\n ADAM MEIER, in his capacity as Secretary of the │\\n Cabinet of Health and Family Services (17-6151), │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.\\n No. 3:17-cv-00016—David J. Hale, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: July 25, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 4, 2019\\n\\n Before: NORRIS, DONALD, and BUSH, Circuit Judges;\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: S. Chad Meredith, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for\\nAppellant in 17-6151. Steven Travis Mayo, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF\\nKENTUCKY, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-6183. Alexa Kolbi-Molinas,\\nAMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, for\\nAppellees. ON BRIEF: S. Chad Meredith, M. Stephen Pitt, Matthew F. Kuhn, OFFICE OF\\nTHE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-6151. La Tasha Buckner, OFFICE\\nOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\n6183. Alexa Kolbi-Molinas, Andrew D. Beck, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION\\nFOUNDATION, New York, New York, Amy D. Cubbage, Heather Gatnarek, ACLU OF\\nKENTUCKY FOUNDATION, INC., Louisville, Kentucky, Anton Metlitsky, Leah Godesky,\\nO’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, New York, New York, for Appellees. Scott A. Keller, OFFICE\\nOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, Austin, Texas, Michael Lee Francisco, MRD\\nLAW, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Scott W. Gaylord, ELON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF\\nLAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, Shannon Rose Selden, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP,\\nNew York, New York, Kimberly A. Parker, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND\\nDORR LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.\\n\\n BUSH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which NORRIS, J., joined, and\\nDONALD, J., joined only in that Attorney General Beshear is not a proper party to this action.\\nDONALD, J. (pp. 34–54), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a woman has\\nthe right to choose to have an abortion. To inform that choice, the Commonwealth of Kentucky\\ndirects a doctor, before performing an abortion, to auscultate (or make audible) the fetal\\nheartbeat, perform an ultrasound, and display and describe the ultrasound images to the patient.\\nThis appeal principally concerns whether those requirements violate the doctor’s First\\nAmendment rights.\\n\\n “The Ultrasound Informed Consent Act,” also known as “House Bill 2” or “H.B. 2,”1 is\\nchallenged by Plaintiffs-Appellees EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. and its associated\\nphysicians (collectively, “EMW”) under the First Amendment, as incorporated against the States\\nby the Fourteenth Amendment. EMW prevailed in the district court, which, in granting the\\ncomplaint’s first claim for relief under the First Amendment, applied heightened scrutiny to\\ninvalidate the statute and permanently enjoin enforcement of H.B. 2. See EMW Women’s\\nSurgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 283 F. Supp. 3d 629 (W.D. Ky. 2017). Our court then denied\\nthe motion of then-Defendant-Appellant Vickie Glisson, who was Secretary of the Cabinet for\\nHealth and Family Services, to stay the injunction pending appeal. See EMW Women’s Surgical\\n\\n\\n 1Codified at Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) §§ 311.727, 311.990(34).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\nCtr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, No. 17-6151 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2017) (order). However, neither our court\\nnor the district court had the benefit of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in National Institute\\nof Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (“NIFLA”).\\n\\n In NIFLA the Court clarified that no heightened First Amendment scrutiny should apply\\nto informed-consent statutes like the abortion-informed-consent statute at issue in Planned\\nParenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).2\\nSee NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. Thus, even though an abortion-informed-consent law compels a\\ndoctor’s disclosure of certain information, it should be upheld so long as the disclosure is\\ntruthful, non-misleading, and relevant to an abortion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; Tex. Med.\\nProviders Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012); Planned\\nParenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).\\n\\n Because H.B. 2, like the statute in Casey, requires the disclosure of truthful, non-\\nmisleading, and relevant information about an abortion, we hold that it does not violate a\\ndoctor’s right to free speech under the First Amendment. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 882–84. We also hold that the Attorney General, Defendant-Appellant Andrew\\nBeshear, is not a proper party to this case.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n H.B. 2 directs a doctor, prior to performing an abortion, to perform an ultrasound; display\\nthe ultrasound images for the patient; and explain, in the doctor’s own words, what is being\\ndepicted by the images—for example, pointing out organs and whether the patient is pregnant\\nwith twins. KRS § 311.727. There is no requirement that the patient view the images or listen to\\nthe doctor’s description. The doctor also must auscultate the fetal heartbeat but may turn off the\\nvolume of the auscultation if the patient so requests. Id. Failure to comply with these\\nrequirements can result in the doctor being fined and referred to Kentucky’s medical-licensing\\nboard. KRS § 311.990(34). But H.B. 2 does not penalize a doctor if the patient requested that\\nthe heartbeat sound be turned off or chose not to look at the ultrasound images. KRS\\n§ 311.727(3). Nor does H.B. 2 penalize a doctor if she or he exercises discretion to advise a\\n\\n 2Citations to Casey refer to the joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\npatient that she need not listen to or view the disclosures, or if the doctor makes any other\\nstatement, including advising the patient to have an abortion. Finally, a doctor need not make\\nany disclosure from H.B. 2 at all if an abortion is medically necessary or in the case of a medical\\nemergency. KRS § 311.727(5).\\n\\n EMW sued General Beshear, Secretary Glisson, and Michael S. Rodman, who is\\nExecutive Director of the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure. The parties cross-moved for\\nsummary judgment on the complaint’s first claim for relief, styled “First Amendment Rights of\\nPhysicians.” The district court ruled in favor of EMW and, as noted, permanently enjoined\\nenforcement of H.B. 2. Executive Director Rodman does not appeal, but Secretary Meier, as\\nSecretary Glisson’s successor, seeks reversal of the judgment. General Beshear also defends\\nH.B. 2 on appeal but argues that he is not a proper party to this case. We address first whether\\nH.B. 2 violates doctors’ First Amendment rights, then whether General Beshear is appropriately\\nin this suit.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We engage in de novo review of the district court’s summary judgment. McKay v.\\nFederspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2016). “[W]here, as here, the parties filed cross-motions\\nfor summary judgment, ‘the court must evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking\\ncare in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under\\nconsideration.’” Id. at 866 (quoting Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th\\nCir. 1991)). A moving party may obtain summary judgment only if it “shows that there is no\\ngenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\nlaw.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under\\nthe governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).\\n\\n No material facts are in dispute here, so this matter turns on a pure question of law: does\\nH.B. 2 compel a doctor’s speech in violation of the First Amendment?\\n\\n The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see,\\ne.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall\\nmake no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” U.S. Const. amend. I. This constitutional\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\nguarantee, the Supreme Court has held, applies not only when government restricts speech, see,\\ne.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015), but also when it compels speech,\\nsee, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. When laws, whether restrictive or compulsive, “target\\nspeech based on its communicative content,” they generally “are presumptively unconstitutional\\nand may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve\\ncompelling state interests.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226). Such\\ncontent-based restrictions have been declared unconstitutional in compelled-speech cases such as\\nWest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which struck down a\\nrequirement that students salute the United States flag; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977),\\nwhich invalidated a law requiring a state motto “Live Free or Die” on license plates; and Hurley\\nv. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), which held\\nthat a State could not force parade organizers to include a group that would convey a message\\ncontrary to the organizers’ views.\\n\\n Heightened scrutiny generally applies to content-based regulation of any speaker,\\nincluding a physician or other professional. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. But, as the\\nSupreme Court noted in NIFLA, there is “less protection for professional speech in two\\ncircumstances”: first, for “some laws that require professionals to disclose factual,\\nnoncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’”;3 second, for regulation of\\n“professional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech,” id. at 2372 (citing\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 884). The second exception is at issue here because H.B. 2 regulates doctors’\\nconduct: performing abortions.4\\n\\n We review H.B. 2 against the backdrop of thirty-five years of evolving Supreme Court\\nprecedent concerning the constitutionality of abortion-informed-consent statutes. In the 1980s,\\nthe Court invalidated some aspects of these laws. For example, in City of Akron v. Akron Center\\nfor Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (“Akron I”), and Thornburgh v. American\\n\\n 3NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,\\n471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010); Ohralik v.\\nOhio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).\\n 4We do not address whether H.B. 2 falls within the Zauderer/Milzavetz/Ohralik commercial-speech\\nexception.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\nCollege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), the Court struck down state laws\\nrequiring abortion doctors to provide patients with information about the development of unborn\\nlife5 and alternatives to abortion. In Akron I, the Court “invalidated an ordinance which required\\nthat a woman seeking an abortion be provided by her physician with specific information\\n‘designed to influence the woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.’” Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 881 (quoting Akron I, 462 U.S. at 444). The required disclosure included the\\nstatement that “the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception.” Akron I,\\n462 U.S. at 444. That this “information was designed to dissuade the woman from having an\\nabortion,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, was one of “two purported flaws in the Akron ordinance.” Id.\\n(citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762). The other purported flaw was that the Akron I statute\\nmandated “a rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases,\\nirrespective of the particular needs of the patient, [that] intrude[d] upon the discretion of the\\npregnant woman’s physician.” Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.\\nIn Thornburgh, the purported flaw in the Pennsylvania informed-consent statute at issue was that\\nit was “an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth’s message discouraging abortion into\\nthe privacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician,”\\nThornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762—that is, an interference with the doctor-patient relationship.\\n\\n In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court reversed course. In Casey, the Court effectively\\nabrogated the holdings in Akron I and Thornburgh. The Casey joint opinion declared:\\n\\n To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when\\n the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading\\n information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those\\n of childbirth, and the “probable gestational age” of the fetus, those cases go too\\n far, are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in\\n potential life, and are overruled.\\n\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Casey addressed\\ninformed-consent provisions of another Pennsylvania statute that required physicians, among\\nother things, to inform patients orally of the nature of the abortion procedure; its risks and\\nalternatives; the probable gestational age of the unborn life in the patient when the doctors would\\n\\n 5We use the term unborn life consistent with the Supreme Court’s reference to “the life of the unborn,”\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 883. See also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nperform the abortion; and the availability of pamphlets (1) describing unborn life in further\\ndetail, including stages of gestational development, (2) listing agencies offering alternatives to\\nabortion, and (3) giving information about obtaining child support from the unborn life’s father.\\nSee Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 902–03 (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3205(a)); Planned Parenthood\\nof Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that pamphlets described\\nstages of development for unborn life).\\n\\n The Casey plurality reasoned that “a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain\\ninformation as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no\\ndifferent from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical\\nprocedure.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Though the joint opinion acknowledged that “the\\nphysician’s First Amendment rights not to speak” were implicated by the informed-consent\\nstatute, the plurality applied no heightened scrutiny and upheld the statute because a doctor’s\\nrights were implicated “only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing\\nand regulation by the State.” Id. at 884 (citations omitted).\\n\\n Importantly too, in “depart[ing] from the holdings of Akron I and Thornburgh,” the\\nCasey plurality emphasized that a State may “further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of\\nthe unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even\\nwhen in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S.\\nat 883 (emphasis added); see also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972–73 (1997) (per\\ncuriam) (affirming Casey and holding that a statute restricting who could perform abortions that\\nwas drafted by an anti-abortion group had no improper purpose). The plurality instructed that\\ninformed consent to an abortion procedure may mandate disclosure of the “full consequences of”\\nthe abortion decision, including “a requirement that a woman be apprised of the health risks of\\nabortion and childbirth,” as well as “the impact on” or “consequences to the fetus, even when\\nthose consequences have no direct relation to her health.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. As the\\nplurality explained, it cannot “be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem\\nthe impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.” Id. (emphasis added). The\\njoint opinion analogized an informed-consent disclosure of the effect on unborn life to a\\nrequirement that an organ recipient learn the effect on the donor before consenting to the\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\ntransplant: “[w]e would think it constitutional for the State to require that in order for there to be\\ninformed consent to a kidney transplant operation the recipient must be supplied with\\ninformation about risks to the donor as well as risks to himself or herself.” Id. at 882–83.\\n\\n We have long understood Casey as marking a shift toward greater respect for States’\\ninterests in informing women and protecting unborn life. For example, in Women’s Medical\\nProfessional Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003), we affirmed that “[a]n essential feature\\nof the jointly authored opinion in Casey is the reaffirmation of the substantial state interest in\\npotential life throughout pregnancy.” Id. at 443 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, in\\nMemphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 1999), we explained that\\nCasey establishes that States may take steps to ensure that a woman’s choice to abort is\\ninformed:\\n\\n [a] plurality of the justices in Casey recognized the weighty concerns of the state\\n in “the protection of potential life” and reasoned that, although “the woman has a\\n right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not\\n at all follow that the state is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice\\n is thoughtful and informed.”\\n\\nId. at 460–61 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 871–72). In other words, our circuit has recognized\\nthat after Casey there can be no doubt that “a state can require that a doctor give a woman certain\\ninformation before she may have an abortion.” Id. at 465 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\\n\\n Recently, in NIFLA, a majority of the Supreme Court adopted the First Amendment\\nanalysis applied in Casey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373–74. Specifically, the Court explained\\nthat although heightened scrutiny generally applies to content-based regulations of speech,\\n“regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech” receive lower scrutiny. Id.\\nat 2373. The Court acknowledged that “drawing the line between speech and conduct can be\\ndifficult.” Id. But it held that statutes that “facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure,”\\nlike the one at issue in Casey, fall on the conduct side of the line because they regulate speech\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\n“only ‘as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the\\nState.’”6 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\\n\\n In both NIFLA and Casey, then, the Court clarified that the First Amendment has a\\nlimited role to play in allowing doctors to avoid making truthful mandated disclosures related to\\ninformed consent. Under the First Amendment, we will not highly scrutinize an informed-\\nconsent statute, including one involving informed consent to an abortion, so long as it meets\\nthese three requirements: (1) it must relate to a medical procedure; (2) it must be truthful and not\\nmisleading; and (3) it must be relevant to the patient’s decision whether to undertake the\\nprocedure, which may include, in the abortion context, information relevant to the woman’s\\nhealth risks, as well as the impact on the unborn life. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 882.\\n\\n Although much of the analysis in Casey addressed the plaintiffs’ undue-burden claim, the\\njoint opinion’s First Amendment holding built upon its conclusion that the mandated informed-\\nconsent disclosures in that case met the criteria of being truthful, non-misleading, and relevant.\\nContrary to the Dissent’s suggestion that we have “focused on the wrong provision of the\\nConstitution,” Dissent at 38, indeed we do address the relevant provision—the First Amendment.\\nCasey and NIFLA recognize that First Amendment heightened scrutiny does not apply to\\nincidental regulation of professional speech that is part of the practice of medicine and that such\\nincidental regulation includes mandated informed-consent requirements, provided that the\\ndisclosures are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–84; NIFLA,\\n138 S. Ct at 2373. Casey also recognizes that, as part of informed consent for an abortion,\\npermissible mandated disclosures under the First Amendment may pertain to the effect of the\\nprocedure on unborn life. 505 U.S. at 882. And in NIFLA, the Court explicitly reaffirmed that\\nheightened scrutiny is not appropriate under the First Amendment for informed-consent\\n\\n\\n 6The Court went on in NIFLA to declare unconstitutional a California statute requiring crisis pregnancy\\ncenters to disclose that the State offered abortion services, among other things. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368–70.\\nIn so doing, the Court distinguished the California statute from the Pennsylvania law upheld in Casey because the\\nnotice at issue under the California statute was not an informed-consent law: it “provide[d] no information about the\\nrisks or benefits of [medical] procedures.” Id. at 2373. Because the regulation “at issue [in NIFLA] [was] not an\\ninformed-consent requirement [like in Casey] or any other regulation of professional conduct,” the Court applied\\nheightened scrutiny and held that the California law likely violated the First Amendment. Id. at 2373, 2375.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\nrequirements of the nature upheld in Casey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373, 2375.7 We therefore\\nare applying Casey and NIFLA as they directly pertain to the First Amendment claim and not to\\nany undue-burden claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n This First Amendment appeal, thus, turns on whether H.B. 2 shares the same material\\nattributes as the informed-consent statute in Casey. If it does, then no heightened First\\nAmendment scrutiny applies because, as NIFLA instructed, an informed-consent law like the\\nCasey statute is a regulation of professional conduct that only incidentally burdens professional\\nspeech. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.\\n\\n Does H.B. 2 relate to a medical procedure? Yes—abortion. Are the mandated\\ndisclosures truthful and not misleading? Yes—no one argues that the heartbeat, sonogram, or its\\ndescription is false or misleading. We have previously held that similar information conveys\\nobjective medical facts. For example, in United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2018),\\nwe explained that “it would be an insult to common sense and the practice of medicine to say\\nthat [the doctor] was not measuring facts (or attempting to do so) when he conducted the\\nangiograms at issue” in that case. Id. at 276. Similarly, we explained in Discount Tobacco City\\n& Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2011), that anatomical pictures convey\\nfacts:\\n\\n Students in biology, human-anatomy, and medical-school courses look at\\n pictures or drawings in textbooks of both healthy and damaged cells, tissues,\\n organs, organ systems, and humans because those pictures convey factual\\n information about medical conditions and biological systems. The argument that\\n a picture of a specific person or part of a person is opinion because not every\\n person or part of a person with that condition would appear the same way is\\n unpersuasive. . . . People with the same illness can and often will suffer a variety\\n of differing symptoms. But one wouldn’t say that a list of symptoms\\n\\n\\n 7The dissenters in NIFLA also recognized this key attribute of Casey’s holding. See 138 S. Ct. at 2385\\n(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the [Casey] Court considered the State’s statutory requirements, including that the\\ndoctor must inform his patient about where she could learn how to have the newborn child adopted (if carried to\\nterm) and how she could find related financial assistance. To repeat the point, [Casey] held that the State’s\\nrequirements did not violate the Constitution’s protection of free speech or its protection of a woman’s right to\\nchoose to have an abortion.” (citation omitted)).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n characterizing a particular medical condition is nonfactual and opinion-based as a\\n result.\\n\\nId. at 559 (footnote omitted). So, “[t]o belabor the obvious and conceded point,” the disclosures\\nof the heartbeat, sonogram, and its description “are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading\\ninformation.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577–78.\\n\\n That leaves the final question: are the mandated disclosures relevant to the patient’s\\ndecision whether to abort unborn life? The Supreme Court’s abortion precedent answers this\\nquestion for us.\\n\\n “Abortion is a unique act,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, that “requires a difficult and painful\\nmoral decision,” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). It is “fraught with\\nconsequences . . . for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision.” Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 852. “[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their\\nchoice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of\\nesteem can follow.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (citations omitted). Abortion also is “fraught\\nwith consequences . . . for the life or potential life that is aborted,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, in\\nwhom the State may have a significant interest, Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158, and who cannot\\nconsent to the procedure to terminate her or his life or potential life. Thus, the Supreme Court\\nhas explained that the effect of an abortion procedure on unborn life is “relevant, if not\\ndispositive” information for the patient’s decision. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added).\\n\\n With this background in mind, we hold that H.B. 2 provides relevant information. The\\ninformation conveyed by an ultrasound image, its description, and the audible beating fetal heart\\ngives a patient greater knowledge of the unborn life inside her. This also inherently provides the\\npatient with more knowledge about the effect of an abortion procedure: it shows her what, or\\nwhom, she is consenting to terminate. That this information might persuade a woman to change\\nher mind does not render it suspect under the First Amendment. It just means that it is pertinent\\nto her decision-making. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (explaining that information on abortion’s\\nimpact on unborn life “furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may\\nelect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her\\ndecision was not fully informed”).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 12\\n\\n\\n The prevalence of ultrasound-use in pregnancy also underscores the relevance of the\\nmandated sonogram of H.B. 2 to a woman’s abortion decision. Ultrasounds are ubiquitous\\nprocedures that are a part of every pregnancy and, EMW concedes, every abortion. Oral Arg. at\\n23:53–24:10; R. 3-3, PageID 111, 112–13. Indeed, ultrasounds are “routine measures in\\npregnancy [and] viewed as ‘medically necessary’ for the mother and fetus.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at\\n579. The physical invasiveness of the sonogram, as noted by the Dissent, see Dissent at 35, 46\\nn.9, therefore, is no reason to characterize the procedure as an unwarranted invasion of bodily\\nintegrity; indeed, the Dissent cites authority “finding that up to 98% of U.S. abortion facilities\\nuse an ultrasound to date the pregnancy,” id. at 46. Also, Kentucky is hardly alone among the\\nStates in finding ultrasounds to be relevant: according to amici, twenty-four other States have\\nenacted informed-consent laws that involve ultrasounds.8\\n\\n Although Casey did not involve the displaying of an ultrasound, its facts are not “a\\nconstitutional ceiling for regulation of informed consent to abortion, [but] a set of principles to\\nbe applied to the states’ legislative decisions.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at 579. The Casey statute\\nrequired doctors to inform patients of the unborn life’s gestational age and offer them materials\\nfurther describing unborn life’s development at a given gestational age. See Casey, 505 U.S. at\\n881, 902; Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575 n.2, 578; Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1349. The sonogram\\nrequirements of H.B. 2 provide “materially identical” information. See A Woman’s Choice–East\\nSide Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding informed-\\nconsent law requiring abortion doctors to offer pictures, drawings, and dimensions of the unborn\\n\\n\\n 8Three of them track more closely with H.B. 2 and require physicians to perform, display, and describe\\nultrasounds before an abortion. La. Stat. § 40:1061.10(D), invalidated by June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F.\\nSupp. 3d 27, 30 (M.D. La. 2017) (holding statute was an undue burden), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. LLC v.\\nGee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018); Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.012(a)(4); Wis. Stat. § 253.10. Seven require\\ndoctors to perform ultrasounds and offer patients the chance to view them. Ala. Code § 26-23A-6; Ariz. Rev. Stat.\\n§ 36-2156; Fla. Stat. § 390.0111; Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1.1; Iowa Code § 146A.1, invalidated by Planned Parenthood\\nof Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 N.W.2d 206, 212 (Iowa 2018) (holding 72-hour waiting period was an\\nundue burden); Miss. Code § 41-41-34; Va. Code § 18.2-76. Ten require doctors to offer the patient the chance to\\nview the ultrasound image if they perform one. Ark. Code § 20-16-602; Ga. Code § 31-9A-3; Idaho Code § 18-609;\\nKan. Stat. § 65-6709; Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.17015; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-327 (requiring doctors to display the\\nsonogram “so that the woman may choose to view [it]”); Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.561; S.C. Code § 44-41-330; Utah\\nCode § 76-7-305 (requiring doctors to display the sonogram “to permit the woman . . . to view the images, if she\\nchooses to”); W. Va. Code § 16-2I-2. Four require doctors to offer women the chance to view—and thus receive—\\nan ultrasound. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.027; N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-04; S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-52; Wyo.\\nStat. § 35-6-119.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 13\\n\\n\\nlife within patients was “materially identical” to the Casey statute’s requirements); see also\\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 578 (explaining that disclosures like those in H.B. 2 “are not different in\\nkind” than the disclosures in Casey). A sonogram depicts unborn life in further detail at the\\ncurrent gestational age—information no less relevant to the patient’s decision than were the\\nmaterials at issue in Casey. In fact, because of its individualized nature, a sonogram provides\\neven more relevant information for the patient’s decision than any of the required materials at\\nissue in Casey. Whereas the Pennsylvania law provided information about unborn life generally,\\nH.B. 2 directs that the patient receive specific, real-time images of herself and the unborn life\\nwithin her.9 H.B. 2 also allows the doctor to explain, in her or his own words, the sonogram, as\\nwell as the auscultation, thus further ensuring that the information is tailored to the patient’s\\nspecific circumstances.\\n\\n Sonograms of unborn life were uncommon when Roe was decided. Writing for the Roe\\nCourt, Justice Blackmun was limited by words on paper—sometimes using medieval\\ndescriptions such as “quickening” or “infused with a ‘soul’ or ‘animated’”—to explain when life\\nhad been understood to come into being. Roe, 410 U.S. at 133. But in the Cyber Age,10 words\\ntell only part of a story. For today’s Posterity11—the Gen-X, Millennial, and Gen-Z generations,\\nwhose first picture of themselves commonly comes from a sonogram, and who increasingly turn\\nto photos and videos to share information12—one can hardly dispute the relevance of sonogram\\nimages for twenty-first-century informed consent.\\n\\n\\n\\n 9Contrary to EMW’s assertion at oral argument, the information’s pictorial medium fails to take H.B. 2 out\\nof the realm of informed consent. See A Woman’s Choice–East Side Women’s Clinic, 305 F.3d at 684–85; see also\\nF. Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment: A Practical Guide 2-82 (5th ed. 2018) (discussing the use of videos, pictures,\\nand slides to obtain informed consent). This means of sharing information simply is more scientifically up to date.\\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 578.\\n 10See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (explaining “that the Cyber Age is a\\nrevolution of historic proportions [and that] we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter\\nhow we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be” (emphasis added)); see also South Dakota v.\\nWayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018) (discussing the Cyber Age).\\n 11U.S. Const. pmbl.\\n 12See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, While We Weren’t Looking, Snapchat Revolutionized Social Networks, N.Y.\\nTimes (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www nytimes.com/2016/11/30/technology/while-we-werent-looking-snapchat-\\nrevolutionized-social-networks.html.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 14\\n\\n\\n Under the lower level of scrutiny mandated by Casey and NIFLA, there is no burden\\nplaced on the State to justify that its prior regulation “was defective in facilitating informed\\nconsent” or that “H.B. 2 filled any gaps in existing informed-consent legislation,” as the Dissent\\napparently believes the State must show, see Dissent at 48, 52. No such requirements were\\nimposed on Pennsylvania to justify its statute in Casey. But even if the Commonwealth bore\\nsuch a burden, it would easily meet it here. It is not difficult to conclude that the particularized\\nvisual and audible disclosures mandated by H.B. 2 provide more relevant information for\\ninformed consent than was provided by the less patient-specific, verbal and written disclosures of\\nthe earlier Kentucky abortion-informed-consent statute, KRS § 311.725.\\n\\n In sum, H.B. 2, like the Pennsylvania statute in Casey, provides truthful, non-misleading,\\nand relevant information aimed at informing a patient about her decision to abort unborn life.\\nTherefore, although the statute requires doctors to disclose certain truthful and non-misleading\\ninformation relevant to the abortion procedure, it does not violate their First Amendment rights\\nbecause the required disclosures are incidental to the Commonwealth’s regulation of doctors’\\nprofessional conduct.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n This result is in line with two other circuits that have faced First Amendment challenges\\nto similar abortion-informed-consent statutes. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits read Casey, as well\\nas Gonzales, to establish the same First Amendment test for truthful, non-misleading, and\\nrelevant informed-consent disclosures that we apply here.\\n\\n In Lakey, the Fifth Circuit addressed a Texas informed-consent statute requiring the\\nperformance, display, and description of an ultrasound as well as the auscultation of the unborn\\nlife’s heartbeat. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 574\\n(5th Cir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge to the statute,\\nexplaining that Casey upheld the constitutionality of informed-consent laws that require\\ndisclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information, including facts about the unborn\\nlife, with no heightened scrutiny applying to such laws:\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 15\\n\\n\\n First, informed consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on the woman’s\\n right to have an abortion are permissible if they require truthful, non-misleading,\\n and relevant disclosures. Second, such laws are part of the state’s reasonable\\n regulation of medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of compelling\\n “ideological” speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny. Third,\\n “relevant” informed consent may entail not only the physical and psychological\\n risks to the expectant mother facing this “difficult moral decision,” but also the\\n state’s legitimate interests in “protecting the potential life within her.”\\n\\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 576 (footnote omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 871).\\n\\n Applying this understanding of Casey, the Fifth Circuit held that requirements that\\ndoctors perform, display, and describe the ultrasound and auscultate the heartbeat—though more\\ntechnologically advanced than the mandated disclosure that Casey allowed—were the “epitome”\\nof truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information that Casey permits:\\n\\n To belabor the obvious and conceded point, the required disclosures of a\\n sonogram, the fetal heartbeat, and their medical descriptions are the epitome of\\n truthful, non-misleading information. They are not different in kind, although\\n more graphic and scientifically up-to-date, than the disclosures discussed in\\n Casey—probable gestational age of the fetus and printed material showing a\\n baby’s general prenatal development stages. Likewise, the relevance of these\\n disclosures to securing informed consent is sustained by Casey and Gonzales,\\n because both cases allow the state to regulate medical practice by deciding that\\n information about fetal development is “relevant” to a woman’s decision-making.\\n\\nId. at 577–78 (emphasis added).\\n\\n Because the Texas statute at issue in Lakey satisfied the criteria for an abortion-informed-\\nconsent statute (that is, the statute mandated only truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\\ndisclosures related to an abortion), the Fifth Circuit determined that no heightened scrutiny of the\\nstatute was warranted under Casey and reversed the district court’s determination otherwise:\\n\\n The [Casey] plurality response to the compelled speech claim is clearly\\n not a strict scrutiny analysis. It inquires into neither compelling interests nor\\n narrow tailoring. The three sentences with which the Court disposed of the First\\n Amendment claims are, if anything, the antithesis of strict scrutiny. Indeed, the\\n plurality references Whalen v. Roe, in which the Court had upheld a regulation of\\n medical practice against a right to privacy challenge. The only reasonable reading\\n of Casey’s passage is that physicians’ rights not to speak are, when part of the\\n practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 16\\n\\n\\n This applies to information that is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant . . . to the\\n decision to undergo an abortion.\\n ....\\n\\n Applying to [the statute] the principles of Casey’s plurality, the most\\n reasonable conclusion is to uphold the provisions declared as unconstitutional\\n compelled speech by the district court.\\n\\nId. at 575, 577 (cleaned up).\\n\\n When faced with an analogous issue, the Eighth Circuit read the Supreme Court’s\\nprecedent similarly. The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Rounds involved a South Dakota informed-\\nconsent statute. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.\\n2008) (en banc). The statute required physicians to give patients a written statement providing,\\namong other things, “[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique,\\nliving human being,” “[t]hat the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with that unborn\\nhuman being and that the relationship enjoys protection under the United States Constitution and\\nthe laws of South Dakota,” “[t]hat by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her\\nexisting constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be terminated,” and “[a]\\ndescription of all known medical risks of the procedure . . . including . . . [d]epression and related\\npsychological distress [and] [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.” Id. The statute\\ndefined “Human being” as “an individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens,\\nincluding the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization\\nto full gestation.” Id. at 727. The statute further required physicians to certify in writing that\\nthey provided all this information to the patients. Id. Also, the patients had to sign a written\\nstatement showing that the abortion doctors had complied with the statute’s disclosure\\nrequirements and provided them with the required information. Id.\\n\\n Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit explained that Supreme Court precedent likely allowed\\nthe statute to stand because it mandated the doctor provide only “truthful, non-misleading\\ninformation relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion”:\\n\\n Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an\\n individual simply to speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its\\n regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 17\\n\\n\\n information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that\\n information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.\\n Therefore, Planned Parenthood cannot succeed on the merits of its claim that [the\\n statute] violates a physician’s right not to speak unless it can show that the\\n disclosure is either untruthful, misleading or not relevant to the patient’s decision\\n to have an abortion.\\n\\nId. at 734–35. Because Planned Parenthood’s evidence did not establish a likelihood of proving\\nthat the statute required “anything but truthful, non-misleading and relevant [information] to the\\npatient’s decision to have an abortion,” the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary\\ninjunction. Id. at 738.\\n\\n The Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretations of Casey support our holding today. Like\\nthe statutes in those circuits’ cases, H.B. 2 provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\\ninformation for a decision whether to abort unborn life. Like these other circuits, we find no\\nFirst Amendment infirmity.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n In challenging H.B. 2, EMW echoes Planned Parenthood’s unsuccessful arguments in\\nCasey. EMW contends that H.B. 2 warrants heightened scrutiny because it (1) compels\\nideological speech, (2) interferes with the doctor-patient relationship, and (3) emotionally affects\\npatients.\\n\\n Ideological Speech. Casey forecloses EMW’s attempt to invoke heightened scrutiny by\\nclaiming that H.B. 2 requires the doctors to engage in ideological speech. The statute in Casey\\nrequired doctors to disclose facts about the abortion procedure, the unborn life within a patient,\\nand options available to a patient if she carried that life to term. Planned Parenthood argued that\\nthe statute mandated ideological speech that warranted heighted scrutiny. Brief of Petitioners\\nand Cross-Respondents, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No. 91-744), 1992 WL 12006398 at *54\\n(“Casey Br.”). The Casey plurality acknowledged that the disclosure requirements were targeted\\nat causing patients to “choose childbirth over abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. Yet, the\\nplurality applied no heightened scrutiny to Pennsylvania’s statute because of the alleged\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 18\\n\\n\\nideological nature of the required disclosures. So Casey rejected EMW’s rationale for applying\\nheightened scrutiny.13\\n\\n The Fourth Circuit, however, disagreed that Casey forecloses the ideological argument.\\nIn Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), decided before NIFLA, the Fourth Circuit\\nstruck down as compelled ideological speech a North Carolina statute similar to H.B. 2. Id. at\\n246, 255–56. We decline to follow Stuart, however, because it gave insufficient regard to the\\nFirst Amendment analysis in Casey that the Court clarified and adopted as the majority view in\\nNIFLA.\\n\\n Stuart’s basis for applying heightened scrutiny is called into question by Supreme Court\\nprecedent. Stuart applied heightened scrutiny because the facts disclosed by a sonogram have\\n“moral or ideological implications.” Id. at 246. However, the “moral or ideological” label has\\nnot been used by the Supreme Court as a reason to apply heightened scrutiny to mandated factual\\ndisclosures in the informed-consent context. Nor has the Supreme Court considered on what\\n“side of the abortion debate” required factual disclosures fall in deciding the level of scrutiny to\\napply to abortion-informed-consent laws, as did the Fourth Circuit, see id.14 And unlike the\\nFourth Circuit, the Supreme Court has not been concerned that facts might “convey[] a particular\\nopinion” like “convinc[ing] women seeking abortions to change their minds.” Id.\\n\\n\\n 13Contrary to what the Dissent maintains, a State is entitled to regulate informed consent with respect to\\nthe abortion even when it has a political “goal” to protect unborn life. See Dissent at 53. The Casey joint opinion\\nmade that point clear when it allowed for mandated disclosures intended by the State to further its “profound interest\\nin potential life” and “to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.” See 505 U.S. at 878 (“To promote\\nthe State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the\\nwoman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their\\npurpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”).\\n 14It is not at all clear that the facts mandated to be disclosed by an H.B. 2 sonogram fall on only one side of\\nthe abortion debate. For example, abortions are increasingly sought to terminate lives likely to be born with\\ndisabilities. See Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (granting a preliminary\\ninjunction against an Ohio law criminalizing abortions performed because of fetal indication of Down Syndrome),\\nappeal docketed, No. 18-3329 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 2018); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind.\\nState Dep’t of Health, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (granting a permanent injunction against a similar law),\\naff’d, 888 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3172 (Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 18-483); Julian\\nQuinones & Arijeta Lajka, “What Kind of Society Do You Want to Live In?”: Inside the Country Where Down\\nSyndrome is Disappearing, CBS News (Aug. 14, 2007, 4:00 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/down-syndrome-\\niceland/?linkId=40953194. An ultrasound showing the likelihood of a disability could be interpreted by some\\npeople, but not all, as a reason to have an abortion.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 19\\n\\n\\n Instead, under Casey, what matters for First Amendment purposes is whether the\\ndisclosed facts are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the procedure, not whether they fall\\non one side of the debate, and not whether they influence a woman to keep the child. Casey, 505\\nU.S. at 882–84; see also Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575–77; Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35. In Stuart the\\nFourth Circuit tried to distinguish Casey by reasoning that the Casey statute was not ideological:\\n“[i]nforming a patient that there are state-issued materials available is not ideological, because\\nthe viewpoint conveyed by the pamphlet is clearly the state’s—not the physician’s.” Stuart,\\n774 F.3d at 253. But the same is true here. H.B. 2 allows doctors to tell patients that the\\nCommonwealth requires this information. The record shows that’s exactly what they do. R. 55,\\nPageID 699. Thus, the doctors are just as free as those subject to the statute in Casey to clarify\\nthat the mandated disclosures come from the State not the doctors themselves.\\n\\n After holding that the North Carolina statute compelled ideological speech, the Fourth\\nCircuit in Stuart adopted a “sliding-scale” test first applied by the Ninth Circuit in Pickup v.\\nBrown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–29 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding professional speech is viewed “along a\\ncontinuum”). The Fourth Circuit then asserted the statute “reside[d] somewhere in the middle on\\nthat sliding scale” because it regulated medical treatment but also regulated speech, Stuart,\\n774 F.3d at 248, thus justifying intermediate scrutiny, id. at 249. This “sliding scale” test based\\non ideological speech, however, appeared nowhere in Casey.\\n\\n Nor did this test appear in NIFLA. In fact, the NIFLA Court, after citing the Ninth Circuit\\nin Pickup as an example of “[s]ome Courts of Appeals” that “have recognized ‘professional\\nspeech’ as a separate category of speech that is subject to different rules,” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at\\n2371, did not adopt any of the “different rules” applied in Pickup. Instead, the Court explained\\nthat, generally, it is the compulsion of a message—not whether the compulsion is of an\\nideological nature—that alters the content of speech and therefore dictates a single heightened-\\nscrutiny standard, with no sliding scale. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. However, as discussed,\\nthe Supreme Court explicitly carved out two exceptions to that general test that do not call for\\nheightened scrutiny. As also already explained, H.B. 2 falls into at least one of those exceptions.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 20\\n\\n\\n We therefore find that Stuart is unpersuasive in light of NIFLA, and we decline to follow\\nthe Fourth Circuit.15 If at least one of the two exceptions noted in NIFLA applies, there is no\\nSupreme Court authority for looking to whether the speech has ideological implications and\\napplying a “sliding scale” that may result in intermediate scrutiny.\\n\\n Doctor-Patient Relationship. As for EMW’s second argument, H.B. 2 does not interfere\\nwith the doctor-patient relationship any more than other informed-consent laws. “[I]nformed\\nconsent is generally required for medical treatment,” Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department\\nof Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990), and this requirement “is firmly entrenched in American tort\\nlaw,” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he\\ncommon-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a\\ncompetent individual to refuse medical treatment.” Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277. This right,\\ngrounded in principles of self-determination, may “demand[] a standard set by law for physicians\\nrather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.” Canterbury v.\\nSpence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasis added); see F. Rozovsky, Consent to\\nTreatment: A Practical Guide 2-8 (5th ed. 2018) (explaining that informed-consent standards are\\nset by “state legislation, regulations, and case law” in addition to standards among professional\\ngroups).16 “[T]o safeguard the patient’s interest in achieving [her or] his own determination on\\ntreatment, the law must itself set the standard for adequate disclosure.” Canterbury, 464 F.2d at\\n787.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15The district court also relied largely on Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir.\\n2017) (en banc), which invalidated a Florida law restricting doctors from asking patients about gun ownership in\\npart because of concerns over interrupting the flow of information between doctor and patient. Id. at 1313. Those\\nconcerns are not present here: H.B. 2 serves to increase the flow of information between doctor and patient. Also,\\nunlike the statute in Wollschlaeger, H.B. 2 restricts no speech that the doctor wishes to impart to the patient. More\\nimportant, however, Wollschlaeger did not involve patients’ informed consent.\\n 16The Supreme Court has cited earlier editions of this treatise. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 21\\n\\n\\n The principle that informed-consent requirements may be created by law, as opposed to\\nmerely medical-profession custom, applies to all medical procedures, including abortion. As the\\nSupreme Court has instructed, “an informed-consent requirement in the abortion context [is] ‘no\\ndifferent from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical\\nprocedure.’” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\\n“The law need not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical practice,\\nnor should it elevate their status above other physicians in the medical community.” Id. As part\\nof States’ regulation of the medical profession, they may require doctors to provide information\\nto their patients to ensure patients can give their informed consent for an abortion, like for any\\nother medical procedure. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.\\n\\n The district court cited testimony that the mandated disclosures of H.B. 2 are inconsistent\\nwith medical standards because (1) their mandatory nature—that is, the Commonwealth’s\\nrequiring their actual disclosure rather than requiring their being offered to be disclosed—makes\\nthem contrary to the customary standard of care for informed consent, and (2) they provide\\ninformation that the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) and the\\nNational Abortion Federation do not consider to be necessary for informed consent. See EMW\\nWomen’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 644.\\n\\n As for the first point, most legally enacted informed-consent disclosures could be subject\\nto the same criticism because they require the doctor to disclose, rather than simply offer to\\ndisclose, information.17 The Casey plurality explained that States can require doctors to give\\ninformation to patients about abortion just like it can require doctors to give information to an\\norgan donor about that procedure. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. Also, the very reason that the\\nrequired disclosure in NIFLA did “not facilitate informed consent” was because it provided no\\ninformation about the risks or benefits of a medical procedure. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. In\\nother words, the doctrine of informed consent does not stop at offering the opportunity for the\\n\\n 17For example, other Kentucky informed-consent and physician-disclosure requirements require\\ninformation actually to be given when (1) diagnosing and treating breast cancer, KRS § 311.935; (2) performing\\nacupuncture, KRS § 311.678; (3) testing for HIV infection, KRS § 214.625; and (4) performing mammograms,\\nKRS § 214.555. An example of this at the federal level is 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.257–.258, which requires medical\\nproviders actually disclose—not just offer to disclose—the risks, benefits, and alternatives of sterilization\\nprocedures to ensure a patient’s informed consent to be sterilized.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 22\\n\\n\\ninformation. It applies equally when a doctor must actually disclose the information. True, for\\nsome information, the Casey statute required doctors to inform patients that it was available. See\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 881. But it also mandated information actually be given to patients. Id.\\nH.B. 2 is no different.18\\n\\n The second point considered significant by the district court—certain medical groups’\\nviews regarding whether a particular mandated truthful disclosure is necessary for informed\\nconsent—is not the type of evidence deemed material by the Supreme Court in reviewing\\nabortion-informed-consent statutes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld abortion regulations\\nthat were directly contrary to alleged medical-profession custom and that certain medical groups\\ndid not consider to be necessary—laws that those groups asserted were inconsistent with\\naccepted standards of care for informed consent. For example, in Casey, the district court found\\nthat “[t]he informed consent requirements of the [Pennsylvania law] represent a substantial\\ndeparture from the ordinary medical requirements of informed consent,” Casey, 744 F. Supp. at\\n1351; that “[c]ontent-based informed consent is contrary to the standard medical practice that\\ninformed consent be specifically tailored to the needs of the specific patient,” id. at 1353; and\\nthat various provisions of the Pennsylvania law conflicted with official positions of ACOG and\\nthe American Public Health Association, see id. at 1351–52, 1355, 1360. Still, the Supreme\\nCourt in Casey upheld the law’s informed-consent requirements. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.\\n\\n Similarly, in Gonzales, the Court upheld a statute prohibiting a form of partial-birth\\nabortions, despite the district court’s factual findings that the law was contrary to certain\\nmedical-profession views, including that ACOG “told Congress several times that the procedure\\n\\n 18The district court’s first point also overlooks that H.B. 2 allows patients to decline to receive the\\ninformation, by not viewing the sonogram or listening to the verbal disclosures, and asking the doctors to turn off\\nthe heartbeat. In fact, that H.B. 2 provides patients with the choice not to receive the information is the very reason\\nthe district court held that H.B. 2 does not go far enough to meet Kentucky’s goal of informing the patients. EMW\\nWomen’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 645–46. In other words, according to the district court, if the Kentucky\\nlegislature wished to better inform patients about their abortion procedure, it should have required the patients\\nreceive the information, rather than allowing them to choose not to do so. We disagree with this conclusion. That\\nH.B. 2 allows women to avoid receiving the disclosures does not detract from the statute’s purpose to better inform;\\nit merely reflects the Commonwealth’s recognition that, ultimately, it is the woman’s choice as to whether to\\nconsider those disclosures in making her decision. And even if the disclosures do not change many minds, either\\nbecause some patients are not persuaded by them or because some patients ignore them, the Commonwealth still is\\nentitled under Casey to require doctors to provide them. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–84; Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575–77;\\nRounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 23\\n\\n\\nshould not be banned,” Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1011 (D. Neb. 2004), and “that\\nCongress’[s] Finding—that a medical consensus supports the ban because partial-birth abortions\\nare unnecessary—is both unreasonable and not supported by substantial evidence,” id. at 1015.\\n\\n If the validity of an informed-consent law depended on whether doctors agreed with the\\nlaw—or whether the law required disclosures that, with no law, the doctor would disclose\\nanyway—there would be no need for the law to supplement custom. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d\\nat 784 (“[T]o bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to arrogate the decision on\\nrevelation to the physician alone.”). As Casey and Gonzales establish, the constitutionality of an\\nabortion regulation is based on the relevant legal standard as interpreted by the Supreme Court—\\nhere, whether the mandated disclosures are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the medical\\nprocedure—and not necessarily whether the law is consistent with medical-profession custom or\\nviews of certain medical groups.\\n\\n The Dissent, therefore, is mistaken to argue that we “must naturally turn to the medical\\ncommunity” to ascertain the “contours of informed consent” to determine whether a regulation is\\nin accord with “medical practice” or “medical purpose.” Dissent at 37. Following that approach\\nwould require us, in effect, to hold that a State must surrender its authority to regulate informed\\nconsent to private parties. This method, however, would conflict with the Court’s recognition in\\nGonzales that the State may regulate informed consent in the abortion context in the same way\\nthat it regulates informed consent in other medical contexts. See 550 U.S. at 163. The validity\\nof this regulation does not turn on what any private party claims is the norm for the practice of\\nmedicine. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784, 787. Instead, we defer to the legislature’s\\ndetermination of which informed-consent disclosures are required, provided that they are\\nrelevant, truthful, and non-misleading. This deference does not make our court a player in policy\\nmaking, as the Dissent contends, see Dissent at 44, but rather preserves our role as umpires who\\napply the rules enacted by the People’s representatives. If the medical groups cited by the\\nDissent want the legislated rules of informed consent to change, they should address their\\narguments to those elected representatives. Casey makes clear, however, that the Dissent is\\nincorrect to contend that opposition by medical groups to informed-consent rules necessarily\\nrenders those rules invalid under the First Amendment.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 24\\n\\n\\n The reasoning in Casey also shows that H.B. 2 does not impermissibly infringe on\\nabortion doctors’ autonomy. Indeed, as noted, the Casey plurality overruled the Court’s earlier\\nholdings that requiring doctors to give certain information to all patients impermissibly intruded\\nupon doctors’ discretion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881; Thornburgh v. American Coll. of\\nObstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986).\\n\\n To be sure, H.B. 2 does require the disclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\\nfacts that otherwise the doctor might not disclose. However, to the extent that it matters to the\\nFirst Amendment analysis,19 nothing prevents the doctor from informing the patient that the\\nfactual disclosures of H.B.2 are required by the Commonwealth rather than made by the doctor’s\\nchoice. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (rejecting argument that\\nregulations abridged free-speech rights of the grantee’s staff and noting that “[n]othing in [the\\nregulations] requires a doctor to represent as [her or] his own any opinion that [she or] he does\\nnot in fact hold”); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 1994)\\n(upholding abortion-informed-consent statute and observing that it allowed doctors to\\n“disassociate themselves” from the required information).\\n\\n It is also true that H.B. 2 differs from the Pennsylvania statute in Casey in that H.B. 2\\ndoes not have an express provision, as did the Casey statute, excusing a doctor from providing\\nthe mandated disclosure “if he or she can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that\\nhe or she reasonably believed that furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely\\nadverse effect on the physical or mental health of the patient.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84.\\nAlthough the Casey joint opinion noted this statutory provision in the context of discussing “a\\nconstitutional right of privacy between a pregnant woman and her physician,” id. at 883, there is\\nno indication that the plurality considered the provision to be significant for its First Amendment\\nreview. To the extent that it was, we also must consider that a doctor need not comply with H.B.\\n2 if an abortion is medically necessary or in the case of a medical emergency, KRS § 311.727(5),\\nand H.B. 2 has other provisions not contained in the Casey statute that effectively give the doctor\\nthe same discretion afforded to doctors under the Casey statute. For example, unlike the Casey\\n\\n 19See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 737 (concluding doctor’s ability to disassociate herself or himself from\\ndisclosures is irrelevant to the compelled-speech analysis if disclosures are truthful and non-misleading).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 25\\n\\n\\nstatute, H.B. 2 imposes no obligation that the patient certify in writing that she has received\\ncertain mandated disclosures, see id. at 881, or even requires that the patient pay attention to the\\ndisclosures, and it imposes no penalty on the doctor if the patient ignores the disclosures the\\ndoctor is making, see KRS § 311.727(3). These provisions operate to allow a doctor who\\nreasonably believes that the disclosures would result in a severely adverse effect on the patient,\\nto inform the patient in the doctor’s discretion that she need not listen to or view the disclosures.\\n\\n Furthermore, H.B. 2 restricts no doctor from advising the patient to keep or abort the\\nunborn life displayed or from providing any other opinion, medical or otherwise, that the doctor\\nwishes to convey. See generally Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th\\nCir. 2017) (en banc) (“Importantly, however, the law [at issue in other cases] did not restrict\\nwhat the practitioner could say or recommend to a patient or client.” (emphasis added)). Indeed,\\nthe statute contains nothing that would prevent a doctor in her or his discretion from advocating\\nto the patient in favor of an abortion.\\n\\n Given these considerations, the requirements of H.B. 2 are no more of a regulation that\\ndeparted from a medical group’s definition of medical practice than the abortion-informed-\\nconsent law upheld in Casey and no more of a regulation of professional speech than many\\ninformed-consent and physician-disclosure laws enacted by Kentucky, other States, and the\\nfederal government.20\\n\\n Emotional Effect on Patients. As for EMW’s third argument—that the emotional effect\\nof H.B. 2 on patients warrants heightened scrutiny—Casey again is instructive. In that case, the\\ndistrict court accepted Planned Parenthood’s similar argument and held that the Pennsylvania\\ninformed-consent statute did not survive heightened scrutiny because the mandated information\\n“will create the impression in women that the Commonwealth disapproves of the woman’s\\ndecision” and “will create undesirable and unnecessary anxiety, anguish and fear.” Casey,\\n744 F. Supp. at 1354. In this regard, the district court’s factual finding in Casey was like the\\ndistrict court’s finding here, based on evidence cited by the Dissent, see Dissent at 49–50, that\\n\\n 20See supra note 17. Other examples of Kentucky mandating speech in the health-care context occur when\\n(1) reporting tuberculosis, KRS § 215.590; (2) reporting abuse of adults and dependents, KRS §§ 209.030, 620.030;\\n(3) displaying licenses, KRS § 311.470; and, of course, (4) performing an abortion, KRS §§ 311.725, 311.727.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 26\\n\\n\\n“H.B. 2 causes patients distress.” EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 645. We\\nrecognize the significance of the district court’s finding regarding the negative emotional effect\\non certain patients, as well as its acknowledgment of declarations from several women who had\\nundergone abortions and who stated that the mandated disclosures of H.B. 2 would have had a\\npositive impact on their emotional health by persuading them not to have an abortion. R. 32-3,\\nPageID 406–08; R. 32-4, PageID 410; R. 32-5, PageID 412–14. However, for purposes of this\\nsummary judgment determination, we need not and should not weigh the competing evidence of\\nemotional effect, as the district court and Dissent appear to do.21 Instead, the Casey plurality did\\nnot view any finding regarding emotional effect as material to the level of First Amendment\\nscrutiny of an informed-consent statute. Although the Casey district court’s finding as to\\nemotional effect was quoted by Planned Parenthood in its brief to the Supreme Court, see Casey\\nBr. at *52, the controlling opinion in Casey did not make any note of this finding in its analysis\\nof the doctors’ First Amendment challenge. Instead, without mentioning emotional effect on\\npatients at all, the Casey plurality reversed the district court’s judgment that struck down the\\ninformed-consent statute.\\n\\n\\n\\n 21The Dissent states that “the Commonwealth did not controvert” testimony from a Texas resident against\\nH.B. 2 based upon the emotional impact on her from disclosures required by a Texas informed-consent statute.\\nDissent at 35, 47. True, the Commonwealth did not dispute that particular patient’s experience, but it is not accurate\\nto conclude that the evidence of the emotional effect of the H.B. 2 disclosures is uncontroverted based on that\\ntestimony. To the contrary, several Kentucky residents submitted declarations attesting to beneficial emotional\\neffects they would have experienced from disclosures mandated by H.B. 2 had they received them. R. 32-3, PageID\\n406–08; R. 32-4, PageID 410; R. 32-5, PageID 412–14. For example, one patient stated that if she had received the\\ninformation required by H.B. 2, she “would never have gone through with the procedure” and that having not\\nreceived that information makes her regret of the abortion “even more painful.” R. 32-3, PageID 407. The\\nDissent’s and district court’s discounting of this testimony and other evidence submitted by the Commonwealth\\nregarding emotional effect appears to involve the weighing of proof and credibility determinations not appropriate\\nfor summary judgment. Dissent at 50; see Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 168 (6th Cir. 2011) (“When\\nreviewing a summary judgment motion, credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited.”\\n(quotation omitted)); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n summary judgment,\\nneither the district court nor this Court may make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” (citation\\nomitted)). Unlike in Casey, where the district court made its findings of fact after a bench trial, Casey, 505 U.S. at\\n845; Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1325–26, the district court here was ruling on summary judgment, see EMW Women’s\\nSurgical Center, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 648, and therefore was not permitted to make findings of fact based on the\\ndisputed evidence. And we further note that on cross-motions for summary judgment this court must review the\\nissues of material fact in the light most favorable to the party whose motion did not prevail in the district court. See\\nB.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 598 (6th Cir. 2001). However, as explained above, ultimately\\nfact issues regarding emotional effect on patients are not material to resolution of the relevant First Amendment\\nissue of whether the disclosures of H.B. 2 are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to an abortion.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 27\\n\\n\\n Casey thus implicitly recognized that discomfort to the patient from the mandated\\ndisclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information does not make an informed-\\nconsent law invalid under the First Amendment. Indeed, discomfort may be a byproduct of\\ninformed consent itself. See generally Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (“Any number of patients\\nfacing imminent surgical procedures would prefer not to hear all details, lest the usual anxiety\\npreceding invasive medical procedures become the more intense.”). This may be especially true\\nin the abortion context. For, as the Supreme Court has explained, “[a]bortion is inherently\\ndifferent from other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful\\ntermination of a potential life.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).\\n\\n Providing sonogram and auscultation results to the patient furthers the State’s legitimate\\ninterest, recognized in Casey, of ensuring that the patient understands the full implications of her\\ndecision, including the impact on unborn life. Under Casey, the State may decide that its interest\\nin having the unborn life actually be seen and heard before being aborted, and potential negative\\nemotional consequences to the patient from not having received that disclosure, justify the\\nincidental regulation of professional speech and outweigh the risk of negative emotional impact\\non the patient from the disclosure (even assuming the latter consideration is relevant to the First\\nAmendment analysis and was a permissible finding for summary judgment given the disputed\\nfactual record). This conclusion follows from Casey’s reasoning that the State has “an important\\ninterest in potential life,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882,22 and that there is the risk to the patient’s\\npsychological health from having made such a profound decision without adequate disclosure of\\nits consequences, including the impact on unborn life, beforehand:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22See also Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157 (emphasizing that a State “may use its voice and its regulatory\\nauthority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman”); id. at 158 (“[T]he State may use its regulatory\\npower to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the\\nmedical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.”).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 28\\n\\n\\n It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health. Nor can\\n it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the impact on\\n the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a\\n woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the\\n legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only\\n to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision\\n was not fully informed.\\n\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 882.\\n\\n EMW has offered no Supreme Court authority to contradict Casey’s teaching. At oral\\nargument, EMW cited only Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), as support for our considering\\nthe impact of H.B. 2 on the listening patients as part of the First Amendment analysis. Hill\\nexplained that the effect of certain speech on unwilling listeners can be a factor when\\ndetermining whether restricting speech is constitutional. See 530 U.S. at 716 (“[T]he protection\\nafforded to offensive messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that\\nthe unwilling audience cannot avoid it.”). Hill, however, did not involve a situation where, as\\nhere, no speech—fact or opinion—is restricted. The only issue here is whether the government\\nmay compel more disclosures of a strictly truthful, non-misleading, and relevant nature.23\\n\\n More fundamentally, though, Hill is distinguishable because it did not involve informed\\nconsent to a medical procedure. Hill concerned speech to people on public streets and sidewalks\\nwithin 100 feet of health-care facilities. 530 U.S. at 707. The informed-consent exception to\\nheightened scrutiny simply did not apply, as NIFLA confirms. Because H.B. 2, like the Casey\\nstatute, provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information about an abortion, it helps\\n\\n 23Hill also explained that a reason we allow protestors to display vulgar language is because viewers can\\navert their eyes to avoid more offense. 530 U.S. at 716 (citation omitted). The information provided by H.B. 2 is\\nnot vulgar speech, but still, if the patient desires not to receive the information mandated by H.B. 2, she may avert\\nher eyes from the ultrasound image, not listen to the doctor’s description of the image, and ask the doctor to turn off\\nthe heartbeat. See Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (rejecting\\nunwilling-listener challenge to abortion-informed-consent statute because the statute did not require the patient to\\nlisten). Unlike in Casey and Rounds, this appeal involves no challenge to H.B. 2 as an undue burden on a woman’s\\nsubstantive due process right to choose an abortion. The only challenge here is alleged unconstitutional compelled\\nspeech of the abortion doctors. We must be careful, therefore, not to upset Casey’s balance between States’ ability\\nto regulate the medical profession and women’s rights. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577 (“If the disclosures are truthful\\nand non-misleading, and if they would not violate the woman’s privacy right under the Casey plurality opinion, then\\nAppellees would, by means of their First Amendment claim, essentially trump the balance Casey struck between\\nwomen’s rights and the states’ prerogatives. Casey, however, rejected any such clash of rights in the informed\\nconsent context.”).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 29\\n\\n\\nensure informed consent to that procedure. It therefore is not subject to heightened scrutiny and\\ncomplies with the First Amendment under NIFLA and Casey.\\n\\n VI.\\n\\n Finally, a few words in response to the Dissent’s conclusion, based on physician\\ntestimony that is disputed by other physician testimony, 24 that H.B. 2 “would require physicians\\nto harm their patients with ‘no medical purpose,’” id. at 37, and the Dissent’s statement that “[i]t\\nis transparent that furthering informed consent was not the aim of the Commonwealth—nor will\\nit be achieved by H.B. 2,” id. at 52.\\n\\n First, in order to make the claim that informed consent is a pretextual and not the actual\\nreason for H.B. 2, the Dissent engages in a methodology that we respectfully submit is\\ninconsistent with Casey. The Dissent argues that “H.B. 2 is not coterminous with the medical\\npractice of informed consent. It should not receive deferential review because it regulates the\\ncontent of physician speech, not the practice of medicine.” Dissent at 44.\\n\\n The Dissent’s approach departs from with how the Casey joint opinion reviewed the\\ninformed-consent statute in that case. The plurality considered mandated informed-consent\\ndisclosures regarding unborn life to be an incidental regulation of professional speech that was\\n\\n 24In addressing standard-of-care issues, such as whether H.B. 2 “cause[s] patient harm,” whether it has a\\n“medical purpose,” and whether it “facilitates informed consent as part of the practice of medicine,” Dissent at 35,\\nthe Dissent and district court again appear to make credibility determinations and to weigh the evidence in a manner\\nthat is contrary to the summary judgment standard. It is not undisputed that H.B. 2 is “at odds with the prevailing\\nstandard of care,” as the Dissent contends. See Dissent at 35. To the contrary, the Commonwealth’s experts (John\\nW. Seeds, M.D., FACOG, the retired chair of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Virginia\\nCommonwealth University, and W. David Hager, M.D., FACOG, an obstetrician and gynecologist who practices in\\nLexington, Kentucky) submitted declarations that H.B. 2 complies with existing standards of medical care. See\\ngenerally R. 32-1; R. 32-2. For example, Dr. Seeds stated: “Far from impairing the physician-patient relationship,\\nthe Act simply conforms the law to the existing national standards of care for the diagnosis of pregnancy and the\\nobtaining of a knowing and voluntary consent of the patient before the pregnancy is surgically or medically\\nterminated through elective abortion.” R. 32-1, PageID 363. We also note that Dr. Seeds offered this expert opinion\\nwith the understanding that the disclosures required by H.B. 2 are mandatory. Id. at 349. The district court\\nacknowledged Dr. Seeds’s (and Dr. Hager’s) opinion “that H.B. 2 conforms to existing national standards of care,”\\nEMW Women’s Surgical Center, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 643, but then dismissed that testimony as “undermined by the\\ntestimony given at the hearing” by EMW’s witnesses, id. Such weighing of evidence regarding national standards\\nof care appears inappropriate at summary judgment, but ultimately a factual finding in this area is not material to the\\nrelevant legal issue. As explained above, the First Amendment analysis of an informed-consent statute turns on\\nwhether the mandated disclosure is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant, not whether the disclosure is, or is not,\\ncurrently embodied in the customary standard of medical care.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 30\\n\\n\\nengaged in as “part of the practice of medicine.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. In Casey, as here,\\ncertain private medical organizations argued, and the district court found, that the mandated\\ndisclosures were inconsistent with informed-consent custom. But that argument and lower court\\nfinding did not cause the Casey plurality to conclude that the disclosures were somehow not part\\nof the practice of medicine and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny. Nor did Casey question\\nthe motives of the legislature. Instead, the plurality accepted as “legitimate” that the legislature\\nmay have the motive of “protecting the life of the unborn” in fashioning informed-consent\\nrequirements for the abortion procedure. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. This motive did not\\ncall for heightened scrutiny in Casey. Nor should it in this case.\\n\\n Furthermore, the reasoning in Casey establishes that H.B. 2 does indeed legitimately\\nfacilitate informed consent and serve a medical purpose that does not harm the patient. To give\\nthe patient more information that is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to a medical procedure\\nis the epitome of ensuring informed consent. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; Lakey, 667 F.3d at\\n579; Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735. A sonogram and heartbeat auscultation of the unborn life inside\\nthe patient are disclosures directly pertinent to whether to obtain a procedure to abort that unborn\\nlife. If we were to hold that a State may not require such disclosures, we would essentially be\\nconcluding that women must be shielded and protected from this up-to-date medical information,\\nthat women are unable to or should not be required to process it. This conclusion is incompatible\\nwith the concept of personal choice under Casey. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84; Lakey, 667\\nF.3d at 579 (“Denying [a woman] up to date medical information is more of an abuse to her\\nability to decide than providing the information.”). Casey recognized that a State may require a\\nphysician to inform the patient of the impact on unborn life and that facts relating to this impact\\nare among the disclosures that may be part of informed consent for an abortion.\\n\\n VII.\\n\\n Shifting from the First Amendment to the Eleventh, General Beshear argues that he is not\\na proper party to this matter. “[A] suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is\\nbarred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” Pennhurst State Sch. &\\nHosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984) (citation omitted). That said, one “important\\nexception” exists for suits “challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action.” Id.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 31\\n\\n\\n(citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)) (emphasis added). The district court held that\\nGeneral Beshear falls into this exception because he has the “necessary authority” to enforce\\nH.B. 2. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 647–48. But General Beshear argues\\nthat “an attorney general’s status as the chief law enforcement officer of the state is not a\\nsufficient connection” to fall into this exception. We agree with him.\\n\\n State officials who are “clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws\\nof the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings . . . to enforce against\\nparties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a\\nFederal court of equity from such action.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added).\\nHowever, this exception to sovereign immunity created in Ex parte Young has been read\\nnarrowly. Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1415 (6th Cir.\\n1996). We have held that it “does not apply when a defendant state official has neither enforced\\nnor threatened to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional state statute.” Id. (citations omitted).\\nThere must be “a realistic possibility the official will take legal or administrative actions against\\nthe plaintiff’s interests.” Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1048 (6th Cir. 2015)\\n(citing Deters, 92 F.3d at 1415). General enforcement authority is insufficient. Id. (citation\\nomitted).\\n\\n H.B. 2 and its penalty provision, in contrast with other statutes, do not delegate specific\\nenforcement power to any single state actor. KRS §§ 311.727, 311.990(33). Multiple local\\nprosecutors—the Commonwealth’s and county attorneys—have the duty to enforce H.B. 2.\\n\\n True, the Attorney General is “the chief law officer of the Commonwealth” with a\\nresponsibility to “exercise all common law duties and authority pertaining to the office of the\\nAttorney General under the common law, except when modified by statutory enactment.” KRS\\n§ 15.020. Kentucky law permits the Attorney General to defend a statute’s constitutional\\nvalidity, but it also gives her or him discretion. KRS § 418.075(1); Commonwealth v. Hamilton,\\n411 S.W.3d 741, 751 (Ky. 2013). However, Kentucky law does not require the Attorney\\nGeneral to represent the Commonwealth “where it is made the duty of the Commonwealth’s\\nattorney or county attorney” instead. KRS § 15.020. That is what we have here.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 32\\n\\n\\n Each Commonwealth’s attorney must “attend to all civil cases and proceedings in which\\nthe Commonwealth is interested in the Circuit Courts of [her or] his judicial circuit.” KRS\\n§ 69.010(1). The county attorneys must do the same within their counties. KRS § 69.210(4)(a).\\nBoth must investigate the condition of unsatisfied judgments in their districts or counties. KRS\\n§§ 69.040, 69.240. They also must “take all necessary steps, by motion, action, or otherwise to\\ncollect [them] and cause them to be paid into the State Treasury.” KRS § 69.240; accord KRS\\n§ 69.040. When these attorneys fail to meet this mandate, and if the Department of Revenue\\nsubmits a written request, then the Attorney General must bring an action to collect any\\nunsatisfied judgments. See KRS § 15.060(3). The duty to enforce H.B. 2 therefore lies not with\\nthe Attorney General but with the Commonwealth’s attorneys and the county attorneys.\\n\\n To support their interpretation of Ex parte Young, EMW cites McNeilus Truck &\\nManufacturing, Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2000). That case,\\nhowever, affirms the holding of Deters, which we rely on here. See McNeilus Truck & Mfg.,\\n226 F.3d at 438 (citing Deters for the proposition that Young “does not apply when the defendant\\nofficial has neither enforced nor threatened to enforce” the challenged statute). McNeilus also\\nheld that the Attorney General is a proper defendant “[w]here there is an imminent threat of\\nenforcement.” Id. at 437. There, the Attorney General helped enforce portions of the statute,\\nand the other defendant had threatened to withdraw the plaintiff’s license. So, we held both the\\nAttorney General and the other defendant could be sued. McNeilus, however, does not help\\nEMW because there is no evidence of a similar “imminent threat” of prosecution by the Attorney\\nGeneral in the present case. Any imminent threat comes from the Commonwealth’s and county\\nattorneys, not the Attorney General.\\n\\n General Beshear has not enforced or even threatened to enforce H.B. 2. Rather, the\\nKentucky legislature has charged local prosecutors with its enforcement. We therefore hold that\\nthe Attorney General is not a proper party to this action.25\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25Because it is uncontested that the Secretary Meier is a proper party, no concern exists that EMW “would\\nbe unable to vindicate the alleged infringement of their constitutional rights without first violating [H.B. 2].” See\\nAllied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 665 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 33\\n\\n\\n VIII.\\n\\n H.B. 2—The Ultrasound Informed Consent Act—is an informed-consent statute like the\\nstatute in Casey because it provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information related to\\nan abortion. The statute incidentally burdens speech only as part of Kentucky’s regulation of\\nprofessional conduct. Therefore, H.B. 2 is not subject to any heightened scrutiny with respect to\\nthe doctors’ First Amendment rights, and it does not violate those rights, based on NIFLA and\\nCasey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Also, because local prosecutors\\nwould handle the enforcement of fines under H.B. 2, the Attorney General is not a proper party\\nto this action.\\n\\n With due respect for the views of the Dissent, we adopt instead the position of the Fifth\\nand Eighth Circuits on the First Amendment issue. Our responsibility here is to apply the level\\nof scrutiny mandated by the plurality opinion in Casey and reaffirmed by a majority of the\\nSupreme Court in NIFLA. Under Casey, “protecting the life of the unborn” is a “legitimate goal”\\nthat may be pursued by a State as part of informed consent. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. As\\na First Amendment matter, there is nothing suspect with a State’s requiring a doctor, before\\nperforming an abortion, to make truthful, non-misleading factual disclosures, relevant to\\ninformed consent, even if those disclosures relate to unborn life and have the effect of persuading\\nthe patient not to have an abortion.\\n\\n Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s contrary decision and VACATE the\\ninjunction. We also remand with instructions for General Beshear to be dismissed from the case,\\nfor summary judgment to be entered in favor of Secretary Meier on the first claim for relief\\nstated in the complaint, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 34\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n DISSENT\\n _________________\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1653,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607078,"string":"4,607,078"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Christopher SULLIVAN; Nathan Haskell; William Gentry, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Sam BENNINGFIELD; Oddie Shoupe, Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Christopher Sullivan v. Sam Benningfield"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-5643"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Cole, Suhrheinrich\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888314/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"040dissent\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888315/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0060p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n CHRISTOPHER SULLIVAN; NATHAN HASKELL; WILLIAM ┐\\n GENTRY, │\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants, │\\n > No. 18-5643\\n │\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n SAM BENNINGFIELD; ODDIE SHOUPE, │\\n Defendants-Appellees. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Tennessee at Cookeville.\\n No. 2:17-cv-00052—Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: January 15, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 4, 2019\\n\\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and MOORE, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Daniel A. Horwitz, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL A. HORWITZ, Nashville,\\nTennessee, for Appellants. Michael T. Schmitt, ORTALE KELLEY LAW FIRM, Nashville,\\nTennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Daniel A. Horwitz, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL A.\\nHORWITZ, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Michael T. Schmitt, ORTALE KELLEY\\nLAW FIRM, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.\\n\\n COLE, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MOORE, J., joined.\\nSUHRHEINRICH, J. (pg. 14), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n COLE, Chief Judge. In May 2017, Judge Sam Benningfield issued an order offering a\\n30-day sentencing credit to inmates in White County, Tennessee. There was one condition: to\\nobtain the credit, inmates had to submit to sterilization. After public outcry about the\\nsterilization-for-sentencing-credits program, Judge Benningfield issued a second order declaring\\nthat inmates could no longer enroll in the program, followed by a third order clarifying which of\\nthe inmates who initially enrolled could still receive the sentencing credit. Within months, the\\nTennessee Legislature passed Senate Bill 2133, which made it illegal for courts to make\\nsentencing determinations based on a defendant’s willingness to consent to sterilization.\\n\\n Christopher Sullivan, Nathan Haskell, and William Gentry—inmates who refused to\\nsubmit to a vasectomy and were consequently denied the sentencing credit that was awarded to\\ninmates who underwent sterilization—challenged Judge Benningfield’s orders under the Equal\\nProtection Clause, arguing that the orders subjected inmates to differential treatment on the basis\\nof their procreative rights and their sex. The district court found that the claims were moot in\\nlight of the passage of Senate Bill 2133 and Judge Benningfield’s second and third orders.\\nBecause none of those subsequent developments in the law ended the differential treatment that\\nplaintiffs challenge, we reverse and remand for consideration of plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n On May 15, 2017, White County General Sessions Judge Sam Benningfield entered a\\nstanding order, which stated:\\n\\n For good cause shown including judicial economy and the administration of\\n justice, it is ORDERED any White County inmate serving a sentence for the\\n General Sessions Court who satisfactorily completes the State of Tennessee,\\n Department of Health Neonatal Syndrome Education (NAS) Program be given\\n two (2) days credit toward completion of his/her jail sentence. Any such female\\n inmate who receives the free [N]explanon implant or any such male inmate who\\n has the free vasectomy as a result thereof shall be given an additional thirty\\n (30) days credit toward completion of his/her jail sentence.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\n(Initial Order, R. 13-1 (emphasis in original).) After Judge Benningfield issued this order,\\nPlaintiffs allege that “dozens of White County inmates”—including Plaintiff William Gentry—\\n“agreed to submit to surgical sterilization in order to reduce the length of their respective jail\\nsentences.” (Am. Compl., R. 13, PageID 133–35.) Both parties agree that Judge Benningfield’s\\nco-defendant, White County Sheriff Oddie Shoupe, enforced this order by reducing the sentences\\nof inmates who underwent sterilization. It is uncontested that multiple inmates were sterilized\\nand received a sentence credit in line with Judge Benningfield’s order.\\n\\n The press covered White County’s sterilization-for-sentencing-credits program on July\\n19, 2017, after the White County District Attorney expressed concerns about the program to a\\nreporter. Plaintiffs allege that “intense national outrage and widespread condemnation”\\nfollowed. (Id. at PageID 131, 135.) Shortly thereafter, on July 26, 2017, Judge Benningfield\\nissued a second order, which stated:\\n\\n Whereas the State of Tennessee, Department of Health has indicated to the court\\n through its representative that it will no longer offer free vasectomies to White\\n County inmates serving a sentence for the General Sessions Court and will not\\n provide the free [N]explanon implant to White County inmates serving a sentence\\n for the General Sessions Court who receives any credit toward the completion of\\n their jail sentence as a result thereof; it is hereby ORDERED the previous order\\n i[n] this regard is hereby rescinded.\\n Those inmates who have demonstrated to the court their desire to improve their\\n situations and take serious and considered steps toward their rehabilitation by\\n having the procedures or agreeing to have same will not be denied the credit. You\\n will be awarded the 30 days jail credit promised whether you ultimately receive\\n the procedures or not. All inmates shall remain eligible for the two (2) days credit\\n for completing the State of Tennessee, Department of Health Neonatal Syndrome\\n Education (NAS) Program satisfactorily.\\n\\n(Rescinding Order, R. 13-2 (emphasis in original).) In this second order, Judge Benningfield\\nattempted to rescind the initial standing order by awarding sentencing credits to all inmates who\\noffered to undergo sterilization, regardless of whether those inmates were ultimately sterilized.\\nBut this order took no action with respect to inmates who had refused the offer to undergo\\nsterilization in exchange for sentencing credits. Consequently, the second order ensured that\\ninmates who had agreed to submit to sterilization would still receive a 30-day sentence reduction\\nthat was denied to inmates who had maintained their unwillingness to undergo sterilization.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\n Two of those inmates who had refused to undergo sterilization were Plaintiffs\\nChristopher Sullivan and Nathan Haskell. At the time the first and second orders were issued,\\nSullivan and Haskell were both inmates in the White County jail. Neither accepted Judge\\nBenningfield’s offer to undergo sterilization in exchange for sentencing credits, and neither\\nreceived a sentencing credit. After the second order was issued, Plaintiff William Gentry also\\nopted not to obtain a vasectomy. Despite the second order’s promise that inmates who initially\\nsigned up to undergo sterilization would receive the credit “whether [they] ultimately receive[d]\\nthe procedures or not,” Gentry never obtained the sentencing credit, either. (Id.)\\n\\n In August 2017, Sullivan filed a complaint in the Chancery Court in White County,\\nTennessee, alleging that Benningfield and Shoupe (collectively, “Defendants”) deprived him of\\nhis Fourteenth Amendment rights by issuing and enforcing the sterilization-for-sentencing-credit\\norders. Defendants removed the lawsuit to federal court, and Sullivan filed an amended\\ncomplaint, adding Gentry and Haskell as plaintiffs. The amended complaint sought declaratory\\nand injunctive relief, the latter of which requested that Sullivan, Haskell, and Gentry\\n(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) receive the same 30-day sentencing credit that had been afforded to\\nsimilarly-situated inmates who relinquished their procreative rights. Defendants filed a motion\\nto dismiss, and Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment.\\n\\n While litigation was pending, Judge Benningfield entered a third order on November 9,\\n2017, which stated:\\n\\n Whereas, on May 15, 2017, this Court entered a Standing Order, which applied\\n only to White County inmates who were serving a sentence for the General\\n Sessions Court. The Standing Order gave two days credit toward the [sentence]\\n of any eligible inmate who completed the State of Tennessee, Department of\\n Health’s Neonatal Syndrome Education (NAS) Program. Additionally, the\\n Standing Order offered a 30-day credit toward the completion of an eligible\\n inmate’s jail sentence if that inmate received the free [N]explanon implant or\\n vasectomy offered by the Tennessee Department of Health.\\n Whereas, on July 26, 2017, this Court entered an Order Rescinding Previous\\n Standing Order. Specifically, the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order\\n explained that this Court would no longer offer a 30-day credit toward the\\n completion of an eligible inmate’s jail sentence if that inmate received the free\\n nexplanon implant or vasectomy offered by the Tennessee Department of Health.\\n The Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order informed those eligible inmates\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\n that had signed up to receive a free [N]explanon implant or vasectomy before the\\n entry of the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order that they would still\\n receive the 30-day credit toward the completion of their sentence, regardless of\\n whether the[y] actually went through with receiving the procedure. It has now\\n come to this Court’s attention that the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order\\n has caused some confusion, specifically whether an inmate can currently promise\\n to have one of the available procedure and still receive a 30-day jail sentence\\n credit and this Court now enters this Order to clarify the Court’s intent as to how\\n the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order was intended to be, and was in\\n fact, applied.\\n It is hereby clarified that the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order was not\\n intended to extend the 30-day jail sentence credit for anyone who promised to\\n undergo these surgical procedures after the entry of the Order Rescinding\\n Previous Standing Order; rather, the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order\\n was intended only to insure that the eligible inmates that had already complied\\n with the Standing Order of May 15, 2017 (either by having the procedure or\\n signing up with the intent to have the procedure) would receive the promised\\n benefit regardless of whether those individuals ultimately had the procedure.\\n\\n(Clarifying Order, R. 42-1, PageID 500 (emphasis in original).) This third order clarified that,\\neven though the second order purported to discontinue the sterilization-for-sentencing-credits\\nprogram, inmates who opted to undergo sterilization before the second order was issued were\\nstill eligible to receive the sentencing credit.\\n\\n On May 1, 2018, the Tennessee Legislature passed Senate Bill 2133, which enacted a\\nnew law forbidding courts from making sentencing determinations based upon a defendant’s\\nwillingness to consent to sterilization. The law states in relevant part that a “sentencing court\\nshall not make a sentencing determination that is based in whole or in part on the defendant’s\\nconsent or refusal to consent to any form of temporary or permanent birth control, sterilization,\\nor family planning services, regardless of whether the defendant’s consent is voluntarily given.”\\nTenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-217(c); see also Tenn. S.B. 2133, R. 50-2, PageID 557.\\n\\n On May 26, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to supplement their motion to dismiss,\\nclaiming that Tennessee’s passage of this new law rendered the controversy moot. On June 18,\\n2018, the district court granted Defendants’ motions and dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims and\\npending motions for summary judgment as moot. Plaintiffs now appeal the district court’s\\nmootness determination.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n\\n Defendants maintain this case is moot, and they also contend that Plaintiffs have no\\nstanding to sue. This court reviews questions of standing and mootness de novo. Cleveland\\nBranch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 523 (6th Cir. 2001).\\n\\n Although the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution\\n“underpins both our standing and our mootness jurisprudence,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.\\nLaidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000), standing and mootness inquiries\\ndiverge in several important respects, one of which is timing. Whether a plaintiff has standing to\\nsue is “determined as of the time the complaint is filed.” Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P.,\\n263 F.3d at 524. If a plaintiff overcomes the standing hurdle at the time of filing, the doctrine of\\nmootness then “requires that there be a live case or controversy at the time that a federal court\\ndecides the case.” Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987). We address the standing and\\nmootness doctrines in turn.\\n\\n A. Standing\\n\\n To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff must show “(1) an ‘injury in fact,’\\n(2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and\\n(3) a ‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Susan B. Anthony\\nList v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157–58 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,\\n560 (1992)). “In the context of claims for injunctive or declaratory relief,” the threatened injury\\nin fact must be “concrete and particularized,” as well as “actual and imminent, not conjectural or\\nhypothetical[.]” Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473, 491 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Summers v.\\nEarth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). “Past exposure to illegal conduct” is insufficient\\nto demonstrate an injury in fact that warrants declaratory or injunctive relief unless the past\\ninjury is accompanied by “continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.\\n488, 495–96 (1974); Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 252 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 2001).\\n\\n Defendants dispute that Plaintiffs can satisfy the first element: an injury in fact.\\nDefendants argue that there is no constitutional right to a sentencing credit, Hansard v. Barrett,\\n980 F.2d 1059, 1062 (6th Cir. 1992), so “the denial of a sentence credit, by itself, cannot be the\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nbasis for standing’s injury-in-fact requirement.” (Appellee Br. 9.) But “[w]hen the government\\nerects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is\\nfor members of another group,” the “injury in fact” at issue is “the denial of equal treatment\\nresulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.” Ne.\\nFla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666\\n(1993) [hereinafter “NFAGC”]). Thus, Plaintiffs need not show the denial of an independent\\nright to make out an Article III injury in fact. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362–63 (1970)\\n(finding that, although appellants had no right to be appointed to board of education, the Equal\\nProtection Clause guaranteed that the “State may not deny to some the privilege of holding\\npublic office that it extends to others on the basis of distinctions that violate federal\\nconstitutional guarantees”).\\n\\n Defendants next argue that the types of differential treatment alleged do not violate the\\nEqual Protection Clause and, accordingly, cannot constitute injuries in fact. Because the Equal\\nProtection Clause “prohibits discrimination by government which either burdens a fundamental\\nright, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than others similarly situated\\nwithout any rational basis for the difference,” Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d\\n673, 681–82 (6th Cir. 2011), an allegation that plaintiffs were subjected to differential treatment\\nin one of these impermissible ways amounts to a cognizable injury in fact, so long as the\\ndifferential treatment was either ongoing or accompanied by continuing adverse effects at the\\ntime the complaint was filed. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96. Plaintiffs have identified two\\npotential injuries in fact: differential treatment that burdens the fundamental right to procreate,\\nand differential treatment based on sex.\\n\\n Plaintiffs first argue that Judge Benningfield’s order called for differential treatment that\\nimpermissibly burdened the fundamental right to procreate, because it awarded benefits to only\\nthose inmates who agreed to submit to sterilization, not those who refused to relinquish their\\nprocreative rights. Both this court and the Supreme Court have acknowledged that the right to\\nprocreate has achieved the status of a fundamental right for the purposes of equal protection\\nchallenges. Robinson v. Bd. of Regents of E. Ky. Univ., 475 F.2d 707, 710 (6th Cir. 1973) (citing\\nSkinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). Plaintiffs allege that Judge\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\nBenningfield specifically ordered that inmates would be awarded a 30-day sentencing credit in\\nexchange for their agreement to undergo sterilization. They further allege that the same credit\\nwas not available to inmates who chose not to forfeit their procreative rights. Requiring inmates\\nto waive a fundamental right to obtain a government benefit impermissibly burdens that right.\\nFouche, 396 U.S. at 362–63.\\n\\n Plaintiffs next argue that Judge Benningfield’s order called for differential treatment that\\ntargeted a suspect class. The order made an express distinction between the choice that men and\\nwomen faced. Men who wanted the sentencing credit would have to obtain a vasectomy, which\\nPlaintiffs argue is a “potentially irreversible” form of sterilization. (Appellant Br. 14.) In\\ncontrast, women who wanted the sentencing credit would have to obtain a Nexplanon implant,\\nwhich Plaintiffs argue is a “surgically inserted but removable birth control” option. (Id.)\\nPlaintiffs’ allegation that vasectomies pose more severe risks than Nexplanon implants finds\\nsome support in the number of inmates who volunteered to submit to the respective procedures:\\nas Defendants conceded at oral argument, fewer than five men signed up for vasectomies (and\\nzero men ultimately obtained vasectomies), while about 40 women ultimately received\\nNexplanon implants through the sterilization-for-sentencing-credits program. (Oral Arg. 19:31–\\n20:05.) Taken together, the evidence and allegations before this court confirm that Plaintiffs\\nadequately alleged that Defendants “erect[ed] a barrier that ma[de] it more difficult for members\\nof one group”—male inmates—“to obtain a benefit”—sentencing credits—“than it [wa]s for\\nmembers of another group”—female inmates. NFAGC, 508 U.S. at 666.\\n\\n Finally, standing requires that Plaintiffs alleged these injuries in fact were ongoing or had\\n“continuing, present adverse effects” at the time they filed their complaint. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at\\n495–96; Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 524. Plaintiffs adequately alleged that the\\ndifferential treatment that burdened the exercise of a fundamental right was ongoing at the time\\nthe complaint was filed, as they argued that Judge Benningfield’s second order continued to\\npermit inmates who initially elected to waive their procreative rights to receive the 30-day\\nsentencing credit without extending the same benefit to those who refused to waive their rights.\\nPlaintiffs also alleged that, by continuing to award the sentencing credit to only those inmates\\nwho opted to waive their procreative rights under the terms of the first order, the second order\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\neffectively froze the inmates’ initial choices in place. As a result, the current distinction between\\ninmates who will receive the sentencing credit and those who will not is still tainted by any\\nimpermissible sex discrimination that the first order contained. So, if the initial choice contained\\na heightened barrier to male inmates, as Plaintiffs allege, the current distribution of sentencing\\ncredits constitutes a continuing, adverse effect of that injury. Therefore, Plaintiffs adequately\\nalleged that the sex-based differential treatment had “continuing, present adverse effects” at the\\ntime they filed their complaint as well. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96.\\n\\n We note that Defendants have not made any arguments contesting causation or\\nredressability, and that appears to be with good reason. The denial of differential treatment is\\nfairly traceable to Judge Benningfield’s order, which set the terms of the sterilization-for-\\nsentencing-credit program, and at the time the complaint was filed, the differential treatment that\\nallegedly burdened the fundamental right to procreate and imposed a heightened barrier for male\\ninmates to receive the sentencing credit would have been redressable by injunctive relief\\nawarding the credit to Sullivan, Haskell, and Gentry. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740\\n(1984). Thus, we find Plaintiffs had standing to bring both claims.\\n\\n B. Mootness\\n\\n The mootness doctrine, in contrast to our standing jurisprudence, “requires that there be a\\nlive case or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case.” Burke, 479 U.S. at\\n363. “[I]f events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of\\nthe ability to give meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be dismissed.” Ailor v. City\\nof Maynardville, 368 F.3d 587, 596 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).\\n\\n Ultimately, the “test for mootness is whether the relief sought would, if granted, make a\\ndifference to the legal interests of the parties.” McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n,\\nInc., 119 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir.1997) (en banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “No\\nmatter how vehemently the parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that\\nprecipitated the lawsuit, the case is moot if the dispute ‘is no longer embedded in any actual\\ncontroversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal rights.’” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\n85, 91 (2013) (internal citations omitted). “The heavy burden of demonstrating mootness rests\\non the party claiming mootness.” Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 531.\\n\\n Defendants first argue that, even if Plaintiffs initially had standing to bring these claims,\\nthe claims are now moot, because the challenged order has been rescinded, and Tennessee has\\npassed a new law making the challenged practice illegal. Defendants argue that these changes in\\nthe law, as well as the public reprimand Judge Benningfield received due to his issuance of the\\norders, are sufficient to show that Defendants have stopped engaging in the conduct at issue and\\nthere is no reasonable expectation they will repeat it.\\n\\n A defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice moots a case only in the “rare\\ninstance” where “subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior\\ncannot reasonably be expected to recur and ‘interim relief or events have completely and\\nirrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.’” League of Women Voters of Ohio v.\\nBrunner, 548 F.3d 463, 473 (6th Cir. 2008); Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 530–31\\n(quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). Defendants bear a “heavy”\\nburden to demonstrate mootness in the context of voluntary cessation. Akers v. McGinnis,\\n352 F.3d 1030, 1035 (6th Cir. 2003). Still, this court has noted that “cessation of the allegedly\\nillegal conduct by government officials has been treated with more solicitude by the courts than\\nsimilar action by private parties.” Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 705 (6th Cir. 2003).\\n\\n Repeal of a challenged law can, in some cases, render a case or controversy moot, Ky.\\nRight to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 644 (6th Cir. 1997), but a case or controversy “does\\nnot cease to exist merely by virtue of a change in the applicable law.” Hamilton Cty. Educ.\\nAss’n v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 822 F.3d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 2016). “[W]here the changes in\\nthe law arguably do not remove the harm or threatened harm underlying the dispute, ‘the case\\nremains alive and suitable for judicial determination.’” Cam I, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty.\\nMetro Gov’t, 460 F.3d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Put another way,\\nbefore voluntary cessation of a practice could ever moot a claim, the challenged practice must\\nhave actually ceased. See Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 531. Thus, the effects of\\nthe legal changes that took place after the complaint was filed are paramount in determining\\nwhether Plaintiffs’ claims are moot.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n Judge Benningfield’s third order stated that “eligible inmates that had already complied\\nwith the Standing Order of May 15, 2017 (either by having the procedure or signing up with the\\nintent to have the procedure) would receive the promised benefit regardless of whether those\\nindividuals ultimately had the procedure.” (Clarifying Order, R. 42-1, PageID 500.) Because\\nthe third order continues to extend the credit to “eligible” inmates, but not to those who never\\nagreed to forego their procreative rights, this order did not end the challenged differential\\ntreatment.1 At oral argument, Defendants confirmed that anyone who initially agreed to undergo\\nsterilization would still be eligible to receive a 30-day credit under the terms of the second and\\nthird orders, and that inmates were still requesting credits from Judge Benningfield after the third\\norder was issued in November 2017. Although this court treats government actors with “more\\nsolicitude” than private parties in analyzing whether a voluntarily ceased practice is likely to\\nrecur, Ammex, 351 F.3d at 705, our more favorable standard for government actors cannot\\ndispense with an allegation that Defendants did not in fact cease their challenged conduct in the\\nfirst instance.2 Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 531.\\n\\n Senate Bill 2133—enacted as Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-217—fares no better at\\nextinguishing the challenged practice. The new law declares that judges cannot consider\\nsterilization in any sentencing determinations going forward, which ensures that future inmates\\nwill not endure this allegedly unconstitutional practice. But the new law had no impact on\\nPlaintiffs, as the statute impacts only sentences imposed after the effective date of the statute.\\nThus, the statute fails to stop the differential treatment Plaintiffs continue to suffer: not receiving\\nthe sentencing credit that was awarded to inmates who forfeited their fundamental right to\\n\\n\\n 1Although the order promised that inmates like Gentry who “sign[ed] up with the intent to have the\\nprocedure” but never “ultimately had the procedure” would receive the credit and be treated the same as inmates\\nwho were actually sterilized (Clarifying Order, R. 42-1, PageID 500), Plaintiffs allege Gentry never received his\\nsentencing credit. Thus, even in direct contravention of Judge Benningfield’s third order, Plaintiffs argue that the\\nchallenged practice of providing sentencing credits to those who underwent sterilization while denying them to\\ninmates who did not forfeit their procreative rights continued.\\n 2We also note that, even if the program had ceased, Defendants failed to make “absolutely clear” they\\nwould refrain from engaging in this conduct in the future. To the contrary, they went as far as to call the program a\\n“good deed” in oral argument before this court. (Oral Arg. 25:11–25:28 (“A lot of them are addicted to drugs, a lot\\nof them . . . have unwanted children—the judge was talking about seeing these families come time and time again\\nbefore him and he was really trying to do something that was well. No good deed goes unpunished.”).)\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 12\\n\\n\\nprocreate. Thus, neither of the changes to the law has ceased the allegedly unconstitutional\\ndifferential treatment that any of the Plaintiffs faced, and they do not moot Plaintiffs’ claims.\\n\\n Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot because all three plaintiffs have\\nbeen released from the White County jail in the time since this lawsuit was filed, and that\\nprospective relief cannot redress claims challenging conditions of confinement if Plaintiffs are no\\nlonger incarcerated. For example, Defendants press that courts have found it would be\\nmeaningless to order prison officials to stop searching an inmate’s mail or to allow an inmate to\\nattend a religious service after the inmate has already been released from detention. See, e.g.,\\nKensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996); Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,\\n65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993).\\nPlaintiffs’ claims are distinguishable from those extinguished in the cases cited above, because\\nthey do not challenge conditions of confinement; they challenge the differential treatment with\\nrespect to the distribution of sentencing credits. Still, the question remains whether Plaintiffs’\\nrelease from jail similarly “deprive[s] the court of the ability to give meaningful relief.” Ailor,\\n368 F.3d at 596.\\n\\n Plaintiffs argue that awarding them the 30-day sentencing credit would still provide\\nmeaningful relief, because the credit would impact collateral rights under state law that turn on\\nthe date their sentences were terminated.3 Even where a plaintiff’s sentence has expired, the\\nSupreme Court has recognized that challenges that impact the length of an inmate’s sentence can\\nstill present a live case or controversy, so long as the former inmate identifies an ongoing\\ncollateral consequence that can be redressed by the relief sought. Pollard v. United States,\\n352 U.S. 354, 358 (1957) (finding that the “possibility of consequences collateral to the\\nimposition of sentence is sufficiently substantial to justify our dealing with the merits” of\\nplaintiff’s challenge to his sentence, even though plaintiff had already been released from\\n\\n 3Plaintiffs also contend that at least one of their sentences has not yet expired: although William Gentry\\nwas released from jail, he is serving the remainder of his sentence on probation under the supervision of Community\\nCorrections. “As such, Plaintiff Gentry would still benefit from a 30-day sentence credit even after his release,\\nbecause such a credit would reduce the length of time that he has to spend under state custodial control,” which\\nwould still constitute meaningful relief. (Reply Br. 23 (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)).) If\\nGentry is still serving his sentence, we agree that awarding him the credit he requests and thereby reducing his\\nsentence by 30 days would provide meaningful relief. Ailor, 368 F.3d at 596.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 13\\n\\n\\nprison); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 220–21 (1946) (finding case was not mooted by\\nexpiration of sentence where plaintiff could show “under either state or federal law further\\npenalties or disabilities can be imposed on him as a result of the judgment which has now been\\nsatisfied”); cf. United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 937 (2011) (finding claim moot\\nwhere plaintiff “was no longer subject to the sex-offender-registration conditions that he sought\\nto challenge on appeal,” and plaintiff failed to show “some ongoing ‘collateral consequenc[e]’\\nthat is ‘traceable’ to the challenged portion of the sentence and ‘likely to be redressed by a\\nfavorable judicial decision’”); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (“Once the convict’s\\nsentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended\\nincarceration or parole—some ‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction—must exist if the suit\\n[challenging the plaintiff’s parole revocation] is to be maintained.”).\\n\\n While Defendants cannot give Plaintiffs back the 30 extra days they served as compared\\nto inmates who opted to undergo sterilization, Plaintiffs have alleged that awarding them the 30-\\nday sentencing credit would affect other collateral consequences related to sentencing.\\nConcretely, Plaintiffs argue that Tennessee law permits non-violent offenders to petition for\\nexpungement five years after the sentence termination date, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-32-\\n101(g)(2)(B), such that retroactive application of the sentencing credit would allow them to\\npursue expungement 30 days sooner. Because Plaintiffs have alleged that the 30-day sentencing\\ncredit would accelerate their access to expungement, they have shown that the “the relief sought\\nwould, if granted, make a difference to the legal interests of the parties.” McPherson, 119 F.3d\\nat 458. Thus, Plaintiffs’ release from jail does not moot their claims.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n We reverse the district court’s determination that Plaintiffs’ claims were moot and\\nremand for consideration of their claims on the merits.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 14\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n DISSENT\\n _________________\", \"author\": \"COLE, Chief Judge\"}, {\"type\": \"dissent\", \"author\": \"SUHRHEINRICH\", \"text\": \"SUHRHEINRICH, J. dissenting: None of the Plaintiffs suffered any injury in this case.\\nPlaintiffs’ sentences were not increased; rather they served their sentences as originally ordered.\\nBeing offered contraceptive services, even being encouraged to accept free contraceptive\\nservices, is not an injury in fact for purposes of standing. Plaintiffs did not receive the\\nvasectomies and their right to procreate has not been hindered in any way. Cf. Harris v. McRae,\\n448 U.S. 297 (1980) (explaining that even when the government favors childbirth over abortion\\nby subsidizing one decision over the other; such regulation does not impinge on the\\nconstitutional freedom to make those decisions because it imposed no restrictions on access to\\nabortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (“The State may have made childbirth a\\nmore attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but it has imposed no\\nrestriction on access to abortions that was not already there.”).\\n\\n Plaintiffs also did not suffer any “differential treatment.” See Scarbrough v. Morgan Cty.\\nBd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The threshold element of an equal protection\\nclaim is disparate treatment . . . .”). Every inmate was received the same offer. The fact that two\\nof the three Plaintiffs exercised their right to refuse the offer and preserve their right to procreate\\nactually underscores the point. Cf. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978) (criminal\\ndefendants who refused plea deals to protect their right to trial by jury thereby facing a\\nmandatory life sentence if convicted, rather than pleading guilty in return for a lesser sentence,\\nwere not denied equal protection because “[a]ll . . . defendants [were] given the same choice”).\\n\\n For these reasons, I would affirm the district court’s conclusion that the Plaintiffs’ lacked\\nstanding. I therefore respectfully dissent.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SUHRHEINRICH"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"COLE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607078/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Christopher SULLIVAN; Nathan Haskell; William Gentry, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Sam BENNINGFIELD; Oddie Shoupe, Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0060p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n CHRISTOPHER SULLIVAN; NATHAN HASKELL; WILLIAM ┐\n GENTRY, │\n Plaintiffs-Appellants, │\n > No. 18-5643\n │\n v. │\n │\n │\n SAM BENNINGFIELD; ODDIE SHOUPE, │\n Defendants-Appellees. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Tennessee at Cookeville.\n No. 2:17-cv-00052—Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge.\n\n Argued: January 15, 2019\n\n Decided and Filed: April 4, 2019\n\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and MOORE, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: Daniel A. Horwitz, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL A. HORWITZ, Nashville,\nTennessee, for Appellants. Michael T. Schmitt, ORTALE KELLEY LAW FIRM, Nashville,\nTennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Daniel A. Horwitz, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL A.\nHORWITZ, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Michael T. Schmitt, ORTALE KELLEY\nLAW FIRM, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.\n\n COLE, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MOORE, J., joined.\nSUHRHEINRICH, J. (pg. 14), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 2\n\n\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n COLE, Chief Judge. In May 2017, Judge Sam Benningfield issued an order offering a\n30-day sentencing credit to inmates in White County, Tennessee. There was one condition: to\nobtain the credit, inmates had to submit to sterilization. After public outcry about the\nsterilization-for-sentencing-credits program, Judge Benningfield issued a second order declaring\nthat inmates could no longer enroll in the program, followed by a third order clarifying which of\nthe inmates who initially enrolled could still receive the sentencing credit. Within months, the\nTennessee Legislature passed Senate Bill 2133, which made it illegal for courts to make\nsentencing determinations based on a defendant’s willingness to consent to sterilization.\n\n Christopher Sullivan, Nathan Haskell, and William Gentry—inmates who refused to\nsubmit to a vasectomy and were consequently denied the sentencing credit that was awarded to\ninmates who underwent sterilization—challenged Judge Benningfield’s orders under the Equal\nProtection Clause, arguing that the orders subjected inmates to differential treatment on the basis\nof their procreative rights and their sex. The district court found that the claims were moot in\nlight of the passage of Senate Bill 2133 and Judge Benningfield’s second and third orders.\nBecause none of those subsequent developments in the law ended the differential treatment that\nplaintiffs challenge, we reverse and remand for consideration of plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n\n On May 15, 2017, White County General Sessions Judge Sam Benningfield entered a\nstanding order, which stated:\n\n For good cause shown including judicial economy and the administration of\n justice, it is ORDERED any White County inmate serving a sentence for the\n General Sessions Court who satisfactorily completes the State of Tennessee,\n Department of Health Neonatal Syndrome Education (NAS) Program be given\n two (2) days credit toward completion of his/her jail sentence. Any such female\n inmate who receives the free [N]explanon implant or any such male inmate who\n has the free vasectomy as a result thereof shall be given an additional thirty\n (30) days credit toward completion of his/her jail sentence.\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 3\n\n\n(Initial Order, R. 13-1 (emphasis in original).) After Judge Benningfield issued this order,\nPlaintiffs allege that “dozens of White County inmates”—including Plaintiff William Gentry—\n“agreed to submit to surgical sterilization in order to reduce the length of their respective jail\nsentences.” (Am. Compl., R. 13, PageID 133–35.) Both parties agree that Judge Benningfield’s\nco-defendant, White County Sheriff Oddie Shoupe, enforced this order by reducing the sentences\nof inmates who underwent sterilization. It is uncontested that multiple inmates were sterilized\nand received a sentence credit in line with Judge Benningfield’s order.\n\n The press covered White County’s sterilization-for-sentencing-credits program on July\n19, 2017, after the White County District Attorney expressed concerns about the program to a\nreporter. Plaintiffs allege that “intense national outrage and widespread condemnation”\nfollowed. (Id. at PageID 131, 135.) Shortly thereafter, on July 26, 2017, Judge Benningfield\nissued a second order, which stated:\n\n Whereas the State of Tennessee, Department of Health has indicated to the court\n through its representative that it will no longer offer free vasectomies to White\n County inmates serving a sentence for the General Sessions Court and will not\n provide the free [N]explanon implant to White County inmates serving a sentence\n for the General Sessions Court who receives any credit toward the completion of\n their jail sentence as a result thereof; it is hereby ORDERED the previous order\n i[n] this regard is hereby rescinded.\n Those inmates who have demonstrated to the court their desire to improve their\n situations and take serious and considered steps toward their rehabilitation by\n having the procedures or agreeing to have same will not be denied the credit. You\n will be awarded the 30 days jail credit promised whether you ultimately receive\n the procedures or not. All inmates shall remain eligible for the two (2) days credit\n for completing the State of Tennessee, Department of Health Neonatal Syndrome\n Education (NAS) Program satisfactorily.\n\n(Rescinding Order, R. 13-2 (emphasis in original).) In this second order, Judge Benningfield\nattempted to rescind the initial standing order by awarding sentencing credits to all inmates who\noffered to undergo sterilization, regardless of whether those inmates were ultimately sterilized.\nBut this order took no action with respect to inmates who had refused the offer to undergo\nsterilization in exchange for sentencing credits. Consequently, the second order ensured that\ninmates who had agreed to submit to sterilization would still receive a 30-day sentence reduction\nthat was denied to inmates who had maintained their unwillingness to undergo sterilization.\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 4\n\n\n Two of those inmates who had refused to undergo sterilization were Plaintiffs\nChristopher Sullivan and Nathan Haskell. At the time the first and second orders were issued,\nSullivan and Haskell were both inmates in the White County jail. Neither accepted Judge\nBenningfield’s offer to undergo sterilization in exchange for sentencing credits, and neither\nreceived a sentencing credit. After the second order was issued, Plaintiff William Gentry also\nopted not to obtain a vasectomy. Despite the second order’s promise that inmates who initially\nsigned up to undergo sterilization would receive the credit “whether [they] ultimately receive[d]\nthe procedures or not,” Gentry never obtained the sentencing credit, either. (Id.)\n\n In August 2017, Sullivan filed a complaint in the Chancery Court in White County,\nTennessee, alleging that Benningfield and Shoupe (collectively, “Defendants”) deprived him of\nhis Fourteenth Amendment rights by issuing and enforcing the sterilization-for-sentencing-credit\norders. Defendants removed the lawsuit to federal court, and Sullivan filed an amended\ncomplaint, adding Gentry and Haskell as plaintiffs. The amended complaint sought declaratory\nand injunctive relief, the latter of which requested that Sullivan, Haskell, and Gentry\n(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) receive the same 30-day sentencing credit that had been afforded to\nsimilarly-situated inmates who relinquished their procreative rights. Defendants filed a motion\nto dismiss, and Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment.\n\n While litigation was pending, Judge Benningfield entered a third order on November 9,\n2017, which stated:\n\n Whereas, on May 15, 2017, this Court entered a Standing Order, which applied\n only to White County inmates who were serving a sentence for the General\n Sessions Court. The Standing Order gave two days credit toward the [sentence]\n of any eligible inmate who completed the State of Tennessee, Department of\n Health’s Neonatal Syndrome Education (NAS) Program. Additionally, the\n Standing Order offered a 30-day credit toward the completion of an eligible\n inmate’s jail sentence if that inmate received the free [N]explanon implant or\n vasectomy offered by the Tennessee Department of Health.\n Whereas, on July 26, 2017, this Court entered an Order Rescinding Previous\n Standing Order. Specifically, the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order\n explained that this Court would no longer offer a 30-day credit toward the\n completion of an eligible inmate’s jail sentence if that inmate received the free\n nexplanon implant or vasectomy offered by the Tennessee Department of Health.\n The Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order informed those eligible inmates\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 5\n\n\n that had signed up to receive a free [N]explanon implant or vasectomy before the\n entry of the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order that they would still\n receive the 30-day credit toward the completion of their sentence, regardless of\n whether the[y] actually went through with receiving the procedure. It has now\n come to this Court’s attention that the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order\n has caused some confusion, specifically whether an inmate can currently promise\n to have one of the available procedure and still receive a 30-day jail sentence\n credit and this Court now enters this Order to clarify the Court’s intent as to how\n the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order was intended to be, and was in\n fact, applied.\n It is hereby clarified that the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order was not\n intended to extend the 30-day jail sentence credit for anyone who promised to\n undergo these surgical procedures after the entry of the Order Rescinding\n Previous Standing Order; rather, the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order\n was intended only to insure that the eligible inmates that had already complied\n with the Standing Order of May 15, 2017 (either by having the procedure or\n signing up with the intent to have the procedure) would receive the promised\n benefit regardless of whether those individuals ultimately had the procedure.\n\n(Clarifying Order, R. 42-1, PageID 500 (emphasis in original).) This third order clarified that,\neven though the second order purported to discontinue the sterilization-for-sentencing-credits\nprogram, inmates who opted to undergo sterilization before the second order was issued were\nstill eligible to receive the sentencing credit.\n\n On May 1, 2018, the Tennessee Legislature passed Senate Bill 2133, which enacted a\nnew law forbidding courts from making sentencing determinations based upon a defendant’s\nwillingness to consent to sterilization. The law states in relevant part that a “sentencing court\nshall not make a sentencing determination that is based in whole or in part on the defendant’s\nconsent or refusal to consent to any form of temporary or permanent birth control, sterilization,\nor family planning services, regardless of whether the defendant’s consent is voluntarily given.”\nTenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-217(c); see also Tenn. S.B. 2133, R. 50-2, PageID 557.\n\n On May 26, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to supplement their motion to dismiss,\nclaiming that Tennessee’s passage of this new law rendered the controversy moot. On June 18,\n2018, the district court granted Defendants’ motions and dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims and\npending motions for summary judgment as moot. Plaintiffs now appeal the district court’s\nmootness determination.\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 6\n\n\n II. ANALYSIS\n\n Defendants maintain this case is moot, and they also contend that Plaintiffs have no\nstanding to sue. This court reviews questions of standing and mootness de novo. Cleveland\nBranch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 523 (6th Cir. 2001).\n\n Although the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution\n“underpins both our standing and our mootness jurisprudence,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.\nLaidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000), standing and mootness inquiries\ndiverge in several important respects, one of which is timing. Whether a plaintiff has standing to\nsue is “determined as of the time the complaint is filed.” Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P.,\n263 F.3d at 524. If a plaintiff overcomes the standing hurdle at the time of filing, the doctrine of\nmootness then “requires that there be a live case or controversy at the time that a federal court\ndecides the case.” Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987). We address the standing and\nmootness doctrines in turn.\n\n A. Standing\n\n To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff must show “(1) an ‘injury in fact,’\n(2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and\n(3) a ‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Susan B. Anthony\nList v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157–58 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,\n560 (1992)). “In the context of claims for injunctive or declaratory relief,” the threatened injury\nin fact must be “concrete and particularized,” as well as “actual and imminent, not conjectural or\nhypothetical[.]” Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473, 491 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Summers v.\nEarth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). “Past exposure to illegal conduct” is insufficient\nto demonstrate an injury in fact that warrants declaratory or injunctive relief unless the past\ninjury is accompanied by “continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.\n488, 495–96 (1974); Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 252 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 2001).\n\n Defendants dispute that Plaintiffs can satisfy the first element: an injury in fact.\nDefendants argue that there is no constitutional right to a sentencing credit, Hansard v. Barrett,\n980 F.2d 1059, 1062 (6th Cir. 1992), so “the denial of a sentence credit, by itself, cannot be the\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 7\n\n\nbasis for standing’s injury-in-fact requirement.” (Appellee Br. 9.) But “[w]hen the government\nerects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is\nfor members of another group,” the “injury in fact” at issue is “the denial of equal treatment\nresulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.” Ne.\nFla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666\n(1993) [hereinafter “NFAGC”]). Thus, Plaintiffs need not show the denial of an independent\nright to make out an Article III injury in fact. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362–63 (1970)\n(finding that, although appellants had no right to be appointed to board of education, the Equal\nProtection Clause guaranteed that the “State may not deny to some the privilege of holding\npublic office that it extends to others on the basis of distinctions that violate federal\nconstitutional guarantees”).\n\n Defendants next argue that the types of differential treatment alleged do not violate the\nEqual Protection Clause and, accordingly, cannot constitute injuries in fact. Because the Equal\nProtection Clause “prohibits discrimination by government which either burdens a fundamental\nright, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than others similarly situated\nwithout any rational basis for the difference,” Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d\n673, 681–82 (6th Cir. 2011), an allegation that plaintiffs were subjected to differential treatment\nin one of these impermissible ways amounts to a cognizable injury in fact, so long as the\ndifferential treatment was either ongoing or accompanied by continuing adverse effects at the\ntime the complaint was filed. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96. Plaintiffs have identified two\npotential injuries in fact: differential treatment that burdens the fundamental right to procreate,\nand differential treatment based on sex.\n\n Plaintiffs first argue that Judge Benningfield’s order called for differential treatment that\nimpermissibly burdened the fundamental right to procreate, because it awarded benefits to only\nthose inmates who agreed to submit to sterilization, not those who refused to relinquish their\nprocreative rights. Both this court and the Supreme Court have acknowledged that the right to\nprocreate has achieved the status of a fundamental right for the purposes of equal protection\nchallenges. Robinson v. Bd. of Regents of E. Ky. Univ., 475 F.2d 707, 710 (6th Cir. 1973) (citing\nSkinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). Plaintiffs allege that Judge\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 8\n\n\nBenningfield specifically ordered that inmates would be awarded a 30-day sentencing credit in\nexchange for their agreement to undergo sterilization. They further allege that the same credit\nwas not available to inmates who chose not to forfeit their procreative rights. Requiring inmates\nto waive a fundamental right to obtain a government benefit impermissibly burdens that right.\nFouche, 396 U.S. at 362–63.\n\n Plaintiffs next argue that Judge Benningfield’s order called for differential treatment that\ntargeted a suspect class. The order made an express distinction between the choice that men and\nwomen faced. Men who wanted the sentencing credit would have to obtain a vasectomy, which\nPlaintiffs argue is a “potentially irreversible” form of sterilization. (Appellant Br. 14.) In\ncontrast, women who wanted the sentencing credit would have to obtain a Nexplanon implant,\nwhich Plaintiffs argue is a “surgically inserted but removable birth control” option. (Id.)\nPlaintiffs’ allegation that vasectomies pose more severe risks than Nexplanon implants finds\nsome support in the number of inmates who volunteered to submit to the respective procedures:\nas Defendants conceded at oral argument, fewer than five men signed up for vasectomies (and\nzero men ultimately obtained vasectomies), while about 40 women ultimately received\nNexplanon implants through the sterilization-for-sentencing-credits program. (Oral Arg. 19:31–\n20:05.) Taken together, the evidence and allegations before this court confirm that Plaintiffs\nadequately alleged that Defendants “erect[ed] a barrier that ma[de] it more difficult for members\nof one group”—male inmates—“to obtain a benefit”—sentencing credits—“than it [wa]s for\nmembers of another group”—female inmates. NFAGC, 508 U.S. at 666.\n\n Finally, standing requires that Plaintiffs alleged these injuries in fact were ongoing or had\n“continuing, present adverse effects” at the time they filed their complaint. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at\n495–96; Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 524. Plaintiffs adequately alleged that the\ndifferential treatment that burdened the exercise of a fundamental right was ongoing at the time\nthe complaint was filed, as they argued that Judge Benningfield’s second order continued to\npermit inmates who initially elected to waive their procreative rights to receive the 30-day\nsentencing credit without extending the same benefit to those who refused to waive their rights.\nPlaintiffs also alleged that, by continuing to award the sentencing credit to only those inmates\nwho opted to waive their procreative rights under the terms of the first order, the second order\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 9\n\n\neffectively froze the inmates’ initial choices in place. As a result, the current distinction between\ninmates who will receive the sentencing credit and those who will not is still tainted by any\nimpermissible sex discrimination that the first order contained. So, if the initial choice contained\na heightened barrier to male inmates, as Plaintiffs allege, the current distribution of sentencing\ncredits constitutes a continuing, adverse effect of that injury. Therefore, Plaintiffs adequately\nalleged that the sex-based differential treatment had “continuing, present adverse effects” at the\ntime they filed their complaint as well. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96.\n\n We note that Defendants have not made any arguments contesting causation or\nredressability, and that appears to be with good reason. The denial of differential treatment is\nfairly traceable to Judge Benningfield’s order, which set the terms of the sterilization-for-\nsentencing-credit program, and at the time the complaint was filed, the differential treatment that\nallegedly burdened the fundamental right to procreate and imposed a heightened barrier for male\ninmates to receive the sentencing credit would have been redressable by injunctive relief\nawarding the credit to Sullivan, Haskell, and Gentry. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740\n(1984). Thus, we find Plaintiffs had standing to bring both claims.\n\n B. Mootness\n\n The mootness doctrine, in contrast to our standing jurisprudence, “requires that there be a\nlive case or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case.” Burke, 479 U.S. at\n363. “[I]f events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of\nthe ability to give meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be dismissed.” Ailor v. City\nof Maynardville, 368 F.3d 587, 596 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).\n\n Ultimately, the “test for mootness is whether the relief sought would, if granted, make a\ndifference to the legal interests of the parties.” McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n,\nInc., 119 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir.1997) (en banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “No\nmatter how vehemently the parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that\nprecipitated the lawsuit, the case is moot if the dispute ‘is no longer embedded in any actual\ncontroversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal rights.’” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 10\n\n\n85, 91 (2013) (internal citations omitted). “The heavy burden of demonstrating mootness rests\non the party claiming mootness.” Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 531.\n\n Defendants first argue that, even if Plaintiffs initially had standing to bring these claims,\nthe claims are now moot, because the challenged order has been rescinded, and Tennessee has\npassed a new law making the challenged practice illegal. Defendants argue that these changes in\nthe law, as well as the public reprimand Judge Benningfield received due to his issuance of the\norders, are sufficient to show that Defendants have stopped engaging in the conduct at issue and\nthere is no reasonable expectation they will repeat it.\n\n A defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice moots a case only in the “rare\ninstance” where “subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior\ncannot reasonably be expected to recur and ‘interim relief or events have completely and\nirrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.’” League of Women Voters of Ohio v.\nBrunner, 548 F.3d 463, 473 (6th Cir. 2008); Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 530–31\n(quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). Defendants bear a “heavy”\nburden to demonstrate mootness in the context of voluntary cessation. Akers v. McGinnis,\n352 F.3d 1030, 1035 (6th Cir. 2003). Still, this court has noted that “cessation of the allegedly\nillegal conduct by government officials has been treated with more solicitude by the courts than\nsimilar action by private parties.” Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 705 (6th Cir. 2003).\n\n Repeal of a challenged law can, in some cases, render a case or controversy moot, Ky.\nRight to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 644 (6th Cir. 1997), but a case or controversy “does\nnot cease to exist merely by virtue of a change in the applicable law.” Hamilton Cty. Educ.\nAss’n v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 822 F.3d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 2016). “[W]here the changes in\nthe law arguably do not remove the harm or threatened harm underlying the dispute, ‘the case\nremains alive and suitable for judicial determination.’” Cam I, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty.\nMetro Gov’t, 460 F.3d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Put another way,\nbefore voluntary cessation of a practice could ever moot a claim, the challenged practice must\nhave actually ceased. See Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 531. Thus, the effects of\nthe legal changes that took place after the complaint was filed are paramount in determining\nwhether Plaintiffs’ claims are moot.\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 11\n\n\n Judge Benningfield’s third order stated that “eligible inmates that had already complied\nwith the Standing Order of May 15, 2017 (either by having the procedure or signing up with the\nintent to have the procedure) would receive the promised benefit regardless of whether those\nindividuals ultimately had the procedure.” (Clarifying Order, R. 42-1, PageID 500.) Because\nthe third order continues to extend the credit to “eligible” inmates, but not to those who never\nagreed to forego their procreative rights, this order did not end the challenged differential\ntreatment.1 At oral argument, Defendants confirmed that anyone who initially agreed to undergo\nsterilization would still be eligible to receive a 30-day credit under the terms of the second and\nthird orders, and that inmates were still requesting credits from Judge Benningfield after the third\norder was issued in November 2017. Although this court treats government actors with “more\nsolicitude” than private parties in analyzing whether a voluntarily ceased practice is likely to\nrecur, Ammex, 351 F.3d at 705, our more favorable standard for government actors cannot\ndispense with an allegation that Defendants did not in fact cease their challenged conduct in the\nfirst instance.2 Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 531.\n\n Senate Bill 2133—enacted as Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-217—fares no better at\nextinguishing the challenged practice. The new law declares that judges cannot consider\nsterilization in any sentencing determinations going forward, which ensures that future inmates\nwill not endure this allegedly unconstitutional practice. But the new law had no impact on\nPlaintiffs, as the statute impacts only sentences imposed after the effective date of the statute.\nThus, the statute fails to stop the differential treatment Plaintiffs continue to suffer: not receiving\nthe sentencing credit that was awarded to inmates who forfeited their fundamental right to\n\n\n 1Although the order promised that inmates like Gentry who “sign[ed] up with the intent to have the\nprocedure” but never “ultimately had the procedure” would receive the credit and be treated the same as inmates\nwho were actually sterilized (Clarifying Order, R. 42-1, PageID 500), Plaintiffs allege Gentry never received his\nsentencing credit. Thus, even in direct contravention of Judge Benningfield’s third order, Plaintiffs argue that the\nchallenged practice of providing sentencing credits to those who underwent sterilization while denying them to\ninmates who did not forfeit their procreative rights continued.\n 2We also note that, even if the program had ceased, Defendants failed to make “absolutely clear” they\nwould refrain from engaging in this conduct in the future. To the contrary, they went as far as to call the program a\n“good deed” in oral argument before this court. (Oral Arg. 25:11–25:28 (“A lot of them are addicted to drugs, a lot\nof them . . . have unwanted children—the judge was talking about seeing these families come time and time again\nbefore him and he was really trying to do something that was well. No good deed goes unpunished.”).)\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 12\n\n\nprocreate. Thus, neither of the changes to the law has ceased the allegedly unconstitutional\ndifferential treatment that any of the Plaintiffs faced, and they do not moot Plaintiffs’ claims.\n\n Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot because all three plaintiffs have\nbeen released from the White County jail in the time since this lawsuit was filed, and that\nprospective relief cannot redress claims challenging conditions of confinement if Plaintiffs are no\nlonger incarcerated. For example, Defendants press that courts have found it would be\nmeaningless to order prison officials to stop searching an inmate’s mail or to allow an inmate to\nattend a religious service after the inmate has already been released from detention. See, e.g.,\nKensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996); Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,\n65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993).\nPlaintiffs’ claims are distinguishable from those extinguished in the cases cited above, because\nthey do not challenge conditions of confinement; they challenge the differential treatment with\nrespect to the distribution of sentencing credits. Still, the question remains whether Plaintiffs’\nrelease from jail similarly “deprive[s] the court of the ability to give meaningful relief.” Ailor,\n368 F.3d at 596.\n\n Plaintiffs argue that awarding them the 30-day sentencing credit would still provide\nmeaningful relief, because the credit would impact collateral rights under state law that turn on\nthe date their sentences were terminated.3 Even where a plaintiff’s sentence has expired, the\nSupreme Court has recognized that challenges that impact the length of an inmate’s sentence can\nstill present a live case or controversy, so long as the former inmate identifies an ongoing\ncollateral consequence that can be redressed by the relief sought. Pollard v. United States,\n352 U.S. 354, 358 (1957) (finding that the “possibility of consequences collateral to the\nimposition of sentence is sufficiently substantial to justify our dealing with the merits” of\nplaintiff’s challenge to his sentence, even though plaintiff had already been released from\n\n 3Plaintiffs also contend that at least one of their sentences has not yet expired: although William Gentry\nwas released from jail, he is serving the remainder of his sentence on probation under the supervision of Community\nCorrections. “As such, Plaintiff Gentry would still benefit from a 30-day sentence credit even after his release,\nbecause such a credit would reduce the length of time that he has to spend under state custodial control,” which\nwould still constitute meaningful relief. (Reply Br. 23 (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)).) If\nGentry is still serving his sentence, we agree that awarding him the credit he requests and thereby reducing his\nsentence by 30 days would provide meaningful relief. Ailor, 368 F.3d at 596.\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 13\n\n\nprison); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 220–21 (1946) (finding case was not mooted by\nexpiration of sentence where plaintiff could show “under either state or federal law further\npenalties or disabilities can be imposed on him as a result of the judgment which has now been\nsatisfied”); cf. United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 937 (2011) (finding claim moot\nwhere plaintiff “was no longer subject to the sex-offender-registration conditions that he sought\nto challenge on appeal,” and plaintiff failed to show “some ongoing ‘collateral consequenc[e]’\nthat is ‘traceable’ to the challenged portion of the sentence and ‘likely to be redressed by a\nfavorable judicial decision’”); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (“Once the convict’s\nsentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended\nincarceration or parole—some ‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction—must exist if the suit\n[challenging the plaintiff’s parole revocation] is to be maintained.”).\n\n While Defendants cannot give Plaintiffs back the 30 extra days they served as compared\nto inmates who opted to undergo sterilization, Plaintiffs have alleged that awarding them the 30-\nday sentencing credit would affect other collateral consequences related to sentencing.\nConcretely, Plaintiffs argue that Tennessee law permits non-violent offenders to petition for\nexpungement five years after the sentence termination date, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-32-\n101(g)(2)(B), such that retroactive application of the sentencing credit would allow them to\npursue expungement 30 days sooner. Because Plaintiffs have alleged that the 30-day sentencing\ncredit would accelerate their access to expungement, they have shown that the “the relief sought\nwould, if granted, make a difference to the legal interests of the parties.” McPherson, 119 F.3d\nat 458. Thus, Plaintiffs’ release from jail does not moot their claims.\n\n III. CONCLUSION\n\n We reverse the district court’s determination that Plaintiffs’ claims were moot and\nremand for consideration of their claims on the merits.\n\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 14\n\n\n _________________\n\n DISSENT\n _________________\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Christopher SULLIVAN; Nathan Haskell; William Gentry, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Sam BENNINGFIELD; Oddie Shoupe, Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0060p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n CHRISTOPHER SULLIVAN; NATHAN HASKELL; WILLIAM ┐\\n GENTRY, │\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants, │\\n > No. 18-5643\\n │\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n SAM BENNINGFIELD; ODDIE SHOUPE, │\\n Defendants-Appellees. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Tennessee at Cookeville.\\n No. 2:17-cv-00052—Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: January 15, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 4, 2019\\n\\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and MOORE, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Daniel A. Horwitz, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL A. HORWITZ, Nashville,\\nTennessee, for Appellants. Michael T. Schmitt, ORTALE KELLEY LAW FIRM, Nashville,\\nTennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Daniel A. Horwitz, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL A.\\nHORWITZ, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Michael T. Schmitt, ORTALE KELLEY\\nLAW FIRM, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.\\n\\n COLE, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MOORE, J., joined.\\nSUHRHEINRICH, J. (pg. 14), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n COLE, Chief Judge. In May 2017, Judge Sam Benningfield issued an order offering a\\n30-day sentencing credit to inmates in White County, Tennessee. There was one condition: to\\nobtain the credit, inmates had to submit to sterilization. After public outcry about the\\nsterilization-for-sentencing-credits program, Judge Benningfield issued a second order declaring\\nthat inmates could no longer enroll in the program, followed by a third order clarifying which of\\nthe inmates who initially enrolled could still receive the sentencing credit. Within months, the\\nTennessee Legislature passed Senate Bill 2133, which made it illegal for courts to make\\nsentencing determinations based on a defendant’s willingness to consent to sterilization.\\n\\n Christopher Sullivan, Nathan Haskell, and William Gentry—inmates who refused to\\nsubmit to a vasectomy and were consequently denied the sentencing credit that was awarded to\\ninmates who underwent sterilization—challenged Judge Benningfield’s orders under the Equal\\nProtection Clause, arguing that the orders subjected inmates to differential treatment on the basis\\nof their procreative rights and their sex. The district court found that the claims were moot in\\nlight of the passage of Senate Bill 2133 and Judge Benningfield’s second and third orders.\\nBecause none of those subsequent developments in the law ended the differential treatment that\\nplaintiffs challenge, we reverse and remand for consideration of plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n On May 15, 2017, White County General Sessions Judge Sam Benningfield entered a\\nstanding order, which stated:\\n\\n For good cause shown including judicial economy and the administration of\\n justice, it is ORDERED any White County inmate serving a sentence for the\\n General Sessions Court who satisfactorily completes the State of Tennessee,\\n Department of Health Neonatal Syndrome Education (NAS) Program be given\\n two (2) days credit toward completion of his/her jail sentence. Any such female\\n inmate who receives the free [N]explanon implant or any such male inmate who\\n has the free vasectomy as a result thereof shall be given an additional thirty\\n (30) days credit toward completion of his/her jail sentence.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\n(Initial Order, R. 13-1 (emphasis in original).) After Judge Benningfield issued this order,\\nPlaintiffs allege that “dozens of White County inmates”—including Plaintiff William Gentry—\\n“agreed to submit to surgical sterilization in order to reduce the length of their respective jail\\nsentences.” (Am. Compl., R. 13, PageID 133–35.) Both parties agree that Judge Benningfield’s\\nco-defendant, White County Sheriff Oddie Shoupe, enforced this order by reducing the sentences\\nof inmates who underwent sterilization. It is uncontested that multiple inmates were sterilized\\nand received a sentence credit in line with Judge Benningfield’s order.\\n\\n The press covered White County’s sterilization-for-sentencing-credits program on July\\n19, 2017, after the White County District Attorney expressed concerns about the program to a\\nreporter. Plaintiffs allege that “intense national outrage and widespread condemnation”\\nfollowed. (Id. at PageID 131, 135.) Shortly thereafter, on July 26, 2017, Judge Benningfield\\nissued a second order, which stated:\\n\\n Whereas the State of Tennessee, Department of Health has indicated to the court\\n through its representative that it will no longer offer free vasectomies to White\\n County inmates serving a sentence for the General Sessions Court and will not\\n provide the free [N]explanon implant to White County inmates serving a sentence\\n for the General Sessions Court who receives any credit toward the completion of\\n their jail sentence as a result thereof; it is hereby ORDERED the previous order\\n i[n] this regard is hereby rescinded.\\n Those inmates who have demonstrated to the court their desire to improve their\\n situations and take serious and considered steps toward their rehabilitation by\\n having the procedures or agreeing to have same will not be denied the credit. You\\n will be awarded the 30 days jail credit promised whether you ultimately receive\\n the procedures or not. All inmates shall remain eligible for the two (2) days credit\\n for completing the State of Tennessee, Department of Health Neonatal Syndrome\\n Education (NAS) Program satisfactorily.\\n\\n(Rescinding Order, R. 13-2 (emphasis in original).) In this second order, Judge Benningfield\\nattempted to rescind the initial standing order by awarding sentencing credits to all inmates who\\noffered to undergo sterilization, regardless of whether those inmates were ultimately sterilized.\\nBut this order took no action with respect to inmates who had refused the offer to undergo\\nsterilization in exchange for sentencing credits. Consequently, the second order ensured that\\ninmates who had agreed to submit to sterilization would still receive a 30-day sentence reduction\\nthat was denied to inmates who had maintained their unwillingness to undergo sterilization.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\n Two of those inmates who had refused to undergo sterilization were Plaintiffs\\nChristopher Sullivan and Nathan Haskell. At the time the first and second orders were issued,\\nSullivan and Haskell were both inmates in the White County jail. Neither accepted Judge\\nBenningfield’s offer to undergo sterilization in exchange for sentencing credits, and neither\\nreceived a sentencing credit. After the second order was issued, Plaintiff William Gentry also\\nopted not to obtain a vasectomy. Despite the second order’s promise that inmates who initially\\nsigned up to undergo sterilization would receive the credit “whether [they] ultimately receive[d]\\nthe procedures or not,” Gentry never obtained the sentencing credit, either. (Id.)\\n\\n In August 2017, Sullivan filed a complaint in the Chancery Court in White County,\\nTennessee, alleging that Benningfield and Shoupe (collectively, “Defendants”) deprived him of\\nhis Fourteenth Amendment rights by issuing and enforcing the sterilization-for-sentencing-credit\\norders. Defendants removed the lawsuit to federal court, and Sullivan filed an amended\\ncomplaint, adding Gentry and Haskell as plaintiffs. The amended complaint sought declaratory\\nand injunctive relief, the latter of which requested that Sullivan, Haskell, and Gentry\\n(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) receive the same 30-day sentencing credit that had been afforded to\\nsimilarly-situated inmates who relinquished their procreative rights. Defendants filed a motion\\nto dismiss, and Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment.\\n\\n While litigation was pending, Judge Benningfield entered a third order on November 9,\\n2017, which stated:\\n\\n Whereas, on May 15, 2017, this Court entered a Standing Order, which applied\\n only to White County inmates who were serving a sentence for the General\\n Sessions Court. The Standing Order gave two days credit toward the [sentence]\\n of any eligible inmate who completed the State of Tennessee, Department of\\n Health’s Neonatal Syndrome Education (NAS) Program. Additionally, the\\n Standing Order offered a 30-day credit toward the completion of an eligible\\n inmate’s jail sentence if that inmate received the free [N]explanon implant or\\n vasectomy offered by the Tennessee Department of Health.\\n Whereas, on July 26, 2017, this Court entered an Order Rescinding Previous\\n Standing Order. Specifically, the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order\\n explained that this Court would no longer offer a 30-day credit toward the\\n completion of an eligible inmate’s jail sentence if that inmate received the free\\n nexplanon implant or vasectomy offered by the Tennessee Department of Health.\\n The Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order informed those eligible inmates\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\n that had signed up to receive a free [N]explanon implant or vasectomy before the\\n entry of the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order that they would still\\n receive the 30-day credit toward the completion of their sentence, regardless of\\n whether the[y] actually went through with receiving the procedure. It has now\\n come to this Court’s attention that the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order\\n has caused some confusion, specifically whether an inmate can currently promise\\n to have one of the available procedure and still receive a 30-day jail sentence\\n credit and this Court now enters this Order to clarify the Court’s intent as to how\\n the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order was intended to be, and was in\\n fact, applied.\\n It is hereby clarified that the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order was not\\n intended to extend the 30-day jail sentence credit for anyone who promised to\\n undergo these surgical procedures after the entry of the Order Rescinding\\n Previous Standing Order; rather, the Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order\\n was intended only to insure that the eligible inmates that had already complied\\n with the Standing Order of May 15, 2017 (either by having the procedure or\\n signing up with the intent to have the procedure) would receive the promised\\n benefit regardless of whether those individuals ultimately had the procedure.\\n\\n(Clarifying Order, R. 42-1, PageID 500 (emphasis in original).) This third order clarified that,\\neven though the second order purported to discontinue the sterilization-for-sentencing-credits\\nprogram, inmates who opted to undergo sterilization before the second order was issued were\\nstill eligible to receive the sentencing credit.\\n\\n On May 1, 2018, the Tennessee Legislature passed Senate Bill 2133, which enacted a\\nnew law forbidding courts from making sentencing determinations based upon a defendant’s\\nwillingness to consent to sterilization. The law states in relevant part that a “sentencing court\\nshall not make a sentencing determination that is based in whole or in part on the defendant’s\\nconsent or refusal to consent to any form of temporary or permanent birth control, sterilization,\\nor family planning services, regardless of whether the defendant’s consent is voluntarily given.”\\nTenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-217(c); see also Tenn. S.B. 2133, R. 50-2, PageID 557.\\n\\n On May 26, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to supplement their motion to dismiss,\\nclaiming that Tennessee’s passage of this new law rendered the controversy moot. On June 18,\\n2018, the district court granted Defendants’ motions and dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims and\\npending motions for summary judgment as moot. Plaintiffs now appeal the district court’s\\nmootness determination.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n\\n Defendants maintain this case is moot, and they also contend that Plaintiffs have no\\nstanding to sue. This court reviews questions of standing and mootness de novo. Cleveland\\nBranch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 523 (6th Cir. 2001).\\n\\n Although the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution\\n“underpins both our standing and our mootness jurisprudence,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.\\nLaidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000), standing and mootness inquiries\\ndiverge in several important respects, one of which is timing. Whether a plaintiff has standing to\\nsue is “determined as of the time the complaint is filed.” Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P.,\\n263 F.3d at 524. If a plaintiff overcomes the standing hurdle at the time of filing, the doctrine of\\nmootness then “requires that there be a live case or controversy at the time that a federal court\\ndecides the case.” Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987). We address the standing and\\nmootness doctrines in turn.\\n\\n A. Standing\\n\\n To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff must show “(1) an ‘injury in fact,’\\n(2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and\\n(3) a ‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Susan B. Anthony\\nList v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157–58 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,\\n560 (1992)). “In the context of claims for injunctive or declaratory relief,” the threatened injury\\nin fact must be “concrete and particularized,” as well as “actual and imminent, not conjectural or\\nhypothetical[.]” Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473, 491 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Summers v.\\nEarth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). “Past exposure to illegal conduct” is insufficient\\nto demonstrate an injury in fact that warrants declaratory or injunctive relief unless the past\\ninjury is accompanied by “continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.\\n488, 495–96 (1974); Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 252 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 2001).\\n\\n Defendants dispute that Plaintiffs can satisfy the first element: an injury in fact.\\nDefendants argue that there is no constitutional right to a sentencing credit, Hansard v. Barrett,\\n980 F.2d 1059, 1062 (6th Cir. 1992), so “the denial of a sentence credit, by itself, cannot be the\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nbasis for standing’s injury-in-fact requirement.” (Appellee Br. 9.) But “[w]hen the government\\nerects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is\\nfor members of another group,” the “injury in fact” at issue is “the denial of equal treatment\\nresulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.” Ne.\\nFla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666\\n(1993) [hereinafter “NFAGC”]). Thus, Plaintiffs need not show the denial of an independent\\nright to make out an Article III injury in fact. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362–63 (1970)\\n(finding that, although appellants had no right to be appointed to board of education, the Equal\\nProtection Clause guaranteed that the “State may not deny to some the privilege of holding\\npublic office that it extends to others on the basis of distinctions that violate federal\\nconstitutional guarantees”).\\n\\n Defendants next argue that the types of differential treatment alleged do not violate the\\nEqual Protection Clause and, accordingly, cannot constitute injuries in fact. Because the Equal\\nProtection Clause “prohibits discrimination by government which either burdens a fundamental\\nright, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than others similarly situated\\nwithout any rational basis for the difference,” Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d\\n673, 681–82 (6th Cir. 2011), an allegation that plaintiffs were subjected to differential treatment\\nin one of these impermissible ways amounts to a cognizable injury in fact, so long as the\\ndifferential treatment was either ongoing or accompanied by continuing adverse effects at the\\ntime the complaint was filed. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96. Plaintiffs have identified two\\npotential injuries in fact: differential treatment that burdens the fundamental right to procreate,\\nand differential treatment based on sex.\\n\\n Plaintiffs first argue that Judge Benningfield’s order called for differential treatment that\\nimpermissibly burdened the fundamental right to procreate, because it awarded benefits to only\\nthose inmates who agreed to submit to sterilization, not those who refused to relinquish their\\nprocreative rights. Both this court and the Supreme Court have acknowledged that the right to\\nprocreate has achieved the status of a fundamental right for the purposes of equal protection\\nchallenges. Robinson v. Bd. of Regents of E. Ky. Univ., 475 F.2d 707, 710 (6th Cir. 1973) (citing\\nSkinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). Plaintiffs allege that Judge\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\nBenningfield specifically ordered that inmates would be awarded a 30-day sentencing credit in\\nexchange for their agreement to undergo sterilization. They further allege that the same credit\\nwas not available to inmates who chose not to forfeit their procreative rights. Requiring inmates\\nto waive a fundamental right to obtain a government benefit impermissibly burdens that right.\\nFouche, 396 U.S. at 362–63.\\n\\n Plaintiffs next argue that Judge Benningfield’s order called for differential treatment that\\ntargeted a suspect class. The order made an express distinction between the choice that men and\\nwomen faced. Men who wanted the sentencing credit would have to obtain a vasectomy, which\\nPlaintiffs argue is a “potentially irreversible” form of sterilization. (Appellant Br. 14.) In\\ncontrast, women who wanted the sentencing credit would have to obtain a Nexplanon implant,\\nwhich Plaintiffs argue is a “surgically inserted but removable birth control” option. (Id.)\\nPlaintiffs’ allegation that vasectomies pose more severe risks than Nexplanon implants finds\\nsome support in the number of inmates who volunteered to submit to the respective procedures:\\nas Defendants conceded at oral argument, fewer than five men signed up for vasectomies (and\\nzero men ultimately obtained vasectomies), while about 40 women ultimately received\\nNexplanon implants through the sterilization-for-sentencing-credits program. (Oral Arg. 19:31–\\n20:05.) Taken together, the evidence and allegations before this court confirm that Plaintiffs\\nadequately alleged that Defendants “erect[ed] a barrier that ma[de] it more difficult for members\\nof one group”—male inmates—“to obtain a benefit”—sentencing credits—“than it [wa]s for\\nmembers of another group”—female inmates. NFAGC, 508 U.S. at 666.\\n\\n Finally, standing requires that Plaintiffs alleged these injuries in fact were ongoing or had\\n“continuing, present adverse effects” at the time they filed their complaint. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at\\n495–96; Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 524. Plaintiffs adequately alleged that the\\ndifferential treatment that burdened the exercise of a fundamental right was ongoing at the time\\nthe complaint was filed, as they argued that Judge Benningfield’s second order continued to\\npermit inmates who initially elected to waive their procreative rights to receive the 30-day\\nsentencing credit without extending the same benefit to those who refused to waive their rights.\\nPlaintiffs also alleged that, by continuing to award the sentencing credit to only those inmates\\nwho opted to waive their procreative rights under the terms of the first order, the second order\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\neffectively froze the inmates’ initial choices in place. As a result, the current distinction between\\ninmates who will receive the sentencing credit and those who will not is still tainted by any\\nimpermissible sex discrimination that the first order contained. So, if the initial choice contained\\na heightened barrier to male inmates, as Plaintiffs allege, the current distribution of sentencing\\ncredits constitutes a continuing, adverse effect of that injury. Therefore, Plaintiffs adequately\\nalleged that the sex-based differential treatment had “continuing, present adverse effects” at the\\ntime they filed their complaint as well. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96.\\n\\n We note that Defendants have not made any arguments contesting causation or\\nredressability, and that appears to be with good reason. The denial of differential treatment is\\nfairly traceable to Judge Benningfield’s order, which set the terms of the sterilization-for-\\nsentencing-credit program, and at the time the complaint was filed, the differential treatment that\\nallegedly burdened the fundamental right to procreate and imposed a heightened barrier for male\\ninmates to receive the sentencing credit would have been redressable by injunctive relief\\nawarding the credit to Sullivan, Haskell, and Gentry. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740\\n(1984). Thus, we find Plaintiffs had standing to bring both claims.\\n\\n B. Mootness\\n\\n The mootness doctrine, in contrast to our standing jurisprudence, “requires that there be a\\nlive case or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case.” Burke, 479 U.S. at\\n363. “[I]f events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of\\nthe ability to give meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be dismissed.” Ailor v. City\\nof Maynardville, 368 F.3d 587, 596 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).\\n\\n Ultimately, the “test for mootness is whether the relief sought would, if granted, make a\\ndifference to the legal interests of the parties.” McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n,\\nInc., 119 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir.1997) (en banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “No\\nmatter how vehemently the parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that\\nprecipitated the lawsuit, the case is moot if the dispute ‘is no longer embedded in any actual\\ncontroversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal rights.’” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\n85, 91 (2013) (internal citations omitted). “The heavy burden of demonstrating mootness rests\\non the party claiming mootness.” Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 531.\\n\\n Defendants first argue that, even if Plaintiffs initially had standing to bring these claims,\\nthe claims are now moot, because the challenged order has been rescinded, and Tennessee has\\npassed a new law making the challenged practice illegal. Defendants argue that these changes in\\nthe law, as well as the public reprimand Judge Benningfield received due to his issuance of the\\norders, are sufficient to show that Defendants have stopped engaging in the conduct at issue and\\nthere is no reasonable expectation they will repeat it.\\n\\n A defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice moots a case only in the “rare\\ninstance” where “subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior\\ncannot reasonably be expected to recur and ‘interim relief or events have completely and\\nirrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.’” League of Women Voters of Ohio v.\\nBrunner, 548 F.3d 463, 473 (6th Cir. 2008); Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 530–31\\n(quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). Defendants bear a “heavy”\\nburden to demonstrate mootness in the context of voluntary cessation. Akers v. McGinnis,\\n352 F.3d 1030, 1035 (6th Cir. 2003). Still, this court has noted that “cessation of the allegedly\\nillegal conduct by government officials has been treated with more solicitude by the courts than\\nsimilar action by private parties.” Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 705 (6th Cir. 2003).\\n\\n Repeal of a challenged law can, in some cases, render a case or controversy moot, Ky.\\nRight to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 644 (6th Cir. 1997), but a case or controversy “does\\nnot cease to exist merely by virtue of a change in the applicable law.” Hamilton Cty. Educ.\\nAss’n v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 822 F.3d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 2016). “[W]here the changes in\\nthe law arguably do not remove the harm or threatened harm underlying the dispute, ‘the case\\nremains alive and suitable for judicial determination.’” Cam I, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty.\\nMetro Gov’t, 460 F.3d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Put another way,\\nbefore voluntary cessation of a practice could ever moot a claim, the challenged practice must\\nhave actually ceased. See Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 531. Thus, the effects of\\nthe legal changes that took place after the complaint was filed are paramount in determining\\nwhether Plaintiffs’ claims are moot.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n Judge Benningfield’s third order stated that “eligible inmates that had already complied\\nwith the Standing Order of May 15, 2017 (either by having the procedure or signing up with the\\nintent to have the procedure) would receive the promised benefit regardless of whether those\\nindividuals ultimately had the procedure.” (Clarifying Order, R. 42-1, PageID 500.) Because\\nthe third order continues to extend the credit to “eligible” inmates, but not to those who never\\nagreed to forego their procreative rights, this order did not end the challenged differential\\ntreatment.1 At oral argument, Defendants confirmed that anyone who initially agreed to undergo\\nsterilization would still be eligible to receive a 30-day credit under the terms of the second and\\nthird orders, and that inmates were still requesting credits from Judge Benningfield after the third\\norder was issued in November 2017. Although this court treats government actors with “more\\nsolicitude” than private parties in analyzing whether a voluntarily ceased practice is likely to\\nrecur, Ammex, 351 F.3d at 705, our more favorable standard for government actors cannot\\ndispense with an allegation that Defendants did not in fact cease their challenged conduct in the\\nfirst instance.2 Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 263 F.3d at 531.\\n\\n Senate Bill 2133—enacted as Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-217—fares no better at\\nextinguishing the challenged practice. The new law declares that judges cannot consider\\nsterilization in any sentencing determinations going forward, which ensures that future inmates\\nwill not endure this allegedly unconstitutional practice. But the new law had no impact on\\nPlaintiffs, as the statute impacts only sentences imposed after the effective date of the statute.\\nThus, the statute fails to stop the differential treatment Plaintiffs continue to suffer: not receiving\\nthe sentencing credit that was awarded to inmates who forfeited their fundamental right to\\n\\n\\n 1Although the order promised that inmates like Gentry who “sign[ed] up with the intent to have the\\nprocedure” but never “ultimately had the procedure” would receive the credit and be treated the same as inmates\\nwho were actually sterilized (Clarifying Order, R. 42-1, PageID 500), Plaintiffs allege Gentry never received his\\nsentencing credit. Thus, even in direct contravention of Judge Benningfield’s third order, Plaintiffs argue that the\\nchallenged practice of providing sentencing credits to those who underwent sterilization while denying them to\\ninmates who did not forfeit their procreative rights continued.\\n 2We also note that, even if the program had ceased, Defendants failed to make “absolutely clear” they\\nwould refrain from engaging in this conduct in the future. To the contrary, they went as far as to call the program a\\n“good deed” in oral argument before this court. (Oral Arg. 25:11–25:28 (“A lot of them are addicted to drugs, a lot\\nof them . . . have unwanted children—the judge was talking about seeing these families come time and time again\\nbefore him and he was really trying to do something that was well. No good deed goes unpunished.”).)\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 12\\n\\n\\nprocreate. Thus, neither of the changes to the law has ceased the allegedly unconstitutional\\ndifferential treatment that any of the Plaintiffs faced, and they do not moot Plaintiffs’ claims.\\n\\n Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot because all three plaintiffs have\\nbeen released from the White County jail in the time since this lawsuit was filed, and that\\nprospective relief cannot redress claims challenging conditions of confinement if Plaintiffs are no\\nlonger incarcerated. For example, Defendants press that courts have found it would be\\nmeaningless to order prison officials to stop searching an inmate’s mail or to allow an inmate to\\nattend a religious service after the inmate has already been released from detention. See, e.g.,\\nKensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996); Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,\\n65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993).\\nPlaintiffs’ claims are distinguishable from those extinguished in the cases cited above, because\\nthey do not challenge conditions of confinement; they challenge the differential treatment with\\nrespect to the distribution of sentencing credits. Still, the question remains whether Plaintiffs’\\nrelease from jail similarly “deprive[s] the court of the ability to give meaningful relief.” Ailor,\\n368 F.3d at 596.\\n\\n Plaintiffs argue that awarding them the 30-day sentencing credit would still provide\\nmeaningful relief, because the credit would impact collateral rights under state law that turn on\\nthe date their sentences were terminated.3 Even where a plaintiff’s sentence has expired, the\\nSupreme Court has recognized that challenges that impact the length of an inmate’s sentence can\\nstill present a live case or controversy, so long as the former inmate identifies an ongoing\\ncollateral consequence that can be redressed by the relief sought. Pollard v. United States,\\n352 U.S. 354, 358 (1957) (finding that the “possibility of consequences collateral to the\\nimposition of sentence is sufficiently substantial to justify our dealing with the merits” of\\nplaintiff’s challenge to his sentence, even though plaintiff had already been released from\\n\\n 3Plaintiffs also contend that at least one of their sentences has not yet expired: although William Gentry\\nwas released from jail, he is serving the remainder of his sentence on probation under the supervision of Community\\nCorrections. “As such, Plaintiff Gentry would still benefit from a 30-day sentence credit even after his release,\\nbecause such a credit would reduce the length of time that he has to spend under state custodial control,” which\\nwould still constitute meaningful relief. (Reply Br. 23 (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)).) If\\nGentry is still serving his sentence, we agree that awarding him the credit he requests and thereby reducing his\\nsentence by 30 days would provide meaningful relief. Ailor, 368 F.3d at 596.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 13\\n\\n\\nprison); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 220–21 (1946) (finding case was not mooted by\\nexpiration of sentence where plaintiff could show “under either state or federal law further\\npenalties or disabilities can be imposed on him as a result of the judgment which has now been\\nsatisfied”); cf. United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 937 (2011) (finding claim moot\\nwhere plaintiff “was no longer subject to the sex-offender-registration conditions that he sought\\nto challenge on appeal,” and plaintiff failed to show “some ongoing ‘collateral consequenc[e]’\\nthat is ‘traceable’ to the challenged portion of the sentence and ‘likely to be redressed by a\\nfavorable judicial decision’”); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (“Once the convict’s\\nsentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended\\nincarceration or parole—some ‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction—must exist if the suit\\n[challenging the plaintiff’s parole revocation] is to be maintained.”).\\n\\n While Defendants cannot give Plaintiffs back the 30 extra days they served as compared\\nto inmates who opted to undergo sterilization, Plaintiffs have alleged that awarding them the 30-\\nday sentencing credit would affect other collateral consequences related to sentencing.\\nConcretely, Plaintiffs argue that Tennessee law permits non-violent offenders to petition for\\nexpungement five years after the sentence termination date, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-32-\\n101(g)(2)(B), such that retroactive application of the sentencing credit would allow them to\\npursue expungement 30 days sooner. Because Plaintiffs have alleged that the 30-day sentencing\\ncredit would accelerate their access to expungement, they have shown that the “the relief sought\\nwould, if granted, make a difference to the legal interests of the parties.” McPherson, 119 F.3d\\nat 458. Thus, Plaintiffs’ release from jail does not moot their claims.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n We reverse the district court’s determination that Plaintiffs’ claims were moot and\\nremand for consideration of their claims on the merits.\\n\\f No. 18-5643 Sullivan, et al. v. Benningfield, et al. Page 14\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n DISSENT\\n _________________\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1654,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607079,"string":"4,607,079"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Carlos Clifford LOWE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Carlos Lowe v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-5490"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Donald, Thapar\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888316/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"030concurrence\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888317/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0059p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n CARLOS CLIFFORD LOWE, ┐\\n Petitioner-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-5490\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │\\n Respondent-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.\\n Nos. 3:05-cr-00022-1; 3:16-cv-00714—Thomas A. Varlan, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: October 3, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 4, 2019\\n\\n Before: BATCHELDER, DONALD, and THAPAR, Circuit judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Melissa M. Salinas, Garrett T. Fox, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW\\nSCHOOL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Melissa M. Salinas,\\nGarrett T. Fox, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for\\nAppellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville,\\nTennessee, for Appellee.\\n\\n DONALD, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BATCHELDER and THAPAR,\\nJJ., joined. THAPAR, J. (pg. 10), delivered a separate concurring opinion in which\\nBATCHELDER, J., joined.\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-appellant Carlos Lowe appeals\\nthe district court’s denial of his successive pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his\\nsentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the reasons more fully explained below, we\\nREVERSE and REMAND the case back to the district court.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In 2005, a jury found Lowe guilty of possessing ammunition as a convicted felon, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lowe had previously been convicted of four felonies under\\nTennessee law. They include: third-degree burglary, aggravated assault, a rape occurring in\\n1977, and a rape occurring in 1985.\\n\\n At his sentencing, the district court determined that at least three of those prior felonies\\nqualified Lowe as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)\\nand sentenced him to 235 months imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Lowe subsequently\\nappealed his conviction and his sentence, but this court affirmed. United States v. Lowe, No. 06-\\n5352 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2007) (order). Lowe then filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28\\nU.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied.\\n\\n After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally\\nvague in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), Lowe filed a motion for an order\\nauthorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or\\ncorrect his sentence under § 2255. In re Carlos Clifford Lowe, 16-6002 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 2016)\\n(order). We granted the motion and transferred the case to the district court. Id.\\n\\n Lowe filed his second or successive § 2255 motion in the district court, challenging his\\nstatus as an armed career criminal. The district court denied the motion and certified that an\\nappeal would not be taken in good faith, holding that Lowe’s convictions for third-degree\\nburglary, aggravated assault, and the 1977 rape still qualify as ACCA predicates. Based on those\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 3\\n\\n\\ndeterminations, the district court did not address Lowe’s 1985 rape, for which he was convicted\\nunder a different statute than for the 1977 rape.\\n\\n Lowe timely appealed the district court’s denial of his second § 2255 motion. This court\\ngranted him a certificate of appealability to determine whether his third-degree burglary\\nconviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. That question, however, was recently answered in\\nCradler v. United States, 891 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2018). It does not. See id. at 671.\\n\\n Undeterred, the Government now argues that Lowe’s status as an armed career criminal\\nremains valid because his convictions for aggravated assault and the two rapes qualify as violent\\nfelonies under the ACCA. In response, Lowe asserts that the Government has not met its burden\\nof establishing that the 1985 rape qualifies.1 We now turn to that conviction.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The validity of Lowe’s designation as an Armed Career Criminal hinges entirely on\\nwhether his 1985 rape qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense. The district court declined to\\nreach this question once it determined that Lowe’s convictions for third-degree burglary,\\naggravated assault, and the 1977 rape qualified as violent felonies. Nevertheless, we exercise\\nour discretion to consider this issue in the first instance. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,\\n121 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on\\nappeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts\\nof individual cases.”).\\n\\n The ACCA imposes a fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant who\\nviolates § 922(g) after having been convicted of three prior “violent felonies.” See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(e). A violent felony, as pertinent here, is defined as “any crime punishable by\\nimprisonment for a term exceeding one year, . . . that—(i) has as an element the use, attempted\\n\\n 1Lowe also argues that his conviction for aggravated assault cannot be an ACCA predicate because the\\nGovernment has not demonstrated that he was convicted for acting intentionally rather than recklessly. Our recent\\nholding in Davis v. United States, 900 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2018), forecloses this argument, as we held that both\\nreckless and intentional aggravated assault in Tennessee qualify as violent felonies. Accord United States v. Harper,\\n875 F.3d 329, 330 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e are bound to hold that reckless aggravated assault in violation of Tenn.\\nCode Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B) is a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).”). Lowe, however,\\ndoes not submit argument concerning the 1977 rape; thus, we do not consider it.\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 4\\n\\n\\nuse, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another[.]” § 924(e)(2)(B), (i).\\nThis clause has come to be known as the “use-of-force” or the “elements” clause, requiring a\\nfinding that an offense involved a level of “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to\\nanother person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).\\n\\n “To determine whether a conviction offense is a [violent felony], we apply a categorical\\napproach ‘focus[ing] on the statutory definition of the offense, rather than the manner in which\\nthe offender may have violated the statute in a particular circumstance.’” United States v.\\nGooch, 850 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437, 444\\n(6th Cir. 2016)). Pursuant to the categorical approach, if an offense’s elements do not\\nnecessarily involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another,\\nthe crime does not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA (in the elements-clause\\ncontext). See United States v. Harris, 853 F.3d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n Where, however, a statute sets out “one or more elements of the offense in the\\nalternative,” the statute defines multiple crimes and is considered divisible. See Descamps v.\\nUnited States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). In that scenario, we employ a modified categorical\\napproach, which requires a multi-step inquiry. See id. We first look to the statute as a whole to\\ndetermine whether it includes crimes that do not necessarily involve the use of force. If it does,\\nwe determine whether the statute is divisible and whether any crime defined by the statute may\\nqualify as an ACCA predicate offense. If the answer is yes, we “look[] to a limited class of\\ndocuments (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to\\ndetermine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of.” Mathis v. United\\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005)).\\nFinally, we determine whether that crime necessarily involved the use, attempted use, or\\nthreatened use of force.\\n\\n Under either the categorical or the modified categorical approach, the first step is to look\\nto the statute under which the defendant was convicted. At the time Lowe committed the 1985\\nrape, the relevant statute read:\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 5\\n\\n\\n (a) Rape is unlawful sexual penetration of another accompanied by any of the\\n following circumstances:\\n (1) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act;\\n (2) The actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally\\n defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless; and\\n (3) The actor accomplishes sexual penetration by fraud.\\n (b) Rape is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a\\n determinate sentence not less than five (5) years nor more than twenty\\n (20) years.\\n\\nTenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-604 (1982).\\n\\n As we have previously held, a conviction for rape where the victim is “physically\\nhelpless” does not necessarily require the use of force. In re Sargent, 837 F.3d 675, 677-78 (6th\\nCir. 2016). Thus, for purposes of the ACCA, this statute is overbroad because it is comprised of\\nat least one crime that does not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. The\\nnext step is to determine whether the statute is divisible.\\n\\n We find that it is because it lists elements in the alternative, thereby defining multiple\\ncrimes. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (“‘Elements’ are the ‘constituent parts’ of a crime’s legal\\ndefinition—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction.’”) (quoting Black’s\\nLaw Dictionary 634 (10th ed. 2014)). For instance, a jury may find that a defendant committed\\nrape by force or coercion, as listed in (a)(1), without finding that the defendant committed rape\\nby fraud, as listed in (a)(3). Therefore, § 39-2-604 defines multiple crimes and is divisible. See\\nDescamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013).\\n\\n The next question is whether the statute defines at least one crime that would likely\\nqualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA. We find that it likely does. Section (a)(1)\\ncriminalizes rape committed by force. Force is defined as “compulsion by the use of physical\\npower or violence and shall be broadly construed to accomplish the purposes of the Sexual\\nOffenses Law[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-602(3) (1982). Therefore, rape by force would\\nalmost certainly qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA.\\n\\n Because the statute defines the crime of rape in a way that could, but need not, qualify as\\nan ACCA predicate, our next step is to consult the Shepard documents to see which offense\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 6\\n\\n\\nLowe committed. In this case, the only Shepard document we have is the indictment. It charged\\nLowe with “feloniously engag[ing] in sexual penetration . . . by use of fear and coercion in\\nviolation of TCA 39-2-604.” The parties dispute whether the indictment contains a typo because\\nit used the terms “fear and coercion” rather than (a)(1)’s “force or coercion” or whether, instead,\\nLowe was charged with only rape by coercion. This distinction is immaterial, though, because it\\nis clear that Lowe was indicted under (a)(1). No other section in the statute criminalizes rape by\\ncoercion, and nowhere in the statute is rape by fear criminalized at all. Therefore, the only\\nquestion before us is whether a violation of (a)(1) necessarily involved the use, attempted use, or\\nthreatened use of force.\\n\\n As described above, rape by “force” would almost certainly qualify as a predicate offense\\nunder the ACCA; however, it is not immediately clear whether rape by “coercion” would\\nlikewise qualify. Because (a)(1) lists both force and coercion, we must determine whether rape\\nby coercion would qualify on its own as a predicate offense, and further, whether (a)(1) is\\ndivisible. If the answer to both questions is no (e.g., rape by coercion is not a predicate offense\\nand (a)(1) is not divisible), then Lowe’s conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense. We\\nbegin with the definition of coercion.\\n\\n Tennessee defines “coercion” as a “threat of kidnapping, extortion, force or violence to\\nbe performed immediately or in the future or the use of parental, custodial, or official authority\\nover a child less than fifteen (15) years of age[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-602(1). The last\\nclause of this definition, which requires only use of authority over a child, does not satisfy the\\nuse of force clause. Therefore, we must determine whether this definition describes various\\nfactual means by which a defendant may commit a single element—rape by coercion—or\\nelements in the alternative, thereby listing the constituent parts of four separate crimes. See\\nMathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). If it is the former (means), then rape by\\ncoercion is not a predicate offense because it can be committed without the use, attempted use, or\\nthreatened use of force; but if it is the latter (elements), we continue down the modified-\\ncategorical-approach pathway. To make the means versus elements determination, we first look\\nto state court decisions addressing the issue. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (opining that the\\nmeans versus elements question be made easy where “a state court decision definitively answers\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 7\\n\\n\\nthe question”); see also United States v. Ritchey, 840 F.3d 310, 318 (6th Cir. 2106) (“In\\ndetermining whether statutory alternatives constitute elements or means, the Court clarified that\\nsentencing courts should look first to state law, including judicial interpretations of the criminal\\nstatute by state courts.”); Smith v. Sowders, 848 F.2d 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1988) (“State courts\\ninterpret state criminal statutes, and their interpretations are binding on federal courts.”).\\n\\n In this instance, Tennessee courts have determined that rape by force or coercion, as\\nlisted in (a)(1), is an indivisible crime. Therefore, the definition of coercion simply lists means\\nby which that crime may be committed. Numerous opinions issued by Tennessee appellate\\ncourts support this conclusion. State v. Sontay, No. M2012-01579-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 Tenn.\\nCrim. App. LEXIS 643, at *29-*30 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2013); State v. Way, No. E2002-\\n00251-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 120, at *28-*29 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 9,\\n2004); State v. Hilton, C.C.A. No. 278, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Crim. App.\\nSep. 4, 1991); State v. Watkins, 754 S.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Halton,\\nC.C.A. NO. 23, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 1988).\\n\\n The most illustrative state-court case is State v. Goff, No. E2002-691, 2003 WL\\n21788914, at *8-*11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 5, 2003). There, a jury convicted Goff of, among\\nother things, multiple counts of rape by force or coercion. See id. at *2-*3. On appeal, Goff\\nchallenged the sufficiency of the evidence of those rape convictions. Id. at *18-*19.\\n\\n The Tennessee Court of Appeals began its analysis by considering how many crimes the\\nrape statute listed. It stated, “Many of our proscriptive statutes set forth alternative modes for\\ncommitting crimes. Code section 39-13-503 specifies four different modes of committing rape.”\\nId. at *21.\\n\\n The statute at issue in Goff was Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-503, not § 39-2-604,\\nthe statute at issue here. However, § 39-13-503 is the successor to § 39-2-604, and (a)(1) in both\\nstatutes criminalizes rape by the use of “[f]orce or coercion,” and the correlative definitions of\\ncoercion are identical. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-501(1), 503(a)(1), with Tenn. Code\\nAnn. §§ 39-2-602(1), 604(a)(1) (1982). The only meaningful difference between the two statutes\\nfor purposes of this case is that § 39-13-503(a) contains four subsections whereas § 39-2-604(a)\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 8\\n\\n\\ncontains only three, which is why the Goff court found that § 39-13-503 lists four separate\\ncrimes, instead of three. According to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, then, the definition of\\ncoercion does not list additional crimes. Rather, it lists means of committing the single crime of\\nrape by coercion.\\n\\n Delving further into the court’s opinion, we find more support for this determination. In\\nanalyzing whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Goff of rape by force or coercion, the\\ncourt began by defining force and coercion. It then opined that “the evidence strikes us as an\\neffort to persuade that the element of coercion was supplied via the ‘parental authority language.\\n. . .” Id. at *22 (emphasis added). The court found that there was no evidence in the record that\\nthe victim was under fifteen years of age at the time the alleged rapes occurred; thus, there was\\ninsufficient evidence to convict Goff of rape by coercion “through the use of parental . . .\\nauthority over a child less than fifteen (15) years of age.” Id. at *22-*26.\\n\\n Notably—and dispositive to the question at hand—the court did not stop its analysis\\nthere. It continued, stating that\\n\\n there are two other avenues by which the sufficiency of the rape convictions\\n might be upheld. Section 39-13-503(1) supplies an alternative definition of\\n coercion as the “threat of kidnapping, extortion, force of violence to be performed\\n immediately or in the future.” Also, the rape statute provides that either “force”\\n or “coercion” will suffice.\\n\\nId. at *26 (internal citations omitted). The court first found that the record could not support a\\nconviction for rape by force. Id. at *26-*29. It then went on to analyze each remaining\\nprovision in the definition of coercion, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support a\\nfinding that Goff committed rape by “threat of kidnapping, extortion, force or violence to be\\nperformed immediately or in the future. . . .” Id. at *26-*32; see also § 39-2-604(a)(1).\\n\\n What is clear from the court’s opinion is that it would have upheld the jury’s conviction\\nfor rape by force or coercion if a single definitional provision of force or coercion had been\\nestablished in the record. This means two things: (1) rape by force or coercion, as enumerated in\\n(a)(1), is an indivisible crime, and (2) the definition of coercion is not a list of elements that\\ndefines four separate crimes. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (opining that elements are what\\nmust be proven by “the prosecution to sustain a conviction[]”). As the Tennessee appellate\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 9\\n\\n\\ncourt’s analysis makes clear, the jury could have chosen any definitional provision upon which\\nto convict Goff, and its verdict would have been upheld. It necessarily follows, then, that the\\ngovernment did not have to prove the existence of any one specific definitional provision.\\nTherefore, § 39-2-604(a)(1) defines one crime, that being rape by force or coercion. Because\\nrape by coercion can be committed by the use of parental authority—e.g., without any force—the\\nstatute is overbroad for purposes of the ACCA.\\n\\n III\\n\\n Lowe’s previous convictions for third degree burglary and the 1985 rape do not qualify\\nas ACCA predicates. Therefore, his sentence as an armed career criminal cannot stand.\\nAccordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND the case for resentencing.\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 10\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n CONCURRENCE\\n _________________\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384332/\", \"author_raw\": \"BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"THAPAR, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"THAPAR, Circuit Judge, concurring. Rape is always violent. Whether a rapist coerces a\\nvictim, tricks them, or drugs them, the act of “unlawful sexual penetration” involves violent\\nforce. And then there is this case, where Carlos Lowe dragged his victim across a car seat and\\nraped her. No one questions that his act was unlawful, forceful, and violent.\\n\\n Yet, in the categorical-approach world, we cannot call rape what it is. Instead of\\nanalyzing the facts underlying Lowe’s crime to determine if it was violent, we must engage in a\\nhypothetical exercise to determine whether the crime’s elements could be committed in a non-\\nviolent fashion. So, although rape is always violent as a matter of fact, the majority correctly\\napplies our precedent to conclude that Lowe’s rape was not violent as a matter of law. But this\\ncase demonstrates, once again, that it is time for Congress to revisit the categorical approach so\\nwe do not have to live in a fictional world where we call a violent rape non-violent. See United\\nStates v. Burris, 912 F.3d 386, 407–10 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Thapar, J., concurring); Ovalles\\nv. United States, 905 F.3d 1231, 1257–62 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (W. Pryor, J., concurring)\\n(suggesting that Congress adopt a fact-based approach for the Armed Career Criminal Act); see\\nalso U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 83 Fed. Reg.\\n65400, 65408 (proposed Dec. 20, 2018) (similar proposal for sentencing guidelines). Since\\nCongress has not yet eliminated the categorical approach, I regrettably concur.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384332/\", \"author_raw\": \"THAPAR, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"DONALD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"THAPAR"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DONALD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607079/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Carlos Clifford LOWE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0059p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n CARLOS CLIFFORD LOWE, ┐\n Petitioner-Appellant, │\n │\n > No. 17-5490\n v. │\n │\n │\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │\n Respondent-Appellee. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.\n Nos. 3:05-cr-00022-1; 3:16-cv-00714—Thomas A. Varlan, District Judge.\n\n Argued: October 3, 2018\n\n Decided and Filed: April 4, 2019\n\n Before: BATCHELDER, DONALD, and THAPAR, Circuit judges.\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: Melissa M. Salinas, Garrett T. Fox, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW\nSCHOOL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Melissa M. Salinas,\nGarrett T. Fox, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for\nAppellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville,\nTennessee, for Appellee.\n\n DONALD, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BATCHELDER and THAPAR,\nJJ., joined. THAPAR, J. (pg. 10), delivered a separate concurring opinion in which\nBATCHELDER, J., joined.\n\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 2\n\n\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-appellant Carlos Lowe appeals\nthe district court’s denial of his successive pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his\nsentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the reasons more fully explained below, we\nREVERSE and REMAND the case back to the district court.\n\n I.\n\n In 2005, a jury found Lowe guilty of possessing ammunition as a convicted felon, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lowe had previously been convicted of four felonies under\nTennessee law. They include: third-degree burglary, aggravated assault, a rape occurring in\n1977, and a rape occurring in 1985.\n\n At his sentencing, the district court determined that at least three of those prior felonies\nqualified Lowe as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)\nand sentenced him to 235 months imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Lowe subsequently\nappealed his conviction and his sentence, but this court affirmed. United States v. Lowe, No. 06-\n5352 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2007) (order). Lowe then filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28\nU.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied.\n\n After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally\nvague in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), Lowe filed a motion for an order\nauthorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or\ncorrect his sentence under § 2255. In re Carlos Clifford Lowe, 16-6002 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 2016)\n(order). We granted the motion and transferred the case to the district court. Id.\n\n Lowe filed his second or successive § 2255 motion in the district court, challenging his\nstatus as an armed career criminal. The district court denied the motion and certified that an\nappeal would not be taken in good faith, holding that Lowe’s convictions for third-degree\nburglary, aggravated assault, and the 1977 rape still qualify as ACCA predicates. Based on those\n\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 3\n\n\ndeterminations, the district court did not address Lowe’s 1985 rape, for which he was convicted\nunder a different statute than for the 1977 rape.\n\n Lowe timely appealed the district court’s denial of his second § 2255 motion. This court\ngranted him a certificate of appealability to determine whether his third-degree burglary\nconviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. That question, however, was recently answered in\nCradler v. United States, 891 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2018). It does not. See id. at 671.\n\n Undeterred, the Government now argues that Lowe’s status as an armed career criminal\nremains valid because his convictions for aggravated assault and the two rapes qualify as violent\nfelonies under the ACCA. In response, Lowe asserts that the Government has not met its burden\nof establishing that the 1985 rape qualifies.1 We now turn to that conviction.\n\n II.\n\n The validity of Lowe’s designation as an Armed Career Criminal hinges entirely on\nwhether his 1985 rape qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense. The district court declined to\nreach this question once it determined that Lowe’s convictions for third-degree burglary,\naggravated assault, and the 1977 rape qualified as violent felonies. Nevertheless, we exercise\nour discretion to consider this issue in the first instance. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,\n121 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on\nappeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts\nof individual cases.”).\n\n The ACCA imposes a fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant who\nviolates § 922(g) after having been convicted of three prior “violent felonies.” See 18 U.S.C.\n§ 924(e). A violent felony, as pertinent here, is defined as “any crime punishable by\nimprisonment for a term exceeding one year, . . . that—(i) has as an element the use, attempted\n\n 1Lowe also argues that his conviction for aggravated assault cannot be an ACCA predicate because the\nGovernment has not demonstrated that he was convicted for acting intentionally rather than recklessly. Our recent\nholding in Davis v. United States, 900 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2018), forecloses this argument, as we held that both\nreckless and intentional aggravated assault in Tennessee qualify as violent felonies. Accord United States v. Harper,\n875 F.3d 329, 330 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e are bound to hold that reckless aggravated assault in violation of Tenn.\nCode Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B) is a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).”). Lowe, however,\ndoes not submit argument concerning the 1977 rape; thus, we do not consider it.\n\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 4\n\n\nuse, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another[.]” § 924(e)(2)(B), (i).\nThis clause has come to be known as the “use-of-force” or the “elements” clause, requiring a\nfinding that an offense involved a level of “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to\nanother person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).\n\n “To determine whether a conviction offense is a [violent felony], we apply a categorical\napproach ‘focus[ing] on the statutory definition of the offense, rather than the manner in which\nthe offender may have violated the statute in a particular circumstance.’” United States v.\nGooch, 850 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437, 444\n(6th Cir. 2016)). Pursuant to the categorical approach, if an offense’s elements do not\nnecessarily involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another,\nthe crime does not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA (in the elements-clause\ncontext). See United States v. Harris, 853 F.3d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 2017).\n\n Where, however, a statute sets out “one or more elements of the offense in the\nalternative,” the statute defines multiple crimes and is considered divisible. See Descamps v.\nUnited States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). In that scenario, we employ a modified categorical\napproach, which requires a multi-step inquiry. See id. We first look to the statute as a whole to\ndetermine whether it includes crimes that do not necessarily involve the use of force. If it does,\nwe determine whether the statute is divisible and whether any crime defined by the statute may\nqualify as an ACCA predicate offense. If the answer is yes, we “look[] to a limited class of\ndocuments (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to\ndetermine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of.” Mathis v. United\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005)).\nFinally, we determine whether that crime necessarily involved the use, attempted use, or\nthreatened use of force.\n\n Under either the categorical or the modified categorical approach, the first step is to look\nto the statute under which the defendant was convicted. At the time Lowe committed the 1985\nrape, the relevant statute read:\n\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 5\n\n\n (a) Rape is unlawful sexual penetration of another accompanied by any of the\n following circumstances:\n (1) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act;\n (2) The actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally\n defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless; and\n (3) The actor accomplishes sexual penetration by fraud.\n (b) Rape is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a\n determinate sentence not less than five (5) years nor more than twenty\n (20) years.\n\nTenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-604 (1982).\n\n As we have previously held, a conviction for rape where the victim is “physically\nhelpless” does not necessarily require the use of force. In re Sargent, 837 F.3d 675, 677-78 (6th\nCir. 2016). Thus, for purposes of the ACCA, this statute is overbroad because it is comprised of\nat least one crime that does not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. The\nnext step is to determine whether the statute is divisible.\n\n We find that it is because it lists elements in the alternative, thereby defining multiple\ncrimes. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (“‘Elements’ are the ‘constituent parts’ of a crime’s legal\ndefinition—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction.’”) (quoting Black’s\nLaw Dictionary 634 (10th ed. 2014)). For instance, a jury may find that a defendant committed\nrape by force or coercion, as listed in (a)(1), without finding that the defendant committed rape\nby fraud, as listed in (a)(3). Therefore, § 39-2-604 defines multiple crimes and is divisible. See\nDescamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013).\n\n The next question is whether the statute defines at least one crime that would likely\nqualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA. We find that it likely does. Section (a)(1)\ncriminalizes rape committed by force. Force is defined as “compulsion by the use of physical\npower or violence and shall be broadly construed to accomplish the purposes of the Sexual\nOffenses Law[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-602(3) (1982). Therefore, rape by force would\nalmost certainly qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA.\n\n Because the statute defines the crime of rape in a way that could, but need not, qualify as\nan ACCA predicate, our next step is to consult the Shepard documents to see which offense\n\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 6\n\n\nLowe committed. In this case, the only Shepard document we have is the indictment. It charged\nLowe with “feloniously engag[ing] in sexual penetration . . . by use of fear and coercion in\nviolation of TCA 39-2-604.” The parties dispute whether the indictment contains a typo because\nit used the terms “fear and coercion” rather than (a)(1)’s “force or coercion” or whether, instead,\nLowe was charged with only rape by coercion. This distinction is immaterial, though, because it\nis clear that Lowe was indicted under (a)(1). No other section in the statute criminalizes rape by\ncoercion, and nowhere in the statute is rape by fear criminalized at all. Therefore, the only\nquestion before us is whether a violation of (a)(1) necessarily involved the use, attempted use, or\nthreatened use of force.\n\n As described above, rape by “force” would almost certainly qualify as a predicate offense\nunder the ACCA; however, it is not immediately clear whether rape by “coercion” would\nlikewise qualify. Because (a)(1) lists both force and coercion, we must determine whether rape\nby coercion would qualify on its own as a predicate offense, and further, whether (a)(1) is\ndivisible. If the answer to both questions is no (e.g., rape by coercion is not a predicate offense\nand (a)(1) is not divisible), then Lowe’s conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense. We\nbegin with the definition of coercion.\n\n Tennessee defines “coercion” as a “threat of kidnapping, extortion, force or violence to\nbe performed immediately or in the future or the use of parental, custodial, or official authority\nover a child less than fifteen (15) years of age[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-602(1). The last\nclause of this definition, which requires only use of authority over a child, does not satisfy the\nuse of force clause. Therefore, we must determine whether this definition describes various\nfactual means by which a defendant may commit a single element—rape by coercion—or\nelements in the alternative, thereby listing the constituent parts of four separate crimes. See\nMathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). If it is the former (means), then rape by\ncoercion is not a predicate offense because it can be committed without the use, attempted use, or\nthreatened use of force; but if it is the latter (elements), we continue down the modified-\ncategorical-approach pathway. To make the means versus elements determination, we first look\nto state court decisions addressing the issue. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (opining that the\nmeans versus elements question be made easy where “a state court decision definitively answers\n\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 7\n\n\nthe question”); see also United States v. Ritchey, 840 F.3d 310, 318 (6th Cir. 2106) (“In\ndetermining whether statutory alternatives constitute elements or means, the Court clarified that\nsentencing courts should look first to state law, including judicial interpretations of the criminal\nstatute by state courts.”); Smith v. Sowders, 848 F.2d 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1988) (“State courts\ninterpret state criminal statutes, and their interpretations are binding on federal courts.”).\n\n In this instance, Tennessee courts have determined that rape by force or coercion, as\nlisted in (a)(1), is an indivisible crime. Therefore, the definition of coercion simply lists means\nby which that crime may be committed. Numerous opinions issued by Tennessee appellate\ncourts support this conclusion. State v. Sontay, No. M2012-01579-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 Tenn.\nCrim. App. LEXIS 643, at *29-*30 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2013); State v. Way, No. E2002-\n00251-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 120, at *28-*29 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 9,\n2004); State v. Hilton, C.C.A. No. 278, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Crim. App.\nSep. 4, 1991); State v. Watkins, 754 S.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Halton,\nC.C.A. NO. 23, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 1988).\n\n The most illustrative state-court case is State v. Goff, No. E2002-691, 2003 WL\n21788914, at *8-*11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 5, 2003). There, a jury convicted Goff of, among\nother things, multiple counts of rape by force or coercion. See id. at *2-*3. On appeal, Goff\nchallenged the sufficiency of the evidence of those rape convictions. Id. at *18-*19.\n\n The Tennessee Court of Appeals began its analysis by considering how many crimes the\nrape statute listed. It stated, “Many of our proscriptive statutes set forth alternative modes for\ncommitting crimes. Code section 39-13-503 specifies four different modes of committing rape.”\nId. at *21.\n\n The statute at issue in Goff was Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-503, not § 39-2-604,\nthe statute at issue here. However, § 39-13-503 is the successor to § 39-2-604, and (a)(1) in both\nstatutes criminalizes rape by the use of “[f]orce or coercion,” and the correlative definitions of\ncoercion are identical. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-501(1), 503(a)(1), with Tenn. Code\nAnn. §§ 39-2-602(1), 604(a)(1) (1982). The only meaningful difference between the two statutes\nfor purposes of this case is that § 39-13-503(a) contains four subsections whereas § 39-2-604(a)\n\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 8\n\n\ncontains only three, which is why the Goff court found that § 39-13-503 lists four separate\ncrimes, instead of three. According to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, then, the definition of\ncoercion does not list additional crimes. Rather, it lists means of committing the single crime of\nrape by coercion.\n\n Delving further into the court’s opinion, we find more support for this determination. In\nanalyzing whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Goff of rape by force or coercion, the\ncourt began by defining force and coercion. It then opined that “the evidence strikes us as an\neffort to persuade that the element of coercion was supplied via the ‘parental authority language.\n. . .” Id. at *22 (emphasis added). The court found that there was no evidence in the record that\nthe victim was under fifteen years of age at the time the alleged rapes occurred; thus, there was\ninsufficient evidence to convict Goff of rape by coercion “through the use of parental . . .\nauthority over a child less than fifteen (15) years of age.” Id. at *22-*26.\n\n Notably—and dispositive to the question at hand—the court did not stop its analysis\nthere. It continued, stating that\n\n there are two other avenues by which the sufficiency of the rape convictions\n might be upheld. Section 39-13-503(1) supplies an alternative definition of\n coercion as the “threat of kidnapping, extortion, force of violence to be performed\n immediately or in the future.” Also, the rape statute provides that either “force”\n or “coercion” will suffice.\n\nId. at *26 (internal citations omitted). The court first found that the record could not support a\nconviction for rape by force. Id. at *26-*29. It then went on to analyze each remaining\nprovision in the definition of coercion, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support a\nfinding that Goff committed rape by “threat of kidnapping, extortion, force or violence to be\nperformed immediately or in the future. . . .” Id. at *26-*32; see also § 39-2-604(a)(1).\n\n What is clear from the court’s opinion is that it would have upheld the jury’s conviction\nfor rape by force or coercion if a single definitional provision of force or coercion had been\nestablished in the record. This means two things: (1) rape by force or coercion, as enumerated in\n(a)(1), is an indivisible crime, and (2) the definition of coercion is not a list of elements that\ndefines four separate crimes. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (opining that elements are what\nmust be proven by “the prosecution to sustain a conviction[]”). As the Tennessee appellate\n\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 9\n\n\ncourt’s analysis makes clear, the jury could have chosen any definitional provision upon which\nto convict Goff, and its verdict would have been upheld. It necessarily follows, then, that the\ngovernment did not have to prove the existence of any one specific definitional provision.\nTherefore, § 39-2-604(a)(1) defines one crime, that being rape by force or coercion. Because\nrape by coercion can be committed by the use of parental authority—e.g., without any force—the\nstatute is overbroad for purposes of the ACCA.\n\n III\n\n Lowe’s previous convictions for third degree burglary and the 1985 rape do not qualify\nas ACCA predicates. Therefore, his sentence as an armed career criminal cannot stand.\nAccordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND the case for resentencing.\n\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 10\n\n\n _________________\n\n CONCURRENCE\n _________________\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Carlos Clifford LOWE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0059p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n CARLOS CLIFFORD LOWE, ┐\\n Petitioner-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-5490\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │\\n Respondent-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.\\n Nos. 3:05-cr-00022-1; 3:16-cv-00714—Thomas A. Varlan, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: October 3, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 4, 2019\\n\\n Before: BATCHELDER, DONALD, and THAPAR, Circuit judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Melissa M. Salinas, Garrett T. Fox, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW\\nSCHOOL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Melissa M. Salinas,\\nGarrett T. Fox, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for\\nAppellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville,\\nTennessee, for Appellee.\\n\\n DONALD, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BATCHELDER and THAPAR,\\nJJ., joined. THAPAR, J. (pg. 10), delivered a separate concurring opinion in which\\nBATCHELDER, J., joined.\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-appellant Carlos Lowe appeals\\nthe district court’s denial of his successive pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his\\nsentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the reasons more fully explained below, we\\nREVERSE and REMAND the case back to the district court.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In 2005, a jury found Lowe guilty of possessing ammunition as a convicted felon, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lowe had previously been convicted of four felonies under\\nTennessee law. They include: third-degree burglary, aggravated assault, a rape occurring in\\n1977, and a rape occurring in 1985.\\n\\n At his sentencing, the district court determined that at least three of those prior felonies\\nqualified Lowe as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)\\nand sentenced him to 235 months imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Lowe subsequently\\nappealed his conviction and his sentence, but this court affirmed. United States v. Lowe, No. 06-\\n5352 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2007) (order). Lowe then filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28\\nU.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied.\\n\\n After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally\\nvague in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), Lowe filed a motion for an order\\nauthorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or\\ncorrect his sentence under § 2255. In re Carlos Clifford Lowe, 16-6002 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 2016)\\n(order). We granted the motion and transferred the case to the district court. Id.\\n\\n Lowe filed his second or successive § 2255 motion in the district court, challenging his\\nstatus as an armed career criminal. The district court denied the motion and certified that an\\nappeal would not be taken in good faith, holding that Lowe’s convictions for third-degree\\nburglary, aggravated assault, and the 1977 rape still qualify as ACCA predicates. Based on those\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 3\\n\\n\\ndeterminations, the district court did not address Lowe’s 1985 rape, for which he was convicted\\nunder a different statute than for the 1977 rape.\\n\\n Lowe timely appealed the district court’s denial of his second § 2255 motion. This court\\ngranted him a certificate of appealability to determine whether his third-degree burglary\\nconviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. That question, however, was recently answered in\\nCradler v. United States, 891 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2018). It does not. See id. at 671.\\n\\n Undeterred, the Government now argues that Lowe’s status as an armed career criminal\\nremains valid because his convictions for aggravated assault and the two rapes qualify as violent\\nfelonies under the ACCA. In response, Lowe asserts that the Government has not met its burden\\nof establishing that the 1985 rape qualifies.1 We now turn to that conviction.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The validity of Lowe’s designation as an Armed Career Criminal hinges entirely on\\nwhether his 1985 rape qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense. The district court declined to\\nreach this question once it determined that Lowe’s convictions for third-degree burglary,\\naggravated assault, and the 1977 rape qualified as violent felonies. Nevertheless, we exercise\\nour discretion to consider this issue in the first instance. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,\\n121 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on\\nappeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts\\nof individual cases.”).\\n\\n The ACCA imposes a fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant who\\nviolates § 922(g) after having been convicted of three prior “violent felonies.” See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(e). A violent felony, as pertinent here, is defined as “any crime punishable by\\nimprisonment for a term exceeding one year, . . . that—(i) has as an element the use, attempted\\n\\n 1Lowe also argues that his conviction for aggravated assault cannot be an ACCA predicate because the\\nGovernment has not demonstrated that he was convicted for acting intentionally rather than recklessly. Our recent\\nholding in Davis v. United States, 900 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2018), forecloses this argument, as we held that both\\nreckless and intentional aggravated assault in Tennessee qualify as violent felonies. Accord United States v. Harper,\\n875 F.3d 329, 330 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e are bound to hold that reckless aggravated assault in violation of Tenn.\\nCode Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B) is a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).”). Lowe, however,\\ndoes not submit argument concerning the 1977 rape; thus, we do not consider it.\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 4\\n\\n\\nuse, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another[.]” § 924(e)(2)(B), (i).\\nThis clause has come to be known as the “use-of-force” or the “elements” clause, requiring a\\nfinding that an offense involved a level of “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to\\nanother person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).\\n\\n “To determine whether a conviction offense is a [violent felony], we apply a categorical\\napproach ‘focus[ing] on the statutory definition of the offense, rather than the manner in which\\nthe offender may have violated the statute in a particular circumstance.’” United States v.\\nGooch, 850 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437, 444\\n(6th Cir. 2016)). Pursuant to the categorical approach, if an offense’s elements do not\\nnecessarily involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another,\\nthe crime does not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA (in the elements-clause\\ncontext). See United States v. Harris, 853 F.3d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n Where, however, a statute sets out “one or more elements of the offense in the\\nalternative,” the statute defines multiple crimes and is considered divisible. See Descamps v.\\nUnited States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). In that scenario, we employ a modified categorical\\napproach, which requires a multi-step inquiry. See id. We first look to the statute as a whole to\\ndetermine whether it includes crimes that do not necessarily involve the use of force. If it does,\\nwe determine whether the statute is divisible and whether any crime defined by the statute may\\nqualify as an ACCA predicate offense. If the answer is yes, we “look[] to a limited class of\\ndocuments (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to\\ndetermine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of.” Mathis v. United\\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005)).\\nFinally, we determine whether that crime necessarily involved the use, attempted use, or\\nthreatened use of force.\\n\\n Under either the categorical or the modified categorical approach, the first step is to look\\nto the statute under which the defendant was convicted. At the time Lowe committed the 1985\\nrape, the relevant statute read:\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 5\\n\\n\\n (a) Rape is unlawful sexual penetration of another accompanied by any of the\\n following circumstances:\\n (1) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act;\\n (2) The actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally\\n defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless; and\\n (3) The actor accomplishes sexual penetration by fraud.\\n (b) Rape is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a\\n determinate sentence not less than five (5) years nor more than twenty\\n (20) years.\\n\\nTenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-604 (1982).\\n\\n As we have previously held, a conviction for rape where the victim is “physically\\nhelpless” does not necessarily require the use of force. In re Sargent, 837 F.3d 675, 677-78 (6th\\nCir. 2016). Thus, for purposes of the ACCA, this statute is overbroad because it is comprised of\\nat least one crime that does not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. The\\nnext step is to determine whether the statute is divisible.\\n\\n We find that it is because it lists elements in the alternative, thereby defining multiple\\ncrimes. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (“‘Elements’ are the ‘constituent parts’ of a crime’s legal\\ndefinition—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction.’”) (quoting Black’s\\nLaw Dictionary 634 (10th ed. 2014)). For instance, a jury may find that a defendant committed\\nrape by force or coercion, as listed in (a)(1), without finding that the defendant committed rape\\nby fraud, as listed in (a)(3). Therefore, § 39-2-604 defines multiple crimes and is divisible. See\\nDescamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013).\\n\\n The next question is whether the statute defines at least one crime that would likely\\nqualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA. We find that it likely does. Section (a)(1)\\ncriminalizes rape committed by force. Force is defined as “compulsion by the use of physical\\npower or violence and shall be broadly construed to accomplish the purposes of the Sexual\\nOffenses Law[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-602(3) (1982). Therefore, rape by force would\\nalmost certainly qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA.\\n\\n Because the statute defines the crime of rape in a way that could, but need not, qualify as\\nan ACCA predicate, our next step is to consult the Shepard documents to see which offense\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 6\\n\\n\\nLowe committed. In this case, the only Shepard document we have is the indictment. It charged\\nLowe with “feloniously engag[ing] in sexual penetration . . . by use of fear and coercion in\\nviolation of TCA 39-2-604.” The parties dispute whether the indictment contains a typo because\\nit used the terms “fear and coercion” rather than (a)(1)’s “force or coercion” or whether, instead,\\nLowe was charged with only rape by coercion. This distinction is immaterial, though, because it\\nis clear that Lowe was indicted under (a)(1). No other section in the statute criminalizes rape by\\ncoercion, and nowhere in the statute is rape by fear criminalized at all. Therefore, the only\\nquestion before us is whether a violation of (a)(1) necessarily involved the use, attempted use, or\\nthreatened use of force.\\n\\n As described above, rape by “force” would almost certainly qualify as a predicate offense\\nunder the ACCA; however, it is not immediately clear whether rape by “coercion” would\\nlikewise qualify. Because (a)(1) lists both force and coercion, we must determine whether rape\\nby coercion would qualify on its own as a predicate offense, and further, whether (a)(1) is\\ndivisible. If the answer to both questions is no (e.g., rape by coercion is not a predicate offense\\nand (a)(1) is not divisible), then Lowe’s conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense. We\\nbegin with the definition of coercion.\\n\\n Tennessee defines “coercion” as a “threat of kidnapping, extortion, force or violence to\\nbe performed immediately or in the future or the use of parental, custodial, or official authority\\nover a child less than fifteen (15) years of age[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-602(1). The last\\nclause of this definition, which requires only use of authority over a child, does not satisfy the\\nuse of force clause. Therefore, we must determine whether this definition describes various\\nfactual means by which a defendant may commit a single element—rape by coercion—or\\nelements in the alternative, thereby listing the constituent parts of four separate crimes. See\\nMathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). If it is the former (means), then rape by\\ncoercion is not a predicate offense because it can be committed without the use, attempted use, or\\nthreatened use of force; but if it is the latter (elements), we continue down the modified-\\ncategorical-approach pathway. To make the means versus elements determination, we first look\\nto state court decisions addressing the issue. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (opining that the\\nmeans versus elements question be made easy where “a state court decision definitively answers\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 7\\n\\n\\nthe question”); see also United States v. Ritchey, 840 F.3d 310, 318 (6th Cir. 2106) (“In\\ndetermining whether statutory alternatives constitute elements or means, the Court clarified that\\nsentencing courts should look first to state law, including judicial interpretations of the criminal\\nstatute by state courts.”); Smith v. Sowders, 848 F.2d 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1988) (“State courts\\ninterpret state criminal statutes, and their interpretations are binding on federal courts.”).\\n\\n In this instance, Tennessee courts have determined that rape by force or coercion, as\\nlisted in (a)(1), is an indivisible crime. Therefore, the definition of coercion simply lists means\\nby which that crime may be committed. Numerous opinions issued by Tennessee appellate\\ncourts support this conclusion. State v. Sontay, No. M2012-01579-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 Tenn.\\nCrim. App. LEXIS 643, at *29-*30 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2013); State v. Way, No. E2002-\\n00251-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 120, at *28-*29 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 9,\\n2004); State v. Hilton, C.C.A. No. 278, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Crim. App.\\nSep. 4, 1991); State v. Watkins, 754 S.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Halton,\\nC.C.A. NO. 23, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 619, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 1988).\\n\\n The most illustrative state-court case is State v. Goff, No. E2002-691, 2003 WL\\n21788914, at *8-*11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 5, 2003). There, a jury convicted Goff of, among\\nother things, multiple counts of rape by force or coercion. See id. at *2-*3. On appeal, Goff\\nchallenged the sufficiency of the evidence of those rape convictions. Id. at *18-*19.\\n\\n The Tennessee Court of Appeals began its analysis by considering how many crimes the\\nrape statute listed. It stated, “Many of our proscriptive statutes set forth alternative modes for\\ncommitting crimes. Code section 39-13-503 specifies four different modes of committing rape.”\\nId. at *21.\\n\\n The statute at issue in Goff was Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-503, not § 39-2-604,\\nthe statute at issue here. However, § 39-13-503 is the successor to § 39-2-604, and (a)(1) in both\\nstatutes criminalizes rape by the use of “[f]orce or coercion,” and the correlative definitions of\\ncoercion are identical. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-501(1), 503(a)(1), with Tenn. Code\\nAnn. §§ 39-2-602(1), 604(a)(1) (1982). The only meaningful difference between the two statutes\\nfor purposes of this case is that § 39-13-503(a) contains four subsections whereas § 39-2-604(a)\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 8\\n\\n\\ncontains only three, which is why the Goff court found that § 39-13-503 lists four separate\\ncrimes, instead of three. According to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, then, the definition of\\ncoercion does not list additional crimes. Rather, it lists means of committing the single crime of\\nrape by coercion.\\n\\n Delving further into the court’s opinion, we find more support for this determination. In\\nanalyzing whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Goff of rape by force or coercion, the\\ncourt began by defining force and coercion. It then opined that “the evidence strikes us as an\\neffort to persuade that the element of coercion was supplied via the ‘parental authority language.\\n. . .” Id. at *22 (emphasis added). The court found that there was no evidence in the record that\\nthe victim was under fifteen years of age at the time the alleged rapes occurred; thus, there was\\ninsufficient evidence to convict Goff of rape by coercion “through the use of parental . . .\\nauthority over a child less than fifteen (15) years of age.” Id. at *22-*26.\\n\\n Notably—and dispositive to the question at hand—the court did not stop its analysis\\nthere. It continued, stating that\\n\\n there are two other avenues by which the sufficiency of the rape convictions\\n might be upheld. Section 39-13-503(1) supplies an alternative definition of\\n coercion as the “threat of kidnapping, extortion, force of violence to be performed\\n immediately or in the future.” Also, the rape statute provides that either “force”\\n or “coercion” will suffice.\\n\\nId. at *26 (internal citations omitted). The court first found that the record could not support a\\nconviction for rape by force. Id. at *26-*29. It then went on to analyze each remaining\\nprovision in the definition of coercion, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support a\\nfinding that Goff committed rape by “threat of kidnapping, extortion, force or violence to be\\nperformed immediately or in the future. . . .” Id. at *26-*32; see also § 39-2-604(a)(1).\\n\\n What is clear from the court’s opinion is that it would have upheld the jury’s conviction\\nfor rape by force or coercion if a single definitional provision of force or coercion had been\\nestablished in the record. This means two things: (1) rape by force or coercion, as enumerated in\\n(a)(1), is an indivisible crime, and (2) the definition of coercion is not a list of elements that\\ndefines four separate crimes. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (opining that elements are what\\nmust be proven by “the prosecution to sustain a conviction[]”). As the Tennessee appellate\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 9\\n\\n\\ncourt’s analysis makes clear, the jury could have chosen any definitional provision upon which\\nto convict Goff, and its verdict would have been upheld. It necessarily follows, then, that the\\ngovernment did not have to prove the existence of any one specific definitional provision.\\nTherefore, § 39-2-604(a)(1) defines one crime, that being rape by force or coercion. Because\\nrape by coercion can be committed by the use of parental authority—e.g., without any force—the\\nstatute is overbroad for purposes of the ACCA.\\n\\n III\\n\\n Lowe’s previous convictions for third degree burglary and the 1985 rape do not qualify\\nas ACCA predicates. Therefore, his sentence as an armed career criminal cannot stand.\\nAccordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND the case for resentencing.\\n\\n No. 17-5490 Lowe v. United States Page 10\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n CONCURRENCE\\n _________________\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1655,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607135,"string":"4,607,135"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"EMW Women's Surgical Ctr. v. Andrew Beshear"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-6183"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before: NORRIS, DONALD, and BUSH, Circuit Judges; _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: S. Chad Meredith, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-6151.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0062p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P.S.C., on behalf ┐\\n of itself, its staff, and its patients; ERNEST MARSHALL, │\\n M.D., on behalf of himself and his patients; ASHLEY │\\n BERGIN, M.D., on behalf of herself and her patients; │\\n TANYA FRANKLIN, M.D., on behalf of herself and her │\\n patients, │\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees, │\\n │\\n > Nos. 17-6151/6183\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n ANDREW G. BESHEAR, Attorney General (17-6183); │\\n ADAM MEIER, in his capacity as Secretary of the │\\n Cabinet of Health and Family Services (17-6151), │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.\\n No. 3:17-cv-00016—David J. Hale, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: July 25, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 4, 2019\\n\\n Before: NORRIS, DONALD, and BUSH, Circuit Judges;\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: S. Chad Meredith, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for\\nAppellant in 17-6151. Steven Travis Mayo, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF\\nKENTUCKY, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-6183. Alexa Kolbi-Molinas,\\nAMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, for\\nAppellees. ON BRIEF: S. Chad Meredith, M. Stephen Pitt, Matthew F. Kuhn, OFFICE OF\\nTHE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-6151. La Tasha Buckner, OFFICE\\nOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\n6183. Alexa Kolbi-Molinas, Andrew D. Beck, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION\\nFOUNDATION, New York, New York, Amy D. Cubbage, Heather Gatnarek, ACLU OF\\nKENTUCKY FOUNDATION, INC., Louisville, Kentucky, Anton Metlitsky, Leah Godesky,\\nO’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, New York, New York, for Appellees. Scott A. Keller, OFFICE\\nOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, Austin, Texas, Michael Lee Francisco, MRD\\nLAW, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Scott W. Gaylord, ELON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF\\nLAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, Shannon Rose Selden, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP,\\nNew York, New York, Kimberly A. Parker, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND\\nDORR LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.\\n\\n BUSH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which NORRIS, J., joined, and\\nDONALD, J., joined only in that Attorney General Beshear is not a proper party to this action.\\nDONALD, J. (pp. 34–54), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a woman has\\nthe right to choose to have an abortion. To inform that choice, the Commonwealth of Kentucky\\ndirects a doctor, before performing an abortion, to auscultate (or make audible) the fetal\\nheartbeat, perform an ultrasound, and display and describe the ultrasound images to the patient.\\nThis appeal principally concerns whether those requirements violate the doctor’s First\\nAmendment rights.\\n\\n “The Ultrasound Informed Consent Act,” also known as “House Bill 2” or “H.B. 2,”1 is\\nchallenged by Plaintiffs-Appellees EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. and its associated\\nphysicians (collectively, “EMW”) under the First Amendment, as incorporated against the States\\nby the Fourteenth Amendment. EMW prevailed in the district court, which, in granting the\\ncomplaint’s first claim for relief under the First Amendment, applied heightened scrutiny to\\ninvalidate the statute and permanently enjoin enforcement of H.B. 2. See EMW Women’s\\nSurgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 283 F. Supp. 3d 629 (W.D. Ky. 2017). Our court then denied\\nthe motion of then-Defendant-Appellant Vickie Glisson, who was Secretary of the Cabinet for\\nHealth and Family Services, to stay the injunction pending appeal. See EMW Women’s Surgical\\n\\n\\n 1Codified at Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) §§ 311.727, 311.990(34).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\nCtr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, No. 17-6151 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2017) (order). However, neither our court\\nnor the district court had the benefit of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in National Institute\\nof Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (“NIFLA”).\\n\\n In NIFLA the Court clarified that no heightened First Amendment scrutiny should apply\\nto informed-consent statutes like the abortion-informed-consent statute at issue in Planned\\nParenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).2\\nSee NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. Thus, even though an abortion-informed-consent law compels a\\ndoctor’s disclosure of certain information, it should be upheld so long as the disclosure is\\ntruthful, non-misleading, and relevant to an abortion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; Tex. Med.\\nProviders Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012); Planned\\nParenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).\\n\\n Because H.B. 2, like the statute in Casey, requires the disclosure of truthful, non-\\nmisleading, and relevant information about an abortion, we hold that it does not violate a\\ndoctor’s right to free speech under the First Amendment. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 882–84. We also hold that the Attorney General, Defendant-Appellant Andrew\\nBeshear, is not a proper party to this case.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n H.B. 2 directs a doctor, prior to performing an abortion, to perform an ultrasound; display\\nthe ultrasound images for the patient; and explain, in the doctor’s own words, what is being\\ndepicted by the images—for example, pointing out organs and whether the patient is pregnant\\nwith twins. KRS § 311.727. There is no requirement that the patient view the images or listen to\\nthe doctor’s description. The doctor also must auscultate the fetal heartbeat but may turn off the\\nvolume of the auscultation if the patient so requests. Id. Failure to comply with these\\nrequirements can result in the doctor being fined and referred to Kentucky’s medical-licensing\\nboard. KRS § 311.990(34). But H.B. 2 does not penalize a doctor if the patient requested that\\nthe heartbeat sound be turned off or chose not to look at the ultrasound images. KRS\\n§ 311.727(3). Nor does H.B. 2 penalize a doctor if she or he exercises discretion to advise a\\n\\n 2Citations to Casey refer to the joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\npatient that she need not listen to or view the disclosures, or if the doctor makes any other\\nstatement, including advising the patient to have an abortion. Finally, a doctor need not make\\nany disclosure from H.B. 2 at all if an abortion is medically necessary or in the case of a medical\\nemergency. KRS § 311.727(5).\\n\\n EMW sued General Beshear, Secretary Glisson, and Michael S. Rodman, who is\\nExecutive Director of the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure. The parties cross-moved for\\nsummary judgment on the complaint’s first claim for relief, styled “First Amendment Rights of\\nPhysicians.” The district court ruled in favor of EMW and, as noted, permanently enjoined\\nenforcement of H.B. 2. Executive Director Rodman does not appeal, but Secretary Meier, as\\nSecretary Glisson’s successor, seeks reversal of the judgment. General Beshear also defends\\nH.B. 2 on appeal but argues that he is not a proper party to this case. We address first whether\\nH.B. 2 violates doctors’ First Amendment rights, then whether General Beshear is appropriately\\nin this suit.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We engage in de novo review of the district court’s summary judgment. McKay v.\\nFederspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2016). “[W]here, as here, the parties filed cross-motions\\nfor summary judgment, ‘the court must evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking\\ncare in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under\\nconsideration.’” Id. at 866 (quoting Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th\\nCir. 1991)). A moving party may obtain summary judgment only if it “shows that there is no\\ngenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\nlaw.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under\\nthe governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).\\n\\n No material facts are in dispute here, so this matter turns on a pure question of law: does\\nH.B. 2 compel a doctor’s speech in violation of the First Amendment?\\n\\n The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see,\\ne.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall\\nmake no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” U.S. Const. amend. I. This constitutional\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\nguarantee, the Supreme Court has held, applies not only when government restricts speech, see,\\ne.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015), but also when it compels speech,\\nsee, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. When laws, whether restrictive or compulsive, “target\\nspeech based on its communicative content,” they generally “are presumptively unconstitutional\\nand may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve\\ncompelling state interests.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226). Such\\ncontent-based restrictions have been declared unconstitutional in compelled-speech cases such as\\nWest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which struck down a\\nrequirement that students salute the United States flag; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977),\\nwhich invalidated a law requiring a state motto “Live Free or Die” on license plates; and Hurley\\nv. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), which held\\nthat a State could not force parade organizers to include a group that would convey a message\\ncontrary to the organizers’ views.\\n\\n Heightened scrutiny generally applies to content-based regulation of any speaker,\\nincluding a physician or other professional. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. But, as the\\nSupreme Court noted in NIFLA, there is “less protection for professional speech in two\\ncircumstances”: first, for “some laws that require professionals to disclose factual,\\nnoncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’”;3 second, for regulation of\\n“professional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech,” id. at 2372 (citing\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 884). The second exception is at issue here because H.B. 2 regulates doctors’\\nconduct: performing abortions.4\\n\\n We review H.B. 2 against the backdrop of thirty-five years of evolving Supreme Court\\nprecedent concerning the constitutionality of abortion-informed-consent statutes. In the 1980s,\\nthe Court invalidated some aspects of these laws. For example, in City of Akron v. Akron Center\\nfor Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (“Akron I”), and Thornburgh v. American\\n\\n 3NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,\\n471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010); Ohralik v.\\nOhio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).\\n 4We do not address whether H.B. 2 falls within the Zauderer/Milzavetz/Ohralik commercial-speech\\nexception.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\nCollege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), the Court struck down state laws\\nrequiring abortion doctors to provide patients with information about the development of unborn\\nlife5 and alternatives to abortion. In Akron I, the Court “invalidated an ordinance which required\\nthat a woman seeking an abortion be provided by her physician with specific information\\n‘designed to influence the woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.’” Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 881 (quoting Akron I, 462 U.S. at 444). The required disclosure included the\\nstatement that “the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception.” Akron I,\\n462 U.S. at 444. That this “information was designed to dissuade the woman from having an\\nabortion,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, was one of “two purported flaws in the Akron ordinance.” Id.\\n(citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762). The other purported flaw was that the Akron I statute\\nmandated “a rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases,\\nirrespective of the particular needs of the patient, [that] intrude[d] upon the discretion of the\\npregnant woman’s physician.” Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.\\nIn Thornburgh, the purported flaw in the Pennsylvania informed-consent statute at issue was that\\nit was “an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth’s message discouraging abortion into\\nthe privacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician,”\\nThornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762—that is, an interference with the doctor-patient relationship.\\n\\n In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court reversed course. In Casey, the Court effectively\\nabrogated the holdings in Akron I and Thornburgh. The Casey joint opinion declared:\\n\\n To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when\\n the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading\\n information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those\\n of childbirth, and the “probable gestational age” of the fetus, those cases go too\\n far, are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in\\n potential life, and are overruled.\\n\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Casey addressed\\ninformed-consent provisions of another Pennsylvania statute that required physicians, among\\nother things, to inform patients orally of the nature of the abortion procedure; its risks and\\nalternatives; the probable gestational age of the unborn life in the patient when the doctors would\\n\\n 5We use the term unborn life consistent with the Supreme Court’s reference to “the life of the unborn,”\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 883. See also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nperform the abortion; and the availability of pamphlets (1) describing unborn life in further\\ndetail, including stages of gestational development, (2) listing agencies offering alternatives to\\nabortion, and (3) giving information about obtaining child support from the unborn life’s father.\\nSee Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 902–03 (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3205(a)); Planned Parenthood\\nof Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that pamphlets described\\nstages of development for unborn life).\\n\\n The Casey plurality reasoned that “a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain\\ninformation as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no\\ndifferent from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical\\nprocedure.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Though the joint opinion acknowledged that “the\\nphysician’s First Amendment rights not to speak” were implicated by the informed-consent\\nstatute, the plurality applied no heightened scrutiny and upheld the statute because a doctor’s\\nrights were implicated “only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing\\nand regulation by the State.” Id. at 884 (citations omitted).\\n\\n Importantly too, in “depart[ing] from the holdings of Akron I and Thornburgh,” the\\nCasey plurality emphasized that a State may “further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of\\nthe unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even\\nwhen in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S.\\nat 883 (emphasis added); see also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972–73 (1997) (per\\ncuriam) (affirming Casey and holding that a statute restricting who could perform abortions that\\nwas drafted by an anti-abortion group had no improper purpose). The plurality instructed that\\ninformed consent to an abortion procedure may mandate disclosure of the “full consequences of”\\nthe abortion decision, including “a requirement that a woman be apprised of the health risks of\\nabortion and childbirth,” as well as “the impact on” or “consequences to the fetus, even when\\nthose consequences have no direct relation to her health.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. As the\\nplurality explained, it cannot “be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem\\nthe impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.” Id. (emphasis added). The\\njoint opinion analogized an informed-consent disclosure of the effect on unborn life to a\\nrequirement that an organ recipient learn the effect on the donor before consenting to the\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\ntransplant: “[w]e would think it constitutional for the State to require that in order for there to be\\ninformed consent to a kidney transplant operation the recipient must be supplied with\\ninformation about risks to the donor as well as risks to himself or herself.” Id. at 882–83.\\n\\n We have long understood Casey as marking a shift toward greater respect for States’\\ninterests in informing women and protecting unborn life. For example, in Women’s Medical\\nProfessional Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003), we affirmed that “[a]n essential feature\\nof the jointly authored opinion in Casey is the reaffirmation of the substantial state interest in\\npotential life throughout pregnancy.” Id. at 443 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, in\\nMemphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 1999), we explained that\\nCasey establishes that States may take steps to ensure that a woman’s choice to abort is\\ninformed:\\n\\n [a] plurality of the justices in Casey recognized the weighty concerns of the state\\n in “the protection of potential life” and reasoned that, although “the woman has a\\n right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not\\n at all follow that the state is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice\\n is thoughtful and informed.”\\n\\nId. at 460–61 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 871–72). In other words, our circuit has recognized\\nthat after Casey there can be no doubt that “a state can require that a doctor give a woman certain\\ninformation before she may have an abortion.” Id. at 465 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\\n\\n Recently, in NIFLA, a majority of the Supreme Court adopted the First Amendment\\nanalysis applied in Casey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373–74. Specifically, the Court explained\\nthat although heightened scrutiny generally applies to content-based regulations of speech,\\n“regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech” receive lower scrutiny. Id.\\nat 2373. The Court acknowledged that “drawing the line between speech and conduct can be\\ndifficult.” Id. But it held that statutes that “facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure,”\\nlike the one at issue in Casey, fall on the conduct side of the line because they regulate speech\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\n“only ‘as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the\\nState.’”6 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\\n\\n In both NIFLA and Casey, then, the Court clarified that the First Amendment has a\\nlimited role to play in allowing doctors to avoid making truthful mandated disclosures related to\\ninformed consent. Under the First Amendment, we will not highly scrutinize an informed-\\nconsent statute, including one involving informed consent to an abortion, so long as it meets\\nthese three requirements: (1) it must relate to a medical procedure; (2) it must be truthful and not\\nmisleading; and (3) it must be relevant to the patient’s decision whether to undertake the\\nprocedure, which may include, in the abortion context, information relevant to the woman’s\\nhealth risks, as well as the impact on the unborn life. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 882.\\n\\n Although much of the analysis in Casey addressed the plaintiffs’ undue-burden claim, the\\njoint opinion’s First Amendment holding built upon its conclusion that the mandated informed-\\nconsent disclosures in that case met the criteria of being truthful, non-misleading, and relevant.\\nContrary to the Dissent’s suggestion that we have “focused on the wrong provision of the\\nConstitution,” Dissent at 38, indeed we do address the relevant provision—the First Amendment.\\nCasey and NIFLA recognize that First Amendment heightened scrutiny does not apply to\\nincidental regulation of professional speech that is part of the practice of medicine and that such\\nincidental regulation includes mandated informed-consent requirements, provided that the\\ndisclosures are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–84; NIFLA,\\n138 S. Ct at 2373. Casey also recognizes that, as part of informed consent for an abortion,\\npermissible mandated disclosures under the First Amendment may pertain to the effect of the\\nprocedure on unborn life. 505 U.S. at 882. And in NIFLA, the Court explicitly reaffirmed that\\nheightened scrutiny is not appropriate under the First Amendment for informed-consent\\n\\n\\n 6The Court went on in NIFLA to declare unconstitutional a California statute requiring crisis pregnancy\\ncenters to disclose that the State offered abortion services, among other things. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368–70.\\nIn so doing, the Court distinguished the California statute from the Pennsylvania law upheld in Casey because the\\nnotice at issue under the California statute was not an informed-consent law: it “provide[d] no information about the\\nrisks or benefits of [medical] procedures.” Id. at 2373. Because the regulation “at issue [in NIFLA] [was] not an\\ninformed-consent requirement [like in Casey] or any other regulation of professional conduct,” the Court applied\\nheightened scrutiny and held that the California law likely violated the First Amendment. Id. at 2373, 2375.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\nrequirements of the nature upheld in Casey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373, 2375.7 We therefore\\nare applying Casey and NIFLA as they directly pertain to the First Amendment claim and not to\\nany undue-burden claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n This First Amendment appeal, thus, turns on whether H.B. 2 shares the same material\\nattributes as the informed-consent statute in Casey. If it does, then no heightened First\\nAmendment scrutiny applies because, as NIFLA instructed, an informed-consent law like the\\nCasey statute is a regulation of professional conduct that only incidentally burdens professional\\nspeech. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.\\n\\n Does H.B. 2 relate to a medical procedure? Yes—abortion. Are the mandated\\ndisclosures truthful and not misleading? Yes—no one argues that the heartbeat, sonogram, or its\\ndescription is false or misleading. We have previously held that similar information conveys\\nobjective medical facts. For example, in United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2018),\\nwe explained that “it would be an insult to common sense and the practice of medicine to say\\nthat [the doctor] was not measuring facts (or attempting to do so) when he conducted the\\nangiograms at issue” in that case. Id. at 276. Similarly, we explained in Discount Tobacco City\\n& Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2011), that anatomical pictures convey\\nfacts:\\n\\n Students in biology, human-anatomy, and medical-school courses look at\\n pictures or drawings in textbooks of both healthy and damaged cells, tissues,\\n organs, organ systems, and humans because those pictures convey factual\\n information about medical conditions and biological systems. The argument that\\n a picture of a specific person or part of a person is opinion because not every\\n person or part of a person with that condition would appear the same way is\\n unpersuasive. . . . People with the same illness can and often will suffer a variety\\n of differing symptoms. But one wouldn’t say that a list of symptoms\\n\\n\\n 7The dissenters in NIFLA also recognized this key attribute of Casey’s holding. See 138 S. Ct. at 2385\\n(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the [Casey] Court considered the State’s statutory requirements, including that the\\ndoctor must inform his patient about where she could learn how to have the newborn child adopted (if carried to\\nterm) and how she could find related financial assistance. To repeat the point, [Casey] held that the State’s\\nrequirements did not violate the Constitution’s protection of free speech or its protection of a woman’s right to\\nchoose to have an abortion.” (citation omitted)).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n characterizing a particular medical condition is nonfactual and opinion-based as a\\n result.\\n\\nId. at 559 (footnote omitted). So, “[t]o belabor the obvious and conceded point,” the disclosures\\nof the heartbeat, sonogram, and its description “are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading\\ninformation.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577–78.\\n\\n That leaves the final question: are the mandated disclosures relevant to the patient’s\\ndecision whether to abort unborn life? The Supreme Court’s abortion precedent answers this\\nquestion for us.\\n\\n “Abortion is a unique act,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, that “requires a difficult and painful\\nmoral decision,” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). It is “fraught with\\nconsequences . . . for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision.” Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 852. “[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their\\nchoice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of\\nesteem can follow.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (citations omitted). Abortion also is “fraught\\nwith consequences . . . for the life or potential life that is aborted,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, in\\nwhom the State may have a significant interest, Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158, and who cannot\\nconsent to the procedure to terminate her or his life or potential life. Thus, the Supreme Court\\nhas explained that the effect of an abortion procedure on unborn life is “relevant, if not\\ndispositive” information for the patient’s decision. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added).\\n\\n With this background in mind, we hold that H.B. 2 provides relevant information. The\\ninformation conveyed by an ultrasound image, its description, and the audible beating fetal heart\\ngives a patient greater knowledge of the unborn life inside her. This also inherently provides the\\npatient with more knowledge about the effect of an abortion procedure: it shows her what, or\\nwhom, she is consenting to terminate. That this information might persuade a woman to change\\nher mind does not render it suspect under the First Amendment. It just means that it is pertinent\\nto her decision-making. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (explaining that information on abortion’s\\nimpact on unborn life “furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may\\nelect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her\\ndecision was not fully informed”).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 12\\n\\n\\n The prevalence of ultrasound-use in pregnancy also underscores the relevance of the\\nmandated sonogram of H.B. 2 to a woman’s abortion decision. Ultrasounds are ubiquitous\\nprocedures that are a part of every pregnancy and, EMW concedes, every abortion. Oral Arg. at\\n23:53–24:10; R. 3-3, PageID 111, 112–13. Indeed, ultrasounds are “routine measures in\\npregnancy [and] viewed as ‘medically necessary’ for the mother and fetus.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at\\n579. The physical invasiveness of the sonogram, as noted by the Dissent, see Dissent at 35, 46\\nn.9, therefore, is no reason to characterize the procedure as an unwarranted invasion of bodily\\nintegrity; indeed, the Dissent cites authority “finding that up to 98% of U.S. abortion facilities\\nuse an ultrasound to date the pregnancy,” id. at 46. Also, Kentucky is hardly alone among the\\nStates in finding ultrasounds to be relevant: according to amici, twenty-four other States have\\nenacted informed-consent laws that involve ultrasounds.8\\n\\n Although Casey did not involve the displaying of an ultrasound, its facts are not “a\\nconstitutional ceiling for regulation of informed consent to abortion, [but] a set of principles to\\nbe applied to the states’ legislative decisions.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at 579. The Casey statute\\nrequired doctors to inform patients of the unborn life’s gestational age and offer them materials\\nfurther describing unborn life’s development at a given gestational age. See Casey, 505 U.S. at\\n881, 902; Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575 n.2, 578; Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1349. The sonogram\\nrequirements of H.B. 2 provide “materially identical” information. See A Woman’s Choice–East\\nSide Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding informed-\\nconsent law requiring abortion doctors to offer pictures, drawings, and dimensions of the unborn\\n\\n\\n 8Three of them track more closely with H.B. 2 and require physicians to perform, display, and describe\\nultrasounds before an abortion. La. Stat. § 40:1061.10(D), invalidated by June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F.\\nSupp. 3d 27, 30 (M.D. La. 2017) (holding statute was an undue burden), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. LLC v.\\nGee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018); Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.012(a)(4); Wis. Stat. § 253.10. Seven require\\ndoctors to perform ultrasounds and offer patients the chance to view them. Ala. Code § 26-23A-6; Ariz. Rev. Stat.\\n§ 36-2156; Fla. Stat. § 390.0111; Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1.1; Iowa Code § 146A.1, invalidated by Planned Parenthood\\nof Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 N.W.2d 206, 212 (Iowa 2018) (holding 72-hour waiting period was an\\nundue burden); Miss. Code § 41-41-34; Va. Code § 18.2-76. Ten require doctors to offer the patient the chance to\\nview the ultrasound image if they perform one. Ark. Code § 20-16-602; Ga. Code § 31-9A-3; Idaho Code § 18-609;\\nKan. Stat. § 65-6709; Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.17015; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-327 (requiring doctors to display the\\nsonogram “so that the woman may choose to view [it]”); Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.561; S.C. Code § 44-41-330; Utah\\nCode § 76-7-305 (requiring doctors to display the sonogram “to permit the woman . . . to view the images, if she\\nchooses to”); W. Va. Code § 16-2I-2. Four require doctors to offer women the chance to view—and thus receive—\\nan ultrasound. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.027; N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-04; S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-52; Wyo.\\nStat. § 35-6-119.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 13\\n\\n\\nlife within patients was “materially identical” to the Casey statute’s requirements); see also\\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 578 (explaining that disclosures like those in H.B. 2 “are not different in\\nkind” than the disclosures in Casey). A sonogram depicts unborn life in further detail at the\\ncurrent gestational age—information no less relevant to the patient’s decision than were the\\nmaterials at issue in Casey. In fact, because of its individualized nature, a sonogram provides\\neven more relevant information for the patient’s decision than any of the required materials at\\nissue in Casey. Whereas the Pennsylvania law provided information about unborn life generally,\\nH.B. 2 directs that the patient receive specific, real-time images of herself and the unborn life\\nwithin her.9 H.B. 2 also allows the doctor to explain, in her or his own words, the sonogram, as\\nwell as the auscultation, thus further ensuring that the information is tailored to the patient’s\\nspecific circumstances.\\n\\n Sonograms of unborn life were uncommon when Roe was decided. Writing for the Roe\\nCourt, Justice Blackmun was limited by words on paper—sometimes using medieval\\ndescriptions such as “quickening” or “infused with a ‘soul’ or ‘animated’”—to explain when life\\nhad been understood to come into being. Roe, 410 U.S. at 133. But in the Cyber Age,10 words\\ntell only part of a story. For today’s Posterity11—the Gen-X, Millennial, and Gen-Z generations,\\nwhose first picture of themselves commonly comes from a sonogram, and who increasingly turn\\nto photos and videos to share information12—one can hardly dispute the relevance of sonogram\\nimages for twenty-first-century informed consent.\\n\\n\\n\\n 9Contrary to EMW’s assertion at oral argument, the information’s pictorial medium fails to take H.B. 2 out\\nof the realm of informed consent. See A Woman’s Choice–East Side Women’s Clinic, 305 F.3d at 684–85; see also\\nF. Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment: A Practical Guide 2-82 (5th ed. 2018) (discussing the use of videos, pictures,\\nand slides to obtain informed consent). This means of sharing information simply is more scientifically up to date.\\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 578.\\n 10See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (explaining “that the Cyber Age is a\\nrevolution of historic proportions [and that] we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter\\nhow we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be” (emphasis added)); see also South Dakota v.\\nWayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018) (discussing the Cyber Age).\\n 11U.S. Const. pmbl.\\n 12See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, While We Weren’t Looking, Snapchat Revolutionized Social Networks, N.Y.\\nTimes (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www nytimes.com/2016/11/30/technology/while-we-werent-looking-snapchat-\\nrevolutionized-social-networks.html.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 14\\n\\n\\n Under the lower level of scrutiny mandated by Casey and NIFLA, there is no burden\\nplaced on the State to justify that its prior regulation “was defective in facilitating informed\\nconsent” or that “H.B. 2 filled any gaps in existing informed-consent legislation,” as the Dissent\\napparently believes the State must show, see Dissent at 48, 52. No such requirements were\\nimposed on Pennsylvania to justify its statute in Casey. But even if the Commonwealth bore\\nsuch a burden, it would easily meet it here. It is not difficult to conclude that the particularized\\nvisual and audible disclosures mandated by H.B. 2 provide more relevant information for\\ninformed consent than was provided by the less patient-specific, verbal and written disclosures of\\nthe earlier Kentucky abortion-informed-consent statute, KRS § 311.725.\\n\\n In sum, H.B. 2, like the Pennsylvania statute in Casey, provides truthful, non-misleading,\\nand relevant information aimed at informing a patient about her decision to abort unborn life.\\nTherefore, although the statute requires doctors to disclose certain truthful and non-misleading\\ninformation relevant to the abortion procedure, it does not violate their First Amendment rights\\nbecause the required disclosures are incidental to the Commonwealth’s regulation of doctors’\\nprofessional conduct.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n This result is in line with two other circuits that have faced First Amendment challenges\\nto similar abortion-informed-consent statutes. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits read Casey, as well\\nas Gonzales, to establish the same First Amendment test for truthful, non-misleading, and\\nrelevant informed-consent disclosures that we apply here.\\n\\n In Lakey, the Fifth Circuit addressed a Texas informed-consent statute requiring the\\nperformance, display, and description of an ultrasound as well as the auscultation of the unborn\\nlife’s heartbeat. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 574\\n(5th Cir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge to the statute,\\nexplaining that Casey upheld the constitutionality of informed-consent laws that require\\ndisclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information, including facts about the unborn\\nlife, with no heightened scrutiny applying to such laws:\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 15\\n\\n\\n First, informed consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on the woman’s\\n right to have an abortion are permissible if they require truthful, non-misleading,\\n and relevant disclosures. Second, such laws are part of the state’s reasonable\\n regulation of medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of compelling\\n “ideological” speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny. Third,\\n “relevant” informed consent may entail not only the physical and psychological\\n risks to the expectant mother facing this “difficult moral decision,” but also the\\n state’s legitimate interests in “protecting the potential life within her.”\\n\\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 576 (footnote omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 871).\\n\\n Applying this understanding of Casey, the Fifth Circuit held that requirements that\\ndoctors perform, display, and describe the ultrasound and auscultate the heartbeat—though more\\ntechnologically advanced than the mandated disclosure that Casey allowed—were the “epitome”\\nof truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information that Casey permits:\\n\\n To belabor the obvious and conceded point, the required disclosures of a\\n sonogram, the fetal heartbeat, and their medical descriptions are the epitome of\\n truthful, non-misleading information. They are not different in kind, although\\n more graphic and scientifically up-to-date, than the disclosures discussed in\\n Casey—probable gestational age of the fetus and printed material showing a\\n baby’s general prenatal development stages. Likewise, the relevance of these\\n disclosures to securing informed consent is sustained by Casey and Gonzales,\\n because both cases allow the state to regulate medical practice by deciding that\\n information about fetal development is “relevant” to a woman’s decision-making.\\n\\nId. at 577–78 (emphasis added).\\n\\n Because the Texas statute at issue in Lakey satisfied the criteria for an abortion-informed-\\nconsent statute (that is, the statute mandated only truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\\ndisclosures related to an abortion), the Fifth Circuit determined that no heightened scrutiny of the\\nstatute was warranted under Casey and reversed the district court’s determination otherwise:\\n\\n The [Casey] plurality response to the compelled speech claim is clearly\\n not a strict scrutiny analysis. It inquires into neither compelling interests nor\\n narrow tailoring. The three sentences with which the Court disposed of the First\\n Amendment claims are, if anything, the antithesis of strict scrutiny. Indeed, the\\n plurality references Whalen v. Roe, in which the Court had upheld a regulation of\\n medical practice against a right to privacy challenge. The only reasonable reading\\n of Casey’s passage is that physicians’ rights not to speak are, when part of the\\n practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 16\\n\\n\\n This applies to information that is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant . . . to the\\n decision to undergo an abortion.\\n ....\\n\\n Applying to [the statute] the principles of Casey’s plurality, the most\\n reasonable conclusion is to uphold the provisions declared as unconstitutional\\n compelled speech by the district court.\\n\\nId. at 575, 577 (cleaned up).\\n\\n When faced with an analogous issue, the Eighth Circuit read the Supreme Court’s\\nprecedent similarly. The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Rounds involved a South Dakota informed-\\nconsent statute. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.\\n2008) (en banc). The statute required physicians to give patients a written statement providing,\\namong other things, “[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique,\\nliving human being,” “[t]hat the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with that unborn\\nhuman being and that the relationship enjoys protection under the United States Constitution and\\nthe laws of South Dakota,” “[t]hat by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her\\nexisting constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be terminated,” and “[a]\\ndescription of all known medical risks of the procedure . . . including . . . [d]epression and related\\npsychological distress [and] [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.” Id. The statute\\ndefined “Human being” as “an individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens,\\nincluding the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization\\nto full gestation.” Id. at 727. The statute further required physicians to certify in writing that\\nthey provided all this information to the patients. Id. Also, the patients had to sign a written\\nstatement showing that the abortion doctors had complied with the statute’s disclosure\\nrequirements and provided them with the required information. Id.\\n\\n Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit explained that Supreme Court precedent likely allowed\\nthe statute to stand because it mandated the doctor provide only “truthful, non-misleading\\ninformation relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion”:\\n\\n Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an\\n individual simply to speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its\\n regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 17\\n\\n\\n information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that\\n information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.\\n Therefore, Planned Parenthood cannot succeed on the merits of its claim that [the\\n statute] violates a physician’s right not to speak unless it can show that the\\n disclosure is either untruthful, misleading or not relevant to the patient’s decision\\n to have an abortion.\\n\\nId. at 734–35. Because Planned Parenthood’s evidence did not establish a likelihood of proving\\nthat the statute required “anything but truthful, non-misleading and relevant [information] to the\\npatient’s decision to have an abortion,” the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary\\ninjunction. Id. at 738.\\n\\n The Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretations of Casey support our holding today. Like\\nthe statutes in those circuits’ cases, H.B. 2 provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\\ninformation for a decision whether to abort unborn life. Like these other circuits, we find no\\nFirst Amendment infirmity.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n In challenging H.B. 2, EMW echoes Planned Parenthood’s unsuccessful arguments in\\nCasey. EMW contends that H.B. 2 warrants heightened scrutiny because it (1) compels\\nideological speech, (2) interferes with the doctor-patient relationship, and (3) emotionally affects\\npatients.\\n\\n Ideological Speech. Casey forecloses EMW’s attempt to invoke heightened scrutiny by\\nclaiming that H.B. 2 requires the doctors to engage in ideological speech. The statute in Casey\\nrequired doctors to disclose facts about the abortion procedure, the unborn life within a patient,\\nand options available to a patient if she carried that life to term. Planned Parenthood argued that\\nthe statute mandated ideological speech that warranted heighted scrutiny. Brief of Petitioners\\nand Cross-Respondents, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No. 91-744), 1992 WL 12006398 at *54\\n(“Casey Br.”). The Casey plurality acknowledged that the disclosure requirements were targeted\\nat causing patients to “choose childbirth over abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. Yet, the\\nplurality applied no heightened scrutiny to Pennsylvania’s statute because of the alleged\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 18\\n\\n\\nideological nature of the required disclosures. So Casey rejected EMW’s rationale for applying\\nheightened scrutiny.13\\n\\n The Fourth Circuit, however, disagreed that Casey forecloses the ideological argument.\\nIn Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), decided before NIFLA, the Fourth Circuit\\nstruck down as compelled ideological speech a North Carolina statute similar to H.B. 2. Id. at\\n246, 255–56. We decline to follow Stuart, however, because it gave insufficient regard to the\\nFirst Amendment analysis in Casey that the Court clarified and adopted as the majority view in\\nNIFLA.\\n\\n Stuart’s basis for applying heightened scrutiny is called into question by Supreme Court\\nprecedent. Stuart applied heightened scrutiny because the facts disclosed by a sonogram have\\n“moral or ideological implications.” Id. at 246. However, the “moral or ideological” label has\\nnot been used by the Supreme Court as a reason to apply heightened scrutiny to mandated factual\\ndisclosures in the informed-consent context. Nor has the Supreme Court considered on what\\n“side of the abortion debate” required factual disclosures fall in deciding the level of scrutiny to\\napply to abortion-informed-consent laws, as did the Fourth Circuit, see id.14 And unlike the\\nFourth Circuit, the Supreme Court has not been concerned that facts might “convey[] a particular\\nopinion” like “convinc[ing] women seeking abortions to change their minds.” Id.\\n\\n\\n 13Contrary to what the Dissent maintains, a State is entitled to regulate informed consent with respect to\\nthe abortion even when it has a political “goal” to protect unborn life. See Dissent at 53. The Casey joint opinion\\nmade that point clear when it allowed for mandated disclosures intended by the State to further its “profound interest\\nin potential life” and “to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.” See 505 U.S. at 878 (“To promote\\nthe State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the\\nwoman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their\\npurpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”).\\n 14It is not at all clear that the facts mandated to be disclosed by an H.B. 2 sonogram fall on only one side of\\nthe abortion debate. For example, abortions are increasingly sought to terminate lives likely to be born with\\ndisabilities. See Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (granting a preliminary\\ninjunction against an Ohio law criminalizing abortions performed because of fetal indication of Down Syndrome),\\nappeal docketed, No. 18-3329 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 2018); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind.\\nState Dep’t of Health, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (granting a permanent injunction against a similar law),\\naff’d, 888 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3172 (Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 18-483); Julian\\nQuinones & Arijeta Lajka, “What Kind of Society Do You Want to Live In?”: Inside the Country Where Down\\nSyndrome is Disappearing, CBS News (Aug. 14, 2007, 4:00 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/down-syndrome-\\niceland/?linkId=40953194. An ultrasound showing the likelihood of a disability could be interpreted by some\\npeople, but not all, as a reason to have an abortion.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 19\\n\\n\\n Instead, under Casey, what matters for First Amendment purposes is whether the\\ndisclosed facts are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the procedure, not whether they fall\\non one side of the debate, and not whether they influence a woman to keep the child. Casey, 505\\nU.S. at 882–84; see also Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575–77; Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35. In Stuart the\\nFourth Circuit tried to distinguish Casey by reasoning that the Casey statute was not ideological:\\n“[i]nforming a patient that there are state-issued materials available is not ideological, because\\nthe viewpoint conveyed by the pamphlet is clearly the state’s—not the physician’s.” Stuart,\\n774 F.3d at 253. But the same is true here. H.B. 2 allows doctors to tell patients that the\\nCommonwealth requires this information. The record shows that’s exactly what they do. R. 55,\\nPageID 699. Thus, the doctors are just as free as those subject to the statute in Casey to clarify\\nthat the mandated disclosures come from the State not the doctors themselves.\\n\\n After holding that the North Carolina statute compelled ideological speech, the Fourth\\nCircuit in Stuart adopted a “sliding-scale” test first applied by the Ninth Circuit in Pickup v.\\nBrown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–29 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding professional speech is viewed “along a\\ncontinuum”). The Fourth Circuit then asserted the statute “reside[d] somewhere in the middle on\\nthat sliding scale” because it regulated medical treatment but also regulated speech, Stuart,\\n774 F.3d at 248, thus justifying intermediate scrutiny, id. at 249. This “sliding scale” test based\\non ideological speech, however, appeared nowhere in Casey.\\n\\n Nor did this test appear in NIFLA. In fact, the NIFLA Court, after citing the Ninth Circuit\\nin Pickup as an example of “[s]ome Courts of Appeals” that “have recognized ‘professional\\nspeech’ as a separate category of speech that is subject to different rules,” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at\\n2371, did not adopt any of the “different rules” applied in Pickup. Instead, the Court explained\\nthat, generally, it is the compulsion of a message—not whether the compulsion is of an\\nideological nature—that alters the content of speech and therefore dictates a single heightened-\\nscrutiny standard, with no sliding scale. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. However, as discussed,\\nthe Supreme Court explicitly carved out two exceptions to that general test that do not call for\\nheightened scrutiny. As also already explained, H.B. 2 falls into at least one of those exceptions.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 20\\n\\n\\n We therefore find that Stuart is unpersuasive in light of NIFLA, and we decline to follow\\nthe Fourth Circuit.15 If at least one of the two exceptions noted in NIFLA applies, there is no\\nSupreme Court authority for looking to whether the speech has ideological implications and\\napplying a “sliding scale” that may result in intermediate scrutiny.\\n\\n Doctor-Patient Relationship. As for EMW’s second argument, H.B. 2 does not interfere\\nwith the doctor-patient relationship any more than other informed-consent laws. “[I]nformed\\nconsent is generally required for medical treatment,” Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department\\nof Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990), and this requirement “is firmly entrenched in American tort\\nlaw,” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he\\ncommon-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a\\ncompetent individual to refuse medical treatment.” Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277. This right,\\ngrounded in principles of self-determination, may “demand[] a standard set by law for physicians\\nrather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.” Canterbury v.\\nSpence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasis added); see F. Rozovsky, Consent to\\nTreatment: A Practical Guide 2-8 (5th ed. 2018) (explaining that informed-consent standards are\\nset by “state legislation, regulations, and case law” in addition to standards among professional\\ngroups).16 “[T]o safeguard the patient’s interest in achieving [her or] his own determination on\\ntreatment, the law must itself set the standard for adequate disclosure.” Canterbury, 464 F.2d at\\n787.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15The district court also relied largely on Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir.\\n2017) (en banc), which invalidated a Florida law restricting doctors from asking patients about gun ownership in\\npart because of concerns over interrupting the flow of information between doctor and patient. Id. at 1313. Those\\nconcerns are not present here: H.B. 2 serves to increase the flow of information between doctor and patient. Also,\\nunlike the statute in Wollschlaeger, H.B. 2 restricts no speech that the doctor wishes to impart to the patient. More\\nimportant, however, Wollschlaeger did not involve patients’ informed consent.\\n 16The Supreme Court has cited earlier editions of this treatise. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 21\\n\\n\\n The principle that informed-consent requirements may be created by law, as opposed to\\nmerely medical-profession custom, applies to all medical procedures, including abortion. As the\\nSupreme Court has instructed, “an informed-consent requirement in the abortion context [is] ‘no\\ndifferent from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical\\nprocedure.’” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\\n“The law need not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical practice,\\nnor should it elevate their status above other physicians in the medical community.” Id. As part\\nof States’ regulation of the medical profession, they may require doctors to provide information\\nto their patients to ensure patients can give their informed consent for an abortion, like for any\\nother medical procedure. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.\\n\\n The district court cited testimony that the mandated disclosures of H.B. 2 are inconsistent\\nwith medical standards because (1) their mandatory nature—that is, the Commonwealth’s\\nrequiring their actual disclosure rather than requiring their being offered to be disclosed—makes\\nthem contrary to the customary standard of care for informed consent, and (2) they provide\\ninformation that the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) and the\\nNational Abortion Federation do not consider to be necessary for informed consent. See EMW\\nWomen’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 644.\\n\\n As for the first point, most legally enacted informed-consent disclosures could be subject\\nto the same criticism because they require the doctor to disclose, rather than simply offer to\\ndisclose, information.17 The Casey plurality explained that States can require doctors to give\\ninformation to patients about abortion just like it can require doctors to give information to an\\norgan donor about that procedure. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. Also, the very reason that the\\nrequired disclosure in NIFLA did “not facilitate informed consent” was because it provided no\\ninformation about the risks or benefits of a medical procedure. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. In\\nother words, the doctrine of informed consent does not stop at offering the opportunity for the\\n\\n 17For example, other Kentucky informed-consent and physician-disclosure requirements require\\ninformation actually to be given when (1) diagnosing and treating breast cancer, KRS § 311.935; (2) performing\\nacupuncture, KRS § 311.678; (3) testing for HIV infection, KRS § 214.625; and (4) performing mammograms,\\nKRS § 214.555. An example of this at the federal level is 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.257–.258, which requires medical\\nproviders actually disclose—not just offer to disclose—the risks, benefits, and alternatives of sterilization\\nprocedures to ensure a patient’s informed consent to be sterilized.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 22\\n\\n\\ninformation. It applies equally when a doctor must actually disclose the information. True, for\\nsome information, the Casey statute required doctors to inform patients that it was available. See\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 881. But it also mandated information actually be given to patients. Id.\\nH.B. 2 is no different.18\\n\\n The second point considered significant by the district court—certain medical groups’\\nviews regarding whether a particular mandated truthful disclosure is necessary for informed\\nconsent—is not the type of evidence deemed material by the Supreme Court in reviewing\\nabortion-informed-consent statutes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld abortion regulations\\nthat were directly contrary to alleged medical-profession custom and that certain medical groups\\ndid not consider to be necessary—laws that those groups asserted were inconsistent with\\naccepted standards of care for informed consent. For example, in Casey, the district court found\\nthat “[t]he informed consent requirements of the [Pennsylvania law] represent a substantial\\ndeparture from the ordinary medical requirements of informed consent,” Casey, 744 F. Supp. at\\n1351; that “[c]ontent-based informed consent is contrary to the standard medical practice that\\ninformed consent be specifically tailored to the needs of the specific patient,” id. at 1353; and\\nthat various provisions of the Pennsylvania law conflicted with official positions of ACOG and\\nthe American Public Health Association, see id. at 1351–52, 1355, 1360. Still, the Supreme\\nCourt in Casey upheld the law’s informed-consent requirements. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.\\n\\n Similarly, in Gonzales, the Court upheld a statute prohibiting a form of partial-birth\\nabortions, despite the district court’s factual findings that the law was contrary to certain\\nmedical-profession views, including that ACOG “told Congress several times that the procedure\\n\\n 18The district court’s first point also overlooks that H.B. 2 allows patients to decline to receive the\\ninformation, by not viewing the sonogram or listening to the verbal disclosures, and asking the doctors to turn off\\nthe heartbeat. In fact, that H.B. 2 provides patients with the choice not to receive the information is the very reason\\nthe district court held that H.B. 2 does not go far enough to meet Kentucky’s goal of informing the patients. EMW\\nWomen’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 645–46. In other words, according to the district court, if the Kentucky\\nlegislature wished to better inform patients about their abortion procedure, it should have required the patients\\nreceive the information, rather than allowing them to choose not to do so. We disagree with this conclusion. That\\nH.B. 2 allows women to avoid receiving the disclosures does not detract from the statute’s purpose to better inform;\\nit merely reflects the Commonwealth’s recognition that, ultimately, it is the woman’s choice as to whether to\\nconsider those disclosures in making her decision. And even if the disclosures do not change many minds, either\\nbecause some patients are not persuaded by them or because some patients ignore them, the Commonwealth still is\\nentitled under Casey to require doctors to provide them. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–84; Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575–77;\\nRounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 23\\n\\n\\nshould not be banned,” Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1011 (D. Neb. 2004), and “that\\nCongress’[s] Finding—that a medical consensus supports the ban because partial-birth abortions\\nare unnecessary—is both unreasonable and not supported by substantial evidence,” id. at 1015.\\n\\n If the validity of an informed-consent law depended on whether doctors agreed with the\\nlaw—or whether the law required disclosures that, with no law, the doctor would disclose\\nanyway—there would be no need for the law to supplement custom. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d\\nat 784 (“[T]o bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to arrogate the decision on\\nrevelation to the physician alone.”). As Casey and Gonzales establish, the constitutionality of an\\nabortion regulation is based on the relevant legal standard as interpreted by the Supreme Court—\\nhere, whether the mandated disclosures are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the medical\\nprocedure—and not necessarily whether the law is consistent with medical-profession custom or\\nviews of certain medical groups.\\n\\n The Dissent, therefore, is mistaken to argue that we “must naturally turn to the medical\\ncommunity” to ascertain the “contours of informed consent” to determine whether a regulation is\\nin accord with “medical practice” or “medical purpose.” Dissent at 37. Following that approach\\nwould require us, in effect, to hold that a State must surrender its authority to regulate informed\\nconsent to private parties. This method, however, would conflict with the Court’s recognition in\\nGonzales that the State may regulate informed consent in the abortion context in the same way\\nthat it regulates informed consent in other medical contexts. See 550 U.S. at 163. The validity\\nof this regulation does not turn on what any private party claims is the norm for the practice of\\nmedicine. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784, 787. Instead, we defer to the legislature’s\\ndetermination of which informed-consent disclosures are required, provided that they are\\nrelevant, truthful, and non-misleading. This deference does not make our court a player in policy\\nmaking, as the Dissent contends, see Dissent at 44, but rather preserves our role as umpires who\\napply the rules enacted by the People’s representatives. If the medical groups cited by the\\nDissent want the legislated rules of informed consent to change, they should address their\\narguments to those elected representatives. Casey makes clear, however, that the Dissent is\\nincorrect to contend that opposition by medical groups to informed-consent rules necessarily\\nrenders those rules invalid under the First Amendment.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 24\\n\\n\\n The reasoning in Casey also shows that H.B. 2 does not impermissibly infringe on\\nabortion doctors’ autonomy. Indeed, as noted, the Casey plurality overruled the Court’s earlier\\nholdings that requiring doctors to give certain information to all patients impermissibly intruded\\nupon doctors’ discretion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881; Thornburgh v. American Coll. of\\nObstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986).\\n\\n To be sure, H.B. 2 does require the disclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\\nfacts that otherwise the doctor might not disclose. However, to the extent that it matters to the\\nFirst Amendment analysis,19 nothing prevents the doctor from informing the patient that the\\nfactual disclosures of H.B.2 are required by the Commonwealth rather than made by the doctor’s\\nchoice. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (rejecting argument that\\nregulations abridged free-speech rights of the grantee’s staff and noting that “[n]othing in [the\\nregulations] requires a doctor to represent as [her or] his own any opinion that [she or] he does\\nnot in fact hold”); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 1994)\\n(upholding abortion-informed-consent statute and observing that it allowed doctors to\\n“disassociate themselves” from the required information).\\n\\n It is also true that H.B. 2 differs from the Pennsylvania statute in Casey in that H.B. 2\\ndoes not have an express provision, as did the Casey statute, excusing a doctor from providing\\nthe mandated disclosure “if he or she can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that\\nhe or she reasonably believed that furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely\\nadverse effect on the physical or mental health of the patient.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84.\\nAlthough the Casey joint opinion noted this statutory provision in the context of discussing “a\\nconstitutional right of privacy between a pregnant woman and her physician,” id. at 883, there is\\nno indication that the plurality considered the provision to be significant for its First Amendment\\nreview. To the extent that it was, we also must consider that a doctor need not comply with H.B.\\n2 if an abortion is medically necessary or in the case of a medical emergency, KRS § 311.727(5),\\nand H.B. 2 has other provisions not contained in the Casey statute that effectively give the doctor\\nthe same discretion afforded to doctors under the Casey statute. For example, unlike the Casey\\n\\n 19See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 737 (concluding doctor’s ability to disassociate herself or himself from\\ndisclosures is irrelevant to the compelled-speech analysis if disclosures are truthful and non-misleading).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 25\\n\\n\\nstatute, H.B. 2 imposes no obligation that the patient certify in writing that she has received\\ncertain mandated disclosures, see id. at 881, or even requires that the patient pay attention to the\\ndisclosures, and it imposes no penalty on the doctor if the patient ignores the disclosures the\\ndoctor is making, see KRS § 311.727(3). These provisions operate to allow a doctor who\\nreasonably believes that the disclosures would result in a severely adverse effect on the patient,\\nto inform the patient in the doctor’s discretion that she need not listen to or view the disclosures.\\n\\n Furthermore, H.B. 2 restricts no doctor from advising the patient to keep or abort the\\nunborn life displayed or from providing any other opinion, medical or otherwise, that the doctor\\nwishes to convey. See generally Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th\\nCir. 2017) (en banc) (“Importantly, however, the law [at issue in other cases] did not restrict\\nwhat the practitioner could say or recommend to a patient or client.” (emphasis added)). Indeed,\\nthe statute contains nothing that would prevent a doctor in her or his discretion from advocating\\nto the patient in favor of an abortion.\\n\\n Given these considerations, the requirements of H.B. 2 are no more of a regulation that\\ndeparted from a medical group’s definition of medical practice than the abortion-informed-\\nconsent law upheld in Casey and no more of a regulation of professional speech than many\\ninformed-consent and physician-disclosure laws enacted by Kentucky, other States, and the\\nfederal government.20\\n\\n Emotional Effect on Patients. As for EMW’s third argument—that the emotional effect\\nof H.B. 2 on patients warrants heightened scrutiny—Casey again is instructive. In that case, the\\ndistrict court accepted Planned Parenthood’s similar argument and held that the Pennsylvania\\ninformed-consent statute did not survive heightened scrutiny because the mandated information\\n“will create the impression in women that the Commonwealth disapproves of the woman’s\\ndecision” and “will create undesirable and unnecessary anxiety, anguish and fear.” Casey,\\n744 F. Supp. at 1354. In this regard, the district court’s factual finding in Casey was like the\\ndistrict court’s finding here, based on evidence cited by the Dissent, see Dissent at 49–50, that\\n\\n 20See supra note 17. Other examples of Kentucky mandating speech in the health-care context occur when\\n(1) reporting tuberculosis, KRS § 215.590; (2) reporting abuse of adults and dependents, KRS §§ 209.030, 620.030;\\n(3) displaying licenses, KRS § 311.470; and, of course, (4) performing an abortion, KRS §§ 311.725, 311.727.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 26\\n\\n\\n“H.B. 2 causes patients distress.” EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 645. We\\nrecognize the significance of the district court’s finding regarding the negative emotional effect\\non certain patients, as well as its acknowledgment of declarations from several women who had\\nundergone abortions and who stated that the mandated disclosures of H.B. 2 would have had a\\npositive impact on their emotional health by persuading them not to have an abortion. R. 32-3,\\nPageID 406–08; R. 32-4, PageID 410; R. 32-5, PageID 412–14. However, for purposes of this\\nsummary judgment determination, we need not and should not weigh the competing evidence of\\nemotional effect, as the district court and Dissent appear to do.21 Instead, the Casey plurality did\\nnot view any finding regarding emotional effect as material to the level of First Amendment\\nscrutiny of an informed-consent statute. Although the Casey district court’s finding as to\\nemotional effect was quoted by Planned Parenthood in its brief to the Supreme Court, see Casey\\nBr. at *52, the controlling opinion in Casey did not make any note of this finding in its analysis\\nof the doctors’ First Amendment challenge. Instead, without mentioning emotional effect on\\npatients at all, the Casey plurality reversed the district court’s judgment that struck down the\\ninformed-consent statute.\\n\\n\\n\\n 21The Dissent states that “the Commonwealth did not controvert” testimony from a Texas resident against\\nH.B. 2 based upon the emotional impact on her from disclosures required by a Texas informed-consent statute.\\nDissent at 35, 47. True, the Commonwealth did not dispute that particular patient’s experience, but it is not accurate\\nto conclude that the evidence of the emotional effect of the H.B. 2 disclosures is uncontroverted based on that\\ntestimony. To the contrary, several Kentucky residents submitted declarations attesting to beneficial emotional\\neffects they would have experienced from disclosures mandated by H.B. 2 had they received them. R. 32-3, PageID\\n406–08; R. 32-4, PageID 410; R. 32-5, PageID 412–14. For example, one patient stated that if she had received the\\ninformation required by H.B. 2, she “would never have gone through with the procedure” and that having not\\nreceived that information makes her regret of the abortion “even more painful.” R. 32-3, PageID 407. The\\nDissent’s and district court’s discounting of this testimony and other evidence submitted by the Commonwealth\\nregarding emotional effect appears to involve the weighing of proof and credibility determinations not appropriate\\nfor summary judgment. Dissent at 50; see Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 168 (6th Cir. 2011) (“When\\nreviewing a summary judgment motion, credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited.”\\n(quotation omitted)); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n summary judgment,\\nneither the district court nor this Court may make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” (citation\\nomitted)). Unlike in Casey, where the district court made its findings of fact after a bench trial, Casey, 505 U.S. at\\n845; Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1325–26, the district court here was ruling on summary judgment, see EMW Women’s\\nSurgical Center, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 648, and therefore was not permitted to make findings of fact based on the\\ndisputed evidence. And we further note that on cross-motions for summary judgment this court must review the\\nissues of material fact in the light most favorable to the party whose motion did not prevail in the district court. See\\nB.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 598 (6th Cir. 2001). However, as explained above, ultimately\\nfact issues regarding emotional effect on patients are not material to resolution of the relevant First Amendment\\nissue of whether the disclosures of H.B. 2 are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to an abortion.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 27\\n\\n\\n Casey thus implicitly recognized that discomfort to the patient from the mandated\\ndisclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information does not make an informed-\\nconsent law invalid under the First Amendment. Indeed, discomfort may be a byproduct of\\ninformed consent itself. See generally Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (“Any number of patients\\nfacing imminent surgical procedures would prefer not to hear all details, lest the usual anxiety\\npreceding invasive medical procedures become the more intense.”). This may be especially true\\nin the abortion context. For, as the Supreme Court has explained, “[a]bortion is inherently\\ndifferent from other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful\\ntermination of a potential life.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).\\n\\n Providing sonogram and auscultation results to the patient furthers the State’s legitimate\\ninterest, recognized in Casey, of ensuring that the patient understands the full implications of her\\ndecision, including the impact on unborn life. Under Casey, the State may decide that its interest\\nin having the unborn life actually be seen and heard before being aborted, and potential negative\\nemotional consequences to the patient from not having received that disclosure, justify the\\nincidental regulation of professional speech and outweigh the risk of negative emotional impact\\non the patient from the disclosure (even assuming the latter consideration is relevant to the First\\nAmendment analysis and was a permissible finding for summary judgment given the disputed\\nfactual record). This conclusion follows from Casey’s reasoning that the State has “an important\\ninterest in potential life,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882,22 and that there is the risk to the patient’s\\npsychological health from having made such a profound decision without adequate disclosure of\\nits consequences, including the impact on unborn life, beforehand:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22See also Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157 (emphasizing that a State “may use its voice and its regulatory\\nauthority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman”); id. at 158 (“[T]he State may use its regulatory\\npower to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the\\nmedical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.”).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 28\\n\\n\\n It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health. Nor can\\n it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the impact on\\n the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a\\n woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the\\n legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only\\n to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision\\n was not fully informed.\\n\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 882.\\n\\n EMW has offered no Supreme Court authority to contradict Casey’s teaching. At oral\\nargument, EMW cited only Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), as support for our considering\\nthe impact of H.B. 2 on the listening patients as part of the First Amendment analysis. Hill\\nexplained that the effect of certain speech on unwilling listeners can be a factor when\\ndetermining whether restricting speech is constitutional. See 530 U.S. at 716 (“[T]he protection\\nafforded to offensive messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that\\nthe unwilling audience cannot avoid it.”). Hill, however, did not involve a situation where, as\\nhere, no speech—fact or opinion—is restricted. The only issue here is whether the government\\nmay compel more disclosures of a strictly truthful, non-misleading, and relevant nature.23\\n\\n More fundamentally, though, Hill is distinguishable because it did not involve informed\\nconsent to a medical procedure. Hill concerned speech to people on public streets and sidewalks\\nwithin 100 feet of health-care facilities. 530 U.S. at 707. The informed-consent exception to\\nheightened scrutiny simply did not apply, as NIFLA confirms. Because H.B. 2, like the Casey\\nstatute, provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information about an abortion, it helps\\n\\n 23Hill also explained that a reason we allow protestors to display vulgar language is because viewers can\\navert their eyes to avoid more offense. 530 U.S. at 716 (citation omitted). The information provided by H.B. 2 is\\nnot vulgar speech, but still, if the patient desires not to receive the information mandated by H.B. 2, she may avert\\nher eyes from the ultrasound image, not listen to the doctor’s description of the image, and ask the doctor to turn off\\nthe heartbeat. See Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (rejecting\\nunwilling-listener challenge to abortion-informed-consent statute because the statute did not require the patient to\\nlisten). Unlike in Casey and Rounds, this appeal involves no challenge to H.B. 2 as an undue burden on a woman’s\\nsubstantive due process right to choose an abortion. The only challenge here is alleged unconstitutional compelled\\nspeech of the abortion doctors. We must be careful, therefore, not to upset Casey’s balance between States’ ability\\nto regulate the medical profession and women’s rights. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577 (“If the disclosures are truthful\\nand non-misleading, and if they would not violate the woman’s privacy right under the Casey plurality opinion, then\\nAppellees would, by means of their First Amendment claim, essentially trump the balance Casey struck between\\nwomen’s rights and the states’ prerogatives. Casey, however, rejected any such clash of rights in the informed\\nconsent context.”).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 29\\n\\n\\nensure informed consent to that procedure. It therefore is not subject to heightened scrutiny and\\ncomplies with the First Amendment under NIFLA and Casey.\\n\\n VI.\\n\\n Finally, a few words in response to the Dissent’s conclusion, based on physician\\ntestimony that is disputed by other physician testimony, 24 that H.B. 2 “would require physicians\\nto harm their patients with ‘no medical purpose,’” id. at 37, and the Dissent’s statement that “[i]t\\nis transparent that furthering informed consent was not the aim of the Commonwealth—nor will\\nit be achieved by H.B. 2,” id. at 52.\\n\\n First, in order to make the claim that informed consent is a pretextual and not the actual\\nreason for H.B. 2, the Dissent engages in a methodology that we respectfully submit is\\ninconsistent with Casey. The Dissent argues that “H.B. 2 is not coterminous with the medical\\npractice of informed consent. It should not receive deferential review because it regulates the\\ncontent of physician speech, not the practice of medicine.” Dissent at 44.\\n\\n The Dissent’s approach departs from with how the Casey joint opinion reviewed the\\ninformed-consent statute in that case. The plurality considered mandated informed-consent\\ndisclosures regarding unborn life to be an incidental regulation of professional speech that was\\n\\n 24In addressing standard-of-care issues, such as whether H.B. 2 “cause[s] patient harm,” whether it has a\\n“medical purpose,” and whether it “facilitates informed consent as part of the practice of medicine,” Dissent at 35,\\nthe Dissent and district court again appear to make credibility determinations and to weigh the evidence in a manner\\nthat is contrary to the summary judgment standard. It is not undisputed that H.B. 2 is “at odds with the prevailing\\nstandard of care,” as the Dissent contends. See Dissent at 35. To the contrary, the Commonwealth’s experts (John\\nW. Seeds, M.D., FACOG, the retired chair of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Virginia\\nCommonwealth University, and W. David Hager, M.D., FACOG, an obstetrician and gynecologist who practices in\\nLexington, Kentucky) submitted declarations that H.B. 2 complies with existing standards of medical care. See\\ngenerally R. 32-1; R. 32-2. For example, Dr. Seeds stated: “Far from impairing the physician-patient relationship,\\nthe Act simply conforms the law to the existing national standards of care for the diagnosis of pregnancy and the\\nobtaining of a knowing and voluntary consent of the patient before the pregnancy is surgically or medically\\nterminated through elective abortion.” R. 32-1, PageID 363. We also note that Dr. Seeds offered this expert opinion\\nwith the understanding that the disclosures required by H.B. 2 are mandatory. Id. at 349. The district court\\nacknowledged Dr. Seeds’s (and Dr. Hager’s) opinion “that H.B. 2 conforms to existing national standards of care,”\\nEMW Women’s Surgical Center, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 643, but then dismissed that testimony as “undermined by the\\ntestimony given at the hearing” by EMW’s witnesses, id. Such weighing of evidence regarding national standards\\nof care appears inappropriate at summary judgment, but ultimately a factual finding in this area is not material to the\\nrelevant legal issue. As explained above, the First Amendment analysis of an informed-consent statute turns on\\nwhether the mandated disclosure is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant, not whether the disclosure is, or is not,\\ncurrently embodied in the customary standard of medical care.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 30\\n\\n\\nengaged in as “part of the practice of medicine.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. In Casey, as here,\\ncertain private medical organizations argued, and the district court found, that the mandated\\ndisclosures were inconsistent with informed-consent custom. But that argument and lower court\\nfinding did not cause the Casey plurality to conclude that the disclosures were somehow not part\\nof the practice of medicine and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny. Nor did Casey question\\nthe motives of the legislature. Instead, the plurality accepted as “legitimate” that the legislature\\nmay have the motive of “protecting the life of the unborn” in fashioning informed-consent\\nrequirements for the abortion procedure. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. This motive did not\\ncall for heightened scrutiny in Casey. Nor should it in this case.\\n\\n Furthermore, the reasoning in Casey establishes that H.B. 2 does indeed legitimately\\nfacilitate informed consent and serve a medical purpose that does not harm the patient. To give\\nthe patient more information that is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to a medical procedure\\nis the epitome of ensuring informed consent. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; Lakey, 667 F.3d at\\n579; Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735. A sonogram and heartbeat auscultation of the unborn life inside\\nthe patient are disclosures directly pertinent to whether to obtain a procedure to abort that unborn\\nlife. If we were to hold that a State may not require such disclosures, we would essentially be\\nconcluding that women must be shielded and protected from this up-to-date medical information,\\nthat women are unable to or should not be required to process it. This conclusion is incompatible\\nwith the concept of personal choice under Casey. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84; Lakey, 667\\nF.3d at 579 (“Denying [a woman] up to date medical information is more of an abuse to her\\nability to decide than providing the information.”). Casey recognized that a State may require a\\nphysician to inform the patient of the impact on unborn life and that facts relating to this impact\\nare among the disclosures that may be part of informed consent for an abortion.\\n\\n VII.\\n\\n Shifting from the First Amendment to the Eleventh, General Beshear argues that he is not\\na proper party to this matter. “[A] suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is\\nbarred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” Pennhurst State Sch. &\\nHosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984) (citation omitted). That said, one “important\\nexception” exists for suits “challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action.” Id.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 31\\n\\n\\n(citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)) (emphasis added). The district court held that\\nGeneral Beshear falls into this exception because he has the “necessary authority” to enforce\\nH.B. 2. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 647–48. But General Beshear argues\\nthat “an attorney general’s status as the chief law enforcement officer of the state is not a\\nsufficient connection” to fall into this exception. We agree with him.\\n\\n State officials who are “clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws\\nof the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings . . . to enforce against\\nparties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a\\nFederal court of equity from such action.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added).\\nHowever, this exception to sovereign immunity created in Ex parte Young has been read\\nnarrowly. Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1415 (6th Cir.\\n1996). We have held that it “does not apply when a defendant state official has neither enforced\\nnor threatened to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional state statute.” Id. (citations omitted).\\nThere must be “a realistic possibility the official will take legal or administrative actions against\\nthe plaintiff’s interests.” Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1048 (6th Cir. 2015)\\n(citing Deters, 92 F.3d at 1415). General enforcement authority is insufficient. Id. (citation\\nomitted).\\n\\n H.B. 2 and its penalty provision, in contrast with other statutes, do not delegate specific\\nenforcement power to any single state actor. KRS §§ 311.727, 311.990(33). Multiple local\\nprosecutors—the Commonwealth’s and county attorneys—have the duty to enforce H.B. 2.\\n\\n True, the Attorney General is “the chief law officer of the Commonwealth” with a\\nresponsibility to “exercise all common law duties and authority pertaining to the office of the\\nAttorney General under the common law, except when modified by statutory enactment.” KRS\\n§ 15.020. Kentucky law permits the Attorney General to defend a statute’s constitutional\\nvalidity, but it also gives her or him discretion. KRS § 418.075(1); Commonwealth v. Hamilton,\\n411 S.W.3d 741, 751 (Ky. 2013). However, Kentucky law does not require the Attorney\\nGeneral to represent the Commonwealth “where it is made the duty of the Commonwealth’s\\nattorney or county attorney” instead. KRS § 15.020. That is what we have here.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 32\\n\\n\\n Each Commonwealth’s attorney must “attend to all civil cases and proceedings in which\\nthe Commonwealth is interested in the Circuit Courts of [her or] his judicial circuit.” KRS\\n§ 69.010(1). The county attorneys must do the same within their counties. KRS § 69.210(4)(a).\\nBoth must investigate the condition of unsatisfied judgments in their districts or counties. KRS\\n§§ 69.040, 69.240. They also must “take all necessary steps, by motion, action, or otherwise to\\ncollect [them] and cause them to be paid into the State Treasury.” KRS § 69.240; accord KRS\\n§ 69.040. When these attorneys fail to meet this mandate, and if the Department of Revenue\\nsubmits a written request, then the Attorney General must bring an action to collect any\\nunsatisfied judgments. See KRS § 15.060(3). The duty to enforce H.B. 2 therefore lies not with\\nthe Attorney General but with the Commonwealth’s attorneys and the county attorneys.\\n\\n To support their interpretation of Ex parte Young, EMW cites McNeilus Truck &\\nManufacturing, Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2000). That case,\\nhowever, affirms the holding of Deters, which we rely on here. See McNeilus Truck & Mfg.,\\n226 F.3d at 438 (citing Deters for the proposition that Young “does not apply when the defendant\\nofficial has neither enforced nor threatened to enforce” the challenged statute). McNeilus also\\nheld that the Attorney General is a proper defendant “[w]here there is an imminent threat of\\nenforcement.” Id. at 437. There, the Attorney General helped enforce portions of the statute,\\nand the other defendant had threatened to withdraw the plaintiff’s license. So, we held both the\\nAttorney General and the other defendant could be sued. McNeilus, however, does not help\\nEMW because there is no evidence of a similar “imminent threat” of prosecution by the Attorney\\nGeneral in the present case. Any imminent threat comes from the Commonwealth’s and county\\nattorneys, not the Attorney General.\\n\\n General Beshear has not enforced or even threatened to enforce H.B. 2. Rather, the\\nKentucky legislature has charged local prosecutors with its enforcement. We therefore hold that\\nthe Attorney General is not a proper party to this action.25\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25Because it is uncontested that the Secretary Meier is a proper party, no concern exists that EMW “would\\nbe unable to vindicate the alleged infringement of their constitutional rights without first violating [H.B. 2].” See\\nAllied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 665 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 33\\n\\n\\n VIII.\\n\\n H.B. 2—The Ultrasound Informed Consent Act—is an informed-consent statute like the\\nstatute in Casey because it provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information related to\\nan abortion. The statute incidentally burdens speech only as part of Kentucky’s regulation of\\nprofessional conduct. Therefore, H.B. 2 is not subject to any heightened scrutiny with respect to\\nthe doctors’ First Amendment rights, and it does not violate those rights, based on NIFLA and\\nCasey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Also, because local prosecutors\\nwould handle the enforcement of fines under H.B. 2, the Attorney General is not a proper party\\nto this action.\\n\\n With due respect for the views of the Dissent, we adopt instead the position of the Fifth\\nand Eighth Circuits on the First Amendment issue. Our responsibility here is to apply the level\\nof scrutiny mandated by the plurality opinion in Casey and reaffirmed by a majority of the\\nSupreme Court in NIFLA. Under Casey, “protecting the life of the unborn” is a “legitimate goal”\\nthat may be pursued by a State as part of informed consent. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. As\\na First Amendment matter, there is nothing suspect with a State’s requiring a doctor, before\\nperforming an abortion, to make truthful, non-misleading factual disclosures, relevant to\\ninformed consent, even if those disclosures relate to unborn life and have the effect of persuading\\nthe patient not to have an abortion.\\n\\n Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s contrary decision and VACATE the\\ninjunction. We also remand with instructions for General Beshear to be dismissed from the case,\\nfor summary judgment to be entered in favor of Secretary Meier on the first claim for relief\\nstated in the complaint, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 34\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n DISSENT\\n _________________\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384388/\", \"author_raw\": \"JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge, dissenting.1\\n\\n This is a First Amendment case. Although the challenged statute affects abortion, the\\nquestion before this Court is not whether the statute unduly burdens a woman’s right to choose.\\nThe question is how the statute—which compels specific speech and actions by physicians—\\nimpacts a physician’s First Amendment rights. The majority misses this critical distinction.\\nThey incorrectly apply Fourteenth Amendment precedent to resolve this case, as succinctly\\ndepicted by their opening line: “Under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a woman has the right\\nto choose to have an abortion.” Majority Opn. at 1. The categorical test the majority conjures\\ntoday may be applicable to an undue burden challenge, but it does not reflect the protections the\\nFirst Amendment affords private citizens.\\n\\n Pursuant to the First Amendment, a regulation that compels physician speech is subject to\\nheightened scrutiny unless it regulates speech “as part of the practice of medicine,” Nat’l Inst. of\\nFamily & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018) (“NIFLA”) (quoting Planned\\nParenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)),2 such as when it\\n“facilitate[s] informed consent to a medical procedure,” id. The driving term here is “practice of\\nmedicine.” A regulation that affects physician speech receives deferential review only when that\\nspeech is auxiliary to a medical practice. Id. at 2372 (“The Court has afforded less protection for\\nprofessional speech . . . where States regulate professional conduct, even though that conduct\\nincidentally regulates speech.” (emphasis added)). In other words, when the state regulates the\\ncontent of physician speech in a manner that is inconsistent with the practice of medicine, we\\nmust apply heightened scrutiny, full stop. Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1I agree with the majority that Attorney General Beshear is not a proper party to this action.\\n 2All citations to Casey are to the plurality opinion, unless otherwise noted.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 35\\n\\n\\n At issue in this case is H.B. 2, a law that has no basis in the practice of medicine. Prior to\\nperforming an abortion, H.B. 2 requires physicians in the Commonwealth of Kentucky to\\nconduct an ultrasound (oftentimes using a transvaginal probe) while simultaneously describing\\nthe fetus with particularity, displaying the sonogram images, and playing aloud the fetus’\\nheartbeat to the patient. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.727(2)(a)–(f). Moreover, the physician is not\\npermitted to exercise his or her medical judgment in deciding whether the procedure is\\nappropriate or ethical. Id. The Commonwealth argues that H.B. 2 facilitates informed consent\\nas part of the practice of medicine. Prevailing standards of care and the undisputed evidence,\\nhowever, contradict this contention.\\n\\n H.B. 2 does not facilitate informed consent. Under the prevailing standard of care,\\ninformed consent requires respect for the patient’s autonomy and sensitivity to the patient’s\\ncondition. Physician discretion is vital, but H.B. 2 eviscerates physician discretion. H.B. 2 is\\nthus at odds with the prevailing standard of care. The undisputed evidence shows the same.\\nPlaintiffs introduced 1) physician testimony stating that H.B. 2’s mandatory provisions would\\ncause patient harm but “serve no medical purpose,” and 2) a grim account from a woman who\\nhad an abortion under a “display and describe” regulation that caused her serious harm without\\nfacilitating her informed consent. The Commonwealth did not controvert that evidence, and the\\nmajority ignores these significant points (indeed, the majority goes so far as to hold that\\n“customary standard[s] of medical care” play no role in determining whether a regulation\\nconforms to the practice of medicine, Majority Opn. at n. 24).\\n\\n Rather than look to the standard of care and the evidence, the majority relies on undue\\nburden jurisprudence to fashion a test that they believe comprehensively captures informed\\nconsent. The result is erroneous. If a regulation requires the provision of truthful, non-\\nmisleading, and relevant information, the majority has decided that the regulation per se\\nfacilitates informed consent. The three elements the majority identifies—truthful, non-\\nmisleading, and relevant—were drawn from Casey, a controlling case that considered both an\\nundue burden and a First Amendment challenge. These three elements, however, were central\\nonly to Casey’s undue burden analysis. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 (holding that a regulation that\\nrequires provision of truthful and non-misleading information “cannot be considered a\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 36\\n\\n\\nsubstantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden.”).\\nNowhere are these elements even mentioned in Casey’s discussion of the First Amendment. See\\nid. at 884. It is a mistake to transpose Casey’s holding on undue burden to the First Amendment\\nchallenge here. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The fact that a regulation\\ndoes not impose an undue burden on a woman under the due process clause does not answer the\\nquestion of whether it imposes an impermissible burden on the physician under the First\\nAmendment.”). To illustrate further, imagine if a state passed a law requiring all gun owners to\\nturn in their guns for just compensation, and this Court upheld the law under the Second\\nAmendment, but relied only on facts from Takings Clause jurisprudence. The outcome would be\\nflawed because the issues are distinct. The same is true in this case.\\n\\n The ultimate question in this First Amendment case is whether H.B. 2 regulates the\\npractice of medicine, with physician speech being an “incidental” victim. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at\\n2372. The two authorities upon which the majority relies to answer this question do not canvass\\nthe medical practice of informed consent (nor do they profess to do so); the majority thus takes\\nCasey and NIFLA too far by extrapolating from them a categorical test on informed consent.\\nCasey established the general principle that regulation of physician speech must be reasonable\\nand regulate speech “as part of the practice of medicine.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Applying that\\nprinciple, the Court upheld a law that permitted a physician to exercise his or her medical\\njudgment in deciding whether to provide truthful, non-misleading information to patients. Id.\\nThen, in NIFLA, the Court applied the same principle to a regulation that required unlicensed\\nmedical clinics to disseminate certain information in all of their advertising materials. NIFLA,\\n138 S. Ct. at 2373. Because that regulation extended to non-patients, the Court found that it did\\nnot facilitate informed consent, so it was nothing more than a prohibited regulation of “speech as\\nspeech.” Id. at 2374. Casey and NIFLA do the following two things for our First Amendment\\ninquiry: they provide a guiding principle and two factual comparators.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 37\\n\\n\\n Despite what the majority avers, these cases do not set out elements that comprehensively\\ndefine the medical practice of informed consent.3 Because we do not have legal authority\\nreciting the contours of informed consent, we must naturally turn to the medical community for\\nthat definition. The prevailing standard of care and the undisputed evidence from below make\\nthis clear: H.B. 2 does not facilitate informed consent. H.B. 2 does not permit physician\\ndiscretion—a central tenet of informed consent—and it would require physicians to harm their\\npatients with “no medical purpose.” Accordingly, it does not regulate speech as part of the\\npractice of medicine; it regulates “speech as speech.” See id. at 2374. For that reason, H.B. 2\\nshould be subjected to heightened scrutiny and deemed an unconstitutional infringement of the\\nphysicians’ right to free speech. I respectfully dissent.\\n\\n A. Informed Consent and First Amendment Jurisprudence\\n\\n The controlling First Amendment cases in this context are Casey and NIFLA (and only a\\nlimited portion of Casey is germane). These cases do two things. First, they create the guiding\\nprinciple that reasonable regulations that facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure are\\nexcepted from heightened scrutiny. Second, they illustrate that guiding principle by applying it\\nto a Pennsylvania statute (in Casey) and a California statute (in NIFLA). What these cases do not\\ndo, however, is provide a simple equation with which to calculate whether a regulation facilitates\\ninformed consent. They do not support the majority’s categorical test.\\n\\n 1. Under Casey, a Regulation Compelling Physician Speech is Subject to\\n Deferential Review Only When It is Reasonable and Conforms to the\\n Practice of Medicine\\n\\n In Casey, several abortion clinics and physicians challenged a Pennsylvania statute that\\nrequired a woman seeking an abortion to receive certain information at least 24 hours before the\\nabortion was performed. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844–45. The Pennsylvania statute also permitted\\nthe physician to exercise his or her medical judgment (e.g., discretion) to decide whether to\\nprovide the information at all. Id. Though the primary challenge in Casey centered on the\\n\\n\\n 3Nordo these cases propose that the state’s intention in regulating physician speech is immaterial to a First\\nAmendment challenge. To the contrary, NIFLA explicitly condemned California’s attempt to further its ideological\\nmessage by regulating the content of physician speech outside the practice of medicine. 138 S. Ct. at 2374–76.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 38\\n\\n\\nwoman’s right to choose, the physicians also challenged the statute as a violation of their right to\\nfree speech. See id. at 844–853, 884. The Court disposed of that First Amendment challenge\\nwith a single paragraph, reproduced in its entirety below:\\n\\n All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment right of a\\n physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in\\n a manner mandated by the State. To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment\\n rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine,\\n subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no\\n constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the\\n information mandated by the State here.\\n\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 884 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). This paragraph “did not\\nhold sweepingly that all regulation of speech in the medical context merely receives rational\\nbasis review.” Wollschlaeger v. Gov. Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1311 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting\\nStuart, 774 F.3d at 249). Indeed, Casey’s First Amendment reach is limited. The Court held that\\nthe Pennsylvania statute—with all of its specific features—was a “reasonable . . . regulation by\\nthe State” “as part of the practice of medicine,” and thus did not run afoul of the physicians’ First\\nAmendment rights. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.\\n\\n The majority interprets Casey very differently. First, the majority recites language from\\nseveral passages in Casey detailing why the provision of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\\ninformation is constitutionally appropriate. They have focused on the wrong provision of the\\nConstitution. The following summation, which immediately follows the specific passages the\\nmajority cites from Casey, makes clear that the pertinent language is specific to the undue burden\\nchallenge in that case:\\n\\n In short, requiring that the woman be informed of the availability of information\\n relating to fetal development and the assistance available should she decide to\\n carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable measure to ensure an informed\\n choice, one which might cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.\\n This requirement cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an\\n abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden.\\n\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 883 (emphasis added). Only after the discussion of those enumerated\\nelements and the summation above did the Court begin to analyze the plaintiffs’ First\\nAmendment claims. See id. The analysis in Casey that the majority relies upon applies to an\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 39\\n\\n\\nundue burden challenge, not a First Amendment challenge. We are not at liberty to transpose\\nundue burden principles to the First Amendment.\\n\\n More egregiously, the majority announces that “the First Amendment analysis of an\\ninformed-consent statute turns on whether the mandated disclosure is truthful, non-misleading,\\nand relevant, not whether the disclosure is, or is not, currently embodied in the customary\\nstandard of medical care.” Majority Opn. at n. 24. This proclamation contravenes Casey’s\\nexplicit holding on the First Amendment. In Casey, the Court addressed the First Amendment\\nchallenge within a single paragraph, and within that single paragraph, only a single sentence\\nprovided the germane, guiding principle: “To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights\\nnot to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable\\nlicensing and regulation by the State.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (emphasis added). The majority\\nnow reads this sentence completely out of Casey, and instead dictates that what truly matters to\\nour inquiry is whether a subsequent statute shares some material features of the Casey statute.\\nThis is the proverbial tail that wags the dog.\\n\\n Second, the majority highlights that Casey explicitly overruled City of Akron v. Akron\\nCtr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (“Akron I”) and Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of\\nObstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), cases the majority argues might have lent\\ncredence to the position that H.B. 2 does not facilitate informed consent. This argument attacks\\na straw man. The legal challenges in Akron I and Thornburgh were based on undue burden, not\\nthe First Amendment. Akron I, 462 U.S. at n.16 (“This is not to say that the informed consent\\nprovisions may not violate the First Amendment rights of the physician . . . .”), Thornburgh,\\n476 U.S. at 830–31 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Since the Court of Appeals did not reach\\nappellees’ First Amendment claim, and since appellees do not raise it here, I need not decide\\nwhether this potential problem would be sufficiently serious to warrant issuance of a preliminary\\ninjunction.”). Casey even explained that overruling Akron I and Thornburgh was premised\\nentirely on “the undue burden standard adopted in this opinion.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 881\\n(emphasis added). The majority’s attempt to bolster their own analysis by pointing out that\\nAkron I and Thornburgh are no longer good law unnecessarily confuses the issues.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 40\\n\\n\\n Last, the majority avers that any statute that is “of the nature upheld in Casey” should not\\nbe subjected to heightened scrutiny. This point is uncontroversial. If the Court has considered a\\nmaterially identical statute and treated it in one way, we are bound to do the same (given the\\nsame challenge).4 The issue here, however, is how we define the material elements of the\\nPennsylvania statute in Casey. As the majority frequently repeats, the Pennsylvania statute\\nrequired the provision of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information. That is not the\\nwhole story, though. The statute also permitted the physician to “exercis[e] his or her medical\\njudgment” in deciding whether to provide the information at all. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884–85\\n(“[I]t is worth noting that the statute now before us does not require a physician to comply with\\nthe informed consent provisions ‘if he or she can demonstrate by a preponderance of the\\nevidence, that he or she reasonably believed that furnishing the information would have resulted\\nin a severely adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the patient.’” (quoting 18 Pa.\\nCons. Stat. § 3205 (1990)). This fact the majority decides not to repeat as a material feature of\\nthe statute.\\n\\n To the extent that we use the facts of Casey to guide our decision-making in this case, we\\ncannot cherry-pick those that align with H.B. 2 and ignore those that do not. The Pennsylvania\\nstatute in Casey required the provision of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information, and\\nit provided the physician the opportunity to exercise his or her medical judgment to decide not to\\nprovide that information. Those are the material facts. If we encounter a statute with those same\\nmaterial elements, it should be deemed constitutionally sound, just as the Pennsylvania statute in\\nCasey was—but H.B. 2 does not share those same material elements because H.B. 2 does not\\nallow for the physician to exercise his or her medical judgment. H.B. 2 cannot be treated as\\nequivalent to the Pennsylvania statute in Casey. It is not “of the nature upheld in Casey.”\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4Casey guides us to apply a deferential standard of review to a regulation on physician speech only when it\\nregulates speech “as part of the practice of medicine.” 505 U.S. at 884. It must be said that the practice of medicine\\nis always subject to change given advancements in research and treatment. If such change occurs, it could render\\nthe facts of a previous First Amendment case no longer useful as a comparator. At which point, the Court must rely\\non the parties to apprise it of the prevailing standards of care.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 41\\n\\n\\n Although they try, the majority cannot explain this stubborn fact away. 5 First, the\\nmajority concludes that “there is no indication that the [Casey] plurality considered the\\n[physician discretion] provision to be significant for its First Amendment review.” Majority\\nOpn. at 27. This principle is of no help to the majority. The Casey plurality never mentioned the\\nprovision of non-misleading or truthful information in its brief discussion of the First\\nAmendment, yet the majority bases its entire analytical approach on those elements. See 505\\nU.S. at 884. Equal application of the principle, then, would undermine the majority’s entire\\nopinion. Second, the majority attempts to frame H.B. 2 as “effectively” providing the same\\nphysician discretion as the Pennsylvania statute did, pointing out that H.B. 2 permits the\\nphysician to tell his or her patient not to listen to the heartbeat and not to watch the images from\\nthe sonogram. Majority Opn. at 27. This fact may be so, but under H.B. 2, the patient must still\\nbe probed, the doctor must still describe the fetus with mandated particularity and auscultate the\\nheartbeat, and the procedure must proceed to completion. There is no discretion to avoid these\\nacts, regardless of their impact on the health of the patient. H.B. 2 thus does not afford the same\\ndiscretion as the Pennsylvania statute did and is therefore not “of the nature upheld in Casey.”\\n\\n 2. NIFLA Requires the Provision of Information to Actual Patients, and\\n Warns of the Dangers of Abridging Speech\\n\\n Moving on from Casey, the next case shaping the informed-consent exception is NIFLA.\\nIn NIFLA, California passed a regulation that required unlicensed facilities to display\\ngovernment-drafted notices on all advertising materials and within on-site locations. NIFLA, 138\\nS. Ct. at 2369–70. The government there argued that the regulation facilitated informed consent,\\nbut the Court was not convinced. Id. at 2373–74. The reason why: the provision of information\\nwas “not tied to a procedure at all . . . [and] applie[d] to all interactions between a covered\\nfacility and its clients, regardless of whether a medical procedure [was] ever sought, offered, or\\nperformed.” Id. at 2373. Because the regulation did not facilitate informed consent, it did not\\nregulate speech as part of the practice of medicine—it “regulate[d] speech as speech.” Id. at\\n2374. Therefore, the Court applied heightened scrutiny and deemed it an unconstitutional\\n\\n 5The majority also makes clear that they do not find physician discretion to be material to their First\\nAmendment analysis. Majority Opn. at n. 24 (“[U]ltimately a factual finding in this area is not material to the\\nrelevant legal issue.”). Their discussion on the matter thus amounts to surplusage.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 42\\n\\n\\ninfringement of the physicians’ right to free speech. Id. at 2376. Other than requiring the\\nprovision of information to actual patients seeking a specific medical procedure, NIFLA does not\\nsay anything else about what constitutes informed consent. Indeed, the words “truthful,” “not\\nmisleading,” and “relevant” are wholly absent from NIFLA, except in the dissent. Id. at 2385, 88\\n(Breyer, J., dissenting).\\n\\n The second and arguably most important point in NIFLA is that the First Amendment is\\nnecessary to maintain a free and democratic society. Id. at 2374 (“[W]hen the government\\npolices the content of professional speech, it can fail to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of\\nideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.” (quotation marks omitted)). The Court\\nemphatically rebuked California’s attempt to restrict physician speech under the guise of\\nfacilitating informed consent. See id. at 2375 (“[the regulation] cannot survive even intermediate\\nscrutiny”). Of the 5,945 words in the majority and concurring opinions, approximately 2,485\\n(41.8%) of them were dedicated to explicating the dangers of abridging speech. Word count is,\\nof course, a crude measure of importance; but the substance of those words underscored the same\\npoint. The Court emphasized “the fundamental principle that governments ‘have no power to\\nrestrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’” Id. at\\n2371 (citation omitted). More specific to physician speech, the Court warned that “regulating the\\ncontent of professionals’ speech ‘pose[s] the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to\\nadvance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information.’” Id. at\\n2374 (citation omitted).\\n\\n To illuminate that risk, the Court recounted a laundry list of despotic regimes that had\\n“manipulated the content of doctor-patient discourse” to advance their own iniquitous interests,\\nsuch as China during the Cultural Revolution, the Soviet Government in the 1930’s, and Nazi\\nGermany. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The results were, respectively, to suppress child\\nrearing in peasant communities; to place injured railroad workers in significant danger; and to\\nexact an unprecedented campaign of genocide. Id. It is unsettling to think that this country\\ncould follow in those ignominious footsteps. Yet, the majority cavalierly dismisses this concern,\\nstating that “what matters for First Amendment purposes is whether the disclosed facts are\\ntruthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the procedure, not whether they fall on one side of the\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 43\\n\\n\\ndebate, and not whether they influence a woman to abort or keep the child.” Majority Opn. at\\n19. This account is at odds with the principles of the First Amendment, particularly as described\\nin NIFLA.\\n\\n To avoid this foundational consideration, the majority relies on (and emphasizes) the\\nfollowing holding in Casey: “a State may ‘further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the\\nunborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even\\nwhen in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.’” Majority Opn.\\nat 7 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 883). This sentiment makes sense in an undue burden\\nchallenge. The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the life of unborn children, Roe v.\\nWade, 410 U.S. at 153, and, when challenged under the due process clause, is free to convey that\\nmessage itself so long as the woman’s right to choose is not unduly burdened, Casey, 505 U.S. at\\n876 (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s\\ninterest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).\\n\\n However, we apply a different, more inquisitive standard when the state forces private\\nindividuals to voice that preference. Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc.,\\n487 U.S. 781, 790 (1988) (content-based restrictions on speech must pass strict scrutiny). As\\nmade clear in NIFLA, the state “cannot co-opt [physicians] to deliver its message for it. ‘[T]he\\nFirst Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency.’” NIFLA, 138 S.\\nCt. at 2376 (quoting Riley, 487 U.S. at 795); see also Stuart, 774 F.3d at 253 (holding that the\\nstate “cannot commandeer the doctor-patient relationship to compel a physician to express its\\npreference to the patient[]”). As a First Amendment challenge, we must consider whether the\\nstate is regulating the content of speech and for what reason. Riley, 487 U.S. at 790. Here, the\\nCommonwealth is regulating the content of physician speech, not the practice of medicine, and is\\ndoing so to promote the Commonwealth’s chosen message. The First Amendment protects\\nphysicians—who are private citizens—from such regulations.\\n\\n In sum, Casey and NIFLA are useful in the underlying First Amendment case in the\\nfollowing ways: they establish the guiding principle that reasonable regulations that facilitate\\ninformed consent to a medical procedure are excepted from heightened scrutiny, and they\\nprovide two comparator statutes. These cases do not, however, provide comprehensive\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 44\\n\\n\\ninstructions on what informed consent is or what it means to facilitate informed consent. To\\ndiscern those definitions, we must turn to the medical community, because, after all, the primary\\nquestion here is whether H.B. 2 regulates speech “only as part of the practice of medicine.”\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 884 (emphasis added).\\n\\n B. The Medical Definition of Informed Consent\\n\\n Before delving into the prevailing standard of medical care, I must address the majority’s\\ncontention that the Court, and not “private part[ies],”6 should determine on its own what\\nconstitutes a medical practice. Majority Opn. at 23–25. What the majority describes is not\\nconsistent with jurisprudential tenets. As the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court aptly noted, it\\nis our job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.7 We are not medical experts, and even\\nif we were, we would not be permitted to divine from our own personal beliefs what a medical\\npractice is and what it is not. This foundational rule is particularly important when confronted\\nwith an ever-evolving practice such as medicine. Indeed, what once was an acceptable medical\\npractice—like easing children’s nerves with “soothing syrups” containing heroin in the early\\n20th century—is no longer acceptable based upon modern standards of practice and research. 8\\nUnlike the majority, and pursuant to jurisprudential tenets, I rely on the evidence submitted by\\nthe parties (and the materials submitted by the amici) to determine whether H.B. 2 facilitates\\ninformed consent.\\n\\n As a medical practice, informed consent requires a physician to be able to exercise his or\\nher judgment in deciding how to provide relevant information to the patient. H.B. 2 does not\\nallow for any physician discretion. Therefore, very simply, H.B. 2 is not coterminous with the\\nmedical practice of informed consent. It should not receive deferential review because it\\nregulates the content of physician speech, not the practice of medicine.\\n\\n 6This is the majority’s reference to the plaintiffs in the underlying case who provided evidence to support\\ntheir arguments.\\n 7Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on the Nomination of The Honorable John G. Roberts to be\\nthe Chief Justice of the United States, 109th Cong. (Sept. 12, 2005), https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-\\nresources/educational-activities/chief-justice-roberts-statement-nomination-process.\\n 8Soothing Syrups, N.Y. Times (Aug. 30, 1910) https://timesmachine nytimes.com/timesmachine/1910/08/3\\n0/105088995.pdf.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 45\\n\\n\\n The ethical doctrine of informed consent is “rooted in the concept of self-determination\\nand the fundamental understanding that patients have the right to make their own decisions\\nregarding their own bodies.” Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists (“ACOG”) & the Am.\\nMed. Ass’n (“AMA”) Br. at 6 (citing ACOG Comm. on Ethics, Comm. Op. No. 439 (2009,\\nreaffirmed 2015)). Facilitating informed consent involves two major elements: comprehension\\nand free consent. ACOG Comm. on Ethics, Comm. Op. No. 439; ACOG & AMA Br. at 7.\\n“Comprehension . . . includes the patient’s awareness and understanding of her situation and the\\npossibilities. It implies that she has been given adequate information about her diagnosis,\\nprognosis, and alternative treatment choices, including the option of no treatment.” ACOG\\nComm. Op. No. 439 at 3. “Free consent is an intentional and voluntary choice that authorizes\\nsomeone else to act in certain ways.” Id. Informed consent is not attained when a patient is\\n“deceived [or] coerced.” Id.\\n\\n The purpose of informed consent is to permit a patient’s “self-determination,” or, “the\\ntaking hold of her own life and action, determining the meaning and possibility of what she\\nundergoes as well as what she does.” Id. at 2. The AMA code of ethics requires physicians to:\\n\\n (a) Assess the patient’s ability to understand relevant medical information and the\\n implications of treatment alternatives and to make an independent, voluntary\\n decision.\\n (b) Present relevant information accurately and sensitively, in keeping with the\\n patient’s preferences for receiving medical information. The physician should\\n include information about:\\n 1. The diagnosis (when known)\\n 2. The nature and purpose of recommended interventions\\n 3. The burdens, risks, and expected benefits of all options, including forgoing\\n treatment\\n (c) Document the informed consent conversation and the patient’s (or surrogate’s)\\n decision in the medical record in some manner. When the patient/surrogate has\\n provided specific written consent, the consent form should be included in the\\n record.\\n\\nAMA Code of Ethics, Opinion 2.1.1(a)-(c) – Informed Consent (2016) (emphasis added). As a\\ngeneral practice, informed consent requires the physician to be able to assess the situation and\\npresent information in a way that helps the patient make a voluntary, informed, and personal\\ndecision.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 46\\n\\n\\n Specific to the procedure at issue here, the National Abortion Federation informed-\\nconsent standard of care states that: “The practitioner must ensure that appropriate personnel\\nhave a discussion with the patient in which accurate information is provided about the abortion\\nprocess and its alternatives, and the potential risks and benefits. The patient must have\\nthe opportunity to have any questions answered to her satisfaction prior to intervention.”\\nNat’l Abortion Fed’n, Clinical Policy Guidelines for Abortion Care (2018), https://5aa1b2xfmfh\\n2e2mk03kk8rsx-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018_CPGs.pdf. There is no\\nrequirement that the patient undergo an ultrasound to provide informed consent to an abortion.\\nSee id. (“The use of ultrasound is not a requirement for the provision of first-trimester abortion\\ncare.”), cf. K. White, H. Jones, E.S. Lichtenberg & M. Paul, First-Trimester Surgical Abortion\\nPractices in the United States, 92 Contraception 368 (2015) (finding that up to 98% of U.S.\\nabortion facilities use an ultrasound to date the pregnancy). When an ultrasound is conducted,\\nthe standard of care requires an evaluation of the uterus and the embryo or fetus for specific\\nfeatures. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, Clinical Policy Guidelines for Abortion Care (2018). Further,\\nthe patient must affirm that she understands the risks of the procedure. Id.\\n\\n Unlike H.B. 2, this standard of care does not require the physician to conduct an\\nultrasound and to simultaneously describe specific parts of the fetus, display those images to the\\npatient, and play aloud any audible heartbeat. (Summary Judgment Hearing Tr., Mar. 23, 2017,\\nTestimony of Dr. Joffe, R. 55, PageID # 751–53 (explaining in detail the National Abortion\\nFederation standard of care).) Nor does the standard of care require physicians to abandon their\\nethical and professional obligation to present information sensitively. (Id. at 753–54.) H.B. 2\\ndiverges from the national standard of care in a dispositive way: physicians have no ability to\\nrespond to their patients’ conditions, histories, and needs in performing the mandated procedure.\\nBy proscribing physician discretion, H.B. 2 is hostile to the medical practice of informed\\nconsent.9 Accordingly, H.B. 2 is not a regulation of speech as part of the practice of medicine, it\\nis a regulation of “speech as speech.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2374.\\n\\n\\n 9According to the majority, H.B. 2 does permit physician discretion because it allows the physician to tell\\nhis or her patient that she may avoid listening to the heartbeat or watching the images displayed. This is not the type\\nof discretion that informed consent requires. Under H.B. 2, the physician must still probe his or her patient and\\nperform the mandated procedure. In Casey, on the other hand, the physician could exercise his or her discretion not\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 47\\n\\n\\n C. The Undisputed Evidence\\n\\n The undisputed evidence introduced below demonstrates that H.B. 2 would require\\nphysicians to violate their professional and ethical obligations. Three physicians testified that\\nH.B. 2’s one-size-fits-all approach would cause them to harm their patients in direct violation of\\nthe prevailing standard of care. Further, a woman who underwent an abortion under a similar\\nregulation described the horrifying pain she suffered as a result, all while not receiving any\\nhelpful information. The Commonwealth did not controvert these facts. Nor did the\\nCommonwealth introduce evidence demonstrating that the mandatory nature of H.B. 2 is\\nconsistent with informed consent. Therefore, the undisputed evidence shows that H.B. 2 does\\nnot facilitate informed consent as a medical practice.\\n\\n 1. Informed-Consent Regulation Preceding H.B. 2\\n\\n Originally enacted in 1998, Kentucky Revised Statute § 311.725 is the abortion\\ninformed-consent statute that preceded H.B. 2 in the Commonwealth. It contains a list of\\nrequired information physicians must provide to a woman at least 24 hours prior to the\\nprocedure, including:\\n\\n 1. The nature and purpose of the particular abortion procedure or treatment to be\\n performed and of those medical risks and alternatives to the procedure or treatment\\n that a reasonable patient would consider material to the decision of whether or not to\\n undergo the abortion;\\n 2. The probable gestational age of the embryo or fetus at the time the abortion is to be\\n performed;\\n 3. The medical risks associated with the pregnant woman carrying her pregnancy to\\n term;\\n 4. That published materials produced by the state are available to her which she has a\\n right to, free of charge;\\n 5. That there may be medical assistance benefits available to her for prenatal care,\\n childbirth, and neonatal care; and\\n 6. That the father of the fetus is liable to assist in the support of her child, even in\\n instances where he has offered to pay for the abortion.\\n\\nto perform the mandated practice at all based on the potential effect it would have on the patient. There is no similar\\ndiscretion under H.B. 2. The majority’s attempt to frame H.B. 2 as permitting physician discretion fails because it\\nglosses over this fact.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 48\\n\\n\\nKy. Rev. Stat. § 311.725(1)(a)–(b) (1998). For almost twenty years, these regulations governed\\nthe information that the Commonwealth mandated be disclosed to patients seeking an abortion.\\nIn the underlying proceedings, the Commonwealth failed to, and then refused to, describe how\\nthis regulation was defective in facilitating informed consent. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 283\\nF. Supp. 3d 629, 646 (W.D. Ky. 2017).\\n\\n 2. Physician Testimony on H.B. 2\\n\\n On the other hand, the undisputed evidence shows that that regulation’s successor—\\nH.B. 2—is defective in facilitating informed consent. The testimony offered in affidavits and at\\nthe summary judgment hearing clarified that H.B. 2 would require physicians to inflict\\nunnecessary harm upon their patients in direct contravention of the practice of medicine.\\n\\n As an initial matter, Dr. Franklin testified that offering, rather than requiring, an\\nultrasound is the national standard of care pursuant to the National Abortion Federation practice\\nguidelines. H.B. 2’s mandatory provisions are not consistent with that standard of care. For\\nexample, Dr. Joffe testified that “[t]o continue to speak to a patient, to continue to share that\\ninformation with a patient who’s clearly signaling that she doesn’t want that information to me is\\nthe definition of insensitivity.” Dr. Nichols similarly testified that simultaneously displaying and\\ndescribing the fetus “clearly violates basic principles of medical ethics and informed consent and\\nserves no medical purpose.” Indeed, in his decades of experience, Dr. Nichols has “never heard\\nof an institution that—absent a law compelling them to do so—forces an ultrasound image and\\ndescription and any fetal heart tones on a woman before she can have an abortion.”\\n\\n As a practical matter, the undisputed evidence also demonstrates that, regardless of her\\nstated preferences, the woman will likely still hear the auscultation of the heartbeat and her\\nphysician’s description of the fetus. Dr. Franklin explained that a physician “can’t auscultate\\n[the fetus’ heartbeat] in the room with [the patient] and she not hear it too.” Yet H.B. 2 requires\\nauscultation. Accordingly, even when a patient asks not to hear the heartbeat, “the sound can not\\nnecessarily be drowned out unless they have their ears covered and they’re yelling or they’re\\nmaking noises or humming. So there’s no true way to not hear the heartbeat, even though we\\nthink they have a choice about it.” Dr. Joffe similarly testified that even when a patient is\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 49\\n\\n\\npermitted to cover her ears or avert her eyes, the physician must still audibly describe and\\nvisually display the fetus as the Commonwealth mandates:\\n\\n [I]f you just imagine for a moment being in that exam room with a patient who is\\n -- the doctor is talking, the doctor is talking on because she’s mandated to be\\n talking on by H.B. 2, and the patient is doing everything in her power to avoid\\n that experience, and that interaction, and those sounds, that looks nothing like any\\n informed consent that I am familiar with, any standard of informed consent.\\n That’s in complete violation of it.\\n\\nThese physicians each emphatically agreed that H.B. 2 bears no resemblance to the medical\\npractice of informed consent.\\n\\n 3. Patient Testimony on Display-and-Describe Regulations\\n\\n The procedure—and its impact—was not solely described by physicians. The affidavit of\\na woman who was forced to undergo a “display-and-describe” procedure offered a grim scene,\\none in which the professional and ethical practice of medicine was absent. This pregnant woman\\nand her husband, already parents of a two-year-old girl, went to the doctor’s office for a routine\\nultrasound. Horrific news and a traumatic experience followed. The doctor informed the couple\\nthat the “baby was profoundly ill,” and sent them to a specialist for further consultation. After\\nspeaking with two more medical professionals that same day, the couple was left with the\\nfollowing options: “abortion or continue the pregnancy and subject our child to a life of pain.”\\nThey had to make a “very difficult decision,” but they did so with full comprehension and free\\nconsent. As a medical question, the mother provided informed consent to have an abortion (and\\nto spare her unborn child a life of pain). However, because she was having the procedure in\\nTexas, and pursuant to Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.012(a)(4), she was required to undergo\\nan additional “display-and-describe” procedure, just like H.B. 2 requires. Her account of that\\nexperience—which was mandated by her state government, not her doctor—is tragic:\\n\\n While the staff at the abortion clinic did all they could for me, this experience was\\n nothing short of torture. I had to lie on an examination table, with my feet in\\n stirrups. My belly was exposed with the ultrasound gel and abdominal probe on it\\n while we saw images of our sick child forming on the screen for the third time\\n that day. Before the doctor even started the description, I began to sob until I\\n could barely breathe. My husband had to calm me down and the doctor had to\\n wait for me to find my breath.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 50\\n\\n\\n The description the doctor provided was perhaps the most devastating part\\n because although our baby was profoundly ill, he had healthy organs too. So, the\\n doctor was forced to describe – and I to hear – that he had a well-developed\\n diaphragm and four healthy chambers of the heart. His words were unwelcome\\n and I felt completely trapped. I closed my eyes. I twisted away from the screen.\\n The doctor and staff repeatedly apologized for making us go through this, but\\n their compassion could not ameliorate my pain.10\\n\\n She explained that she “learned nothing as a result of [her] experience.” Moreover, “the\\ndoctor and staff at the abortion clinic were clear that they were doing this, even though [she] was\\nso upset, because the Texas law required it – not because they thought it provided any medical\\nbenefit.” In her words, the “Texas law did nothing other than cause me additional pain and\\ndistress on a day that was already the worst of my life.” H.B. 2 mandates the same process,\\nwhich will incur the same results. This is not the practice of medicine. The Commonwealth has\\noffered no evidence showing otherwise.11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10Dr. Franklin testified at the summary judgment hearing to a similar experience:\\n A. And I actually had a patient in the first month who had a fetal anomaly who was -- had five or\\n six ultrasounds, went to that specialist, to that specialist to try to determine whether or not they\\n were going to proceed on. This was a wanted pregnancy, a very desired pregnancy. And her\\n husband did come back with her because they were very, very upset and were making a very\\n difficult decision. And so when I told them about the state laws changing and this is what I had to\\n do, she immediately started sobbing. Like you could not console this woman. Her husband was\\n visibly furious and saying, “Why do they have to force her to do this? She has gone through\\n enough. We have gone through enough.” And I had to auscultate the heartbeat and I had to\\n describe in detail what I saw on the screen.\\n Q. And did you believe that that woman was competent to make a decision as to whether she\\n should look at the screen or not?\\n A. I absolutely do think that. She had already been informed multiple times by multiple\\n physicians with multiple ultrasounds already, and I felt like this was just adding no additional\\n piece to the care that she and her husband ultimately decided needed to happen for them.\\n Q. Do you think she understood what the result of an abortion would be?\\n A. Yes. And I’m sure that she had multiple conversations with all those different physicians\\n along the way because there was a problem with the pregnancy.\\n 11The patient also has no input in the process. She must subject herself to this invasive procedure. Ky. Rev.\\nStat. § 311.727(2). The majority makes much of the fact that the woman may cover her ears and look away as the\\ndoctor goes on with the procedure. This cannot be the saving grace of an informed-consent statute. As described,\\nthe purpose of informed consent is to ensure that the patient makes an informed, autonomous, and rational decision.\\nEmotion should be subdued, not inflamed. Forcing a woman to undergo the invasive procedure—which adds\\napproximately three to five minutes to a standard ultrasound—while permitting her to avoid all of the information,\\ndoes nothing to facilitate her comprehension or free consent. See ACOG Comm. on Ethics, Comm. Op. No. 439.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 51\\n\\n\\n 4. The Commonwealth’s Limited Evidence\\n\\n Last, the Commonwealth produced no evidence that H.B. 2 was either aimed at furthering\\ninformed consent or will achieve that ostensible goal. When presented the opportunity to offer\\nevidence at the summary judgment hearing, the Commonwealth decided instead to rely on the\\naffidavits it submitted with its briefing, despite the extensive testimony presented by the\\nplaintiffs’ witnesses describing precisely how H.B. 2 is adverse to informed consent. Specific to\\nthe issues in this appeal, the Commonwealth produced no evidence demonstrating that\\nmandating the procedure set forth in H.B. 2, rather than offering it, is the medically-accepted\\nstandard of care.\\n\\n As part of its briefing, the Commonwealth submitted four affidavits from women who\\nhad obtained abortions they later came to regret; but these undated affidavits have no\\ninformation as to when or with what information the women obtained abortions. It is even\\nunclear whether they were before or after the passage of the informed-consent statute that\\npredated H.B. 2. Without such information, these affidavits do not create a genuine issue of\\nmaterial fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). More importantly, simply\\nbecause H.B. 2’s provisions might have assisted some women in their autonomous decision-\\nmaking does not mean that H.B. 2’s provisions will assist all women in their autonomous\\ndecision-making. No number of affidavits can negate the grim experience described by the\\nwoman in Texas or the absence of the “practice of medicine” in that setting.\\n\\n The Commonwealth also submitted two affidavits from physicians opining that an\\nultrasound, a description of the fetus, and an auscultation of the heartbeat are consistent with the\\nnational standard of care. Those affidavits are deficient, however, because neither physician\\ndiscusses the impact of offering these procedures versus requiring them—even against patient\\nwishes.12 Requiring these procedures is the primary flaw with H.B. 2. Failing to directly\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12As the district court noted, both physicians misunderstood EMW’s previous practice.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 52\\n\\n\\naddress that flaw means the Commonwealth failed to establish that H.B. 2 regulates speech as\\npart of the practice of medicine.13\\n\\n There is also no evidence that H.B. 2 filled any gaps in existing informed-consent\\nlegislation. Although the Commonwealth submitted affidavits from state legislators explaining\\nwhy they passed H.B. 2 (including to “protect the lives of unborn infants”), those affidavits are\\nsilent on any deficiencies with the earlier law. In contrast, EMW (the sole abortion-provider in\\nthe Commonwealth) produced evidence, undisputed at summary judgment, that “prior to H.B. 2,\\nEMW patients made informed decisions about abortion and that the informed-consent process\\nfollowed by EMW physicians ensured this.” EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at\\n646 (citing the testimony of Dr. Franklin). It is transparent that furthering informed consent was\\nnot the aim of the Commonwealth—nor will it be achieved by H.B. 2—and thus, H.B. 2 is an\\nimpermissible regulation of the content of speech.\\n\\n D. Conclusion\\n\\n I am gravely concerned with the precedent the majority creates today. Its decision opens\\nthe floodgates to states in this Circuit to manipulate doctor-patient discourse solely for\\nideological reasons. So long as the state’s legislators wisely use the words “informed consent” in\\nthe title of a regulation, the majority instructs us to “defer to the legislature’s determination of\\nwhich informed-consent disclosures are required,” despite what the evidence or standards of care\\nsay. Majority Opn. at 23; but see NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375 (“[S]tate labels cannot be\\ndispositive of [the] degree of First Amendment protection.” (quoting Riley, 487 U.S. at 796)).\\nEven further, the majority contends that “[i]f the [plaintiffs] want the legislated rules of informed\\nconsent to change, they should address their arguments to [their] elected officials” and not the\\nCourt. Majority Opn. at 23. This instruction amounts to an improper abdication of judicial\\n\\n 13The majority contends that the dissent “appears” to be weighing the evidence and making credibility\\ndeterminations in violation of the principles of summary judgment. Majority Opn. at n. 21. The majority is\\nincorrect. If the evidence a party submits does not actually dispute the opposing evidence, there is no weighing\\nnecessary because no genuine issue has been made. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (when\\nthe moving party submits a summary judgment motion, “Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving party to go beyond\\nthe pleadings and . . . designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” (emphasis added)).\\nSuch is the case here. The plaintiffs submitted evidence showing that the mandatory provisions of H.B. 2 conflict\\nwith the medical practice of informed consent. No other evidence refutes that fact. Therefore, there is no genuine\\nissue as to whether H.B. 2 facilitates informed consent—it does not.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 53\\n\\n\\noversight. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2374 (striking down as unconstitutional a law the state said\\npromoted informed consent). In reviewing whether a regulation facilitates informed consent, we\\ndo not give deference to the state simply because it is a governmental body; rather, we must rely\\non the evidence submitted by the parties and look to the prevailing standard of care. See id.\\nEmploying that practice here clarifies that H.B. 2 has the singular goal\\nto “completely end abortion” in the Commonwealth. See Robert Post, Informed Consent to\\nAbortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech,\\n2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 939, 940 (2007); see also Audrey Carlsen, Ash Ngu & Sara Simon,\\nWhat it Takes to Get an Abortion in the Most Restrictive U.S. State, N.Y. Times (July 20, 2018),\\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/20/us/mississippi-abortion-restrictions.html?action\\n=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage (highlighting the ways legal abortion is\\nmade increasingly less accessible). That goal is driven by politics, which explains why H.B. 2\\nwas not drafted to be coextensive with the practice of medicine.14\\n\\n As a final analogy more closely related to the business of the Court, consider if the state\\nlegislature passed a law mandating that attorneys inform their clients of certain truthful, non-\\nmisleading, and relevant information in specific types of cases. More precisely, what if the state\\nrequired an attorney, prior to filing a complaint, to inform each medical-malpractice plaintiff that\\npursuing her claim would burden the state’s resources, incur reputational harm for the physician,\\nand make healthcare less accessible to the community? Any attorney would find this to be a\\nrepugnant invasion of the attorney-client relationship. Yet, pursuant to the deferential standard\\nadopted by the majority today, the state is the sole and final arbiter of what constitutes the\\npractice of any profession, including the law. This hypothetical legislation amounts to client\\ncounseling, which is part of the practice of law, so would say the state; further, it does not\\ninfringe on the attorneys’ First Amendment rights, so would say the majority. On balance, this\\ntwo-step registers more Orwellian than it does a “reasonable regulation” of speech “as part of the\\n\\n 14The majority tries to lessen the impropriety of H.B. 2 by noting that the physician is permitted to distance\\nhimself or herself from the procedure’s anti-abortion message after the procedure is completed. Majority Opn. at\\n25. This fact has no legal significance. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.\\n1719, 1740 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[The Circuit Court] reasoned that an outside observer would think that\\nPhillips was merely complying with Colorado’s public-accommodations law, not expressing a message, and that\\nPhillips could post a disclaimer to that effect. This reasoning flouts bedrock principles of our free-speech\\njurisprudence and would justify virtually any law that compels individuals to speak.”).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 54\\n\\n\\npractice” of a profession. I trust that a panel of this Court would treat that claim much\\ndifferently than the majority treats the underlying one.\\n\\n The Commonwealth has coopted physicians’ examining tables, their probing instruments,\\nand their voices in order to espouse a political message, without regard to the health of the\\npatient or the judgment of the physician. Armed with the title “informed consent,” the majority\\naffirms this practice as constitutional. In so doing, the majority 1) conflates the undue burden\\nand First Amendment standards, while misreading the explicit language of Casey; 2) ignores the\\nnational standards of medical care; and 3) disregards the evidence showing that H.B. 2 is not\\nconsistent with the medical practice of informed consent. Benjamin Franklin warned that\\n“[f]reedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government; when this support is taken away,\\nthe constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny is erected on its ruins.” H.B. 2 is a\\nrestriction on speech that has no basis in the practice of medicine. It should be subjected to\\nheightened scrutiny and deemed unconstitutional, lest our constitution dissolve, and tyranny be\\nerected on its ruins. I dissent!\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384388/\", \"author_raw\": \"BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"NORRIS"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DONALD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BUSH"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"NORRIS\": \", Circuit\", \"DONALD\": \", Circuit\", \"BUSH\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607135/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: EMW Women's Surgical Ctr. v. Andrew Beshear\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0062p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P.S.C., on behalf ┐\n of itself, its staff, and its patients; ERNEST MARSHALL, │\n M.D., on behalf of himself and his patients; ASHLEY │\n BERGIN, M.D., on behalf of herself and her patients; │\n TANYA FRANKLIN, M.D., on behalf of herself and her │\n patients, │\n Plaintiffs-Appellees, │\n │\n > Nos. 17-6151/6183\n v. │\n │\n │\n ANDREW G. BESHEAR, Attorney General (17-6183); │\n ADAM MEIER, in his capacity as Secretary of the │\n Cabinet of Health and Family Services (17-6151), │\n Defendants-Appellants. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.\n No. 3:17-cv-00016—David J. Hale, District Judge.\n\n Argued: July 25, 2018\n\n Decided and Filed: April 4, 2019\n\n Before: NORRIS, DONALD, and BUSH, Circuit Judges;\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: S. Chad Meredith, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for\nAppellant in 17-6151. Steven Travis Mayo, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF\nKENTUCKY, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-6183. Alexa Kolbi-Molinas,\nAMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, for\nAppellees. ON BRIEF: S. Chad Meredith, M. Stephen Pitt, Matthew F. Kuhn, OFFICE OF\nTHE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-6151. La Tasha Buckner, OFFICE\nOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 2\n\n\n6183. Alexa Kolbi-Molinas, Andrew D. Beck, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION\nFOUNDATION, New York, New York, Amy D. Cubbage, Heather Gatnarek, ACLU OF\nKENTUCKY FOUNDATION, INC., Louisville, Kentucky, Anton Metlitsky, Leah Godesky,\nO’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, New York, New York, for Appellees. Scott A. Keller, OFFICE\nOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, Austin, Texas, Michael Lee Francisco, MRD\nLAW, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Scott W. Gaylord, ELON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF\nLAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, Shannon Rose Selden, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP,\nNew York, New York, Kimberly A. Parker, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND\nDORR LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.\n\n BUSH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which NORRIS, J., joined, and\nDONALD, J., joined only in that Attorney General Beshear is not a proper party to this action.\nDONALD, J. (pp. 34–54), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a woman has\nthe right to choose to have an abortion. To inform that choice, the Commonwealth of Kentucky\ndirects a doctor, before performing an abortion, to auscultate (or make audible) the fetal\nheartbeat, perform an ultrasound, and display and describe the ultrasound images to the patient.\nThis appeal principally concerns whether those requirements violate the doctor’s First\nAmendment rights.\n\n “The Ultrasound Informed Consent Act,” also known as “House Bill 2” or “H.B. 2,”1 is\nchallenged by Plaintiffs-Appellees EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. and its associated\nphysicians (collectively, “EMW”) under the First Amendment, as incorporated against the States\nby the Fourteenth Amendment. EMW prevailed in the district court, which, in granting the\ncomplaint’s first claim for relief under the First Amendment, applied heightened scrutiny to\ninvalidate the statute and permanently enjoin enforcement of H.B. 2. See EMW Women’s\nSurgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 283 F. Supp. 3d 629 (W.D. Ky. 2017). Our court then denied\nthe motion of then-Defendant-Appellant Vickie Glisson, who was Secretary of the Cabinet for\nHealth and Family Services, to stay the injunction pending appeal. See EMW Women’s Surgical\n\n\n 1Codified at Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) §§ 311.727, 311.990(34).\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 3\n\n\nCtr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, No. 17-6151 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2017) (order). However, neither our court\nnor the district court had the benefit of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in National Institute\nof Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (“NIFLA”).\n\n In NIFLA the Court clarified that no heightened First Amendment scrutiny should apply\nto informed-consent statutes like the abortion-informed-consent statute at issue in Planned\nParenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).2\nSee NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. Thus, even though an abortion-informed-consent law compels a\ndoctor’s disclosure of certain information, it should be upheld so long as the disclosure is\ntruthful, non-misleading, and relevant to an abortion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; Tex. Med.\nProviders Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012); Planned\nParenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).\n\n Because H.B. 2, like the statute in Casey, requires the disclosure of truthful, non-\nmisleading, and relevant information about an abortion, we hold that it does not violate a\ndoctor’s right to free speech under the First Amendment. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey,\n505 U.S. at 882–84. We also hold that the Attorney General, Defendant-Appellant Andrew\nBeshear, is not a proper party to this case.\n\n I.\n\n H.B. 2 directs a doctor, prior to performing an abortion, to perform an ultrasound; display\nthe ultrasound images for the patient; and explain, in the doctor’s own words, what is being\ndepicted by the images—for example, pointing out organs and whether the patient is pregnant\nwith twins. KRS § 311.727. There is no requirement that the patient view the images or listen to\nthe doctor’s description. The doctor also must auscultate the fetal heartbeat but may turn off the\nvolume of the auscultation if the patient so requests. Id. Failure to comply with these\nrequirements can result in the doctor being fined and referred to Kentucky’s medical-licensing\nboard. KRS § 311.990(34). But H.B. 2 does not penalize a doctor if the patient requested that\nthe heartbeat sound be turned off or chose not to look at the ultrasound images. KRS\n§ 311.727(3). Nor does H.B. 2 penalize a doctor if she or he exercises discretion to advise a\n\n 2Citations to Casey refer to the joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 4\n\n\npatient that she need not listen to or view the disclosures, or if the doctor makes any other\nstatement, including advising the patient to have an abortion. Finally, a doctor need not make\nany disclosure from H.B. 2 at all if an abortion is medically necessary or in the case of a medical\nemergency. KRS § 311.727(5).\n\n EMW sued General Beshear, Secretary Glisson, and Michael S. Rodman, who is\nExecutive Director of the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure. The parties cross-moved for\nsummary judgment on the complaint’s first claim for relief, styled “First Amendment Rights of\nPhysicians.” The district court ruled in favor of EMW and, as noted, permanently enjoined\nenforcement of H.B. 2. Executive Director Rodman does not appeal, but Secretary Meier, as\nSecretary Glisson’s successor, seeks reversal of the judgment. General Beshear also defends\nH.B. 2 on appeal but argues that he is not a proper party to this case. We address first whether\nH.B. 2 violates doctors’ First Amendment rights, then whether General Beshear is appropriately\nin this suit.\n\n II.\n\n We engage in de novo review of the district court’s summary judgment. McKay v.\nFederspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2016). “[W]here, as here, the parties filed cross-motions\nfor summary judgment, ‘the court must evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking\ncare in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under\nconsideration.’” Id. at 866 (quoting Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th\nCir. 1991)). A moving party may obtain summary judgment only if it “shows that there is no\ngenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\nlaw.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under\nthe governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).\n\n No material facts are in dispute here, so this matter turns on a pure question of law: does\nH.B. 2 compel a doctor’s speech in violation of the First Amendment?\n\n The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see,\ne.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall\nmake no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” U.S. Const. amend. I. This constitutional\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 5\n\n\nguarantee, the Supreme Court has held, applies not only when government restricts speech, see,\ne.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015), but also when it compels speech,\nsee, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. When laws, whether restrictive or compulsive, “target\nspeech based on its communicative content,” they generally “are presumptively unconstitutional\nand may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve\ncompelling state interests.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226). Such\ncontent-based restrictions have been declared unconstitutional in compelled-speech cases such as\nWest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which struck down a\nrequirement that students salute the United States flag; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977),\nwhich invalidated a law requiring a state motto “Live Free or Die” on license plates; and Hurley\nv. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), which held\nthat a State could not force parade organizers to include a group that would convey a message\ncontrary to the organizers’ views.\n\n Heightened scrutiny generally applies to content-based regulation of any speaker,\nincluding a physician or other professional. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. But, as the\nSupreme Court noted in NIFLA, there is “less protection for professional speech in two\ncircumstances”: first, for “some laws that require professionals to disclose factual,\nnoncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’”;3 second, for regulation of\n“professional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech,” id. at 2372 (citing\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 884). The second exception is at issue here because H.B. 2 regulates doctors’\nconduct: performing abortions.4\n\n We review H.B. 2 against the backdrop of thirty-five years of evolving Supreme Court\nprecedent concerning the constitutionality of abortion-informed-consent statutes. In the 1980s,\nthe Court invalidated some aspects of these laws. For example, in City of Akron v. Akron Center\nfor Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (“Akron I”), and Thornburgh v. American\n\n 3NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,\n471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010); Ohralik v.\nOhio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).\n 4We do not address whether H.B. 2 falls within the Zauderer/Milzavetz/Ohralik commercial-speech\nexception.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 6\n\n\nCollege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), the Court struck down state laws\nrequiring abortion doctors to provide patients with information about the development of unborn\nlife5 and alternatives to abortion. In Akron I, the Court “invalidated an ordinance which required\nthat a woman seeking an abortion be provided by her physician with specific information\n‘designed to influence the woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.’” Casey,\n505 U.S. at 881 (quoting Akron I, 462 U.S. at 444). The required disclosure included the\nstatement that “the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception.” Akron I,\n462 U.S. at 444. That this “information was designed to dissuade the woman from having an\nabortion,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, was one of “two purported flaws in the Akron ordinance.” Id.\n(citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762). The other purported flaw was that the Akron I statute\nmandated “a rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases,\nirrespective of the particular needs of the patient, [that] intrude[d] upon the discretion of the\npregnant woman’s physician.” Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.\nIn Thornburgh, the purported flaw in the Pennsylvania informed-consent statute at issue was that\nit was “an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth’s message discouraging abortion into\nthe privacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician,”\nThornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762—that is, an interference with the doctor-patient relationship.\n\n In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court reversed course. In Casey, the Court effectively\nabrogated the holdings in Akron I and Thornburgh. The Casey joint opinion declared:\n\n To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when\n the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading\n information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those\n of childbirth, and the “probable gestational age” of the fetus, those cases go too\n far, are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in\n potential life, and are overruled.\n\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Casey addressed\ninformed-consent provisions of another Pennsylvania statute that required physicians, among\nother things, to inform patients orally of the nature of the abortion procedure; its risks and\nalternatives; the probable gestational age of the unborn life in the patient when the doctors would\n\n 5We use the term unborn life consistent with the Supreme Court’s reference to “the life of the unborn,”\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 883. See also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007).\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 7\n\n\nperform the abortion; and the availability of pamphlets (1) describing unborn life in further\ndetail, including stages of gestational development, (2) listing agencies offering alternatives to\nabortion, and (3) giving information about obtaining child support from the unborn life’s father.\nSee Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 902–03 (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3205(a)); Planned Parenthood\nof Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that pamphlets described\nstages of development for unborn life).\n\n The Casey plurality reasoned that “a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain\ninformation as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no\ndifferent from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical\nprocedure.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Though the joint opinion acknowledged that “the\nphysician’s First Amendment rights not to speak” were implicated by the informed-consent\nstatute, the plurality applied no heightened scrutiny and upheld the statute because a doctor’s\nrights were implicated “only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing\nand regulation by the State.” Id. at 884 (citations omitted).\n\n Importantly too, in “depart[ing] from the holdings of Akron I and Thornburgh,” the\nCasey plurality emphasized that a State may “further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of\nthe unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even\nwhen in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S.\nat 883 (emphasis added); see also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972–73 (1997) (per\ncuriam) (affirming Casey and holding that a statute restricting who could perform abortions that\nwas drafted by an anti-abortion group had no improper purpose). The plurality instructed that\ninformed consent to an abortion procedure may mandate disclosure of the “full consequences of”\nthe abortion decision, including “a requirement that a woman be apprised of the health risks of\nabortion and childbirth,” as well as “the impact on” or “consequences to the fetus, even when\nthose consequences have no direct relation to her health.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. As the\nplurality explained, it cannot “be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem\nthe impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.” Id. (emphasis added). The\njoint opinion analogized an informed-consent disclosure of the effect on unborn life to a\nrequirement that an organ recipient learn the effect on the donor before consenting to the\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 8\n\n\ntransplant: “[w]e would think it constitutional for the State to require that in order for there to be\ninformed consent to a kidney transplant operation the recipient must be supplied with\ninformation about risks to the donor as well as risks to himself or herself.” Id. at 882–83.\n\n We have long understood Casey as marking a shift toward greater respect for States’\ninterests in informing women and protecting unborn life. For example, in Women’s Medical\nProfessional Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003), we affirmed that “[a]n essential feature\nof the jointly authored opinion in Casey is the reaffirmation of the substantial state interest in\npotential life throughout pregnancy.” Id. at 443 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, in\nMemphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 1999), we explained that\nCasey establishes that States may take steps to ensure that a woman’s choice to abort is\ninformed:\n\n [a] plurality of the justices in Casey recognized the weighty concerns of the state\n in “the protection of potential life” and reasoned that, although “the woman has a\n right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not\n at all follow that the state is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice\n is thoughtful and informed.”\n\nId. at 460–61 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 871–72). In other words, our circuit has recognized\nthat after Casey there can be no doubt that “a state can require that a doctor give a woman certain\ninformation before she may have an abortion.” Id. at 465 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\n\n Recently, in NIFLA, a majority of the Supreme Court adopted the First Amendment\nanalysis applied in Casey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373–74. Specifically, the Court explained\nthat although heightened scrutiny generally applies to content-based regulations of speech,\n“regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech” receive lower scrutiny. Id.\nat 2373. The Court acknowledged that “drawing the line between speech and conduct can be\ndifficult.” Id. But it held that statutes that “facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure,”\nlike the one at issue in Casey, fall on the conduct side of the line because they regulate speech\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 9\n\n\n“only ‘as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the\nState.’”6 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\n\n In both NIFLA and Casey, then, the Court clarified that the First Amendment has a\nlimited role to play in allowing doctors to avoid making truthful mandated disclosures related to\ninformed consent. Under the First Amendment, we will not highly scrutinize an informed-\nconsent statute, including one involving informed consent to an abortion, so long as it meets\nthese three requirements: (1) it must relate to a medical procedure; (2) it must be truthful and not\nmisleading; and (3) it must be relevant to the patient’s decision whether to undertake the\nprocedure, which may include, in the abortion context, information relevant to the woman’s\nhealth risks, as well as the impact on the unborn life. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey,\n505 U.S. at 882.\n\n Although much of the analysis in Casey addressed the plaintiffs’ undue-burden claim, the\njoint opinion’s First Amendment holding built upon its conclusion that the mandated informed-\nconsent disclosures in that case met the criteria of being truthful, non-misleading, and relevant.\nContrary to the Dissent’s suggestion that we have “focused on the wrong provision of the\nConstitution,” Dissent at 38, indeed we do address the relevant provision—the First Amendment.\nCasey and NIFLA recognize that First Amendment heightened scrutiny does not apply to\nincidental regulation of professional speech that is part of the practice of medicine and that such\nincidental regulation includes mandated informed-consent requirements, provided that the\ndisclosures are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–84; NIFLA,\n138 S. Ct at 2373. Casey also recognizes that, as part of informed consent for an abortion,\npermissible mandated disclosures under the First Amendment may pertain to the effect of the\nprocedure on unborn life. 505 U.S. at 882. And in NIFLA, the Court explicitly reaffirmed that\nheightened scrutiny is not appropriate under the First Amendment for informed-consent\n\n\n 6The Court went on in NIFLA to declare unconstitutional a California statute requiring crisis pregnancy\ncenters to disclose that the State offered abortion services, among other things. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368–70.\nIn so doing, the Court distinguished the California statute from the Pennsylvania law upheld in Casey because the\nnotice at issue under the California statute was not an informed-consent law: it “provide[d] no information about the\nrisks or benefits of [medical] procedures.” Id. at 2373. Because the regulation “at issue [in NIFLA] [was] not an\ninformed-consent requirement [like in Casey] or any other regulation of professional conduct,” the Court applied\nheightened scrutiny and held that the California law likely violated the First Amendment. Id. at 2373, 2375.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 10\n\n\nrequirements of the nature upheld in Casey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373, 2375.7 We therefore\nare applying Casey and NIFLA as they directly pertain to the First Amendment claim and not to\nany undue-burden claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\n III.\n\n This First Amendment appeal, thus, turns on whether H.B. 2 shares the same material\nattributes as the informed-consent statute in Casey. If it does, then no heightened First\nAmendment scrutiny applies because, as NIFLA instructed, an informed-consent law like the\nCasey statute is a regulation of professional conduct that only incidentally burdens professional\nspeech. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.\n\n Does H.B. 2 relate to a medical procedure? Yes—abortion. Are the mandated\ndisclosures truthful and not misleading? Yes—no one argues that the heartbeat, sonogram, or its\ndescription is false or misleading. We have previously held that similar information conveys\nobjective medical facts. For example, in United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2018),\nwe explained that “it would be an insult to common sense and the practice of medicine to say\nthat [the doctor] was not measuring facts (or attempting to do so) when he conducted the\nangiograms at issue” in that case. Id. at 276. Similarly, we explained in Discount Tobacco City\n& Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2011), that anatomical pictures convey\nfacts:\n\n Students in biology, human-anatomy, and medical-school courses look at\n pictures or drawings in textbooks of both healthy and damaged cells, tissues,\n organs, organ systems, and humans because those pictures convey factual\n information about medical conditions and biological systems. The argument that\n a picture of a specific person or part of a person is opinion because not every\n person or part of a person with that condition would appear the same way is\n unpersuasive. . . . People with the same illness can and often will suffer a variety\n of differing symptoms. But one wouldn’t say that a list of symptoms\n\n\n 7The dissenters in NIFLA also recognized this key attribute of Casey’s holding. See 138 S. Ct. at 2385\n(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the [Casey] Court considered the State’s statutory requirements, including that the\ndoctor must inform his patient about where she could learn how to have the newborn child adopted (if carried to\nterm) and how she could find related financial assistance. To repeat the point, [Casey] held that the State’s\nrequirements did not violate the Constitution’s protection of free speech or its protection of a woman’s right to\nchoose to have an abortion.” (citation omitted)).\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 11\n\n\n characterizing a particular medical condition is nonfactual and opinion-based as a\n result.\n\nId. at 559 (footnote omitted). So, “[t]o belabor the obvious and conceded point,” the disclosures\nof the heartbeat, sonogram, and its description “are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading\ninformation.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577–78.\n\n That leaves the final question: are the mandated disclosures relevant to the patient’s\ndecision whether to abort unborn life? The Supreme Court’s abortion precedent answers this\nquestion for us.\n\n “Abortion is a unique act,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, that “requires a difficult and painful\nmoral decision,” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). It is “fraught with\nconsequences . . . for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision.” Casey,\n505 U.S. at 852. “[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their\nchoice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of\nesteem can follow.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (citations omitted). Abortion also is “fraught\nwith consequences . . . for the life or potential life that is aborted,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, in\nwhom the State may have a significant interest, Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158, and who cannot\nconsent to the procedure to terminate her or his life or potential life. Thus, the Supreme Court\nhas explained that the effect of an abortion procedure on unborn life is “relevant, if not\ndispositive” information for the patient’s decision. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added).\n\n With this background in mind, we hold that H.B. 2 provides relevant information. The\ninformation conveyed by an ultrasound image, its description, and the audible beating fetal heart\ngives a patient greater knowledge of the unborn life inside her. This also inherently provides the\npatient with more knowledge about the effect of an abortion procedure: it shows her what, or\nwhom, she is consenting to terminate. That this information might persuade a woman to change\nher mind does not render it suspect under the First Amendment. It just means that it is pertinent\nto her decision-making. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (explaining that information on abortion’s\nimpact on unborn life “furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may\nelect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her\ndecision was not fully informed”).\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 12\n\n\n The prevalence of ultrasound-use in pregnancy also underscores the relevance of the\nmandated sonogram of H.B. 2 to a woman’s abortion decision. Ultrasounds are ubiquitous\nprocedures that are a part of every pregnancy and, EMW concedes, every abortion. Oral Arg. at\n23:53–24:10; R. 3-3, PageID 111, 112–13. Indeed, ultrasounds are “routine measures in\npregnancy [and] viewed as ‘medically necessary’ for the mother and fetus.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at\n579. The physical invasiveness of the sonogram, as noted by the Dissent, see Dissent at 35, 46\nn.9, therefore, is no reason to characterize the procedure as an unwarranted invasion of bodily\nintegrity; indeed, the Dissent cites authority “finding that up to 98% of U.S. abortion facilities\nuse an ultrasound to date the pregnancy,” id. at 46. Also, Kentucky is hardly alone among the\nStates in finding ultrasounds to be relevant: according to amici, twenty-four other States have\nenacted informed-consent laws that involve ultrasounds.8\n\n Although Casey did not involve the displaying of an ultrasound, its facts are not “a\nconstitutional ceiling for regulation of informed consent to abortion, [but] a set of principles to\nbe applied to the states’ legislative decisions.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at 579. The Casey statute\nrequired doctors to inform patients of the unborn life’s gestational age and offer them materials\nfurther describing unborn life’s development at a given gestational age. See Casey, 505 U.S. at\n881, 902; Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575 n.2, 578; Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1349. The sonogram\nrequirements of H.B. 2 provide “materially identical” information. See A Woman’s Choice–East\nSide Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding informed-\nconsent law requiring abortion doctors to offer pictures, drawings, and dimensions of the unborn\n\n\n 8Three of them track more closely with H.B. 2 and require physicians to perform, display, and describe\nultrasounds before an abortion. La. Stat. § 40:1061.10(D), invalidated by June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F.\nSupp. 3d 27, 30 (M.D. La. 2017) (holding statute was an undue burden), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. LLC v.\nGee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018); Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.012(a)(4); Wis. Stat. § 253.10. Seven require\ndoctors to perform ultrasounds and offer patients the chance to view them. Ala. Code § 26-23A-6; Ariz. Rev. Stat.\n§ 36-2156; Fla. Stat. § 390.0111; Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1.1; Iowa Code § 146A.1, invalidated by Planned Parenthood\nof Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 N.W.2d 206, 212 (Iowa 2018) (holding 72-hour waiting period was an\nundue burden); Miss. Code § 41-41-34; Va. Code § 18.2-76. Ten require doctors to offer the patient the chance to\nview the ultrasound image if they perform one. Ark. Code § 20-16-602; Ga. Code § 31-9A-3; Idaho Code § 18-609;\nKan. Stat. § 65-6709; Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.17015; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-327 (requiring doctors to display the\nsonogram “so that the woman may choose to view [it]”); Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.561; S.C. Code § 44-41-330; Utah\nCode § 76-7-305 (requiring doctors to display the sonogram “to permit the woman . . . to view the images, if she\nchooses to”); W. Va. Code § 16-2I-2. Four require doctors to offer women the chance to view—and thus receive—\nan ultrasound. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.027; N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-04; S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-52; Wyo.\nStat. § 35-6-119.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 13\n\n\nlife within patients was “materially identical” to the Casey statute’s requirements); see also\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 578 (explaining that disclosures like those in H.B. 2 “are not different in\nkind” than the disclosures in Casey). A sonogram depicts unborn life in further detail at the\ncurrent gestational age—information no less relevant to the patient’s decision than were the\nmaterials at issue in Casey. In fact, because of its individualized nature, a sonogram provides\neven more relevant information for the patient’s decision than any of the required materials at\nissue in Casey. Whereas the Pennsylvania law provided information about unborn life generally,\nH.B. 2 directs that the patient receive specific, real-time images of herself and the unborn life\nwithin her.9 H.B. 2 also allows the doctor to explain, in her or his own words, the sonogram, as\nwell as the auscultation, thus further ensuring that the information is tailored to the patient’s\nspecific circumstances.\n\n Sonograms of unborn life were uncommon when Roe was decided. Writing for the Roe\nCourt, Justice Blackmun was limited by words on paper—sometimes using medieval\ndescriptions such as “quickening” or “infused with a ‘soul’ or ‘animated’”—to explain when life\nhad been understood to come into being. Roe, 410 U.S. at 133. But in the Cyber Age,10 words\ntell only part of a story. For today’s Posterity11—the Gen-X, Millennial, and Gen-Z generations,\nwhose first picture of themselves commonly comes from a sonogram, and who increasingly turn\nto photos and videos to share information12—one can hardly dispute the relevance of sonogram\nimages for twenty-first-century informed consent.\n\n\n\n 9Contrary to EMW’s assertion at oral argument, the information’s pictorial medium fails to take H.B. 2 out\nof the realm of informed consent. See A Woman’s Choice–East Side Women’s Clinic, 305 F.3d at 684–85; see also\nF. Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment: A Practical Guide 2-82 (5th ed. 2018) (discussing the use of videos, pictures,\nand slides to obtain informed consent). This means of sharing information simply is more scientifically up to date.\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 578.\n 10See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (explaining “that the Cyber Age is a\nrevolution of historic proportions [and that] we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter\nhow we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be” (emphasis added)); see also South Dakota v.\nWayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018) (discussing the Cyber Age).\n 11U.S. Const. pmbl.\n 12See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, While We Weren’t Looking, Snapchat Revolutionized Social Networks, N.Y.\nTimes (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www nytimes.com/2016/11/30/technology/while-we-werent-looking-snapchat-\nrevolutionized-social-networks.html.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 14\n\n\n Under the lower level of scrutiny mandated by Casey and NIFLA, there is no burden\nplaced on the State to justify that its prior regulation “was defective in facilitating informed\nconsent” or that “H.B. 2 filled any gaps in existing informed-consent legislation,” as the Dissent\napparently believes the State must show, see Dissent at 48, 52. No such requirements were\nimposed on Pennsylvania to justify its statute in Casey. But even if the Commonwealth bore\nsuch a burden, it would easily meet it here. It is not difficult to conclude that the particularized\nvisual and audible disclosures mandated by H.B. 2 provide more relevant information for\ninformed consent than was provided by the less patient-specific, verbal and written disclosures of\nthe earlier Kentucky abortion-informed-consent statute, KRS § 311.725.\n\n In sum, H.B. 2, like the Pennsylvania statute in Casey, provides truthful, non-misleading,\nand relevant information aimed at informing a patient about her decision to abort unborn life.\nTherefore, although the statute requires doctors to disclose certain truthful and non-misleading\ninformation relevant to the abortion procedure, it does not violate their First Amendment rights\nbecause the required disclosures are incidental to the Commonwealth’s regulation of doctors’\nprofessional conduct.\n\n IV.\n\n This result is in line with two other circuits that have faced First Amendment challenges\nto similar abortion-informed-consent statutes. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits read Casey, as well\nas Gonzales, to establish the same First Amendment test for truthful, non-misleading, and\nrelevant informed-consent disclosures that we apply here.\n\n In Lakey, the Fifth Circuit addressed a Texas informed-consent statute requiring the\nperformance, display, and description of an ultrasound as well as the auscultation of the unborn\nlife’s heartbeat. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 574\n(5th Cir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge to the statute,\nexplaining that Casey upheld the constitutionality of informed-consent laws that require\ndisclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information, including facts about the unborn\nlife, with no heightened scrutiny applying to such laws:\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 15\n\n\n First, informed consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on the woman’s\n right to have an abortion are permissible if they require truthful, non-misleading,\n and relevant disclosures. Second, such laws are part of the state’s reasonable\n regulation of medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of compelling\n “ideological” speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny. Third,\n “relevant” informed consent may entail not only the physical and psychological\n risks to the expectant mother facing this “difficult moral decision,” but also the\n state’s legitimate interests in “protecting the potential life within her.”\n\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 576 (footnote omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 871).\n\n Applying this understanding of Casey, the Fifth Circuit held that requirements that\ndoctors perform, display, and describe the ultrasound and auscultate the heartbeat—though more\ntechnologically advanced than the mandated disclosure that Casey allowed—were the “epitome”\nof truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information that Casey permits:\n\n To belabor the obvious and conceded point, the required disclosures of a\n sonogram, the fetal heartbeat, and their medical descriptions are the epitome of\n truthful, non-misleading information. They are not different in kind, although\n more graphic and scientifically up-to-date, than the disclosures discussed in\n Casey—probable gestational age of the fetus and printed material showing a\n baby’s general prenatal development stages. Likewise, the relevance of these\n disclosures to securing informed consent is sustained by Casey and Gonzales,\n because both cases allow the state to regulate medical practice by deciding that\n information about fetal development is “relevant” to a woman’s decision-making.\n\nId. at 577–78 (emphasis added).\n\n Because the Texas statute at issue in Lakey satisfied the criteria for an abortion-informed-\nconsent statute (that is, the statute mandated only truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\ndisclosures related to an abortion), the Fifth Circuit determined that no heightened scrutiny of the\nstatute was warranted under Casey and reversed the district court’s determination otherwise:\n\n The [Casey] plurality response to the compelled speech claim is clearly\n not a strict scrutiny analysis. It inquires into neither compelling interests nor\n narrow tailoring. The three sentences with which the Court disposed of the First\n Amendment claims are, if anything, the antithesis of strict scrutiny. Indeed, the\n plurality references Whalen v. Roe, in which the Court had upheld a regulation of\n medical practice against a right to privacy challenge. The only reasonable reading\n of Casey’s passage is that physicians’ rights not to speak are, when part of the\n practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 16\n\n\n This applies to information that is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant . . . to the\n decision to undergo an abortion.\n ....\n\n Applying to [the statute] the principles of Casey’s plurality, the most\n reasonable conclusion is to uphold the provisions declared as unconstitutional\n compelled speech by the district court.\n\nId. at 575, 577 (cleaned up).\n\n When faced with an analogous issue, the Eighth Circuit read the Supreme Court’s\nprecedent similarly. The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Rounds involved a South Dakota informed-\nconsent statute. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.\n2008) (en banc). The statute required physicians to give patients a written statement providing,\namong other things, “[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique,\nliving human being,” “[t]hat the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with that unborn\nhuman being and that the relationship enjoys protection under the United States Constitution and\nthe laws of South Dakota,” “[t]hat by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her\nexisting constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be terminated,” and “[a]\ndescription of all known medical risks of the procedure . . . including . . . [d]epression and related\npsychological distress [and] [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.” Id. The statute\ndefined “Human being” as “an individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens,\nincluding the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization\nto full gestation.” Id. at 727. The statute further required physicians to certify in writing that\nthey provided all this information to the patients. Id. Also, the patients had to sign a written\nstatement showing that the abortion doctors had complied with the statute’s disclosure\nrequirements and provided them with the required information. Id.\n\n Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit explained that Supreme Court precedent likely allowed\nthe statute to stand because it mandated the doctor provide only “truthful, non-misleading\ninformation relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion”:\n\n Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an\n individual simply to speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its\n regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 17\n\n\n information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that\n information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.\n Therefore, Planned Parenthood cannot succeed on the merits of its claim that [the\n statute] violates a physician’s right not to speak unless it can show that the\n disclosure is either untruthful, misleading or not relevant to the patient’s decision\n to have an abortion.\n\nId. at 734–35. Because Planned Parenthood’s evidence did not establish a likelihood of proving\nthat the statute required “anything but truthful, non-misleading and relevant [information] to the\npatient’s decision to have an abortion,” the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary\ninjunction. Id. at 738.\n\n The Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretations of Casey support our holding today. Like\nthe statutes in those circuits’ cases, H.B. 2 provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\ninformation for a decision whether to abort unborn life. Like these other circuits, we find no\nFirst Amendment infirmity.\n\n V.\n\n In challenging H.B. 2, EMW echoes Planned Parenthood’s unsuccessful arguments in\nCasey. EMW contends that H.B. 2 warrants heightened scrutiny because it (1) compels\nideological speech, (2) interferes with the doctor-patient relationship, and (3) emotionally affects\npatients.\n\n Ideological Speech. Casey forecloses EMW’s attempt to invoke heightened scrutiny by\nclaiming that H.B. 2 requires the doctors to engage in ideological speech. The statute in Casey\nrequired doctors to disclose facts about the abortion procedure, the unborn life within a patient,\nand options available to a patient if she carried that life to term. Planned Parenthood argued that\nthe statute mandated ideological speech that warranted heighted scrutiny. Brief of Petitioners\nand Cross-Respondents, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No. 91-744), 1992 WL 12006398 at *54\n(“Casey Br.”). The Casey plurality acknowledged that the disclosure requirements were targeted\nat causing patients to “choose childbirth over abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. Yet, the\nplurality applied no heightened scrutiny to Pennsylvania’s statute because of the alleged\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 18\n\n\nideological nature of the required disclosures. So Casey rejected EMW’s rationale for applying\nheightened scrutiny.13\n\n The Fourth Circuit, however, disagreed that Casey forecloses the ideological argument.\nIn Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), decided before NIFLA, the Fourth Circuit\nstruck down as compelled ideological speech a North Carolina statute similar to H.B. 2. Id. at\n246, 255–56. We decline to follow Stuart, however, because it gave insufficient regard to the\nFirst Amendment analysis in Casey that the Court clarified and adopted as the majority view in\nNIFLA.\n\n Stuart’s basis for applying heightened scrutiny is called into question by Supreme Court\nprecedent. Stuart applied heightened scrutiny because the facts disclosed by a sonogram have\n“moral or ideological implications.” Id. at 246. However, the “moral or ideological” label has\nnot been used by the Supreme Court as a reason to apply heightened scrutiny to mandated factual\ndisclosures in the informed-consent context. Nor has the Supreme Court considered on what\n“side of the abortion debate” required factual disclosures fall in deciding the level of scrutiny to\napply to abortion-informed-consent laws, as did the Fourth Circuit, see id.14 And unlike the\nFourth Circuit, the Supreme Court has not been concerned that facts might “convey[] a particular\nopinion” like “convinc[ing] women seeking abortions to change their minds.” Id.\n\n\n 13Contrary to what the Dissent maintains, a State is entitled to regulate informed consent with respect to\nthe abortion even when it has a political “goal” to protect unborn life. See Dissent at 53. The Casey joint opinion\nmade that point clear when it allowed for mandated disclosures intended by the State to further its “profound interest\nin potential life” and “to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.” See 505 U.S. at 878 (“To promote\nthe State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the\nwoman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their\npurpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”).\n 14It is not at all clear that the facts mandated to be disclosed by an H.B. 2 sonogram fall on only one side of\nthe abortion debate. For example, abortions are increasingly sought to terminate lives likely to be born with\ndisabilities. See Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (granting a preliminary\ninjunction against an Ohio law criminalizing abortions performed because of fetal indication of Down Syndrome),\nappeal docketed, No. 18-3329 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 2018); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind.\nState Dep’t of Health, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (granting a permanent injunction against a similar law),\naff’d, 888 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3172 (Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 18-483); Julian\nQuinones & Arijeta Lajka, “What Kind of Society Do You Want to Live In?”: Inside the Country Where Down\nSyndrome is Disappearing, CBS News (Aug. 14, 2007, 4:00 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/down-syndrome-\niceland/?linkId=40953194. An ultrasound showing the likelihood of a disability could be interpreted by some\npeople, but not all, as a reason to have an abortion.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 19\n\n\n Instead, under Casey, what matters for First Amendment purposes is whether the\ndisclosed facts are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the procedure, not whether they fall\non one side of the debate, and not whether they influence a woman to keep the child. Casey, 505\nU.S. at 882–84; see also Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575–77; Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35. In Stuart the\nFourth Circuit tried to distinguish Casey by reasoning that the Casey statute was not ideological:\n“[i]nforming a patient that there are state-issued materials available is not ideological, because\nthe viewpoint conveyed by the pamphlet is clearly the state’s—not the physician’s.” Stuart,\n774 F.3d at 253. But the same is true here. H.B. 2 allows doctors to tell patients that the\nCommonwealth requires this information. The record shows that’s exactly what they do. R. 55,\nPageID 699. Thus, the doctors are just as free as those subject to the statute in Casey to clarify\nthat the mandated disclosures come from the State not the doctors themselves.\n\n After holding that the North Carolina statute compelled ideological speech, the Fourth\nCircuit in Stuart adopted a “sliding-scale” test first applied by the Ninth Circuit in Pickup v.\nBrown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–29 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding professional speech is viewed “along a\ncontinuum”). The Fourth Circuit then asserted the statute “reside[d] somewhere in the middle on\nthat sliding scale” because it regulated medical treatment but also regulated speech, Stuart,\n774 F.3d at 248, thus justifying intermediate scrutiny, id. at 249. This “sliding scale” test based\non ideological speech, however, appeared nowhere in Casey.\n\n Nor did this test appear in NIFLA. In fact, the NIFLA Court, after citing the Ninth Circuit\nin Pickup as an example of “[s]ome Courts of Appeals” that “have recognized ‘professional\nspeech’ as a separate category of speech that is subject to different rules,” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at\n2371, did not adopt any of the “different rules” applied in Pickup. Instead, the Court explained\nthat, generally, it is the compulsion of a message—not whether the compulsion is of an\nideological nature—that alters the content of speech and therefore dictates a single heightened-\nscrutiny standard, with no sliding scale. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. However, as discussed,\nthe Supreme Court explicitly carved out two exceptions to that general test that do not call for\nheightened scrutiny. As also already explained, H.B. 2 falls into at least one of those exceptions.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 20\n\n\n We therefore find that Stuart is unpersuasive in light of NIFLA, and we decline to follow\nthe Fourth Circuit.15 If at least one of the two exceptions noted in NIFLA applies, there is no\nSupreme Court authority for looking to whether the speech has ideological implications and\napplying a “sliding scale” that may result in intermediate scrutiny.\n\n Doctor-Patient Relationship. As for EMW’s second argument, H.B. 2 does not interfere\nwith the doctor-patient relationship any more than other informed-consent laws. “[I]nformed\nconsent is generally required for medical treatment,” Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department\nof Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990), and this requirement “is firmly entrenched in American tort\nlaw,” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he\ncommon-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a\ncompetent individual to refuse medical treatment.” Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277. This right,\ngrounded in principles of self-determination, may “demand[] a standard set by law for physicians\nrather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.” Canterbury v.\nSpence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasis added); see F. Rozovsky, Consent to\nTreatment: A Practical Guide 2-8 (5th ed. 2018) (explaining that informed-consent standards are\nset by “state legislation, regulations, and case law” in addition to standards among professional\ngroups).16 “[T]o safeguard the patient’s interest in achieving [her or] his own determination on\ntreatment, the law must itself set the standard for adequate disclosure.” Canterbury, 464 F.2d at\n787.\n\n\n\n\n 15The district court also relied largely on Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir.\n2017) (en banc), which invalidated a Florida law restricting doctors from asking patients about gun ownership in\npart because of concerns over interrupting the flow of information between doctor and patient. Id. at 1313. Those\nconcerns are not present here: H.B. 2 serves to increase the flow of information between doctor and patient. Also,\nunlike the statute in Wollschlaeger, H.B. 2 restricts no speech that the doctor wishes to impart to the patient. More\nimportant, however, Wollschlaeger did not involve patients’ informed consent.\n 16The Supreme Court has cited earlier editions of this treatise. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 21\n\n\n The principle that informed-consent requirements may be created by law, as opposed to\nmerely medical-profession custom, applies to all medical procedures, including abortion. As the\nSupreme Court has instructed, “an informed-consent requirement in the abortion context [is] ‘no\ndifferent from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical\nprocedure.’” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\n“The law need not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical practice,\nnor should it elevate their status above other physicians in the medical community.” Id. As part\nof States’ regulation of the medical profession, they may require doctors to provide information\nto their patients to ensure patients can give their informed consent for an abortion, like for any\nother medical procedure. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.\n\n The district court cited testimony that the mandated disclosures of H.B. 2 are inconsistent\nwith medical standards because (1) their mandatory nature—that is, the Commonwealth’s\nrequiring their actual disclosure rather than requiring their being offered to be disclosed—makes\nthem contrary to the customary standard of care for informed consent, and (2) they provide\ninformation that the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) and the\nNational Abortion Federation do not consider to be necessary for informed consent. See EMW\nWomen’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 644.\n\n As for the first point, most legally enacted informed-consent disclosures could be subject\nto the same criticism because they require the doctor to disclose, rather than simply offer to\ndisclose, information.17 The Casey plurality explained that States can require doctors to give\ninformation to patients about abortion just like it can require doctors to give information to an\norgan donor about that procedure. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. Also, the very reason that the\nrequired disclosure in NIFLA did “not facilitate informed consent” was because it provided no\ninformation about the risks or benefits of a medical procedure. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. In\nother words, the doctrine of informed consent does not stop at offering the opportunity for the\n\n 17For example, other Kentucky informed-consent and physician-disclosure requirements require\ninformation actually to be given when (1) diagnosing and treating breast cancer, KRS § 311.935; (2) performing\nacupuncture, KRS § 311.678; (3) testing for HIV infection, KRS § 214.625; and (4) performing mammograms,\nKRS § 214.555. An example of this at the federal level is 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.257–.258, which requires medical\nproviders actually disclose—not just offer to disclose—the risks, benefits, and alternatives of sterilization\nprocedures to ensure a patient’s informed consent to be sterilized.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 22\n\n\ninformation. It applies equally when a doctor must actually disclose the information. True, for\nsome information, the Casey statute required doctors to inform patients that it was available. See\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 881. But it also mandated information actually be given to patients. Id.\nH.B. 2 is no different.18\n\n The second point considered significant by the district court—certain medical groups’\nviews regarding whether a particular mandated truthful disclosure is necessary for informed\nconsent—is not the type of evidence deemed material by the Supreme Court in reviewing\nabortion-informed-consent statutes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld abortion regulations\nthat were directly contrary to alleged medical-profession custom and that certain medical groups\ndid not consider to be necessary—laws that those groups asserted were inconsistent with\naccepted standards of care for informed consent. For example, in Casey, the district court found\nthat “[t]he informed consent requirements of the [Pennsylvania law] represent a substantial\ndeparture from the ordinary medical requirements of informed consent,” Casey, 744 F. Supp. at\n1351; that “[c]ontent-based informed consent is contrary to the standard medical practice that\ninformed consent be specifically tailored to the needs of the specific patient,” id. at 1353; and\nthat various provisions of the Pennsylvania law conflicted with official positions of ACOG and\nthe American Public Health Association, see id. at 1351–52, 1355, 1360. Still, the Supreme\nCourt in Casey upheld the law’s informed-consent requirements. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.\n\n Similarly, in Gonzales, the Court upheld a statute prohibiting a form of partial-birth\nabortions, despite the district court’s factual findings that the law was contrary to certain\nmedical-profession views, including that ACOG “told Congress several times that the procedure\n\n 18The district court’s first point also overlooks that H.B. 2 allows patients to decline to receive the\ninformation, by not viewing the sonogram or listening to the verbal disclosures, and asking the doctors to turn off\nthe heartbeat. In fact, that H.B. 2 provides patients with the choice not to receive the information is the very reason\nthe district court held that H.B. 2 does not go far enough to meet Kentucky’s goal of informing the patients. EMW\nWomen’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 645–46. In other words, according to the district court, if the Kentucky\nlegislature wished to better inform patients about their abortion procedure, it should have required the patients\nreceive the information, rather than allowing them to choose not to do so. We disagree with this conclusion. That\nH.B. 2 allows women to avoid receiving the disclosures does not detract from the statute’s purpose to better inform;\nit merely reflects the Commonwealth’s recognition that, ultimately, it is the woman’s choice as to whether to\nconsider those disclosures in making her decision. And even if the disclosures do not change many minds, either\nbecause some patients are not persuaded by them or because some patients ignore them, the Commonwealth still is\nentitled under Casey to require doctors to provide them. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–84; Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575–77;\nRounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 23\n\n\nshould not be banned,” Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1011 (D. Neb. 2004), and “that\nCongress’[s] Finding—that a medical consensus supports the ban because partial-birth abortions\nare unnecessary—is both unreasonable and not supported by substantial evidence,” id. at 1015.\n\n If the validity of an informed-consent law depended on whether doctors agreed with the\nlaw—or whether the law required disclosures that, with no law, the doctor would disclose\nanyway—there would be no need for the law to supplement custom. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d\nat 784 (“[T]o bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to arrogate the decision on\nrevelation to the physician alone.”). As Casey and Gonzales establish, the constitutionality of an\nabortion regulation is based on the relevant legal standard as interpreted by the Supreme Court—\nhere, whether the mandated disclosures are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the medical\nprocedure—and not necessarily whether the law is consistent with medical-profession custom or\nviews of certain medical groups.\n\n The Dissent, therefore, is mistaken to argue that we “must naturally turn to the medical\ncommunity” to ascertain the “contours of informed consent” to determine whether a regulation is\nin accord with “medical practice” or “medical purpose.” Dissent at 37. Following that approach\nwould require us, in effect, to hold that a State must surrender its authority to regulate informed\nconsent to private parties. This method, however, would conflict with the Court’s recognition in\nGonzales that the State may regulate informed consent in the abortion context in the same way\nthat it regulates informed consent in other medical contexts. See 550 U.S. at 163. The validity\nof this regulation does not turn on what any private party claims is the norm for the practice of\nmedicine. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784, 787. Instead, we defer to the legislature’s\ndetermination of which informed-consent disclosures are required, provided that they are\nrelevant, truthful, and non-misleading. This deference does not make our court a player in policy\nmaking, as the Dissent contends, see Dissent at 44, but rather preserves our role as umpires who\napply the rules enacted by the People’s representatives. If the medical groups cited by the\nDissent want the legislated rules of informed consent to change, they should address their\narguments to those elected representatives. Casey makes clear, however, that the Dissent is\nincorrect to contend that opposition by medical groups to informed-consent rules necessarily\nrenders those rules invalid under the First Amendment.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 24\n\n\n The reasoning in Casey also shows that H.B. 2 does not impermissibly infringe on\nabortion doctors’ autonomy. Indeed, as noted, the Casey plurality overruled the Court’s earlier\nholdings that requiring doctors to give certain information to all patients impermissibly intruded\nupon doctors’ discretion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881; Thornburgh v. American Coll. of\nObstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986).\n\n To be sure, H.B. 2 does require the disclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\nfacts that otherwise the doctor might not disclose. However, to the extent that it matters to the\nFirst Amendment analysis,19 nothing prevents the doctor from informing the patient that the\nfactual disclosures of H.B.2 are required by the Commonwealth rather than made by the doctor’s\nchoice. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (rejecting argument that\nregulations abridged free-speech rights of the grantee’s staff and noting that “[n]othing in [the\nregulations] requires a doctor to represent as [her or] his own any opinion that [she or] he does\nnot in fact hold”); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 1994)\n(upholding abortion-informed-consent statute and observing that it allowed doctors to\n“disassociate themselves” from the required information).\n\n It is also true that H.B. 2 differs from the Pennsylvania statute in Casey in that H.B. 2\ndoes not have an express provision, as did the Casey statute, excusing a doctor from providing\nthe mandated disclosure “if he or she can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that\nhe or she reasonably believed that furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely\nadverse effect on the physical or mental health of the patient.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84.\nAlthough the Casey joint opinion noted this statutory provision in the context of discussing “a\nconstitutional right of privacy between a pregnant woman and her physician,” id. at 883, there is\nno indication that the plurality considered the provision to be significant for its First Amendment\nreview. To the extent that it was, we also must consider that a doctor need not comply with H.B.\n2 if an abortion is medically necessary or in the case of a medical emergency, KRS § 311.727(5),\nand H.B. 2 has other provisions not contained in the Casey statute that effectively give the doctor\nthe same discretion afforded to doctors under the Casey statute. For example, unlike the Casey\n\n 19See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 737 (concluding doctor’s ability to disassociate herself or himself from\ndisclosures is irrelevant to the compelled-speech analysis if disclosures are truthful and non-misleading).\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 25\n\n\nstatute, H.B. 2 imposes no obligation that the patient certify in writing that she has received\ncertain mandated disclosures, see id. at 881, or even requires that the patient pay attention to the\ndisclosures, and it imposes no penalty on the doctor if the patient ignores the disclosures the\ndoctor is making, see KRS § 311.727(3). These provisions operate to allow a doctor who\nreasonably believes that the disclosures would result in a severely adverse effect on the patient,\nto inform the patient in the doctor’s discretion that she need not listen to or view the disclosures.\n\n Furthermore, H.B. 2 restricts no doctor from advising the patient to keep or abort the\nunborn life displayed or from providing any other opinion, medical or otherwise, that the doctor\nwishes to convey. See generally Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th\nCir. 2017) (en banc) (“Importantly, however, the law [at issue in other cases] did not restrict\nwhat the practitioner could say or recommend to a patient or client.” (emphasis added)). Indeed,\nthe statute contains nothing that would prevent a doctor in her or his discretion from advocating\nto the patient in favor of an abortion.\n\n Given these considerations, the requirements of H.B. 2 are no more of a regulation that\ndeparted from a medical group’s definition of medical practice than the abortion-informed-\nconsent law upheld in Casey and no more of a regulation of professional speech than many\ninformed-consent and physician-disclosure laws enacted by Kentucky, other States, and the\nfederal government.20\n\n Emotional Effect on Patients. As for EMW’s third argument—that the emotional effect\nof H.B. 2 on patients warrants heightened scrutiny—Casey again is instructive. In that case, the\ndistrict court accepted Planned Parenthood’s similar argument and held that the Pennsylvania\ninformed-consent statute did not survive heightened scrutiny because the mandated information\n“will create the impression in women that the Commonwealth disapproves of the woman’s\ndecision” and “will create undesirable and unnecessary anxiety, anguish and fear.” Casey,\n744 F. Supp. at 1354. In this regard, the district court’s factual finding in Casey was like the\ndistrict court’s finding here, based on evidence cited by the Dissent, see Dissent at 49–50, that\n\n 20See supra note 17. Other examples of Kentucky mandating speech in the health-care context occur when\n(1) reporting tuberculosis, KRS § 215.590; (2) reporting abuse of adults and dependents, KRS §§ 209.030, 620.030;\n(3) displaying licenses, KRS § 311.470; and, of course, (4) performing an abortion, KRS §§ 311.725, 311.727.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 26\n\n\n“H.B. 2 causes patients distress.” EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 645. We\nrecognize the significance of the district court’s finding regarding the negative emotional effect\non certain patients, as well as its acknowledgment of declarations from several women who had\nundergone abortions and who stated that the mandated disclosures of H.B. 2 would have had a\npositive impact on their emotional health by persuading them not to have an abortion. R. 32-3,\nPageID 406–08; R. 32-4, PageID 410; R. 32-5, PageID 412–14. However, for purposes of this\nsummary judgment determination, we need not and should not weigh the competing evidence of\nemotional effect, as the district court and Dissent appear to do.21 Instead, the Casey plurality did\nnot view any finding regarding emotional effect as material to the level of First Amendment\nscrutiny of an informed-consent statute. Although the Casey district court’s finding as to\nemotional effect was quoted by Planned Parenthood in its brief to the Supreme Court, see Casey\nBr. at *52, the controlling opinion in Casey did not make any note of this finding in its analysis\nof the doctors’ First Amendment challenge. Instead, without mentioning emotional effect on\npatients at all, the Casey plurality reversed the district court’s judgment that struck down the\ninformed-consent statute.\n\n\n\n 21The Dissent states that “the Commonwealth did not controvert” testimony from a Texas resident against\nH.B. 2 based upon the emotional impact on her from disclosures required by a Texas informed-consent statute.\nDissent at 35, 47. True, the Commonwealth did not dispute that particular patient’s experience, but it is not accurate\nto conclude that the evidence of the emotional effect of the H.B. 2 disclosures is uncontroverted based on that\ntestimony. To the contrary, several Kentucky residents submitted declarations attesting to beneficial emotional\neffects they would have experienced from disclosures mandated by H.B. 2 had they received them. R. 32-3, PageID\n406–08; R. 32-4, PageID 410; R. 32-5, PageID 412–14. For example, one patient stated that if she had received the\ninformation required by H.B. 2, she “would never have gone through with the procedure” and that having not\nreceived that information makes her regret of the abortion “even more painful.” R. 32-3, PageID 407. The\nDissent’s and district court’s discounting of this testimony and other evidence submitted by the Commonwealth\nregarding emotional effect appears to involve the weighing of proof and credibility determinations not appropriate\nfor summary judgment. Dissent at 50; see Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 168 (6th Cir. 2011) (“When\nreviewing a summary judgment motion, credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited.”\n(quotation omitted)); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n summary judgment,\nneither the district court nor this Court may make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” (citation\nomitted)). Unlike in Casey, where the district court made its findings of fact after a bench trial, Casey, 505 U.S. at\n845; Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1325–26, the district court here was ruling on summary judgment, see EMW Women’s\nSurgical Center, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 648, and therefore was not permitted to make findings of fact based on the\ndisputed evidence. And we further note that on cross-motions for summary judgment this court must review the\nissues of material fact in the light most favorable to the party whose motion did not prevail in the district court. See\nB.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 598 (6th Cir. 2001). However, as explained above, ultimately\nfact issues regarding emotional effect on patients are not material to resolution of the relevant First Amendment\nissue of whether the disclosures of H.B. 2 are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to an abortion.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 27\n\n\n Casey thus implicitly recognized that discomfort to the patient from the mandated\ndisclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information does not make an informed-\nconsent law invalid under the First Amendment. Indeed, discomfort may be a byproduct of\ninformed consent itself. See generally Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (“Any number of patients\nfacing imminent surgical procedures would prefer not to hear all details, lest the usual anxiety\npreceding invasive medical procedures become the more intense.”). This may be especially true\nin the abortion context. For, as the Supreme Court has explained, “[a]bortion is inherently\ndifferent from other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful\ntermination of a potential life.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).\n\n Providing sonogram and auscultation results to the patient furthers the State’s legitimate\ninterest, recognized in Casey, of ensuring that the patient understands the full implications of her\ndecision, including the impact on unborn life. Under Casey, the State may decide that its interest\nin having the unborn life actually be seen and heard before being aborted, and potential negative\nemotional consequences to the patient from not having received that disclosure, justify the\nincidental regulation of professional speech and outweigh the risk of negative emotional impact\non the patient from the disclosure (even assuming the latter consideration is relevant to the First\nAmendment analysis and was a permissible finding for summary judgment given the disputed\nfactual record). This conclusion follows from Casey’s reasoning that the State has “an important\ninterest in potential life,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882,22 and that there is the risk to the patient’s\npsychological health from having made such a profound decision without adequate disclosure of\nits consequences, including the impact on unborn life, beforehand:\n\n\n\n\n 22See also Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157 (emphasizing that a State “may use its voice and its regulatory\nauthority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman”); id. at 158 (“[T]he State may use its regulatory\npower to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the\nmedical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.”).\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 28\n\n\n It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health. Nor can\n it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the impact on\n the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a\n woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the\n legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only\n to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision\n was not fully informed.\n\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 882.\n\n EMW has offered no Supreme Court authority to contradict Casey’s teaching. At oral\nargument, EMW cited only Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), as support for our considering\nthe impact of H.B. 2 on the listening patients as part of the First Amendment analysis. Hill\nexplained that the effect of certain speech on unwilling listeners can be a factor when\ndetermining whether restricting speech is constitutional. See 530 U.S. at 716 (“[T]he protection\nafforded to offensive messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that\nthe unwilling audience cannot avoid it.”). Hill, however, did not involve a situation where, as\nhere, no speech—fact or opinion—is restricted. The only issue here is whether the government\nmay compel more disclosures of a strictly truthful, non-misleading, and relevant nature.23\n\n More fundamentally, though, Hill is distinguishable because it did not involve informed\nconsent to a medical procedure. Hill concerned speech to people on public streets and sidewalks\nwithin 100 feet of health-care facilities. 530 U.S. at 707. The informed-consent exception to\nheightened scrutiny simply did not apply, as NIFLA confirms. Because H.B. 2, like the Casey\nstatute, provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information about an abortion, it helps\n\n 23Hill also explained that a reason we allow protestors to display vulgar language is because viewers can\navert their eyes to avoid more offense. 530 U.S. at 716 (citation omitted). The information provided by H.B. 2 is\nnot vulgar speech, but still, if the patient desires not to receive the information mandated by H.B. 2, she may avert\nher eyes from the ultrasound image, not listen to the doctor’s description of the image, and ask the doctor to turn off\nthe heartbeat. See Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (rejecting\nunwilling-listener challenge to abortion-informed-consent statute because the statute did not require the patient to\nlisten). Unlike in Casey and Rounds, this appeal involves no challenge to H.B. 2 as an undue burden on a woman’s\nsubstantive due process right to choose an abortion. The only challenge here is alleged unconstitutional compelled\nspeech of the abortion doctors. We must be careful, therefore, not to upset Casey’s balance between States’ ability\nto regulate the medical profession and women’s rights. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577 (“If the disclosures are truthful\nand non-misleading, and if they would not violate the woman’s privacy right under the Casey plurality opinion, then\nAppellees would, by means of their First Amendment claim, essentially trump the balance Casey struck between\nwomen’s rights and the states’ prerogatives. Casey, however, rejected any such clash of rights in the informed\nconsent context.”).\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 29\n\n\nensure informed consent to that procedure. It therefore is not subject to heightened scrutiny and\ncomplies with the First Amendment under NIFLA and Casey.\n\n VI.\n\n Finally, a few words in response to the Dissent’s conclusion, based on physician\ntestimony that is disputed by other physician testimony, 24 that H.B. 2 “would require physicians\nto harm their patients with ‘no medical purpose,’” id. at 37, and the Dissent’s statement that “[i]t\nis transparent that furthering informed consent was not the aim of the Commonwealth—nor will\nit be achieved by H.B. 2,” id. at 52.\n\n First, in order to make the claim that informed consent is a pretextual and not the actual\nreason for H.B. 2, the Dissent engages in a methodology that we respectfully submit is\ninconsistent with Casey. The Dissent argues that “H.B. 2 is not coterminous with the medical\npractice of informed consent. It should not receive deferential review because it regulates the\ncontent of physician speech, not the practice of medicine.” Dissent at 44.\n\n The Dissent’s approach departs from with how the Casey joint opinion reviewed the\ninformed-consent statute in that case. The plurality considered mandated informed-consent\ndisclosures regarding unborn life to be an incidental regulation of professional speech that was\n\n 24In addressing standard-of-care issues, such as whether H.B. 2 “cause[s] patient harm,” whether it has a\n“medical purpose,” and whether it “facilitates informed consent as part of the practice of medicine,” Dissent at 35,\nthe Dissent and district court again appear to make credibility determinations and to weigh the evidence in a manner\nthat is contrary to the summary judgment standard. It is not undisputed that H.B. 2 is “at odds with the prevailing\nstandard of care,” as the Dissent contends. See Dissent at 35. To the contrary, the Commonwealth’s experts (John\nW. Seeds, M.D., FACOG, the retired chair of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Virginia\nCommonwealth University, and W. David Hager, M.D., FACOG, an obstetrician and gynecologist who practices in\nLexington, Kentucky) submitted declarations that H.B. 2 complies with existing standards of medical care. See\ngenerally R. 32-1; R. 32-2. For example, Dr. Seeds stated: “Far from impairing the physician-patient relationship,\nthe Act simply conforms the law to the existing national standards of care for the diagnosis of pregnancy and the\nobtaining of a knowing and voluntary consent of the patient before the pregnancy is surgically or medically\nterminated through elective abortion.” R. 32-1, PageID 363. We also note that Dr. Seeds offered this expert opinion\nwith the understanding that the disclosures required by H.B. 2 are mandatory. Id. at 349. The district court\nacknowledged Dr. Seeds’s (and Dr. Hager’s) opinion “that H.B. 2 conforms to existing national standards of care,”\nEMW Women’s Surgical Center, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 643, but then dismissed that testimony as “undermined by the\ntestimony given at the hearing” by EMW’s witnesses, id. Such weighing of evidence regarding national standards\nof care appears inappropriate at summary judgment, but ultimately a factual finding in this area is not material to the\nrelevant legal issue. As explained above, the First Amendment analysis of an informed-consent statute turns on\nwhether the mandated disclosure is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant, not whether the disclosure is, or is not,\ncurrently embodied in the customary standard of medical care.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 30\n\n\nengaged in as “part of the practice of medicine.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. In Casey, as here,\ncertain private medical organizations argued, and the district court found, that the mandated\ndisclosures were inconsistent with informed-consent custom. But that argument and lower court\nfinding did not cause the Casey plurality to conclude that the disclosures were somehow not part\nof the practice of medicine and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny. Nor did Casey question\nthe motives of the legislature. Instead, the plurality accepted as “legitimate” that the legislature\nmay have the motive of “protecting the life of the unborn” in fashioning informed-consent\nrequirements for the abortion procedure. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. This motive did not\ncall for heightened scrutiny in Casey. Nor should it in this case.\n\n Furthermore, the reasoning in Casey establishes that H.B. 2 does indeed legitimately\nfacilitate informed consent and serve a medical purpose that does not harm the patient. To give\nthe patient more information that is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to a medical procedure\nis the epitome of ensuring informed consent. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; Lakey, 667 F.3d at\n579; Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735. A sonogram and heartbeat auscultation of the unborn life inside\nthe patient are disclosures directly pertinent to whether to obtain a procedure to abort that unborn\nlife. If we were to hold that a State may not require such disclosures, we would essentially be\nconcluding that women must be shielded and protected from this up-to-date medical information,\nthat women are unable to or should not be required to process it. This conclusion is incompatible\nwith the concept of personal choice under Casey. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84; Lakey, 667\nF.3d at 579 (“Denying [a woman] up to date medical information is more of an abuse to her\nability to decide than providing the information.”). Casey recognized that a State may require a\nphysician to inform the patient of the impact on unborn life and that facts relating to this impact\nare among the disclosures that may be part of informed consent for an abortion.\n\n VII.\n\n Shifting from the First Amendment to the Eleventh, General Beshear argues that he is not\na proper party to this matter. “[A] suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is\nbarred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” Pennhurst State Sch. &\nHosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984) (citation omitted). That said, one “important\nexception” exists for suits “challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action.” Id.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 31\n\n\n(citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)) (emphasis added). The district court held that\nGeneral Beshear falls into this exception because he has the “necessary authority” to enforce\nH.B. 2. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 647–48. But General Beshear argues\nthat “an attorney general’s status as the chief law enforcement officer of the state is not a\nsufficient connection” to fall into this exception. We agree with him.\n\n State officials who are “clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws\nof the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings . . . to enforce against\nparties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a\nFederal court of equity from such action.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added).\nHowever, this exception to sovereign immunity created in Ex parte Young has been read\nnarrowly. Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1415 (6th Cir.\n1996). We have held that it “does not apply when a defendant state official has neither enforced\nnor threatened to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional state statute.” Id. (citations omitted).\nThere must be “a realistic possibility the official will take legal or administrative actions against\nthe plaintiff’s interests.” Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1048 (6th Cir. 2015)\n(citing Deters, 92 F.3d at 1415). General enforcement authority is insufficient. Id. (citation\nomitted).\n\n H.B. 2 and its penalty provision, in contrast with other statutes, do not delegate specific\nenforcement power to any single state actor. KRS §§ 311.727, 311.990(33). Multiple local\nprosecutors—the Commonwealth’s and county attorneys—have the duty to enforce H.B. 2.\n\n True, the Attorney General is “the chief law officer of the Commonwealth” with a\nresponsibility to “exercise all common law duties and authority pertaining to the office of the\nAttorney General under the common law, except when modified by statutory enactment.” KRS\n§ 15.020. Kentucky law permits the Attorney General to defend a statute’s constitutional\nvalidity, but it also gives her or him discretion. KRS § 418.075(1); Commonwealth v. Hamilton,\n411 S.W.3d 741, 751 (Ky. 2013). However, Kentucky law does not require the Attorney\nGeneral to represent the Commonwealth “where it is made the duty of the Commonwealth’s\nattorney or county attorney” instead. KRS § 15.020. That is what we have here.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 32\n\n\n Each Commonwealth’s attorney must “attend to all civil cases and proceedings in which\nthe Commonwealth is interested in the Circuit Courts of [her or] his judicial circuit.” KRS\n§ 69.010(1). The county attorneys must do the same within their counties. KRS § 69.210(4)(a).\nBoth must investigate the condition of unsatisfied judgments in their districts or counties. KRS\n§§ 69.040, 69.240. They also must “take all necessary steps, by motion, action, or otherwise to\ncollect [them] and cause them to be paid into the State Treasury.” KRS § 69.240; accord KRS\n§ 69.040. When these attorneys fail to meet this mandate, and if the Department of Revenue\nsubmits a written request, then the Attorney General must bring an action to collect any\nunsatisfied judgments. See KRS § 15.060(3). The duty to enforce H.B. 2 therefore lies not with\nthe Attorney General but with the Commonwealth’s attorneys and the county attorneys.\n\n To support their interpretation of Ex parte Young, EMW cites McNeilus Truck &\nManufacturing, Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2000). That case,\nhowever, affirms the holding of Deters, which we rely on here. See McNeilus Truck & Mfg.,\n226 F.3d at 438 (citing Deters for the proposition that Young “does not apply when the defendant\nofficial has neither enforced nor threatened to enforce” the challenged statute). McNeilus also\nheld that the Attorney General is a proper defendant “[w]here there is an imminent threat of\nenforcement.” Id. at 437. There, the Attorney General helped enforce portions of the statute,\nand the other defendant had threatened to withdraw the plaintiff’s license. So, we held both the\nAttorney General and the other defendant could be sued. McNeilus, however, does not help\nEMW because there is no evidence of a similar “imminent threat” of prosecution by the Attorney\nGeneral in the present case. Any imminent threat comes from the Commonwealth’s and county\nattorneys, not the Attorney General.\n\n General Beshear has not enforced or even threatened to enforce H.B. 2. Rather, the\nKentucky legislature has charged local prosecutors with its enforcement. We therefore hold that\nthe Attorney General is not a proper party to this action.25\n\n\n\n\n 25Because it is uncontested that the Secretary Meier is a proper party, no concern exists that EMW “would\nbe unable to vindicate the alleged infringement of their constitutional rights without first violating [H.B. 2].” See\nAllied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 665 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982).\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 33\n\n\n VIII.\n\n H.B. 2—The Ultrasound Informed Consent Act—is an informed-consent statute like the\nstatute in Casey because it provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information related to\nan abortion. The statute incidentally burdens speech only as part of Kentucky’s regulation of\nprofessional conduct. Therefore, H.B. 2 is not subject to any heightened scrutiny with respect to\nthe doctors’ First Amendment rights, and it does not violate those rights, based on NIFLA and\nCasey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Also, because local prosecutors\nwould handle the enforcement of fines under H.B. 2, the Attorney General is not a proper party\nto this action.\n\n With due respect for the views of the Dissent, we adopt instead the position of the Fifth\nand Eighth Circuits on the First Amendment issue. Our responsibility here is to apply the level\nof scrutiny mandated by the plurality opinion in Casey and reaffirmed by a majority of the\nSupreme Court in NIFLA. Under Casey, “protecting the life of the unborn” is a “legitimate goal”\nthat may be pursued by a State as part of informed consent. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. As\na First Amendment matter, there is nothing suspect with a State’s requiring a doctor, before\nperforming an abortion, to make truthful, non-misleading factual disclosures, relevant to\ninformed consent, even if those disclosures relate to unborn life and have the effect of persuading\nthe patient not to have an abortion.\n\n Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s contrary decision and VACATE the\ninjunction. We also remand with instructions for General Beshear to be dismissed from the case,\nfor summary judgment to be entered in favor of Secretary Meier on the first claim for relief\nstated in the complaint, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 34\n\n\n _________________\n\n DISSENT\n _________________\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: EMW Women's Surgical Ctr. v. Andrew Beshear\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0062p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P.S.C., on behalf ┐\\n of itself, its staff, and its patients; ERNEST MARSHALL, │\\n M.D., on behalf of himself and his patients; ASHLEY │\\n BERGIN, M.D., on behalf of herself and her patients; │\\n TANYA FRANKLIN, M.D., on behalf of herself and her │\\n patients, │\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees, │\\n │\\n > Nos. 17-6151/6183\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n ANDREW G. BESHEAR, Attorney General (17-6183); │\\n ADAM MEIER, in his capacity as Secretary of the │\\n Cabinet of Health and Family Services (17-6151), │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.\\n No. 3:17-cv-00016—David J. Hale, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: July 25, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 4, 2019\\n\\n Before: NORRIS, DONALD, and BUSH, Circuit Judges;\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: S. Chad Meredith, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for\\nAppellant in 17-6151. Steven Travis Mayo, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF\\nKENTUCKY, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-6183. Alexa Kolbi-Molinas,\\nAMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, for\\nAppellees. ON BRIEF: S. Chad Meredith, M. Stephen Pitt, Matthew F. Kuhn, OFFICE OF\\nTHE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-6151. La Tasha Buckner, OFFICE\\nOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\n6183. Alexa Kolbi-Molinas, Andrew D. Beck, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION\\nFOUNDATION, New York, New York, Amy D. Cubbage, Heather Gatnarek, ACLU OF\\nKENTUCKY FOUNDATION, INC., Louisville, Kentucky, Anton Metlitsky, Leah Godesky,\\nO’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, New York, New York, for Appellees. Scott A. Keller, OFFICE\\nOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, Austin, Texas, Michael Lee Francisco, MRD\\nLAW, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Scott W. Gaylord, ELON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF\\nLAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, Shannon Rose Selden, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP,\\nNew York, New York, Kimberly A. Parker, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND\\nDORR LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.\\n\\n BUSH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which NORRIS, J., joined, and\\nDONALD, J., joined only in that Attorney General Beshear is not a proper party to this action.\\nDONALD, J. (pp. 34–54), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a woman has\\nthe right to choose to have an abortion. To inform that choice, the Commonwealth of Kentucky\\ndirects a doctor, before performing an abortion, to auscultate (or make audible) the fetal\\nheartbeat, perform an ultrasound, and display and describe the ultrasound images to the patient.\\nThis appeal principally concerns whether those requirements violate the doctor’s First\\nAmendment rights.\\n\\n “The Ultrasound Informed Consent Act,” also known as “House Bill 2” or “H.B. 2,”1 is\\nchallenged by Plaintiffs-Appellees EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. and its associated\\nphysicians (collectively, “EMW”) under the First Amendment, as incorporated against the States\\nby the Fourteenth Amendment. EMW prevailed in the district court, which, in granting the\\ncomplaint’s first claim for relief under the First Amendment, applied heightened scrutiny to\\ninvalidate the statute and permanently enjoin enforcement of H.B. 2. See EMW Women’s\\nSurgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 283 F. Supp. 3d 629 (W.D. Ky. 2017). Our court then denied\\nthe motion of then-Defendant-Appellant Vickie Glisson, who was Secretary of the Cabinet for\\nHealth and Family Services, to stay the injunction pending appeal. See EMW Women’s Surgical\\n\\n\\n 1Codified at Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) §§ 311.727, 311.990(34).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\nCtr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, No. 17-6151 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2017) (order). However, neither our court\\nnor the district court had the benefit of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in National Institute\\nof Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (“NIFLA”).\\n\\n In NIFLA the Court clarified that no heightened First Amendment scrutiny should apply\\nto informed-consent statutes like the abortion-informed-consent statute at issue in Planned\\nParenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).2\\nSee NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. Thus, even though an abortion-informed-consent law compels a\\ndoctor’s disclosure of certain information, it should be upheld so long as the disclosure is\\ntruthful, non-misleading, and relevant to an abortion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; Tex. Med.\\nProviders Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012); Planned\\nParenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).\\n\\n Because H.B. 2, like the statute in Casey, requires the disclosure of truthful, non-\\nmisleading, and relevant information about an abortion, we hold that it does not violate a\\ndoctor’s right to free speech under the First Amendment. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 882–84. We also hold that the Attorney General, Defendant-Appellant Andrew\\nBeshear, is not a proper party to this case.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n H.B. 2 directs a doctor, prior to performing an abortion, to perform an ultrasound; display\\nthe ultrasound images for the patient; and explain, in the doctor’s own words, what is being\\ndepicted by the images—for example, pointing out organs and whether the patient is pregnant\\nwith twins. KRS § 311.727. There is no requirement that the patient view the images or listen to\\nthe doctor’s description. The doctor also must auscultate the fetal heartbeat but may turn off the\\nvolume of the auscultation if the patient so requests. Id. Failure to comply with these\\nrequirements can result in the doctor being fined and referred to Kentucky’s medical-licensing\\nboard. KRS § 311.990(34). But H.B. 2 does not penalize a doctor if the patient requested that\\nthe heartbeat sound be turned off or chose not to look at the ultrasound images. KRS\\n§ 311.727(3). Nor does H.B. 2 penalize a doctor if she or he exercises discretion to advise a\\n\\n 2Citations to Casey refer to the joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\npatient that she need not listen to or view the disclosures, or if the doctor makes any other\\nstatement, including advising the patient to have an abortion. Finally, a doctor need not make\\nany disclosure from H.B. 2 at all if an abortion is medically necessary or in the case of a medical\\nemergency. KRS § 311.727(5).\\n\\n EMW sued General Beshear, Secretary Glisson, and Michael S. Rodman, who is\\nExecutive Director of the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure. The parties cross-moved for\\nsummary judgment on the complaint’s first claim for relief, styled “First Amendment Rights of\\nPhysicians.” The district court ruled in favor of EMW and, as noted, permanently enjoined\\nenforcement of H.B. 2. Executive Director Rodman does not appeal, but Secretary Meier, as\\nSecretary Glisson’s successor, seeks reversal of the judgment. General Beshear also defends\\nH.B. 2 on appeal but argues that he is not a proper party to this case. We address first whether\\nH.B. 2 violates doctors’ First Amendment rights, then whether General Beshear is appropriately\\nin this suit.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We engage in de novo review of the district court’s summary judgment. McKay v.\\nFederspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2016). “[W]here, as here, the parties filed cross-motions\\nfor summary judgment, ‘the court must evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking\\ncare in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under\\nconsideration.’” Id. at 866 (quoting Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th\\nCir. 1991)). A moving party may obtain summary judgment only if it “shows that there is no\\ngenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\nlaw.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under\\nthe governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).\\n\\n No material facts are in dispute here, so this matter turns on a pure question of law: does\\nH.B. 2 compel a doctor’s speech in violation of the First Amendment?\\n\\n The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see,\\ne.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall\\nmake no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” U.S. Const. amend. I. This constitutional\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\nguarantee, the Supreme Court has held, applies not only when government restricts speech, see,\\ne.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015), but also when it compels speech,\\nsee, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. When laws, whether restrictive or compulsive, “target\\nspeech based on its communicative content,” they generally “are presumptively unconstitutional\\nand may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve\\ncompelling state interests.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226). Such\\ncontent-based restrictions have been declared unconstitutional in compelled-speech cases such as\\nWest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which struck down a\\nrequirement that students salute the United States flag; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977),\\nwhich invalidated a law requiring a state motto “Live Free or Die” on license plates; and Hurley\\nv. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), which held\\nthat a State could not force parade organizers to include a group that would convey a message\\ncontrary to the organizers’ views.\\n\\n Heightened scrutiny generally applies to content-based regulation of any speaker,\\nincluding a physician or other professional. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. But, as the\\nSupreme Court noted in NIFLA, there is “less protection for professional speech in two\\ncircumstances”: first, for “some laws that require professionals to disclose factual,\\nnoncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’”;3 second, for regulation of\\n“professional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech,” id. at 2372 (citing\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 884). The second exception is at issue here because H.B. 2 regulates doctors’\\nconduct: performing abortions.4\\n\\n We review H.B. 2 against the backdrop of thirty-five years of evolving Supreme Court\\nprecedent concerning the constitutionality of abortion-informed-consent statutes. In the 1980s,\\nthe Court invalidated some aspects of these laws. For example, in City of Akron v. Akron Center\\nfor Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (“Akron I”), and Thornburgh v. American\\n\\n 3NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,\\n471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010); Ohralik v.\\nOhio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).\\n 4We do not address whether H.B. 2 falls within the Zauderer/Milzavetz/Ohralik commercial-speech\\nexception.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\nCollege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), the Court struck down state laws\\nrequiring abortion doctors to provide patients with information about the development of unborn\\nlife5 and alternatives to abortion. In Akron I, the Court “invalidated an ordinance which required\\nthat a woman seeking an abortion be provided by her physician with specific information\\n‘designed to influence the woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.’” Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 881 (quoting Akron I, 462 U.S. at 444). The required disclosure included the\\nstatement that “the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception.” Akron I,\\n462 U.S. at 444. That this “information was designed to dissuade the woman from having an\\nabortion,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, was one of “two purported flaws in the Akron ordinance.” Id.\\n(citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762). The other purported flaw was that the Akron I statute\\nmandated “a rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases,\\nirrespective of the particular needs of the patient, [that] intrude[d] upon the discretion of the\\npregnant woman’s physician.” Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.\\nIn Thornburgh, the purported flaw in the Pennsylvania informed-consent statute at issue was that\\nit was “an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth’s message discouraging abortion into\\nthe privacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician,”\\nThornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762—that is, an interference with the doctor-patient relationship.\\n\\n In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court reversed course. In Casey, the Court effectively\\nabrogated the holdings in Akron I and Thornburgh. The Casey joint opinion declared:\\n\\n To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when\\n the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading\\n information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those\\n of childbirth, and the “probable gestational age” of the fetus, those cases go too\\n far, are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in\\n potential life, and are overruled.\\n\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Casey addressed\\ninformed-consent provisions of another Pennsylvania statute that required physicians, among\\nother things, to inform patients orally of the nature of the abortion procedure; its risks and\\nalternatives; the probable gestational age of the unborn life in the patient when the doctors would\\n\\n 5We use the term unborn life consistent with the Supreme Court’s reference to “the life of the unborn,”\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 883. See also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nperform the abortion; and the availability of pamphlets (1) describing unborn life in further\\ndetail, including stages of gestational development, (2) listing agencies offering alternatives to\\nabortion, and (3) giving information about obtaining child support from the unborn life’s father.\\nSee Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 902–03 (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3205(a)); Planned Parenthood\\nof Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that pamphlets described\\nstages of development for unborn life).\\n\\n The Casey plurality reasoned that “a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain\\ninformation as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no\\ndifferent from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical\\nprocedure.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Though the joint opinion acknowledged that “the\\nphysician’s First Amendment rights not to speak” were implicated by the informed-consent\\nstatute, the plurality applied no heightened scrutiny and upheld the statute because a doctor’s\\nrights were implicated “only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing\\nand regulation by the State.” Id. at 884 (citations omitted).\\n\\n Importantly too, in “depart[ing] from the holdings of Akron I and Thornburgh,” the\\nCasey plurality emphasized that a State may “further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of\\nthe unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even\\nwhen in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S.\\nat 883 (emphasis added); see also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972–73 (1997) (per\\ncuriam) (affirming Casey and holding that a statute restricting who could perform abortions that\\nwas drafted by an anti-abortion group had no improper purpose). The plurality instructed that\\ninformed consent to an abortion procedure may mandate disclosure of the “full consequences of”\\nthe abortion decision, including “a requirement that a woman be apprised of the health risks of\\nabortion and childbirth,” as well as “the impact on” or “consequences to the fetus, even when\\nthose consequences have no direct relation to her health.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. As the\\nplurality explained, it cannot “be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem\\nthe impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.” Id. (emphasis added). The\\njoint opinion analogized an informed-consent disclosure of the effect on unborn life to a\\nrequirement that an organ recipient learn the effect on the donor before consenting to the\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\ntransplant: “[w]e would think it constitutional for the State to require that in order for there to be\\ninformed consent to a kidney transplant operation the recipient must be supplied with\\ninformation about risks to the donor as well as risks to himself or herself.” Id. at 882–83.\\n\\n We have long understood Casey as marking a shift toward greater respect for States’\\ninterests in informing women and protecting unborn life. For example, in Women’s Medical\\nProfessional Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003), we affirmed that “[a]n essential feature\\nof the jointly authored opinion in Casey is the reaffirmation of the substantial state interest in\\npotential life throughout pregnancy.” Id. at 443 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, in\\nMemphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 1999), we explained that\\nCasey establishes that States may take steps to ensure that a woman’s choice to abort is\\ninformed:\\n\\n [a] plurality of the justices in Casey recognized the weighty concerns of the state\\n in “the protection of potential life” and reasoned that, although “the woman has a\\n right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not\\n at all follow that the state is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice\\n is thoughtful and informed.”\\n\\nId. at 460–61 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 871–72). In other words, our circuit has recognized\\nthat after Casey there can be no doubt that “a state can require that a doctor give a woman certain\\ninformation before she may have an abortion.” Id. at 465 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\\n\\n Recently, in NIFLA, a majority of the Supreme Court adopted the First Amendment\\nanalysis applied in Casey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373–74. Specifically, the Court explained\\nthat although heightened scrutiny generally applies to content-based regulations of speech,\\n“regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech” receive lower scrutiny. Id.\\nat 2373. The Court acknowledged that “drawing the line between speech and conduct can be\\ndifficult.” Id. But it held that statutes that “facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure,”\\nlike the one at issue in Casey, fall on the conduct side of the line because they regulate speech\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\n“only ‘as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the\\nState.’”6 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\\n\\n In both NIFLA and Casey, then, the Court clarified that the First Amendment has a\\nlimited role to play in allowing doctors to avoid making truthful mandated disclosures related to\\ninformed consent. Under the First Amendment, we will not highly scrutinize an informed-\\nconsent statute, including one involving informed consent to an abortion, so long as it meets\\nthese three requirements: (1) it must relate to a medical procedure; (2) it must be truthful and not\\nmisleading; and (3) it must be relevant to the patient’s decision whether to undertake the\\nprocedure, which may include, in the abortion context, information relevant to the woman’s\\nhealth risks, as well as the impact on the unborn life. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 882.\\n\\n Although much of the analysis in Casey addressed the plaintiffs’ undue-burden claim, the\\njoint opinion’s First Amendment holding built upon its conclusion that the mandated informed-\\nconsent disclosures in that case met the criteria of being truthful, non-misleading, and relevant.\\nContrary to the Dissent’s suggestion that we have “focused on the wrong provision of the\\nConstitution,” Dissent at 38, indeed we do address the relevant provision—the First Amendment.\\nCasey and NIFLA recognize that First Amendment heightened scrutiny does not apply to\\nincidental regulation of professional speech that is part of the practice of medicine and that such\\nincidental regulation includes mandated informed-consent requirements, provided that the\\ndisclosures are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–84; NIFLA,\\n138 S. Ct at 2373. Casey also recognizes that, as part of informed consent for an abortion,\\npermissible mandated disclosures under the First Amendment may pertain to the effect of the\\nprocedure on unborn life. 505 U.S. at 882. And in NIFLA, the Court explicitly reaffirmed that\\nheightened scrutiny is not appropriate under the First Amendment for informed-consent\\n\\n\\n 6The Court went on in NIFLA to declare unconstitutional a California statute requiring crisis pregnancy\\ncenters to disclose that the State offered abortion services, among other things. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368–70.\\nIn so doing, the Court distinguished the California statute from the Pennsylvania law upheld in Casey because the\\nnotice at issue under the California statute was not an informed-consent law: it “provide[d] no information about the\\nrisks or benefits of [medical] procedures.” Id. at 2373. Because the regulation “at issue [in NIFLA] [was] not an\\ninformed-consent requirement [like in Casey] or any other regulation of professional conduct,” the Court applied\\nheightened scrutiny and held that the California law likely violated the First Amendment. Id. at 2373, 2375.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\nrequirements of the nature upheld in Casey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373, 2375.7 We therefore\\nare applying Casey and NIFLA as they directly pertain to the First Amendment claim and not to\\nany undue-burden claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n This First Amendment appeal, thus, turns on whether H.B. 2 shares the same material\\nattributes as the informed-consent statute in Casey. If it does, then no heightened First\\nAmendment scrutiny applies because, as NIFLA instructed, an informed-consent law like the\\nCasey statute is a regulation of professional conduct that only incidentally burdens professional\\nspeech. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.\\n\\n Does H.B. 2 relate to a medical procedure? Yes—abortion. Are the mandated\\ndisclosures truthful and not misleading? Yes—no one argues that the heartbeat, sonogram, or its\\ndescription is false or misleading. We have previously held that similar information conveys\\nobjective medical facts. For example, in United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2018),\\nwe explained that “it would be an insult to common sense and the practice of medicine to say\\nthat [the doctor] was not measuring facts (or attempting to do so) when he conducted the\\nangiograms at issue” in that case. Id. at 276. Similarly, we explained in Discount Tobacco City\\n& Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2011), that anatomical pictures convey\\nfacts:\\n\\n Students in biology, human-anatomy, and medical-school courses look at\\n pictures or drawings in textbooks of both healthy and damaged cells, tissues,\\n organs, organ systems, and humans because those pictures convey factual\\n information about medical conditions and biological systems. The argument that\\n a picture of a specific person or part of a person is opinion because not every\\n person or part of a person with that condition would appear the same way is\\n unpersuasive. . . . People with the same illness can and often will suffer a variety\\n of differing symptoms. But one wouldn’t say that a list of symptoms\\n\\n\\n 7The dissenters in NIFLA also recognized this key attribute of Casey’s holding. See 138 S. Ct. at 2385\\n(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the [Casey] Court considered the State’s statutory requirements, including that the\\ndoctor must inform his patient about where she could learn how to have the newborn child adopted (if carried to\\nterm) and how she could find related financial assistance. To repeat the point, [Casey] held that the State’s\\nrequirements did not violate the Constitution’s protection of free speech or its protection of a woman’s right to\\nchoose to have an abortion.” (citation omitted)).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n characterizing a particular medical condition is nonfactual and opinion-based as a\\n result.\\n\\nId. at 559 (footnote omitted). So, “[t]o belabor the obvious and conceded point,” the disclosures\\nof the heartbeat, sonogram, and its description “are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading\\ninformation.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577–78.\\n\\n That leaves the final question: are the mandated disclosures relevant to the patient’s\\ndecision whether to abort unborn life? The Supreme Court’s abortion precedent answers this\\nquestion for us.\\n\\n “Abortion is a unique act,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, that “requires a difficult and painful\\nmoral decision,” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). It is “fraught with\\nconsequences . . . for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision.” Casey,\\n505 U.S. at 852. “[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their\\nchoice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of\\nesteem can follow.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (citations omitted). Abortion also is “fraught\\nwith consequences . . . for the life or potential life that is aborted,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, in\\nwhom the State may have a significant interest, Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158, and who cannot\\nconsent to the procedure to terminate her or his life or potential life. Thus, the Supreme Court\\nhas explained that the effect of an abortion procedure on unborn life is “relevant, if not\\ndispositive” information for the patient’s decision. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added).\\n\\n With this background in mind, we hold that H.B. 2 provides relevant information. The\\ninformation conveyed by an ultrasound image, its description, and the audible beating fetal heart\\ngives a patient greater knowledge of the unborn life inside her. This also inherently provides the\\npatient with more knowledge about the effect of an abortion procedure: it shows her what, or\\nwhom, she is consenting to terminate. That this information might persuade a woman to change\\nher mind does not render it suspect under the First Amendment. It just means that it is pertinent\\nto her decision-making. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (explaining that information on abortion’s\\nimpact on unborn life “furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may\\nelect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her\\ndecision was not fully informed”).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 12\\n\\n\\n The prevalence of ultrasound-use in pregnancy also underscores the relevance of the\\nmandated sonogram of H.B. 2 to a woman’s abortion decision. Ultrasounds are ubiquitous\\nprocedures that are a part of every pregnancy and, EMW concedes, every abortion. Oral Arg. at\\n23:53–24:10; R. 3-3, PageID 111, 112–13. Indeed, ultrasounds are “routine measures in\\npregnancy [and] viewed as ‘medically necessary’ for the mother and fetus.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at\\n579. The physical invasiveness of the sonogram, as noted by the Dissent, see Dissent at 35, 46\\nn.9, therefore, is no reason to characterize the procedure as an unwarranted invasion of bodily\\nintegrity; indeed, the Dissent cites authority “finding that up to 98% of U.S. abortion facilities\\nuse an ultrasound to date the pregnancy,” id. at 46. Also, Kentucky is hardly alone among the\\nStates in finding ultrasounds to be relevant: according to amici, twenty-four other States have\\nenacted informed-consent laws that involve ultrasounds.8\\n\\n Although Casey did not involve the displaying of an ultrasound, its facts are not “a\\nconstitutional ceiling for regulation of informed consent to abortion, [but] a set of principles to\\nbe applied to the states’ legislative decisions.” Lakey, 667 F.3d at 579. The Casey statute\\nrequired doctors to inform patients of the unborn life’s gestational age and offer them materials\\nfurther describing unborn life’s development at a given gestational age. See Casey, 505 U.S. at\\n881, 902; Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575 n.2, 578; Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1349. The sonogram\\nrequirements of H.B. 2 provide “materially identical” information. See A Woman’s Choice–East\\nSide Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding informed-\\nconsent law requiring abortion doctors to offer pictures, drawings, and dimensions of the unborn\\n\\n\\n 8Three of them track more closely with H.B. 2 and require physicians to perform, display, and describe\\nultrasounds before an abortion. La. Stat. § 40:1061.10(D), invalidated by June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F.\\nSupp. 3d 27, 30 (M.D. La. 2017) (holding statute was an undue burden), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. LLC v.\\nGee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018); Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.012(a)(4); Wis. Stat. § 253.10. Seven require\\ndoctors to perform ultrasounds and offer patients the chance to view them. Ala. Code § 26-23A-6; Ariz. Rev. Stat.\\n§ 36-2156; Fla. Stat. § 390.0111; Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1.1; Iowa Code § 146A.1, invalidated by Planned Parenthood\\nof Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 N.W.2d 206, 212 (Iowa 2018) (holding 72-hour waiting period was an\\nundue burden); Miss. Code § 41-41-34; Va. Code § 18.2-76. Ten require doctors to offer the patient the chance to\\nview the ultrasound image if they perform one. Ark. Code § 20-16-602; Ga. Code § 31-9A-3; Idaho Code § 18-609;\\nKan. Stat. § 65-6709; Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.17015; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-327 (requiring doctors to display the\\nsonogram “so that the woman may choose to view [it]”); Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.561; S.C. Code § 44-41-330; Utah\\nCode § 76-7-305 (requiring doctors to display the sonogram “to permit the woman . . . to view the images, if she\\nchooses to”); W. Va. Code § 16-2I-2. Four require doctors to offer women the chance to view—and thus receive—\\nan ultrasound. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.027; N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-04; S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-52; Wyo.\\nStat. § 35-6-119.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 13\\n\\n\\nlife within patients was “materially identical” to the Casey statute’s requirements); see also\\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 578 (explaining that disclosures like those in H.B. 2 “are not different in\\nkind” than the disclosures in Casey). A sonogram depicts unborn life in further detail at the\\ncurrent gestational age—information no less relevant to the patient’s decision than were the\\nmaterials at issue in Casey. In fact, because of its individualized nature, a sonogram provides\\neven more relevant information for the patient’s decision than any of the required materials at\\nissue in Casey. Whereas the Pennsylvania law provided information about unborn life generally,\\nH.B. 2 directs that the patient receive specific, real-time images of herself and the unborn life\\nwithin her.9 H.B. 2 also allows the doctor to explain, in her or his own words, the sonogram, as\\nwell as the auscultation, thus further ensuring that the information is tailored to the patient’s\\nspecific circumstances.\\n\\n Sonograms of unborn life were uncommon when Roe was decided. Writing for the Roe\\nCourt, Justice Blackmun was limited by words on paper—sometimes using medieval\\ndescriptions such as “quickening” or “infused with a ‘soul’ or ‘animated’”—to explain when life\\nhad been understood to come into being. Roe, 410 U.S. at 133. But in the Cyber Age,10 words\\ntell only part of a story. For today’s Posterity11—the Gen-X, Millennial, and Gen-Z generations,\\nwhose first picture of themselves commonly comes from a sonogram, and who increasingly turn\\nto photos and videos to share information12—one can hardly dispute the relevance of sonogram\\nimages for twenty-first-century informed consent.\\n\\n\\n\\n 9Contrary to EMW’s assertion at oral argument, the information’s pictorial medium fails to take H.B. 2 out\\nof the realm of informed consent. See A Woman’s Choice–East Side Women’s Clinic, 305 F.3d at 684–85; see also\\nF. Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment: A Practical Guide 2-82 (5th ed. 2018) (discussing the use of videos, pictures,\\nand slides to obtain informed consent). This means of sharing information simply is more scientifically up to date.\\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 578.\\n 10See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (explaining “that the Cyber Age is a\\nrevolution of historic proportions [and that] we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter\\nhow we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be” (emphasis added)); see also South Dakota v.\\nWayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018) (discussing the Cyber Age).\\n 11U.S. Const. pmbl.\\n 12See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, While We Weren’t Looking, Snapchat Revolutionized Social Networks, N.Y.\\nTimes (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www nytimes.com/2016/11/30/technology/while-we-werent-looking-snapchat-\\nrevolutionized-social-networks.html.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 14\\n\\n\\n Under the lower level of scrutiny mandated by Casey and NIFLA, there is no burden\\nplaced on the State to justify that its prior regulation “was defective in facilitating informed\\nconsent” or that “H.B. 2 filled any gaps in existing informed-consent legislation,” as the Dissent\\napparently believes the State must show, see Dissent at 48, 52. No such requirements were\\nimposed on Pennsylvania to justify its statute in Casey. But even if the Commonwealth bore\\nsuch a burden, it would easily meet it here. It is not difficult to conclude that the particularized\\nvisual and audible disclosures mandated by H.B. 2 provide more relevant information for\\ninformed consent than was provided by the less patient-specific, verbal and written disclosures of\\nthe earlier Kentucky abortion-informed-consent statute, KRS § 311.725.\\n\\n In sum, H.B. 2, like the Pennsylvania statute in Casey, provides truthful, non-misleading,\\nand relevant information aimed at informing a patient about her decision to abort unborn life.\\nTherefore, although the statute requires doctors to disclose certain truthful and non-misleading\\ninformation relevant to the abortion procedure, it does not violate their First Amendment rights\\nbecause the required disclosures are incidental to the Commonwealth’s regulation of doctors’\\nprofessional conduct.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n This result is in line with two other circuits that have faced First Amendment challenges\\nto similar abortion-informed-consent statutes. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits read Casey, as well\\nas Gonzales, to establish the same First Amendment test for truthful, non-misleading, and\\nrelevant informed-consent disclosures that we apply here.\\n\\n In Lakey, the Fifth Circuit addressed a Texas informed-consent statute requiring the\\nperformance, display, and description of an ultrasound as well as the auscultation of the unborn\\nlife’s heartbeat. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 574\\n(5th Cir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge to the statute,\\nexplaining that Casey upheld the constitutionality of informed-consent laws that require\\ndisclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information, including facts about the unborn\\nlife, with no heightened scrutiny applying to such laws:\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 15\\n\\n\\n First, informed consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on the woman’s\\n right to have an abortion are permissible if they require truthful, non-misleading,\\n and relevant disclosures. Second, such laws are part of the state’s reasonable\\n regulation of medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of compelling\\n “ideological” speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny. Third,\\n “relevant” informed consent may entail not only the physical and psychological\\n risks to the expectant mother facing this “difficult moral decision,” but also the\\n state’s legitimate interests in “protecting the potential life within her.”\\n\\nLakey, 667 F.3d at 576 (footnote omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 871).\\n\\n Applying this understanding of Casey, the Fifth Circuit held that requirements that\\ndoctors perform, display, and describe the ultrasound and auscultate the heartbeat—though more\\ntechnologically advanced than the mandated disclosure that Casey allowed—were the “epitome”\\nof truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information that Casey permits:\\n\\n To belabor the obvious and conceded point, the required disclosures of a\\n sonogram, the fetal heartbeat, and their medical descriptions are the epitome of\\n truthful, non-misleading information. They are not different in kind, although\\n more graphic and scientifically up-to-date, than the disclosures discussed in\\n Casey—probable gestational age of the fetus and printed material showing a\\n baby’s general prenatal development stages. Likewise, the relevance of these\\n disclosures to securing informed consent is sustained by Casey and Gonzales,\\n because both cases allow the state to regulate medical practice by deciding that\\n information about fetal development is “relevant” to a woman’s decision-making.\\n\\nId. at 577–78 (emphasis added).\\n\\n Because the Texas statute at issue in Lakey satisfied the criteria for an abortion-informed-\\nconsent statute (that is, the statute mandated only truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\\ndisclosures related to an abortion), the Fifth Circuit determined that no heightened scrutiny of the\\nstatute was warranted under Casey and reversed the district court’s determination otherwise:\\n\\n The [Casey] plurality response to the compelled speech claim is clearly\\n not a strict scrutiny analysis. It inquires into neither compelling interests nor\\n narrow tailoring. The three sentences with which the Court disposed of the First\\n Amendment claims are, if anything, the antithesis of strict scrutiny. Indeed, the\\n plurality references Whalen v. Roe, in which the Court had upheld a regulation of\\n medical practice against a right to privacy challenge. The only reasonable reading\\n of Casey’s passage is that physicians’ rights not to speak are, when part of the\\n practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 16\\n\\n\\n This applies to information that is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant . . . to the\\n decision to undergo an abortion.\\n ....\\n\\n Applying to [the statute] the principles of Casey’s plurality, the most\\n reasonable conclusion is to uphold the provisions declared as unconstitutional\\n compelled speech by the district court.\\n\\nId. at 575, 577 (cleaned up).\\n\\n When faced with an analogous issue, the Eighth Circuit read the Supreme Court’s\\nprecedent similarly. The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Rounds involved a South Dakota informed-\\nconsent statute. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.\\n2008) (en banc). The statute required physicians to give patients a written statement providing,\\namong other things, “[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique,\\nliving human being,” “[t]hat the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with that unborn\\nhuman being and that the relationship enjoys protection under the United States Constitution and\\nthe laws of South Dakota,” “[t]hat by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her\\nexisting constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be terminated,” and “[a]\\ndescription of all known medical risks of the procedure . . . including . . . [d]epression and related\\npsychological distress [and] [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.” Id. The statute\\ndefined “Human being” as “an individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens,\\nincluding the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization\\nto full gestation.” Id. at 727. The statute further required physicians to certify in writing that\\nthey provided all this information to the patients. Id. Also, the patients had to sign a written\\nstatement showing that the abortion doctors had complied with the statute’s disclosure\\nrequirements and provided them with the required information. Id.\\n\\n Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit explained that Supreme Court precedent likely allowed\\nthe statute to stand because it mandated the doctor provide only “truthful, non-misleading\\ninformation relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion”:\\n\\n Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an\\n individual simply to speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its\\n regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 17\\n\\n\\n information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that\\n information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.\\n Therefore, Planned Parenthood cannot succeed on the merits of its claim that [the\\n statute] violates a physician’s right not to speak unless it can show that the\\n disclosure is either untruthful, misleading or not relevant to the patient’s decision\\n to have an abortion.\\n\\nId. at 734–35. Because Planned Parenthood’s evidence did not establish a likelihood of proving\\nthat the statute required “anything but truthful, non-misleading and relevant [information] to the\\npatient’s decision to have an abortion,” the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary\\ninjunction. Id. at 738.\\n\\n The Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretations of Casey support our holding today. Like\\nthe statutes in those circuits’ cases, H.B. 2 provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\\ninformation for a decision whether to abort unborn life. Like these other circuits, we find no\\nFirst Amendment infirmity.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n In challenging H.B. 2, EMW echoes Planned Parenthood’s unsuccessful arguments in\\nCasey. EMW contends that H.B. 2 warrants heightened scrutiny because it (1) compels\\nideological speech, (2) interferes with the doctor-patient relationship, and (3) emotionally affects\\npatients.\\n\\n Ideological Speech. Casey forecloses EMW’s attempt to invoke heightened scrutiny by\\nclaiming that H.B. 2 requires the doctors to engage in ideological speech. The statute in Casey\\nrequired doctors to disclose facts about the abortion procedure, the unborn life within a patient,\\nand options available to a patient if she carried that life to term. Planned Parenthood argued that\\nthe statute mandated ideological speech that warranted heighted scrutiny. Brief of Petitioners\\nand Cross-Respondents, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No. 91-744), 1992 WL 12006398 at *54\\n(“Casey Br.”). The Casey plurality acknowledged that the disclosure requirements were targeted\\nat causing patients to “choose childbirth over abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. Yet, the\\nplurality applied no heightened scrutiny to Pennsylvania’s statute because of the alleged\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 18\\n\\n\\nideological nature of the required disclosures. So Casey rejected EMW’s rationale for applying\\nheightened scrutiny.13\\n\\n The Fourth Circuit, however, disagreed that Casey forecloses the ideological argument.\\nIn Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), decided before NIFLA, the Fourth Circuit\\nstruck down as compelled ideological speech a North Carolina statute similar to H.B. 2. Id. at\\n246, 255–56. We decline to follow Stuart, however, because it gave insufficient regard to the\\nFirst Amendment analysis in Casey that the Court clarified and adopted as the majority view in\\nNIFLA.\\n\\n Stuart’s basis for applying heightened scrutiny is called into question by Supreme Court\\nprecedent. Stuart applied heightened scrutiny because the facts disclosed by a sonogram have\\n“moral or ideological implications.” Id. at 246. However, the “moral or ideological” label has\\nnot been used by the Supreme Court as a reason to apply heightened scrutiny to mandated factual\\ndisclosures in the informed-consent context. Nor has the Supreme Court considered on what\\n“side of the abortion debate” required factual disclosures fall in deciding the level of scrutiny to\\napply to abortion-informed-consent laws, as did the Fourth Circuit, see id.14 And unlike the\\nFourth Circuit, the Supreme Court has not been concerned that facts might “convey[] a particular\\nopinion” like “convinc[ing] women seeking abortions to change their minds.” Id.\\n\\n\\n 13Contrary to what the Dissent maintains, a State is entitled to regulate informed consent with respect to\\nthe abortion even when it has a political “goal” to protect unborn life. See Dissent at 53. The Casey joint opinion\\nmade that point clear when it allowed for mandated disclosures intended by the State to further its “profound interest\\nin potential life” and “to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.” See 505 U.S. at 878 (“To promote\\nthe State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the\\nwoman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their\\npurpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”).\\n 14It is not at all clear that the facts mandated to be disclosed by an H.B. 2 sonogram fall on only one side of\\nthe abortion debate. For example, abortions are increasingly sought to terminate lives likely to be born with\\ndisabilities. See Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (granting a preliminary\\ninjunction against an Ohio law criminalizing abortions performed because of fetal indication of Down Syndrome),\\nappeal docketed, No. 18-3329 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 2018); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind.\\nState Dep’t of Health, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (granting a permanent injunction against a similar law),\\naff’d, 888 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3172 (Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 18-483); Julian\\nQuinones & Arijeta Lajka, “What Kind of Society Do You Want to Live In?”: Inside the Country Where Down\\nSyndrome is Disappearing, CBS News (Aug. 14, 2007, 4:00 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/down-syndrome-\\niceland/?linkId=40953194. An ultrasound showing the likelihood of a disability could be interpreted by some\\npeople, but not all, as a reason to have an abortion.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 19\\n\\n\\n Instead, under Casey, what matters for First Amendment purposes is whether the\\ndisclosed facts are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the procedure, not whether they fall\\non one side of the debate, and not whether they influence a woman to keep the child. Casey, 505\\nU.S. at 882–84; see also Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575–77; Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35. In Stuart the\\nFourth Circuit tried to distinguish Casey by reasoning that the Casey statute was not ideological:\\n“[i]nforming a patient that there are state-issued materials available is not ideological, because\\nthe viewpoint conveyed by the pamphlet is clearly the state’s—not the physician’s.” Stuart,\\n774 F.3d at 253. But the same is true here. H.B. 2 allows doctors to tell patients that the\\nCommonwealth requires this information. The record shows that’s exactly what they do. R. 55,\\nPageID 699. Thus, the doctors are just as free as those subject to the statute in Casey to clarify\\nthat the mandated disclosures come from the State not the doctors themselves.\\n\\n After holding that the North Carolina statute compelled ideological speech, the Fourth\\nCircuit in Stuart adopted a “sliding-scale” test first applied by the Ninth Circuit in Pickup v.\\nBrown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–29 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding professional speech is viewed “along a\\ncontinuum”). The Fourth Circuit then asserted the statute “reside[d] somewhere in the middle on\\nthat sliding scale” because it regulated medical treatment but also regulated speech, Stuart,\\n774 F.3d at 248, thus justifying intermediate scrutiny, id. at 249. This “sliding scale” test based\\non ideological speech, however, appeared nowhere in Casey.\\n\\n Nor did this test appear in NIFLA. In fact, the NIFLA Court, after citing the Ninth Circuit\\nin Pickup as an example of “[s]ome Courts of Appeals” that “have recognized ‘professional\\nspeech’ as a separate category of speech that is subject to different rules,” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at\\n2371, did not adopt any of the “different rules” applied in Pickup. Instead, the Court explained\\nthat, generally, it is the compulsion of a message—not whether the compulsion is of an\\nideological nature—that alters the content of speech and therefore dictates a single heightened-\\nscrutiny standard, with no sliding scale. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. However, as discussed,\\nthe Supreme Court explicitly carved out two exceptions to that general test that do not call for\\nheightened scrutiny. As also already explained, H.B. 2 falls into at least one of those exceptions.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 20\\n\\n\\n We therefore find that Stuart is unpersuasive in light of NIFLA, and we decline to follow\\nthe Fourth Circuit.15 If at least one of the two exceptions noted in NIFLA applies, there is no\\nSupreme Court authority for looking to whether the speech has ideological implications and\\napplying a “sliding scale” that may result in intermediate scrutiny.\\n\\n Doctor-Patient Relationship. As for EMW’s second argument, H.B. 2 does not interfere\\nwith the doctor-patient relationship any more than other informed-consent laws. “[I]nformed\\nconsent is generally required for medical treatment,” Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department\\nof Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990), and this requirement “is firmly entrenched in American tort\\nlaw,” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he\\ncommon-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a\\ncompetent individual to refuse medical treatment.” Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277. This right,\\ngrounded in principles of self-determination, may “demand[] a standard set by law for physicians\\nrather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.” Canterbury v.\\nSpence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasis added); see F. Rozovsky, Consent to\\nTreatment: A Practical Guide 2-8 (5th ed. 2018) (explaining that informed-consent standards are\\nset by “state legislation, regulations, and case law” in addition to standards among professional\\ngroups).16 “[T]o safeguard the patient’s interest in achieving [her or] his own determination on\\ntreatment, the law must itself set the standard for adequate disclosure.” Canterbury, 464 F.2d at\\n787.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15The district court also relied largely on Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir.\\n2017) (en banc), which invalidated a Florida law restricting doctors from asking patients about gun ownership in\\npart because of concerns over interrupting the flow of information between doctor and patient. Id. at 1313. Those\\nconcerns are not present here: H.B. 2 serves to increase the flow of information between doctor and patient. Also,\\nunlike the statute in Wollschlaeger, H.B. 2 restricts no speech that the doctor wishes to impart to the patient. More\\nimportant, however, Wollschlaeger did not involve patients’ informed consent.\\n 16The Supreme Court has cited earlier editions of this treatise. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 21\\n\\n\\n The principle that informed-consent requirements may be created by law, as opposed to\\nmerely medical-profession custom, applies to all medical procedures, including abortion. As the\\nSupreme Court has instructed, “an informed-consent requirement in the abortion context [is] ‘no\\ndifferent from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical\\nprocedure.’” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).\\n“The law need not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical practice,\\nnor should it elevate their status above other physicians in the medical community.” Id. As part\\nof States’ regulation of the medical profession, they may require doctors to provide information\\nto their patients to ensure patients can give their informed consent for an abortion, like for any\\nother medical procedure. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.\\n\\n The district court cited testimony that the mandated disclosures of H.B. 2 are inconsistent\\nwith medical standards because (1) their mandatory nature—that is, the Commonwealth’s\\nrequiring their actual disclosure rather than requiring their being offered to be disclosed—makes\\nthem contrary to the customary standard of care for informed consent, and (2) they provide\\ninformation that the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) and the\\nNational Abortion Federation do not consider to be necessary for informed consent. See EMW\\nWomen’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 644.\\n\\n As for the first point, most legally enacted informed-consent disclosures could be subject\\nto the same criticism because they require the doctor to disclose, rather than simply offer to\\ndisclose, information.17 The Casey plurality explained that States can require doctors to give\\ninformation to patients about abortion just like it can require doctors to give information to an\\norgan donor about that procedure. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. Also, the very reason that the\\nrequired disclosure in NIFLA did “not facilitate informed consent” was because it provided no\\ninformation about the risks or benefits of a medical procedure. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. In\\nother words, the doctrine of informed consent does not stop at offering the opportunity for the\\n\\n 17For example, other Kentucky informed-consent and physician-disclosure requirements require\\ninformation actually to be given when (1) diagnosing and treating breast cancer, KRS § 311.935; (2) performing\\nacupuncture, KRS § 311.678; (3) testing for HIV infection, KRS § 214.625; and (4) performing mammograms,\\nKRS § 214.555. An example of this at the federal level is 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.257–.258, which requires medical\\nproviders actually disclose—not just offer to disclose—the risks, benefits, and alternatives of sterilization\\nprocedures to ensure a patient’s informed consent to be sterilized.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 22\\n\\n\\ninformation. It applies equally when a doctor must actually disclose the information. True, for\\nsome information, the Casey statute required doctors to inform patients that it was available. See\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 881. But it also mandated information actually be given to patients. Id.\\nH.B. 2 is no different.18\\n\\n The second point considered significant by the district court—certain medical groups’\\nviews regarding whether a particular mandated truthful disclosure is necessary for informed\\nconsent—is not the type of evidence deemed material by the Supreme Court in reviewing\\nabortion-informed-consent statutes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld abortion regulations\\nthat were directly contrary to alleged medical-profession custom and that certain medical groups\\ndid not consider to be necessary—laws that those groups asserted were inconsistent with\\naccepted standards of care for informed consent. For example, in Casey, the district court found\\nthat “[t]he informed consent requirements of the [Pennsylvania law] represent a substantial\\ndeparture from the ordinary medical requirements of informed consent,” Casey, 744 F. Supp. at\\n1351; that “[c]ontent-based informed consent is contrary to the standard medical practice that\\ninformed consent be specifically tailored to the needs of the specific patient,” id. at 1353; and\\nthat various provisions of the Pennsylvania law conflicted with official positions of ACOG and\\nthe American Public Health Association, see id. at 1351–52, 1355, 1360. Still, the Supreme\\nCourt in Casey upheld the law’s informed-consent requirements. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.\\n\\n Similarly, in Gonzales, the Court upheld a statute prohibiting a form of partial-birth\\nabortions, despite the district court’s factual findings that the law was contrary to certain\\nmedical-profession views, including that ACOG “told Congress several times that the procedure\\n\\n 18The district court’s first point also overlooks that H.B. 2 allows patients to decline to receive the\\ninformation, by not viewing the sonogram or listening to the verbal disclosures, and asking the doctors to turn off\\nthe heartbeat. In fact, that H.B. 2 provides patients with the choice not to receive the information is the very reason\\nthe district court held that H.B. 2 does not go far enough to meet Kentucky’s goal of informing the patients. EMW\\nWomen’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 645–46. In other words, according to the district court, if the Kentucky\\nlegislature wished to better inform patients about their abortion procedure, it should have required the patients\\nreceive the information, rather than allowing them to choose not to do so. We disagree with this conclusion. That\\nH.B. 2 allows women to avoid receiving the disclosures does not detract from the statute’s purpose to better inform;\\nit merely reflects the Commonwealth’s recognition that, ultimately, it is the woman’s choice as to whether to\\nconsider those disclosures in making her decision. And even if the disclosures do not change many minds, either\\nbecause some patients are not persuaded by them or because some patients ignore them, the Commonwealth still is\\nentitled under Casey to require doctors to provide them. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–84; Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575–77;\\nRounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 23\\n\\n\\nshould not be banned,” Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1011 (D. Neb. 2004), and “that\\nCongress’[s] Finding—that a medical consensus supports the ban because partial-birth abortions\\nare unnecessary—is both unreasonable and not supported by substantial evidence,” id. at 1015.\\n\\n If the validity of an informed-consent law depended on whether doctors agreed with the\\nlaw—or whether the law required disclosures that, with no law, the doctor would disclose\\nanyway—there would be no need for the law to supplement custom. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d\\nat 784 (“[T]o bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to arrogate the decision on\\nrevelation to the physician alone.”). As Casey and Gonzales establish, the constitutionality of an\\nabortion regulation is based on the relevant legal standard as interpreted by the Supreme Court—\\nhere, whether the mandated disclosures are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the medical\\nprocedure—and not necessarily whether the law is consistent with medical-profession custom or\\nviews of certain medical groups.\\n\\n The Dissent, therefore, is mistaken to argue that we “must naturally turn to the medical\\ncommunity” to ascertain the “contours of informed consent” to determine whether a regulation is\\nin accord with “medical practice” or “medical purpose.” Dissent at 37. Following that approach\\nwould require us, in effect, to hold that a State must surrender its authority to regulate informed\\nconsent to private parties. This method, however, would conflict with the Court’s recognition in\\nGonzales that the State may regulate informed consent in the abortion context in the same way\\nthat it regulates informed consent in other medical contexts. See 550 U.S. at 163. The validity\\nof this regulation does not turn on what any private party claims is the norm for the practice of\\nmedicine. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784, 787. Instead, we defer to the legislature’s\\ndetermination of which informed-consent disclosures are required, provided that they are\\nrelevant, truthful, and non-misleading. This deference does not make our court a player in policy\\nmaking, as the Dissent contends, see Dissent at 44, but rather preserves our role as umpires who\\napply the rules enacted by the People’s representatives. If the medical groups cited by the\\nDissent want the legislated rules of informed consent to change, they should address their\\narguments to those elected representatives. Casey makes clear, however, that the Dissent is\\nincorrect to contend that opposition by medical groups to informed-consent rules necessarily\\nrenders those rules invalid under the First Amendment.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 24\\n\\n\\n The reasoning in Casey also shows that H.B. 2 does not impermissibly infringe on\\nabortion doctors’ autonomy. Indeed, as noted, the Casey plurality overruled the Court’s earlier\\nholdings that requiring doctors to give certain information to all patients impermissibly intruded\\nupon doctors’ discretion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881; Thornburgh v. American Coll. of\\nObstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986).\\n\\n To be sure, H.B. 2 does require the disclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant\\nfacts that otherwise the doctor might not disclose. However, to the extent that it matters to the\\nFirst Amendment analysis,19 nothing prevents the doctor from informing the patient that the\\nfactual disclosures of H.B.2 are required by the Commonwealth rather than made by the doctor’s\\nchoice. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (rejecting argument that\\nregulations abridged free-speech rights of the grantee’s staff and noting that “[n]othing in [the\\nregulations] requires a doctor to represent as [her or] his own any opinion that [she or] he does\\nnot in fact hold”); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 1994)\\n(upholding abortion-informed-consent statute and observing that it allowed doctors to\\n“disassociate themselves” from the required information).\\n\\n It is also true that H.B. 2 differs from the Pennsylvania statute in Casey in that H.B. 2\\ndoes not have an express provision, as did the Casey statute, excusing a doctor from providing\\nthe mandated disclosure “if he or she can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that\\nhe or she reasonably believed that furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely\\nadverse effect on the physical or mental health of the patient.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84.\\nAlthough the Casey joint opinion noted this statutory provision in the context of discussing “a\\nconstitutional right of privacy between a pregnant woman and her physician,” id. at 883, there is\\nno indication that the plurality considered the provision to be significant for its First Amendment\\nreview. To the extent that it was, we also must consider that a doctor need not comply with H.B.\\n2 if an abortion is medically necessary or in the case of a medical emergency, KRS § 311.727(5),\\nand H.B. 2 has other provisions not contained in the Casey statute that effectively give the doctor\\nthe same discretion afforded to doctors under the Casey statute. For example, unlike the Casey\\n\\n 19See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 737 (concluding doctor’s ability to disassociate herself or himself from\\ndisclosures is irrelevant to the compelled-speech analysis if disclosures are truthful and non-misleading).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 25\\n\\n\\nstatute, H.B. 2 imposes no obligation that the patient certify in writing that she has received\\ncertain mandated disclosures, see id. at 881, or even requires that the patient pay attention to the\\ndisclosures, and it imposes no penalty on the doctor if the patient ignores the disclosures the\\ndoctor is making, see KRS § 311.727(3). These provisions operate to allow a doctor who\\nreasonably believes that the disclosures would result in a severely adverse effect on the patient,\\nto inform the patient in the doctor’s discretion that she need not listen to or view the disclosures.\\n\\n Furthermore, H.B. 2 restricts no doctor from advising the patient to keep or abort the\\nunborn life displayed or from providing any other opinion, medical or otherwise, that the doctor\\nwishes to convey. See generally Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th\\nCir. 2017) (en banc) (“Importantly, however, the law [at issue in other cases] did not restrict\\nwhat the practitioner could say or recommend to a patient or client.” (emphasis added)). Indeed,\\nthe statute contains nothing that would prevent a doctor in her or his discretion from advocating\\nto the patient in favor of an abortion.\\n\\n Given these considerations, the requirements of H.B. 2 are no more of a regulation that\\ndeparted from a medical group’s definition of medical practice than the abortion-informed-\\nconsent law upheld in Casey and no more of a regulation of professional speech than many\\ninformed-consent and physician-disclosure laws enacted by Kentucky, other States, and the\\nfederal government.20\\n\\n Emotional Effect on Patients. As for EMW’s third argument—that the emotional effect\\nof H.B. 2 on patients warrants heightened scrutiny—Casey again is instructive. In that case, the\\ndistrict court accepted Planned Parenthood’s similar argument and held that the Pennsylvania\\ninformed-consent statute did not survive heightened scrutiny because the mandated information\\n“will create the impression in women that the Commonwealth disapproves of the woman’s\\ndecision” and “will create undesirable and unnecessary anxiety, anguish and fear.” Casey,\\n744 F. Supp. at 1354. In this regard, the district court’s factual finding in Casey was like the\\ndistrict court’s finding here, based on evidence cited by the Dissent, see Dissent at 49–50, that\\n\\n 20See supra note 17. Other examples of Kentucky mandating speech in the health-care context occur when\\n(1) reporting tuberculosis, KRS § 215.590; (2) reporting abuse of adults and dependents, KRS §§ 209.030, 620.030;\\n(3) displaying licenses, KRS § 311.470; and, of course, (4) performing an abortion, KRS §§ 311.725, 311.727.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 26\\n\\n\\n“H.B. 2 causes patients distress.” EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 645. We\\nrecognize the significance of the district court’s finding regarding the negative emotional effect\\non certain patients, as well as its acknowledgment of declarations from several women who had\\nundergone abortions and who stated that the mandated disclosures of H.B. 2 would have had a\\npositive impact on their emotional health by persuading them not to have an abortion. R. 32-3,\\nPageID 406–08; R. 32-4, PageID 410; R. 32-5, PageID 412–14. However, for purposes of this\\nsummary judgment determination, we need not and should not weigh the competing evidence of\\nemotional effect, as the district court and Dissent appear to do.21 Instead, the Casey plurality did\\nnot view any finding regarding emotional effect as material to the level of First Amendment\\nscrutiny of an informed-consent statute. Although the Casey district court’s finding as to\\nemotional effect was quoted by Planned Parenthood in its brief to the Supreme Court, see Casey\\nBr. at *52, the controlling opinion in Casey did not make any note of this finding in its analysis\\nof the doctors’ First Amendment challenge. Instead, without mentioning emotional effect on\\npatients at all, the Casey plurality reversed the district court’s judgment that struck down the\\ninformed-consent statute.\\n\\n\\n\\n 21The Dissent states that “the Commonwealth did not controvert” testimony from a Texas resident against\\nH.B. 2 based upon the emotional impact on her from disclosures required by a Texas informed-consent statute.\\nDissent at 35, 47. True, the Commonwealth did not dispute that particular patient’s experience, but it is not accurate\\nto conclude that the evidence of the emotional effect of the H.B. 2 disclosures is uncontroverted based on that\\ntestimony. To the contrary, several Kentucky residents submitted declarations attesting to beneficial emotional\\neffects they would have experienced from disclosures mandated by H.B. 2 had they received them. R. 32-3, PageID\\n406–08; R. 32-4, PageID 410; R. 32-5, PageID 412–14. For example, one patient stated that if she had received the\\ninformation required by H.B. 2, she “would never have gone through with the procedure” and that having not\\nreceived that information makes her regret of the abortion “even more painful.” R. 32-3, PageID 407. The\\nDissent’s and district court’s discounting of this testimony and other evidence submitted by the Commonwealth\\nregarding emotional effect appears to involve the weighing of proof and credibility determinations not appropriate\\nfor summary judgment. Dissent at 50; see Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 168 (6th Cir. 2011) (“When\\nreviewing a summary judgment motion, credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited.”\\n(quotation omitted)); Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n summary judgment,\\nneither the district court nor this Court may make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” (citation\\nomitted)). Unlike in Casey, where the district court made its findings of fact after a bench trial, Casey, 505 U.S. at\\n845; Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1325–26, the district court here was ruling on summary judgment, see EMW Women’s\\nSurgical Center, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 648, and therefore was not permitted to make findings of fact based on the\\ndisputed evidence. And we further note that on cross-motions for summary judgment this court must review the\\nissues of material fact in the light most favorable to the party whose motion did not prevail in the district court. See\\nB.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 598 (6th Cir. 2001). However, as explained above, ultimately\\nfact issues regarding emotional effect on patients are not material to resolution of the relevant First Amendment\\nissue of whether the disclosures of H.B. 2 are truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to an abortion.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 27\\n\\n\\n Casey thus implicitly recognized that discomfort to the patient from the mandated\\ndisclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information does not make an informed-\\nconsent law invalid under the First Amendment. Indeed, discomfort may be a byproduct of\\ninformed consent itself. See generally Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (“Any number of patients\\nfacing imminent surgical procedures would prefer not to hear all details, lest the usual anxiety\\npreceding invasive medical procedures become the more intense.”). This may be especially true\\nin the abortion context. For, as the Supreme Court has explained, “[a]bortion is inherently\\ndifferent from other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful\\ntermination of a potential life.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).\\n\\n Providing sonogram and auscultation results to the patient furthers the State’s legitimate\\ninterest, recognized in Casey, of ensuring that the patient understands the full implications of her\\ndecision, including the impact on unborn life. Under Casey, the State may decide that its interest\\nin having the unborn life actually be seen and heard before being aborted, and potential negative\\nemotional consequences to the patient from not having received that disclosure, justify the\\nincidental regulation of professional speech and outweigh the risk of negative emotional impact\\non the patient from the disclosure (even assuming the latter consideration is relevant to the First\\nAmendment analysis and was a permissible finding for summary judgment given the disputed\\nfactual record). This conclusion follows from Casey’s reasoning that the State has “an important\\ninterest in potential life,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882,22 and that there is the risk to the patient’s\\npsychological health from having made such a profound decision without adequate disclosure of\\nits consequences, including the impact on unborn life, beforehand:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22See also Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157 (emphasizing that a State “may use its voice and its regulatory\\nauthority to show its profound respect for the life within the woman”); id. at 158 (“[T]he State may use its regulatory\\npower to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the\\nmedical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.”).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 28\\n\\n\\n It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health. Nor can\\n it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the impact on\\n the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a\\n woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the\\n legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only\\n to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision\\n was not fully informed.\\n\\nCasey, 505 U.S. at 882.\\n\\n EMW has offered no Supreme Court authority to contradict Casey’s teaching. At oral\\nargument, EMW cited only Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), as support for our considering\\nthe impact of H.B. 2 on the listening patients as part of the First Amendment analysis. Hill\\nexplained that the effect of certain speech on unwilling listeners can be a factor when\\ndetermining whether restricting speech is constitutional. See 530 U.S. at 716 (“[T]he protection\\nafforded to offensive messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that\\nthe unwilling audience cannot avoid it.”). Hill, however, did not involve a situation where, as\\nhere, no speech—fact or opinion—is restricted. The only issue here is whether the government\\nmay compel more disclosures of a strictly truthful, non-misleading, and relevant nature.23\\n\\n More fundamentally, though, Hill is distinguishable because it did not involve informed\\nconsent to a medical procedure. Hill concerned speech to people on public streets and sidewalks\\nwithin 100 feet of health-care facilities. 530 U.S. at 707. The informed-consent exception to\\nheightened scrutiny simply did not apply, as NIFLA confirms. Because H.B. 2, like the Casey\\nstatute, provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information about an abortion, it helps\\n\\n 23Hill also explained that a reason we allow protestors to display vulgar language is because viewers can\\navert their eyes to avoid more offense. 530 U.S. at 716 (citation omitted). The information provided by H.B. 2 is\\nnot vulgar speech, but still, if the patient desires not to receive the information mandated by H.B. 2, she may avert\\nher eyes from the ultrasound image, not listen to the doctor’s description of the image, and ask the doctor to turn off\\nthe heartbeat. See Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (rejecting\\nunwilling-listener challenge to abortion-informed-consent statute because the statute did not require the patient to\\nlisten). Unlike in Casey and Rounds, this appeal involves no challenge to H.B. 2 as an undue burden on a woman’s\\nsubstantive due process right to choose an abortion. The only challenge here is alleged unconstitutional compelled\\nspeech of the abortion doctors. We must be careful, therefore, not to upset Casey’s balance between States’ ability\\nto regulate the medical profession and women’s rights. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577 (“If the disclosures are truthful\\nand non-misleading, and if they would not violate the woman’s privacy right under the Casey plurality opinion, then\\nAppellees would, by means of their First Amendment claim, essentially trump the balance Casey struck between\\nwomen’s rights and the states’ prerogatives. Casey, however, rejected any such clash of rights in the informed\\nconsent context.”).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 29\\n\\n\\nensure informed consent to that procedure. It therefore is not subject to heightened scrutiny and\\ncomplies with the First Amendment under NIFLA and Casey.\\n\\n VI.\\n\\n Finally, a few words in response to the Dissent’s conclusion, based on physician\\ntestimony that is disputed by other physician testimony, 24 that H.B. 2 “would require physicians\\nto harm their patients with ‘no medical purpose,’” id. at 37, and the Dissent’s statement that “[i]t\\nis transparent that furthering informed consent was not the aim of the Commonwealth—nor will\\nit be achieved by H.B. 2,” id. at 52.\\n\\n First, in order to make the claim that informed consent is a pretextual and not the actual\\nreason for H.B. 2, the Dissent engages in a methodology that we respectfully submit is\\ninconsistent with Casey. The Dissent argues that “H.B. 2 is not coterminous with the medical\\npractice of informed consent. It should not receive deferential review because it regulates the\\ncontent of physician speech, not the practice of medicine.” Dissent at 44.\\n\\n The Dissent’s approach departs from with how the Casey joint opinion reviewed the\\ninformed-consent statute in that case. The plurality considered mandated informed-consent\\ndisclosures regarding unborn life to be an incidental regulation of professional speech that was\\n\\n 24In addressing standard-of-care issues, such as whether H.B. 2 “cause[s] patient harm,” whether it has a\\n“medical purpose,” and whether it “facilitates informed consent as part of the practice of medicine,” Dissent at 35,\\nthe Dissent and district court again appear to make credibility determinations and to weigh the evidence in a manner\\nthat is contrary to the summary judgment standard. It is not undisputed that H.B. 2 is “at odds with the prevailing\\nstandard of care,” as the Dissent contends. See Dissent at 35. To the contrary, the Commonwealth’s experts (John\\nW. Seeds, M.D., FACOG, the retired chair of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Virginia\\nCommonwealth University, and W. David Hager, M.D., FACOG, an obstetrician and gynecologist who practices in\\nLexington, Kentucky) submitted declarations that H.B. 2 complies with existing standards of medical care. See\\ngenerally R. 32-1; R. 32-2. For example, Dr. Seeds stated: “Far from impairing the physician-patient relationship,\\nthe Act simply conforms the law to the existing national standards of care for the diagnosis of pregnancy and the\\nobtaining of a knowing and voluntary consent of the patient before the pregnancy is surgically or medically\\nterminated through elective abortion.” R. 32-1, PageID 363. We also note that Dr. Seeds offered this expert opinion\\nwith the understanding that the disclosures required by H.B. 2 are mandatory. Id. at 349. The district court\\nacknowledged Dr. Seeds’s (and Dr. Hager’s) opinion “that H.B. 2 conforms to existing national standards of care,”\\nEMW Women’s Surgical Center, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 643, but then dismissed that testimony as “undermined by the\\ntestimony given at the hearing” by EMW’s witnesses, id. Such weighing of evidence regarding national standards\\nof care appears inappropriate at summary judgment, but ultimately a factual finding in this area is not material to the\\nrelevant legal issue. As explained above, the First Amendment analysis of an informed-consent statute turns on\\nwhether the mandated disclosure is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant, not whether the disclosure is, or is not,\\ncurrently embodied in the customary standard of medical care.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 30\\n\\n\\nengaged in as “part of the practice of medicine.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373. In Casey, as here,\\ncertain private medical organizations argued, and the district court found, that the mandated\\ndisclosures were inconsistent with informed-consent custom. But that argument and lower court\\nfinding did not cause the Casey plurality to conclude that the disclosures were somehow not part\\nof the practice of medicine and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny. Nor did Casey question\\nthe motives of the legislature. Instead, the plurality accepted as “legitimate” that the legislature\\nmay have the motive of “protecting the life of the unborn” in fashioning informed-consent\\nrequirements for the abortion procedure. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. This motive did not\\ncall for heightened scrutiny in Casey. Nor should it in this case.\\n\\n Furthermore, the reasoning in Casey establishes that H.B. 2 does indeed legitimately\\nfacilitate informed consent and serve a medical purpose that does not harm the patient. To give\\nthe patient more information that is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to a medical procedure\\nis the epitome of ensuring informed consent. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; Lakey, 667 F.3d at\\n579; Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735. A sonogram and heartbeat auscultation of the unborn life inside\\nthe patient are disclosures directly pertinent to whether to obtain a procedure to abort that unborn\\nlife. If we were to hold that a State may not require such disclosures, we would essentially be\\nconcluding that women must be shielded and protected from this up-to-date medical information,\\nthat women are unable to or should not be required to process it. This conclusion is incompatible\\nwith the concept of personal choice under Casey. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84; Lakey, 667\\nF.3d at 579 (“Denying [a woman] up to date medical information is more of an abuse to her\\nability to decide than providing the information.”). Casey recognized that a State may require a\\nphysician to inform the patient of the impact on unborn life and that facts relating to this impact\\nare among the disclosures that may be part of informed consent for an abortion.\\n\\n VII.\\n\\n Shifting from the First Amendment to the Eleventh, General Beshear argues that he is not\\na proper party to this matter. “[A] suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is\\nbarred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” Pennhurst State Sch. &\\nHosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984) (citation omitted). That said, one “important\\nexception” exists for suits “challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action.” Id.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 31\\n\\n\\n(citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)) (emphasis added). The district court held that\\nGeneral Beshear falls into this exception because he has the “necessary authority” to enforce\\nH.B. 2. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 283 F. Supp. 3d at 647–48. But General Beshear argues\\nthat “an attorney general’s status as the chief law enforcement officer of the state is not a\\nsufficient connection” to fall into this exception. We agree with him.\\n\\n State officials who are “clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws\\nof the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings . . . to enforce against\\nparties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a\\nFederal court of equity from such action.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added).\\nHowever, this exception to sovereign immunity created in Ex parte Young has been read\\nnarrowly. Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1415 (6th Cir.\\n1996). We have held that it “does not apply when a defendant state official has neither enforced\\nnor threatened to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional state statute.” Id. (citations omitted).\\nThere must be “a realistic possibility the official will take legal or administrative actions against\\nthe plaintiff’s interests.” Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1048 (6th Cir. 2015)\\n(citing Deters, 92 F.3d at 1415). General enforcement authority is insufficient. Id. (citation\\nomitted).\\n\\n H.B. 2 and its penalty provision, in contrast with other statutes, do not delegate specific\\nenforcement power to any single state actor. KRS §§ 311.727, 311.990(33). Multiple local\\nprosecutors—the Commonwealth’s and county attorneys—have the duty to enforce H.B. 2.\\n\\n True, the Attorney General is “the chief law officer of the Commonwealth” with a\\nresponsibility to “exercise all common law duties and authority pertaining to the office of the\\nAttorney General under the common law, except when modified by statutory enactment.” KRS\\n§ 15.020. Kentucky law permits the Attorney General to defend a statute’s constitutional\\nvalidity, but it also gives her or him discretion. KRS § 418.075(1); Commonwealth v. Hamilton,\\n411 S.W.3d 741, 751 (Ky. 2013). However, Kentucky law does not require the Attorney\\nGeneral to represent the Commonwealth “where it is made the duty of the Commonwealth’s\\nattorney or county attorney” instead. KRS § 15.020. That is what we have here.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 32\\n\\n\\n Each Commonwealth’s attorney must “attend to all civil cases and proceedings in which\\nthe Commonwealth is interested in the Circuit Courts of [her or] his judicial circuit.” KRS\\n§ 69.010(1). The county attorneys must do the same within their counties. KRS § 69.210(4)(a).\\nBoth must investigate the condition of unsatisfied judgments in their districts or counties. KRS\\n§§ 69.040, 69.240. They also must “take all necessary steps, by motion, action, or otherwise to\\ncollect [them] and cause them to be paid into the State Treasury.” KRS § 69.240; accord KRS\\n§ 69.040. When these attorneys fail to meet this mandate, and if the Department of Revenue\\nsubmits a written request, then the Attorney General must bring an action to collect any\\nunsatisfied judgments. See KRS § 15.060(3). The duty to enforce H.B. 2 therefore lies not with\\nthe Attorney General but with the Commonwealth’s attorneys and the county attorneys.\\n\\n To support their interpretation of Ex parte Young, EMW cites McNeilus Truck &\\nManufacturing, Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2000). That case,\\nhowever, affirms the holding of Deters, which we rely on here. See McNeilus Truck & Mfg.,\\n226 F.3d at 438 (citing Deters for the proposition that Young “does not apply when the defendant\\nofficial has neither enforced nor threatened to enforce” the challenged statute). McNeilus also\\nheld that the Attorney General is a proper defendant “[w]here there is an imminent threat of\\nenforcement.” Id. at 437. There, the Attorney General helped enforce portions of the statute,\\nand the other defendant had threatened to withdraw the plaintiff’s license. So, we held both the\\nAttorney General and the other defendant could be sued. McNeilus, however, does not help\\nEMW because there is no evidence of a similar “imminent threat” of prosecution by the Attorney\\nGeneral in the present case. Any imminent threat comes from the Commonwealth’s and county\\nattorneys, not the Attorney General.\\n\\n General Beshear has not enforced or even threatened to enforce H.B. 2. Rather, the\\nKentucky legislature has charged local prosecutors with its enforcement. We therefore hold that\\nthe Attorney General is not a proper party to this action.25\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25Because it is uncontested that the Secretary Meier is a proper party, no concern exists that EMW “would\\nbe unable to vindicate the alleged infringement of their constitutional rights without first violating [H.B. 2].” See\\nAllied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 665 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982).\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 33\\n\\n\\n VIII.\\n\\n H.B. 2—The Ultrasound Informed Consent Act—is an informed-consent statute like the\\nstatute in Casey because it provides truthful, non-misleading, and relevant information related to\\nan abortion. The statute incidentally burdens speech only as part of Kentucky’s regulation of\\nprofessional conduct. Therefore, H.B. 2 is not subject to any heightened scrutiny with respect to\\nthe doctors’ First Amendment rights, and it does not violate those rights, based on NIFLA and\\nCasey. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Also, because local prosecutors\\nwould handle the enforcement of fines under H.B. 2, the Attorney General is not a proper party\\nto this action.\\n\\n With due respect for the views of the Dissent, we adopt instead the position of the Fifth\\nand Eighth Circuits on the First Amendment issue. Our responsibility here is to apply the level\\nof scrutiny mandated by the plurality opinion in Casey and reaffirmed by a majority of the\\nSupreme Court in NIFLA. Under Casey, “protecting the life of the unborn” is a “legitimate goal”\\nthat may be pursued by a State as part of informed consent. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. As\\na First Amendment matter, there is nothing suspect with a State’s requiring a doctor, before\\nperforming an abortion, to make truthful, non-misleading factual disclosures, relevant to\\ninformed consent, even if those disclosures relate to unborn life and have the effect of persuading\\nthe patient not to have an abortion.\\n\\n Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s contrary decision and VACATE the\\ninjunction. We also remand with instructions for General Beshear to be dismissed from the case,\\nfor summary judgment to be entered in favor of Secretary Meier on the first claim for relief\\nstated in the complaint, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n Nos. 17-6151/6183 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., et al. v. Beshear, et al. Page 34\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n DISSENT\\n _________________\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1656,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607421,"string":"4,607,421"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"SECRETARY OF LABOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TIMBERLINE SOUTH, LLC; Jim Payne, Defendants-Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Sec'y Labor v. Timberline S., LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1763"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before: SUTTON, WHITE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0063p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n SECRETARY OF LABOR, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-1763\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n TIMBERLINE SOUTH, LLC; JIM PAYNE, │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City.\\n No. 1:16-cv-11552—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: March 14, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 5, 2019\\n\\n Before: SUTTON, WHITE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Jeffrey S. Theuer, LOOMIS, EWERT, PARSLEY, DAVIS & GOTTING, P.C.,\\nLansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Sarah J. Starrett, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\\nLABOR, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey S. Theuer, LOOMIS, EWERT,\\nPARSLEY, DAVIS & GOTTING, P.C., Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Sarah J. Starrett,\\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Timberline South, LLC (Timberline) is a\\ntimber-harvesting company that operates solely in Michigan, but uses logging and harvesting\\nequipment and trucks that were manufactured outside of Michigan. The Secretary of Labor (the\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\nSecretary) brought this action against Timberline and its director, Jim Payne, alleging violations\\nof the overtime and recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).\\n\\n The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, and awarded\\n$439,437.42 in unpaid overtime and an equal amount in liquidated damages. The district court\\nreasoned that Timberline was a covered enterprise under the FLSA because it “has employees\\nhandling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or\\nproduced for commerce by any person,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i), i.e., the logging and\\nharvesting equipment manufactured outside of Michigan. Part of the damages award included\\ntime employees spent commuting from home to work or for meal periods, which the district\\ncourt included in the overtime calculation after finding that Timberline had an established\\ncustom or practice of compensating its employees for such time.\\n\\n Defendants appeal, arguing that the district court erred in finding liability and awarding\\nunpaid overtime and liquidated damages. We affirm the district court’s liability determination.\\nHowever, because the district court erred in finding that ordinary commute time and bona fide\\nmeal periods qualify as compensable hours subject to the FLSA’s overtime requirements, we\\nvacate the award of damages and remand for further proceedings.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Timberline was formed in 2010 as a Michigan limited liability company. Payne is an\\nofficer of Timberline and directs all of its operations. Timberline removes raw timber from\\nforests, cuts the timber, and transports the timber to mills for processing into paper and other\\nproducts. Timberline maintains two to four worksites, each with approximately four equipment\\noperators who cut down trees, cut the timber into lengths, and transport the timber to a landing\\nsite. Timberline also employs six to eight truck drivers, who load the timber at the landing site\\nand transport it to the mills, as well as mechanics and an office manager. Timberline’s\\nequipment operators use heavy, specialized machinery, including harvesters and hydro-axes to\\ncut down trees and cut the trees into lengths, and forwarders and skidders to transport the timber\\nto the landing site or to load trucks. All of Timberline’s business activities occur in Michigan: it\\nharvests timber in Michigan; it transports timber to mills located only in Michigan; it entered\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\ninto contracts for cutting timber in Michigan; and it purchased its trucks and heavy equipment\\nfrom Michigan sellers. Although purchased and used only in Michigan, Timberline’s trucks and\\nheavy equipment were manufactured outside of Michigan.\\n\\n Payne established Timberline’s compensation and recordkeeping practices. Timberline\\npaid its employees using a daily rate, an hourly rate, or a cord 1 rate. Timberline recorded hours\\nworked for hourly employees but did not do so for most non-hourly employees, and did not pay\\nits employees an overtime rate for hours worked over 40 in a week.\\n\\n Timberline was founded after a previous company, Timberline Logging, Inc. (Timberline\\nLogging), went out of business. In February 2011, Payne instructed his office manager to email\\nMatthew Rooyakker, Timberline Logging’s accountant, regarding whether Timberline Logging\\nwas exempt from paying overtime “under FLSA in Tennessee.” (R. 18-12, PID 1674.)2 Payne\\nalso testified that he discussed FLSA coverage with his accountant on “a couple different\\noccasions” “awhile back,” “before the investigation” that led to this lawsuit. (R. 19-12, PID\\n2273.) According to Payne, Rooyakker told him that “we were exempt under agriculture” (id. at\\nPID 2274), although Rooyakker had not held himself out as knowledgeable about the FLSA, and\\nPayne did not believe that his truck drivers or office workers were agricultural employees.\\nPayne did not consult with an attorney.\\n\\n Defendants took the position in this lawsuit that the Motor Carrier Act exemption,\\n29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1), exempts some of Timberline’s employees from FLSA coverage. In\\nresponse to the Secretary’s interrogatories about this exemption, Defendants stated that they\\nrelied upon the “FLSA and publications prepared by Plaintiff” in determining that that the Motor\\nCarrier Act exemption applied, but Payne did not recall which publications he relied on and was\\nnot able to explain why his drivers and their helpers were exempt if the drivers only drove\\nintrastate routes. (R. 18-4, PID 271-81.)\\n\\n Rooyakker testified that the only time he provided advice regarding the FLSA was at a\\nmeeting with Payne on February 17, 2011. At that meeting, in response to Timberline Logging’s\\n\\n 1A cord is a standard measurement of wood.\\n 2Timberline Logging performed work in Tennessee, but Timberline did not.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\ninquiry, Rooyakker told Payne that it appeared that “you’re exempt” under the agricultural\\nexemption. (R. 18-13, PID 1702.) Rooyakker testified that he did not advise which of\\nTimberline Logging’s or Timberline’s employees were subject to the FLSA’s agricultural\\nexemption and never opined whether either entity’s employees in Michigan may also be exempt.\\n\\n Wage and Hour Investigator Jeffrey Wrona of the Department of Labor (DOL)\\ninvestigated Timberline for wage and recordkeeping violations for the time period of August 25,\\n2013 through August 20, 2015, later extended through March 20, 2017. After assessing unpaid\\novertime wages, the Secretary of Labor filed a complaint alleging that Defendants had violated\\nthe overtime and recordkeeping provisions of the FLSA, and sought an injunction, back wages,\\nand liquidated damages.\\n\\n The district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment in part and\\ndenied Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, granted the Secretary’s motion to\\namend the complaint to include additional employees and FLSA violations that had occurred\\nduring 2016 and 2017, awarded liquidated damages, and ordered further briefing by the parties\\non the amount of backpay.\\n\\n After two rounds of supplemental briefing, the district court issued a final summary\\njudgment decision awarding $439,437.42 in backpay damages and an equal amount in liquidated\\ndamages. This appeal followed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing all evidence and\\ndrawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pearce v.\\nChrysler Grp. LLC Pension Plan, 893 F.3d 339, 345 (6th Cir. 2018).3 Summary judgment is\\n\\n\\n\\n 3The Secretary argues that we should review the district court’s decision to award liquidated damages for\\nan abuse of discretion, but in making that argument the Secretary relies on cases involving liquidated damages\\nawarded after a trial. Here, the district court decided the issue on summary judgment and found that it had no\\ndiscretion as a matter of law to decline to award or reduce the amount of liquidated damages. Hence, our review is\\nde novo. See Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Although we generally review a\\ndistrict court’s decision on liquidated damages for abuse of discretion, we review the issue here, which was decided\\nbelow on summary judgment, de novo.” (internal citation omitted)).\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\nappropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is\\nentitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\\n\\n A. Enterprise Coverage and the Handling Clause\\n\\n The FLSA requires, among other things, that a qualifying enterprise pay certain\\nemployees overtime pay at one and one-half times their regular rate for each hour above 40\\nworked in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). At issue in this appeal is whether Timberline is “an\\nenterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” defined as\\n\\n an enterprise that--\\n (A)(i) has employees engaged in commerce4 or in the production of goods5 for\\n commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on\\n goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any\\n person; and\\n (ii) is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done\\n is not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level that are\\n separately stated);\\n\\n29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A).\\n\\n There is no dispute that Timberline is an “enterprise” under § 203(r)(1),6 qualifies as an\\n“employer” under § 203(d),7 and had an annual gross volume of sales in excess of $500,000 for\\neach relevant year, § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). Nor did the Secretary argue that Timberline was a\\ncovered enterprise because it had “employees engaged in commerce or in the production of\\n\\n\\n 4‘“Commerce’ means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several\\nStates or between any State and any place outside thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(b).\\n 5“‘Goods’ means goods (including ships and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities,\\nmerchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof, but does not\\ninclude goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a\\nproducer, manufacturer, or processor thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(i).\\n 6‘“Enterprise’ means the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control)\\nby any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one\\nor more establishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including departments of an\\nestablishment operated through leasing arrangements, but shall not include the related activities performed for such\\nenterprise by an independent contractor. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1).\\n 7‘“Employer’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to\\nan employee and includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization (other than when acting as an\\nemployer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\ngoods for commerce.” § 203(s)(1)(A)(i). Rather, the parties disagree about whether Timberline\\n“has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been\\nmoved in or produced for commerce by any person,” id., often referred to as the “handling\\nclause.”\\n\\n As originally enacted, the FLSA covered certain employees but did not encompass\\nenterprise-wide coverage. That concept was added in 1961. See Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2, 75 Stat.\\n65, 65-66 (1961). “After the [1961] amendment, if an employer had two or more workers\\nengaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce, FLSA coverage extended to all\\nof the enterprise’s employees.” Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 616 F.3d 1217, 1220\\n(11th Cir. 2010) (citing Dunlop v. Indus. Am. Corp., 516 F.2d 498, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1975)).\\nIncluded in the 1961 amendment was the addition of the handling clause. In 1974, Congress\\nclarified that the handling clause was an independent basis for enterprise coverage8 and added\\n“or materials” to that clause. See id. at 1220-21. “Materials” is not defined in the statute.\\n“Goods” is, however, and contains what is often called the “ultimate-consumer exception,”\\nexcluding from the definition “goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of\\nthe ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof.”\\n29 U.S.C. § 203(i). The district court held that Timberline is a covered enterprise under the\\nhandling clause because Timberline’s employees’ use of logging and harvesting equipment\\nmanufactured outside of Michigan constitutes “handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods\\nor materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person.”\\n§ 203(s)(1)(A)(i).\\n\\n Defendants argue that Timberline is not a covered enterprise because the only thing\\nTimberline’s employees “handle” is timber, which never crosses state lines; and that even if they\\n“handled” the logging and harvesting equipment, that equipment does not qualify as “materials,”\\nbut rather qualifies as “goods,” and that Timberline is the ultimate consumer of those goods such\\nthat the FLSA does not apply. (Appellants’ Br. at 11-14, 16-18.) Further, Defendants argue that\\n\\n 8Between the 1961 and 1974 amendments, coverage extended to enterprises with “employees engaged in\\ncommerce or in the production of goods for commerce, including employees handling, selling, or otherwise working\\non goods that have been moved in or produced for commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970) (emphasis added). The\\n1974 amendment replaced “including” with “or.”\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nfinding enterprise coverage in this case “would effectively erase the commerce requirement\\nnecessary for FLSA jurisdiction” because “[e]very business uses computers made overseas, or\\npencils and pens made out of state, or copiers, paper, or telephones made in other jurisdictions.”\\n(Appellants’ Br. at 14.)\\n\\n We begin our analysis of the “handling clause” with the language of the statute.\\nBrilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc’ns, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2007). “If\\nthe language of the statute is clear, then the inquiry is complete, and the court should look no\\nfurther. Only if the statute is ‘inescapably ambiguous’ should a court look to other persuasive\\nauthority in an attempt to discern legislative meaning.” Id. (citations omitted).\\n\\n The plain language of the statute contradicts Defendants’ arguments that Timberline is\\nnot a covered enterprise because “[t]he only good or material that Timberline handles, sells, or\\notherwise works on within the meaning of the FLSA, is the timber itself,” and because\\nTimberline’s employees “did not place th[e logging and harvesting] equipment in commerce\\nthemselves.” (Appellants’ Br. at 12.) We find no merit to these arguments because it is not\\nrelevant under the statute that Timberline employees did not place the logging and harvesting\\nequipment in commerce themselves; the plain language of the statute provides coverage where\\nemployees handle, sell, or otherwise work on “goods or materials that have been moved in or\\nproduced for commerce by any person.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). “The\\ntense is in the past. There is no requirement of continuity in the present.” Polycarpe, 616 F.3d\\nat 1221 (quoting Brennan v. Greene’s Propane Gas Serv., Inc., 479 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir.\\n1973)). Further, the statute makes clear that it applies when any person—not just the employees\\nof the enterprise—has moved or produced the handled goods or materials in commerce. Because\\nthe logging and harvesting equipment had previously been moved in and produced for commerce\\nby others prior to being handled by Timberline employees, this part of the statute is satisfied.\\n\\n Less clear is whether the logging and harvesting equipment constitute “goods” or\\n“materials” and whether Timberline is the ultimate consumer of the logging and harvesting\\nequipment such that if the logging and harvesting equipment qualify as goods and not materials,\\nthe ultimate-consumer exception operates to exclude Timberline from coverage. “[P]recisely\\ndetermining the correct ordinary meaning of ‘materials’ for the FLSA is challenging because the\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\nFLSA’s statutory definition of ‘goods’ is so expansive, ostensibly including some items that\\ncould also fall under the ordinary meaning of ‘materials.’” Id. at 1223. Thus, we may look to\\nother sources to determine the meaning, including “interpretations by other courts, legislative\\nhistory, policy rationales, and the context in which the statute was passed.” Brilliance Audio,\\n474 F.3d at 371-72.\\n\\n As an initial matter, we have previously explained that the FLSA “was enacted by\\nCongress to be a broadly remedial and humanitarian statute. The Act was designed to correct\\n‘labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for\\nhealth, efficiency, and general well-being of workers . . .’” Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114,\\n1116 (6th Cir. 1984) (alteration in original) (quoting Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d\\n139, 143 (6th Cir. 1977)). “[T]he FLSA, as a statute designed to protect individual rights, . . .\\n‘must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.’” Herman v. Fabri-Centers of\\nAm., Inc., 308 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda\\nLocal No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)).\\n\\n Several of our sister circuits have addressed similar situations and have suggested that the\\naddition of “or materials” to the handling clause essentially rendered the ultimate-consumer\\nexception obsolete. In Brock v. Hamad, the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant’s rental\\noperation was a covered enterprise where the defendant stipulated that he “had bought goods that\\nhad been moved in interstate commerce and that these goods had been used in the course of his\\nemployees’ employment.” 867 F.2d 804, 807-08 (4th Cir. 1989). Rejecting the defendant’s\\nargument that the rental operation was the ultimate consumer of these goods so that coverage did\\nnot extend to it, the Fourth Circuit explained: “Hamad’s argument, however, erroneously isolates\\nSection 203(i)[‘s definition of ‘goods’] from the remainder of the FLSA. When Section 203(i) is\\nread in context with Section 203(s), which covers ‘employees handling, selling, or otherwise\\nworking on goods or materials,’ it seems that defendant’s argument must fail.” Id. at 807; see\\nalso id. at 808 (“[I]t is well established that local business activities fall within the FLSA when\\nan enterprise employs workers who handle goods or materials that have moved or have been\\nproduced in interstate commerce.”); Dole v. Odd Fellows Home Endowment Bd., 912 F.2d 689,\\n695 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Appellants’ contention that the Home was in some sense the ‘ultimate\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\nconsumer’ of the goods and materials that moved in interstate commerce does not preclude\\napplication of the Act.” (citing Hamad, 867 F.2d at 807-08)).\\n\\n Similarly, the Third Circuit held that a company “engaged in the business of collecting\\ngarbage, trash, and scrap metal” was a covered enterprise. Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748,\\n750 (3d Cir. 1982). The defendant argued that its use of “motor vehicles, gas, oil, and other\\nmanufactured goods” did not result in FLSA coverage because it was the ultimate consumer of\\nthose goods. Id. at 751. The Third Circuit rejected that argument, relying heavily on the\\nlegislative history in concluding that the company was a covered enterprise. Id. at 751-52 (citing\\nS. Rep. No. 93–690, at 17 (1974), which explains that the amendment “adds the words ‘or\\nmaterials’ after the word ‘goods’ to make clear the Congressional intent to include within this\\nadditional basis of coverage the handling of goods consumed in the employer’s business, as, e.g.,\\nthe soap used by a laundry”).\\n\\n The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion regarding a real-estate developer whose\\nemployees used construction machinery for “removing and thinning trees, clearing brush,\\ngrading and contouring the land for streets and drainage, installing culverts, pouring concrete for\\ncurbs and laying asphalt.” Donovan v. Pointon, 717 F.2d 1320, 1322 (10th Cir. 1983). Although\\nthe defendant had acquired the machinery from within the same state in which the equipment\\nwas used, the Tenth Circuit explained that fact was\\n\\n irrelevant to a determination of whether [the defendant] is a covered\\n employer. The critical issue is whether the goods or materials handled by [the\\n defendant] and his employees had moved in interstate commerce, and, in this\\n regard, it is undisputed that they did. “Using” goods or materials which have\\n moved in interstate commerce constitutes a “handling” within the meaning of\\n 29 U.S.C. § 203(s).\\n\\nId. at 1322-23 (internal citations omitted); see also Donovan v. Scoles, 652 F.2d 16, 18-19 (9th\\nCir. 1981) (gas station engaged in purely intrastate activities is a covered enterprise because the\\nFLSA “imposes no requirement that the goods have a present involvement in interstate\\ncommerce when they are handled or sold. Instead it broadens coverage to include all employees\\nwithin the stream of commerce of such goods, even if their own participation remains purely\\nintrastate.”); Brennan v. Iowa, 494 F.2d 100, 101, 103 n.5, 104 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\nhospitals and schools were subject to the FLSA because “many employees handle articles which\\nhave moved in interstate commerce,” including drugs, cleaning supplies, food, and laundry\\nsupplies); Indus. Am. Corp., 516 F.2d at 501-02, 502 n.8 (explaining that the 1974 “amendment\\nleaves the definition of goods intact but circumvents it by a broader definition of ‘enterprise\\nengaged in commerce,’” which had the effect of expanding the FLSA “to every enterprise in the\\nnation doing” the requisite volume of business); Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc., 997 F. Supp.\\n504, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Sotomayor, J.) (explaining that the 1974 amendments to the FLSA\\nresulted in “virtually every enterprise” doing the requisite volume of business being covered by\\nthe FLSA, and holding that sanitations crews’ use of “bags, brooms, shovels, pails, scrapers . . .\\nradios, books . . . [and] flashlights” that had moved in interstate commerce resulted in FLSA\\nenterprise coverage (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).\\n\\n In recent years, the Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue at length, extracting a definition\\nof “materials” from the FLSA by considering the plain language of the statute, legislative\\nhistory, and the DOL’s interpretation. Polycarpe, 616 F.3d at 1221-27. In its view, courts could\\nnot properly assume that Congress intended to overrule the ultimate-consumer exception\\ncontained in the definition of “goods” with the addition of “materials” to the statute. Doing so, it\\nsaid, would violate a basic principle of statutory interpretation by not giving effect to all the\\nwords in the statute. Id. at 1222-23.\\n\\n The court thus considered two ordinary definitions of “materials” potentially applicable\\nin the FLSA context and adopted one for purposes of the handling clause:\\n\\n One definition views “materials” as the “apparatus (as tools or other articles)\\n necessary for doing or making something.” A second definition defines\\n “materials” as “the basic matter (as metal, wood, plastic, fiber) from which the\\n whole or the greater part of something physical (as a machine, tool, building,\\n fabric) is made.” Looking only to the word’s ordinary meaning, it seems that\\n “materials” as used in the FLSA could potentially include items used in\\n performing actions or services (e.g. describing pen and paper as “writing\\n materials”), items that serve as a component of something else, or both.\\n But precisely determining the correct ordinary meaning of “materials” for the\\n FLSA is challenging because the FLSA’s statutory definition of “goods” is so\\n expansive, ostensibly including some items that could also fall under the ordinary\\n meaning of “materials.” Much of the FLSA’s definition of “goods” is comprised,\\n it seems, of synonyms for items sold by a business: “goods . . . , wares, products,\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n commodities, merchandise, or articles . . . .” But Congress’s expressed definition\\n for “goods” also includes “or any part or ingredient thereof.” The plain text of\\n this last phrase indicates to us that, of the two ordinary meanings that we\\n identified for “materials,” the second one—the one involving constituent parts—\\n overlaps with part of the statutory definition of “goods.”\\n We must interpret the FLSA in a way that Congress’s 1974 addition of the words\\n “or materials” does not impliedly repeal the unchanged “goods” definition or that\\n definition’s ultimate-consumer exception. Therefore, we believe that the most\\n accurate view of Congress’s intent for the interplay between “goods” and\\n “materials” in the FLSA—one that does not impliedly repeal some of the statutory\\n definition of “goods”—is to read “materials” in the FLSA this way: “materials” in\\n the FLSA means tools or other articles necessary for doing or making\\n something. We believe that this interpretation is true to the ordinary meaning of\\n “materials” and avoids conflict with the statutory “goods” definition.\\n\\nId. at 1223-24 (alterations in original) (internal citations and footnote omitted). The court also\\nexplained that to be considered “materials,” an item “must have a significant connection with the\\nemployer’s commercial activity; the business may not just somehow internally and incidentally\\nconsume the item.” Id. at 1226. “This requirement,” the court reasoned, “is compelled because\\nthe statute covers not all ‘goods’ and ‘materials,’ but only ‘goods’ and ‘materials’ that a\\ncompany is engaged in ‘handling, selling, or otherwise working on.’” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 203(s)(1)(A)(i)).\\n\\n Polycarpe cautioned that the same items could be goods in one case, materials in another,\\nand neither goods nor materials in still another case, depending on the use of the item in the\\ncontext of each case. “Where a catering business uses the china plates at a client’s banquet, the\\nplates count as part of the ‘materials’ necessary for serving a catered meal. But, where a\\ndepartment store sells the same china plates as stand-alone items, the plates count as ‘goods’ for\\nthat retailer.” Id. Those same plates hung as decorations on the lobby wall of an accounting\\nfirm, however, constitute neither goods nor materials “because the plates have no significant\\nconnection to the business’s accounting work.” Id.\\n\\n We find the reasoning of Polycarpe persuasive because it gives effect to “materials”\\nwithout totally overlapping with the statutory definition of “goods” and thus displacing the\\nultimate-consumer exception contained within that definition. See Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660,\\n667 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Every word in the statute is presumed to have meaning, and we must give\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 12\\n\\n\\neffect all the words to avoid an interpretation which would render words superfluous or\\nredundant.” (citations omitted)); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987)\\n(“[R]epeals by implication are not favored and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is\\nclear and manifest.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).\\n\\n Applying the definition of “materials” from Polycarpe, the logging and harvesting\\nequipment used by Timberline’s employees plainly constitute “materials” because the equipment\\nis necessary to cut down trees and transport the timber, which in turn have a significant\\nconnection to Timberline’s commercial activities of harvesting and selling timber.\\n\\n Defendants disagree with Polycarpe’s analysis, arguing that it erroneously “relied upon a\\nsimple alternate definition” of “materials” rather than other definitions that would be “more\\nconsistent with the language of the FLSA,” such as “constituent parts of a whole, or elements of\\nsomething else,” or the “material components that make up” “the thing being produced by the\\nenterprise.” (Reply at 1, 3-4.) However, Defendants’ proffered definition of “materials” has not\\nbeen adopted by other circuits; and because “goods” includes in its definition “any part or\\ningredient [of goods],” 29 U.S.C. § 203(i), Defendants’ definition would render both terms\\nredundant.\\n\\n Defendants also argue that Polycarpe’s definition of “materials” is limited to items\\nprovided by an employer to its customers or “incorporated into products as part of the defendant\\nemployer’s services, such as paint used by a construction company, shutter blades for a window\\nshutter manufacturer, [or] burglar alarms installed by a security company.” (Appellants’ Br. at\\n13.) Defendants read Polycarpe too narrowly. Polycarpe remanded all but one of the cases9 to\\nthe district court to determine whether the items at issue were moved in or produced for interstate\\ncommerce and, if so, whether those items constitute “goods” or “materials.” 616 F.3d at 1229.\\nSome of the items at issue in Polycarpe are analogous to the logging and harvesting equipment\\nin this case, such as lawnmowers, edgers, and trucks used by a landscaping company. Id. at\\n1228. On remand, the district court held that the landscaping company was a covered enterprise\\n\\n\\n 9Polycarpe affirmed one judgment in one case in favor of the defendants because the evidence at trial did\\nnot establish that the business met the volume requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). 616 F.3d at 1229.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 13\\n\\n\\nbecause the trucks it used were “materials” rather than “goods.” Polycarpe v. E & S\\nLandscaping Serv., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2011).\\n\\n Finally, under these facts, we need not extensively address Defendants’ argument that\\nfinding FLSA coverage in this case would “effectively erase the commerce requirement\\nnecessary for FLSA jurisdiction” because “[e]very business uses computers made overseas, or\\npencils and pens made out of state.” (Appellants’ Br. at 14.) As an initial matter, the parties\\npoint to no case where the DOL has attempted to enforce the statute in this manner. Further, the\\ncourt in Polycarpe was apparently concerned with expanding coverage in this way and offered\\nreasonable bases to reject any attempt to do so. First, the court noted that the terms, “handling,\\nselling, or otherwise working on” “denote a connection to the employer’s . . . commercial\\nactivity,” such that mere internal and incidental consumption of an item would not suffice to\\nqualify. 616 F.3d at 1226. Second, it explained that DOL regulations instruct that employees\\nmust handle or work on the goods or materials “regularly and recurrently” for enterprise\\ncoverage to attach. Id. at 1226 n.7 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 779.238). Regardless, coverage here is\\nnot premised on employees’ incidental use of office items; rather, it is premised on employees’\\nregular and recurrent use of logging and harvesting equipment that is used to carry out the\\ncompany’s commercial activity of harvesting timber.\\n\\n Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Timberline is a covered enterprise\\nunder the FLSA’s handling clause.\\n\\n B. Motor Carrier Act Exemption\\n\\n Next, Defendants challenge the district court’s determination that Timberline’s truck\\ndrivers and their helpers are not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions pursuant to\\n29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1), which exempts from coverage “any employee with respect to whom the\\nSecretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service\\npursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49.” The Motor Carrier Act (MCA) provides\\nthat the “Secretary of Transportation may prescribe requirements for” “(1) qualifications and\\nmaximum hours of service of employees of, and safety of operation and equipment of, a motor\\ncarrier”; and “(2) qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of, and standards of\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 14\\n\\n\\nequipment of, a motor private carrier, when needed to promote safety of operation.” 49 U.S.C.\\n§ 31502(b). “Motor carrier” is defined as a “person who provides motor vehicle transportation\\nfor compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). Defendants do not contend that Timberline is a\\nmotor carrier. Rather, Defendants argue that Timberline is a “motor private carrier,” defined as a\\nperson who transports property or goods in interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(15).\\nConsistent with these statutory definitions, this court has previously explained that “[t]he\\nMCA . . . gives the Secretary of Transportation ‘the authority to regulate the hours of an\\nemployee (1) who works for a private motor carrier that provides transportation in interstate\\ncommerce and (2) whose work activities affect the safety of operation of that motor\\ncarrier.’” Vaughn v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 291 F.3d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting\\nTroutt v. Stavola Bros., Inc., 107 F.3d 1104, 1106-07 (4th Cir. 1997)).\\n\\n Exemptions from the FLSA’s overtime provisions requirements are narrowly construed\\nagainst the employer, and the employer bears the burden of proving that it qualifies for a\\nclaimed exemption. Martin v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 381 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2004); see also\\nMazzarella v. Fast Rig Support, LLC, 823 F.3d 786, 790-91 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that the\\nMCA exemption is narrowly construed against the employer); Deherrera v. Decker Truck Line,\\nInc., 820 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016) (same); Abel v. S. Shuttle Servs., Inc., 631 F.3d 1210,\\n1212 (11th Cir. 2011) (same).\\n\\n Defendants argue that some of Timberline’s employees are exempt from coverage\\nbecause Timberline’s trucks are operated under U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)\\nregistration numbers and its drivers maintain commercial driver’s licenses, which they say are\\nsufficient bases to find that the MCA exemption applies. In support of this argument,\\nDefendants cite Finn v. Dean Transportation, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1043 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). In\\nFinn, the district court held that a company was a motor private carrier where its drivers\\ntransported ten percent of its goods in interstate commerce. Id. at 1056-57. In response to the\\nemployee’s argument that the MCA exemption should not apply because the DOT had never\\nexercised its authority to audit the company or to conduct roadside stops, the district court stated\\nthat “Finn’s concession that the DOT had ‘some regulatory authority’ over his work as a driver\\nis, standing alone, dispositive of this issue.” Id. at 1057. The district court then noted that the\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 15\\n\\n\\ndriver “admits that he was required to hold a CDL, that DTI has a DOT registration number, that\\nDTI was subject to DOT audit, that its vehicles could be stopped for inspection at any time, and\\nthat DTI drivers were required to undergo a yearly physical (for which DTI paid).” Id. at 1057-\\n58.\\n\\n Defendants read too much into Finn. Finn was exempt because his employer met the\\ndefinition of a motor private carrier and was therefore subject to DOT regulation. Id. at 1055-56.\\nWe have previously rejected an argument that the mere issuance of a certificate by the Interstate\\nCommerce Commission (which regulated motor carriers prior to the DOT) was sufficient to\\nbring employees within the MCA exemption when those employees drove only intrastate routes.\\nSee Baird v. Wagoner Transp. Co., 425 F.2d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 1970); see also Mazzarella,\\n823 F.3d at 792 (“The DOT certificate merely authorizes Defendants to engage in interstate\\ntransportation. It provides no information about whether Defendants’ drivers actually drove\\nacross state lines or otherwise engaged in interstate commerce.”).\\n\\n The dispositive inquiry here is not whether Timberline’s employees held commercial\\ndriver’s licenses or whether its trucks had DOT registration numbers; rather, the dispositive\\ninquiry is whether Timberline’s drivers transport goods in interstate commerce, thus rendering\\nTimberline a motor private carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(15); Vaughn, 291 F.3d at 904. Courts\\nhave consistently interpreted this to mean that drivers must travel or transport the goods across\\nstate lines, or transport the goods in a “‘practical continuity of movement’ across State lines from\\nthe point of origin to the point of departure.” 29 C.F.R. 782.7(b)(1) (quoting Walling v.\\nJacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 568 (1943)); see also Baird, 425 F.2d at 413; Goldberg v.\\nFaber Indus., Inc., 291 F.2d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 1961). Here, it is undisputed that Timberline’s\\ntruck drivers did not cross state lines.\\n\\n Defendants nevertheless argue that Timberline’s drivers transport goods in “a practical\\ncontinuity of movement” in interstate commerce because its timber “is an ingredient in the goods\\nmanufactured by the mills to which it is delivered.” (Appellants’ Br. at 22.) Defendants,\\nhowever, presented no evidence that their timber was eventually shipped in interstate commerce\\nby the mills. To the contrary, Payne’s affidavit stated that Timberline has “no control over what\\nis done with the timber delivered to the mills, nor do we know the eventual destination or use of\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 16\\n\\n\\nthat timber.” (R. 19-3, PID 2080.) Further, even if the timber was used by the mills to make\\nother products, such as paper, and then shipped across state lines, the fact that the timber was\\naltered before crossing state lines weighs against finding the MCA exemption applicable. See\\nMazzarella, 823 F.3d at 791-93 (citing Collins v. Heritage Wine Cellars, Ltd., 589 F.3d 895, 897\\n(7th Cir. 2009)) (in considering whether drivers who transported water to hydraulic fracking sites\\nwithin Pennsylvania were subject to MCA exemption, “whether the water is altered during the\\nfracking process” would be relevant in determining whether there was a practical continuity of\\nmovement in interstate commerce; MCA exemption did not apply because the defendant\\nproduced no evidence concerning this or other relevant matters).\\n\\n Absent any evidence that Timberline’s drivers crossed state lines or transported goods as\\npart of a practical continuity of movement in interstate commerce, the district court correctly\\nfound that none of Timberline’s employees was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements\\nunder the MCA exemption.\\n\\n C. Damages\\n\\n 1. Briefing Before the District Court\\n\\n Three rounds of briefing occurred before the district court granted summary judgment on\\ndamages. In the Secretary’s original summary judgment brief, Investigator Wrona estimated that\\nTimberline owed unpaid overtime of $468,595.80 for 50 employees. Wrona explained that he\\nprimarily relied on Timberline’s payroll records to calculate unpaid overtime. However, because\\nTimberline lacked hours-worked records for some employees, Wrona had to use other methods\\nto reconstruct the hours those employees worked. Defendants argued in part that in extrapolating\\nhours worked from the employees’ pay records, the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 254(a), required a reduction in the number of hours for the time employees spent on meals and\\nin traveling to and from their homes to their workplaces—hours for which the employees were\\npaid, but which do not count as work. After the original summary judgment briefing, the district\\ncourt rejected Defendants’ argument that the Portal-to-Portal Act required such a reduction,\\nfinding that Defendants had an established custom or practice of compensating for such time.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 17\\n\\n\\nThe district court also ordered supplemental briefing to clarify inconsistencies in the record and\\nto provide requested information in a specific format.\\n\\n In the Secretary’s first supplemental brief, he calculated revised unpaid overtime to be\\n$454,684.73 for the 50 employees. The Secretary explained that 43 out of the 50 employees\\nwere paid an hourly rate for their entire employment, and because Defendants kept records of\\ntheir hours worked, “[c]omputing overtime for these employees is a simple case of arithmetic\\nbased upon Defendants’ own records.” (R. 38, PID 3725-26.) The Secretary explained that he\\ncomputed back wages for the remaining seven employees without complete hours-worked\\nrecords by: “(1) averaging the number of hours similarly situated employees worked per week or\\n(2) averaging the number of hours individual employees worked each workweek based upon\\ntime records previously kept for each employee prior to Defendants changing the employee\\ncompensation to non-hourly and ceas[ing] keeping the required records.” (Id. at PID 3726.) The\\nSecretary also presented voluminous data showing how he arrived at the calculated unpaid\\novertime. Defendants argued in response that the calculations performed by the Secretary for the\\nnon-hourly employees lacked credibility because the calculations guessed at hours worked and\\npay rate, contained errors, and led to absurd results because Defendants presented evidence that\\ntheir employees were paid significantly more than the industry average.\\n\\n The district court noted certain discrepancies that required additional briefing but also\\nrejected many of Defendants’ arguments that the data was inflated and that industry-aggregate\\ndata should be used instead. It reasoned that “Defendants simply reassert their overarching\\nargument that their compensation scheme resulted in compensation that far exceeded industry\\naverages and, therefore, that they should be excused from their obligations under the FLSA\\novertime provisions. They cite no authority for this proposition.” (R. 43, PID 4187.) The\\ndistrict court also noted that Defendants were critiquing the Secretary’s “methodology largely by\\ncherry picking particular workweeks with unusually high gross wages or unusually low gross\\nwages” and were essentially attacking “the statistical concept of an average.” (Id. at PID 4188.)\\n\\n In the Secretary’s second supplemental brief regarding damages, the Secretary addressed\\nthe district court’s identified concerns and recalculated unpaid overtime to $445,533.49, which\\nreflected a change of unpaid overtime for three non-hourly employees and one hourly employee.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 18\\n\\n\\nDefendants responded by arguing that the Secretary’s third attempt still contained errors, which\\nthey said evidenced a total lack of credibility in the Secretary’s calculations, and thus the district\\ncourt should award no damages or use the industry-aggregate data to determine unpaid overtime.\\nThey also reasserted their argument that the award should be reduced due to compensation for\\ncommute and meal time.\\n\\n The district court made reductions to the Secretary’s claimed unpaid overtime to address\\nerrors identified by Defendants, but otherwise rejected Defendants’ arguments. The district court\\nawarded damages for unpaid overtime of $439,437.42, and an equal amount in liquidated\\ndamages.\\n\\n 2. Arguments on Appeal\\n\\n On appeal, Defendants appear to make two legal arguments. First, Defendants argue that\\nthe district court erred in not applying the Portal-to-Portal Act to reduce overtime owed by the\\ntime the employees spent during meals and traveling to and from work. Second, Defendants\\nargue that because each of the Secretary’s calculations of overtime contained errors and\\ninconsistences, the Secretary failed to meet his burden to prove damages, and the district court\\nshould have entered an award of no damages or ordered that industry-aggregate data be used to\\narrive at a just and reasonable damages amount.\\n\\n 3. Analysis\\n The Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254, provides in part:\\n\\n (a) Activities not compensable\\n Except as provided in subsection (b), no employer shall be subject to any liability\\n or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . on account of the\\n failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an\\n employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any of the following\\n activities of such employee . . .\\n (1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of\\n performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is\\n employed to perform, and\\n (2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal\\n activity or activities,\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 19\\n\\n\\n which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such\\n employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at\\n which he ceases, such principal activity or activities. . . .\\n\\n (b) Compensability by contract or custom\\n Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) which relieve an employer from\\n liability and punishment with respect to any activity, the employer shall not be so\\n relieved if such activity is compensable by . . .\\n ....\\n (2) a custom or practice in effect, at the time of such activity, at the\\n establishment or other place where such employee is employed, covering\\n such activity, not inconsistent with a written or nonwritten contract, in\\n effect at the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or\\n collective-bargaining representative and his employer.\\n (c) Restriction on activities compensable under contract or custom\\n For the purposes of subsection (b), an activity shall be considered as compensable\\n under such contract provision or such custom or practice only when it is engaged\\n in during the portion of the day with respect to which it is so made compensable.\\n (d) Determination of time employed with respect to activities\\n In the application of the minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions of\\n the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, of the Walsh-Healey Act, or\\n of the Bacon-Davis Act, in determining the time for which an employer employs\\n an employee with respect to walking, riding, traveling, or other preliminary or\\n postliminary activities described in subsection (a) of this section, there shall be\\n counted all that time, but only that time, during which the employee engages in\\n any such activity which is compensable within the meaning of subsections (b) and\\n (c) of this section.\\n\\n The district court held after the initial summary judgment briefing that Defendants had a\\ncustom or practice of paying for non-compensable time such as travel and meal time and\\nreasoned that this time must be included in determining hours worked and overtime owed\\npursuant to the Portal-to-Portal Act. After the initial summary judgment briefing, Defendants\\nsubmitted affidavits from five employees, which they argued showed “some, but not necessarily\\nall, employees who did not agree or understand that these hours would be included as hours\\nworked or for overtime.” (R. 41, PID 4115.) These affidavits stated that the employee “was\\npaid for driving to and from the worksite, but [he] did not have an agreement or understanding\\nthat this time would be included in any calculation of overtime.” (See, e.g., R. 41-12, PID\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 20\\n\\n\\n4167.)10 The affidavits also stated that the employee “took a half-hour lunch when [he] could fit\\nit in” and that the employee included “drive time and lunch time in total hours.” (Id.)\\n\\n Although the plain language of the Portal-to-Portal Act suggests that home-to-work\\ncommutes are deemed compensable if the employer has a custom or practice of compensating for\\nsuch work, 29 C.F.R. § 785.34 explains that “ordinary travel from home to work (see § 785.35)\\nneed not be counted as hours worked even if the employer agrees to pay for it.” And, 29 C.F.R.\\n§ 785.35 says plainly that “[n]ormal travel from home to work is not worktime.” The reason is\\nthat the FLSA only requires overtime compensation for “actual work or employment,” Tenn.\\nCoal, Iron & R. Co., 321 U.S. at 597, “[a]nd even where there is a contract, custom, or practice\\nto pay for time spent in such a ‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ activity, section 4(d) of the Portal\\nAct does not make such time hours worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act, if it would not\\nbe so counted under the latter Act alone,” 29 C.F.R. § 790.7; see also id. § 790.5 (“But where,\\napart from the Portal Act, time spent in such an activity would not be time worked within the\\nmeaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, although made compensable by contract, custom, or\\npractice, such compensability will not make it time worked under section 4(d) of the Portal\\nAct.”)11 “The general rule . . . is and always has been that the FLSA does not treat ordinary\\nhome-to-job-site travel as compensable.” Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 360 (2d\\nCir. 2011). The same is true of “bona fide meal periods.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.19; see also Ruffin v.\\nMotorCity Casino, 775 F.3d 807, 811-15 (6th Cir. 2015) (examining whether meal periods were\\ncompensable under the FLSA as “work”).\\n\\n Although it does not appear that any other circuit court has addressed this issue, district\\ncourts have held that ordinary home-to-work and work-to-home commute time does not qualify\\nas “work” under the FLSA even if the employer has paid for such time, and therefore that time is\\nnot subject to overtime requirements. See Pietrzycki v. Heights Tower Serv., Inc., 290 F. Supp.\\n\\n 10Other employees submitted declarations indicating that their timecards did not include commute time and\\nthat they usually did not take a bona fide meal break.\\n 11A different regulation suggests that where there is an agreement between the parties to treat non-\\ncompensable time, such as bona fide meal time, as “work” that is subject to the overtime requirements of the FLSA,\\nthat time would be included as “work” in the calculation of unpaid overtime. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.320. However,\\nthe district court did not rely on any agreement between the parties, and neither party briefs this issue on appeal.\\nRather, the district court focused only on whether Defendants had a custom or practice of paying for commute and\\nlunch time, not whether there was an agreement to treat the time as hours worked under the FLSA.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 21\\n\\n\\n3d 822, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“In other words, a custom, practice, or contract of paying for\\nordinary home-to-work commuting cannot make that travel time into hours worked if it would\\nnot have been characterized as such before Congress passed the PPA.”); Shearer v. Edger\\nAssocs. Inc., No. 8:14-CV-2689-T-27JSS, 2015 WL 9274928, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2015)\\n(“As discussed, Defendants’ policy to compensate Shearer for her commute time from home to\\nthe first work site and from the last work site home does not make those hours ‘worked’ for\\npurposes of the FLSA.”); Gilmer v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., No. C 08-05186 CW,\\n2010 WL 289299, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010) (“Thus, the exceptions to the Portal Act do not\\nrender compensable time that would not otherwise have been compensable under the FLSA. . . .\\nAccordingly, Plaintiffs’ start-end travel time, even if they were paid for it, would not be included\\nin computing their hours worked for overtime purposes if it were considered travel from work to\\nhome.”); Johnson v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, 554 F. Supp. 2d 693, 707 (E.D. Tex. 2007)\\n(“A review of the applicable regulations and case law on this issue leads the court to conclude\\nthat, because the travel at issue in this case was ordinary home-to-work travel, such travel did not\\nqualify as hours worked, even if RGIS had a custom or practice of paying for it.”).\\n\\n The regulations and district court cases applying them are persuasive and a reasonable\\ninterpretation of the statutes. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“[R]ulings,\\ninterpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the\\ncourts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to\\nwhich courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a\\nparticular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its\\nreasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give\\nit power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). Accordingly, we adopt their interpretation.\\n\\n Here, the district court determined that ordinary commute time and meal time that was\\nincluded in Defendants’ records qualified as compensable hours under the FLSA and, therefore,\\nthe court did not determine, and the Secretary did not calculate, the amount of ordinary commute\\ntime and bona fide meal time included in the records used to calculate unpaid overtime. This\\nwas error. Any ordinary commute and bona fide meal time that can be established must not be\\nincluded in determining how many hours of overtime each employee worked, although\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 22\\n\\n\\nDefendants may not use the amounts paid for those otherwise non-compensable work periods as\\nan offset against the amounts owed. See Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901, 913\\n(9th Cir. 2004); Reich v. Lucas Enterprises, Inc., 2 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we\\nvacate the grant of summary judgment on damages and remand for further proceedings.12\\n\\n Given our disposition of this issue, we need not address Defendants’ remaining\\narguments on damages. However, in the interest of judicial economy, we note that the district\\ncourt was correct in rejecting Defendants’ argument that “industry aggregate data” should be\\nused to determine unpaid overtime rather than Defendants’ payroll records. Defendants’\\nproposed calculation method focuses not on the employees’ actual rate, see 29 U.S.C. § 207\\n(requiring employers to pay an employee “not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at\\nwhich he is employed” for hours worked over 40 in a workweek (emphasis added)), but rather\\nthe rate at which other employees at different companies with potentially vastly different job\\nduties and experience are paid. Because there is no support for applying this methodology, the\\ndistrict court correctly rejected this argument at the summary-judgment stage. See Acosta v. Off\\nDuty Police Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 1050, 1065 (6th Cir. 2019) (“The reasonableness of the DOL’s\\nproposed calculation depends in part on the availability of other, more reasonable alternatives to\\nthat proposal. . . . Although the calculation adopted by the district court may be imprecise, it is\\nthe best method available in light of ODPS’s failure to maintain accurate and complete\\nrecords.”).\\n\\n D. Liquidated Damages\\n\\n The FLSA provides that “[a]ny employer who violates [the FLSA’s minimum wage or\\novertime provisions] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected” in the amount of the\\nunpaid overtime compensation “and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”\\n29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Despite the mandatory wording of that section, Congress has authorized\\n\\n\\n 12The Secretary argued to the district court that even if Defendants’ employees’ travel time and lunch\\nbreaks were included in the recorded hours, Defendants did not meet their burden to negate the reasonableness of the\\nSecretary’s damages computations, that there was an agreement to treat these hours as hours worked, and that\\nDefendants did not establish that the travel time did not constitute work time or that their employees received bona\\nfide meal breaks. The district court did not address any of these arguments, and the Secretary does not argue these\\nalternative bases for affirmance on appeal. Accordingly, we leave these issues to the district court.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 23\\n\\n\\ndistrict courts to reduce or decline to award liquidated damages under the FLSA “if the employer\\nshows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in\\ngood faith and that [the employer] had reasonable grounds for believing that [the] act or\\nomission was not a violation of the” FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 260. “This burden on the employer is\\nsubstantial and requires ‘proof that [the employer’s] failure to obey the statute was both in good\\nfaith and predicated upon such reasonable grounds that it would be unfair to impose upon [it]\\nmore than a compensatory verdict.’” Elwell v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care Servs., 276 F.3d 832,\\n840 (6th Cir. 2002) (alterations in original) (quoting McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 322\\n(6th Cir. 1971)).\\n\\n “To prove that it acted in good faith, an employer ‘must show that [it] took affirmative\\nsteps to ascertain the Act’s requirements, but nonetheless violated its provisions.’” Martin v.\\nInd. Mich. Power Co., 381 F.3d 574, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting\\nMartin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 908 (3d. Cir. 1991)). Establishing that the\\nemployer did not willfully misclassify an employee is insufficient to show good faith. Id. (citing\\nElwell, 276 F.3d at 841 n.5). Rather, “[t]he employer has an affirmative duty to ascertain and\\nmeet the FLSA’s requirements, and an employer who negligently misclassifies an employee as\\nexempt is not acting in good faith.” Id. (citing Elwell, 276 F.3d at 841 n.5)\\n\\n Defendants argue that because Payne reasonably and in good faith relied on his\\naccountant’s advice that logging companies are exempt from the overtime provisions of the\\nFLSA, the district court erred in concluding that it had no discretion to decline to award or to\\nreduce the liquidated damages. Defendants further argue that Timberline’s pay structure\\nresulting in higher-than-average compensation for its employees makes an award of liquidated\\ndamages particularly unjust.\\n\\n Defendants have not presented sufficient evidence to meet their substantial burden to\\nprove both good faith and reasonable grounds for the incorrect classification. As to the drivers,\\nshop workers, and office workers, Payne himself testified that he knew these employees were not\\nagricultural workers. Although Payne attempted to justify exempting his drivers and shop\\nworkers under the MCA exemption, Payne never sought advice for this decision or took any\\nother active steps to inform himself regarding this determination. Further, he acknowledged that\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 24\\n\\n\\nhis drivers never crossed state lines, and he was not able to explain any reasonable grounds he\\nmay have had for determining that the MCA exemption applied to purely intrastate drivers.\\nThus, Defendants have not met their substantial burden to prove both good faith and reasonable\\ngrounds for the incorrect classification of Timberline’s drivers, shop workers, and office\\nworkers.\\n\\n Defendants’ employees performing harvesting and logging duties present a closer\\nquestion. Taking Payne’s testimony as true, he talked to Rooyakker on several occasions about\\nwhether the agricultural exemption applied. Although caselaw usually cites discussions with\\nattorneys or government officials as evidence of good faith, see, e.g., Elwell, 276 F.3d at 841\\n(“Nor has University suggested that it was relying on the expertise or opinion of any other person\\nor entity with knowledge of the FLSA regulations, including its attorney or the Department of\\nLabor.”); Featsent v. City of Youngstown, 70 F.3d 900, 906-07 (6th Cir. 1995); Steele v. Leasing\\nEnterprises, Ltd., 826 F.3d 237, 246-47 (5th Cir. 2016), some cases have extended this rationale\\nto accountants, see Copantitla v. Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 253, 316-17\\n(S.D.N.Y. 2011). However, several undisputed facts weigh against finding that Defendants\\ncould meet their burden here. First, Payne knew that Rooyakker’s advice was flawed or\\nincomplete, at least with respect to truck drivers and office workers. Second, Payne never\\ndiscussed any of his employees’ duties with Rooyakker such that Payne could reasonably believe\\nthat Rooyakker was advising that specific employees were exempt. And third, Rooyakker did\\nnot hold himself out as an expert in FLSA matters, and indeed never provided anyone else with\\nadvice on such matters.\\n\\n Further, Defendants do not attempt to explain on appeal how a determination that any of\\ntheir employees fell under the agricultural exemption was reasonable. The district court\\nsummarily rejected that the agricultural exemption applied; Defendants do not raise this issue on\\nappeal; and Defendants’ briefing regarding liquidated damages focuses primarily on the MCA\\nexemption. Under these circumstances, Payne’s general discussions with Rooyakker are\\ninsufficient as a matter of law for Defendants to meet their heavy burden to prove both good\\nfaith and reasonable grounds for the incorrect classification. See Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720,\\n726 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that advice of an accountant that compensation scheme was legal\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 25\\n\\n\\neight to ten years prior to trial was insufficient to meet employer’s burden where the employer\\n“never sought an opinion from an attorney or the relevant government agency regarding the\\nlegality of” the compensation scheme and did not read government literature regarding wage and\\nhour laws).\\n\\n Finally, as the district court explained, Defendants’ argument that they compensated their\\nemployees above the industry average is irrelevant to whether they met their burden to establish\\ngood faith and reasonable grounds for the determination that Timberline’s employees were\\nexempt from overtime coverage. If they had established both of those prongs, the district court\\ncould consider the overall compensation in the exercise of its discretion in awarding liquidated\\ndamages. But having failed to meet their burden, this argument is misplaced.\\n\\n Accordingly, the district court correctly held that it had no discretion to award liquidated\\ndamages in an amount less than the amount of unpaid overtime compensation. See 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 216(b). However, because the amount of unpaid overtime compensation owed may change\\nafter further proceedings, we vacate the amount awarded for liquidated damages and remand for\\nrecalculation after further proceedings.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the reasons stated, we affirm the grant of summary judgment as to liability, including\\non the issue of liquidated damages, vacate the award of damages, and remand for further\\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384674/\", \"author_raw\": \"HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SUTTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WHITE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DONALD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SUTTON\": \", Circuit\", \"WHITE\": \", Circuit\", \"DONALD\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607421/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: SECRETARY OF LABOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TIMBERLINE SOUTH, LLC; Jim Payne, Defendants-Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0063p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n SECRETARY OF LABOR, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n > No. 18-1763\n v. │\n │\n │\n TIMBERLINE SOUTH, LLC; JIM PAYNE, │\n Defendants-Appellants. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City.\n No. 1:16-cv-11552—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge.\n\n Argued: March 14, 2019\n\n Decided and Filed: April 5, 2019\n\n Before: SUTTON, WHITE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: Jeffrey S. Theuer, LOOMIS, EWERT, PARSLEY, DAVIS & GOTTING, P.C.,\nLansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Sarah J. Starrett, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\nLABOR, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey S. Theuer, LOOMIS, EWERT,\nPARSLEY, DAVIS & GOTTING, P.C., Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Sarah J. Starrett,\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Timberline South, LLC (Timberline) is a\ntimber-harvesting company that operates solely in Michigan, but uses logging and harvesting\nequipment and trucks that were manufactured outside of Michigan. The Secretary of Labor (the\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 2\n\n\nSecretary) brought this action against Timberline and its director, Jim Payne, alleging violations\nof the overtime and recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).\n\n The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, and awarded\n$439,437.42 in unpaid overtime and an equal amount in liquidated damages. The district court\nreasoned that Timberline was a covered enterprise under the FLSA because it “has employees\nhandling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or\nproduced for commerce by any person,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i), i.e., the logging and\nharvesting equipment manufactured outside of Michigan. Part of the damages award included\ntime employees spent commuting from home to work or for meal periods, which the district\ncourt included in the overtime calculation after finding that Timberline had an established\ncustom or practice of compensating its employees for such time.\n\n Defendants appeal, arguing that the district court erred in finding liability and awarding\nunpaid overtime and liquidated damages. We affirm the district court’s liability determination.\nHowever, because the district court erred in finding that ordinary commute time and bona fide\nmeal periods qualify as compensable hours subject to the FLSA’s overtime requirements, we\nvacate the award of damages and remand for further proceedings.\n\n I.\n\n Timberline was formed in 2010 as a Michigan limited liability company. Payne is an\nofficer of Timberline and directs all of its operations. Timberline removes raw timber from\nforests, cuts the timber, and transports the timber to mills for processing into paper and other\nproducts. Timberline maintains two to four worksites, each with approximately four equipment\noperators who cut down trees, cut the timber into lengths, and transport the timber to a landing\nsite. Timberline also employs six to eight truck drivers, who load the timber at the landing site\nand transport it to the mills, as well as mechanics and an office manager. Timberline’s\nequipment operators use heavy, specialized machinery, including harvesters and hydro-axes to\ncut down trees and cut the trees into lengths, and forwarders and skidders to transport the timber\nto the landing site or to load trucks. All of Timberline’s business activities occur in Michigan: it\nharvests timber in Michigan; it transports timber to mills located only in Michigan; it entered\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 3\n\n\ninto contracts for cutting timber in Michigan; and it purchased its trucks and heavy equipment\nfrom Michigan sellers. Although purchased and used only in Michigan, Timberline’s trucks and\nheavy equipment were manufactured outside of Michigan.\n\n Payne established Timberline’s compensation and recordkeeping practices. Timberline\npaid its employees using a daily rate, an hourly rate, or a cord 1 rate. Timberline recorded hours\nworked for hourly employees but did not do so for most non-hourly employees, and did not pay\nits employees an overtime rate for hours worked over 40 in a week.\n\n Timberline was founded after a previous company, Timberline Logging, Inc. (Timberline\nLogging), went out of business. In February 2011, Payne instructed his office manager to email\nMatthew Rooyakker, Timberline Logging’s accountant, regarding whether Timberline Logging\nwas exempt from paying overtime “under FLSA in Tennessee.” (R. 18-12, PID 1674.)2 Payne\nalso testified that he discussed FLSA coverage with his accountant on “a couple different\noccasions” “awhile back,” “before the investigation” that led to this lawsuit. (R. 19-12, PID\n2273.) According to Payne, Rooyakker told him that “we were exempt under agriculture” (id. at\nPID 2274), although Rooyakker had not held himself out as knowledgeable about the FLSA, and\nPayne did not believe that his truck drivers or office workers were agricultural employees.\nPayne did not consult with an attorney.\n\n Defendants took the position in this lawsuit that the Motor Carrier Act exemption,\n29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1), exempts some of Timberline’s employees from FLSA coverage. In\nresponse to the Secretary’s interrogatories about this exemption, Defendants stated that they\nrelied upon the “FLSA and publications prepared by Plaintiff” in determining that that the Motor\nCarrier Act exemption applied, but Payne did not recall which publications he relied on and was\nnot able to explain why his drivers and their helpers were exempt if the drivers only drove\nintrastate routes. (R. 18-4, PID 271-81.)\n\n Rooyakker testified that the only time he provided advice regarding the FLSA was at a\nmeeting with Payne on February 17, 2011. At that meeting, in response to Timberline Logging’s\n\n 1A cord is a standard measurement of wood.\n 2Timberline Logging performed work in Tennessee, but Timberline did not.\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 4\n\n\ninquiry, Rooyakker told Payne that it appeared that “you’re exempt” under the agricultural\nexemption. (R. 18-13, PID 1702.) Rooyakker testified that he did not advise which of\nTimberline Logging’s or Timberline’s employees were subject to the FLSA’s agricultural\nexemption and never opined whether either entity’s employees in Michigan may also be exempt.\n\n Wage and Hour Investigator Jeffrey Wrona of the Department of Labor (DOL)\ninvestigated Timberline for wage and recordkeeping violations for the time period of August 25,\n2013 through August 20, 2015, later extended through March 20, 2017. After assessing unpaid\novertime wages, the Secretary of Labor filed a complaint alleging that Defendants had violated\nthe overtime and recordkeeping provisions of the FLSA, and sought an injunction, back wages,\nand liquidated damages.\n\n The district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment in part and\ndenied Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, granted the Secretary’s motion to\namend the complaint to include additional employees and FLSA violations that had occurred\nduring 2016 and 2017, awarded liquidated damages, and ordered further briefing by the parties\non the amount of backpay.\n\n After two rounds of supplemental briefing, the district court issued a final summary\njudgment decision awarding $439,437.42 in backpay damages and an equal amount in liquidated\ndamages. This appeal followed.\n\n II.\n\n This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing all evidence and\ndrawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pearce v.\nChrysler Grp. LLC Pension Plan, 893 F.3d 339, 345 (6th Cir. 2018).3 Summary judgment is\n\n\n\n 3The Secretary argues that we should review the district court’s decision to award liquidated damages for\nan abuse of discretion, but in making that argument the Secretary relies on cases involving liquidated damages\nawarded after a trial. Here, the district court decided the issue on summary judgment and found that it had no\ndiscretion as a matter of law to decline to award or reduce the amount of liquidated damages. Hence, our review is\nde novo. See Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Although we generally review a\ndistrict court’s decision on liquidated damages for abuse of discretion, we review the issue here, which was decided\nbelow on summary judgment, de novo.” (internal citation omitted)).\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 5\n\n\nappropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is\nentitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\n\n A. Enterprise Coverage and the Handling Clause\n\n The FLSA requires, among other things, that a qualifying enterprise pay certain\nemployees overtime pay at one and one-half times their regular rate for each hour above 40\nworked in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). At issue in this appeal is whether Timberline is “an\nenterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” defined as\n\n an enterprise that--\n (A)(i) has employees engaged in commerce4 or in the production of goods5 for\n commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on\n goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any\n person; and\n (ii) is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done\n is not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level that are\n separately stated);\n\n29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A).\n\n There is no dispute that Timberline is an “enterprise” under § 203(r)(1),6 qualifies as an\n“employer” under § 203(d),7 and had an annual gross volume of sales in excess of $500,000 for\neach relevant year, § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). Nor did the Secretary argue that Timberline was a\ncovered enterprise because it had “employees engaged in commerce or in the production of\n\n\n 4‘“Commerce’ means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several\nStates or between any State and any place outside thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(b).\n 5“‘Goods’ means goods (including ships and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities,\nmerchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof, but does not\ninclude goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a\nproducer, manufacturer, or processor thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(i).\n 6‘“Enterprise’ means the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control)\nby any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one\nor more establishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including departments of an\nestablishment operated through leasing arrangements, but shall not include the related activities performed for such\nenterprise by an independent contractor. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1).\n 7‘“Employer’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to\nan employee and includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization (other than when acting as an\nemployer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 6\n\n\ngoods for commerce.” § 203(s)(1)(A)(i). Rather, the parties disagree about whether Timberline\n“has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been\nmoved in or produced for commerce by any person,” id., often referred to as the “handling\nclause.”\n\n As originally enacted, the FLSA covered certain employees but did not encompass\nenterprise-wide coverage. That concept was added in 1961. See Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2, 75 Stat.\n65, 65-66 (1961). “After the [1961] amendment, if an employer had two or more workers\nengaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce, FLSA coverage extended to all\nof the enterprise’s employees.” Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 616 F.3d 1217, 1220\n(11th Cir. 2010) (citing Dunlop v. Indus. Am. Corp., 516 F.2d 498, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1975)).\nIncluded in the 1961 amendment was the addition of the handling clause. In 1974, Congress\nclarified that the handling clause was an independent basis for enterprise coverage8 and added\n“or materials” to that clause. See id. at 1220-21. “Materials” is not defined in the statute.\n“Goods” is, however, and contains what is often called the “ultimate-consumer exception,”\nexcluding from the definition “goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of\nthe ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof.”\n29 U.S.C. § 203(i). The district court held that Timberline is a covered enterprise under the\nhandling clause because Timberline’s employees’ use of logging and harvesting equipment\nmanufactured outside of Michigan constitutes “handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods\nor materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person.”\n§ 203(s)(1)(A)(i).\n\n Defendants argue that Timberline is not a covered enterprise because the only thing\nTimberline’s employees “handle” is timber, which never crosses state lines; and that even if they\n“handled” the logging and harvesting equipment, that equipment does not qualify as “materials,”\nbut rather qualifies as “goods,” and that Timberline is the ultimate consumer of those goods such\nthat the FLSA does not apply. (Appellants’ Br. at 11-14, 16-18.) Further, Defendants argue that\n\n 8Between the 1961 and 1974 amendments, coverage extended to enterprises with “employees engaged in\ncommerce or in the production of goods for commerce, including employees handling, selling, or otherwise working\non goods that have been moved in or produced for commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970) (emphasis added). The\n1974 amendment replaced “including” with “or.”\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 7\n\n\nfinding enterprise coverage in this case “would effectively erase the commerce requirement\nnecessary for FLSA jurisdiction” because “[e]very business uses computers made overseas, or\npencils and pens made out of state, or copiers, paper, or telephones made in other jurisdictions.”\n(Appellants’ Br. at 14.)\n\n We begin our analysis of the “handling clause” with the language of the statute.\nBrilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc’ns, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2007). “If\nthe language of the statute is clear, then the inquiry is complete, and the court should look no\nfurther. Only if the statute is ‘inescapably ambiguous’ should a court look to other persuasive\nauthority in an attempt to discern legislative meaning.” Id. (citations omitted).\n\n The plain language of the statute contradicts Defendants’ arguments that Timberline is\nnot a covered enterprise because “[t]he only good or material that Timberline handles, sells, or\notherwise works on within the meaning of the FLSA, is the timber itself,” and because\nTimberline’s employees “did not place th[e logging and harvesting] equipment in commerce\nthemselves.” (Appellants’ Br. at 12.) We find no merit to these arguments because it is not\nrelevant under the statute that Timberline employees did not place the logging and harvesting\nequipment in commerce themselves; the plain language of the statute provides coverage where\nemployees handle, sell, or otherwise work on “goods or materials that have been moved in or\nproduced for commerce by any person.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). “The\ntense is in the past. There is no requirement of continuity in the present.” Polycarpe, 616 F.3d\nat 1221 (quoting Brennan v. Greene’s Propane Gas Serv., Inc., 479 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir.\n1973)). Further, the statute makes clear that it applies when any person—not just the employees\nof the enterprise—has moved or produced the handled goods or materials in commerce. Because\nthe logging and harvesting equipment had previously been moved in and produced for commerce\nby others prior to being handled by Timberline employees, this part of the statute is satisfied.\n\n Less clear is whether the logging and harvesting equipment constitute “goods” or\n“materials” and whether Timberline is the ultimate consumer of the logging and harvesting\nequipment such that if the logging and harvesting equipment qualify as goods and not materials,\nthe ultimate-consumer exception operates to exclude Timberline from coverage. “[P]recisely\ndetermining the correct ordinary meaning of ‘materials’ for the FLSA is challenging because the\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 8\n\n\nFLSA’s statutory definition of ‘goods’ is so expansive, ostensibly including some items that\ncould also fall under the ordinary meaning of ‘materials.’” Id. at 1223. Thus, we may look to\nother sources to determine the meaning, including “interpretations by other courts, legislative\nhistory, policy rationales, and the context in which the statute was passed.” Brilliance Audio,\n474 F.3d at 371-72.\n\n As an initial matter, we have previously explained that the FLSA “was enacted by\nCongress to be a broadly remedial and humanitarian statute. The Act was designed to correct\n‘labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for\nhealth, efficiency, and general well-being of workers . . .’” Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114,\n1116 (6th Cir. 1984) (alteration in original) (quoting Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d\n139, 143 (6th Cir. 1977)). “[T]he FLSA, as a statute designed to protect individual rights, . . .\n‘must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.’” Herman v. Fabri-Centers of\nAm., Inc., 308 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda\nLocal No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)).\n\n Several of our sister circuits have addressed similar situations and have suggested that the\naddition of “or materials” to the handling clause essentially rendered the ultimate-consumer\nexception obsolete. In Brock v. Hamad, the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant’s rental\noperation was a covered enterprise where the defendant stipulated that he “had bought goods that\nhad been moved in interstate commerce and that these goods had been used in the course of his\nemployees’ employment.” 867 F.2d 804, 807-08 (4th Cir. 1989). Rejecting the defendant’s\nargument that the rental operation was the ultimate consumer of these goods so that coverage did\nnot extend to it, the Fourth Circuit explained: “Hamad’s argument, however, erroneously isolates\nSection 203(i)[‘s definition of ‘goods’] from the remainder of the FLSA. When Section 203(i) is\nread in context with Section 203(s), which covers ‘employees handling, selling, or otherwise\nworking on goods or materials,’ it seems that defendant’s argument must fail.” Id. at 807; see\nalso id. at 808 (“[I]t is well established that local business activities fall within the FLSA when\nan enterprise employs workers who handle goods or materials that have moved or have been\nproduced in interstate commerce.”); Dole v. Odd Fellows Home Endowment Bd., 912 F.2d 689,\n695 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Appellants’ contention that the Home was in some sense the ‘ultimate\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 9\n\n\nconsumer’ of the goods and materials that moved in interstate commerce does not preclude\napplication of the Act.” (citing Hamad, 867 F.2d at 807-08)).\n\n Similarly, the Third Circuit held that a company “engaged in the business of collecting\ngarbage, trash, and scrap metal” was a covered enterprise. Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748,\n750 (3d Cir. 1982). The defendant argued that its use of “motor vehicles, gas, oil, and other\nmanufactured goods” did not result in FLSA coverage because it was the ultimate consumer of\nthose goods. Id. at 751. The Third Circuit rejected that argument, relying heavily on the\nlegislative history in concluding that the company was a covered enterprise. Id. at 751-52 (citing\nS. Rep. No. 93–690, at 17 (1974), which explains that the amendment “adds the words ‘or\nmaterials’ after the word ‘goods’ to make clear the Congressional intent to include within this\nadditional basis of coverage the handling of goods consumed in the employer’s business, as, e.g.,\nthe soap used by a laundry”).\n\n The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion regarding a real-estate developer whose\nemployees used construction machinery for “removing and thinning trees, clearing brush,\ngrading and contouring the land for streets and drainage, installing culverts, pouring concrete for\ncurbs and laying asphalt.” Donovan v. Pointon, 717 F.2d 1320, 1322 (10th Cir. 1983). Although\nthe defendant had acquired the machinery from within the same state in which the equipment\nwas used, the Tenth Circuit explained that fact was\n\n irrelevant to a determination of whether [the defendant] is a covered\n employer. The critical issue is whether the goods or materials handled by [the\n defendant] and his employees had moved in interstate commerce, and, in this\n regard, it is undisputed that they did. “Using” goods or materials which have\n moved in interstate commerce constitutes a “handling” within the meaning of\n 29 U.S.C. § 203(s).\n\nId. at 1322-23 (internal citations omitted); see also Donovan v. Scoles, 652 F.2d 16, 18-19 (9th\nCir. 1981) (gas station engaged in purely intrastate activities is a covered enterprise because the\nFLSA “imposes no requirement that the goods have a present involvement in interstate\ncommerce when they are handled or sold. Instead it broadens coverage to include all employees\nwithin the stream of commerce of such goods, even if their own participation remains purely\nintrastate.”); Brennan v. Iowa, 494 F.2d 100, 101, 103 n.5, 104 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 10\n\n\nhospitals and schools were subject to the FLSA because “many employees handle articles which\nhave moved in interstate commerce,” including drugs, cleaning supplies, food, and laundry\nsupplies); Indus. Am. Corp., 516 F.2d at 501-02, 502 n.8 (explaining that the 1974 “amendment\nleaves the definition of goods intact but circumvents it by a broader definition of ‘enterprise\nengaged in commerce,’” which had the effect of expanding the FLSA “to every enterprise in the\nnation doing” the requisite volume of business); Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc., 997 F. Supp.\n504, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Sotomayor, J.) (explaining that the 1974 amendments to the FLSA\nresulted in “virtually every enterprise” doing the requisite volume of business being covered by\nthe FLSA, and holding that sanitations crews’ use of “bags, brooms, shovels, pails, scrapers . . .\nradios, books . . . [and] flashlights” that had moved in interstate commerce resulted in FLSA\nenterprise coverage (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).\n\n In recent years, the Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue at length, extracting a definition\nof “materials” from the FLSA by considering the plain language of the statute, legislative\nhistory, and the DOL’s interpretation. Polycarpe, 616 F.3d at 1221-27. In its view, courts could\nnot properly assume that Congress intended to overrule the ultimate-consumer exception\ncontained in the definition of “goods” with the addition of “materials” to the statute. Doing so, it\nsaid, would violate a basic principle of statutory interpretation by not giving effect to all the\nwords in the statute. Id. at 1222-23.\n\n The court thus considered two ordinary definitions of “materials” potentially applicable\nin the FLSA context and adopted one for purposes of the handling clause:\n\n One definition views “materials” as the “apparatus (as tools or other articles)\n necessary for doing or making something.” A second definition defines\n “materials” as “the basic matter (as metal, wood, plastic, fiber) from which the\n whole or the greater part of something physical (as a machine, tool, building,\n fabric) is made.” Looking only to the word’s ordinary meaning, it seems that\n “materials” as used in the FLSA could potentially include items used in\n performing actions or services (e.g. describing pen and paper as “writing\n materials”), items that serve as a component of something else, or both.\n But precisely determining the correct ordinary meaning of “materials” for the\n FLSA is challenging because the FLSA’s statutory definition of “goods” is so\n expansive, ostensibly including some items that could also fall under the ordinary\n meaning of “materials.” Much of the FLSA’s definition of “goods” is comprised,\n it seems, of synonyms for items sold by a business: “goods . . . , wares, products,\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 11\n\n\n commodities, merchandise, or articles . . . .” But Congress’s expressed definition\n for “goods” also includes “or any part or ingredient thereof.” The plain text of\n this last phrase indicates to us that, of the two ordinary meanings that we\n identified for “materials,” the second one—the one involving constituent parts—\n overlaps with part of the statutory definition of “goods.”\n We must interpret the FLSA in a way that Congress’s 1974 addition of the words\n “or materials” does not impliedly repeal the unchanged “goods” definition or that\n definition’s ultimate-consumer exception. Therefore, we believe that the most\n accurate view of Congress’s intent for the interplay between “goods” and\n “materials” in the FLSA—one that does not impliedly repeal some of the statutory\n definition of “goods”—is to read “materials” in the FLSA this way: “materials” in\n the FLSA means tools or other articles necessary for doing or making\n something. We believe that this interpretation is true to the ordinary meaning of\n “materials” and avoids conflict with the statutory “goods” definition.\n\nId. at 1223-24 (alterations in original) (internal citations and footnote omitted). The court also\nexplained that to be considered “materials,” an item “must have a significant connection with the\nemployer’s commercial activity; the business may not just somehow internally and incidentally\nconsume the item.” Id. at 1226. “This requirement,” the court reasoned, “is compelled because\nthe statute covers not all ‘goods’ and ‘materials,’ but only ‘goods’ and ‘materials’ that a\ncompany is engaged in ‘handling, selling, or otherwise working on.’” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.\n§ 203(s)(1)(A)(i)).\n\n Polycarpe cautioned that the same items could be goods in one case, materials in another,\nand neither goods nor materials in still another case, depending on the use of the item in the\ncontext of each case. “Where a catering business uses the china plates at a client’s banquet, the\nplates count as part of the ‘materials’ necessary for serving a catered meal. But, where a\ndepartment store sells the same china plates as stand-alone items, the plates count as ‘goods’ for\nthat retailer.” Id. Those same plates hung as decorations on the lobby wall of an accounting\nfirm, however, constitute neither goods nor materials “because the plates have no significant\nconnection to the business’s accounting work.” Id.\n\n We find the reasoning of Polycarpe persuasive because it gives effect to “materials”\nwithout totally overlapping with the statutory definition of “goods” and thus displacing the\nultimate-consumer exception contained within that definition. See Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660,\n667 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Every word in the statute is presumed to have meaning, and we must give\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 12\n\n\neffect all the words to avoid an interpretation which would render words superfluous or\nredundant.” (citations omitted)); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987)\n(“[R]epeals by implication are not favored and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is\nclear and manifest.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).\n\n Applying the definition of “materials” from Polycarpe, the logging and harvesting\nequipment used by Timberline’s employees plainly constitute “materials” because the equipment\nis necessary to cut down trees and transport the timber, which in turn have a significant\nconnection to Timberline’s commercial activities of harvesting and selling timber.\n\n Defendants disagree with Polycarpe’s analysis, arguing that it erroneously “relied upon a\nsimple alternate definition” of “materials” rather than other definitions that would be “more\nconsistent with the language of the FLSA,” such as “constituent parts of a whole, or elements of\nsomething else,” or the “material components that make up” “the thing being produced by the\nenterprise.” (Reply at 1, 3-4.) However, Defendants’ proffered definition of “materials” has not\nbeen adopted by other circuits; and because “goods” includes in its definition “any part or\ningredient [of goods],” 29 U.S.C. § 203(i), Defendants’ definition would render both terms\nredundant.\n\n Defendants also argue that Polycarpe’s definition of “materials” is limited to items\nprovided by an employer to its customers or “incorporated into products as part of the defendant\nemployer’s services, such as paint used by a construction company, shutter blades for a window\nshutter manufacturer, [or] burglar alarms installed by a security company.” (Appellants’ Br. at\n13.) Defendants read Polycarpe too narrowly. Polycarpe remanded all but one of the cases9 to\nthe district court to determine whether the items at issue were moved in or produced for interstate\ncommerce and, if so, whether those items constitute “goods” or “materials.” 616 F.3d at 1229.\nSome of the items at issue in Polycarpe are analogous to the logging and harvesting equipment\nin this case, such as lawnmowers, edgers, and trucks used by a landscaping company. Id. at\n1228. On remand, the district court held that the landscaping company was a covered enterprise\n\n\n 9Polycarpe affirmed one judgment in one case in favor of the defendants because the evidence at trial did\nnot establish that the business met the volume requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). 616 F.3d at 1229.\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 13\n\n\nbecause the trucks it used were “materials” rather than “goods.” Polycarpe v. E & S\nLandscaping Serv., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2011).\n\n Finally, under these facts, we need not extensively address Defendants’ argument that\nfinding FLSA coverage in this case would “effectively erase the commerce requirement\nnecessary for FLSA jurisdiction” because “[e]very business uses computers made overseas, or\npencils and pens made out of state.” (Appellants’ Br. at 14.) As an initial matter, the parties\npoint to no case where the DOL has attempted to enforce the statute in this manner. Further, the\ncourt in Polycarpe was apparently concerned with expanding coverage in this way and offered\nreasonable bases to reject any attempt to do so. First, the court noted that the terms, “handling,\nselling, or otherwise working on” “denote a connection to the employer’s . . . commercial\nactivity,” such that mere internal and incidental consumption of an item would not suffice to\nqualify. 616 F.3d at 1226. Second, it explained that DOL regulations instruct that employees\nmust handle or work on the goods or materials “regularly and recurrently” for enterprise\ncoverage to attach. Id. at 1226 n.7 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 779.238). Regardless, coverage here is\nnot premised on employees’ incidental use of office items; rather, it is premised on employees’\nregular and recurrent use of logging and harvesting equipment that is used to carry out the\ncompany’s commercial activity of harvesting timber.\n\n Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Timberline is a covered enterprise\nunder the FLSA’s handling clause.\n\n B. Motor Carrier Act Exemption\n\n Next, Defendants challenge the district court’s determination that Timberline’s truck\ndrivers and their helpers are not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions pursuant to\n29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1), which exempts from coverage “any employee with respect to whom the\nSecretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service\npursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49.” The Motor Carrier Act (MCA) provides\nthat the “Secretary of Transportation may prescribe requirements for” “(1) qualifications and\nmaximum hours of service of employees of, and safety of operation and equipment of, a motor\ncarrier”; and “(2) qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of, and standards of\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 14\n\n\nequipment of, a motor private carrier, when needed to promote safety of operation.” 49 U.S.C.\n§ 31502(b). “Motor carrier” is defined as a “person who provides motor vehicle transportation\nfor compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). Defendants do not contend that Timberline is a\nmotor carrier. Rather, Defendants argue that Timberline is a “motor private carrier,” defined as a\nperson who transports property or goods in interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(15).\nConsistent with these statutory definitions, this court has previously explained that “[t]he\nMCA . . . gives the Secretary of Transportation ‘the authority to regulate the hours of an\nemployee (1) who works for a private motor carrier that provides transportation in interstate\ncommerce and (2) whose work activities affect the safety of operation of that motor\ncarrier.’” Vaughn v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 291 F.3d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting\nTroutt v. Stavola Bros., Inc., 107 F.3d 1104, 1106-07 (4th Cir. 1997)).\n\n Exemptions from the FLSA’s overtime provisions requirements are narrowly construed\nagainst the employer, and the employer bears the burden of proving that it qualifies for a\nclaimed exemption. Martin v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 381 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2004); see also\nMazzarella v. Fast Rig Support, LLC, 823 F.3d 786, 790-91 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that the\nMCA exemption is narrowly construed against the employer); Deherrera v. Decker Truck Line,\nInc., 820 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016) (same); Abel v. S. Shuttle Servs., Inc., 631 F.3d 1210,\n1212 (11th Cir. 2011) (same).\n\n Defendants argue that some of Timberline’s employees are exempt from coverage\nbecause Timberline’s trucks are operated under U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)\nregistration numbers and its drivers maintain commercial driver’s licenses, which they say are\nsufficient bases to find that the MCA exemption applies. In support of this argument,\nDefendants cite Finn v. Dean Transportation, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1043 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). In\nFinn, the district court held that a company was a motor private carrier where its drivers\ntransported ten percent of its goods in interstate commerce. Id. at 1056-57. In response to the\nemployee’s argument that the MCA exemption should not apply because the DOT had never\nexercised its authority to audit the company or to conduct roadside stops, the district court stated\nthat “Finn’s concession that the DOT had ‘some regulatory authority’ over his work as a driver\nis, standing alone, dispositive of this issue.” Id. at 1057. The district court then noted that the\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 15\n\n\ndriver “admits that he was required to hold a CDL, that DTI has a DOT registration number, that\nDTI was subject to DOT audit, that its vehicles could be stopped for inspection at any time, and\nthat DTI drivers were required to undergo a yearly physical (for which DTI paid).” Id. at 1057-\n58.\n\n Defendants read too much into Finn. Finn was exempt because his employer met the\ndefinition of a motor private carrier and was therefore subject to DOT regulation. Id. at 1055-56.\nWe have previously rejected an argument that the mere issuance of a certificate by the Interstate\nCommerce Commission (which regulated motor carriers prior to the DOT) was sufficient to\nbring employees within the MCA exemption when those employees drove only intrastate routes.\nSee Baird v. Wagoner Transp. Co., 425 F.2d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 1970); see also Mazzarella,\n823 F.3d at 792 (“The DOT certificate merely authorizes Defendants to engage in interstate\ntransportation. It provides no information about whether Defendants’ drivers actually drove\nacross state lines or otherwise engaged in interstate commerce.”).\n\n The dispositive inquiry here is not whether Timberline’s employees held commercial\ndriver’s licenses or whether its trucks had DOT registration numbers; rather, the dispositive\ninquiry is whether Timberline’s drivers transport goods in interstate commerce, thus rendering\nTimberline a motor private carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(15); Vaughn, 291 F.3d at 904. Courts\nhave consistently interpreted this to mean that drivers must travel or transport the goods across\nstate lines, or transport the goods in a “‘practical continuity of movement’ across State lines from\nthe point of origin to the point of departure.” 29 C.F.R. 782.7(b)(1) (quoting Walling v.\nJacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 568 (1943)); see also Baird, 425 F.2d at 413; Goldberg v.\nFaber Indus., Inc., 291 F.2d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 1961). Here, it is undisputed that Timberline’s\ntruck drivers did not cross state lines.\n\n Defendants nevertheless argue that Timberline’s drivers transport goods in “a practical\ncontinuity of movement” in interstate commerce because its timber “is an ingredient in the goods\nmanufactured by the mills to which it is delivered.” (Appellants’ Br. at 22.) Defendants,\nhowever, presented no evidence that their timber was eventually shipped in interstate commerce\nby the mills. To the contrary, Payne’s affidavit stated that Timberline has “no control over what\nis done with the timber delivered to the mills, nor do we know the eventual destination or use of\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 16\n\n\nthat timber.” (R. 19-3, PID 2080.) Further, even if the timber was used by the mills to make\nother products, such as paper, and then shipped across state lines, the fact that the timber was\naltered before crossing state lines weighs against finding the MCA exemption applicable. See\nMazzarella, 823 F.3d at 791-93 (citing Collins v. Heritage Wine Cellars, Ltd., 589 F.3d 895, 897\n(7th Cir. 2009)) (in considering whether drivers who transported water to hydraulic fracking sites\nwithin Pennsylvania were subject to MCA exemption, “whether the water is altered during the\nfracking process” would be relevant in determining whether there was a practical continuity of\nmovement in interstate commerce; MCA exemption did not apply because the defendant\nproduced no evidence concerning this or other relevant matters).\n\n Absent any evidence that Timberline’s drivers crossed state lines or transported goods as\npart of a practical continuity of movement in interstate commerce, the district court correctly\nfound that none of Timberline’s employees was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements\nunder the MCA exemption.\n\n C. Damages\n\n 1. Briefing Before the District Court\n\n Three rounds of briefing occurred before the district court granted summary judgment on\ndamages. In the Secretary’s original summary judgment brief, Investigator Wrona estimated that\nTimberline owed unpaid overtime of $468,595.80 for 50 employees. Wrona explained that he\nprimarily relied on Timberline’s payroll records to calculate unpaid overtime. However, because\nTimberline lacked hours-worked records for some employees, Wrona had to use other methods\nto reconstruct the hours those employees worked. Defendants argued in part that in extrapolating\nhours worked from the employees’ pay records, the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.\n§ 254(a), required a reduction in the number of hours for the time employees spent on meals and\nin traveling to and from their homes to their workplaces—hours for which the employees were\npaid, but which do not count as work. After the original summary judgment briefing, the district\ncourt rejected Defendants’ argument that the Portal-to-Portal Act required such a reduction,\nfinding that Defendants had an established custom or practice of compensating for such time.\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 17\n\n\nThe district court also ordered supplemental briefing to clarify inconsistencies in the record and\nto provide requested information in a specific format.\n\n In the Secretary’s first supplemental brief, he calculated revised unpaid overtime to be\n$454,684.73 for the 50 employees. The Secretary explained that 43 out of the 50 employees\nwere paid an hourly rate for their entire employment, and because Defendants kept records of\ntheir hours worked, “[c]omputing overtime for these employees is a simple case of arithmetic\nbased upon Defendants’ own records.” (R. 38, PID 3725-26.) The Secretary explained that he\ncomputed back wages for the remaining seven employees without complete hours-worked\nrecords by: “(1) averaging the number of hours similarly situated employees worked per week or\n(2) averaging the number of hours individual employees worked each workweek based upon\ntime records previously kept for each employee prior to Defendants changing the employee\ncompensation to non-hourly and ceas[ing] keeping the required records.” (Id. at PID 3726.) The\nSecretary also presented voluminous data showing how he arrived at the calculated unpaid\novertime. Defendants argued in response that the calculations performed by the Secretary for the\nnon-hourly employees lacked credibility because the calculations guessed at hours worked and\npay rate, contained errors, and led to absurd results because Defendants presented evidence that\ntheir employees were paid significantly more than the industry average.\n\n The district court noted certain discrepancies that required additional briefing but also\nrejected many of Defendants’ arguments that the data was inflated and that industry-aggregate\ndata should be used instead. It reasoned that “Defendants simply reassert their overarching\nargument that their compensation scheme resulted in compensation that far exceeded industry\naverages and, therefore, that they should be excused from their obligations under the FLSA\novertime provisions. They cite no authority for this proposition.” (R. 43, PID 4187.) The\ndistrict court also noted that Defendants were critiquing the Secretary’s “methodology largely by\ncherry picking particular workweeks with unusually high gross wages or unusually low gross\nwages” and were essentially attacking “the statistical concept of an average.” (Id. at PID 4188.)\n\n In the Secretary’s second supplemental brief regarding damages, the Secretary addressed\nthe district court’s identified concerns and recalculated unpaid overtime to $445,533.49, which\nreflected a change of unpaid overtime for three non-hourly employees and one hourly employee.\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 18\n\n\nDefendants responded by arguing that the Secretary’s third attempt still contained errors, which\nthey said evidenced a total lack of credibility in the Secretary’s calculations, and thus the district\ncourt should award no damages or use the industry-aggregate data to determine unpaid overtime.\nThey also reasserted their argument that the award should be reduced due to compensation for\ncommute and meal time.\n\n The district court made reductions to the Secretary’s claimed unpaid overtime to address\nerrors identified by Defendants, but otherwise rejected Defendants’ arguments. The district court\nawarded damages for unpaid overtime of $439,437.42, and an equal amount in liquidated\ndamages.\n\n 2. Arguments on Appeal\n\n On appeal, Defendants appear to make two legal arguments. First, Defendants argue that\nthe district court erred in not applying the Portal-to-Portal Act to reduce overtime owed by the\ntime the employees spent during meals and traveling to and from work. Second, Defendants\nargue that because each of the Secretary’s calculations of overtime contained errors and\ninconsistences, the Secretary failed to meet his burden to prove damages, and the district court\nshould have entered an award of no damages or ordered that industry-aggregate data be used to\narrive at a just and reasonable damages amount.\n\n 3. Analysis\n The Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254, provides in part:\n\n (a) Activities not compensable\n Except as provided in subsection (b), no employer shall be subject to any liability\n or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . on account of the\n failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an\n employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any of the following\n activities of such employee . . .\n (1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of\n performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is\n employed to perform, and\n (2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal\n activity or activities,\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 19\n\n\n which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such\n employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at\n which he ceases, such principal activity or activities. . . .\n\n (b) Compensability by contract or custom\n Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) which relieve an employer from\n liability and punishment with respect to any activity, the employer shall not be so\n relieved if such activity is compensable by . . .\n ....\n (2) a custom or practice in effect, at the time of such activity, at the\n establishment or other place where such employee is employed, covering\n such activity, not inconsistent with a written or nonwritten contract, in\n effect at the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or\n collective-bargaining representative and his employer.\n (c) Restriction on activities compensable under contract or custom\n For the purposes of subsection (b), an activity shall be considered as compensable\n under such contract provision or such custom or practice only when it is engaged\n in during the portion of the day with respect to which it is so made compensable.\n (d) Determination of time employed with respect to activities\n In the application of the minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions of\n the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, of the Walsh-Healey Act, or\n of the Bacon-Davis Act, in determining the time for which an employer employs\n an employee with respect to walking, riding, traveling, or other preliminary or\n postliminary activities described in subsection (a) of this section, there shall be\n counted all that time, but only that time, during which the employee engages in\n any such activity which is compensable within the meaning of subsections (b) and\n (c) of this section.\n\n The district court held after the initial summary judgment briefing that Defendants had a\ncustom or practice of paying for non-compensable time such as travel and meal time and\nreasoned that this time must be included in determining hours worked and overtime owed\npursuant to the Portal-to-Portal Act. After the initial summary judgment briefing, Defendants\nsubmitted affidavits from five employees, which they argued showed “some, but not necessarily\nall, employees who did not agree or understand that these hours would be included as hours\nworked or for overtime.” (R. 41, PID 4115.) These affidavits stated that the employee “was\npaid for driving to and from the worksite, but [he] did not have an agreement or understanding\nthat this time would be included in any calculation of overtime.” (See, e.g., R. 41-12, PID\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 20\n\n\n4167.)10 The affidavits also stated that the employee “took a half-hour lunch when [he] could fit\nit in” and that the employee included “drive time and lunch time in total hours.” (Id.)\n\n Although the plain language of the Portal-to-Portal Act suggests that home-to-work\ncommutes are deemed compensable if the employer has a custom or practice of compensating for\nsuch work, 29 C.F.R. § 785.34 explains that “ordinary travel from home to work (see § 785.35)\nneed not be counted as hours worked even if the employer agrees to pay for it.” And, 29 C.F.R.\n§ 785.35 says plainly that “[n]ormal travel from home to work is not worktime.” The reason is\nthat the FLSA only requires overtime compensation for “actual work or employment,” Tenn.\nCoal, Iron & R. Co., 321 U.S. at 597, “[a]nd even where there is a contract, custom, or practice\nto pay for time spent in such a ‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ activity, section 4(d) of the Portal\nAct does not make such time hours worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act, if it would not\nbe so counted under the latter Act alone,” 29 C.F.R. § 790.7; see also id. § 790.5 (“But where,\napart from the Portal Act, time spent in such an activity would not be time worked within the\nmeaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, although made compensable by contract, custom, or\npractice, such compensability will not make it time worked under section 4(d) of the Portal\nAct.”)11 “The general rule . . . is and always has been that the FLSA does not treat ordinary\nhome-to-job-site travel as compensable.” Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 360 (2d\nCir. 2011). The same is true of “bona fide meal periods.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.19; see also Ruffin v.\nMotorCity Casino, 775 F.3d 807, 811-15 (6th Cir. 2015) (examining whether meal periods were\ncompensable under the FLSA as “work”).\n\n Although it does not appear that any other circuit court has addressed this issue, district\ncourts have held that ordinary home-to-work and work-to-home commute time does not qualify\nas “work” under the FLSA even if the employer has paid for such time, and therefore that time is\nnot subject to overtime requirements. See Pietrzycki v. Heights Tower Serv., Inc., 290 F. Supp.\n\n 10Other employees submitted declarations indicating that their timecards did not include commute time and\nthat they usually did not take a bona fide meal break.\n 11A different regulation suggests that where there is an agreement between the parties to treat non-\ncompensable time, such as bona fide meal time, as “work” that is subject to the overtime requirements of the FLSA,\nthat time would be included as “work” in the calculation of unpaid overtime. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.320. However,\nthe district court did not rely on any agreement between the parties, and neither party briefs this issue on appeal.\nRather, the district court focused only on whether Defendants had a custom or practice of paying for commute and\nlunch time, not whether there was an agreement to treat the time as hours worked under the FLSA.\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 21\n\n\n3d 822, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“In other words, a custom, practice, or contract of paying for\nordinary home-to-work commuting cannot make that travel time into hours worked if it would\nnot have been characterized as such before Congress passed the PPA.”); Shearer v. Edger\nAssocs. Inc., No. 8:14-CV-2689-T-27JSS, 2015 WL 9274928, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2015)\n(“As discussed, Defendants’ policy to compensate Shearer for her commute time from home to\nthe first work site and from the last work site home does not make those hours ‘worked’ for\npurposes of the FLSA.”); Gilmer v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., No. C 08-05186 CW,\n2010 WL 289299, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010) (“Thus, the exceptions to the Portal Act do not\nrender compensable time that would not otherwise have been compensable under the FLSA. . . .\nAccordingly, Plaintiffs’ start-end travel time, even if they were paid for it, would not be included\nin computing their hours worked for overtime purposes if it were considered travel from work to\nhome.”); Johnson v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, 554 F. Supp. 2d 693, 707 (E.D. Tex. 2007)\n(“A review of the applicable regulations and case law on this issue leads the court to conclude\nthat, because the travel at issue in this case was ordinary home-to-work travel, such travel did not\nqualify as hours worked, even if RGIS had a custom or practice of paying for it.”).\n\n The regulations and district court cases applying them are persuasive and a reasonable\ninterpretation of the statutes. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“[R]ulings,\ninterpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the\ncourts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to\nwhich courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a\nparticular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its\nreasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give\nit power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). Accordingly, we adopt their interpretation.\n\n Here, the district court determined that ordinary commute time and meal time that was\nincluded in Defendants’ records qualified as compensable hours under the FLSA and, therefore,\nthe court did not determine, and the Secretary did not calculate, the amount of ordinary commute\ntime and bona fide meal time included in the records used to calculate unpaid overtime. This\nwas error. Any ordinary commute and bona fide meal time that can be established must not be\nincluded in determining how many hours of overtime each employee worked, although\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 22\n\n\nDefendants may not use the amounts paid for those otherwise non-compensable work periods as\nan offset against the amounts owed. See Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901, 913\n(9th Cir. 2004); Reich v. Lucas Enterprises, Inc., 2 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we\nvacate the grant of summary judgment on damages and remand for further proceedings.12\n\n Given our disposition of this issue, we need not address Defendants’ remaining\narguments on damages. However, in the interest of judicial economy, we note that the district\ncourt was correct in rejecting Defendants’ argument that “industry aggregate data” should be\nused to determine unpaid overtime rather than Defendants’ payroll records. Defendants’\nproposed calculation method focuses not on the employees’ actual rate, see 29 U.S.C. § 207\n(requiring employers to pay an employee “not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at\nwhich he is employed” for hours worked over 40 in a workweek (emphasis added)), but rather\nthe rate at which other employees at different companies with potentially vastly different job\nduties and experience are paid. Because there is no support for applying this methodology, the\ndistrict court correctly rejected this argument at the summary-judgment stage. See Acosta v. Off\nDuty Police Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 1050, 1065 (6th Cir. 2019) (“The reasonableness of the DOL’s\nproposed calculation depends in part on the availability of other, more reasonable alternatives to\nthat proposal. . . . Although the calculation adopted by the district court may be imprecise, it is\nthe best method available in light of ODPS’s failure to maintain accurate and complete\nrecords.”).\n\n D. Liquidated Damages\n\n The FLSA provides that “[a]ny employer who violates [the FLSA’s minimum wage or\novertime provisions] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected” in the amount of the\nunpaid overtime compensation “and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”\n29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Despite the mandatory wording of that section, Congress has authorized\n\n\n 12The Secretary argued to the district court that even if Defendants’ employees’ travel time and lunch\nbreaks were included in the recorded hours, Defendants did not meet their burden to negate the reasonableness of the\nSecretary’s damages computations, that there was an agreement to treat these hours as hours worked, and that\nDefendants did not establish that the travel time did not constitute work time or that their employees received bona\nfide meal breaks. The district court did not address any of these arguments, and the Secretary does not argue these\nalternative bases for affirmance on appeal. Accordingly, we leave these issues to the district court.\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 23\n\n\ndistrict courts to reduce or decline to award liquidated damages under the FLSA “if the employer\nshows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in\ngood faith and that [the employer] had reasonable grounds for believing that [the] act or\nomission was not a violation of the” FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 260. “This burden on the employer is\nsubstantial and requires ‘proof that [the employer’s] failure to obey the statute was both in good\nfaith and predicated upon such reasonable grounds that it would be unfair to impose upon [it]\nmore than a compensatory verdict.’” Elwell v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care Servs., 276 F.3d 832,\n840 (6th Cir. 2002) (alterations in original) (quoting McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 322\n(6th Cir. 1971)).\n\n “To prove that it acted in good faith, an employer ‘must show that [it] took affirmative\nsteps to ascertain the Act’s requirements, but nonetheless violated its provisions.’” Martin v.\nInd. Mich. Power Co., 381 F.3d 574, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting\nMartin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 908 (3d. Cir. 1991)). Establishing that the\nemployer did not willfully misclassify an employee is insufficient to show good faith. Id. (citing\nElwell, 276 F.3d at 841 n.5). Rather, “[t]he employer has an affirmative duty to ascertain and\nmeet the FLSA’s requirements, and an employer who negligently misclassifies an employee as\nexempt is not acting in good faith.” Id. (citing Elwell, 276 F.3d at 841 n.5)\n\n Defendants argue that because Payne reasonably and in good faith relied on his\naccountant’s advice that logging companies are exempt from the overtime provisions of the\nFLSA, the district court erred in concluding that it had no discretion to decline to award or to\nreduce the liquidated damages. Defendants further argue that Timberline’s pay structure\nresulting in higher-than-average compensation for its employees makes an award of liquidated\ndamages particularly unjust.\n\n Defendants have not presented sufficient evidence to meet their substantial burden to\nprove both good faith and reasonable grounds for the incorrect classification. As to the drivers,\nshop workers, and office workers, Payne himself testified that he knew these employees were not\nagricultural workers. Although Payne attempted to justify exempting his drivers and shop\nworkers under the MCA exemption, Payne never sought advice for this decision or took any\nother active steps to inform himself regarding this determination. Further, he acknowledged that\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 24\n\n\nhis drivers never crossed state lines, and he was not able to explain any reasonable grounds he\nmay have had for determining that the MCA exemption applied to purely intrastate drivers.\nThus, Defendants have not met their substantial burden to prove both good faith and reasonable\ngrounds for the incorrect classification of Timberline’s drivers, shop workers, and office\nworkers.\n\n Defendants’ employees performing harvesting and logging duties present a closer\nquestion. Taking Payne’s testimony as true, he talked to Rooyakker on several occasions about\nwhether the agricultural exemption applied. Although caselaw usually cites discussions with\nattorneys or government officials as evidence of good faith, see, e.g., Elwell, 276 F.3d at 841\n(“Nor has University suggested that it was relying on the expertise or opinion of any other person\nor entity with knowledge of the FLSA regulations, including its attorney or the Department of\nLabor.”); Featsent v. City of Youngstown, 70 F.3d 900, 906-07 (6th Cir. 1995); Steele v. Leasing\nEnterprises, Ltd., 826 F.3d 237, 246-47 (5th Cir. 2016), some cases have extended this rationale\nto accountants, see Copantitla v. Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 253, 316-17\n(S.D.N.Y. 2011). However, several undisputed facts weigh against finding that Defendants\ncould meet their burden here. First, Payne knew that Rooyakker’s advice was flawed or\nincomplete, at least with respect to truck drivers and office workers. Second, Payne never\ndiscussed any of his employees’ duties with Rooyakker such that Payne could reasonably believe\nthat Rooyakker was advising that specific employees were exempt. And third, Rooyakker did\nnot hold himself out as an expert in FLSA matters, and indeed never provided anyone else with\nadvice on such matters.\n\n Further, Defendants do not attempt to explain on appeal how a determination that any of\ntheir employees fell under the agricultural exemption was reasonable. The district court\nsummarily rejected that the agricultural exemption applied; Defendants do not raise this issue on\nappeal; and Defendants’ briefing regarding liquidated damages focuses primarily on the MCA\nexemption. Under these circumstances, Payne’s general discussions with Rooyakker are\ninsufficient as a matter of law for Defendants to meet their heavy burden to prove both good\nfaith and reasonable grounds for the incorrect classification. See Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720,\n726 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that advice of an accountant that compensation scheme was legal\n\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 25\n\n\neight to ten years prior to trial was insufficient to meet employer’s burden where the employer\n“never sought an opinion from an attorney or the relevant government agency regarding the\nlegality of” the compensation scheme and did not read government literature regarding wage and\nhour laws).\n\n Finally, as the district court explained, Defendants’ argument that they compensated their\nemployees above the industry average is irrelevant to whether they met their burden to establish\ngood faith and reasonable grounds for the determination that Timberline’s employees were\nexempt from overtime coverage. If they had established both of those prongs, the district court\ncould consider the overall compensation in the exercise of its discretion in awarding liquidated\ndamages. But having failed to meet their burden, this argument is misplaced.\n\n Accordingly, the district court correctly held that it had no discretion to award liquidated\ndamages in an amount less than the amount of unpaid overtime compensation. See 29 U.S.C.\n§ 216(b). However, because the amount of unpaid overtime compensation owed may change\nafter further proceedings, we vacate the amount awarded for liquidated damages and remand for\nrecalculation after further proceedings.\n\n III.\n\n For the reasons stated, we affirm the grant of summary judgment as to liability, including\non the issue of liquidated damages, vacate the award of damages, and remand for further\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: SECRETARY OF LABOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TIMBERLINE SOUTH, LLC; Jim Payne, Defendants-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0063p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n SECRETARY OF LABOR, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-1763\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n TIMBERLINE SOUTH, LLC; JIM PAYNE, │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City.\\n No. 1:16-cv-11552—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: March 14, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 5, 2019\\n\\n Before: SUTTON, WHITE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Jeffrey S. Theuer, LOOMIS, EWERT, PARSLEY, DAVIS & GOTTING, P.C.,\\nLansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Sarah J. Starrett, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\\nLABOR, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey S. Theuer, LOOMIS, EWERT,\\nPARSLEY, DAVIS & GOTTING, P.C., Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Sarah J. Starrett,\\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Timberline South, LLC (Timberline) is a\\ntimber-harvesting company that operates solely in Michigan, but uses logging and harvesting\\nequipment and trucks that were manufactured outside of Michigan. The Secretary of Labor (the\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\nSecretary) brought this action against Timberline and its director, Jim Payne, alleging violations\\nof the overtime and recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).\\n\\n The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, and awarded\\n$439,437.42 in unpaid overtime and an equal amount in liquidated damages. The district court\\nreasoned that Timberline was a covered enterprise under the FLSA because it “has employees\\nhandling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or\\nproduced for commerce by any person,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i), i.e., the logging and\\nharvesting equipment manufactured outside of Michigan. Part of the damages award included\\ntime employees spent commuting from home to work or for meal periods, which the district\\ncourt included in the overtime calculation after finding that Timberline had an established\\ncustom or practice of compensating its employees for such time.\\n\\n Defendants appeal, arguing that the district court erred in finding liability and awarding\\nunpaid overtime and liquidated damages. We affirm the district court’s liability determination.\\nHowever, because the district court erred in finding that ordinary commute time and bona fide\\nmeal periods qualify as compensable hours subject to the FLSA’s overtime requirements, we\\nvacate the award of damages and remand for further proceedings.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Timberline was formed in 2010 as a Michigan limited liability company. Payne is an\\nofficer of Timberline and directs all of its operations. Timberline removes raw timber from\\nforests, cuts the timber, and transports the timber to mills for processing into paper and other\\nproducts. Timberline maintains two to four worksites, each with approximately four equipment\\noperators who cut down trees, cut the timber into lengths, and transport the timber to a landing\\nsite. Timberline also employs six to eight truck drivers, who load the timber at the landing site\\nand transport it to the mills, as well as mechanics and an office manager. Timberline’s\\nequipment operators use heavy, specialized machinery, including harvesters and hydro-axes to\\ncut down trees and cut the trees into lengths, and forwarders and skidders to transport the timber\\nto the landing site or to load trucks. All of Timberline’s business activities occur in Michigan: it\\nharvests timber in Michigan; it transports timber to mills located only in Michigan; it entered\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\ninto contracts for cutting timber in Michigan; and it purchased its trucks and heavy equipment\\nfrom Michigan sellers. Although purchased and used only in Michigan, Timberline’s trucks and\\nheavy equipment were manufactured outside of Michigan.\\n\\n Payne established Timberline’s compensation and recordkeeping practices. Timberline\\npaid its employees using a daily rate, an hourly rate, or a cord 1 rate. Timberline recorded hours\\nworked for hourly employees but did not do so for most non-hourly employees, and did not pay\\nits employees an overtime rate for hours worked over 40 in a week.\\n\\n Timberline was founded after a previous company, Timberline Logging, Inc. (Timberline\\nLogging), went out of business. In February 2011, Payne instructed his office manager to email\\nMatthew Rooyakker, Timberline Logging’s accountant, regarding whether Timberline Logging\\nwas exempt from paying overtime “under FLSA in Tennessee.” (R. 18-12, PID 1674.)2 Payne\\nalso testified that he discussed FLSA coverage with his accountant on “a couple different\\noccasions” “awhile back,” “before the investigation” that led to this lawsuit. (R. 19-12, PID\\n2273.) According to Payne, Rooyakker told him that “we were exempt under agriculture” (id. at\\nPID 2274), although Rooyakker had not held himself out as knowledgeable about the FLSA, and\\nPayne did not believe that his truck drivers or office workers were agricultural employees.\\nPayne did not consult with an attorney.\\n\\n Defendants took the position in this lawsuit that the Motor Carrier Act exemption,\\n29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1), exempts some of Timberline’s employees from FLSA coverage. In\\nresponse to the Secretary’s interrogatories about this exemption, Defendants stated that they\\nrelied upon the “FLSA and publications prepared by Plaintiff” in determining that that the Motor\\nCarrier Act exemption applied, but Payne did not recall which publications he relied on and was\\nnot able to explain why his drivers and their helpers were exempt if the drivers only drove\\nintrastate routes. (R. 18-4, PID 271-81.)\\n\\n Rooyakker testified that the only time he provided advice regarding the FLSA was at a\\nmeeting with Payne on February 17, 2011. At that meeting, in response to Timberline Logging’s\\n\\n 1A cord is a standard measurement of wood.\\n 2Timberline Logging performed work in Tennessee, but Timberline did not.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\ninquiry, Rooyakker told Payne that it appeared that “you’re exempt” under the agricultural\\nexemption. (R. 18-13, PID 1702.) Rooyakker testified that he did not advise which of\\nTimberline Logging’s or Timberline’s employees were subject to the FLSA’s agricultural\\nexemption and never opined whether either entity’s employees in Michigan may also be exempt.\\n\\n Wage and Hour Investigator Jeffrey Wrona of the Department of Labor (DOL)\\ninvestigated Timberline for wage and recordkeeping violations for the time period of August 25,\\n2013 through August 20, 2015, later extended through March 20, 2017. After assessing unpaid\\novertime wages, the Secretary of Labor filed a complaint alleging that Defendants had violated\\nthe overtime and recordkeeping provisions of the FLSA, and sought an injunction, back wages,\\nand liquidated damages.\\n\\n The district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment in part and\\ndenied Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, granted the Secretary’s motion to\\namend the complaint to include additional employees and FLSA violations that had occurred\\nduring 2016 and 2017, awarded liquidated damages, and ordered further briefing by the parties\\non the amount of backpay.\\n\\n After two rounds of supplemental briefing, the district court issued a final summary\\njudgment decision awarding $439,437.42 in backpay damages and an equal amount in liquidated\\ndamages. This appeal followed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing all evidence and\\ndrawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pearce v.\\nChrysler Grp. LLC Pension Plan, 893 F.3d 339, 345 (6th Cir. 2018).3 Summary judgment is\\n\\n\\n\\n 3The Secretary argues that we should review the district court’s decision to award liquidated damages for\\nan abuse of discretion, but in making that argument the Secretary relies on cases involving liquidated damages\\nawarded after a trial. Here, the district court decided the issue on summary judgment and found that it had no\\ndiscretion as a matter of law to decline to award or reduce the amount of liquidated damages. Hence, our review is\\nde novo. See Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Although we generally review a\\ndistrict court’s decision on liquidated damages for abuse of discretion, we review the issue here, which was decided\\nbelow on summary judgment, de novo.” (internal citation omitted)).\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\nappropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is\\nentitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\\n\\n A. Enterprise Coverage and the Handling Clause\\n\\n The FLSA requires, among other things, that a qualifying enterprise pay certain\\nemployees overtime pay at one and one-half times their regular rate for each hour above 40\\nworked in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). At issue in this appeal is whether Timberline is “an\\nenterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” defined as\\n\\n an enterprise that--\\n (A)(i) has employees engaged in commerce4 or in the production of goods5 for\\n commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on\\n goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any\\n person; and\\n (ii) is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done\\n is not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level that are\\n separately stated);\\n\\n29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A).\\n\\n There is no dispute that Timberline is an “enterprise” under § 203(r)(1),6 qualifies as an\\n“employer” under § 203(d),7 and had an annual gross volume of sales in excess of $500,000 for\\neach relevant year, § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). Nor did the Secretary argue that Timberline was a\\ncovered enterprise because it had “employees engaged in commerce or in the production of\\n\\n\\n 4‘“Commerce’ means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several\\nStates or between any State and any place outside thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(b).\\n 5“‘Goods’ means goods (including ships and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities,\\nmerchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof, but does not\\ninclude goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a\\nproducer, manufacturer, or processor thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(i).\\n 6‘“Enterprise’ means the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control)\\nby any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one\\nor more establishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including departments of an\\nestablishment operated through leasing arrangements, but shall not include the related activities performed for such\\nenterprise by an independent contractor. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1).\\n 7‘“Employer’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to\\nan employee and includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization (other than when acting as an\\nemployer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\ngoods for commerce.” § 203(s)(1)(A)(i). Rather, the parties disagree about whether Timberline\\n“has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been\\nmoved in or produced for commerce by any person,” id., often referred to as the “handling\\nclause.”\\n\\n As originally enacted, the FLSA covered certain employees but did not encompass\\nenterprise-wide coverage. That concept was added in 1961. See Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2, 75 Stat.\\n65, 65-66 (1961). “After the [1961] amendment, if an employer had two or more workers\\nengaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce, FLSA coverage extended to all\\nof the enterprise’s employees.” Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 616 F.3d 1217, 1220\\n(11th Cir. 2010) (citing Dunlop v. Indus. Am. Corp., 516 F.2d 498, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1975)).\\nIncluded in the 1961 amendment was the addition of the handling clause. In 1974, Congress\\nclarified that the handling clause was an independent basis for enterprise coverage8 and added\\n“or materials” to that clause. See id. at 1220-21. “Materials” is not defined in the statute.\\n“Goods” is, however, and contains what is often called the “ultimate-consumer exception,”\\nexcluding from the definition “goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of\\nthe ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof.”\\n29 U.S.C. § 203(i). The district court held that Timberline is a covered enterprise under the\\nhandling clause because Timberline’s employees’ use of logging and harvesting equipment\\nmanufactured outside of Michigan constitutes “handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods\\nor materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person.”\\n§ 203(s)(1)(A)(i).\\n\\n Defendants argue that Timberline is not a covered enterprise because the only thing\\nTimberline’s employees “handle” is timber, which never crosses state lines; and that even if they\\n“handled” the logging and harvesting equipment, that equipment does not qualify as “materials,”\\nbut rather qualifies as “goods,” and that Timberline is the ultimate consumer of those goods such\\nthat the FLSA does not apply. (Appellants’ Br. at 11-14, 16-18.) Further, Defendants argue that\\n\\n 8Between the 1961 and 1974 amendments, coverage extended to enterprises with “employees engaged in\\ncommerce or in the production of goods for commerce, including employees handling, selling, or otherwise working\\non goods that have been moved in or produced for commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970) (emphasis added). The\\n1974 amendment replaced “including” with “or.”\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nfinding enterprise coverage in this case “would effectively erase the commerce requirement\\nnecessary for FLSA jurisdiction” because “[e]very business uses computers made overseas, or\\npencils and pens made out of state, or copiers, paper, or telephones made in other jurisdictions.”\\n(Appellants’ Br. at 14.)\\n\\n We begin our analysis of the “handling clause” with the language of the statute.\\nBrilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc’ns, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2007). “If\\nthe language of the statute is clear, then the inquiry is complete, and the court should look no\\nfurther. Only if the statute is ‘inescapably ambiguous’ should a court look to other persuasive\\nauthority in an attempt to discern legislative meaning.” Id. (citations omitted).\\n\\n The plain language of the statute contradicts Defendants’ arguments that Timberline is\\nnot a covered enterprise because “[t]he only good or material that Timberline handles, sells, or\\notherwise works on within the meaning of the FLSA, is the timber itself,” and because\\nTimberline’s employees “did not place th[e logging and harvesting] equipment in commerce\\nthemselves.” (Appellants’ Br. at 12.) We find no merit to these arguments because it is not\\nrelevant under the statute that Timberline employees did not place the logging and harvesting\\nequipment in commerce themselves; the plain language of the statute provides coverage where\\nemployees handle, sell, or otherwise work on “goods or materials that have been moved in or\\nproduced for commerce by any person.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). “The\\ntense is in the past. There is no requirement of continuity in the present.” Polycarpe, 616 F.3d\\nat 1221 (quoting Brennan v. Greene’s Propane Gas Serv., Inc., 479 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir.\\n1973)). Further, the statute makes clear that it applies when any person—not just the employees\\nof the enterprise—has moved or produced the handled goods or materials in commerce. Because\\nthe logging and harvesting equipment had previously been moved in and produced for commerce\\nby others prior to being handled by Timberline employees, this part of the statute is satisfied.\\n\\n Less clear is whether the logging and harvesting equipment constitute “goods” or\\n“materials” and whether Timberline is the ultimate consumer of the logging and harvesting\\nequipment such that if the logging and harvesting equipment qualify as goods and not materials,\\nthe ultimate-consumer exception operates to exclude Timberline from coverage. “[P]recisely\\ndetermining the correct ordinary meaning of ‘materials’ for the FLSA is challenging because the\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\nFLSA’s statutory definition of ‘goods’ is so expansive, ostensibly including some items that\\ncould also fall under the ordinary meaning of ‘materials.’” Id. at 1223. Thus, we may look to\\nother sources to determine the meaning, including “interpretations by other courts, legislative\\nhistory, policy rationales, and the context in which the statute was passed.” Brilliance Audio,\\n474 F.3d at 371-72.\\n\\n As an initial matter, we have previously explained that the FLSA “was enacted by\\nCongress to be a broadly remedial and humanitarian statute. The Act was designed to correct\\n‘labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for\\nhealth, efficiency, and general well-being of workers . . .’” Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114,\\n1116 (6th Cir. 1984) (alteration in original) (quoting Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d\\n139, 143 (6th Cir. 1977)). “[T]he FLSA, as a statute designed to protect individual rights, . . .\\n‘must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.’” Herman v. Fabri-Centers of\\nAm., Inc., 308 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda\\nLocal No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)).\\n\\n Several of our sister circuits have addressed similar situations and have suggested that the\\naddition of “or materials” to the handling clause essentially rendered the ultimate-consumer\\nexception obsolete. In Brock v. Hamad, the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant’s rental\\noperation was a covered enterprise where the defendant stipulated that he “had bought goods that\\nhad been moved in interstate commerce and that these goods had been used in the course of his\\nemployees’ employment.” 867 F.2d 804, 807-08 (4th Cir. 1989). Rejecting the defendant’s\\nargument that the rental operation was the ultimate consumer of these goods so that coverage did\\nnot extend to it, the Fourth Circuit explained: “Hamad’s argument, however, erroneously isolates\\nSection 203(i)[‘s definition of ‘goods’] from the remainder of the FLSA. When Section 203(i) is\\nread in context with Section 203(s), which covers ‘employees handling, selling, or otherwise\\nworking on goods or materials,’ it seems that defendant’s argument must fail.” Id. at 807; see\\nalso id. at 808 (“[I]t is well established that local business activities fall within the FLSA when\\nan enterprise employs workers who handle goods or materials that have moved or have been\\nproduced in interstate commerce.”); Dole v. Odd Fellows Home Endowment Bd., 912 F.2d 689,\\n695 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Appellants’ contention that the Home was in some sense the ‘ultimate\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\nconsumer’ of the goods and materials that moved in interstate commerce does not preclude\\napplication of the Act.” (citing Hamad, 867 F.2d at 807-08)).\\n\\n Similarly, the Third Circuit held that a company “engaged in the business of collecting\\ngarbage, trash, and scrap metal” was a covered enterprise. Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748,\\n750 (3d Cir. 1982). The defendant argued that its use of “motor vehicles, gas, oil, and other\\nmanufactured goods” did not result in FLSA coverage because it was the ultimate consumer of\\nthose goods. Id. at 751. The Third Circuit rejected that argument, relying heavily on the\\nlegislative history in concluding that the company was a covered enterprise. Id. at 751-52 (citing\\nS. Rep. No. 93–690, at 17 (1974), which explains that the amendment “adds the words ‘or\\nmaterials’ after the word ‘goods’ to make clear the Congressional intent to include within this\\nadditional basis of coverage the handling of goods consumed in the employer’s business, as, e.g.,\\nthe soap used by a laundry”).\\n\\n The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion regarding a real-estate developer whose\\nemployees used construction machinery for “removing and thinning trees, clearing brush,\\ngrading and contouring the land for streets and drainage, installing culverts, pouring concrete for\\ncurbs and laying asphalt.” Donovan v. Pointon, 717 F.2d 1320, 1322 (10th Cir. 1983). Although\\nthe defendant had acquired the machinery from within the same state in which the equipment\\nwas used, the Tenth Circuit explained that fact was\\n\\n irrelevant to a determination of whether [the defendant] is a covered\\n employer. The critical issue is whether the goods or materials handled by [the\\n defendant] and his employees had moved in interstate commerce, and, in this\\n regard, it is undisputed that they did. “Using” goods or materials which have\\n moved in interstate commerce constitutes a “handling” within the meaning of\\n 29 U.S.C. § 203(s).\\n\\nId. at 1322-23 (internal citations omitted); see also Donovan v. Scoles, 652 F.2d 16, 18-19 (9th\\nCir. 1981) (gas station engaged in purely intrastate activities is a covered enterprise because the\\nFLSA “imposes no requirement that the goods have a present involvement in interstate\\ncommerce when they are handled or sold. Instead it broadens coverage to include all employees\\nwithin the stream of commerce of such goods, even if their own participation remains purely\\nintrastate.”); Brennan v. Iowa, 494 F.2d 100, 101, 103 n.5, 104 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\nhospitals and schools were subject to the FLSA because “many employees handle articles which\\nhave moved in interstate commerce,” including drugs, cleaning supplies, food, and laundry\\nsupplies); Indus. Am. Corp., 516 F.2d at 501-02, 502 n.8 (explaining that the 1974 “amendment\\nleaves the definition of goods intact but circumvents it by a broader definition of ‘enterprise\\nengaged in commerce,’” which had the effect of expanding the FLSA “to every enterprise in the\\nnation doing” the requisite volume of business); Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc., 997 F. Supp.\\n504, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Sotomayor, J.) (explaining that the 1974 amendments to the FLSA\\nresulted in “virtually every enterprise” doing the requisite volume of business being covered by\\nthe FLSA, and holding that sanitations crews’ use of “bags, brooms, shovels, pails, scrapers . . .\\nradios, books . . . [and] flashlights” that had moved in interstate commerce resulted in FLSA\\nenterprise coverage (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).\\n\\n In recent years, the Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue at length, extracting a definition\\nof “materials” from the FLSA by considering the plain language of the statute, legislative\\nhistory, and the DOL’s interpretation. Polycarpe, 616 F.3d at 1221-27. In its view, courts could\\nnot properly assume that Congress intended to overrule the ultimate-consumer exception\\ncontained in the definition of “goods” with the addition of “materials” to the statute. Doing so, it\\nsaid, would violate a basic principle of statutory interpretation by not giving effect to all the\\nwords in the statute. Id. at 1222-23.\\n\\n The court thus considered two ordinary definitions of “materials” potentially applicable\\nin the FLSA context and adopted one for purposes of the handling clause:\\n\\n One definition views “materials” as the “apparatus (as tools or other articles)\\n necessary for doing or making something.” A second definition defines\\n “materials” as “the basic matter (as metal, wood, plastic, fiber) from which the\\n whole or the greater part of something physical (as a machine, tool, building,\\n fabric) is made.” Looking only to the word’s ordinary meaning, it seems that\\n “materials” as used in the FLSA could potentially include items used in\\n performing actions or services (e.g. describing pen and paper as “writing\\n materials”), items that serve as a component of something else, or both.\\n But precisely determining the correct ordinary meaning of “materials” for the\\n FLSA is challenging because the FLSA’s statutory definition of “goods” is so\\n expansive, ostensibly including some items that could also fall under the ordinary\\n meaning of “materials.” Much of the FLSA’s definition of “goods” is comprised,\\n it seems, of synonyms for items sold by a business: “goods . . . , wares, products,\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n commodities, merchandise, or articles . . . .” But Congress’s expressed definition\\n for “goods” also includes “or any part or ingredient thereof.” The plain text of\\n this last phrase indicates to us that, of the two ordinary meanings that we\\n identified for “materials,” the second one—the one involving constituent parts—\\n overlaps with part of the statutory definition of “goods.”\\n We must interpret the FLSA in a way that Congress’s 1974 addition of the words\\n “or materials” does not impliedly repeal the unchanged “goods” definition or that\\n definition’s ultimate-consumer exception. Therefore, we believe that the most\\n accurate view of Congress’s intent for the interplay between “goods” and\\n “materials” in the FLSA—one that does not impliedly repeal some of the statutory\\n definition of “goods”—is to read “materials” in the FLSA this way: “materials” in\\n the FLSA means tools or other articles necessary for doing or making\\n something. We believe that this interpretation is true to the ordinary meaning of\\n “materials” and avoids conflict with the statutory “goods” definition.\\n\\nId. at 1223-24 (alterations in original) (internal citations and footnote omitted). The court also\\nexplained that to be considered “materials,” an item “must have a significant connection with the\\nemployer’s commercial activity; the business may not just somehow internally and incidentally\\nconsume the item.” Id. at 1226. “This requirement,” the court reasoned, “is compelled because\\nthe statute covers not all ‘goods’ and ‘materials,’ but only ‘goods’ and ‘materials’ that a\\ncompany is engaged in ‘handling, selling, or otherwise working on.’” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 203(s)(1)(A)(i)).\\n\\n Polycarpe cautioned that the same items could be goods in one case, materials in another,\\nand neither goods nor materials in still another case, depending on the use of the item in the\\ncontext of each case. “Where a catering business uses the china plates at a client’s banquet, the\\nplates count as part of the ‘materials’ necessary for serving a catered meal. But, where a\\ndepartment store sells the same china plates as stand-alone items, the plates count as ‘goods’ for\\nthat retailer.” Id. Those same plates hung as decorations on the lobby wall of an accounting\\nfirm, however, constitute neither goods nor materials “because the plates have no significant\\nconnection to the business’s accounting work.” Id.\\n\\n We find the reasoning of Polycarpe persuasive because it gives effect to “materials”\\nwithout totally overlapping with the statutory definition of “goods” and thus displacing the\\nultimate-consumer exception contained within that definition. See Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660,\\n667 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Every word in the statute is presumed to have meaning, and we must give\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 12\\n\\n\\neffect all the words to avoid an interpretation which would render words superfluous or\\nredundant.” (citations omitted)); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987)\\n(“[R]epeals by implication are not favored and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is\\nclear and manifest.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).\\n\\n Applying the definition of “materials” from Polycarpe, the logging and harvesting\\nequipment used by Timberline’s employees plainly constitute “materials” because the equipment\\nis necessary to cut down trees and transport the timber, which in turn have a significant\\nconnection to Timberline’s commercial activities of harvesting and selling timber.\\n\\n Defendants disagree with Polycarpe’s analysis, arguing that it erroneously “relied upon a\\nsimple alternate definition” of “materials” rather than other definitions that would be “more\\nconsistent with the language of the FLSA,” such as “constituent parts of a whole, or elements of\\nsomething else,” or the “material components that make up” “the thing being produced by the\\nenterprise.” (Reply at 1, 3-4.) However, Defendants’ proffered definition of “materials” has not\\nbeen adopted by other circuits; and because “goods” includes in its definition “any part or\\ningredient [of goods],” 29 U.S.C. § 203(i), Defendants’ definition would render both terms\\nredundant.\\n\\n Defendants also argue that Polycarpe’s definition of “materials” is limited to items\\nprovided by an employer to its customers or “incorporated into products as part of the defendant\\nemployer’s services, such as paint used by a construction company, shutter blades for a window\\nshutter manufacturer, [or] burglar alarms installed by a security company.” (Appellants’ Br. at\\n13.) Defendants read Polycarpe too narrowly. Polycarpe remanded all but one of the cases9 to\\nthe district court to determine whether the items at issue were moved in or produced for interstate\\ncommerce and, if so, whether those items constitute “goods” or “materials.” 616 F.3d at 1229.\\nSome of the items at issue in Polycarpe are analogous to the logging and harvesting equipment\\nin this case, such as lawnmowers, edgers, and trucks used by a landscaping company. Id. at\\n1228. On remand, the district court held that the landscaping company was a covered enterprise\\n\\n\\n 9Polycarpe affirmed one judgment in one case in favor of the defendants because the evidence at trial did\\nnot establish that the business met the volume requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). 616 F.3d at 1229.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 13\\n\\n\\nbecause the trucks it used were “materials” rather than “goods.” Polycarpe v. E & S\\nLandscaping Serv., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2011).\\n\\n Finally, under these facts, we need not extensively address Defendants’ argument that\\nfinding FLSA coverage in this case would “effectively erase the commerce requirement\\nnecessary for FLSA jurisdiction” because “[e]very business uses computers made overseas, or\\npencils and pens made out of state.” (Appellants’ Br. at 14.) As an initial matter, the parties\\npoint to no case where the DOL has attempted to enforce the statute in this manner. Further, the\\ncourt in Polycarpe was apparently concerned with expanding coverage in this way and offered\\nreasonable bases to reject any attempt to do so. First, the court noted that the terms, “handling,\\nselling, or otherwise working on” “denote a connection to the employer’s . . . commercial\\nactivity,” such that mere internal and incidental consumption of an item would not suffice to\\nqualify. 616 F.3d at 1226. Second, it explained that DOL regulations instruct that employees\\nmust handle or work on the goods or materials “regularly and recurrently” for enterprise\\ncoverage to attach. Id. at 1226 n.7 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 779.238). Regardless, coverage here is\\nnot premised on employees’ incidental use of office items; rather, it is premised on employees’\\nregular and recurrent use of logging and harvesting equipment that is used to carry out the\\ncompany’s commercial activity of harvesting timber.\\n\\n Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Timberline is a covered enterprise\\nunder the FLSA’s handling clause.\\n\\n B. Motor Carrier Act Exemption\\n\\n Next, Defendants challenge the district court’s determination that Timberline’s truck\\ndrivers and their helpers are not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions pursuant to\\n29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1), which exempts from coverage “any employee with respect to whom the\\nSecretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service\\npursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49.” The Motor Carrier Act (MCA) provides\\nthat the “Secretary of Transportation may prescribe requirements for” “(1) qualifications and\\nmaximum hours of service of employees of, and safety of operation and equipment of, a motor\\ncarrier”; and “(2) qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of, and standards of\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 14\\n\\n\\nequipment of, a motor private carrier, when needed to promote safety of operation.” 49 U.S.C.\\n§ 31502(b). “Motor carrier” is defined as a “person who provides motor vehicle transportation\\nfor compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). Defendants do not contend that Timberline is a\\nmotor carrier. Rather, Defendants argue that Timberline is a “motor private carrier,” defined as a\\nperson who transports property or goods in interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(15).\\nConsistent with these statutory definitions, this court has previously explained that “[t]he\\nMCA . . . gives the Secretary of Transportation ‘the authority to regulate the hours of an\\nemployee (1) who works for a private motor carrier that provides transportation in interstate\\ncommerce and (2) whose work activities affect the safety of operation of that motor\\ncarrier.’” Vaughn v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 291 F.3d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting\\nTroutt v. Stavola Bros., Inc., 107 F.3d 1104, 1106-07 (4th Cir. 1997)).\\n\\n Exemptions from the FLSA’s overtime provisions requirements are narrowly construed\\nagainst the employer, and the employer bears the burden of proving that it qualifies for a\\nclaimed exemption. Martin v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 381 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2004); see also\\nMazzarella v. Fast Rig Support, LLC, 823 F.3d 786, 790-91 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that the\\nMCA exemption is narrowly construed against the employer); Deherrera v. Decker Truck Line,\\nInc., 820 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016) (same); Abel v. S. Shuttle Servs., Inc., 631 F.3d 1210,\\n1212 (11th Cir. 2011) (same).\\n\\n Defendants argue that some of Timberline’s employees are exempt from coverage\\nbecause Timberline’s trucks are operated under U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)\\nregistration numbers and its drivers maintain commercial driver’s licenses, which they say are\\nsufficient bases to find that the MCA exemption applies. In support of this argument,\\nDefendants cite Finn v. Dean Transportation, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1043 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). In\\nFinn, the district court held that a company was a motor private carrier where its drivers\\ntransported ten percent of its goods in interstate commerce. Id. at 1056-57. In response to the\\nemployee’s argument that the MCA exemption should not apply because the DOT had never\\nexercised its authority to audit the company or to conduct roadside stops, the district court stated\\nthat “Finn’s concession that the DOT had ‘some regulatory authority’ over his work as a driver\\nis, standing alone, dispositive of this issue.” Id. at 1057. The district court then noted that the\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 15\\n\\n\\ndriver “admits that he was required to hold a CDL, that DTI has a DOT registration number, that\\nDTI was subject to DOT audit, that its vehicles could be stopped for inspection at any time, and\\nthat DTI drivers were required to undergo a yearly physical (for which DTI paid).” Id. at 1057-\\n58.\\n\\n Defendants read too much into Finn. Finn was exempt because his employer met the\\ndefinition of a motor private carrier and was therefore subject to DOT regulation. Id. at 1055-56.\\nWe have previously rejected an argument that the mere issuance of a certificate by the Interstate\\nCommerce Commission (which regulated motor carriers prior to the DOT) was sufficient to\\nbring employees within the MCA exemption when those employees drove only intrastate routes.\\nSee Baird v. Wagoner Transp. Co., 425 F.2d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 1970); see also Mazzarella,\\n823 F.3d at 792 (“The DOT certificate merely authorizes Defendants to engage in interstate\\ntransportation. It provides no information about whether Defendants’ drivers actually drove\\nacross state lines or otherwise engaged in interstate commerce.”).\\n\\n The dispositive inquiry here is not whether Timberline’s employees held commercial\\ndriver’s licenses or whether its trucks had DOT registration numbers; rather, the dispositive\\ninquiry is whether Timberline’s drivers transport goods in interstate commerce, thus rendering\\nTimberline a motor private carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(15); Vaughn, 291 F.3d at 904. Courts\\nhave consistently interpreted this to mean that drivers must travel or transport the goods across\\nstate lines, or transport the goods in a “‘practical continuity of movement’ across State lines from\\nthe point of origin to the point of departure.” 29 C.F.R. 782.7(b)(1) (quoting Walling v.\\nJacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 568 (1943)); see also Baird, 425 F.2d at 413; Goldberg v.\\nFaber Indus., Inc., 291 F.2d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 1961). Here, it is undisputed that Timberline’s\\ntruck drivers did not cross state lines.\\n\\n Defendants nevertheless argue that Timberline’s drivers transport goods in “a practical\\ncontinuity of movement” in interstate commerce because its timber “is an ingredient in the goods\\nmanufactured by the mills to which it is delivered.” (Appellants’ Br. at 22.) Defendants,\\nhowever, presented no evidence that their timber was eventually shipped in interstate commerce\\nby the mills. To the contrary, Payne’s affidavit stated that Timberline has “no control over what\\nis done with the timber delivered to the mills, nor do we know the eventual destination or use of\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 16\\n\\n\\nthat timber.” (R. 19-3, PID 2080.) Further, even if the timber was used by the mills to make\\nother products, such as paper, and then shipped across state lines, the fact that the timber was\\naltered before crossing state lines weighs against finding the MCA exemption applicable. See\\nMazzarella, 823 F.3d at 791-93 (citing Collins v. Heritage Wine Cellars, Ltd., 589 F.3d 895, 897\\n(7th Cir. 2009)) (in considering whether drivers who transported water to hydraulic fracking sites\\nwithin Pennsylvania were subject to MCA exemption, “whether the water is altered during the\\nfracking process” would be relevant in determining whether there was a practical continuity of\\nmovement in interstate commerce; MCA exemption did not apply because the defendant\\nproduced no evidence concerning this or other relevant matters).\\n\\n Absent any evidence that Timberline’s drivers crossed state lines or transported goods as\\npart of a practical continuity of movement in interstate commerce, the district court correctly\\nfound that none of Timberline’s employees was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements\\nunder the MCA exemption.\\n\\n C. Damages\\n\\n 1. Briefing Before the District Court\\n\\n Three rounds of briefing occurred before the district court granted summary judgment on\\ndamages. In the Secretary’s original summary judgment brief, Investigator Wrona estimated that\\nTimberline owed unpaid overtime of $468,595.80 for 50 employees. Wrona explained that he\\nprimarily relied on Timberline’s payroll records to calculate unpaid overtime. However, because\\nTimberline lacked hours-worked records for some employees, Wrona had to use other methods\\nto reconstruct the hours those employees worked. Defendants argued in part that in extrapolating\\nhours worked from the employees’ pay records, the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 254(a), required a reduction in the number of hours for the time employees spent on meals and\\nin traveling to and from their homes to their workplaces—hours for which the employees were\\npaid, but which do not count as work. After the original summary judgment briefing, the district\\ncourt rejected Defendants’ argument that the Portal-to-Portal Act required such a reduction,\\nfinding that Defendants had an established custom or practice of compensating for such time.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 17\\n\\n\\nThe district court also ordered supplemental briefing to clarify inconsistencies in the record and\\nto provide requested information in a specific format.\\n\\n In the Secretary’s first supplemental brief, he calculated revised unpaid overtime to be\\n$454,684.73 for the 50 employees. The Secretary explained that 43 out of the 50 employees\\nwere paid an hourly rate for their entire employment, and because Defendants kept records of\\ntheir hours worked, “[c]omputing overtime for these employees is a simple case of arithmetic\\nbased upon Defendants’ own records.” (R. 38, PID 3725-26.) The Secretary explained that he\\ncomputed back wages for the remaining seven employees without complete hours-worked\\nrecords by: “(1) averaging the number of hours similarly situated employees worked per week or\\n(2) averaging the number of hours individual employees worked each workweek based upon\\ntime records previously kept for each employee prior to Defendants changing the employee\\ncompensation to non-hourly and ceas[ing] keeping the required records.” (Id. at PID 3726.) The\\nSecretary also presented voluminous data showing how he arrived at the calculated unpaid\\novertime. Defendants argued in response that the calculations performed by the Secretary for the\\nnon-hourly employees lacked credibility because the calculations guessed at hours worked and\\npay rate, contained errors, and led to absurd results because Defendants presented evidence that\\ntheir employees were paid significantly more than the industry average.\\n\\n The district court noted certain discrepancies that required additional briefing but also\\nrejected many of Defendants’ arguments that the data was inflated and that industry-aggregate\\ndata should be used instead. It reasoned that “Defendants simply reassert their overarching\\nargument that their compensation scheme resulted in compensation that far exceeded industry\\naverages and, therefore, that they should be excused from their obligations under the FLSA\\novertime provisions. They cite no authority for this proposition.” (R. 43, PID 4187.) The\\ndistrict court also noted that Defendants were critiquing the Secretary’s “methodology largely by\\ncherry picking particular workweeks with unusually high gross wages or unusually low gross\\nwages” and were essentially attacking “the statistical concept of an average.” (Id. at PID 4188.)\\n\\n In the Secretary’s second supplemental brief regarding damages, the Secretary addressed\\nthe district court’s identified concerns and recalculated unpaid overtime to $445,533.49, which\\nreflected a change of unpaid overtime for three non-hourly employees and one hourly employee.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 18\\n\\n\\nDefendants responded by arguing that the Secretary’s third attempt still contained errors, which\\nthey said evidenced a total lack of credibility in the Secretary’s calculations, and thus the district\\ncourt should award no damages or use the industry-aggregate data to determine unpaid overtime.\\nThey also reasserted their argument that the award should be reduced due to compensation for\\ncommute and meal time.\\n\\n The district court made reductions to the Secretary’s claimed unpaid overtime to address\\nerrors identified by Defendants, but otherwise rejected Defendants’ arguments. The district court\\nawarded damages for unpaid overtime of $439,437.42, and an equal amount in liquidated\\ndamages.\\n\\n 2. Arguments on Appeal\\n\\n On appeal, Defendants appear to make two legal arguments. First, Defendants argue that\\nthe district court erred in not applying the Portal-to-Portal Act to reduce overtime owed by the\\ntime the employees spent during meals and traveling to and from work. Second, Defendants\\nargue that because each of the Secretary’s calculations of overtime contained errors and\\ninconsistences, the Secretary failed to meet his burden to prove damages, and the district court\\nshould have entered an award of no damages or ordered that industry-aggregate data be used to\\narrive at a just and reasonable damages amount.\\n\\n 3. Analysis\\n The Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254, provides in part:\\n\\n (a) Activities not compensable\\n Except as provided in subsection (b), no employer shall be subject to any liability\\n or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . on account of the\\n failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an\\n employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any of the following\\n activities of such employee . . .\\n (1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of\\n performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is\\n employed to perform, and\\n (2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal\\n activity or activities,\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 19\\n\\n\\n which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such\\n employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at\\n which he ceases, such principal activity or activities. . . .\\n\\n (b) Compensability by contract or custom\\n Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) which relieve an employer from\\n liability and punishment with respect to any activity, the employer shall not be so\\n relieved if such activity is compensable by . . .\\n ....\\n (2) a custom or practice in effect, at the time of such activity, at the\\n establishment or other place where such employee is employed, covering\\n such activity, not inconsistent with a written or nonwritten contract, in\\n effect at the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or\\n collective-bargaining representative and his employer.\\n (c) Restriction on activities compensable under contract or custom\\n For the purposes of subsection (b), an activity shall be considered as compensable\\n under such contract provision or such custom or practice only when it is engaged\\n in during the portion of the day with respect to which it is so made compensable.\\n (d) Determination of time employed with respect to activities\\n In the application of the minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions of\\n the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, of the Walsh-Healey Act, or\\n of the Bacon-Davis Act, in determining the time for which an employer employs\\n an employee with respect to walking, riding, traveling, or other preliminary or\\n postliminary activities described in subsection (a) of this section, there shall be\\n counted all that time, but only that time, during which the employee engages in\\n any such activity which is compensable within the meaning of subsections (b) and\\n (c) of this section.\\n\\n The district court held after the initial summary judgment briefing that Defendants had a\\ncustom or practice of paying for non-compensable time such as travel and meal time and\\nreasoned that this time must be included in determining hours worked and overtime owed\\npursuant to the Portal-to-Portal Act. After the initial summary judgment briefing, Defendants\\nsubmitted affidavits from five employees, which they argued showed “some, but not necessarily\\nall, employees who did not agree or understand that these hours would be included as hours\\nworked or for overtime.” (R. 41, PID 4115.) These affidavits stated that the employee “was\\npaid for driving to and from the worksite, but [he] did not have an agreement or understanding\\nthat this time would be included in any calculation of overtime.” (See, e.g., R. 41-12, PID\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 20\\n\\n\\n4167.)10 The affidavits also stated that the employee “took a half-hour lunch when [he] could fit\\nit in” and that the employee included “drive time and lunch time in total hours.” (Id.)\\n\\n Although the plain language of the Portal-to-Portal Act suggests that home-to-work\\ncommutes are deemed compensable if the employer has a custom or practice of compensating for\\nsuch work, 29 C.F.R. § 785.34 explains that “ordinary travel from home to work (see § 785.35)\\nneed not be counted as hours worked even if the employer agrees to pay for it.” And, 29 C.F.R.\\n§ 785.35 says plainly that “[n]ormal travel from home to work is not worktime.” The reason is\\nthat the FLSA only requires overtime compensation for “actual work or employment,” Tenn.\\nCoal, Iron & R. Co., 321 U.S. at 597, “[a]nd even where there is a contract, custom, or practice\\nto pay for time spent in such a ‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ activity, section 4(d) of the Portal\\nAct does not make such time hours worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act, if it would not\\nbe so counted under the latter Act alone,” 29 C.F.R. § 790.7; see also id. § 790.5 (“But where,\\napart from the Portal Act, time spent in such an activity would not be time worked within the\\nmeaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, although made compensable by contract, custom, or\\npractice, such compensability will not make it time worked under section 4(d) of the Portal\\nAct.”)11 “The general rule . . . is and always has been that the FLSA does not treat ordinary\\nhome-to-job-site travel as compensable.” Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 360 (2d\\nCir. 2011). The same is true of “bona fide meal periods.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.19; see also Ruffin v.\\nMotorCity Casino, 775 F.3d 807, 811-15 (6th Cir. 2015) (examining whether meal periods were\\ncompensable under the FLSA as “work”).\\n\\n Although it does not appear that any other circuit court has addressed this issue, district\\ncourts have held that ordinary home-to-work and work-to-home commute time does not qualify\\nas “work” under the FLSA even if the employer has paid for such time, and therefore that time is\\nnot subject to overtime requirements. See Pietrzycki v. Heights Tower Serv., Inc., 290 F. Supp.\\n\\n 10Other employees submitted declarations indicating that their timecards did not include commute time and\\nthat they usually did not take a bona fide meal break.\\n 11A different regulation suggests that where there is an agreement between the parties to treat non-\\ncompensable time, such as bona fide meal time, as “work” that is subject to the overtime requirements of the FLSA,\\nthat time would be included as “work” in the calculation of unpaid overtime. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.320. However,\\nthe district court did not rely on any agreement between the parties, and neither party briefs this issue on appeal.\\nRather, the district court focused only on whether Defendants had a custom or practice of paying for commute and\\nlunch time, not whether there was an agreement to treat the time as hours worked under the FLSA.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 21\\n\\n\\n3d 822, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“In other words, a custom, practice, or contract of paying for\\nordinary home-to-work commuting cannot make that travel time into hours worked if it would\\nnot have been characterized as such before Congress passed the PPA.”); Shearer v. Edger\\nAssocs. Inc., No. 8:14-CV-2689-T-27JSS, 2015 WL 9274928, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2015)\\n(“As discussed, Defendants’ policy to compensate Shearer for her commute time from home to\\nthe first work site and from the last work site home does not make those hours ‘worked’ for\\npurposes of the FLSA.”); Gilmer v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., No. C 08-05186 CW,\\n2010 WL 289299, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010) (“Thus, the exceptions to the Portal Act do not\\nrender compensable time that would not otherwise have been compensable under the FLSA. . . .\\nAccordingly, Plaintiffs’ start-end travel time, even if they were paid for it, would not be included\\nin computing their hours worked for overtime purposes if it were considered travel from work to\\nhome.”); Johnson v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, 554 F. Supp. 2d 693, 707 (E.D. Tex. 2007)\\n(“A review of the applicable regulations and case law on this issue leads the court to conclude\\nthat, because the travel at issue in this case was ordinary home-to-work travel, such travel did not\\nqualify as hours worked, even if RGIS had a custom or practice of paying for it.”).\\n\\n The regulations and district court cases applying them are persuasive and a reasonable\\ninterpretation of the statutes. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“[R]ulings,\\ninterpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the\\ncourts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to\\nwhich courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a\\nparticular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its\\nreasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give\\nit power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). Accordingly, we adopt their interpretation.\\n\\n Here, the district court determined that ordinary commute time and meal time that was\\nincluded in Defendants’ records qualified as compensable hours under the FLSA and, therefore,\\nthe court did not determine, and the Secretary did not calculate, the amount of ordinary commute\\ntime and bona fide meal time included in the records used to calculate unpaid overtime. This\\nwas error. Any ordinary commute and bona fide meal time that can be established must not be\\nincluded in determining how many hours of overtime each employee worked, although\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 22\\n\\n\\nDefendants may not use the amounts paid for those otherwise non-compensable work periods as\\nan offset against the amounts owed. See Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901, 913\\n(9th Cir. 2004); Reich v. Lucas Enterprises, Inc., 2 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we\\nvacate the grant of summary judgment on damages and remand for further proceedings.12\\n\\n Given our disposition of this issue, we need not address Defendants’ remaining\\narguments on damages. However, in the interest of judicial economy, we note that the district\\ncourt was correct in rejecting Defendants’ argument that “industry aggregate data” should be\\nused to determine unpaid overtime rather than Defendants’ payroll records. Defendants’\\nproposed calculation method focuses not on the employees’ actual rate, see 29 U.S.C. § 207\\n(requiring employers to pay an employee “not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at\\nwhich he is employed” for hours worked over 40 in a workweek (emphasis added)), but rather\\nthe rate at which other employees at different companies with potentially vastly different job\\nduties and experience are paid. Because there is no support for applying this methodology, the\\ndistrict court correctly rejected this argument at the summary-judgment stage. See Acosta v. Off\\nDuty Police Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 1050, 1065 (6th Cir. 2019) (“The reasonableness of the DOL’s\\nproposed calculation depends in part on the availability of other, more reasonable alternatives to\\nthat proposal. . . . Although the calculation adopted by the district court may be imprecise, it is\\nthe best method available in light of ODPS’s failure to maintain accurate and complete\\nrecords.”).\\n\\n D. Liquidated Damages\\n\\n The FLSA provides that “[a]ny employer who violates [the FLSA’s minimum wage or\\novertime provisions] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected” in the amount of the\\nunpaid overtime compensation “and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”\\n29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Despite the mandatory wording of that section, Congress has authorized\\n\\n\\n 12The Secretary argued to the district court that even if Defendants’ employees’ travel time and lunch\\nbreaks were included in the recorded hours, Defendants did not meet their burden to negate the reasonableness of the\\nSecretary’s damages computations, that there was an agreement to treat these hours as hours worked, and that\\nDefendants did not establish that the travel time did not constitute work time or that their employees received bona\\nfide meal breaks. The district court did not address any of these arguments, and the Secretary does not argue these\\nalternative bases for affirmance on appeal. Accordingly, we leave these issues to the district court.\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 23\\n\\n\\ndistrict courts to reduce or decline to award liquidated damages under the FLSA “if the employer\\nshows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in\\ngood faith and that [the employer] had reasonable grounds for believing that [the] act or\\nomission was not a violation of the” FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 260. “This burden on the employer is\\nsubstantial and requires ‘proof that [the employer’s] failure to obey the statute was both in good\\nfaith and predicated upon such reasonable grounds that it would be unfair to impose upon [it]\\nmore than a compensatory verdict.’” Elwell v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care Servs., 276 F.3d 832,\\n840 (6th Cir. 2002) (alterations in original) (quoting McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 322\\n(6th Cir. 1971)).\\n\\n “To prove that it acted in good faith, an employer ‘must show that [it] took affirmative\\nsteps to ascertain the Act’s requirements, but nonetheless violated its provisions.’” Martin v.\\nInd. Mich. Power Co., 381 F.3d 574, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting\\nMartin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 908 (3d. Cir. 1991)). Establishing that the\\nemployer did not willfully misclassify an employee is insufficient to show good faith. Id. (citing\\nElwell, 276 F.3d at 841 n.5). Rather, “[t]he employer has an affirmative duty to ascertain and\\nmeet the FLSA’s requirements, and an employer who negligently misclassifies an employee as\\nexempt is not acting in good faith.” Id. (citing Elwell, 276 F.3d at 841 n.5)\\n\\n Defendants argue that because Payne reasonably and in good faith relied on his\\naccountant’s advice that logging companies are exempt from the overtime provisions of the\\nFLSA, the district court erred in concluding that it had no discretion to decline to award or to\\nreduce the liquidated damages. Defendants further argue that Timberline’s pay structure\\nresulting in higher-than-average compensation for its employees makes an award of liquidated\\ndamages particularly unjust.\\n\\n Defendants have not presented sufficient evidence to meet their substantial burden to\\nprove both good faith and reasonable grounds for the incorrect classification. As to the drivers,\\nshop workers, and office workers, Payne himself testified that he knew these employees were not\\nagricultural workers. Although Payne attempted to justify exempting his drivers and shop\\nworkers under the MCA exemption, Payne never sought advice for this decision or took any\\nother active steps to inform himself regarding this determination. Further, he acknowledged that\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 24\\n\\n\\nhis drivers never crossed state lines, and he was not able to explain any reasonable grounds he\\nmay have had for determining that the MCA exemption applied to purely intrastate drivers.\\nThus, Defendants have not met their substantial burden to prove both good faith and reasonable\\ngrounds for the incorrect classification of Timberline’s drivers, shop workers, and office\\nworkers.\\n\\n Defendants’ employees performing harvesting and logging duties present a closer\\nquestion. Taking Payne’s testimony as true, he talked to Rooyakker on several occasions about\\nwhether the agricultural exemption applied. Although caselaw usually cites discussions with\\nattorneys or government officials as evidence of good faith, see, e.g., Elwell, 276 F.3d at 841\\n(“Nor has University suggested that it was relying on the expertise or opinion of any other person\\nor entity with knowledge of the FLSA regulations, including its attorney or the Department of\\nLabor.”); Featsent v. City of Youngstown, 70 F.3d 900, 906-07 (6th Cir. 1995); Steele v. Leasing\\nEnterprises, Ltd., 826 F.3d 237, 246-47 (5th Cir. 2016), some cases have extended this rationale\\nto accountants, see Copantitla v. Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 253, 316-17\\n(S.D.N.Y. 2011). However, several undisputed facts weigh against finding that Defendants\\ncould meet their burden here. First, Payne knew that Rooyakker’s advice was flawed or\\nincomplete, at least with respect to truck drivers and office workers. Second, Payne never\\ndiscussed any of his employees’ duties with Rooyakker such that Payne could reasonably believe\\nthat Rooyakker was advising that specific employees were exempt. And third, Rooyakker did\\nnot hold himself out as an expert in FLSA matters, and indeed never provided anyone else with\\nadvice on such matters.\\n\\n Further, Defendants do not attempt to explain on appeal how a determination that any of\\ntheir employees fell under the agricultural exemption was reasonable. The district court\\nsummarily rejected that the agricultural exemption applied; Defendants do not raise this issue on\\nappeal; and Defendants’ briefing regarding liquidated damages focuses primarily on the MCA\\nexemption. Under these circumstances, Payne’s general discussions with Rooyakker are\\ninsufficient as a matter of law for Defendants to meet their heavy burden to prove both good\\nfaith and reasonable grounds for the incorrect classification. See Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720,\\n726 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that advice of an accountant that compensation scheme was legal\\n\\f No. 18-1763 SOL v. Timberline S., et al. Page 25\\n\\n\\neight to ten years prior to trial was insufficient to meet employer’s burden where the employer\\n“never sought an opinion from an attorney or the relevant government agency regarding the\\nlegality of” the compensation scheme and did not read government literature regarding wage and\\nhour laws).\\n\\n Finally, as the district court explained, Defendants’ argument that they compensated their\\nemployees above the industry average is irrelevant to whether they met their burden to establish\\ngood faith and reasonable grounds for the determination that Timberline’s employees were\\nexempt from overtime coverage. If they had established both of those prongs, the district court\\ncould consider the overall compensation in the exercise of its discretion in awarding liquidated\\ndamages. But having failed to meet their burden, this argument is misplaced.\\n\\n Accordingly, the district court correctly held that it had no discretion to award liquidated\\ndamages in an amount less than the amount of unpaid overtime compensation. See 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 216(b). However, because the amount of unpaid overtime compensation owed may change\\nafter further proceedings, we vacate the amount awarded for liquidated damages and remand for\\nrecalculation after further proceedings.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the reasons stated, we affirm the grant of summary judgment as to liability, including\\non the issue of liquidated damages, vacate the award of damages, and remand for further\\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1657,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607424,"string":"4,607,424"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Jonathan Cruz-Guzman v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3520"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before: BATCHELDER, ROGERS, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"THAPAR, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0064p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n JONATHAN CRUZ-GUZMAN, ┐\\n Petitioner, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-3520\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, │\\n Respondent. │\\n ┘\\n\\n On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals;\\n No. A 208 280 977.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: March 15, 2019*\\n\\n Before: BATCHELDER, ROGERS, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Jamie B. Naini, THE LAW OFFICES OF JAMIE B. NAINI, Memphis, Tennessee,\\nfor Petitioner. Holly M. Smith, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,\\nD.C., for Respondent.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Jonathan Cruz-Guzman seeks review of a Board of\\nImmigration Appeals order denying his application for asylum. We deny his petition.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n *This decision was originally filed as an unpublished opinion on March 15, 2019. The court has now\\ndesignated the opinion for publication.\\n\\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 2\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Cruz is a native of El Salvador.1 He grew up in a neighborhood dominated by a gang\\nknown as 18th Street. 18th Street’s rival gang, MS-13, sought to recruit Cruz and his friends to\\njoin MS-13 as “spies” so they could relay information about 18th Street activities in the area.\\nAfter they refused, MS-13 began threatening and assaulting them. This harassment culminated\\nwhen members of MS-13 murdered Cruz’s friend Brian. Later that week, one of them told Cruz\\n“if [he] was just as stupid as Brian, then the same thing would happen to [him].” AR 243.\\nShortly after this threat, Cruz fled El Salvador.\\n\\n Immigration authorities apprehended Cruz upon his entry into the United States near\\nHidalgo, Texas. In his deportation proceeding, Cruz conceded that he was subject to removal but\\nsought asylum based on his fear of gang violence if he returned home. While his asylum\\napplication was pending, his friends and family in El Salvador faced continued threats and\\nviolence. MS-13 killed one friend, while 18th Street killed another. Both gangs extorted\\nprotection money from Cruz’s mother. When she missed a payment to 18th Street, members of\\nthe gang broke into her house, beat her, and threatened to rape Cruz’s sister.\\n\\n During Cruz’s asylum hearing, he detailed the violence and harassment he, his family,\\nand his friends had all faced in El Salvador. He explained that he feared further violence from\\nboth MS-13 and 18th Street if he returned home: MS-13 because of his refusal to join them, and\\n18th Street as punishment for his mother’s refusal to pay protection money. While the\\nImmigration Judge found Cruz’s testimony credible, she denied Cruz’s asylum application\\nbecause, among other things, Cruz failed to establish that he faced this persecution “on account\\nof” a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Accordingly, the judge ordered Cruz\\nremoved to El Salvador.\\n\\n Cruz appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”), which affirmed. Cruz\\nthen petitioned for review in this court. We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision\\nunder 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review administrative factual findings under the deferential\\n\\n\\n 1All names are spelled as they appear in Petitioner’s brief.\\n\\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 3\\n\\n\\nsubstantial-evidence standard: we accept them “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be\\ncompelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. § 1252(b)(4)(B).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The Attorney General may grant asylum to an applicant who proves he is a “refugee.” Id.\\n§ 1158(b)(1)(A). A “refugee” is an individual who, based on his “membership in a particular\\nsocial group” (or other protected status), faces “a well-founded fear of persecution” if he returns\\nto his home country. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The applicant must show that the claimed\\npersecution will be inflicted by “the government or persons a government is unwilling or unable\\nto control.” Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Kasinga, 21 I&N\\nDec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996)). An applicant presumptively has a “well-founded fear of\\npersecution” if he shows that such persecution has already happened to him before. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.13(b)(1). Thus, asylum cases often depend on an evaluation of past events.\\n\\n Cruz claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution based on his membership in three\\npurported social groups: (1) males who are targeted by MS-13 to work as informants,\\n(2) individuals MS-13 thinks are members of 18th Street, and (3) the Cruz-Guzman nuclear\\nfamily unit. To succeed, Cruz must show that at least one of these purported social groups\\nexists, he is a member of it, and he faces persecution motivated by that membership. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A); see also Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2015).\\nThe Board found that (1) “males who are targeted by MS-13 to work as informants” does not\\nqualify as a social group, (2) “imputed 18th Street members” may be a social group, but Cruz\\nfailed to show that MS-13 actually imputed membership in 18th Street to him, and (3) the Cruz-\\nGuzman family is a social group and Cruz is a member, but he failed to show that his association\\nwith his family would motivate any persecution. We review each of these findings in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We first address whether Cruz is a member of a “particular social group.” 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A). A “particular social group” must meet three criteria: (1) immutability\\n(members must share an immutable characteristic), (2) particularity (the group has discrete and\\ndefinable boundaries), and (3) social distinction (society actually perceives the purported group\\n\\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 4\\n\\n\\nas a distinct class of persons). Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d at 498; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N\\nDec. 227, 237–40 (BIA 2014).\\n\\n The Board found that Cruz’s first purported social group—males targeted by MS-13 to\\nwork as informants—did not satisfy the “social distinction” requirement. Rightly so. This court\\nhas already rejected the claim that individuals targeted to join MS-13 qualify as a socially\\ndistinct group. Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 674 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[Asylum\\napplicant]’s proposed particular social group of ‘young Salvadorans who have been threatened\\nbecause they refused to join the MS[-13] gang’ is not cognizable under the INA.” (internal\\nalteration omitted)). No meaningful difference exists between individuals targeted by MS-13 to\\njoin their gang and individuals targeted by MS-13 to join their gang as informants. Salvadorans\\ndo not appear to see a meaningful difference either. The affidavits Cruz submitted from family\\nand friends do not indicate that they see this distinction; instead, they mention threats from MS-\\n13 recruitment in general. And the reports Cruz cites (authored by Americans, not Salvadorans)\\nmention violence against would-be informants either in passing or not at all. In short, Cruz’s\\npurported social group relies on a “distinction without a difference” and does not qualify under\\nthe asylum statute. Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n Cruz’s second purported social group is imputed gang membership. Specifically, Cruz\\ncontends that because he lived and attended school in a neighborhood controlled by 18th Street,\\ntheir MS-13 rivals would view Cruz as a member of that gang. The Board correctly determined\\nthat, even if this social group exists, Cruz failed to demonstrate that he was a member of it. As\\nthe Board found, Cruz’s imputed gang membership argument contradicts his first claimed social\\ngroup. MS-13 attempted to recruit him precisely because MS-13 thought he was unaffiliated\\nwith 18th Street and thus would be willing and able to spy on them. Logically, then, MS-13 did\\nnot impute 18th Street membership to him. Cruz responds that gangs attempt to recruit directly\\nfrom the ranks of their rivals, citing evidence that MS-13 generally views residents of 18th Street\\nneighborhoods as members of that gang. But there was still substantial evidence for the Board to\\n\\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 5\\n\\n\\nconclude that MS-13 did not view Cruz as an 18th Street member.2 Accordingly, Cruz cannot\\nqualify for asylum on the basis of imputed 18th Street membership.\\n\\n That leaves Cruz with one final potential social group: his own nuclear family unit. The\\nBoard assumed that direct familial ties can create a qualifying “particular social group” and that\\nCruz is, by definition, a member of that group. See Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 995\\n(6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “membership in the same family . . . is widely recognized by the\\ncaselaw” as a “particular social group”).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Although Cruz can show that he has a “well-founded fear of persecution” and that he\\nbelongs to a particular social group, he needs to also connect these two concepts. Under the\\nstatute he must show that his membership in the Cruz-Guzman family is “one central reason” for\\nthe persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). This is a question of motive, not just simple\\ncausation. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992); Harmon v. Holder, 758 F.3d\\n728, 735–36 (6th Cir. 2014). The Board can find a persecutor’s motive by “connect[ing] the dots\\nof circumstantial evidence.” Pablo-Sanchez v. Holder, 600 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2010). “But\\nto say that the Board could find circumstantial proof of persecution in a given case is not to say\\nthat it must,” and we can only reverse the Board if the latter is true. Id. at 595–96 (emphasis\\nadded); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d at 499 n.4. Here, the\\nBoard did not find sufficient evidence of motive. Cruz has not shown that the record compels\\nthe opposite conclusion.\\n\\n Cruz bases his family-unit-persecution claim on a dispute between his mother and 18th\\nStreet. Sometime after Cruz left El Salvador, 18th Street began extorting protection money from\\nhis mother. When she missed a payment, members of the gang broke into her home, beat her,\\n\\n 2Cruz also points to one particular encounter with MS-13 members in a different neighborhood. But if\\nanything, Cruz’s example contradicts his claim of imputed gang membership. As the Immigration Judge concluded,\\nthese MS-13 members were “suspicious” but “ultimately did not attribute 18[th Street] gang membership to [Cruz].”\\nAR 92. Cruz argues “it was only a matter of time before the gang found out that [he] lived in 18th Street Gang\\nterritory” given MS-13’s ability to communicate between neighborhoods with cell phones. Petitioner Br. at 23. But\\nthis is merely an alternative—and speculative—view of the evidence. Given that MS-13 members whom Cruz saw\\nevery week clearly did not impute 18th Street membership to him, Cruz’s single run-in with other MS-13 members\\ndoes not clearly show imputed gang membership.\\n\\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 6\\n\\n\\nand threatened to rape her daughter (Cruz’s sister). They also indicated that they knew Cruz was\\nher son and that he was in the United States. Cruz’s mother subsequently fled to Mexico. Now,\\nCruz fears that if he returns, 18th Street will harm him because they cannot get to his mother.\\n\\n Cruz’s evidence does not show that 18th Street’s actions were motivated by a particular\\nanimus toward the Cruz-Guzman family itself, as opposed to an ordinary criminal desire for\\nfinancial gain. As the Immigration Judge found, criminal motivations like this apply against\\n“virtually the entire population of El Salvador.” AR 91. This court has consistently upheld\\ndecisions by the Board denying asylum when the more likely explanation for persecution was\\nbasic criminality as opposed to membership in a social group or other protected status.\\nKhozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d 187, 196 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that an asylum applicant had\\n“failed to connect the [persecution] to anything more than the financial demands of criminal\\ncorruption”); see also Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d at 500–01. Other courts have applied the same\\nlogic when the protected ground at issue is membership in a family unit. See, e.g., Cambara-\\nCambara v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting asylum claim where applicant\\n“provided no proof that the criminal gangs targeted members of the family because of family\\nrelationships, as opposed to the fact that . . . they were obvious targets for extortionate\\ndemands”); Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 492–93 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Matter of L-\\nE-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40, 45–47 (BIA 2017) (“The fact that a persecutor targets a family member\\nsimply as a means to an end is not, by itself, sufficient to establish a claim, especially if the end\\nis not connected to another protected ground.”). The Board concluded that Cruz had failed to\\nshow that 18th Street was motivated by particular animus toward his family, as opposed to\\ngenerally applicable financial desires. The record does not compel the opposite conclusion.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n In sum, Cruz has not shown that he has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of\\na protected ground, which means he is not a “refugee” under the statute, and his asylum claim\\nfails. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Accordingly, we need not address Cruz’s remaining\\narguments that the Salvadoran government is unable or unwilling to control his persecutors and\\nthat internal relocation would be unreasonable under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). The\\npetition for review is denied.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384677/\", \"author_raw\": \"THAPAR, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BATCHELDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROGERS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"THAPAR"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BATCHELDER\": \", Circuit\", \"ROGERS\": \", Circuit\", \"THAPAR\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607424/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Jonathan Cruz-Guzman v. William P. Barr\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0064p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n JONATHAN CRUZ-GUZMAN, ┐\n Petitioner, │\n │\n > No. 18-3520\n v. │\n │\n │\n WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, │\n Respondent. │\n ┘\n\n On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals;\n No. A 208 280 977.\n\n Decided and Filed: March 15, 2019*\n\n Before: BATCHELDER, ROGERS, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nON BRIEF: Jamie B. Naini, THE LAW OFFICES OF JAMIE B. NAINI, Memphis, Tennessee,\nfor Petitioner. Holly M. Smith, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,\nD.C., for Respondent.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Jonathan Cruz-Guzman seeks review of a Board of\nImmigration Appeals order denying his application for asylum. We deny his petition.\n\n\n\n\n *This decision was originally filed as an unpublished opinion on March 15, 2019. The court has now\ndesignated the opinion for publication.\n\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 2\n\n\n I.\n\n Cruz is a native of El Salvador.1 He grew up in a neighborhood dominated by a gang\nknown as 18th Street. 18th Street’s rival gang, MS-13, sought to recruit Cruz and his friends to\njoin MS-13 as “spies” so they could relay information about 18th Street activities in the area.\nAfter they refused, MS-13 began threatening and assaulting them. This harassment culminated\nwhen members of MS-13 murdered Cruz’s friend Brian. Later that week, one of them told Cruz\n“if [he] was just as stupid as Brian, then the same thing would happen to [him].” AR 243.\nShortly after this threat, Cruz fled El Salvador.\n\n Immigration authorities apprehended Cruz upon his entry into the United States near\nHidalgo, Texas. In his deportation proceeding, Cruz conceded that he was subject to removal but\nsought asylum based on his fear of gang violence if he returned home. While his asylum\napplication was pending, his friends and family in El Salvador faced continued threats and\nviolence. MS-13 killed one friend, while 18th Street killed another. Both gangs extorted\nprotection money from Cruz’s mother. When she missed a payment to 18th Street, members of\nthe gang broke into her house, beat her, and threatened to rape Cruz’s sister.\n\n During Cruz’s asylum hearing, he detailed the violence and harassment he, his family,\nand his friends had all faced in El Salvador. He explained that he feared further violence from\nboth MS-13 and 18th Street if he returned home: MS-13 because of his refusal to join them, and\n18th Street as punishment for his mother’s refusal to pay protection money. While the\nImmigration Judge found Cruz’s testimony credible, she denied Cruz’s asylum application\nbecause, among other things, Cruz failed to establish that he faced this persecution “on account\nof” a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Accordingly, the judge ordered Cruz\nremoved to El Salvador.\n\n Cruz appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”), which affirmed. Cruz\nthen petitioned for review in this court. We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision\nunder 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review administrative factual findings under the deferential\n\n\n 1All names are spelled as they appear in Petitioner’s brief.\n\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 3\n\n\nsubstantial-evidence standard: we accept them “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be\ncompelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. § 1252(b)(4)(B).\n\n II.\n\n The Attorney General may grant asylum to an applicant who proves he is a “refugee.” Id.\n§ 1158(b)(1)(A). A “refugee” is an individual who, based on his “membership in a particular\nsocial group” (or other protected status), faces “a well-founded fear of persecution” if he returns\nto his home country. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The applicant must show that the claimed\npersecution will be inflicted by “the government or persons a government is unwilling or unable\nto control.” Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Kasinga, 21 I&N\nDec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996)). An applicant presumptively has a “well-founded fear of\npersecution” if he shows that such persecution has already happened to him before. 8 C.F.R.\n§ 1208.13(b)(1). Thus, asylum cases often depend on an evaluation of past events.\n\n Cruz claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution based on his membership in three\npurported social groups: (1) males who are targeted by MS-13 to work as informants,\n(2) individuals MS-13 thinks are members of 18th Street, and (3) the Cruz-Guzman nuclear\nfamily unit. To succeed, Cruz must show that at least one of these purported social groups\nexists, he is a member of it, and he faces persecution motivated by that membership. 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A); see also Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2015).\nThe Board found that (1) “males who are targeted by MS-13 to work as informants” does not\nqualify as a social group, (2) “imputed 18th Street members” may be a social group, but Cruz\nfailed to show that MS-13 actually imputed membership in 18th Street to him, and (3) the Cruz-\nGuzman family is a social group and Cruz is a member, but he failed to show that his association\nwith his family would motivate any persecution. We review each of these findings in turn.\n\n A.\n\n We first address whether Cruz is a member of a “particular social group.” 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A). A “particular social group” must meet three criteria: (1) immutability\n(members must share an immutable characteristic), (2) particularity (the group has discrete and\ndefinable boundaries), and (3) social distinction (society actually perceives the purported group\n\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 4\n\n\nas a distinct class of persons). Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d at 498; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N\nDec. 227, 237–40 (BIA 2014).\n\n The Board found that Cruz’s first purported social group—males targeted by MS-13 to\nwork as informants—did not satisfy the “social distinction” requirement. Rightly so. This court\nhas already rejected the claim that individuals targeted to join MS-13 qualify as a socially\ndistinct group. Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 674 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[Asylum\napplicant]’s proposed particular social group of ‘young Salvadorans who have been threatened\nbecause they refused to join the MS[-13] gang’ is not cognizable under the INA.” (internal\nalteration omitted)). No meaningful difference exists between individuals targeted by MS-13 to\njoin their gang and individuals targeted by MS-13 to join their gang as informants. Salvadorans\ndo not appear to see a meaningful difference either. The affidavits Cruz submitted from family\nand friends do not indicate that they see this distinction; instead, they mention threats from MS-\n13 recruitment in general. And the reports Cruz cites (authored by Americans, not Salvadorans)\nmention violence against would-be informants either in passing or not at all. In short, Cruz’s\npurported social group relies on a “distinction without a difference” and does not qualify under\nthe asylum statute. Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2015).\n\n Cruz’s second purported social group is imputed gang membership. Specifically, Cruz\ncontends that because he lived and attended school in a neighborhood controlled by 18th Street,\ntheir MS-13 rivals would view Cruz as a member of that gang. The Board correctly determined\nthat, even if this social group exists, Cruz failed to demonstrate that he was a member of it. As\nthe Board found, Cruz’s imputed gang membership argument contradicts his first claimed social\ngroup. MS-13 attempted to recruit him precisely because MS-13 thought he was unaffiliated\nwith 18th Street and thus would be willing and able to spy on them. Logically, then, MS-13 did\nnot impute 18th Street membership to him. Cruz responds that gangs attempt to recruit directly\nfrom the ranks of their rivals, citing evidence that MS-13 generally views residents of 18th Street\nneighborhoods as members of that gang. But there was still substantial evidence for the Board to\n\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 5\n\n\nconclude that MS-13 did not view Cruz as an 18th Street member.2 Accordingly, Cruz cannot\nqualify for asylum on the basis of imputed 18th Street membership.\n\n That leaves Cruz with one final potential social group: his own nuclear family unit. The\nBoard assumed that direct familial ties can create a qualifying “particular social group” and that\nCruz is, by definition, a member of that group. See Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 995\n(6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “membership in the same family . . . is widely recognized by the\ncaselaw” as a “particular social group”).\n\n B.\n\n Although Cruz can show that he has a “well-founded fear of persecution” and that he\nbelongs to a particular social group, he needs to also connect these two concepts. Under the\nstatute he must show that his membership in the Cruz-Guzman family is “one central reason” for\nthe persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). This is a question of motive, not just simple\ncausation. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992); Harmon v. Holder, 758 F.3d\n728, 735–36 (6th Cir. 2014). The Board can find a persecutor’s motive by “connect[ing] the dots\nof circumstantial evidence.” Pablo-Sanchez v. Holder, 600 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2010). “But\nto say that the Board could find circumstantial proof of persecution in a given case is not to say\nthat it must,” and we can only reverse the Board if the latter is true. Id. at 595–96 (emphasis\nadded); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d at 499 n.4. Here, the\nBoard did not find sufficient evidence of motive. Cruz has not shown that the record compels\nthe opposite conclusion.\n\n Cruz bases his family-unit-persecution claim on a dispute between his mother and 18th\nStreet. Sometime after Cruz left El Salvador, 18th Street began extorting protection money from\nhis mother. When she missed a payment, members of the gang broke into her home, beat her,\n\n 2Cruz also points to one particular encounter with MS-13 members in a different neighborhood. But if\nanything, Cruz’s example contradicts his claim of imputed gang membership. As the Immigration Judge concluded,\nthese MS-13 members were “suspicious” but “ultimately did not attribute 18[th Street] gang membership to [Cruz].”\nAR 92. Cruz argues “it was only a matter of time before the gang found out that [he] lived in 18th Street Gang\nterritory” given MS-13’s ability to communicate between neighborhoods with cell phones. Petitioner Br. at 23. But\nthis is merely an alternative—and speculative—view of the evidence. Given that MS-13 members whom Cruz saw\nevery week clearly did not impute 18th Street membership to him, Cruz’s single run-in with other MS-13 members\ndoes not clearly show imputed gang membership.\n\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 6\n\n\nand threatened to rape her daughter (Cruz’s sister). They also indicated that they knew Cruz was\nher son and that he was in the United States. Cruz’s mother subsequently fled to Mexico. Now,\nCruz fears that if he returns, 18th Street will harm him because they cannot get to his mother.\n\n Cruz’s evidence does not show that 18th Street’s actions were motivated by a particular\nanimus toward the Cruz-Guzman family itself, as opposed to an ordinary criminal desire for\nfinancial gain. As the Immigration Judge found, criminal motivations like this apply against\n“virtually the entire population of El Salvador.” AR 91. This court has consistently upheld\ndecisions by the Board denying asylum when the more likely explanation for persecution was\nbasic criminality as opposed to membership in a social group or other protected status.\nKhozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d 187, 196 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that an asylum applicant had\n“failed to connect the [persecution] to anything more than the financial demands of criminal\ncorruption”); see also Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d at 500–01. Other courts have applied the same\nlogic when the protected ground at issue is membership in a family unit. See, e.g., Cambara-\nCambara v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting asylum claim where applicant\n“provided no proof that the criminal gangs targeted members of the family because of family\nrelationships, as opposed to the fact that . . . they were obvious targets for extortionate\ndemands”); Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 492–93 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Matter of L-\nE-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40, 45–47 (BIA 2017) (“The fact that a persecutor targets a family member\nsimply as a means to an end is not, by itself, sufficient to establish a claim, especially if the end\nis not connected to another protected ground.”). The Board concluded that Cruz had failed to\nshow that 18th Street was motivated by particular animus toward his family, as opposed to\ngenerally applicable financial desires. The record does not compel the opposite conclusion.\n\n * * *\n\n In sum, Cruz has not shown that he has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of\na protected ground, which means he is not a “refugee” under the statute, and his asylum claim\nfails. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Accordingly, we need not address Cruz’s remaining\narguments that the Salvadoran government is unable or unwilling to control his persecutors and\nthat internal relocation would be unreasonable under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). The\npetition for review is denied.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Jonathan Cruz-Guzman v. William P. Barr\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0064p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n JONATHAN CRUZ-GUZMAN, ┐\\n Petitioner, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-3520\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, │\\n Respondent. │\\n ┘\\n\\n On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals;\\n No. A 208 280 977.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: March 15, 2019*\\n\\n Before: BATCHELDER, ROGERS, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Jamie B. Naini, THE LAW OFFICES OF JAMIE B. NAINI, Memphis, Tennessee,\\nfor Petitioner. Holly M. Smith, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,\\nD.C., for Respondent.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Jonathan Cruz-Guzman seeks review of a Board of\\nImmigration Appeals order denying his application for asylum. We deny his petition.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n *This decision was originally filed as an unpublished opinion on March 15, 2019. The court has now\\ndesignated the opinion for publication.\\n\\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 2\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Cruz is a native of El Salvador.1 He grew up in a neighborhood dominated by a gang\\nknown as 18th Street. 18th Street’s rival gang, MS-13, sought to recruit Cruz and his friends to\\njoin MS-13 as “spies” so they could relay information about 18th Street activities in the area.\\nAfter they refused, MS-13 began threatening and assaulting them. This harassment culminated\\nwhen members of MS-13 murdered Cruz’s friend Brian. Later that week, one of them told Cruz\\n“if [he] was just as stupid as Brian, then the same thing would happen to [him].” AR 243.\\nShortly after this threat, Cruz fled El Salvador.\\n\\n Immigration authorities apprehended Cruz upon his entry into the United States near\\nHidalgo, Texas. In his deportation proceeding, Cruz conceded that he was subject to removal but\\nsought asylum based on his fear of gang violence if he returned home. While his asylum\\napplication was pending, his friends and family in El Salvador faced continued threats and\\nviolence. MS-13 killed one friend, while 18th Street killed another. Both gangs extorted\\nprotection money from Cruz’s mother. When she missed a payment to 18th Street, members of\\nthe gang broke into her house, beat her, and threatened to rape Cruz’s sister.\\n\\n During Cruz’s asylum hearing, he detailed the violence and harassment he, his family,\\nand his friends had all faced in El Salvador. He explained that he feared further violence from\\nboth MS-13 and 18th Street if he returned home: MS-13 because of his refusal to join them, and\\n18th Street as punishment for his mother’s refusal to pay protection money. While the\\nImmigration Judge found Cruz’s testimony credible, she denied Cruz’s asylum application\\nbecause, among other things, Cruz failed to establish that he faced this persecution “on account\\nof” a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Accordingly, the judge ordered Cruz\\nremoved to El Salvador.\\n\\n Cruz appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”), which affirmed. Cruz\\nthen petitioned for review in this court. We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision\\nunder 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review administrative factual findings under the deferential\\n\\n\\n 1All names are spelled as they appear in Petitioner’s brief.\\n\\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 3\\n\\n\\nsubstantial-evidence standard: we accept them “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be\\ncompelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. § 1252(b)(4)(B).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The Attorney General may grant asylum to an applicant who proves he is a “refugee.” Id.\\n§ 1158(b)(1)(A). A “refugee” is an individual who, based on his “membership in a particular\\nsocial group” (or other protected status), faces “a well-founded fear of persecution” if he returns\\nto his home country. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The applicant must show that the claimed\\npersecution will be inflicted by “the government or persons a government is unwilling or unable\\nto control.” Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Kasinga, 21 I&N\\nDec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996)). An applicant presumptively has a “well-founded fear of\\npersecution” if he shows that such persecution has already happened to him before. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.13(b)(1). Thus, asylum cases often depend on an evaluation of past events.\\n\\n Cruz claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution based on his membership in three\\npurported social groups: (1) males who are targeted by MS-13 to work as informants,\\n(2) individuals MS-13 thinks are members of 18th Street, and (3) the Cruz-Guzman nuclear\\nfamily unit. To succeed, Cruz must show that at least one of these purported social groups\\nexists, he is a member of it, and he faces persecution motivated by that membership. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A); see also Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2015).\\nThe Board found that (1) “males who are targeted by MS-13 to work as informants” does not\\nqualify as a social group, (2) “imputed 18th Street members” may be a social group, but Cruz\\nfailed to show that MS-13 actually imputed membership in 18th Street to him, and (3) the Cruz-\\nGuzman family is a social group and Cruz is a member, but he failed to show that his association\\nwith his family would motivate any persecution. We review each of these findings in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We first address whether Cruz is a member of a “particular social group.” 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A). A “particular social group” must meet three criteria: (1) immutability\\n(members must share an immutable characteristic), (2) particularity (the group has discrete and\\ndefinable boundaries), and (3) social distinction (society actually perceives the purported group\\n\\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 4\\n\\n\\nas a distinct class of persons). Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d at 498; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N\\nDec. 227, 237–40 (BIA 2014).\\n\\n The Board found that Cruz’s first purported social group—males targeted by MS-13 to\\nwork as informants—did not satisfy the “social distinction” requirement. Rightly so. This court\\nhas already rejected the claim that individuals targeted to join MS-13 qualify as a socially\\ndistinct group. Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 674 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[Asylum\\napplicant]’s proposed particular social group of ‘young Salvadorans who have been threatened\\nbecause they refused to join the MS[-13] gang’ is not cognizable under the INA.” (internal\\nalteration omitted)). No meaningful difference exists between individuals targeted by MS-13 to\\njoin their gang and individuals targeted by MS-13 to join their gang as informants. Salvadorans\\ndo not appear to see a meaningful difference either. The affidavits Cruz submitted from family\\nand friends do not indicate that they see this distinction; instead, they mention threats from MS-\\n13 recruitment in general. And the reports Cruz cites (authored by Americans, not Salvadorans)\\nmention violence against would-be informants either in passing or not at all. In short, Cruz’s\\npurported social group relies on a “distinction without a difference” and does not qualify under\\nthe asylum statute. Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n Cruz’s second purported social group is imputed gang membership. Specifically, Cruz\\ncontends that because he lived and attended school in a neighborhood controlled by 18th Street,\\ntheir MS-13 rivals would view Cruz as a member of that gang. The Board correctly determined\\nthat, even if this social group exists, Cruz failed to demonstrate that he was a member of it. As\\nthe Board found, Cruz’s imputed gang membership argument contradicts his first claimed social\\ngroup. MS-13 attempted to recruit him precisely because MS-13 thought he was unaffiliated\\nwith 18th Street and thus would be willing and able to spy on them. Logically, then, MS-13 did\\nnot impute 18th Street membership to him. Cruz responds that gangs attempt to recruit directly\\nfrom the ranks of their rivals, citing evidence that MS-13 generally views residents of 18th Street\\nneighborhoods as members of that gang. But there was still substantial evidence for the Board to\\n\\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 5\\n\\n\\nconclude that MS-13 did not view Cruz as an 18th Street member.2 Accordingly, Cruz cannot\\nqualify for asylum on the basis of imputed 18th Street membership.\\n\\n That leaves Cruz with one final potential social group: his own nuclear family unit. The\\nBoard assumed that direct familial ties can create a qualifying “particular social group” and that\\nCruz is, by definition, a member of that group. See Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 995\\n(6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “membership in the same family . . . is widely recognized by the\\ncaselaw” as a “particular social group”).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Although Cruz can show that he has a “well-founded fear of persecution” and that he\\nbelongs to a particular social group, he needs to also connect these two concepts. Under the\\nstatute he must show that his membership in the Cruz-Guzman family is “one central reason” for\\nthe persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). This is a question of motive, not just simple\\ncausation. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992); Harmon v. Holder, 758 F.3d\\n728, 735–36 (6th Cir. 2014). The Board can find a persecutor’s motive by “connect[ing] the dots\\nof circumstantial evidence.” Pablo-Sanchez v. Holder, 600 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2010). “But\\nto say that the Board could find circumstantial proof of persecution in a given case is not to say\\nthat it must,” and we can only reverse the Board if the latter is true. Id. at 595–96 (emphasis\\nadded); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d at 499 n.4. Here, the\\nBoard did not find sufficient evidence of motive. Cruz has not shown that the record compels\\nthe opposite conclusion.\\n\\n Cruz bases his family-unit-persecution claim on a dispute between his mother and 18th\\nStreet. Sometime after Cruz left El Salvador, 18th Street began extorting protection money from\\nhis mother. When she missed a payment, members of the gang broke into her home, beat her,\\n\\n 2Cruz also points to one particular encounter with MS-13 members in a different neighborhood. But if\\nanything, Cruz’s example contradicts his claim of imputed gang membership. As the Immigration Judge concluded,\\nthese MS-13 members were “suspicious” but “ultimately did not attribute 18[th Street] gang membership to [Cruz].”\\nAR 92. Cruz argues “it was only a matter of time before the gang found out that [he] lived in 18th Street Gang\\nterritory” given MS-13’s ability to communicate between neighborhoods with cell phones. Petitioner Br. at 23. But\\nthis is merely an alternative—and speculative—view of the evidence. Given that MS-13 members whom Cruz saw\\nevery week clearly did not impute 18th Street membership to him, Cruz’s single run-in with other MS-13 members\\ndoes not clearly show imputed gang membership.\\n\\f No. 18-3520 Cruz-Guzman v. Barr Page 6\\n\\n\\nand threatened to rape her daughter (Cruz’s sister). They also indicated that they knew Cruz was\\nher son and that he was in the United States. Cruz’s mother subsequently fled to Mexico. Now,\\nCruz fears that if he returns, 18th Street will harm him because they cannot get to his mother.\\n\\n Cruz’s evidence does not show that 18th Street’s actions were motivated by a particular\\nanimus toward the Cruz-Guzman family itself, as opposed to an ordinary criminal desire for\\nfinancial gain. As the Immigration Judge found, criminal motivations like this apply against\\n“virtually the entire population of El Salvador.” AR 91. This court has consistently upheld\\ndecisions by the Board denying asylum when the more likely explanation for persecution was\\nbasic criminality as opposed to membership in a social group or other protected status.\\nKhozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d 187, 196 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that an asylum applicant had\\n“failed to connect the [persecution] to anything more than the financial demands of criminal\\ncorruption”); see also Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d at 500–01. Other courts have applied the same\\nlogic when the protected ground at issue is membership in a family unit. See, e.g., Cambara-\\nCambara v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting asylum claim where applicant\\n“provided no proof that the criminal gangs targeted members of the family because of family\\nrelationships, as opposed to the fact that . . . they were obvious targets for extortionate\\ndemands”); Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 492–93 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Matter of L-\\nE-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40, 45–47 (BIA 2017) (“The fact that a persecutor targets a family member\\nsimply as a means to an end is not, by itself, sufficient to establish a claim, especially if the end\\nis not connected to another protected ground.”). The Board concluded that Cruz had failed to\\nshow that 18th Street was motivated by particular animus toward his family, as opposed to\\ngenerally applicable financial desires. The record does not compel the opposite conclusion.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n In sum, Cruz has not shown that he has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of\\na protected ground, which means he is not a “refugee” under the statute, and his asylum claim\\nfails. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Accordingly, we need not address Cruz’s remaining\\narguments that the Salvadoran government is unable or unwilling to control his persecutors and\\nthat internal relocation would be unreasonable under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). The\\npetition for review is denied.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1658,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607687,"string":"4,607,687"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"K. H., a Minor Child, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"K. H. v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3426"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Cole, Suhrheinrich, Moore\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLE, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0065p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n K. H., a minor child, ┐\\n Petitioner, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-3426\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, │\\n Respondent. │\\n ┘\\n\\n On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals;\\n No. A 206 685 772.\\n\\n Argued: January 16, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 8, 2019\\n\\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and MOORE, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Edward W. Farrell, RUSSELL IMMIGRATION LAW FIRM PLLC, Louisville,\\nKentucky, for Petitioner. Susan Bennett Green, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\\nJUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Edward W. Farrell, RUSSELL\\nIMMIGRATION LAW FIRM PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Petitioner. Susan Bennett\\nGreen, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n COLE, Chief Judge. K.H., a Guatemalan native and citizen, was kidnapped, beaten, and\\nraped in Guatemala when she was seven years old. Upon notice of the kidnapping, the\\nGuatemalan police quickly intervened and caught K.H.’s persecutors, who were then tried,\\nconvicted, and sentenced. Shortly thereafter, K.H. fled to the United States. K.H. now appeals\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 2\\n\\n\\nthe order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”)\\ndenial of her applications for asylum and humanitarian asylum because she failed to demonstrate\\npast persecution. Specifically, in affirming the IJ’s order, the BIA concluded that K.H. failed to\\nshow that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her persecutors and\\nprotect her, considering the Guatemalan police’s effective response to her kidnapping.\\n\\n We conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that K.H. failed\\nto show that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her persecutors and\\nprotect her. We therefore deny K.H.’s petition for review.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n A. Factual Background\\n\\n In 2012, while waiting at a bus stop in Barbarena, Santa Rosa, Guatemala, seven-year-old\\nK.H. was kidnapped by members of a gang known as “Los Cobardes.” The kidnappers sought\\nransom from both K.H.’s grandmother, Milagro—a woman of indigenous Xinca heritage—and\\nK.H.’s mother, who was living in the United States. While communicating with Milagro, the\\nkidnappers used various slurs to demean indigenous people.1 In response, Milagro contacted the\\nGuatemalan National Police (“GNP”), who began to track the ransom calls.\\n\\n During her detention, K.H.’s kidnappers beat and raped her. When her captors realized\\nthey were being tracked by the GNP, they abandoned K.H. in a field. The GNP then located\\nK.H., who was hospitalized for approximately two weeks due to her injuries.\\n\\n After her hospital stay, the Guatemalan Trial Court for Childhood and Adolescent Cases\\n(the “Trial Court”) ordered K.H. to be placed in a temporary shelter. Consequently, K.H. was\\nsent to Refugio de la Ninez, a refuge for children in Guatemala City. The Trial Court also\\nordered that the refuge “provide intensive psychological therapy” to K.H. and directed the\\nAttorney General to “facilitate the steps necessary in order for the child to be transferred to the\\nUnited States.” (A.R. 311.)\\n\\n\\n 1Evidence in the record notes that the Xinca (Mesoamerican Indians of Southeastern Guatemala) have\\nexperienced harsh treatment—including branding and enslavement—since the early 16th century.\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 3\\n\\n\\n At a follow-up hearing in 2014, the Trial Court directed that K.H. be released from the\\nrefuge, to the care of Milagro, on the condition that they live elsewhere in Guatemala. The Trial\\nCourt also ordered that K.H. and Milagro “be strictly supervised” by the Fraijanes Police\\nDepartment, as Fraijanes was the city in which they planned to live. (A.R. 299.) Finally, the\\nCourt again directed the refuge to help K.H. “obtain her American Visa and to transfer her to a\\nmore secure location.” (A.R. 300.) K.H. and Milagro lived in Fraijanes for a few months but\\neventually returned to Barbarena for economic reasons.\\n\\n At least four of the perpetrators of K.H.’s kidnapping were caught, tried, and convicted,\\nand received sentences ranging from 27 to 72 years’ imprisonment. Two additional individuals\\nwere identified as connected to the gang and potentially the kidnapping, but the record is unclear\\nas to whether they were apprehended.\\n\\n While K.H.’s application for an American visa was pending, she fled to the United States.\\n\\n B. Procedural Background\\n\\n Upon reaching the United States-Mexico border in March 2014, K.H. was apprehended\\nby immigration authorities, taken into custody, and placed in removal proceedings. K.H. filed\\nher application for asylum in December 2014, alleging fear of harm in her home country on\\naccount of her race, ethnicity, and membership in a particular social group comprised of\\nmembers of her family who cooperated with the police and prosecutors to convict gang\\nmembers.\\n\\n Prior to her removal proceedings, the parties stipulated that (1) the harm K.H.\\nexperienced rose to the level of persecution and (2) K.H. was persecuted on account of her race\\nand her membership in a particular social group. Thus, the only remaining issue was whether the\\nGuatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control K.H.’s persecutors and protect her.\\nAs a result, K.H. did not testify.\\n\\n At the hearing, the IJ heard evidence about the kidnapping, the Guatemalan government’s\\nresponse, and general country conditions in Guatemala. Milagro testified through an interpreter,\\nbut the IJ ultimately found that she was not credible.\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 4\\n\\n\\n On June 9, 2017, the IJ denied K.H.’s applications for asylum and humanitarian asylum\\nunder 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii), withholding of removal pursuant to § 241(b)(3) of the\\nImmigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and relief under Article III of the Convention Against\\nTorture (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). The IJ accepted the parties’ stipulations that the harm\\nK.H. experienced rose to the level of persecution and that this persecution was on account of her\\nrace and membership in a particular social group. But the IJ found that the Guatemalan\\ngovernment “was doing everything in its power to control [K.H.]’s persecutors,” including\\ntracking, identifying, and convicting a number of K.H.’s kidnappers. (IJ Decision, A.R. 66–67.)\\nThe IJ also found that the Guatemalan government offered protection to K.H. following her\\nkidnapping by placing her in a shelter, offering psychological care, and ordering her to relocate\\nto another city.\\n\\n In light of this evidence, the IJ found that K.H. had not met her burden to prove that the\\nGuatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her persecutors and protect her, and\\nthus she did not meet the standard to show past persecution. Because the IJ held that K.H. could\\nnot demonstrate past persecution, he also found that she was not eligible for a grant of\\nhumanitarian asylum. Finally, the IJ found that K.H. had failed to establish the well-founded\\nfear requirement, and thus her withholding of removal and CAT claims failed.\\n\\n K.H. appealed to the BIA, challenging only the denial of her asylum and humanitarian\\nasylum applications. The BIA denied K.H.’s appeal, holding that “the specific steps taken by the\\nauthorities in the respondent’s case reflect the government’s ability and willingness to protect her\\nby prosecuting her assailants and providing protection to the respondent from the perpetrators.”\\n(BIA Decision, A.R. 5.) Specifically, the BIA stated that K.H.’s “own experience with the\\npolice, prosecutors, and the judiciary demonstrates a significant governmental willingness and\\nability to protect her.” (Id.) In light of this holding—that K.H. did not establish past\\npersecution—the BIA found that K.H. was not eligible for a grant of humanitarian asylum.\\n\\n K.H. now seeks review in this court, arguing that the BIA erred in holding that she failed\\nto demonstrate that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her\\npersecutors and protect her, and erred in failing to grant her humanitarian asylum.\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 5\\n\\n\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n\\n “Where the BIA reviews the immigration judge’s decision and issues a separate opinion,\\nrather than summarily affirming the immigration judge’s decision, we review the BIA’s decision\\nas the final agency determination.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing\\nMorgan v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 1053, 1057 (6th Cir. 2007)). “To the extent the BIA adopted the\\nimmigration judge’s reasoning, however, this Court also reviews the immigration judge’s\\ndecision.” Id. (citing Patel v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 216, 218 (6th Cir. 2006)). The IJ and the\\nBIA’s factual findings are reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard. Hamida v.\\nGonzales, 478 F.3d 734, 736 (6th Cir. 2007). We cannot reverse such findings simply because\\nwe would have decided them differently. Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972, 978 (6th Cir. 2005).\\nThese findings “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to\\nconclude to the contrary.” Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8\\nU.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).\\n\\n A. Asylum\\n\\n The Attorney General has discretionary authority to grant asylum to an individual who\\nqualifies as a “refugee” within the meaning of § 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA. Ouda v. I.N.S., 324\\nF.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003). “A refugee is defined as a person who is unable or unwilling to\\nreturn to [her] home country ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on\\naccount of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political\\nopinion.’” Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). An asylum applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that she qualifies as a\\nrefugee by establishing “either that [s]he has suffered actual past persecution or that [s]he has a\\nwell-founded fear of future persecution.” Id. (citing Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 389 (6th\\nCir. 1998); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2004)). “Persecution is ‘the infliction of harm or suffering by\\nthe government, or persons the government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a\\ncharacteristic of the victim.’” Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting\\nKhalili, 557 F.3d at 436).\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 6\\n\\n\\n Here, K.H.’s persecution claim is based on past persecution by non-governmental actors.\\nBecause the government stipulated that K.H.’s kidnapping rose to the level of persecution and\\nwas on account of a statutorily proscribed ground, K.H. need only “show that the Guatemalan\\ngovernment was unwilling or unable to control [her persecutors] and protect her” to demonstrate\\npast persecution. Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Whitaker, No. 18-3630, 2019 WL 364446, at *3 (6th\\nCir. Jan. 29, 2019) (citing Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436); see also Borodachev v. Holder, 441 F.\\nApp’x 354, 360 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Fisenko v. Holder, 336 F. App’x 504, 509 (6th Cir. 2009)\\n(“Where the government is not responsible for the persecution, the alien must demonstrate that\\nthe government is unwilling or unable to control those who are responsible.”). K.H. has the\\nburden to show that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her\\npersecutors and protect her. See, e.g., Pilica, 388 F.3d at 950.\\n\\n In evaluating past persecution—and in this case, the “unwilling or unable to control”\\nelement—an adjudicator must examine “the overall context of the applicant’s situation[,]”\\nHaider v. Holder, 595 F.3d 276, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275,\\n285 (6th Cir. 2005)), and review “all relevant evidence in the record[.]” Bringas-Rodriguez v.\\nSessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). In other words, courts “must\\nview the evidence in the aggregate,” with no one factor being dispositive. See Haider, 595 F.3d\\nat 287. The IJ correctly noted, however, that the law in this circuit does not provide a clear\\nroadmap for the “unwilling or unable” analysis:\\n\\n The Court is not aware of any Board or Sixth Circuit precedent that describes the\\n level of activity needed to show that a government is unable or unwilling to\\n control a respondent’s persecutors, however the First Circuit Court of Appeals has\\n spoken to this issue. The First Circuit has held that when a government makes\\n every effort to combat violence by private actors, and its inability to stop the\\n problem is not distinguishable from any other government’s struggles, the private\\n violence has no government nexus, and does not constitute persecution. Burbiene\\n v. Holder, 568 F.3d 251 (1st Cir. 2009). In another case, the First Circuit noted\\n that it was “particularly unwilling to overturn a finding of no government\\n connection where the local authorities have appropriately responded to incidents\\n of violence.” Khan v. Holder, 727 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. [2013]) (citing Ortiz-\\n Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2007)). In a third case, the First\\n Circuit found that the Brazilian government was not unable or unwilling to\\n control the respondents’ persecutors because the arrest of a gang leader showed\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 7\\n\\n\\n their willingness to combat the gang’s tendencies. Dias Gomes v. Holder,\\n 566 F.3d 232, 233 (1st Cir. 2009).\\n\\n(IJ Decision, A.R. 67–68.) The IJ adopted the First Circuit’s approach and held that because “it\\nappears that the Guatemalan government did everything in its power to rescue [K.H.], arrest her\\nkidnappers, and convict her kidnappers,” K.H. did not demonstrate the government was\\nunwilling or unable to control her persecutors. (Id. at 68.)\\n\\n We, however, reject the First Circuit’s one-dimensional approach. In keeping with our\\nprecedent, we note that we “must evaluate past persecution based on ‘the overall context of the\\napplicant’s situation[.]’” See Haider, 595 F.3d at 287 (quoting Gilaj, 408 F.3d at 285).\\nConsequently, a government’s specific response to a petitioner’s persecution cannot be the only\\nrelevant evidence an immigration judge considers. Instead, we look to two general categories of\\ninformation: (1) the government’s response to an asylum applicant’s persecution and (2) general\\nevidence of country conditions. See, e.g., Perez-Aguilon v. Lynch, 674 F. App’x 457, 463 (6th\\nCir. 2016) (relying on the police response, as well as the country-condition reports in\\ndetermining whether the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control petitioner’s\\npersecutors); Gomez-Romero v. Holder, 475 F. App’x 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). Both\\ncategories will be discussed in turn.\\n\\n 1. The Government’s Response\\n\\n In considering a government’s response, courts should review a variety of factors,\\nincluding, but not limited to: (1) whether the police investigated, prosecuted, and punished the\\npersecutors, see, e.g., Berishaj v. Gonzales, 238 F. App’x 57, 63–64 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on\\nthe fact that the persecutor was convicted and punished to hold that the government was not\\nunwilling or unable to protect the asylum applicant); Fisenko, 336 F. App’x at 509 (holding that\\nthe incidents in question “were investigated by the police and the police took that investigation\\nseriously, such that it could not be said that the government was unable or unwilling to control\\nthe [persecutors]”); (2) the degree of protection offered to an asylum applicant following the\\npersecution, see Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436 (relying on the fact that “police have placed potential\\nvictims in protective custody” to hold that the Jordanian government was not unwilling or unable\\nto protect petitioner); and (3) any concessions on the part of the government, see Garcia v.\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 8\\n\\n\\nAttorney General of the United States, 665 F.3d 496, 503 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that “[t]he fact\\nthat Guatemala saw fit to relocate [the petitioner] to Mexico is tantamount to an admission that it\\ncould not protect her in Guatemala.”).\\n\\n In this case, the BIA agreed with the IJ “that the specific steps taken by the authorities in\\n[K.H.’s] case reflect the government’s ability and willingness to protect her by prosecuting her\\nassailants and providing protection to the respondent from the perpetrators.” (BIA Decision,\\nA.R. 5.) Specifically, the BIA referenced the IJ’s reliance on the fact that K.H. “was placed in a\\ngovernment supported child refuge, instructed to relocate to a new city by the judge presiding\\nover the criminal matter, and scheduled for regular check-ins with authorities as a means of\\nprotection after she was rescued by the police.” (Id. at 4–5.) Finally, the BIA briefly noted that\\nthe Trial Court recommended that K.H. “seek a visa allowing her to join her family in the United\\nStates.” (Id. at 4.)\\n\\n As an initial matter, although K.H. was placed in a refuge and scheduled for regular\\ncheck-ins with authorities, there is no indication any such visits occurred. Accordingly, it is not\\nclear from the record what protection, if any, K.H. was provided after she left the refuge.\\nMoreover, the record indicates that K.H. was directed to apply for a humanitarian visa to be with\\nher mother, as well as for safety reasons. These factors, thus, do not support the BIA’s\\nconclusion. To the contrary, these factors actually support K.H.’s argument.\\n\\n But the BIA did adequately consider the other factors that weigh strongly in the\\ngovernment’s favor: for example, the police’s timely and effective investigation, the efficient\\nprosecution of K.H.’s perpetrators, and the lengthy punishments imposed. Thus, although the\\nevidence is not as strong as the BIA indicated, the BIA reasonably concluded that some of the\\nevidence presented, with respect to the government’s response, demonstrated the Guatemalan\\ngovernment was not unwilling or unable to control K.H.’s persecutors and protect her.\\n\\n 2. Country Conditions\\n\\n We also consider country conditions in the “unwilling or unable” analysis, as it allows an\\nadjudicator to consider a country’s practices more generally and gives a broader picture of the\\nsocial, economic, and cultural realities of a country. See Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 819\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 9\\n\\n\\n(6th Cir. 2017). Indeed, this type of evidence is consistently used in a variety of asylum matters,\\nincluding withholding of removal, past persecution, and future persecution analyses, as it\\ninforms an adjudicator (1) how certain crimes are prosecuted and punished, see id. (holding the\\nJordanian government was unable to protect asylum applicant when country reports established\\nthat Jordanian governors routinely abused the law and imprisoned potential victims of honor\\ncrimes in a poor attempt to protect victims); Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436 (relying on the State\\nDepartment’s 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Jordan to determine how\\nhonor crimes were prosecuted and handled on a country-wide basis), as well as (2) the efficacy\\nof the government’s efforts, see El Ghorbi v. Mukasey, 281 F. App’x 514, 517 (6th Cir. 2008)\\n(relying on the State Department’s 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for\\nMauritania to obtain statistics on domestic violence disputes); Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499,\\n507 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Some of the successes cited in the BIA’s opinion—such as the arrests\\nduring a seven-year period of ‘79,000 people on drug trafficking related charges’—may be of\\nlimited practical significance to [asylum applicant]’s situation, because corruption is also\\nrampant among prison guards, and prisoners can and do break out of prison with the guards’\\nhelp.”).\\n\\n Here, the IJ erred in failing to consider the relevant country condition evidence in\\nanalyzing past persecution, which would warrant reversal standing alone. But the BIA’s separate\\nopinion acknowledged this evidence, and that is the final agency determination we review. See\\nKhalili, 557 F.3d at 435. In its opinion, the BIA “recognize[d] [K.H.’s] assertions that (1) the\\nGuatemalan government often provides inadequate protections to indigenous women and girls\\nand (2) there are high levels of crime in the country that are generally hard to control.” (BIA\\nDecision, A.R. 5.) A review of the record certainly illustrates K.H.’s concerns. But the BIA\\nheld that “notwithstanding various identified systemic problems, suggesting that the Guatemalan\\ngovernment does not have the resources to stop all violence against indigenous women and girls,\\nthe respondent’s own experience with the police, prosecutors, and the judiciary demonstrates a\\nsignificant governmental willingness and ability to protect her.” (Id.)\\n\\n Again, we reiterate that the government’s response to K.H.’s kidnapping is not\\ndispositive. But we cannot say that the BIA’s decision here was not supported by substantial\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 10\\n\\n\\nevidence given just how much effort the Guatemalan government expended in trying to control\\nK.H.’s persecutors and protect her. While we may have reached a different result—and found\\nthat the government’s response did not outweigh the record evidence demonstrating the struggles\\nof the Guatemalan government to protect minors and indigenous citizens—that is not the\\nstandard. See Gishta, 404 F.3d at 978. Instead, we can reverse the BIA’s factual findings only\\nwhen “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Slyusar,\\n740 F.3d at 1072. In light of the timely intervention and arrest by the GNP, followed by the\\nprosecution, conviction, and sentencing of K.H.’s persecutors, as well as the steps taken by the\\nTrial Court in an effort to protect K.H., we affirm the BIA’s finding that K.H. failed to meet her\\nburden in showing the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her\\npersecutors and protect her.\\n\\n B. Humanitarian Asylum\\n\\n The BIA held that in the absence of past persecution, K.H. was not eligible for a grant of\\nhumanitarian asylum. “We review the BIA’s denial of humanitarian asylum for an abuse of\\ndiscretion.” Mbodj v. Holder, 394 F. App’x 239, 245 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Karomi v. Gonzales,\\n168 F. App’x 719, 723 (6th Cir. 2006); Hadad v. Ashcroft, 127 F. App’x 800, 802 (6th Cir.\\n2005)). In determining whether the BIA abused its discretion, “this court must decide whether\\nthe [BIA’]s decision was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from\\nestablished policies or rested on an impermissible basis, such as invidious discrimination[.]”\\nDaneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 626 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hazime v. INS, 17 F.3d 136,\\n140 (6th Cir. 1994)).\\n\\n Humanitarian asylum may be granted if (1) the applicant has demonstrated “compelling\\nreasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the\\npast persecution,” or (2) there is a reasonable possibility an applicant “‘may suffer other serious\\nharm upon removal to that country,’ even in the absence of a well-founded fear of future\\npersecution.” Mbodj, 394 F. App’x at 244 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)). Humanitarian\\nasylum is a form of “extraordinary relief” that is appropriate only “in rare instances” where the\\napplicant has “suffered under atrocious forms of persecution.” Id. at 244–45 (quoting Cutaj v.\\nGonzales, 206 F. App’x 485, 492 (6th Cir. 2006); Hamida, 478 F.3d at 740).\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 11\\n\\n\\n K.H. argues that, even if the BIA did not err in determining that she suffered past\\npersecution, it erred in denying her humanitarian asylum because she will suffer “other serious\\nharm” if removed to Guatemala. But K.H. fails to acknowledge that if she did not suffer past\\npersecution, she cannot receive humanitarian asylum. Hamida, 478 F.3d at 741 (holding that\\n“the other serious harm provision provides a second avenue of relief for victims of past\\npersecution[.]”) (internal quotations and brackets omitted); see also Gomez-Romero v. Holder,\\n475 F. App’x 621, 626–27 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that “relief under both [humanitarian asylum]\\nsubsections is contingent upon a showing of past persecution”) (internal quotations and citations\\nomitted). In other words, if K.H. did not suffer past persecution, her claim for humanitarian\\nasylum must fail. See id. Consequently, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying K.H.’s\\napplication for humanitarian asylum.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For these reasons, we find that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that\\nK.H. failed to show the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control her\\npersecutors and protect her. We therefore deny K.H.’s petition for review.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384940/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLE, Chief Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SUHRHEINRICH"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MOORE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607687/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: K. H., a Minor Child, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0065p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n K. H., a minor child, ┐\n Petitioner, │\n │\n > No. 18-3426\n v. │\n │\n │\n WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, │\n Respondent. │\n ┘\n\n On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals;\n No. A 206 685 772.\n\n Argued: January 16, 2019\n\n Decided and Filed: April 8, 2019\n\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and MOORE, Circuit Judges.\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: Edward W. Farrell, RUSSELL IMMIGRATION LAW FIRM PLLC, Louisville,\nKentucky, for Petitioner. Susan Bennett Green, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\nJUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Edward W. Farrell, RUSSELL\nIMMIGRATION LAW FIRM PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Petitioner. Susan Bennett\nGreen, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n COLE, Chief Judge. K.H., a Guatemalan native and citizen, was kidnapped, beaten, and\nraped in Guatemala when she was seven years old. Upon notice of the kidnapping, the\nGuatemalan police quickly intervened and caught K.H.’s persecutors, who were then tried,\nconvicted, and sentenced. Shortly thereafter, K.H. fled to the United States. K.H. now appeals\n\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 2\n\n\nthe order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”)\ndenial of her applications for asylum and humanitarian asylum because she failed to demonstrate\npast persecution. Specifically, in affirming the IJ’s order, the BIA concluded that K.H. failed to\nshow that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her persecutors and\nprotect her, considering the Guatemalan police’s effective response to her kidnapping.\n\n We conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that K.H. failed\nto show that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her persecutors and\nprotect her. We therefore deny K.H.’s petition for review.\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n\n A. Factual Background\n\n In 2012, while waiting at a bus stop in Barbarena, Santa Rosa, Guatemala, seven-year-old\nK.H. was kidnapped by members of a gang known as “Los Cobardes.” The kidnappers sought\nransom from both K.H.’s grandmother, Milagro—a woman of indigenous Xinca heritage—and\nK.H.’s mother, who was living in the United States. While communicating with Milagro, the\nkidnappers used various slurs to demean indigenous people.1 In response, Milagro contacted the\nGuatemalan National Police (“GNP”), who began to track the ransom calls.\n\n During her detention, K.H.’s kidnappers beat and raped her. When her captors realized\nthey were being tracked by the GNP, they abandoned K.H. in a field. The GNP then located\nK.H., who was hospitalized for approximately two weeks due to her injuries.\n\n After her hospital stay, the Guatemalan Trial Court for Childhood and Adolescent Cases\n(the “Trial Court”) ordered K.H. to be placed in a temporary shelter. Consequently, K.H. was\nsent to Refugio de la Ninez, a refuge for children in Guatemala City. The Trial Court also\nordered that the refuge “provide intensive psychological therapy” to K.H. and directed the\nAttorney General to “facilitate the steps necessary in order for the child to be transferred to the\nUnited States.” (A.R. 311.)\n\n\n 1Evidence in the record notes that the Xinca (Mesoamerican Indians of Southeastern Guatemala) have\nexperienced harsh treatment—including branding and enslavement—since the early 16th century.\n\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 3\n\n\n At a follow-up hearing in 2014, the Trial Court directed that K.H. be released from the\nrefuge, to the care of Milagro, on the condition that they live elsewhere in Guatemala. The Trial\nCourt also ordered that K.H. and Milagro “be strictly supervised” by the Fraijanes Police\nDepartment, as Fraijanes was the city in which they planned to live. (A.R. 299.) Finally, the\nCourt again directed the refuge to help K.H. “obtain her American Visa and to transfer her to a\nmore secure location.” (A.R. 300.) K.H. and Milagro lived in Fraijanes for a few months but\neventually returned to Barbarena for economic reasons.\n\n At least four of the perpetrators of K.H.’s kidnapping were caught, tried, and convicted,\nand received sentences ranging from 27 to 72 years’ imprisonment. Two additional individuals\nwere identified as connected to the gang and potentially the kidnapping, but the record is unclear\nas to whether they were apprehended.\n\n While K.H.’s application for an American visa was pending, she fled to the United States.\n\n B. Procedural Background\n\n Upon reaching the United States-Mexico border in March 2014, K.H. was apprehended\nby immigration authorities, taken into custody, and placed in removal proceedings. K.H. filed\nher application for asylum in December 2014, alleging fear of harm in her home country on\naccount of her race, ethnicity, and membership in a particular social group comprised of\nmembers of her family who cooperated with the police and prosecutors to convict gang\nmembers.\n\n Prior to her removal proceedings, the parties stipulated that (1) the harm K.H.\nexperienced rose to the level of persecution and (2) K.H. was persecuted on account of her race\nand her membership in a particular social group. Thus, the only remaining issue was whether the\nGuatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control K.H.’s persecutors and protect her.\nAs a result, K.H. did not testify.\n\n At the hearing, the IJ heard evidence about the kidnapping, the Guatemalan government’s\nresponse, and general country conditions in Guatemala. Milagro testified through an interpreter,\nbut the IJ ultimately found that she was not credible.\n\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 4\n\n\n On June 9, 2017, the IJ denied K.H.’s applications for asylum and humanitarian asylum\nunder 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii), withholding of removal pursuant to § 241(b)(3) of the\nImmigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and relief under Article III of the Convention Against\nTorture (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). The IJ accepted the parties’ stipulations that the harm\nK.H. experienced rose to the level of persecution and that this persecution was on account of her\nrace and membership in a particular social group. But the IJ found that the Guatemalan\ngovernment “was doing everything in its power to control [K.H.]’s persecutors,” including\ntracking, identifying, and convicting a number of K.H.’s kidnappers. (IJ Decision, A.R. 66–67.)\nThe IJ also found that the Guatemalan government offered protection to K.H. following her\nkidnapping by placing her in a shelter, offering psychological care, and ordering her to relocate\nto another city.\n\n In light of this evidence, the IJ found that K.H. had not met her burden to prove that the\nGuatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her persecutors and protect her, and\nthus she did not meet the standard to show past persecution. Because the IJ held that K.H. could\nnot demonstrate past persecution, he also found that she was not eligible for a grant of\nhumanitarian asylum. Finally, the IJ found that K.H. had failed to establish the well-founded\nfear requirement, and thus her withholding of removal and CAT claims failed.\n\n K.H. appealed to the BIA, challenging only the denial of her asylum and humanitarian\nasylum applications. The BIA denied K.H.’s appeal, holding that “the specific steps taken by the\nauthorities in the respondent’s case reflect the government’s ability and willingness to protect her\nby prosecuting her assailants and providing protection to the respondent from the perpetrators.”\n(BIA Decision, A.R. 5.) Specifically, the BIA stated that K.H.’s “own experience with the\npolice, prosecutors, and the judiciary demonstrates a significant governmental willingness and\nability to protect her.” (Id.) In light of this holding—that K.H. did not establish past\npersecution—the BIA found that K.H. was not eligible for a grant of humanitarian asylum.\n\n K.H. now seeks review in this court, arguing that the BIA erred in holding that she failed\nto demonstrate that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her\npersecutors and protect her, and erred in failing to grant her humanitarian asylum.\n\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 5\n\n\n II. DISCUSSION\n\n “Where the BIA reviews the immigration judge’s decision and issues a separate opinion,\nrather than summarily affirming the immigration judge’s decision, we review the BIA’s decision\nas the final agency determination.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing\nMorgan v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 1053, 1057 (6th Cir. 2007)). “To the extent the BIA adopted the\nimmigration judge’s reasoning, however, this Court also reviews the immigration judge’s\ndecision.” Id. (citing Patel v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 216, 218 (6th Cir. 2006)). The IJ and the\nBIA’s factual findings are reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard. Hamida v.\nGonzales, 478 F.3d 734, 736 (6th Cir. 2007). We cannot reverse such findings simply because\nwe would have decided them differently. Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972, 978 (6th Cir. 2005).\nThese findings “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to\nconclude to the contrary.” Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8\nU.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).\n\n A. Asylum\n\n The Attorney General has discretionary authority to grant asylum to an individual who\nqualifies as a “refugee” within the meaning of § 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA. Ouda v. I.N.S., 324\nF.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003). “A refugee is defined as a person who is unable or unwilling to\nreturn to [her] home country ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on\naccount of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political\nopinion.’” Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). An asylum applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that she qualifies as a\nrefugee by establishing “either that [s]he has suffered actual past persecution or that [s]he has a\nwell-founded fear of future persecution.” Id. (citing Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 389 (6th\nCir. 1998); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2004)). “Persecution is ‘the infliction of harm or suffering by\nthe government, or persons the government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a\ncharacteristic of the victim.’” Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting\nKhalili, 557 F.3d at 436).\n\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 6\n\n\n Here, K.H.’s persecution claim is based on past persecution by non-governmental actors.\nBecause the government stipulated that K.H.’s kidnapping rose to the level of persecution and\nwas on account of a statutorily proscribed ground, K.H. need only “show that the Guatemalan\ngovernment was unwilling or unable to control [her persecutors] and protect her” to demonstrate\npast persecution. Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Whitaker, No. 18-3630, 2019 WL 364446, at *3 (6th\nCir. Jan. 29, 2019) (citing Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436); see also Borodachev v. Holder, 441 F.\nApp’x 354, 360 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Fisenko v. Holder, 336 F. App’x 504, 509 (6th Cir. 2009)\n(“Where the government is not responsible for the persecution, the alien must demonstrate that\nthe government is unwilling or unable to control those who are responsible.”). K.H. has the\nburden to show that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her\npersecutors and protect her. See, e.g., Pilica, 388 F.3d at 950.\n\n In evaluating past persecution—and in this case, the “unwilling or unable to control”\nelement—an adjudicator must examine “the overall context of the applicant’s situation[,]”\nHaider v. Holder, 595 F.3d 276, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275,\n285 (6th Cir. 2005)), and review “all relevant evidence in the record[.]” Bringas-Rodriguez v.\nSessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). In other words, courts “must\nview the evidence in the aggregate,” with no one factor being dispositive. See Haider, 595 F.3d\nat 287. The IJ correctly noted, however, that the law in this circuit does not provide a clear\nroadmap for the “unwilling or unable” analysis:\n\n The Court is not aware of any Board or Sixth Circuit precedent that describes the\n level of activity needed to show that a government is unable or unwilling to\n control a respondent’s persecutors, however the First Circuit Court of Appeals has\n spoken to this issue. The First Circuit has held that when a government makes\n every effort to combat violence by private actors, and its inability to stop the\n problem is not distinguishable from any other government’s struggles, the private\n violence has no government nexus, and does not constitute persecution. Burbiene\n v. Holder, 568 F.3d 251 (1st Cir. 2009). In another case, the First Circuit noted\n that it was “particularly unwilling to overturn a finding of no government\n connection where the local authorities have appropriately responded to incidents\n of violence.” Khan v. Holder, 727 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. [2013]) (citing Ortiz-\n Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2007)). In a third case, the First\n Circuit found that the Brazilian government was not unable or unwilling to\n control the respondents’ persecutors because the arrest of a gang leader showed\n\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 7\n\n\n their willingness to combat the gang’s tendencies. Dias Gomes v. Holder,\n 566 F.3d 232, 233 (1st Cir. 2009).\n\n(IJ Decision, A.R. 67–68.) The IJ adopted the First Circuit’s approach and held that because “it\nappears that the Guatemalan government did everything in its power to rescue [K.H.], arrest her\nkidnappers, and convict her kidnappers,” K.H. did not demonstrate the government was\nunwilling or unable to control her persecutors. (Id. at 68.)\n\n We, however, reject the First Circuit’s one-dimensional approach. In keeping with our\nprecedent, we note that we “must evaluate past persecution based on ‘the overall context of the\napplicant’s situation[.]’” See Haider, 595 F.3d at 287 (quoting Gilaj, 408 F.3d at 285).\nConsequently, a government’s specific response to a petitioner’s persecution cannot be the only\nrelevant evidence an immigration judge considers. Instead, we look to two general categories of\ninformation: (1) the government’s response to an asylum applicant’s persecution and (2) general\nevidence of country conditions. See, e.g., Perez-Aguilon v. Lynch, 674 F. App’x 457, 463 (6th\nCir. 2016) (relying on the police response, as well as the country-condition reports in\ndetermining whether the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control petitioner’s\npersecutors); Gomez-Romero v. Holder, 475 F. App’x 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). Both\ncategories will be discussed in turn.\n\n 1. The Government’s Response\n\n In considering a government’s response, courts should review a variety of factors,\nincluding, but not limited to: (1) whether the police investigated, prosecuted, and punished the\npersecutors, see, e.g., Berishaj v. Gonzales, 238 F. App’x 57, 63–64 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on\nthe fact that the persecutor was convicted and punished to hold that the government was not\nunwilling or unable to protect the asylum applicant); Fisenko, 336 F. App’x at 509 (holding that\nthe incidents in question “were investigated by the police and the police took that investigation\nseriously, such that it could not be said that the government was unable or unwilling to control\nthe [persecutors]”); (2) the degree of protection offered to an asylum applicant following the\npersecution, see Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436 (relying on the fact that “police have placed potential\nvictims in protective custody” to hold that the Jordanian government was not unwilling or unable\nto protect petitioner); and (3) any concessions on the part of the government, see Garcia v.\n\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 8\n\n\nAttorney General of the United States, 665 F.3d 496, 503 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that “[t]he fact\nthat Guatemala saw fit to relocate [the petitioner] to Mexico is tantamount to an admission that it\ncould not protect her in Guatemala.”).\n\n In this case, the BIA agreed with the IJ “that the specific steps taken by the authorities in\n[K.H.’s] case reflect the government’s ability and willingness to protect her by prosecuting her\nassailants and providing protection to the respondent from the perpetrators.” (BIA Decision,\nA.R. 5.) Specifically, the BIA referenced the IJ’s reliance on the fact that K.H. “was placed in a\ngovernment supported child refuge, instructed to relocate to a new city by the judge presiding\nover the criminal matter, and scheduled for regular check-ins with authorities as a means of\nprotection after she was rescued by the police.” (Id. at 4–5.) Finally, the BIA briefly noted that\nthe Trial Court recommended that K.H. “seek a visa allowing her to join her family in the United\nStates.” (Id. at 4.)\n\n As an initial matter, although K.H. was placed in a refuge and scheduled for regular\ncheck-ins with authorities, there is no indication any such visits occurred. Accordingly, it is not\nclear from the record what protection, if any, K.H. was provided after she left the refuge.\nMoreover, the record indicates that K.H. was directed to apply for a humanitarian visa to be with\nher mother, as well as for safety reasons. These factors, thus, do not support the BIA’s\nconclusion. To the contrary, these factors actually support K.H.’s argument.\n\n But the BIA did adequately consider the other factors that weigh strongly in the\ngovernment’s favor: for example, the police’s timely and effective investigation, the efficient\nprosecution of K.H.’s perpetrators, and the lengthy punishments imposed. Thus, although the\nevidence is not as strong as the BIA indicated, the BIA reasonably concluded that some of the\nevidence presented, with respect to the government’s response, demonstrated the Guatemalan\ngovernment was not unwilling or unable to control K.H.’s persecutors and protect her.\n\n 2. Country Conditions\n\n We also consider country conditions in the “unwilling or unable” analysis, as it allows an\nadjudicator to consider a country’s practices more generally and gives a broader picture of the\nsocial, economic, and cultural realities of a country. See Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 819\n\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 9\n\n\n(6th Cir. 2017). Indeed, this type of evidence is consistently used in a variety of asylum matters,\nincluding withholding of removal, past persecution, and future persecution analyses, as it\ninforms an adjudicator (1) how certain crimes are prosecuted and punished, see id. (holding the\nJordanian government was unable to protect asylum applicant when country reports established\nthat Jordanian governors routinely abused the law and imprisoned potential victims of honor\ncrimes in a poor attempt to protect victims); Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436 (relying on the State\nDepartment’s 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Jordan to determine how\nhonor crimes were prosecuted and handled on a country-wide basis), as well as (2) the efficacy\nof the government’s efforts, see El Ghorbi v. Mukasey, 281 F. App’x 514, 517 (6th Cir. 2008)\n(relying on the State Department’s 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for\nMauritania to obtain statistics on domestic violence disputes); Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499,\n507 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Some of the successes cited in the BIA’s opinion—such as the arrests\nduring a seven-year period of ‘79,000 people on drug trafficking related charges’—may be of\nlimited practical significance to [asylum applicant]’s situation, because corruption is also\nrampant among prison guards, and prisoners can and do break out of prison with the guards’\nhelp.”).\n\n Here, the IJ erred in failing to consider the relevant country condition evidence in\nanalyzing past persecution, which would warrant reversal standing alone. But the BIA’s separate\nopinion acknowledged this evidence, and that is the final agency determination we review. See\nKhalili, 557 F.3d at 435. In its opinion, the BIA “recognize[d] [K.H.’s] assertions that (1) the\nGuatemalan government often provides inadequate protections to indigenous women and girls\nand (2) there are high levels of crime in the country that are generally hard to control.” (BIA\nDecision, A.R. 5.) A review of the record certainly illustrates K.H.’s concerns. But the BIA\nheld that “notwithstanding various identified systemic problems, suggesting that the Guatemalan\ngovernment does not have the resources to stop all violence against indigenous women and girls,\nthe respondent’s own experience with the police, prosecutors, and the judiciary demonstrates a\nsignificant governmental willingness and ability to protect her.” (Id.)\n\n Again, we reiterate that the government’s response to K.H.’s kidnapping is not\ndispositive. But we cannot say that the BIA’s decision here was not supported by substantial\n\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 10\n\n\nevidence given just how much effort the Guatemalan government expended in trying to control\nK.H.’s persecutors and protect her. While we may have reached a different result—and found\nthat the government’s response did not outweigh the record evidence demonstrating the struggles\nof the Guatemalan government to protect minors and indigenous citizens—that is not the\nstandard. See Gishta, 404 F.3d at 978. Instead, we can reverse the BIA’s factual findings only\nwhen “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Slyusar,\n740 F.3d at 1072. In light of the timely intervention and arrest by the GNP, followed by the\nprosecution, conviction, and sentencing of K.H.’s persecutors, as well as the steps taken by the\nTrial Court in an effort to protect K.H., we affirm the BIA’s finding that K.H. failed to meet her\nburden in showing the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her\npersecutors and protect her.\n\n B. Humanitarian Asylum\n\n The BIA held that in the absence of past persecution, K.H. was not eligible for a grant of\nhumanitarian asylum. “We review the BIA’s denial of humanitarian asylum for an abuse of\ndiscretion.” Mbodj v. Holder, 394 F. App’x 239, 245 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Karomi v. Gonzales,\n168 F. App’x 719, 723 (6th Cir. 2006); Hadad v. Ashcroft, 127 F. App’x 800, 802 (6th Cir.\n2005)). In determining whether the BIA abused its discretion, “this court must decide whether\nthe [BIA’]s decision was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from\nestablished policies or rested on an impermissible basis, such as invidious discrimination[.]”\nDaneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 626 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hazime v. INS, 17 F.3d 136,\n140 (6th Cir. 1994)).\n\n Humanitarian asylum may be granted if (1) the applicant has demonstrated “compelling\nreasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the\npast persecution,” or (2) there is a reasonable possibility an applicant “‘may suffer other serious\nharm upon removal to that country,’ even in the absence of a well-founded fear of future\npersecution.” Mbodj, 394 F. App’x at 244 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)). Humanitarian\nasylum is a form of “extraordinary relief” that is appropriate only “in rare instances” where the\napplicant has “suffered under atrocious forms of persecution.” Id. at 244–45 (quoting Cutaj v.\nGonzales, 206 F. App’x 485, 492 (6th Cir. 2006); Hamida, 478 F.3d at 740).\n\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 11\n\n\n K.H. argues that, even if the BIA did not err in determining that she suffered past\npersecution, it erred in denying her humanitarian asylum because she will suffer “other serious\nharm” if removed to Guatemala. But K.H. fails to acknowledge that if she did not suffer past\npersecution, she cannot receive humanitarian asylum. Hamida, 478 F.3d at 741 (holding that\n“the other serious harm provision provides a second avenue of relief for victims of past\npersecution[.]”) (internal quotations and brackets omitted); see also Gomez-Romero v. Holder,\n475 F. App’x 621, 626–27 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that “relief under both [humanitarian asylum]\nsubsections is contingent upon a showing of past persecution”) (internal quotations and citations\nomitted). In other words, if K.H. did not suffer past persecution, her claim for humanitarian\nasylum must fail. See id. Consequently, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying K.H.’s\napplication for humanitarian asylum.\n\n III. CONCLUSION\n\n For these reasons, we find that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that\nK.H. failed to show the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control her\npersecutors and protect her. We therefore deny K.H.’s petition for review.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: K. H., a Minor Child, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0065p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n K. H., a minor child, ┐\\n Petitioner, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-3426\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, │\\n Respondent. │\\n ┘\\n\\n On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals;\\n No. A 206 685 772.\\n\\n Argued: January 16, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 8, 2019\\n\\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and MOORE, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Edward W. Farrell, RUSSELL IMMIGRATION LAW FIRM PLLC, Louisville,\\nKentucky, for Petitioner. Susan Bennett Green, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\\nJUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Edward W. Farrell, RUSSELL\\nIMMIGRATION LAW FIRM PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Petitioner. Susan Bennett\\nGreen, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n COLE, Chief Judge. K.H., a Guatemalan native and citizen, was kidnapped, beaten, and\\nraped in Guatemala when she was seven years old. Upon notice of the kidnapping, the\\nGuatemalan police quickly intervened and caught K.H.’s persecutors, who were then tried,\\nconvicted, and sentenced. Shortly thereafter, K.H. fled to the United States. K.H. now appeals\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 2\\n\\n\\nthe order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”)\\ndenial of her applications for asylum and humanitarian asylum because she failed to demonstrate\\npast persecution. Specifically, in affirming the IJ’s order, the BIA concluded that K.H. failed to\\nshow that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her persecutors and\\nprotect her, considering the Guatemalan police’s effective response to her kidnapping.\\n\\n We conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that K.H. failed\\nto show that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her persecutors and\\nprotect her. We therefore deny K.H.’s petition for review.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n A. Factual Background\\n\\n In 2012, while waiting at a bus stop in Barbarena, Santa Rosa, Guatemala, seven-year-old\\nK.H. was kidnapped by members of a gang known as “Los Cobardes.” The kidnappers sought\\nransom from both K.H.’s grandmother, Milagro—a woman of indigenous Xinca heritage—and\\nK.H.’s mother, who was living in the United States. While communicating with Milagro, the\\nkidnappers used various slurs to demean indigenous people.1 In response, Milagro contacted the\\nGuatemalan National Police (“GNP”), who began to track the ransom calls.\\n\\n During her detention, K.H.’s kidnappers beat and raped her. When her captors realized\\nthey were being tracked by the GNP, they abandoned K.H. in a field. The GNP then located\\nK.H., who was hospitalized for approximately two weeks due to her injuries.\\n\\n After her hospital stay, the Guatemalan Trial Court for Childhood and Adolescent Cases\\n(the “Trial Court”) ordered K.H. to be placed in a temporary shelter. Consequently, K.H. was\\nsent to Refugio de la Ninez, a refuge for children in Guatemala City. The Trial Court also\\nordered that the refuge “provide intensive psychological therapy” to K.H. and directed the\\nAttorney General to “facilitate the steps necessary in order for the child to be transferred to the\\nUnited States.” (A.R. 311.)\\n\\n\\n 1Evidence in the record notes that the Xinca (Mesoamerican Indians of Southeastern Guatemala) have\\nexperienced harsh treatment—including branding and enslavement—since the early 16th century.\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 3\\n\\n\\n At a follow-up hearing in 2014, the Trial Court directed that K.H. be released from the\\nrefuge, to the care of Milagro, on the condition that they live elsewhere in Guatemala. The Trial\\nCourt also ordered that K.H. and Milagro “be strictly supervised” by the Fraijanes Police\\nDepartment, as Fraijanes was the city in which they planned to live. (A.R. 299.) Finally, the\\nCourt again directed the refuge to help K.H. “obtain her American Visa and to transfer her to a\\nmore secure location.” (A.R. 300.) K.H. and Milagro lived in Fraijanes for a few months but\\neventually returned to Barbarena for economic reasons.\\n\\n At least four of the perpetrators of K.H.’s kidnapping were caught, tried, and convicted,\\nand received sentences ranging from 27 to 72 years’ imprisonment. Two additional individuals\\nwere identified as connected to the gang and potentially the kidnapping, but the record is unclear\\nas to whether they were apprehended.\\n\\n While K.H.’s application for an American visa was pending, she fled to the United States.\\n\\n B. Procedural Background\\n\\n Upon reaching the United States-Mexico border in March 2014, K.H. was apprehended\\nby immigration authorities, taken into custody, and placed in removal proceedings. K.H. filed\\nher application for asylum in December 2014, alleging fear of harm in her home country on\\naccount of her race, ethnicity, and membership in a particular social group comprised of\\nmembers of her family who cooperated with the police and prosecutors to convict gang\\nmembers.\\n\\n Prior to her removal proceedings, the parties stipulated that (1) the harm K.H.\\nexperienced rose to the level of persecution and (2) K.H. was persecuted on account of her race\\nand her membership in a particular social group. Thus, the only remaining issue was whether the\\nGuatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control K.H.’s persecutors and protect her.\\nAs a result, K.H. did not testify.\\n\\n At the hearing, the IJ heard evidence about the kidnapping, the Guatemalan government’s\\nresponse, and general country conditions in Guatemala. Milagro testified through an interpreter,\\nbut the IJ ultimately found that she was not credible.\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 4\\n\\n\\n On June 9, 2017, the IJ denied K.H.’s applications for asylum and humanitarian asylum\\nunder 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii), withholding of removal pursuant to § 241(b)(3) of the\\nImmigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and relief under Article III of the Convention Against\\nTorture (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). The IJ accepted the parties’ stipulations that the harm\\nK.H. experienced rose to the level of persecution and that this persecution was on account of her\\nrace and membership in a particular social group. But the IJ found that the Guatemalan\\ngovernment “was doing everything in its power to control [K.H.]’s persecutors,” including\\ntracking, identifying, and convicting a number of K.H.’s kidnappers. (IJ Decision, A.R. 66–67.)\\nThe IJ also found that the Guatemalan government offered protection to K.H. following her\\nkidnapping by placing her in a shelter, offering psychological care, and ordering her to relocate\\nto another city.\\n\\n In light of this evidence, the IJ found that K.H. had not met her burden to prove that the\\nGuatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her persecutors and protect her, and\\nthus she did not meet the standard to show past persecution. Because the IJ held that K.H. could\\nnot demonstrate past persecution, he also found that she was not eligible for a grant of\\nhumanitarian asylum. Finally, the IJ found that K.H. had failed to establish the well-founded\\nfear requirement, and thus her withholding of removal and CAT claims failed.\\n\\n K.H. appealed to the BIA, challenging only the denial of her asylum and humanitarian\\nasylum applications. The BIA denied K.H.’s appeal, holding that “the specific steps taken by the\\nauthorities in the respondent’s case reflect the government’s ability and willingness to protect her\\nby prosecuting her assailants and providing protection to the respondent from the perpetrators.”\\n(BIA Decision, A.R. 5.) Specifically, the BIA stated that K.H.’s “own experience with the\\npolice, prosecutors, and the judiciary demonstrates a significant governmental willingness and\\nability to protect her.” (Id.) In light of this holding—that K.H. did not establish past\\npersecution—the BIA found that K.H. was not eligible for a grant of humanitarian asylum.\\n\\n K.H. now seeks review in this court, arguing that the BIA erred in holding that she failed\\nto demonstrate that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her\\npersecutors and protect her, and erred in failing to grant her humanitarian asylum.\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 5\\n\\n\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n\\n “Where the BIA reviews the immigration judge’s decision and issues a separate opinion,\\nrather than summarily affirming the immigration judge’s decision, we review the BIA’s decision\\nas the final agency determination.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing\\nMorgan v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 1053, 1057 (6th Cir. 2007)). “To the extent the BIA adopted the\\nimmigration judge’s reasoning, however, this Court also reviews the immigration judge’s\\ndecision.” Id. (citing Patel v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 216, 218 (6th Cir. 2006)). The IJ and the\\nBIA’s factual findings are reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard. Hamida v.\\nGonzales, 478 F.3d 734, 736 (6th Cir. 2007). We cannot reverse such findings simply because\\nwe would have decided them differently. Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972, 978 (6th Cir. 2005).\\nThese findings “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to\\nconclude to the contrary.” Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8\\nU.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).\\n\\n A. Asylum\\n\\n The Attorney General has discretionary authority to grant asylum to an individual who\\nqualifies as a “refugee” within the meaning of § 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA. Ouda v. I.N.S., 324\\nF.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003). “A refugee is defined as a person who is unable or unwilling to\\nreturn to [her] home country ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on\\naccount of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political\\nopinion.’” Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). An asylum applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that she qualifies as a\\nrefugee by establishing “either that [s]he has suffered actual past persecution or that [s]he has a\\nwell-founded fear of future persecution.” Id. (citing Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 389 (6th\\nCir. 1998); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2004)). “Persecution is ‘the infliction of harm or suffering by\\nthe government, or persons the government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a\\ncharacteristic of the victim.’” Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting\\nKhalili, 557 F.3d at 436).\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 6\\n\\n\\n Here, K.H.’s persecution claim is based on past persecution by non-governmental actors.\\nBecause the government stipulated that K.H.’s kidnapping rose to the level of persecution and\\nwas on account of a statutorily proscribed ground, K.H. need only “show that the Guatemalan\\ngovernment was unwilling or unable to control [her persecutors] and protect her” to demonstrate\\npast persecution. Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Whitaker, No. 18-3630, 2019 WL 364446, at *3 (6th\\nCir. Jan. 29, 2019) (citing Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436); see also Borodachev v. Holder, 441 F.\\nApp’x 354, 360 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Fisenko v. Holder, 336 F. App’x 504, 509 (6th Cir. 2009)\\n(“Where the government is not responsible for the persecution, the alien must demonstrate that\\nthe government is unwilling or unable to control those who are responsible.”). K.H. has the\\nburden to show that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her\\npersecutors and protect her. See, e.g., Pilica, 388 F.3d at 950.\\n\\n In evaluating past persecution—and in this case, the “unwilling or unable to control”\\nelement—an adjudicator must examine “the overall context of the applicant’s situation[,]”\\nHaider v. Holder, 595 F.3d 276, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275,\\n285 (6th Cir. 2005)), and review “all relevant evidence in the record[.]” Bringas-Rodriguez v.\\nSessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). In other words, courts “must\\nview the evidence in the aggregate,” with no one factor being dispositive. See Haider, 595 F.3d\\nat 287. The IJ correctly noted, however, that the law in this circuit does not provide a clear\\nroadmap for the “unwilling or unable” analysis:\\n\\n The Court is not aware of any Board or Sixth Circuit precedent that describes the\\n level of activity needed to show that a government is unable or unwilling to\\n control a respondent’s persecutors, however the First Circuit Court of Appeals has\\n spoken to this issue. The First Circuit has held that when a government makes\\n every effort to combat violence by private actors, and its inability to stop the\\n problem is not distinguishable from any other government’s struggles, the private\\n violence has no government nexus, and does not constitute persecution. Burbiene\\n v. Holder, 568 F.3d 251 (1st Cir. 2009). In another case, the First Circuit noted\\n that it was “particularly unwilling to overturn a finding of no government\\n connection where the local authorities have appropriately responded to incidents\\n of violence.” Khan v. Holder, 727 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. [2013]) (citing Ortiz-\\n Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2007)). In a third case, the First\\n Circuit found that the Brazilian government was not unable or unwilling to\\n control the respondents’ persecutors because the arrest of a gang leader showed\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 7\\n\\n\\n their willingness to combat the gang’s tendencies. Dias Gomes v. Holder,\\n 566 F.3d 232, 233 (1st Cir. 2009).\\n\\n(IJ Decision, A.R. 67–68.) The IJ adopted the First Circuit’s approach and held that because “it\\nappears that the Guatemalan government did everything in its power to rescue [K.H.], arrest her\\nkidnappers, and convict her kidnappers,” K.H. did not demonstrate the government was\\nunwilling or unable to control her persecutors. (Id. at 68.)\\n\\n We, however, reject the First Circuit’s one-dimensional approach. In keeping with our\\nprecedent, we note that we “must evaluate past persecution based on ‘the overall context of the\\napplicant’s situation[.]’” See Haider, 595 F.3d at 287 (quoting Gilaj, 408 F.3d at 285).\\nConsequently, a government’s specific response to a petitioner’s persecution cannot be the only\\nrelevant evidence an immigration judge considers. Instead, we look to two general categories of\\ninformation: (1) the government’s response to an asylum applicant’s persecution and (2) general\\nevidence of country conditions. See, e.g., Perez-Aguilon v. Lynch, 674 F. App’x 457, 463 (6th\\nCir. 2016) (relying on the police response, as well as the country-condition reports in\\ndetermining whether the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control petitioner’s\\npersecutors); Gomez-Romero v. Holder, 475 F. App’x 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). Both\\ncategories will be discussed in turn.\\n\\n 1. The Government’s Response\\n\\n In considering a government’s response, courts should review a variety of factors,\\nincluding, but not limited to: (1) whether the police investigated, prosecuted, and punished the\\npersecutors, see, e.g., Berishaj v. Gonzales, 238 F. App’x 57, 63–64 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on\\nthe fact that the persecutor was convicted and punished to hold that the government was not\\nunwilling or unable to protect the asylum applicant); Fisenko, 336 F. App’x at 509 (holding that\\nthe incidents in question “were investigated by the police and the police took that investigation\\nseriously, such that it could not be said that the government was unable or unwilling to control\\nthe [persecutors]”); (2) the degree of protection offered to an asylum applicant following the\\npersecution, see Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436 (relying on the fact that “police have placed potential\\nvictims in protective custody” to hold that the Jordanian government was not unwilling or unable\\nto protect petitioner); and (3) any concessions on the part of the government, see Garcia v.\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 8\\n\\n\\nAttorney General of the United States, 665 F.3d 496, 503 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that “[t]he fact\\nthat Guatemala saw fit to relocate [the petitioner] to Mexico is tantamount to an admission that it\\ncould not protect her in Guatemala.”).\\n\\n In this case, the BIA agreed with the IJ “that the specific steps taken by the authorities in\\n[K.H.’s] case reflect the government’s ability and willingness to protect her by prosecuting her\\nassailants and providing protection to the respondent from the perpetrators.” (BIA Decision,\\nA.R. 5.) Specifically, the BIA referenced the IJ’s reliance on the fact that K.H. “was placed in a\\ngovernment supported child refuge, instructed to relocate to a new city by the judge presiding\\nover the criminal matter, and scheduled for regular check-ins with authorities as a means of\\nprotection after she was rescued by the police.” (Id. at 4–5.) Finally, the BIA briefly noted that\\nthe Trial Court recommended that K.H. “seek a visa allowing her to join her family in the United\\nStates.” (Id. at 4.)\\n\\n As an initial matter, although K.H. was placed in a refuge and scheduled for regular\\ncheck-ins with authorities, there is no indication any such visits occurred. Accordingly, it is not\\nclear from the record what protection, if any, K.H. was provided after she left the refuge.\\nMoreover, the record indicates that K.H. was directed to apply for a humanitarian visa to be with\\nher mother, as well as for safety reasons. These factors, thus, do not support the BIA’s\\nconclusion. To the contrary, these factors actually support K.H.’s argument.\\n\\n But the BIA did adequately consider the other factors that weigh strongly in the\\ngovernment’s favor: for example, the police’s timely and effective investigation, the efficient\\nprosecution of K.H.’s perpetrators, and the lengthy punishments imposed. Thus, although the\\nevidence is not as strong as the BIA indicated, the BIA reasonably concluded that some of the\\nevidence presented, with respect to the government’s response, demonstrated the Guatemalan\\ngovernment was not unwilling or unable to control K.H.’s persecutors and protect her.\\n\\n 2. Country Conditions\\n\\n We also consider country conditions in the “unwilling or unable” analysis, as it allows an\\nadjudicator to consider a country’s practices more generally and gives a broader picture of the\\nsocial, economic, and cultural realities of a country. See Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 819\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 9\\n\\n\\n(6th Cir. 2017). Indeed, this type of evidence is consistently used in a variety of asylum matters,\\nincluding withholding of removal, past persecution, and future persecution analyses, as it\\ninforms an adjudicator (1) how certain crimes are prosecuted and punished, see id. (holding the\\nJordanian government was unable to protect asylum applicant when country reports established\\nthat Jordanian governors routinely abused the law and imprisoned potential victims of honor\\ncrimes in a poor attempt to protect victims); Khalili, 557 F.3d at 436 (relying on the State\\nDepartment’s 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Jordan to determine how\\nhonor crimes were prosecuted and handled on a country-wide basis), as well as (2) the efficacy\\nof the government’s efforts, see El Ghorbi v. Mukasey, 281 F. App’x 514, 517 (6th Cir. 2008)\\n(relying on the State Department’s 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for\\nMauritania to obtain statistics on domestic violence disputes); Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499,\\n507 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Some of the successes cited in the BIA’s opinion—such as the arrests\\nduring a seven-year period of ‘79,000 people on drug trafficking related charges’—may be of\\nlimited practical significance to [asylum applicant]’s situation, because corruption is also\\nrampant among prison guards, and prisoners can and do break out of prison with the guards’\\nhelp.”).\\n\\n Here, the IJ erred in failing to consider the relevant country condition evidence in\\nanalyzing past persecution, which would warrant reversal standing alone. But the BIA’s separate\\nopinion acknowledged this evidence, and that is the final agency determination we review. See\\nKhalili, 557 F.3d at 435. In its opinion, the BIA “recognize[d] [K.H.’s] assertions that (1) the\\nGuatemalan government often provides inadequate protections to indigenous women and girls\\nand (2) there are high levels of crime in the country that are generally hard to control.” (BIA\\nDecision, A.R. 5.) A review of the record certainly illustrates K.H.’s concerns. But the BIA\\nheld that “notwithstanding various identified systemic problems, suggesting that the Guatemalan\\ngovernment does not have the resources to stop all violence against indigenous women and girls,\\nthe respondent’s own experience with the police, prosecutors, and the judiciary demonstrates a\\nsignificant governmental willingness and ability to protect her.” (Id.)\\n\\n Again, we reiterate that the government’s response to K.H.’s kidnapping is not\\ndispositive. But we cannot say that the BIA’s decision here was not supported by substantial\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 10\\n\\n\\nevidence given just how much effort the Guatemalan government expended in trying to control\\nK.H.’s persecutors and protect her. While we may have reached a different result—and found\\nthat the government’s response did not outweigh the record evidence demonstrating the struggles\\nof the Guatemalan government to protect minors and indigenous citizens—that is not the\\nstandard. See Gishta, 404 F.3d at 978. Instead, we can reverse the BIA’s factual findings only\\nwhen “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Slyusar,\\n740 F.3d at 1072. In light of the timely intervention and arrest by the GNP, followed by the\\nprosecution, conviction, and sentencing of K.H.’s persecutors, as well as the steps taken by the\\nTrial Court in an effort to protect K.H., we affirm the BIA’s finding that K.H. failed to meet her\\nburden in showing the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to control her\\npersecutors and protect her.\\n\\n B. Humanitarian Asylum\\n\\n The BIA held that in the absence of past persecution, K.H. was not eligible for a grant of\\nhumanitarian asylum. “We review the BIA’s denial of humanitarian asylum for an abuse of\\ndiscretion.” Mbodj v. Holder, 394 F. App’x 239, 245 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Karomi v. Gonzales,\\n168 F. App’x 719, 723 (6th Cir. 2006); Hadad v. Ashcroft, 127 F. App’x 800, 802 (6th Cir.\\n2005)). In determining whether the BIA abused its discretion, “this court must decide whether\\nthe [BIA’]s decision was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from\\nestablished policies or rested on an impermissible basis, such as invidious discrimination[.]”\\nDaneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 626 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hazime v. INS, 17 F.3d 136,\\n140 (6th Cir. 1994)).\\n\\n Humanitarian asylum may be granted if (1) the applicant has demonstrated “compelling\\nreasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the\\npast persecution,” or (2) there is a reasonable possibility an applicant “‘may suffer other serious\\nharm upon removal to that country,’ even in the absence of a well-founded fear of future\\npersecution.” Mbodj, 394 F. App’x at 244 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)). Humanitarian\\nasylum is a form of “extraordinary relief” that is appropriate only “in rare instances” where the\\napplicant has “suffered under atrocious forms of persecution.” Id. at 244–45 (quoting Cutaj v.\\nGonzales, 206 F. App’x 485, 492 (6th Cir. 2006); Hamida, 478 F.3d at 740).\\n\\f No. 18-3426 K. H. v. Barr Page 11\\n\\n\\n K.H. argues that, even if the BIA did not err in determining that she suffered past\\npersecution, it erred in denying her humanitarian asylum because she will suffer “other serious\\nharm” if removed to Guatemala. But K.H. fails to acknowledge that if she did not suffer past\\npersecution, she cannot receive humanitarian asylum. Hamida, 478 F.3d at 741 (holding that\\n“the other serious harm provision provides a second avenue of relief for victims of past\\npersecution[.]”) (internal quotations and brackets omitted); see also Gomez-Romero v. Holder,\\n475 F. App’x 621, 626–27 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that “relief under both [humanitarian asylum]\\nsubsections is contingent upon a showing of past persecution”) (internal quotations and citations\\nomitted). In other words, if K.H. did not suffer past persecution, her claim for humanitarian\\nasylum must fail. See id. Consequently, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying K.H.’s\\napplication for humanitarian asylum.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For these reasons, we find that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that\\nK.H. failed to show the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control her\\npersecutors and protect her. We therefore deny K.H.’s petition for review.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1659,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607688,"string":"4,607,688"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"BURNETTE FOODS, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; Sonny Perdue, Secretary of Agriculture, Defendants-Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Burnette Foods, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1541"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Griffin, White, Bush\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0066p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n BURNETTE FOODS, INC., A Michigan Corporation, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-1541\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; │\\n SONNY PERDUE, Secretary of Agriculture, │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.\\n No. 1:16-cv-00021—Gordon J. Quist, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 8, 2019\\n\\n Before: GRIFFIN, WHITE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Mark B. Stern, John S. Koppel, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellants. John J. Rosloniec, VERITY LAW, PLC, Grand Rapids,\\nMichigan, G. Thomas Williams, MCGARRY BAIR PC, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Cherries, both tart and sweet, are among the many agricultural products that American\\nfarmers proudly produce and American shoppers fondly consume. Every year, half a million or\\nso festival-goers descend upon Traverse City, Michigan for the National Cherry Festival to eat\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\ncherries, take part in cherry-pit-spitting and cherry-pie-eating competitions, cheer on three\\nseparate parades, crown a “Cherry Queen,” and generally celebrate this beloved crop. 1 But\\nregardless of this fruit’s treasured status, and much like other crops, the Department of\\nAgriculture heavily regulates the cherry market. It does so through the Cherry Industry\\nAdministrative Board. And the Board’s composition is the subject of this appeal.\\n\\n Federal regulations prohibit the Board from having too many members of the same “sales\\nconstituency”—i.e., an organization that represents a group of cherry handlers or growers. At\\none time, eleven of the eighteen Board members were affiliated with CherrCo, Inc., an\\norganization that markets for its members and sets minimum prices for various tart cherry\\nproducts. Plaintiff, Burnette Foods, Inc., a tart cherry handler that is not a member of CherrCo,\\nclaims CherrCo is a “sales constituency,” and thus the Board’s composition violates the\\nregulations. The Secretary of Agriculture found that CherrCo was not a “sales constituency,” but\\nthe district court disagreed. Because the Secretary had substantial evidence to support his\\ndecision and the district court misapplied the law in its review, we reverse and remand for entry\\nof judgment in defendants’ favor.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n To understand Burnette’s claim, we need to understand the relationship between the\\nfarming industry (and the cherry farming industry in particular) and the federal government,\\nbefore turning to the particulars of this dispute.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Seeking to ensure a steady supply and price of food, Congress has exempted American\\nfarmers and food producers from many of the prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices\\nand agreements that unreasonably restrain trade. In 1922, for example, Congress passed a law\\nallowing farmers “to organize together, set association policy, fix prices at which their\\ncooperative will sell their produce, and otherwise carry on like a business corporation without\\n\\n\\n 1National Cherry Festival Fun Facts, National Cherry Festival,\\nhttps://www.cherryfestival.org/p/about/mission-and-vision/302 (last visited Feb. 11, 2019); National Cherry\\nFestival Events, National Cherry Festival, https://www.cherryfestival.org/events (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\nthereby violating the antitrust laws.” Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S.\\n458, 466 (1960) (discussing the Capper-Volstead Act); see also 7 U.S.C. § 291 (Capper-Volstead\\nAct of 1922). Congress went a step further during the depths of the Great Depression. In the\\nAgricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), 7 U.S.C. § 602(4), Congress\\nannounced a national policy of price stabilization. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 516\\n(2013). “The AMAA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate marketing orders\\nthat regulate the sale and delivery of agricultural goods.” Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 608(c); Block v.\\nCmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 346 (1984)). And the AMAA allows the Secretary to\\ndelegate the authority to administer marketing orders to industry committees. Id. at 517.\\n\\n The AMAA does not regulate farmers; it regulates “handlers.” 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1),\\n(13)(B). Handlers are defined as “processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in\\nthe handling” of covered agricultural commodities—things like milk, tobacco, hops, honeybees,\\nand numerous fruits (including cherries). § 608c(1)-(2); see also 7 C.F.R. § 930.11.\\n\\n Through this Congressional authorization, the Secretary of Agriculture issued the Tart\\nCherry Order in 1996. Tart Cherries Grown in the States of Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania,\\nOregon, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin; Order Regulating Handling, 61 Fed. Reg. 49939,\\n49939 (Sept. 24, 1996) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 930). The order seeks “to improve producer\\nreturns by strengthening consumer demand through volume control and quality assurance\\nmechanisms.” Id. In plain English, that means emphasizing quality over quantity. One way to\\naccomplish this goal is to cap cherry sales at an “optimum” amount. 7 C.F.R. § 930.50(a).\\n\\n The Cherry Industry Administrative Board implements the order. Its members hail from\\nnine districts: Northern Michigan, Central Michigan, Southern Michigan, New York, Oregon,\\nPennsylvania, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. See 7 C.F.R. § 930.20(c). Some districts have\\nmultiple Board members. 7 C.F.R. §§ 930.2, 930.20(b). To help achieve “a fair and balanced\\nrepresentation on the Board,” the Secretary limits Board membership. In a district with multiple\\nBoard members, only one member may be from a given sales constituency (unless it’s\\nimpossible to avoid a conflict). § 930.20(g).\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\n In 1996, a “sales constituency” was “a common marketing organization or brokerage firm\\nor individual representing a group of handlers and growers.” § 930.16 (1996). CherrCo, a\\n“federated grower cooperative” whose members account for a large share of Michigan’s tart\\ncherry production, formed thereafter. Tart Cherries Grown in the States of Michigan, et al.;\\nOrder Amending Marketing Agreement and Order No. 930, 66 Fed. Reg. 35891, 35893 (July 10,\\n2001). The Department of Agriculture in 2001 later determined that\\n\\n the primary function of CherrCo is to establish minimum prices for certain tart\\n cherry products. The record indicates that CherrCo is not directly involved in the\\n actual sales of its members’ products. There is intense competition among its\\n members (as well as between its members and non-members) to sell tart cherries.\\n The competition for sales is on the basis of individual handlers’ reputations, on\\n the quality and mix of the products they offer, on any special services they\\n provide to their customers, and on whether or not their processing plants are\\n certified to conform with certain sanitation standards.\\n\\nId. Despite this unique purpose, CherrCo arguably qualified as a sales constituency under the\\nthen-applicable regulation. This concerned the Department because at the time eleven of the\\neighteen Board members were affiliated with CherrCo. Id. So the Department amended the\\ndefinition of “sales constituency” to clarify that an organization such as CherrCo was not one.\\n66 Fed. Reg. at 35,893–94. The amendment said: “An organization which receives\\nconsignments of cherries and does not direct where the consigned cherries are sold is not a sales\\nconstituency.” 7 C.F.R. § 930.16. This definition endures today.\\n\\n To summarize, Congress delegated authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to stabilize\\nfood supply and price. The Secretary issued an order to cap cherry sales. The Board implements\\nthat order. The Secretary has limited the Board’s membership. And the Secretary has changed\\nthat limitation to account for entities that hold cherries for growers but don’t control where the\\ncherries go once they leave.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n With that background in mind, we turn back to this case. Plaintiff Burnette is a Michigan\\ncorporation that handles canned tart cherries. It is not a member of CherrCo. Because Burnette\\nspecializes in canned cherries, it takes raw cherries and immediately converts them into a\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\nfinished, canned product, which has a shelf life of about one year. Unlike Burnette, many other\\ncherry handlers freeze their cherries immediately, which gives the cherries a multi-year shelf life.\\n\\n This shelf-life disparity puts Burnette at a disadvantage when the Board caps cherry sales.\\nWhile other cherry handlers can freeze their excess cherries, Burnette loses any cherries it\\ndoesn’t use or sell. This costs Burnette as much as $3 million per year in wasted inventory.\\n\\n Unhappy with this continual loss of inventory due to the Board’s sales restrictions,\\nBurnette sought a legal remedy. In mid-2011, it filed a petition with the Department of\\nAgriculture, alleging numerous complaints with the Tart Cherry Order and related regulations.\\nSee 7 C.F.R. § 900.52(a). Burnette asked the Secretary of Agriculture to exempt Burnette from\\nthe Tart Cherry Order in its entirety. Burnette also sought a declaration that CherrCo was a\\n“sales constituency.” Because many Board members were affiliated with CherrCo and some of\\nthose members were from the same district, if CherrCo was a “sales constituency,” the Board’s\\ncomposition would violate § 930.20(g)’s one-member-per-sales-constituency rule. In other\\nwords, Burnette sought to shake up who was on the Board in hopes that new Board members\\nwould mean fewer sales restrictions and thus fewer wasted cherries.\\n\\n The parties appeared before an administrative law judge (ALJ) for a six-day evidentiary\\nhearing. The ALJ determined that CherrCo was not a “sales constituency” under § 930.16, and\\nrejected Burnette’s challenge to the composition of the Board. Burnette appealed this ruling to\\nthe Department of Agriculture, but a judicial officer affirmed.\\n\\n Displeased with the outcome of the administrative proceedings, Burnette filed suit in the\\nUnited States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. It sued the Department of\\nAgriculture and its Secretary, challenging the judicial officer’s decision on numerous grounds.\\nFollowing cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court reversed the administrative\\nfindings of fact, concluding that the judicial officer’s decision was not supported by substantial\\nevidence. Specifically, the district court ruled that CherrCo was a sales constituency because it\\ndirected where its members’ cherries were sold. It did so, said the court, because CherrCo’s\\nmembers sign agreements that allow it to process, prepare for market, handle, pack, store, dry,\\nmanufacture, and sell its members’ tart cherries. The court also noted that, pursuant to its\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\nagreement with sales representatives, CherrCo was listed as the seller for all orders, had the\\nauthority to approve all orders, and could reject an order for any reason. So as the district court\\nsaw it, these aspects of CherrCo’s operation amounted to substantial evidence that CherrCo\\nqualified as a sales constituency under 7 C.F.R. § 930.16. On this basis, the court granted\\nplaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that CherrCo could not have more than one\\nseat on the Board.2\\n\\n Defendants now timely appeal the district court’s ruling that CherrCo is a sales\\nconstituency and the corresponding grant of summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo a district court’s decision on motions for summary judgment. Keith\\nv. Cty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is proper “if the\\nmovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled\\nto judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\\n\\n But because this lawsuit stems from administrative proceedings, our review is more\\nlimited. Like the district court, we review the Secretary’s decision—here the judicial officer’s\\ndecision—only to determine “whether [it] is in accordance with law and whether [it] is supported\\nby substantial evidence.” Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1355 (6th Cir. 1994)\\n(quoting Defiance Milk Prods. Co. v. Lyng, 857 F.2d 1065, 1068 (6th Cir. 1988)). “The\\nSecretary’s decision thus must be upheld if the record contains ‘such relevant evidence as a\\nreasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the agency’s conclusion.’” Lehigh Valley\\nFarmers v. Block, 829 F.2d 409, 412 (3d Cir. 1987) (brackets omitted) (quoting Consol. Edison\\nCo. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2Defendants later asked the district court to amend its ruling because the regulations limit “the affiliation of\\na sales constituency to members on the [Board] within ‘those districts having more than one seat on the Board.’” 7\\nC.F.R. § 930.20. The district court recognized its error and amended its opinion to clarify that “[n]ot more than one\\nBoard member (including an alternate Board member) [could] be from, or affiliated with, CherrCo in those districts\\nhaving more than one seat on the Board.”\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The issue we address and resolve is whether the district court erred in reversing the\\nSecretary’s determination that CherrCo is not a “sales constituency” under the applicable\\nregulations.3 As noted previously, a “sales constituency” is:\\n\\n [A] common marketing organization or brokerage firm or individual representing\\n a group of handlers and growers. An organization which receives consignments\\n of cherries and does not direct where the consigned cherries are sold is not a sales\\n constituency.\\n\\n7 C.F.R. § 930.16. So there is both a general definition (the first sentence) and an exception (the\\nsecond sentence). Defendants have never contended that CherrCo falls outside the general rule;\\nthey argue the organization falls within the exception. Thus, we must determine whether the\\njudicial officer had substantial evidence to conclude that CherrCo: (1) receives consignments of\\ncherries from its members and (2) does not direct where those consigned cherries are sold.\\n\\n Receives Consignments of Cherries. The district court and the Secretary’s judicial officer\\nagreed that CherrCo receives cherry consignments from its members, but Burnette argues that\\nCherrCo really owns the cherries. The relevant regulations don’t define “consignments,” so we\\ngive the words “their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication” that they\\nwere intended to bear some different meaning. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa\\nIndians v. Office of the U.S. Attorney for the W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 967 (6th Cir. 2004)\\n(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431–32 (2000)). The pertinent editions of Black’s\\nLaw Dictionary define “consignment” identically: “The act of consigning goods for custody or\\nsale.” Consignment, Black’s Law Dictionary 327 (8th ed. 2004); Consignment, Black’s Law\\nDictionary 303 (7th ed. 1999). And each defines “consign” identically: “To transfer to\\nanother’s custody or charge[,] . . . [t]o give (goods) to a carrier for delivery to a designated\\nrecipient[,] . . . [or] [t]o give (merchandise or the like) to another to sell, usu[ally] with the\\nunderstanding that the seller will pay the owner for the goods from the proceeds.” Consign,\\n\\n\\n\\n 3Defendants also raise whether the prohibition, in multi-member districts, of multiple Board members from\\nthe same sales constituency applies to alternate Board members. Because we agree with defendants that there is\\nsubstantial evidence that CherrCo is not a “sales constituency,” we need not reach that issue.\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\nBlack’s Law Dictionary 327 (8th ed. 2004); Consign, Black’s Law Dictionary 303 (7th ed.\\n1999).4\\n\\n Given these definitions, the evidence presented during the agency proceedings supports\\nthe conclusion that CherrCo “receives consignments of cherries.” § 930.16. For example, James\\nJensen, CherrCo’s president, testified that while CherrCo may have control over a member’s\\nconsigned cherries and can attach a collateral value to them, that product is merely held by\\nCherrCo and remains the fungible property of the member. Glenn LaCross, a member of\\nCherrCo’s board of directors representing a grower-member and cherry handler (Leelanau Fruit\\nCompany), testified that individual members owned the cherries sold through CherrCo. And\\nJames Nugent, a grower-member of the Board and owner of an independent orchard that joined\\nCherrCo (Graceland Fruit, Inc.), specifically testified that members consign their cherries to\\nCherrCo. In short, three witnesses familiar with how CherrCo operates testified that it takes\\ncherries on consignment.\\n\\n Burnette’s arguments on this issue do not negate this evidence of consignment. Burnette\\nclaims that Steven Nugent testified that CherrCo owns the cherries in its possession. This is a\\nmischaracterization—Nugent testified that the members’ product would merely be “transfer[red]\\n. . . into CherrCo’s name and then [the member] could borrow against that inventory.” This\\ntestimony is consistent with the other evidence suggesting that CherrCo uses its consigned cherry\\nstock as collateral for loans to its members. In short, and as determined at every level of\\nproceedings, substantial evidence supported the judicial officer’s determination that CherrCo\\n“receives consignments of cherries.” § 930.16.\\n\\n Direct Where Cherries Are Sold. On this issue, the judicial officer and district court\\ndisagreed. The judicial officer found that CherrCo “does not direct where the consigned cherries\\nare sold,” see 7 C.F.R. § 930.16, while the district court found that CherrCo does. As with the\\nterm “consignment,” the regulations do not define “direct.” Thus, we again must turn to a\\n\\n\\n 4The Secretary amended 7 C.F.R. § 930.16 in 2001, so the seventh and eighth editions of Black’s Law\\nDictionary bookend the amendment and are particularly relevant as contemporary understandings of the term’s\\nmeaning. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 78–92\\n(2012) (discussing the fixed-meaning canon of interpretation).\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\ndictionary to discern the term’s plain meaning. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa &\\nChippewa Indians, 369 F.3d at 967. Again, the contemporary editions of Black’s Law\\nDictionary define the term identically: “To aim (something or someone)[,] . . . [t]o cause\\n(something or someone) to move on a particular course[,] . . . [or] [t]o instruct (someone) with\\nauthority.” Direct, Black’s Law Dictionary 491 (8th ed. 2004); Direct, Black’s Law Dictionary\\n471 (7th ed. 1999). But these definitions, if applied to the regulation, would make little\\ngrammatical sense. One does not “aim” sales, “cause [sales] to move on a particular course,” or\\n“instruct [sales] with authority.” So we must turn to lay dictionaries. Webster’s, for example,\\nprovides a better definition: “[T]o manage or guide by advice, helpful information, instruction,\\netc.[;] . . . to regulate the course of; control[;] . . . to administer[,] manage[,] supervise[;] [or] to\\ngive authoritative instructions to; command; order or ordain[.]” Direct, Random House\\nWebster’s Unabridged Dictionary 558–59 (2001). Thus, we must determine whether the judicial\\nofficer had substantial evidence to support a finding that CherrCo did not control, manage, or\\ncommand sales.\\n\\n And the judicial officer’s finding was supported by such evidence. Roy Hackert, the\\nowner of Michigan Food Processors (a CherrCo member), testified that even when CherrCo\\nmaintained a security interest in his cherries to cover financing it provided to Michigan Food\\nProcessors, CherrCo did not “have the ability to direct the sale of those cherries based on that\\nsecurity interest.” James Nugent, again of Graceland Fruit, agreed that CherrCo “doesn’t say\\n[Graceland Fruit] ha[s] to sell to a particular entity,” and instead merely sets minimum pricing\\nfor Graceland Fruit’s products. Glenn LaCross testified that affiliates can sell their product\\nthrough independent (meaning non-CherrCo) sales agents and that CherrCo’s input is limited to\\ninvoicing and minimum-sales requirements. In fact, LaCross testified that members pick their\\nown sales agents “based on [their] own business interests” and that the CherrCo board does not\\neven discuss the possibility of telling members how or where to sell their product. LaCross\\nfurther testified that “[w]e have always [] had the right to direct our own sales if it be through a\\nsales brokerage constituent or an independent broker. And James Jensen testified that each\\nmember of CherrCo appoints its own, independent agent to sell its product. Jensen also testified\\nthat after CherrCo determines that the price and terms of a sale meet its requirements, it holds the\\nproduct and “authorize[s] a release when a member requests us to release the product to their\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\ncustomer.” On the basis of this testimony, the judicial officer’s determination that CherrCo is\\nnot a “sales constituency” was supported by substantial evidence. See Lansing Dairy, 39 F.3d at\\n1355.\\n\\n In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court made two legal errors. First, it\\nflipped the standard of review on its head. The court first found substantial evidence for the\\nconclusion that CherrCo did direct the sale of cherries; then it disregarded the judicial officer’s\\ncontrary determination in a single, conclusory, and legally unsupported sentence: “Th[ere] is\\nsubstantial evidence that CherrCo ‘directs where the consigned cherries are sold’ and therefore\\nqualifies as a sales constituency under 7 C.F.R. § 930.16. The Judicial Officer’s conclusion was\\nnot supported by substantial evidence.” As we have long held in appeals from agency\\ndeterminations, if substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion, the district court must\\naffirm, even if substantial evidence also exists for the opposite conclusion. See Defiance Milk\\nProds. Co., 857 F.2d at 1069–70.\\n\\n Second, the district court conflated whether CherrCo had contractual authority to do\\nthings with whether CherrCo actually did them. For example, the district court noted that\\nCherrCo is authorized to sell cherries itself under the “Membership and Marketing Agreement”\\neach affiliate signs, and whether it does so or licenses sales agents to do so is determined solely\\nby its Board of Directors. Yet the record reflects—regardless of what its members have\\ntheoretically authorized CherrCo to do—that CherrCo does not sell cherries on its own. And the\\n“sales constituency” regulation applies to what an organization does, not what it could do.\\n\\n If CherrCo were ever to direct the sales of its members’ cherries—as it seems to have the\\nauthority to do under the membership and marketing agreements its members sign—a future\\nchallenge might well succeed. But that is not the record before us. Here the record contains\\nsubstantial evidence to support the finding that CherrCo doesn’t direct cherry sales. Thus,\\nsubstantial evidence supports the Secretary’s conclusion that CherrCo falls within the exception\\nto the regulatory definition of a “sales constituency,” and its numerous members’ presence on the\\nBoard poses no legal issue.\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n Because there was substantial evidence to support the judicial officer’s finding that\\nCherrCo (1) receives consignments of cherries and (2) does not direct where the consigned\\ncherries are sold, the district court erred in overruling the judicial officer’s conclusion that\\nCherrCo is not a sales constituency. And because the judicial officer’s conclusion was\\npermissible, there is no limit on the number of CherrCo members who can serve on the Board.\\nSee 7 C.F.R. § 930.20(g).\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for entry of\\njudgment in defendants’ favor.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384941/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRIFFIN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WHITE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BUSH"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607688/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: BURNETTE FOODS, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; Sonny Perdue, Secretary of Agriculture, Defendants-Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0066p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n BURNETTE FOODS, INC., A Michigan Corporation, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n > No. 18-1541\n v. │\n │\n │\n UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; │\n SONNY PERDUE, Secretary of Agriculture, │\n Defendants-Appellants. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.\n No. 1:16-cv-00021—Gordon J. Quist, District Judge.\n\n Decided and Filed: April 8, 2019\n\n Before: GRIFFIN, WHITE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nON BRIEF: Mark B. Stern, John S. Koppel, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\nWashington, D.C., for Appellants. John J. Rosloniec, VERITY LAW, PLC, Grand Rapids,\nMichigan, G. Thomas Williams, MCGARRY BAIR PC, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.\n\n Cherries, both tart and sweet, are among the many agricultural products that American\nfarmers proudly produce and American shoppers fondly consume. Every year, half a million or\nso festival-goers descend upon Traverse City, Michigan for the National Cherry Festival to eat\n\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 2\n\n\ncherries, take part in cherry-pit-spitting and cherry-pie-eating competitions, cheer on three\nseparate parades, crown a “Cherry Queen,” and generally celebrate this beloved crop. 1 But\nregardless of this fruit’s treasured status, and much like other crops, the Department of\nAgriculture heavily regulates the cherry market. It does so through the Cherry Industry\nAdministrative Board. And the Board’s composition is the subject of this appeal.\n\n Federal regulations prohibit the Board from having too many members of the same “sales\nconstituency”—i.e., an organization that represents a group of cherry handlers or growers. At\none time, eleven of the eighteen Board members were affiliated with CherrCo, Inc., an\norganization that markets for its members and sets minimum prices for various tart cherry\nproducts. Plaintiff, Burnette Foods, Inc., a tart cherry handler that is not a member of CherrCo,\nclaims CherrCo is a “sales constituency,” and thus the Board’s composition violates the\nregulations. The Secretary of Agriculture found that CherrCo was not a “sales constituency,” but\nthe district court disagreed. Because the Secretary had substantial evidence to support his\ndecision and the district court misapplied the law in its review, we reverse and remand for entry\nof judgment in defendants’ favor.\n\n I.\n\n To understand Burnette’s claim, we need to understand the relationship between the\nfarming industry (and the cherry farming industry in particular) and the federal government,\nbefore turning to the particulars of this dispute.\n\n A.\n\n Seeking to ensure a steady supply and price of food, Congress has exempted American\nfarmers and food producers from many of the prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices\nand agreements that unreasonably restrain trade. In 1922, for example, Congress passed a law\nallowing farmers “to organize together, set association policy, fix prices at which their\ncooperative will sell their produce, and otherwise carry on like a business corporation without\n\n\n 1National Cherry Festival Fun Facts, National Cherry Festival,\nhttps://www.cherryfestival.org/p/about/mission-and-vision/302 (last visited Feb. 11, 2019); National Cherry\nFestival Events, National Cherry Festival, https://www.cherryfestival.org/events (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).\n\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 3\n\n\nthereby violating the antitrust laws.” Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S.\n458, 466 (1960) (discussing the Capper-Volstead Act); see also 7 U.S.C. § 291 (Capper-Volstead\nAct of 1922). Congress went a step further during the depths of the Great Depression. In the\nAgricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), 7 U.S.C. § 602(4), Congress\nannounced a national policy of price stabilization. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 516\n(2013). “The AMAA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate marketing orders\nthat regulate the sale and delivery of agricultural goods.” Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 608(c); Block v.\nCmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 346 (1984)). And the AMAA allows the Secretary to\ndelegate the authority to administer marketing orders to industry committees. Id. at 517.\n\n The AMAA does not regulate farmers; it regulates “handlers.” 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1),\n(13)(B). Handlers are defined as “processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in\nthe handling” of covered agricultural commodities—things like milk, tobacco, hops, honeybees,\nand numerous fruits (including cherries). § 608c(1)-(2); see also 7 C.F.R. § 930.11.\n\n Through this Congressional authorization, the Secretary of Agriculture issued the Tart\nCherry Order in 1996. Tart Cherries Grown in the States of Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania,\nOregon, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin; Order Regulating Handling, 61 Fed. Reg. 49939,\n49939 (Sept. 24, 1996) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 930). The order seeks “to improve producer\nreturns by strengthening consumer demand through volume control and quality assurance\nmechanisms.” Id. In plain English, that means emphasizing quality over quantity. One way to\naccomplish this goal is to cap cherry sales at an “optimum” amount. 7 C.F.R. § 930.50(a).\n\n The Cherry Industry Administrative Board implements the order. Its members hail from\nnine districts: Northern Michigan, Central Michigan, Southern Michigan, New York, Oregon,\nPennsylvania, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. See 7 C.F.R. § 930.20(c). Some districts have\nmultiple Board members. 7 C.F.R. §§ 930.2, 930.20(b). To help achieve “a fair and balanced\nrepresentation on the Board,” the Secretary limits Board membership. In a district with multiple\nBoard members, only one member may be from a given sales constituency (unless it’s\nimpossible to avoid a conflict). § 930.20(g).\n\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 4\n\n\n In 1996, a “sales constituency” was “a common marketing organization or brokerage firm\nor individual representing a group of handlers and growers.” § 930.16 (1996). CherrCo, a\n“federated grower cooperative” whose members account for a large share of Michigan’s tart\ncherry production, formed thereafter. Tart Cherries Grown in the States of Michigan, et al.;\nOrder Amending Marketing Agreement and Order No. 930, 66 Fed. Reg. 35891, 35893 (July 10,\n2001). The Department of Agriculture in 2001 later determined that\n\n the primary function of CherrCo is to establish minimum prices for certain tart\n cherry products. The record indicates that CherrCo is not directly involved in the\n actual sales of its members’ products. There is intense competition among its\n members (as well as between its members and non-members) to sell tart cherries.\n The competition for sales is on the basis of individual handlers’ reputations, on\n the quality and mix of the products they offer, on any special services they\n provide to their customers, and on whether or not their processing plants are\n certified to conform with certain sanitation standards.\n\nId. Despite this unique purpose, CherrCo arguably qualified as a sales constituency under the\nthen-applicable regulation. This concerned the Department because at the time eleven of the\neighteen Board members were affiliated with CherrCo. Id. So the Department amended the\ndefinition of “sales constituency” to clarify that an organization such as CherrCo was not one.\n66 Fed. Reg. at 35,893–94. The amendment said: “An organization which receives\nconsignments of cherries and does not direct where the consigned cherries are sold is not a sales\nconstituency.” 7 C.F.R. § 930.16. This definition endures today.\n\n To summarize, Congress delegated authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to stabilize\nfood supply and price. The Secretary issued an order to cap cherry sales. The Board implements\nthat order. The Secretary has limited the Board’s membership. And the Secretary has changed\nthat limitation to account for entities that hold cherries for growers but don’t control where the\ncherries go once they leave.\n\n B.\n\n With that background in mind, we turn back to this case. Plaintiff Burnette is a Michigan\ncorporation that handles canned tart cherries. It is not a member of CherrCo. Because Burnette\nspecializes in canned cherries, it takes raw cherries and immediately converts them into a\n\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 5\n\n\nfinished, canned product, which has a shelf life of about one year. Unlike Burnette, many other\ncherry handlers freeze their cherries immediately, which gives the cherries a multi-year shelf life.\n\n This shelf-life disparity puts Burnette at a disadvantage when the Board caps cherry sales.\nWhile other cherry handlers can freeze their excess cherries, Burnette loses any cherries it\ndoesn’t use or sell. This costs Burnette as much as $3 million per year in wasted inventory.\n\n Unhappy with this continual loss of inventory due to the Board’s sales restrictions,\nBurnette sought a legal remedy. In mid-2011, it filed a petition with the Department of\nAgriculture, alleging numerous complaints with the Tart Cherry Order and related regulations.\nSee 7 C.F.R. § 900.52(a). Burnette asked the Secretary of Agriculture to exempt Burnette from\nthe Tart Cherry Order in its entirety. Burnette also sought a declaration that CherrCo was a\n“sales constituency.” Because many Board members were affiliated with CherrCo and some of\nthose members were from the same district, if CherrCo was a “sales constituency,” the Board’s\ncomposition would violate § 930.20(g)’s one-member-per-sales-constituency rule. In other\nwords, Burnette sought to shake up who was on the Board in hopes that new Board members\nwould mean fewer sales restrictions and thus fewer wasted cherries.\n\n The parties appeared before an administrative law judge (ALJ) for a six-day evidentiary\nhearing. The ALJ determined that CherrCo was not a “sales constituency” under § 930.16, and\nrejected Burnette’s challenge to the composition of the Board. Burnette appealed this ruling to\nthe Department of Agriculture, but a judicial officer affirmed.\n\n Displeased with the outcome of the administrative proceedings, Burnette filed suit in the\nUnited States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. It sued the Department of\nAgriculture and its Secretary, challenging the judicial officer’s decision on numerous grounds.\nFollowing cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court reversed the administrative\nfindings of fact, concluding that the judicial officer’s decision was not supported by substantial\nevidence. Specifically, the district court ruled that CherrCo was a sales constituency because it\ndirected where its members’ cherries were sold. It did so, said the court, because CherrCo’s\nmembers sign agreements that allow it to process, prepare for market, handle, pack, store, dry,\nmanufacture, and sell its members’ tart cherries. The court also noted that, pursuant to its\n\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 6\n\n\nagreement with sales representatives, CherrCo was listed as the seller for all orders, had the\nauthority to approve all orders, and could reject an order for any reason. So as the district court\nsaw it, these aspects of CherrCo’s operation amounted to substantial evidence that CherrCo\nqualified as a sales constituency under 7 C.F.R. § 930.16. On this basis, the court granted\nplaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that CherrCo could not have more than one\nseat on the Board.2\n\n Defendants now timely appeal the district court’s ruling that CherrCo is a sales\nconstituency and the corresponding grant of summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor.\n\n II.\n\n We review de novo a district court’s decision on motions for summary judgment. Keith\nv. Cty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is proper “if the\nmovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled\nto judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\n\n But because this lawsuit stems from administrative proceedings, our review is more\nlimited. Like the district court, we review the Secretary’s decision—here the judicial officer’s\ndecision—only to determine “whether [it] is in accordance with law and whether [it] is supported\nby substantial evidence.” Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1355 (6th Cir. 1994)\n(quoting Defiance Milk Prods. Co. v. Lyng, 857 F.2d 1065, 1068 (6th Cir. 1988)). “The\nSecretary’s decision thus must be upheld if the record contains ‘such relevant evidence as a\nreasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the agency’s conclusion.’” Lehigh Valley\nFarmers v. Block, 829 F.2d 409, 412 (3d Cir. 1987) (brackets omitted) (quoting Consol. Edison\nCo. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).\n\n\n\n\n 2Defendants later asked the district court to amend its ruling because the regulations limit “the affiliation of\na sales constituency to members on the [Board] within ‘those districts having more than one seat on the Board.’” 7\nC.F.R. § 930.20. The district court recognized its error and amended its opinion to clarify that “[n]ot more than one\nBoard member (including an alternate Board member) [could] be from, or affiliated with, CherrCo in those districts\nhaving more than one seat on the Board.”\n\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 7\n\n\n III.\n\n The issue we address and resolve is whether the district court erred in reversing the\nSecretary’s determination that CherrCo is not a “sales constituency” under the applicable\nregulations.3 As noted previously, a “sales constituency” is:\n\n [A] common marketing organization or brokerage firm or individual representing\n a group of handlers and growers. An organization which receives consignments\n of cherries and does not direct where the consigned cherries are sold is not a sales\n constituency.\n\n7 C.F.R. § 930.16. So there is both a general definition (the first sentence) and an exception (the\nsecond sentence). Defendants have never contended that CherrCo falls outside the general rule;\nthey argue the organization falls within the exception. Thus, we must determine whether the\njudicial officer had substantial evidence to conclude that CherrCo: (1) receives consignments of\ncherries from its members and (2) does not direct where those consigned cherries are sold.\n\n Receives Consignments of Cherries. The district court and the Secretary’s judicial officer\nagreed that CherrCo receives cherry consignments from its members, but Burnette argues that\nCherrCo really owns the cherries. The relevant regulations don’t define “consignments,” so we\ngive the words “their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication” that they\nwere intended to bear some different meaning. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa\nIndians v. Office of the U.S. Attorney for the W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 967 (6th Cir. 2004)\n(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431–32 (2000)). The pertinent editions of Black’s\nLaw Dictionary define “consignment” identically: “The act of consigning goods for custody or\nsale.” Consignment, Black’s Law Dictionary 327 (8th ed. 2004); Consignment, Black’s Law\nDictionary 303 (7th ed. 1999). And each defines “consign” identically: “To transfer to\nanother’s custody or charge[,] . . . [t]o give (goods) to a carrier for delivery to a designated\nrecipient[,] . . . [or] [t]o give (merchandise or the like) to another to sell, usu[ally] with the\nunderstanding that the seller will pay the owner for the goods from the proceeds.” Consign,\n\n\n\n 3Defendants also raise whether the prohibition, in multi-member districts, of multiple Board members from\nthe same sales constituency applies to alternate Board members. Because we agree with defendants that there is\nsubstantial evidence that CherrCo is not a “sales constituency,” we need not reach that issue.\n\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 8\n\n\nBlack’s Law Dictionary 327 (8th ed. 2004); Consign, Black’s Law Dictionary 303 (7th ed.\n1999).4\n\n Given these definitions, the evidence presented during the agency proceedings supports\nthe conclusion that CherrCo “receives consignments of cherries.” § 930.16. For example, James\nJensen, CherrCo’s president, testified that while CherrCo may have control over a member’s\nconsigned cherries and can attach a collateral value to them, that product is merely held by\nCherrCo and remains the fungible property of the member. Glenn LaCross, a member of\nCherrCo’s board of directors representing a grower-member and cherry handler (Leelanau Fruit\nCompany), testified that individual members owned the cherries sold through CherrCo. And\nJames Nugent, a grower-member of the Board and owner of an independent orchard that joined\nCherrCo (Graceland Fruit, Inc.), specifically testified that members consign their cherries to\nCherrCo. In short, three witnesses familiar with how CherrCo operates testified that it takes\ncherries on consignment.\n\n Burnette’s arguments on this issue do not negate this evidence of consignment. Burnette\nclaims that Steven Nugent testified that CherrCo owns the cherries in its possession. This is a\nmischaracterization—Nugent testified that the members’ product would merely be “transfer[red]\n. . . into CherrCo’s name and then [the member] could borrow against that inventory.” This\ntestimony is consistent with the other evidence suggesting that CherrCo uses its consigned cherry\nstock as collateral for loans to its members. In short, and as determined at every level of\nproceedings, substantial evidence supported the judicial officer’s determination that CherrCo\n“receives consignments of cherries.” § 930.16.\n\n Direct Where Cherries Are Sold. On this issue, the judicial officer and district court\ndisagreed. The judicial officer found that CherrCo “does not direct where the consigned cherries\nare sold,” see 7 C.F.R. § 930.16, while the district court found that CherrCo does. As with the\nterm “consignment,” the regulations do not define “direct.” Thus, we again must turn to a\n\n\n 4The Secretary amended 7 C.F.R. § 930.16 in 2001, so the seventh and eighth editions of Black’s Law\nDictionary bookend the amendment and are particularly relevant as contemporary understandings of the term’s\nmeaning. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 78–92\n(2012) (discussing the fixed-meaning canon of interpretation).\n\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 9\n\n\ndictionary to discern the term’s plain meaning. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa &\nChippewa Indians, 369 F.3d at 967. Again, the contemporary editions of Black’s Law\nDictionary define the term identically: “To aim (something or someone)[,] . . . [t]o cause\n(something or someone) to move on a particular course[,] . . . [or] [t]o instruct (someone) with\nauthority.” Direct, Black’s Law Dictionary 491 (8th ed. 2004); Direct, Black’s Law Dictionary\n471 (7th ed. 1999). But these definitions, if applied to the regulation, would make little\ngrammatical sense. One does not “aim” sales, “cause [sales] to move on a particular course,” or\n“instruct [sales] with authority.” So we must turn to lay dictionaries. Webster’s, for example,\nprovides a better definition: “[T]o manage or guide by advice, helpful information, instruction,\netc.[;] . . . to regulate the course of; control[;] . . . to administer[,] manage[,] supervise[;] [or] to\ngive authoritative instructions to; command; order or ordain[.]” Direct, Random House\nWebster’s Unabridged Dictionary 558–59 (2001). Thus, we must determine whether the judicial\nofficer had substantial evidence to support a finding that CherrCo did not control, manage, or\ncommand sales.\n\n And the judicial officer’s finding was supported by such evidence. Roy Hackert, the\nowner of Michigan Food Processors (a CherrCo member), testified that even when CherrCo\nmaintained a security interest in his cherries to cover financing it provided to Michigan Food\nProcessors, CherrCo did not “have the ability to direct the sale of those cherries based on that\nsecurity interest.” James Nugent, again of Graceland Fruit, agreed that CherrCo “doesn’t say\n[Graceland Fruit] ha[s] to sell to a particular entity,” and instead merely sets minimum pricing\nfor Graceland Fruit’s products. Glenn LaCross testified that affiliates can sell their product\nthrough independent (meaning non-CherrCo) sales agents and that CherrCo’s input is limited to\ninvoicing and minimum-sales requirements. In fact, LaCross testified that members pick their\nown sales agents “based on [their] own business interests” and that the CherrCo board does not\neven discuss the possibility of telling members how or where to sell their product. LaCross\nfurther testified that “[w]e have always [] had the right to direct our own sales if it be through a\nsales brokerage constituent or an independent broker. And James Jensen testified that each\nmember of CherrCo appoints its own, independent agent to sell its product. Jensen also testified\nthat after CherrCo determines that the price and terms of a sale meet its requirements, it holds the\nproduct and “authorize[s] a release when a member requests us to release the product to their\n\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 10\n\n\ncustomer.” On the basis of this testimony, the judicial officer’s determination that CherrCo is\nnot a “sales constituency” was supported by substantial evidence. See Lansing Dairy, 39 F.3d at\n1355.\n\n In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court made two legal errors. First, it\nflipped the standard of review on its head. The court first found substantial evidence for the\nconclusion that CherrCo did direct the sale of cherries; then it disregarded the judicial officer’s\ncontrary determination in a single, conclusory, and legally unsupported sentence: “Th[ere] is\nsubstantial evidence that CherrCo ‘directs where the consigned cherries are sold’ and therefore\nqualifies as a sales constituency under 7 C.F.R. § 930.16. The Judicial Officer’s conclusion was\nnot supported by substantial evidence.” As we have long held in appeals from agency\ndeterminations, if substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion, the district court must\naffirm, even if substantial evidence also exists for the opposite conclusion. See Defiance Milk\nProds. Co., 857 F.2d at 1069–70.\n\n Second, the district court conflated whether CherrCo had contractual authority to do\nthings with whether CherrCo actually did them. For example, the district court noted that\nCherrCo is authorized to sell cherries itself under the “Membership and Marketing Agreement”\neach affiliate signs, and whether it does so or licenses sales agents to do so is determined solely\nby its Board of Directors. Yet the record reflects—regardless of what its members have\ntheoretically authorized CherrCo to do—that CherrCo does not sell cherries on its own. And the\n“sales constituency” regulation applies to what an organization does, not what it could do.\n\n If CherrCo were ever to direct the sales of its members’ cherries—as it seems to have the\nauthority to do under the membership and marketing agreements its members sign—a future\nchallenge might well succeed. But that is not the record before us. Here the record contains\nsubstantial evidence to support the finding that CherrCo doesn’t direct cherry sales. Thus,\nsubstantial evidence supports the Secretary’s conclusion that CherrCo falls within the exception\nto the regulatory definition of a “sales constituency,” and its numerous members’ presence on the\nBoard poses no legal issue.\n\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 11\n\n\n Because there was substantial evidence to support the judicial officer’s finding that\nCherrCo (1) receives consignments of cherries and (2) does not direct where the consigned\ncherries are sold, the district court erred in overruling the judicial officer’s conclusion that\nCherrCo is not a sales constituency. And because the judicial officer’s conclusion was\npermissible, there is no limit on the number of CherrCo members who can serve on the Board.\nSee 7 C.F.R. § 930.20(g).\n\n IV.\n\n For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for entry of\njudgment in defendants’ favor.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: BURNETTE FOODS, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; Sonny Perdue, Secretary of Agriculture, Defendants-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0066p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n BURNETTE FOODS, INC., A Michigan Corporation, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-1541\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; │\\n SONNY PERDUE, Secretary of Agriculture, │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.\\n No. 1:16-cv-00021—Gordon J. Quist, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 8, 2019\\n\\n Before: GRIFFIN, WHITE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Mark B. Stern, John S. Koppel, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellants. John J. Rosloniec, VERITY LAW, PLC, Grand Rapids,\\nMichigan, G. Thomas Williams, MCGARRY BAIR PC, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Cherries, both tart and sweet, are among the many agricultural products that American\\nfarmers proudly produce and American shoppers fondly consume. Every year, half a million or\\nso festival-goers descend upon Traverse City, Michigan for the National Cherry Festival to eat\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\ncherries, take part in cherry-pit-spitting and cherry-pie-eating competitions, cheer on three\\nseparate parades, crown a “Cherry Queen,” and generally celebrate this beloved crop. 1 But\\nregardless of this fruit’s treasured status, and much like other crops, the Department of\\nAgriculture heavily regulates the cherry market. It does so through the Cherry Industry\\nAdministrative Board. And the Board’s composition is the subject of this appeal.\\n\\n Federal regulations prohibit the Board from having too many members of the same “sales\\nconstituency”—i.e., an organization that represents a group of cherry handlers or growers. At\\none time, eleven of the eighteen Board members were affiliated with CherrCo, Inc., an\\norganization that markets for its members and sets minimum prices for various tart cherry\\nproducts. Plaintiff, Burnette Foods, Inc., a tart cherry handler that is not a member of CherrCo,\\nclaims CherrCo is a “sales constituency,” and thus the Board’s composition violates the\\nregulations. The Secretary of Agriculture found that CherrCo was not a “sales constituency,” but\\nthe district court disagreed. Because the Secretary had substantial evidence to support his\\ndecision and the district court misapplied the law in its review, we reverse and remand for entry\\nof judgment in defendants’ favor.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n To understand Burnette’s claim, we need to understand the relationship between the\\nfarming industry (and the cherry farming industry in particular) and the federal government,\\nbefore turning to the particulars of this dispute.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Seeking to ensure a steady supply and price of food, Congress has exempted American\\nfarmers and food producers from many of the prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices\\nand agreements that unreasonably restrain trade. In 1922, for example, Congress passed a law\\nallowing farmers “to organize together, set association policy, fix prices at which their\\ncooperative will sell their produce, and otherwise carry on like a business corporation without\\n\\n\\n 1National Cherry Festival Fun Facts, National Cherry Festival,\\nhttps://www.cherryfestival.org/p/about/mission-and-vision/302 (last visited Feb. 11, 2019); National Cherry\\nFestival Events, National Cherry Festival, https://www.cherryfestival.org/events (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\nthereby violating the antitrust laws.” Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S.\\n458, 466 (1960) (discussing the Capper-Volstead Act); see also 7 U.S.C. § 291 (Capper-Volstead\\nAct of 1922). Congress went a step further during the depths of the Great Depression. In the\\nAgricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), 7 U.S.C. § 602(4), Congress\\nannounced a national policy of price stabilization. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 516\\n(2013). “The AMAA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate marketing orders\\nthat regulate the sale and delivery of agricultural goods.” Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 608(c); Block v.\\nCmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 346 (1984)). And the AMAA allows the Secretary to\\ndelegate the authority to administer marketing orders to industry committees. Id. at 517.\\n\\n The AMAA does not regulate farmers; it regulates “handlers.” 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1),\\n(13)(B). Handlers are defined as “processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in\\nthe handling” of covered agricultural commodities—things like milk, tobacco, hops, honeybees,\\nand numerous fruits (including cherries). § 608c(1)-(2); see also 7 C.F.R. § 930.11.\\n\\n Through this Congressional authorization, the Secretary of Agriculture issued the Tart\\nCherry Order in 1996. Tart Cherries Grown in the States of Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania,\\nOregon, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin; Order Regulating Handling, 61 Fed. Reg. 49939,\\n49939 (Sept. 24, 1996) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 930). The order seeks “to improve producer\\nreturns by strengthening consumer demand through volume control and quality assurance\\nmechanisms.” Id. In plain English, that means emphasizing quality over quantity. One way to\\naccomplish this goal is to cap cherry sales at an “optimum” amount. 7 C.F.R. § 930.50(a).\\n\\n The Cherry Industry Administrative Board implements the order. Its members hail from\\nnine districts: Northern Michigan, Central Michigan, Southern Michigan, New York, Oregon,\\nPennsylvania, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. See 7 C.F.R. § 930.20(c). Some districts have\\nmultiple Board members. 7 C.F.R. §§ 930.2, 930.20(b). To help achieve “a fair and balanced\\nrepresentation on the Board,” the Secretary limits Board membership. In a district with multiple\\nBoard members, only one member may be from a given sales constituency (unless it’s\\nimpossible to avoid a conflict). § 930.20(g).\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\n In 1996, a “sales constituency” was “a common marketing organization or brokerage firm\\nor individual representing a group of handlers and growers.” § 930.16 (1996). CherrCo, a\\n“federated grower cooperative” whose members account for a large share of Michigan’s tart\\ncherry production, formed thereafter. Tart Cherries Grown in the States of Michigan, et al.;\\nOrder Amending Marketing Agreement and Order No. 930, 66 Fed. Reg. 35891, 35893 (July 10,\\n2001). The Department of Agriculture in 2001 later determined that\\n\\n the primary function of CherrCo is to establish minimum prices for certain tart\\n cherry products. The record indicates that CherrCo is not directly involved in the\\n actual sales of its members’ products. There is intense competition among its\\n members (as well as between its members and non-members) to sell tart cherries.\\n The competition for sales is on the basis of individual handlers’ reputations, on\\n the quality and mix of the products they offer, on any special services they\\n provide to their customers, and on whether or not their processing plants are\\n certified to conform with certain sanitation standards.\\n\\nId. Despite this unique purpose, CherrCo arguably qualified as a sales constituency under the\\nthen-applicable regulation. This concerned the Department because at the time eleven of the\\neighteen Board members were affiliated with CherrCo. Id. So the Department amended the\\ndefinition of “sales constituency” to clarify that an organization such as CherrCo was not one.\\n66 Fed. Reg. at 35,893–94. The amendment said: “An organization which receives\\nconsignments of cherries and does not direct where the consigned cherries are sold is not a sales\\nconstituency.” 7 C.F.R. § 930.16. This definition endures today.\\n\\n To summarize, Congress delegated authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to stabilize\\nfood supply and price. The Secretary issued an order to cap cherry sales. The Board implements\\nthat order. The Secretary has limited the Board’s membership. And the Secretary has changed\\nthat limitation to account for entities that hold cherries for growers but don’t control where the\\ncherries go once they leave.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n With that background in mind, we turn back to this case. Plaintiff Burnette is a Michigan\\ncorporation that handles canned tart cherries. It is not a member of CherrCo. Because Burnette\\nspecializes in canned cherries, it takes raw cherries and immediately converts them into a\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\nfinished, canned product, which has a shelf life of about one year. Unlike Burnette, many other\\ncherry handlers freeze their cherries immediately, which gives the cherries a multi-year shelf life.\\n\\n This shelf-life disparity puts Burnette at a disadvantage when the Board caps cherry sales.\\nWhile other cherry handlers can freeze their excess cherries, Burnette loses any cherries it\\ndoesn’t use or sell. This costs Burnette as much as $3 million per year in wasted inventory.\\n\\n Unhappy with this continual loss of inventory due to the Board’s sales restrictions,\\nBurnette sought a legal remedy. In mid-2011, it filed a petition with the Department of\\nAgriculture, alleging numerous complaints with the Tart Cherry Order and related regulations.\\nSee 7 C.F.R. § 900.52(a). Burnette asked the Secretary of Agriculture to exempt Burnette from\\nthe Tart Cherry Order in its entirety. Burnette also sought a declaration that CherrCo was a\\n“sales constituency.” Because many Board members were affiliated with CherrCo and some of\\nthose members were from the same district, if CherrCo was a “sales constituency,” the Board’s\\ncomposition would violate § 930.20(g)’s one-member-per-sales-constituency rule. In other\\nwords, Burnette sought to shake up who was on the Board in hopes that new Board members\\nwould mean fewer sales restrictions and thus fewer wasted cherries.\\n\\n The parties appeared before an administrative law judge (ALJ) for a six-day evidentiary\\nhearing. The ALJ determined that CherrCo was not a “sales constituency” under § 930.16, and\\nrejected Burnette’s challenge to the composition of the Board. Burnette appealed this ruling to\\nthe Department of Agriculture, but a judicial officer affirmed.\\n\\n Displeased with the outcome of the administrative proceedings, Burnette filed suit in the\\nUnited States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. It sued the Department of\\nAgriculture and its Secretary, challenging the judicial officer’s decision on numerous grounds.\\nFollowing cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court reversed the administrative\\nfindings of fact, concluding that the judicial officer’s decision was not supported by substantial\\nevidence. Specifically, the district court ruled that CherrCo was a sales constituency because it\\ndirected where its members’ cherries were sold. It did so, said the court, because CherrCo’s\\nmembers sign agreements that allow it to process, prepare for market, handle, pack, store, dry,\\nmanufacture, and sell its members’ tart cherries. The court also noted that, pursuant to its\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\nagreement with sales representatives, CherrCo was listed as the seller for all orders, had the\\nauthority to approve all orders, and could reject an order for any reason. So as the district court\\nsaw it, these aspects of CherrCo’s operation amounted to substantial evidence that CherrCo\\nqualified as a sales constituency under 7 C.F.R. § 930.16. On this basis, the court granted\\nplaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that CherrCo could not have more than one\\nseat on the Board.2\\n\\n Defendants now timely appeal the district court’s ruling that CherrCo is a sales\\nconstituency and the corresponding grant of summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo a district court’s decision on motions for summary judgment. Keith\\nv. Cty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is proper “if the\\nmovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled\\nto judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\\n\\n But because this lawsuit stems from administrative proceedings, our review is more\\nlimited. Like the district court, we review the Secretary’s decision—here the judicial officer’s\\ndecision—only to determine “whether [it] is in accordance with law and whether [it] is supported\\nby substantial evidence.” Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1355 (6th Cir. 1994)\\n(quoting Defiance Milk Prods. Co. v. Lyng, 857 F.2d 1065, 1068 (6th Cir. 1988)). “The\\nSecretary’s decision thus must be upheld if the record contains ‘such relevant evidence as a\\nreasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the agency’s conclusion.’” Lehigh Valley\\nFarmers v. Block, 829 F.2d 409, 412 (3d Cir. 1987) (brackets omitted) (quoting Consol. Edison\\nCo. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2Defendants later asked the district court to amend its ruling because the regulations limit “the affiliation of\\na sales constituency to members on the [Board] within ‘those districts having more than one seat on the Board.’” 7\\nC.F.R. § 930.20. The district court recognized its error and amended its opinion to clarify that “[n]ot more than one\\nBoard member (including an alternate Board member) [could] be from, or affiliated with, CherrCo in those districts\\nhaving more than one seat on the Board.”\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The issue we address and resolve is whether the district court erred in reversing the\\nSecretary’s determination that CherrCo is not a “sales constituency” under the applicable\\nregulations.3 As noted previously, a “sales constituency” is:\\n\\n [A] common marketing organization or brokerage firm or individual representing\\n a group of handlers and growers. An organization which receives consignments\\n of cherries and does not direct where the consigned cherries are sold is not a sales\\n constituency.\\n\\n7 C.F.R. § 930.16. So there is both a general definition (the first sentence) and an exception (the\\nsecond sentence). Defendants have never contended that CherrCo falls outside the general rule;\\nthey argue the organization falls within the exception. Thus, we must determine whether the\\njudicial officer had substantial evidence to conclude that CherrCo: (1) receives consignments of\\ncherries from its members and (2) does not direct where those consigned cherries are sold.\\n\\n Receives Consignments of Cherries. The district court and the Secretary’s judicial officer\\nagreed that CherrCo receives cherry consignments from its members, but Burnette argues that\\nCherrCo really owns the cherries. The relevant regulations don’t define “consignments,” so we\\ngive the words “their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication” that they\\nwere intended to bear some different meaning. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa\\nIndians v. Office of the U.S. Attorney for the W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 967 (6th Cir. 2004)\\n(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431–32 (2000)). The pertinent editions of Black’s\\nLaw Dictionary define “consignment” identically: “The act of consigning goods for custody or\\nsale.” Consignment, Black’s Law Dictionary 327 (8th ed. 2004); Consignment, Black’s Law\\nDictionary 303 (7th ed. 1999). And each defines “consign” identically: “To transfer to\\nanother’s custody or charge[,] . . . [t]o give (goods) to a carrier for delivery to a designated\\nrecipient[,] . . . [or] [t]o give (merchandise or the like) to another to sell, usu[ally] with the\\nunderstanding that the seller will pay the owner for the goods from the proceeds.” Consign,\\n\\n\\n\\n 3Defendants also raise whether the prohibition, in multi-member districts, of multiple Board members from\\nthe same sales constituency applies to alternate Board members. Because we agree with defendants that there is\\nsubstantial evidence that CherrCo is not a “sales constituency,” we need not reach that issue.\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\nBlack’s Law Dictionary 327 (8th ed. 2004); Consign, Black’s Law Dictionary 303 (7th ed.\\n1999).4\\n\\n Given these definitions, the evidence presented during the agency proceedings supports\\nthe conclusion that CherrCo “receives consignments of cherries.” § 930.16. For example, James\\nJensen, CherrCo’s president, testified that while CherrCo may have control over a member’s\\nconsigned cherries and can attach a collateral value to them, that product is merely held by\\nCherrCo and remains the fungible property of the member. Glenn LaCross, a member of\\nCherrCo’s board of directors representing a grower-member and cherry handler (Leelanau Fruit\\nCompany), testified that individual members owned the cherries sold through CherrCo. And\\nJames Nugent, a grower-member of the Board and owner of an independent orchard that joined\\nCherrCo (Graceland Fruit, Inc.), specifically testified that members consign their cherries to\\nCherrCo. In short, three witnesses familiar with how CherrCo operates testified that it takes\\ncherries on consignment.\\n\\n Burnette’s arguments on this issue do not negate this evidence of consignment. Burnette\\nclaims that Steven Nugent testified that CherrCo owns the cherries in its possession. This is a\\nmischaracterization—Nugent testified that the members’ product would merely be “transfer[red]\\n. . . into CherrCo’s name and then [the member] could borrow against that inventory.” This\\ntestimony is consistent with the other evidence suggesting that CherrCo uses its consigned cherry\\nstock as collateral for loans to its members. In short, and as determined at every level of\\nproceedings, substantial evidence supported the judicial officer’s determination that CherrCo\\n“receives consignments of cherries.” § 930.16.\\n\\n Direct Where Cherries Are Sold. On this issue, the judicial officer and district court\\ndisagreed. The judicial officer found that CherrCo “does not direct where the consigned cherries\\nare sold,” see 7 C.F.R. § 930.16, while the district court found that CherrCo does. As with the\\nterm “consignment,” the regulations do not define “direct.” Thus, we again must turn to a\\n\\n\\n 4The Secretary amended 7 C.F.R. § 930.16 in 2001, so the seventh and eighth editions of Black’s Law\\nDictionary bookend the amendment and are particularly relevant as contemporary understandings of the term’s\\nmeaning. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 78–92\\n(2012) (discussing the fixed-meaning canon of interpretation).\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\ndictionary to discern the term’s plain meaning. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa &\\nChippewa Indians, 369 F.3d at 967. Again, the contemporary editions of Black’s Law\\nDictionary define the term identically: “To aim (something or someone)[,] . . . [t]o cause\\n(something or someone) to move on a particular course[,] . . . [or] [t]o instruct (someone) with\\nauthority.” Direct, Black’s Law Dictionary 491 (8th ed. 2004); Direct, Black’s Law Dictionary\\n471 (7th ed. 1999). But these definitions, if applied to the regulation, would make little\\ngrammatical sense. One does not “aim” sales, “cause [sales] to move on a particular course,” or\\n“instruct [sales] with authority.” So we must turn to lay dictionaries. Webster’s, for example,\\nprovides a better definition: “[T]o manage or guide by advice, helpful information, instruction,\\netc.[;] . . . to regulate the course of; control[;] . . . to administer[,] manage[,] supervise[;] [or] to\\ngive authoritative instructions to; command; order or ordain[.]” Direct, Random House\\nWebster’s Unabridged Dictionary 558–59 (2001). Thus, we must determine whether the judicial\\nofficer had substantial evidence to support a finding that CherrCo did not control, manage, or\\ncommand sales.\\n\\n And the judicial officer’s finding was supported by such evidence. Roy Hackert, the\\nowner of Michigan Food Processors (a CherrCo member), testified that even when CherrCo\\nmaintained a security interest in his cherries to cover financing it provided to Michigan Food\\nProcessors, CherrCo did not “have the ability to direct the sale of those cherries based on that\\nsecurity interest.” James Nugent, again of Graceland Fruit, agreed that CherrCo “doesn’t say\\n[Graceland Fruit] ha[s] to sell to a particular entity,” and instead merely sets minimum pricing\\nfor Graceland Fruit’s products. Glenn LaCross testified that affiliates can sell their product\\nthrough independent (meaning non-CherrCo) sales agents and that CherrCo’s input is limited to\\ninvoicing and minimum-sales requirements. In fact, LaCross testified that members pick their\\nown sales agents “based on [their] own business interests” and that the CherrCo board does not\\neven discuss the possibility of telling members how or where to sell their product. LaCross\\nfurther testified that “[w]e have always [] had the right to direct our own sales if it be through a\\nsales brokerage constituent or an independent broker. And James Jensen testified that each\\nmember of CherrCo appoints its own, independent agent to sell its product. Jensen also testified\\nthat after CherrCo determines that the price and terms of a sale meet its requirements, it holds the\\nproduct and “authorize[s] a release when a member requests us to release the product to their\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\ncustomer.” On the basis of this testimony, the judicial officer’s determination that CherrCo is\\nnot a “sales constituency” was supported by substantial evidence. See Lansing Dairy, 39 F.3d at\\n1355.\\n\\n In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court made two legal errors. First, it\\nflipped the standard of review on its head. The court first found substantial evidence for the\\nconclusion that CherrCo did direct the sale of cherries; then it disregarded the judicial officer’s\\ncontrary determination in a single, conclusory, and legally unsupported sentence: “Th[ere] is\\nsubstantial evidence that CherrCo ‘directs where the consigned cherries are sold’ and therefore\\nqualifies as a sales constituency under 7 C.F.R. § 930.16. The Judicial Officer’s conclusion was\\nnot supported by substantial evidence.” As we have long held in appeals from agency\\ndeterminations, if substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion, the district court must\\naffirm, even if substantial evidence also exists for the opposite conclusion. See Defiance Milk\\nProds. Co., 857 F.2d at 1069–70.\\n\\n Second, the district court conflated whether CherrCo had contractual authority to do\\nthings with whether CherrCo actually did them. For example, the district court noted that\\nCherrCo is authorized to sell cherries itself under the “Membership and Marketing Agreement”\\neach affiliate signs, and whether it does so or licenses sales agents to do so is determined solely\\nby its Board of Directors. Yet the record reflects—regardless of what its members have\\ntheoretically authorized CherrCo to do—that CherrCo does not sell cherries on its own. And the\\n“sales constituency” regulation applies to what an organization does, not what it could do.\\n\\n If CherrCo were ever to direct the sales of its members’ cherries—as it seems to have the\\nauthority to do under the membership and marketing agreements its members sign—a future\\nchallenge might well succeed. But that is not the record before us. Here the record contains\\nsubstantial evidence to support the finding that CherrCo doesn’t direct cherry sales. Thus,\\nsubstantial evidence supports the Secretary’s conclusion that CherrCo falls within the exception\\nto the regulatory definition of a “sales constituency,” and its numerous members’ presence on the\\nBoard poses no legal issue.\\n\\f No. 18-1541 Burnette Foods, Inc. v. AGRI, et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n Because there was substantial evidence to support the judicial officer’s finding that\\nCherrCo (1) receives consignments of cherries and (2) does not direct where the consigned\\ncherries are sold, the district court erred in overruling the judicial officer’s conclusion that\\nCherrCo is not a sales constituency. And because the judicial officer’s conclusion was\\npermissible, there is no limit on the number of CherrCo members who can serve on the Board.\\nSee 7 C.F.R. § 930.20(g).\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for entry of\\njudgment in defendants’ favor.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1660,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4608224,"string":"4,608,224"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Paul JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IPX INTERNATIONAL EQUATORIAL GUINEA, S.A., Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Paul Jones v. IPX Int'l Equatorial Guinea SA"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1405"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before: BATCHELDER, McKEAGUE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"McKEAGUE\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0067p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n PAUL JONES, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-1405\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n IPX INTERNATIONAL EQUATORIAL GUINEA, S.A., │\\n Defendant-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor.\\n No. 5:17-cv-12483—John Corbett O’Meara, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 9, 2019\\n\\n Before: BATCHELDER, McKEAGUE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Dean Elliott, DEAN ELLIOTT, PLC, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellant.\\nGaëtan Gerville-Réache, WARNER NORCROSS + JUDD LLP, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for\\nAppellee.\\n\\n McKEAGUE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BATCHELDER, J., joined,\\nand NALBANDIAN, J., joined in part and in the judgment. NALBANDIAN, J. (pp. 11–12),\\ndelivered a separate concurring opinion.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Paul Jones is a United States citizen who chose to make his\\nmoney abroad. In good times, he was happy to invest, work, and live in Equatorial Guinea. But\\nwhen business soured, he hoped the United States would sweeten the deal. That hope did not\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 2\\n\\n\\npan out. After Jones sued his employer in the Eastern District of Michigan, the district court\\ndismissed his complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Jones now asks us to\\nreverse that decision. We are unconvinced that there was a clear abuse of discretion. We\\nAFFIRM.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Paul Jones is a Michigan citizen who has worked overseas most of his professional life.\\nHe began working in Equatorial Guinea around 2007. In 2011, he started a company—IPX\\nInternational Equatorial Guinea, S.A.—to provide telecommunication and internet services in\\nEquatorial Guinea. As its name suggests, IPX International Equatorial Guinea, S.A. is\\nincorporated in Equatorial Guinea and its principal place of business is in the country’s capital.\\nLike many founders, Jones wore several hats at his company, including shareholder, director,\\nand employee.\\n\\n This case is about Jones’s role as an employee. Jones worked as a Director General\\nunder an annual contract. Each year, Jones negotiated and signed his contract in Equatorial\\nGuinea. He then lived and worked there during the contract’s term.\\n\\n Jones and his company both did quite well, but financial success could not sustain the\\nrelationship. IPX International decided in 2015 to open a subsidiary in the United States. Given\\nhis ties to Michigan, Jones urged the company to open the subsidiary there. IPX International\\nagreed and sent Jones to Michigan to set up shop. That was supposed to take six months. Jones\\nwould then return to Equatorial Guinea. But after Jones arrived in Michigan, IPX International\\nlearned that he may have been stealing money and neglecting important business relationships.\\nThe company then suspended Jones so it could investigate.\\n\\n For his part, Jones claims that the suspension was a pretext to divest him of his stock and\\nthat IPX International breached his employment contract. He thus sued for breach of contract in\\nthe Eastern District of Michigan. The district court found that the case should be tried in\\nEquatorial Guinea and dismissed the complaint under forum non conveniens. Jones now appeals\\nthat decision.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 3\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Forum non conveniens decisions are “committed to the sound discretion of the trial\\ncourt.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). We thus review for “clear abuse\\nof discretion.” Zions First Nat’l Bank v. Moto Diesel Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 629 F.3d 520, 523\\n(6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Under that standard, we give “substantial deference” to the\\ndistrict court when it considers all relevant interests and balances those interests reasonably.\\nPiper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine that allows a district court not to\\nexercise its jurisdiction. Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir.\\n2016) (quotation omitted). In the federal system, forum non conveniens has been largely\\nreplaced by a statutory scheme that allows district courts to dismiss or transfer cases when better\\nforums are available. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a). Forum non conveniens operates\\nsimilarly to that statutory scheme, nonetheless it is distinct. It generally applies when the\\nalternative forum is in a foreign country, rather than in a different district within the federal\\nsystem. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007)\\n(quotations omitted).\\n\\n When courts apply forum non conveniens, there are three considerations: (1) whether an\\nadequate alternative forum is available; (2) whether a balance of private and public interests\\nsuggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or\\nthe court; and (3) the amount of deference to give the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Sometimes we\\ncall those considerations part of a three-step analysis. Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 492. Other times\\nwe frame the first two considerations as steps and then separately address deference to the\\nplaintiff’s choice of forum. See Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 2009)\\n(citation omitted); Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).\\nRegardless of which framing is best, all three considerations matter here. We will address them\\nin turn.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 4\\n\\n\\n A. Alternative Forum\\n\\n When a court declines to exercise jurisdiction under forum non conveniens, it is saying\\nthat the case should be tried elsewhere. That presupposes that an alternative forum exists, which\\nrequires another forum to be both available and adequate. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254\\nn.22. The question here, then, is whether Equatorial Guinea is an available and adequate forum.\\n\\n An alternative forum is available if the defendant is amenable to process there. Id.;\\nHefferan, 828 F.3d at 494. IPX International submitted an affidavit stating that it is amenable to\\nprocess in Equatorial Guinea. Jones concedes that point as well, stating that it is obvious. Thus,\\nEquatorial Guinea is an available forum.\\n\\n The contentious issue is whether Equatorial Guinea is an adequate forum. A forum is\\nadequate if it can remedy the alleged harm. Id. The alleged harm here is that IPX International\\ndid not pay Jones all it owed him under his employment contract. IPX International submits that\\nEquatorial Guinea recognizes a cause of action to remedy that harm, which Jones does not\\ndispute. So there is a remedy for the alleged harm.\\n\\n Typically that would end the inquiry, but not here. Jones contends that suing in\\nEquatorial Guinea is an inadequate remedy because the country’s judiciary is corrupt and\\nbecause he faces risk of persecution. When a plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of another\\ncountry’s legal system, we examine whether the differences between that legal system and ours\\n“render the possible remedy so clearly inadequate that forcing a plaintiff to bring suit there\\nwould be unjust.” Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 495. In rare circumstances, those differences can\\ninclude serious, non-legal obstacles like persecution, corruption, and political unrest. See Rustal\\nTrading US, Inc. v. Makki, 17 F. App’x 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations\\nomitted).\\n\\n Jones’s fear of corruption and persecution may be understandable, but the district court\\ndid not abuse its discretion when concluding that Equatorial Guinea is an adequate forum.\\nStarting with Jones’s concern about corruption, “general allegations of corruption” do not\\nsupport finding that an alternative forum is inadequate. Id. (citing El-Fadl v. Central Bank of\\nJordan, 75 F.3d 668, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Jones largely relies on Investment Climate\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 5\\n\\n\\nStatements published by the U.S. Department of State. Admittedly, those Statements criticize\\nthe Equatorial Guinean judiciary. They say, for example, that the “judicial system is not\\nindependent” and that there is “[c]orruption throughout the government, including the\\njudiciary[.]” Those are general allegations, however, that do not address the nuances of this\\ncase—particularly because the Statements focus on investment risks rather than employment\\ndisputes. Thus, they are not controlling.\\n\\n But Jones also makes allegations that could be considered particularized. He, for\\nexample, notes that his business partner—who is the majority shareholder of IPX International—\\nis related to the President of Equatorial Guinea. And the President also serves as the Chief\\nMagistrate of the judiciary. That may be a legitimate cause for concern, but it does not require\\nfinding that Equatorial Guinea is an inadequate forum. “It is not the business of our courts to\\nassume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign\\nnation.” Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted).\\nFor that reason, federal courts throughout the country consistently reject allegations of corruption\\nin foreign judicial systems. See 14D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice\\nand Procedure § 3828 n.11 (4th ed. 2018) (collecting cases). We cannot fault the district court\\nfor doing the same.\\n\\n We now turn to Jones’s fear of persecution. To warrant reversal, that fear needs to be\\n“well founded.” Rustal Trading, 17 F. App’x at 335 (citation omitted). Jones again relies on the\\nState Department Statements, which we said are too general to be controlling. But he also makes\\na particularized allegation that he will be falsely arrested and prosecuted. We do not take that\\nconcern lightly, but it is unsupported. Jones’s best piece of evidence seems to be an affidavit\\nstating that his brother in law—who also works for IPX International—had his passport\\nconfiscated shortly after Jones’s suspension. But IPX International’s corporate attorney took the\\npassport, not Equatorial Guinea. And nothing in the record suggests that the confiscation was\\nunjustified. So even that evidence fails to show a well-founded fear that Equatorial Guinea will\\nwrongly arrest and prosecute Jones.\\n\\n In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when finding that Equatorial Guinea\\nis an available and adequate forum.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 6\\n\\n\\n B. Balance of Private and Public Interests\\n\\n If an adequate alternative forum is available, then courts examine whether the plaintiff’s\\nchoice of forum is unnecessarily burdensome. Zions First, 629 F.3d at 523. To guide that\\nanalysis, courts look to the private and public interests that the Supreme Court listed in Gulf Oil\\nCorp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Id. We will start with the private interests and then turn\\nto the public interests.\\n\\n 1. Private Interests\\n\\n In Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court announced a non-exhaustive list of private interests to\\nconsider, including “the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory\\nprocess for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;\\npossibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical\\nproblems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” 330 U.S. at 508. Here,\\nthe district court held that those interests favor trying the case in Equatorial Guinea. In support,\\nthe district court found that most of the witnesses and key documents are in Equatorial Guinea\\nand that the witnesses can be compelled to testify there. Those findings are supported by an\\naffidavit1 stating that six key witnesses live in Equatorial Guinea, four of those witnesses are\\nunwilling to travel to the United States for this litigation, and the key documents are in\\nEquatorial Guinea.\\n\\n Jones raises several challenges on appeal. First, he asks us to weigh the interests\\ndifferently. In support, he notes that some of the key witnesses previously traveled to the United\\nStates and that IPX International could compel them to travel here again. He also claims that\\nIPX International should already possess some of the key documentary evidence, so production\\nwill not need to be compelled. Even if those factual allegations are true, Jones has not shown\\nthat the district court’s balancing was unreasonable. So we give substantial deference to the\\n\\n\\n\\n 1In passing, Jones challenges the adequacy of the affidavit claiming that it is “hearsay and marginally\\nrelevant.” We do not consider that here because Jones did not fully develop the argument and the Supreme Court\\nhas suggested that “affidavits describing the evidentiary problems” are sufficient. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 258–\\n59.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 7\\n\\n\\ndistrict court’s determination that, on balance, the private interests favor trying the case in\\nEquatorial Guinea. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257.\\n\\n Second, Jones says that the district court failed to consider the cost of flying the key\\nwitnesses from Equatorial Guinea to the United States. He is correct, so the district court erred\\nbecause the cost of attendance is a relevant interest. That said, the error is harmless. To use\\nJones’s words, “the flights are relatively expensive.” If anything, that favors trying the case in\\nEquatorial Guinea. Not quite willing to go that far, Jones maintains that the overall cost “does\\nnot favor either party.” We will give Jones the benefit of the doubt. But if cost does not favor\\nJones’s position, then the district court’s failure to consider it does not warrant reversal.\\n\\n Finally, Jones argues that the district court ignored the practical problems of a trial in\\nEquatorial Guinea. In support, he repeats his earlier arguments: the Equatorial Guinean judiciary\\nis corrupt and he fears persecution. We already explained why those concerns are unpersuasive.\\nSee Section III.A.\\n\\n 2. Public Interests\\n\\n Looking again to Gulf Oil, the public interests we consider include the administrative\\ndifficulties of litigation in congested centers instead of the suit’s place of origin, the burden of\\njury duty on citizens of communities with no relation to the case, the importance of trying the\\ncase in view and reach of others that may be affected, the local interest in having localized\\ncontroversies decided at home, and the appropriateness of having trial at home with the law that\\ngoverns the case. 330 U.S. at 508–09. The district court held that those factors favor trying the\\ncase in Equatorial Guinea. In support, the district court made two key findings. First, the court\\nfound that the case is local to Equatorial Guinea because that is where Jones started his\\nrelationship with IPX International, executed his employment contracts, and received\\nperformance evaluations. The court also noted that IPX International suspended Jones and\\nceased payments to him from Equatorial Guinea. Second, the court found that Equatorial\\nGuinean law governs the case under the underlying employment contract’s choice-of-law\\nprovision.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 8\\n\\n\\n Jones challenges those findings on two grounds. Like with the private interests, he first\\nasks us to rebalance the public interests. If we do so, Jones says we should find that the case is\\nlocal to Michigan because he went there to open IPX International’s subsidiary and the dispute\\narose during that time. Fair enough, but it is not our role to rebalance the interests. Instead,\\nJones needs to show that the balancing below was unreasonable. He did not make that showing,\\nso we give substantial deference to the district court’s determination. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at\\n257.\\n\\n Jones next contends that Michigan law governs the contract, thus the district court\\nerroneously considered the burden of applying Equatorial Guinean law. We are unpersuaded.\\nJones relies on the employment contract’s choice-of-law provision, which provides that disputes\\nwill be decided “in accordance with the applicable provisions of the ‘Labor Law’ and state laws\\nand regulations.”2 “Labor Law” is described earlier in the contract as “The Labor Law of\\nEquatorial Guinea.” But Jones homes in on the reference to “state laws” and says, without\\ncitation or analysis, that must mean Michigan law governs because there are no states in\\nEquatorial Guinea. Conflict of laws is a complicated doctrine, so that argument is far too\\nskeletal for us to consider. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)\\n(quotation omitted).\\n\\n But even if Jones fully formed his argument, he still would not prevail. The public\\ninterests favor dismissal not just when a court has to apply foreign law, but also when the court\\n“would be required to untangle problems in conflict of laws[.]” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251\\n(quotation omitted) (emphasis added). A plain reading of the choice-of-law provision suggests\\nEquatorial Guinean law governs. If somehow Michigan law applies instead, then there is a\\ncomplicated conflict-of-laws problem that needs to be untangled. That, too, favors dismissing\\nthe case, so the district court did not abuse its discretion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2The record includes competing copies of the employment contract, one that is signed and one that is not.\\nWe rely on the signed copy.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 9\\n\\n\\n C. Deference to Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum\\n\\n Finally, we consider whether the district court properly deferred to Jones’s choice of\\nforum. “[T]he central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is\\nconvenient[.]” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256. Courts presume that plaintiffs choose convenient\\nforums, so a plaintiff’s choice of forum is given deference. See Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 493.\\n\\n Jones asserts that the district court did not give his choice of forum any deference. That\\ngoes too far. Here, the district court concluded that the private and public interests “strongly\\nweigh” in favor of dismissal. In Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court said that a plaintiff’s choice of\\nforum should be disturbed only when the private and public interests balance “strongly in favor”\\nof dismissal. 330 U.S. at 508. The district court could have been more explicit about deferring\\nto Jones’s selection. But by looking at which direction the interests strongly weighed, the district\\ncourt in effect applied the deference that Gulf Oil requires.\\n\\n Jones also argues that the district court should have given his choice of forum heightened\\ndeference because he is a United States citizen. Our caselaw supports that position in general.\\nSee Duha, 448 F.3d at 873–74 (reversing when the district court failed to indicate that it was\\ngiving heightened deference to a United States citizen’s choice of forum). But here, Jones faces\\ntwo problems.\\n\\n First, he did not request heightened deference below. In fact, he did not even cite Duha.\\nJones instead devoted just two sentences to deference. In the first, he noted that a plaintiff’s\\nchoice of forum is given deference. He explained, in the second, that because of that deference,\\ndismissal would be proper only if the private and public interests balance “strongly in favor” of\\ndismissal. As we said, the district court held that the interests “strongly weigh” in favor of\\ndismissal. So the district court applied the precise amount of deference that Jones requested\\nbelow. We cannot find a clear abuse of discretion because Jones now wishes he had asked for\\nmore.\\n\\n Even if Jones could expand his request for deference on appeal, we are unpersuaded that\\nthe district court erred. Forum non conveniens, as we mentioned, is largely intended to secure\\nconvenient trials, and we defer to a plaintiff’s choice of forum based on an assumption that the\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 10\\n\\n\\nplaintiff will choose a convenient forum. That assumption is stronger when a plaintiff picks his\\nhome forum, so we give greater deference in those circumstances. Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 493\\n(citation omitted). We likewise defer less to a plaintiff who picks a foreign forum because the\\nassumption is weaker. Id. Those assumptions and the corresponding levels of deference are\\nhelpful tools, not oppressive masters. When the facts plainly show that the assumptions do not\\nhold true, then courts need not adhere blindly to the corresponding levels of deference. See id.\\n(“Although descriptively accurate and useful in many cases, that is not an unyielding rule that\\ndistrict courts must apply with equal force in every situation.”).\\n\\n Yet that is what Jones asks us to do here. Jones may be a United States citizen, but\\nnearly everything else about this case suggests he did not select his home forum. Jones spent his\\nprofessional life abroad and lived in Equatorial Guinea since 2007. In 2011, he formed his\\ncompany in Equatorial Guinea to provide services there. Since then, he continually conducted\\nbusiness, signed contracts, and received payments in Equatorial Guinea. There is no evidence\\nthat he made similar investments of time or resources in the United States, other than coming\\nhere for a brief stint to advance his Equatorial Guinean company’s interests before again\\nreturning to Equatorial Guinea.\\n\\n In short, there is strong evidence that Jones is not at home in the United States. So the\\nassumption that a United States court is most convenient for him does not hold true. The district\\ncourt thus acted within its discretion when it did not give heightened deference to his choice of\\nforum. See id. at 494 (finding no abuse of discretion when a district court did not give\\nheightened deference to a United States citizen domiciled elsewhere).\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n In sum, Jones raises some legitimate concerns, but there was not a clear abuse of\\ndiscretion. We affirm.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 11\\n\\n\\n ______________________________________________________\\n\\n CONCURRING IN PART AND IN THE JUDGMENT\\n ______________________________________________________\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385477/\", \"author_raw\": \"McKEAGUE\"}, {\"author\": \"NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in judgment.\\nAlthough I agree that the district court reached the correct outcome in dismissing this case on\\nforum non conveniens grounds, I write separately because I believe that the district court\\noverlooked an important step of the analysis. “Forum non conveniens dismissal involves a three-\\nstep analysis,” and the district court must begin by determining what deference it owes to the\\nplaintiff’s forum choice. Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 828 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2016).\\nGenerally, American plaintiffs receive greater deference to their forum choice than foreign\\nplaintiffs do. See, e.g., Zions First Nat’l Bank v. Moto Diesel Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 629 F.3d\\n520, 525 (6th Cir. 2010); Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 873–74 (6th Cir. 2006). Once the\\ndistrict court resolves the deference question, it must determine whether the defendant has shown\\nthat there is an adequate alternative forum and that the plaintiff’s forum choice “is unnecessarily\\nburdensome based on public and private interests.” Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 492. Although the\\ndistrict court addressed the latter two steps of the analysis, it gave no hint that it considered the\\nfirst step: the level of deference to confer on Jones’s decision to litigate the dispute in Michigan.\\n\\n Jones is entitled to at least some deference in his forum choice because he is an American\\ncitizen. The question, then, is how much and whether that deference outweighs other burdens on\\npublic and private interests. The district court did not answer that question, leaving us in a\\ndifficult position as we review its analysis. Indeed, in at least two published decisions, we have\\nheld that a district court’s failure to address deference may warrant vacating its order of\\ndismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. Zions, 629 F.3d at 525; Duha, 448 F.3d at 873–74.\\n\\n But we need not reach that outcome here. Although the district court’s failure to address\\nthe level of deference it owed to Jones’s forum choice amounts to legal error, that error was\\nharmless because “the record would compel the same result even under the correct legal\\nstandard.” Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 515 (6th Cir. 1998) (Boggs, J., concurring)\\n(citing Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 637 (6th Cir. 1997)). For these reasons, I concur in\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 12\\n\\n\\nthe majority’s opinion to the extent that it is not inconsistent with my own, and I concur in the\\njudgment.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385477/\", \"author_raw\": \"NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BATCHELDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MCKEAGUE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"NALBANDIAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BATCHELDER\": \", Circuit\", \"McKEAGUE\": \", Circuit\", \"NALBANDIAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608224/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Paul JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IPX INTERNATIONAL EQUATORIAL GUINEA, S.A., Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0067p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n PAUL JONES, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\n │\n > No. 18-1405\n v. │\n │\n │\n IPX INTERNATIONAL EQUATORIAL GUINEA, S.A., │\n Defendant-Appellee. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor.\n No. 5:17-cv-12483—John Corbett O’Meara, District Judge.\n\n Decided and Filed: April 9, 2019\n\n Before: BATCHELDER, McKEAGUE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nON BRIEF: Dean Elliott, DEAN ELLIOTT, PLC, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellant.\nGaëtan Gerville-Réache, WARNER NORCROSS + JUDD LLP, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for\nAppellee.\n\n McKEAGUE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BATCHELDER, J., joined,\nand NALBANDIAN, J., joined in part and in the judgment. NALBANDIAN, J. (pp. 11–12),\ndelivered a separate concurring opinion.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Paul Jones is a United States citizen who chose to make his\nmoney abroad. In good times, he was happy to invest, work, and live in Equatorial Guinea. But\nwhen business soured, he hoped the United States would sweeten the deal. That hope did not\n\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 2\n\n\npan out. After Jones sued his employer in the Eastern District of Michigan, the district court\ndismissed his complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Jones now asks us to\nreverse that decision. We are unconvinced that there was a clear abuse of discretion. We\nAFFIRM.\n\n I.\n\n Paul Jones is a Michigan citizen who has worked overseas most of his professional life.\nHe began working in Equatorial Guinea around 2007. In 2011, he started a company—IPX\nInternational Equatorial Guinea, S.A.—to provide telecommunication and internet services in\nEquatorial Guinea. As its name suggests, IPX International Equatorial Guinea, S.A. is\nincorporated in Equatorial Guinea and its principal place of business is in the country’s capital.\nLike many founders, Jones wore several hats at his company, including shareholder, director,\nand employee.\n\n This case is about Jones’s role as an employee. Jones worked as a Director General\nunder an annual contract. Each year, Jones negotiated and signed his contract in Equatorial\nGuinea. He then lived and worked there during the contract’s term.\n\n Jones and his company both did quite well, but financial success could not sustain the\nrelationship. IPX International decided in 2015 to open a subsidiary in the United States. Given\nhis ties to Michigan, Jones urged the company to open the subsidiary there. IPX International\nagreed and sent Jones to Michigan to set up shop. That was supposed to take six months. Jones\nwould then return to Equatorial Guinea. But after Jones arrived in Michigan, IPX International\nlearned that he may have been stealing money and neglecting important business relationships.\nThe company then suspended Jones so it could investigate.\n\n For his part, Jones claims that the suspension was a pretext to divest him of his stock and\nthat IPX International breached his employment contract. He thus sued for breach of contract in\nthe Eastern District of Michigan. The district court found that the case should be tried in\nEquatorial Guinea and dismissed the complaint under forum non conveniens. Jones now appeals\nthat decision.\n\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 3\n\n\n II.\n\n Forum non conveniens decisions are “committed to the sound discretion of the trial\ncourt.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). We thus review for “clear abuse\nof discretion.” Zions First Nat’l Bank v. Moto Diesel Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 629 F.3d 520, 523\n(6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Under that standard, we give “substantial deference” to the\ndistrict court when it considers all relevant interests and balances those interests reasonably.\nPiper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257.\n\n III.\n\n Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine that allows a district court not to\nexercise its jurisdiction. Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir.\n2016) (quotation omitted). In the federal system, forum non conveniens has been largely\nreplaced by a statutory scheme that allows district courts to dismiss or transfer cases when better\nforums are available. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a). Forum non conveniens operates\nsimilarly to that statutory scheme, nonetheless it is distinct. It generally applies when the\nalternative forum is in a foreign country, rather than in a different district within the federal\nsystem. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007)\n(quotations omitted).\n\n When courts apply forum non conveniens, there are three considerations: (1) whether an\nadequate alternative forum is available; (2) whether a balance of private and public interests\nsuggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or\nthe court; and (3) the amount of deference to give the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Sometimes we\ncall those considerations part of a three-step analysis. Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 492. Other times\nwe frame the first two considerations as steps and then separately address deference to the\nplaintiff’s choice of forum. See Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 2009)\n(citation omitted); Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).\nRegardless of which framing is best, all three considerations matter here. We will address them\nin turn.\n\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 4\n\n\n A. Alternative Forum\n\n When a court declines to exercise jurisdiction under forum non conveniens, it is saying\nthat the case should be tried elsewhere. That presupposes that an alternative forum exists, which\nrequires another forum to be both available and adequate. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254\nn.22. The question here, then, is whether Equatorial Guinea is an available and adequate forum.\n\n An alternative forum is available if the defendant is amenable to process there. Id.;\nHefferan, 828 F.3d at 494. IPX International submitted an affidavit stating that it is amenable to\nprocess in Equatorial Guinea. Jones concedes that point as well, stating that it is obvious. Thus,\nEquatorial Guinea is an available forum.\n\n The contentious issue is whether Equatorial Guinea is an adequate forum. A forum is\nadequate if it can remedy the alleged harm. Id. The alleged harm here is that IPX International\ndid not pay Jones all it owed him under his employment contract. IPX International submits that\nEquatorial Guinea recognizes a cause of action to remedy that harm, which Jones does not\ndispute. So there is a remedy for the alleged harm.\n\n Typically that would end the inquiry, but not here. Jones contends that suing in\nEquatorial Guinea is an inadequate remedy because the country’s judiciary is corrupt and\nbecause he faces risk of persecution. When a plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of another\ncountry’s legal system, we examine whether the differences between that legal system and ours\n“render the possible remedy so clearly inadequate that forcing a plaintiff to bring suit there\nwould be unjust.” Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 495. In rare circumstances, those differences can\ninclude serious, non-legal obstacles like persecution, corruption, and political unrest. See Rustal\nTrading US, Inc. v. Makki, 17 F. App’x 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations\nomitted).\n\n Jones’s fear of corruption and persecution may be understandable, but the district court\ndid not abuse its discretion when concluding that Equatorial Guinea is an adequate forum.\nStarting with Jones’s concern about corruption, “general allegations of corruption” do not\nsupport finding that an alternative forum is inadequate. Id. (citing El-Fadl v. Central Bank of\nJordan, 75 F.3d 668, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Jones largely relies on Investment Climate\n\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 5\n\n\nStatements published by the U.S. Department of State. Admittedly, those Statements criticize\nthe Equatorial Guinean judiciary. They say, for example, that the “judicial system is not\nindependent” and that there is “[c]orruption throughout the government, including the\njudiciary[.]” Those are general allegations, however, that do not address the nuances of this\ncase—particularly because the Statements focus on investment risks rather than employment\ndisputes. Thus, they are not controlling.\n\n But Jones also makes allegations that could be considered particularized. He, for\nexample, notes that his business partner—who is the majority shareholder of IPX International—\nis related to the President of Equatorial Guinea. And the President also serves as the Chief\nMagistrate of the judiciary. That may be a legitimate cause for concern, but it does not require\nfinding that Equatorial Guinea is an inadequate forum. “It is not the business of our courts to\nassume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign\nnation.” Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted).\nFor that reason, federal courts throughout the country consistently reject allegations of corruption\nin foreign judicial systems. See 14D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice\nand Procedure § 3828 n.11 (4th ed. 2018) (collecting cases). We cannot fault the district court\nfor doing the same.\n\n We now turn to Jones’s fear of persecution. To warrant reversal, that fear needs to be\n“well founded.” Rustal Trading, 17 F. App’x at 335 (citation omitted). Jones again relies on the\nState Department Statements, which we said are too general to be controlling. But he also makes\na particularized allegation that he will be falsely arrested and prosecuted. We do not take that\nconcern lightly, but it is unsupported. Jones’s best piece of evidence seems to be an affidavit\nstating that his brother in law—who also works for IPX International—had his passport\nconfiscated shortly after Jones’s suspension. But IPX International’s corporate attorney took the\npassport, not Equatorial Guinea. And nothing in the record suggests that the confiscation was\nunjustified. So even that evidence fails to show a well-founded fear that Equatorial Guinea will\nwrongly arrest and prosecute Jones.\n\n In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when finding that Equatorial Guinea\nis an available and adequate forum.\n\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 6\n\n\n B. Balance of Private and Public Interests\n\n If an adequate alternative forum is available, then courts examine whether the plaintiff’s\nchoice of forum is unnecessarily burdensome. Zions First, 629 F.3d at 523. To guide that\nanalysis, courts look to the private and public interests that the Supreme Court listed in Gulf Oil\nCorp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Id. We will start with the private interests and then turn\nto the public interests.\n\n 1. Private Interests\n\n In Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court announced a non-exhaustive list of private interests to\nconsider, including “the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory\nprocess for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;\npossibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical\nproblems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” 330 U.S. at 508. Here,\nthe district court held that those interests favor trying the case in Equatorial Guinea. In support,\nthe district court found that most of the witnesses and key documents are in Equatorial Guinea\nand that the witnesses can be compelled to testify there. Those findings are supported by an\naffidavit1 stating that six key witnesses live in Equatorial Guinea, four of those witnesses are\nunwilling to travel to the United States for this litigation, and the key documents are in\nEquatorial Guinea.\n\n Jones raises several challenges on appeal. First, he asks us to weigh the interests\ndifferently. In support, he notes that some of the key witnesses previously traveled to the United\nStates and that IPX International could compel them to travel here again. He also claims that\nIPX International should already possess some of the key documentary evidence, so production\nwill not need to be compelled. Even if those factual allegations are true, Jones has not shown\nthat the district court’s balancing was unreasonable. So we give substantial deference to the\n\n\n\n 1In passing, Jones challenges the adequacy of the affidavit claiming that it is “hearsay and marginally\nrelevant.” We do not consider that here because Jones did not fully develop the argument and the Supreme Court\nhas suggested that “affidavits describing the evidentiary problems” are sufficient. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 258–\n59.\n\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 7\n\n\ndistrict court’s determination that, on balance, the private interests favor trying the case in\nEquatorial Guinea. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257.\n\n Second, Jones says that the district court failed to consider the cost of flying the key\nwitnesses from Equatorial Guinea to the United States. He is correct, so the district court erred\nbecause the cost of attendance is a relevant interest. That said, the error is harmless. To use\nJones’s words, “the flights are relatively expensive.” If anything, that favors trying the case in\nEquatorial Guinea. Not quite willing to go that far, Jones maintains that the overall cost “does\nnot favor either party.” We will give Jones the benefit of the doubt. But if cost does not favor\nJones’s position, then the district court’s failure to consider it does not warrant reversal.\n\n Finally, Jones argues that the district court ignored the practical problems of a trial in\nEquatorial Guinea. In support, he repeats his earlier arguments: the Equatorial Guinean judiciary\nis corrupt and he fears persecution. We already explained why those concerns are unpersuasive.\nSee Section III.A.\n\n 2. Public Interests\n\n Looking again to Gulf Oil, the public interests we consider include the administrative\ndifficulties of litigation in congested centers instead of the suit’s place of origin, the burden of\njury duty on citizens of communities with no relation to the case, the importance of trying the\ncase in view and reach of others that may be affected, the local interest in having localized\ncontroversies decided at home, and the appropriateness of having trial at home with the law that\ngoverns the case. 330 U.S. at 508–09. The district court held that those factors favor trying the\ncase in Equatorial Guinea. In support, the district court made two key findings. First, the court\nfound that the case is local to Equatorial Guinea because that is where Jones started his\nrelationship with IPX International, executed his employment contracts, and received\nperformance evaluations. The court also noted that IPX International suspended Jones and\nceased payments to him from Equatorial Guinea. Second, the court found that Equatorial\nGuinean law governs the case under the underlying employment contract’s choice-of-law\nprovision.\n\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 8\n\n\n Jones challenges those findings on two grounds. Like with the private interests, he first\nasks us to rebalance the public interests. If we do so, Jones says we should find that the case is\nlocal to Michigan because he went there to open IPX International’s subsidiary and the dispute\narose during that time. Fair enough, but it is not our role to rebalance the interests. Instead,\nJones needs to show that the balancing below was unreasonable. He did not make that showing,\nso we give substantial deference to the district court’s determination. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at\n257.\n\n Jones next contends that Michigan law governs the contract, thus the district court\nerroneously considered the burden of applying Equatorial Guinean law. We are unpersuaded.\nJones relies on the employment contract’s choice-of-law provision, which provides that disputes\nwill be decided “in accordance with the applicable provisions of the ‘Labor Law’ and state laws\nand regulations.”2 “Labor Law” is described earlier in the contract as “The Labor Law of\nEquatorial Guinea.” But Jones homes in on the reference to “state laws” and says, without\ncitation or analysis, that must mean Michigan law governs because there are no states in\nEquatorial Guinea. Conflict of laws is a complicated doctrine, so that argument is far too\nskeletal for us to consider. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)\n(quotation omitted).\n\n But even if Jones fully formed his argument, he still would not prevail. The public\ninterests favor dismissal not just when a court has to apply foreign law, but also when the court\n“would be required to untangle problems in conflict of laws[.]” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251\n(quotation omitted) (emphasis added). A plain reading of the choice-of-law provision suggests\nEquatorial Guinean law governs. If somehow Michigan law applies instead, then there is a\ncomplicated conflict-of-laws problem that needs to be untangled. That, too, favors dismissing\nthe case, so the district court did not abuse its discretion.\n\n\n\n\n 2The record includes competing copies of the employment contract, one that is signed and one that is not.\nWe rely on the signed copy.\n\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 9\n\n\n C. Deference to Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum\n\n Finally, we consider whether the district court properly deferred to Jones’s choice of\nforum. “[T]he central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is\nconvenient[.]” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256. Courts presume that plaintiffs choose convenient\nforums, so a plaintiff’s choice of forum is given deference. See Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 493.\n\n Jones asserts that the district court did not give his choice of forum any deference. That\ngoes too far. Here, the district court concluded that the private and public interests “strongly\nweigh” in favor of dismissal. In Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court said that a plaintiff’s choice of\nforum should be disturbed only when the private and public interests balance “strongly in favor”\nof dismissal. 330 U.S. at 508. The district court could have been more explicit about deferring\nto Jones’s selection. But by looking at which direction the interests strongly weighed, the district\ncourt in effect applied the deference that Gulf Oil requires.\n\n Jones also argues that the district court should have given his choice of forum heightened\ndeference because he is a United States citizen. Our caselaw supports that position in general.\nSee Duha, 448 F.3d at 873–74 (reversing when the district court failed to indicate that it was\ngiving heightened deference to a United States citizen’s choice of forum). But here, Jones faces\ntwo problems.\n\n First, he did not request heightened deference below. In fact, he did not even cite Duha.\nJones instead devoted just two sentences to deference. In the first, he noted that a plaintiff’s\nchoice of forum is given deference. He explained, in the second, that because of that deference,\ndismissal would be proper only if the private and public interests balance “strongly in favor” of\ndismissal. As we said, the district court held that the interests “strongly weigh” in favor of\ndismissal. So the district court applied the precise amount of deference that Jones requested\nbelow. We cannot find a clear abuse of discretion because Jones now wishes he had asked for\nmore.\n\n Even if Jones could expand his request for deference on appeal, we are unpersuaded that\nthe district court erred. Forum non conveniens, as we mentioned, is largely intended to secure\nconvenient trials, and we defer to a plaintiff’s choice of forum based on an assumption that the\n\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 10\n\n\nplaintiff will choose a convenient forum. That assumption is stronger when a plaintiff picks his\nhome forum, so we give greater deference in those circumstances. Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 493\n(citation omitted). We likewise defer less to a plaintiff who picks a foreign forum because the\nassumption is weaker. Id. Those assumptions and the corresponding levels of deference are\nhelpful tools, not oppressive masters. When the facts plainly show that the assumptions do not\nhold true, then courts need not adhere blindly to the corresponding levels of deference. See id.\n(“Although descriptively accurate and useful in many cases, that is not an unyielding rule that\ndistrict courts must apply with equal force in every situation.”).\n\n Yet that is what Jones asks us to do here. Jones may be a United States citizen, but\nnearly everything else about this case suggests he did not select his home forum. Jones spent his\nprofessional life abroad and lived in Equatorial Guinea since 2007. In 2011, he formed his\ncompany in Equatorial Guinea to provide services there. Since then, he continually conducted\nbusiness, signed contracts, and received payments in Equatorial Guinea. There is no evidence\nthat he made similar investments of time or resources in the United States, other than coming\nhere for a brief stint to advance his Equatorial Guinean company’s interests before again\nreturning to Equatorial Guinea.\n\n In short, there is strong evidence that Jones is not at home in the United States. So the\nassumption that a United States court is most convenient for him does not hold true. The district\ncourt thus acted within its discretion when it did not give heightened deference to his choice of\nforum. See id. at 494 (finding no abuse of discretion when a district court did not give\nheightened deference to a United States citizen domiciled elsewhere).\n\n IV.\n\n In sum, Jones raises some legitimate concerns, but there was not a clear abuse of\ndiscretion. We affirm.\n\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 11\n\n\n ______________________________________________________\n\n CONCURRING IN PART AND IN THE JUDGMENT\n ______________________________________________________\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Paul JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IPX INTERNATIONAL EQUATORIAL GUINEA, S.A., Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0067p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n PAUL JONES, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-1405\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n IPX INTERNATIONAL EQUATORIAL GUINEA, S.A., │\\n Defendant-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor.\\n No. 5:17-cv-12483—John Corbett O’Meara, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 9, 2019\\n\\n Before: BATCHELDER, McKEAGUE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Dean Elliott, DEAN ELLIOTT, PLC, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellant.\\nGaëtan Gerville-Réache, WARNER NORCROSS + JUDD LLP, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for\\nAppellee.\\n\\n McKEAGUE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BATCHELDER, J., joined,\\nand NALBANDIAN, J., joined in part and in the judgment. NALBANDIAN, J. (pp. 11–12),\\ndelivered a separate concurring opinion.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Paul Jones is a United States citizen who chose to make his\\nmoney abroad. In good times, he was happy to invest, work, and live in Equatorial Guinea. But\\nwhen business soured, he hoped the United States would sweeten the deal. That hope did not\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 2\\n\\n\\npan out. After Jones sued his employer in the Eastern District of Michigan, the district court\\ndismissed his complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Jones now asks us to\\nreverse that decision. We are unconvinced that there was a clear abuse of discretion. We\\nAFFIRM.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Paul Jones is a Michigan citizen who has worked overseas most of his professional life.\\nHe began working in Equatorial Guinea around 2007. In 2011, he started a company—IPX\\nInternational Equatorial Guinea, S.A.—to provide telecommunication and internet services in\\nEquatorial Guinea. As its name suggests, IPX International Equatorial Guinea, S.A. is\\nincorporated in Equatorial Guinea and its principal place of business is in the country’s capital.\\nLike many founders, Jones wore several hats at his company, including shareholder, director,\\nand employee.\\n\\n This case is about Jones’s role as an employee. Jones worked as a Director General\\nunder an annual contract. Each year, Jones negotiated and signed his contract in Equatorial\\nGuinea. He then lived and worked there during the contract’s term.\\n\\n Jones and his company both did quite well, but financial success could not sustain the\\nrelationship. IPX International decided in 2015 to open a subsidiary in the United States. Given\\nhis ties to Michigan, Jones urged the company to open the subsidiary there. IPX International\\nagreed and sent Jones to Michigan to set up shop. That was supposed to take six months. Jones\\nwould then return to Equatorial Guinea. But after Jones arrived in Michigan, IPX International\\nlearned that he may have been stealing money and neglecting important business relationships.\\nThe company then suspended Jones so it could investigate.\\n\\n For his part, Jones claims that the suspension was a pretext to divest him of his stock and\\nthat IPX International breached his employment contract. He thus sued for breach of contract in\\nthe Eastern District of Michigan. The district court found that the case should be tried in\\nEquatorial Guinea and dismissed the complaint under forum non conveniens. Jones now appeals\\nthat decision.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 3\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Forum non conveniens decisions are “committed to the sound discretion of the trial\\ncourt.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). We thus review for “clear abuse\\nof discretion.” Zions First Nat’l Bank v. Moto Diesel Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 629 F.3d 520, 523\\n(6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Under that standard, we give “substantial deference” to the\\ndistrict court when it considers all relevant interests and balances those interests reasonably.\\nPiper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine that allows a district court not to\\nexercise its jurisdiction. Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir.\\n2016) (quotation omitted). In the federal system, forum non conveniens has been largely\\nreplaced by a statutory scheme that allows district courts to dismiss or transfer cases when better\\nforums are available. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a). Forum non conveniens operates\\nsimilarly to that statutory scheme, nonetheless it is distinct. It generally applies when the\\nalternative forum is in a foreign country, rather than in a different district within the federal\\nsystem. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007)\\n(quotations omitted).\\n\\n When courts apply forum non conveniens, there are three considerations: (1) whether an\\nadequate alternative forum is available; (2) whether a balance of private and public interests\\nsuggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or\\nthe court; and (3) the amount of deference to give the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Sometimes we\\ncall those considerations part of a three-step analysis. Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 492. Other times\\nwe frame the first two considerations as steps and then separately address deference to the\\nplaintiff’s choice of forum. See Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 2009)\\n(citation omitted); Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).\\nRegardless of which framing is best, all three considerations matter here. We will address them\\nin turn.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 4\\n\\n\\n A. Alternative Forum\\n\\n When a court declines to exercise jurisdiction under forum non conveniens, it is saying\\nthat the case should be tried elsewhere. That presupposes that an alternative forum exists, which\\nrequires another forum to be both available and adequate. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254\\nn.22. The question here, then, is whether Equatorial Guinea is an available and adequate forum.\\n\\n An alternative forum is available if the defendant is amenable to process there. Id.;\\nHefferan, 828 F.3d at 494. IPX International submitted an affidavit stating that it is amenable to\\nprocess in Equatorial Guinea. Jones concedes that point as well, stating that it is obvious. Thus,\\nEquatorial Guinea is an available forum.\\n\\n The contentious issue is whether Equatorial Guinea is an adequate forum. A forum is\\nadequate if it can remedy the alleged harm. Id. The alleged harm here is that IPX International\\ndid not pay Jones all it owed him under his employment contract. IPX International submits that\\nEquatorial Guinea recognizes a cause of action to remedy that harm, which Jones does not\\ndispute. So there is a remedy for the alleged harm.\\n\\n Typically that would end the inquiry, but not here. Jones contends that suing in\\nEquatorial Guinea is an inadequate remedy because the country’s judiciary is corrupt and\\nbecause he faces risk of persecution. When a plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of another\\ncountry’s legal system, we examine whether the differences between that legal system and ours\\n“render the possible remedy so clearly inadequate that forcing a plaintiff to bring suit there\\nwould be unjust.” Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 495. In rare circumstances, those differences can\\ninclude serious, non-legal obstacles like persecution, corruption, and political unrest. See Rustal\\nTrading US, Inc. v. Makki, 17 F. App’x 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations\\nomitted).\\n\\n Jones’s fear of corruption and persecution may be understandable, but the district court\\ndid not abuse its discretion when concluding that Equatorial Guinea is an adequate forum.\\nStarting with Jones’s concern about corruption, “general allegations of corruption” do not\\nsupport finding that an alternative forum is inadequate. Id. (citing El-Fadl v. Central Bank of\\nJordan, 75 F.3d 668, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Jones largely relies on Investment Climate\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 5\\n\\n\\nStatements published by the U.S. Department of State. Admittedly, those Statements criticize\\nthe Equatorial Guinean judiciary. They say, for example, that the “judicial system is not\\nindependent” and that there is “[c]orruption throughout the government, including the\\njudiciary[.]” Those are general allegations, however, that do not address the nuances of this\\ncase—particularly because the Statements focus on investment risks rather than employment\\ndisputes. Thus, they are not controlling.\\n\\n But Jones also makes allegations that could be considered particularized. He, for\\nexample, notes that his business partner—who is the majority shareholder of IPX International—\\nis related to the President of Equatorial Guinea. And the President also serves as the Chief\\nMagistrate of the judiciary. That may be a legitimate cause for concern, but it does not require\\nfinding that Equatorial Guinea is an inadequate forum. “It is not the business of our courts to\\nassume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign\\nnation.” Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted).\\nFor that reason, federal courts throughout the country consistently reject allegations of corruption\\nin foreign judicial systems. See 14D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice\\nand Procedure § 3828 n.11 (4th ed. 2018) (collecting cases). We cannot fault the district court\\nfor doing the same.\\n\\n We now turn to Jones’s fear of persecution. To warrant reversal, that fear needs to be\\n“well founded.” Rustal Trading, 17 F. App’x at 335 (citation omitted). Jones again relies on the\\nState Department Statements, which we said are too general to be controlling. But he also makes\\na particularized allegation that he will be falsely arrested and prosecuted. We do not take that\\nconcern lightly, but it is unsupported. Jones’s best piece of evidence seems to be an affidavit\\nstating that his brother in law—who also works for IPX International—had his passport\\nconfiscated shortly after Jones’s suspension. But IPX International’s corporate attorney took the\\npassport, not Equatorial Guinea. And nothing in the record suggests that the confiscation was\\nunjustified. So even that evidence fails to show a well-founded fear that Equatorial Guinea will\\nwrongly arrest and prosecute Jones.\\n\\n In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when finding that Equatorial Guinea\\nis an available and adequate forum.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 6\\n\\n\\n B. Balance of Private and Public Interests\\n\\n If an adequate alternative forum is available, then courts examine whether the plaintiff’s\\nchoice of forum is unnecessarily burdensome. Zions First, 629 F.3d at 523. To guide that\\nanalysis, courts look to the private and public interests that the Supreme Court listed in Gulf Oil\\nCorp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Id. We will start with the private interests and then turn\\nto the public interests.\\n\\n 1. Private Interests\\n\\n In Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court announced a non-exhaustive list of private interests to\\nconsider, including “the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory\\nprocess for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;\\npossibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical\\nproblems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” 330 U.S. at 508. Here,\\nthe district court held that those interests favor trying the case in Equatorial Guinea. In support,\\nthe district court found that most of the witnesses and key documents are in Equatorial Guinea\\nand that the witnesses can be compelled to testify there. Those findings are supported by an\\naffidavit1 stating that six key witnesses live in Equatorial Guinea, four of those witnesses are\\nunwilling to travel to the United States for this litigation, and the key documents are in\\nEquatorial Guinea.\\n\\n Jones raises several challenges on appeal. First, he asks us to weigh the interests\\ndifferently. In support, he notes that some of the key witnesses previously traveled to the United\\nStates and that IPX International could compel them to travel here again. He also claims that\\nIPX International should already possess some of the key documentary evidence, so production\\nwill not need to be compelled. Even if those factual allegations are true, Jones has not shown\\nthat the district court’s balancing was unreasonable. So we give substantial deference to the\\n\\n\\n\\n 1In passing, Jones challenges the adequacy of the affidavit claiming that it is “hearsay and marginally\\nrelevant.” We do not consider that here because Jones did not fully develop the argument and the Supreme Court\\nhas suggested that “affidavits describing the evidentiary problems” are sufficient. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 258–\\n59.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 7\\n\\n\\ndistrict court’s determination that, on balance, the private interests favor trying the case in\\nEquatorial Guinea. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257.\\n\\n Second, Jones says that the district court failed to consider the cost of flying the key\\nwitnesses from Equatorial Guinea to the United States. He is correct, so the district court erred\\nbecause the cost of attendance is a relevant interest. That said, the error is harmless. To use\\nJones’s words, “the flights are relatively expensive.” If anything, that favors trying the case in\\nEquatorial Guinea. Not quite willing to go that far, Jones maintains that the overall cost “does\\nnot favor either party.” We will give Jones the benefit of the doubt. But if cost does not favor\\nJones’s position, then the district court’s failure to consider it does not warrant reversal.\\n\\n Finally, Jones argues that the district court ignored the practical problems of a trial in\\nEquatorial Guinea. In support, he repeats his earlier arguments: the Equatorial Guinean judiciary\\nis corrupt and he fears persecution. We already explained why those concerns are unpersuasive.\\nSee Section III.A.\\n\\n 2. Public Interests\\n\\n Looking again to Gulf Oil, the public interests we consider include the administrative\\ndifficulties of litigation in congested centers instead of the suit’s place of origin, the burden of\\njury duty on citizens of communities with no relation to the case, the importance of trying the\\ncase in view and reach of others that may be affected, the local interest in having localized\\ncontroversies decided at home, and the appropriateness of having trial at home with the law that\\ngoverns the case. 330 U.S. at 508–09. The district court held that those factors favor trying the\\ncase in Equatorial Guinea. In support, the district court made two key findings. First, the court\\nfound that the case is local to Equatorial Guinea because that is where Jones started his\\nrelationship with IPX International, executed his employment contracts, and received\\nperformance evaluations. The court also noted that IPX International suspended Jones and\\nceased payments to him from Equatorial Guinea. Second, the court found that Equatorial\\nGuinean law governs the case under the underlying employment contract’s choice-of-law\\nprovision.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 8\\n\\n\\n Jones challenges those findings on two grounds. Like with the private interests, he first\\nasks us to rebalance the public interests. If we do so, Jones says we should find that the case is\\nlocal to Michigan because he went there to open IPX International’s subsidiary and the dispute\\narose during that time. Fair enough, but it is not our role to rebalance the interests. Instead,\\nJones needs to show that the balancing below was unreasonable. He did not make that showing,\\nso we give substantial deference to the district court’s determination. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at\\n257.\\n\\n Jones next contends that Michigan law governs the contract, thus the district court\\nerroneously considered the burden of applying Equatorial Guinean law. We are unpersuaded.\\nJones relies on the employment contract’s choice-of-law provision, which provides that disputes\\nwill be decided “in accordance with the applicable provisions of the ‘Labor Law’ and state laws\\nand regulations.”2 “Labor Law” is described earlier in the contract as “The Labor Law of\\nEquatorial Guinea.” But Jones homes in on the reference to “state laws” and says, without\\ncitation or analysis, that must mean Michigan law governs because there are no states in\\nEquatorial Guinea. Conflict of laws is a complicated doctrine, so that argument is far too\\nskeletal for us to consider. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)\\n(quotation omitted).\\n\\n But even if Jones fully formed his argument, he still would not prevail. The public\\ninterests favor dismissal not just when a court has to apply foreign law, but also when the court\\n“would be required to untangle problems in conflict of laws[.]” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251\\n(quotation omitted) (emphasis added). A plain reading of the choice-of-law provision suggests\\nEquatorial Guinean law governs. If somehow Michigan law applies instead, then there is a\\ncomplicated conflict-of-laws problem that needs to be untangled. That, too, favors dismissing\\nthe case, so the district court did not abuse its discretion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2The record includes competing copies of the employment contract, one that is signed and one that is not.\\nWe rely on the signed copy.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 9\\n\\n\\n C. Deference to Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum\\n\\n Finally, we consider whether the district court properly deferred to Jones’s choice of\\nforum. “[T]he central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is\\nconvenient[.]” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256. Courts presume that plaintiffs choose convenient\\nforums, so a plaintiff’s choice of forum is given deference. See Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 493.\\n\\n Jones asserts that the district court did not give his choice of forum any deference. That\\ngoes too far. Here, the district court concluded that the private and public interests “strongly\\nweigh” in favor of dismissal. In Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court said that a plaintiff’s choice of\\nforum should be disturbed only when the private and public interests balance “strongly in favor”\\nof dismissal. 330 U.S. at 508. The district court could have been more explicit about deferring\\nto Jones’s selection. But by looking at which direction the interests strongly weighed, the district\\ncourt in effect applied the deference that Gulf Oil requires.\\n\\n Jones also argues that the district court should have given his choice of forum heightened\\ndeference because he is a United States citizen. Our caselaw supports that position in general.\\nSee Duha, 448 F.3d at 873–74 (reversing when the district court failed to indicate that it was\\ngiving heightened deference to a United States citizen’s choice of forum). But here, Jones faces\\ntwo problems.\\n\\n First, he did not request heightened deference below. In fact, he did not even cite Duha.\\nJones instead devoted just two sentences to deference. In the first, he noted that a plaintiff’s\\nchoice of forum is given deference. He explained, in the second, that because of that deference,\\ndismissal would be proper only if the private and public interests balance “strongly in favor” of\\ndismissal. As we said, the district court held that the interests “strongly weigh” in favor of\\ndismissal. So the district court applied the precise amount of deference that Jones requested\\nbelow. We cannot find a clear abuse of discretion because Jones now wishes he had asked for\\nmore.\\n\\n Even if Jones could expand his request for deference on appeal, we are unpersuaded that\\nthe district court erred. Forum non conveniens, as we mentioned, is largely intended to secure\\nconvenient trials, and we defer to a plaintiff’s choice of forum based on an assumption that the\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 10\\n\\n\\nplaintiff will choose a convenient forum. That assumption is stronger when a plaintiff picks his\\nhome forum, so we give greater deference in those circumstances. Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 493\\n(citation omitted). We likewise defer less to a plaintiff who picks a foreign forum because the\\nassumption is weaker. Id. Those assumptions and the corresponding levels of deference are\\nhelpful tools, not oppressive masters. When the facts plainly show that the assumptions do not\\nhold true, then courts need not adhere blindly to the corresponding levels of deference. See id.\\n(“Although descriptively accurate and useful in many cases, that is not an unyielding rule that\\ndistrict courts must apply with equal force in every situation.”).\\n\\n Yet that is what Jones asks us to do here. Jones may be a United States citizen, but\\nnearly everything else about this case suggests he did not select his home forum. Jones spent his\\nprofessional life abroad and lived in Equatorial Guinea since 2007. In 2011, he formed his\\ncompany in Equatorial Guinea to provide services there. Since then, he continually conducted\\nbusiness, signed contracts, and received payments in Equatorial Guinea. There is no evidence\\nthat he made similar investments of time or resources in the United States, other than coming\\nhere for a brief stint to advance his Equatorial Guinean company’s interests before again\\nreturning to Equatorial Guinea.\\n\\n In short, there is strong evidence that Jones is not at home in the United States. So the\\nassumption that a United States court is most convenient for him does not hold true. The district\\ncourt thus acted within its discretion when it did not give heightened deference to his choice of\\nforum. See id. at 494 (finding no abuse of discretion when a district court did not give\\nheightened deference to a United States citizen domiciled elsewhere).\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n In sum, Jones raises some legitimate concerns, but there was not a clear abuse of\\ndiscretion. We affirm.\\n\\n No. 18-1405 Jones v. IPX Int’l Equatorial Guinea SA Page 11\\n\\n\\n ______________________________________________________\\n\\n CONCURRING IN PART AND IN THE JUDGMENT\\n ______________________________________________________\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1661,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4608516,"string":"4,608,516"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmie Eugene WHITE, II, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jimmie White"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"16-1009"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Griffin, Clay\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888338/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"035concurrenceinpart\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888339/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0070p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 16-1009\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n JIMMIE EUGENE WHITE, II, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.\\n United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.\\n No. 2:13-cr-20423—David M. Lawson, District Judge.\\n\\n Reargued: October 18, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 10, 2019\\n\\n Before: GUY, CLAY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nREARGUED: Christian D. Sheehan, VINSON & ELKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., for\\nAppellant. Andrew Goetz, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for\\nAppellee. ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF: Christian D. Sheehan, Jeremy C. Marwell,\\nVINSON & ELKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., Kenneth P. Tableman, KENNETH P.\\nTABLEMAN, P.C., Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Andrew Goetz, UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.\\n\\n GRIFFIN, J. delivered the opinion of the court except with regard to the issue discussed\\nin Section III.B, and delivered a separate opinion with regard to the issue discussed in Section\\nIII.B. GUY, J. (pp. 13–14), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the majority opinion and\\nin the judgment. CLAY, J. (pp. 15–23), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the majority\\nopinion in part and dissenting in part.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Following our circuit’s binding precedent, we previously held in this case that\\npreindictment plea negotiations are “period[s] of delay resulting from other proceedings\\nconcerning the defendant” that are automatically excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) of the\\nSpeedy Trial Act. United States v. White, 679 F. App’x 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing United\\nStates v. Dunbar, 357 F.3d 582, 593 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded on other grounds,\\n543 U.S. 1099 (2005); United States v. Bowers, 834 F.2d 607, 609–10 (6th Cir. 1987) (per\\ncuriam)). Defendant challenged this precedent for the first time in his petition for a writ of\\ncertiorari as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Bloate v. United\\nStates, 559 U.S. 196 (2010). Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22–23, White v. United States,\\n138 S. Ct. 641 (2018) (No. 17-270). The government then changed horses in midstream,\\nconceding—also for the first time before the Supreme Court—that our circuit precedent was\\nincorrect and inconsistent with Bloate, and that the roughly two-week continuance to engage in\\npreindictment plea negotiations here did not qualify for automatic exclusion under § 3161(h)(1).\\nResponse to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–11, White v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 641 (2018)\\n(No. 17-270). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the\\ncase back to us “for further consideration in light of the confession of error by the Solicitor\\nGeneral.” White v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 641, 641 (2018).\\n\\n On remand, we now hold that Bloate abrogated Dunbar and Bowers. Nevertheless, we\\ndeny defendant relief for two independent reasons. First, he cannot overcome plain-error review\\nof his Bloate argument. Second, and alternatively, the time for preindictment plea negotiations\\nwas properly excluded as an ends-of-justice continuance under § 3161(h)(7) of the Speedy Trial\\nAct. Therefore, we again affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 3\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Our prior opinion sets forth the facts pertinent to this remand:\\n\\n On April 29, 2013, the government filed a complaint against White charging him\\n with drug distribution and firearm crimes related to the May 14, 2010, search and\\n seizure. White was arrested on those charges, and an order of temporary\\n detention was entered, on May 2, 2013. He made his initial appearance the next\\n day and was released on bond.\\n After his arrest, the parties engaged in preindictment plea negotiations. To that\\n end, they filed a stipulation with the district court on May 17, 2013, agreeing to\\n adjourn White’s preliminary hearing and exclude the time between May 23, 2013,\\n and June 7, 2013, from White’s Speedy Trial Act clock. Plea negotiations were\\n not successful, and a grand jury indicted White on June 4, 2013.\\n\\nWhite, 679 F. App’x at 429. Including those days expressly excluded by the court, thirty-three\\ndays passed between White’s arrest and indictment.\\n\\n While he filed a bevy of motions before the district court, pertinent to our inquiry is only\\nWhite’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment because the government violated his speedy\\ntrial rights. Defendant’s motion simply announced that the government failed to indict him\\nwithin thirty days of his arrest in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., but\\nsubstantively argued only his rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment to\\nthe Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The district court held a hearing on the motion to\\ndismiss, denied it, a jury convicted White of multiple crimes, and the district court sentenced him\\nto 84 months in prison. We affirmed his conviction and sentence, rejecting his claim the district\\ncourt erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for violations of the Speedy Trial Act\\nand the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause. See White, 679 F. App’x at 430–33.\\nFollowing remand from the Supreme Court, we give a fresh look to this issue.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall\\nenjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Speedy Trial Act strengthens\\nthis constitutional mandate by establishing time limits for completing the various stages of a\\nfederal criminal prosecution. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174. Among these limits is an obligation that\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 4\\n\\n\\nthe government file an indictment within thirty days of arresting a defendant, excepting the time\\nspent on certain events that can be automatically excluded from that calculation and for other\\nevents if sufficient reasons are given by the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (h). We\\ntypically review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act and its factual\\nfindings for clear error. United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir. 2012). And\\n“[w]e review the district court’s decision to grant an ends-of-justice continuance under an abuse-\\nof-discretion standard.” United States v. Williams, 753 F.3d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n The issue on remand is whether the fourteen days spent on preindictment plea\\nnegotiations are excludable under that Act. White argues that our precedent holding that\\npreindictment plea negotiations are automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1) no longer\\npasses muster after the Supreme Court’s Bloate decision. The government counters that this\\ncourt should affirm the district court because (1) White forfeited the argument that Bloate\\nprecludes automatic exclusion of preindictment plea negotiations and cannot show plain error,\\nand (2) even if preindictment plea negotiations are not automatically excludable under\\n§ 3161(h)(1), that time was excludable as an ends-of-justice continuance pursuant to\\n§ 3161(h)(7). We address these arguments in turn.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We first hold that Bloate abrogated our prior decisions concluding that preindictment plea\\nnegotiations are automatically excludable under the Act.\\n\\n Section 3161(h)(1) provides for the automatic exclusion of “[a]ny period of delay\\nresulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to” eight\\nenumerated subcategories. One of those categories expressly excludes the time “resulting from\\nconsideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the defendant and\\nthe attorney for the Government.” § 3161(h)(1)(G). Based primarily on that subparagraph and\\nthe “including but not limited to” language, we have long held that time spent on preindictment\\nplea negotiations between the parties is automatically excludable. Dunbar, 357 F.3d at 593;\\nBowers, 834 F.2d at 609–10. And yet, in Bloate the Supreme Court held that the time a court\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 5\\n\\n\\ngrants to a party to prepare pretrial motions was not automatically excludable under\\n§ 3161(h)(1), notwithstanding § 3161(h)(1)(D)’s express exclusion of the time attributable to\\n“delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of\\nthe hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 559 U.S. at 203–07. The Court\\nheld that “because a specific provision . . . controls one of more general application,” id. at 207\\n(cleaned up), Congress’s express language in subparagraph (h)(1)(D) communicates the decision\\nto make automatically excludable the time for pretrial motions “only from the time a motion is\\nfiled through the hearing or disposition point specified in the subparagraph, and that other\\nperiods of pretrial motion-related delay are excludable only when accompanied by district court\\nfindings,” id. at 206.\\n\\n Given the above reasoning, the Solicitor General’s concession of error in our precedent,\\nand the Supreme Court’s order vacating our prior decision and remanding for reconsideration in\\nlight of that concession of error, we take this opportunity to revisit our prior precedent. Although\\nit is generally true that one panel cannot overrule the binding precedent of a prior panel, United\\nStates v. Ferguson, 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 2017), that rule yields when the prior panel’s\\nreasoning has been undercut or abrogated by a decision of the Supreme Court. See Ne. Ohio\\nCoal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686, 720–21 (6th Cir. 2016). And, as we have held,\\nsuch Supreme Court authority need not be exactly on point, so long as the legal reasoning is\\ndirectly applicable to the issue at hand. Id. at 721; see also Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 571 (6th\\nCir. 2008).\\n\\n Just as the Supreme Court held that the time a court grants to a party to prepare pretrial\\nmotions is not automatically excludable, the same is true for preindictment plea negotiations.\\nThe parties now agree on this point. Subparagraph (h)(1)(G) expressly excludes the time\\nattributable to “delay resulting from consideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to\\nbe entered into by the defendant and the attorney for the Government.” § 3161(h)(1)(G)\\n(emphasis added). This specific provision caps the time to be excluded as beginning at the\\nmoment the proposed plea is given to the court for its consideration. Plea negotiations, which\\nnecessarily occur before a proposed plea agreement comes to fruition, are therefore outside the\\nlimited universe contemplated by this subparagraph and may not be automatically excluded. See\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 6\\n\\n\\nUnited States v. Mathurin, 690 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2012) (“According to the Supreme\\nCourt, when the category of delay at issue is ‘governed by’ one of § 3161(h)(1)’s eight\\nsubparagraphs, a court must look only to that subparagraph to see if the delay is automatically\\nexcludable. In other words, the ‘including but not limited to’ clause of § 3161(h)(1) does not\\nmodify the contents of the enumerated subcategories themselves.” (citations omitted)). Thus,\\napplying Bloate’s reasoning to this analogous subparagraph, we now hold that (1) Bloate\\nabrogated Dunbar and Bowers, and (2) the time spent on preindictment plea negotiations is not\\nautomatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1) of the Speedy Trial Act.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n This conclusion, however, does not end our consideration § 3161(h)(1)’s automatic\\nexclusion in this appeal. The government, though accepting that Bloate abrogated our precedent,\\nnow argues that White has at a minimum forfeited the issue by not raising it before the district\\ncourt.1 I agree.\\n\\n Before the district court, White specifically challenged the excludability of the fifteen-\\nday delay for plea negotiations, and the validity of the stipulation. However, he now presents a\\nnew reason why the district court erroneously concluded that the plea-negotiation time was\\nexcludable, arguing for the first time on appeal that Bloate’s reasoning applied to remove\\npreindictment plea negotiations from the automatic excludability provisions of § 3161(h)(1).\\nThis is insufficient to preserve the issue for de novo review on appeal. See United States v.\\nHuntington Nat. Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 2009) (“To preserve the argument, then, the\\nlitigant not only must identify the issue but also must provide some minimal level of\\nargumentation in support of it.”); United States v. Seals, 450 F. App’x 769, 771 (10th Cir. 2011)\\n(Gorsuch, J.) (declining to review the defendant’s new Speedy Trial Act argument because “not\\n\\n 1\\n The government also argues waiver, which we need not address given our conclusion that White forfeited\\nthis issue. But even if we were so inclined to address the argument, it is unlikely that we could hold this issue\\ncompletely waived in this context, given the Supreme Court’s explicit direction that we “further consider[]” this\\nissue “in light of the confession of error by the Solicitor General.” White, 138 S. Ct. at 641; see Clark v. Chrysler\\nCorp., 436 F.3d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven though Chrysler initially waived its constitutional claim by failing\\nto raise it in the district court, our earlier decision and the Supreme Court’s GVR order indicates that the issue has\\nbeen preserved, and should be considered further on remand”); Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 168 (1996)\\n(“GVR orders are premised on matters that [the Supreme Court] . . . believe[s] the court below did not fully\\nconsider, and . . . require only further consideration . . . .” (emphasis added)).\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 7\\n\\n\\nonly must the defendant seek dismissal prior to trial, but he must do so for the reasons he seeks\\nto press on appeal”); see also United States v. Loughrin, 710 F.3d 1111, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013)\\n(citing Seals as “persuasive” and declining to consider the defendant’s challenge on appeal to an\\norder of continuance he did not challenge in the district court). And generally, an appellant’s\\nfailure to raise an argument in his appellate brief forfeits that issue on appeal. Radvansky v. City\\nof Olmstead Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 310–11 (6th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n Although the Supreme Court’s remand order requires this court to “further consider[]”\\nthe Speedy Trial Act issue, it does not similarly require us to engage in de novo review or to\\ngrant White relief. Cf. Bloate, 559 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[N]othing in the\\n[Supreme Court’s] opinion bars the [circuit court] from considering, on remand, the\\nGovernment’s argument that the indictment, and convictions under it, remain effective”). As\\nWhite himself acknowledges, forfeiture of a specific Speedy Trial Act claim of error can result in\\nplain-error review, see, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 395 F. App’x 177, 181 n.4, 184 n.7\\n(6th Cir. 2010), and we see no reason why the Supreme Court’s remand order would require\\notherwise. Thus, we are limited to plain-error consideration of the district court’s determination\\nthat the preindictment plea-negotiation period was automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1).\\nSee United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\\n52(b), which governs on appeal from criminal proceedings, provides a court of appeals a limited\\npower to correct errors that were forfeited because not timely raised in district court.”).\\n\\n Plain error is, as it should be, a difficult hurdle to clear. The burden is on White “to show\\n(1) error that (2) was plain, (3) affected [his] substantial rights, and (4) seriously affected the\\nfairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Ushery,\\n785 F.3d 210, 218 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). “An error is ‘plain’ when, at\\na minimum, it ‘is clear under current law.’” United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th\\nCir. 2015) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).\\n\\n We have noted that “[a] ‘circuit split precludes a finding of plain error,’ for the split is\\ngood evidence that the issue is ‘subject to reasonable dispute.’” Id. (quoting United States v.\\nWilliams, 53 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1995); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).\\nAnd we have also explained that “[a] lack of binding case law that answers the question\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 8\\n\\n\\npresented will also preclude our finding of plain error.” Id. Here, the district court could not\\nhave plainly erred because we are in a realm beyond either a circuit split or lack of binding\\ncaselaw—at the time of the district court’s decision, the binding precedent of this circuit held\\nthat the time for preindictment plea negotiations was automatically excludable. See Dunbar,\\n357 F.3d at 593; Bowers, 834 F.2d at 609–10.\\n\\n Although we now overrule those decisions in light of their abrogation by Bloate, the\\nanalysis supporting that conclusion shows that we had to extend Bloate’s reasoning to an\\nanalogous, but different, section of the Speedy Trial Act. See, supra, Section III.A. Our\\ndecision today shows that it took no great inferential leap to apply Bloate in this instance, but it\\nstill required both an extension of Bloate’s reasoning and the overruling of two of our published\\ndecisions. We cannot fault a district court for following our binding caselaw, as it was required\\nto do. Cf. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a\\nprecedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in\\nsome other line of decisions, the [lower courts] should follow the case which directly controls,\\nleaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”). Thus, White cannot\\nshow that the district court committed plain error in denying his motion to dismiss on Speedy\\nTrial Act grounds.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Finally, we turn to the government’s alternate argument—that the district court’s order\\ngranting the parties’ stipulation to exclude the preindictment-plea-negotiation period from\\nSpeedy Trial Act calculations satisfied the requirements for an ends-of-justice continuance under\\nthe Act. We agree and hold this to be adequate alternative grounds for affirmance.\\n\\n Regardless of whether a period of time is automatically excludable, the Speedy Trial Act\\nallows for a continuance whenever the judge finds “that the ends of justice served by taking such\\naction outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3161(h)(7)(A). This is a common ground for excluding time and the Supreme Court has noted\\nthat ends-of-justice continuances furnish “[m]uch of the Act’s flexibility.” Zedner v. United\\nStates, 547 U.S. 489, 498 (2006).\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 9\\n\\n\\n To exclude time under this exception, the court must consider certain factors, such as\\nwhether the failure to grant the continuance would “result in a miscarriage of justice,”\\n§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(i); whether due to the nature of the case (or other factors), the case is too\\ncomplex to reasonably expect adequate preparation within the Act’s time limits,\\n§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii); or whether a refusal to continue the case would deny the defendant\\n“reasonable time to obtain counsel,” or would unreasonably deny either party time for “effective\\npreparation,” § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). Notably, the list of enumerated factors is not exhaustive,\\n§ 3161(h)(7)(B) (“The factors, among others, which a judge shall consider . . . .” (emphasis\\nadded)), but preindictment plea negotiations are not expressly included. See § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)–\\n(iv).\\n\\n The Supreme Court has held that other types of delay that are not excludable under\\nsubsection (h)(1) are excludable under the more flexible framework of subsection (h)(7). See\\nBloate, 559 U.S. at 214 (holding that the time spent to prepare pretrial motions, while not\\nexcludable under subsection (h)(1), is excludable under subsection (h)(7)). And a number of our\\nsister circuits have concluded that time spent negotiating preindictment plea agreements can be\\nexcluded under subsection (h)(7)’s ends-of-justice exclusion. See Mathurin, 690 F.3d at 1241–\\n42; United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 1994) (Alito, J.); United States v. Williams,\\n12 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wells,\\n519 U.S. 482, 492 (1997). We agree, and hold that the time spent on preindictment plea\\nnegotiations may be excludable under subsection (h)(7).2 A conclusion to the contrary would\\npervert the Speedy Trial Act and ignore the central importance that the plea bargaining process\\nhas in our modern system of criminal justice—“[i]t is not some adjunct to the criminal justice\\nsystem; it is the criminal justice system.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“[C]riminal\\njustice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”).\\n\\n 2\\n This conclusion does not suffer from the same defect that our prior caselaw on automatic exclusions did—\\nthere is no subpart of § 3161(h)(7) that speaks narrowly to plea agreements or plea negotiations, so we are not\\nforeclosed from permitting plea negotiations as a reasonable basis for an ends-of-justice continuance. Cf. Bloate,\\n559 U.S. at 208–09 (holding that though “the list of categories [in § 3161(h)(1)] is illustrative rather than exhaustive\\nin no way undermines our conclusion that a delay that falls within the category of delay addressed by [a]\\nsubparagraph . . . is governed by the limits in that subparagraph”). Because none of the subparagraphs of\\n§ 3161(h)(7) address pleas at all, we are not similarly constrained here.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 10\\n\\n\\n Therefore, because the time spent on pretrial plea negotiations may be excludable under\\nsubsection (h)(7), we must determine whether the magistrate judge’s order provided sufficient\\nexplanation for the continuance, as required by the Act. Subsection 3161(h)(7) requires a district\\ncourt to “show its work,” before granting an ends-of-justice continuance:\\n\\n No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in\\n accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless\\n the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons\\n for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance\\n outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.\\n\\nId. “[T]he Act requires express findings” when granting an ends-of-justice continuance, and\\n“without on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion” pursuant to § 3161(h)(7). See\\nZedner, 547 U.S. at 506–07.3 The public interest in a speedy trial is also protected by the Act, so\\na defendant’s agreement to waive its protections cannot, by itself, justify an ends-of-justice\\ncontinuance. See id. at 500–01 (finding that a defendant cannot prospectively waive or “opt out\\nof the Act” meant to balance the defendant’s and the government’s interests against those of the\\npublic); see also Bloate, 559 U.S. at 211–12 (noting that a defendant may not opt out of the Act\\neven if he believes it would be in his interest because the Act also “vindicate[s] the public\\ninterest in the swift administration of justice”).\\n\\n Given its unique structure and appearance, it is important to discuss exactly what the\\ncombined stipulation and order granting the continuance said in this case. The first two pages of\\nthe court’s filed order was nothing more than the parties’ stipulation. There, the parties provided\\nthat “the period from May 23, 2013, to June 7, 2013, should be excluded from computing the\\ntime within which an information or indictment must be filed because the parties are engaged in\\nplea negotiations, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), and because the ends of justice served by such\\ncontinuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See\\n18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).” The third page of the court’s order began by noting that the “matter\\n[came] before the court on the stipulation of the parties” and provided, simply, that “the period\\nfrom May 23, 2013, to the new date of the preliminary hearing, June 7, 2013, should be excluded\\n\\n 3\\n The Zedner Court, interpreting an older version of the Act, refers to the pertinent section as § 3161(h)(8).\\nIn a 2008 amendment, this subsection was redesignated as (h)(7). Pub. L. No. 110–406 § 13(3) (2008). The text\\nand substance of the statutory subsection did not change.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 11\\n\\n\\nin calculating the time within which the defendant shall be indicted under the Speedy Trial Act.\\n18 U.S.C. § 3161.”\\n\\n This order sufficiently supports an ends-of-justice exclusion under § 3161(h)(7). First,\\nthe order clearly incorporates the parties’ two-page stipulation, both by attachment and reference.\\nIn the past we’ve upheld a continuance when the reasons for it are clear from the context or\\nrecord. United States v. Richardson, 681 F.3d 736, 741 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[G]iven the context,\\nthe record clearly establishes that a continuance serves the ends of justice.”). That the magistrate\\nattached the parties’ stipulation to its order only bolsters the conclusion that the parties’ proposed\\njustifications for the continuance found their way into the magistrate’s determination. Thus, we\\nagree with the district court and the government that the magistrate adopted the parties’\\nstipulation as part of its own reasoning in support of the roughly two-week continuance.\\n\\n Second, the contents of the order are sufficient to support the continuance. We have\\npreviously affirmed a district court’s ends-of-justice continuance when it simply held that “the\\nends of justice served outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy\\ntrial.” Anderson, 695 F.3d at 397. Given the context surrounding the issue in Anderson—the\\njudge was considering a motion to suppress for some, but not all, of the period for which the\\ncontinuance was granted—this court held that the defendant’s challenge to the district court’s\\nends-of-justice continuance was meritless. Id. at 397–98. In a similar vein, here, the\\nmagistrate’s order and the surrounding context support the continuance. As noted above, time\\nfor preindictment plea negotiations may be excluded under subsection (h)(7) as a valid ends-of-\\njustice exception to the Act’s strict deadlines. Given the relatively short continuance\\nrequested—only approximately two weeks’ time—the magistrate did not err in concluding that\\nthe parties’ efforts to come to a mutually agreeable plea agreement “outweigh[ed] the best\\ninterest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” § 3161(h)(7)(A). And the fact that the\\nmagistrate’s order did not explicitly say “ends of justice” poses no alternate barrier to this\\nconclusion. “An ends-of-justice continuance can be found even when a delay is not designated\\nas such by the court.” United States v. Stone, 461 F. App’x 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing\\nUnited States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1457 (10th Cir. 1996)). The Act does not require such\\n“magic words.” United States v. Breen, 243 F.3d 591, 597 (2d Cir. 2001).\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 12\\n\\n\\n Finally, despite White’s arguments to the contrary, this case is distinguishable from\\nZedner because it does not present the sort of wide-ranging and open-ended error that the Zedner\\nCourt sought to remedy. There, the Court was faced with an open-ended stipulation, which\\nprevented the defendant from raising any Speedy Trial Act issues “for all time.” Zedner,\\n547 U.S. at 494. This universal Speedy Trial Act waiver ultimately led to over seven years\\npassing from the defendant’s indictment to his trial. Id. at 496. Unlike the “waiver for all time”\\nand for all reasons in Zedner, id. at 493–94, here the magistrate accepted a mere two-week\\nexclusion of time for the express purpose of preindictment plea negotiations.\\n\\n Sure, an order more fully explaining the magistrate’s reasoning would have been well\\ntaken by this court, but we cannot forget that the Act does not require a novella of explanation.\\nSee Anderson, 695 F.3d at 397. The magistrate’s succinct and plain statement here, when\\ncombined with the parties’ attached stipulation, granted a short and definite continuance\\n(approximately two weeks), for a permissible reason (preindictment plea negotiations), after\\nexpressly considering the three-pronged interests relevant to the Act (the interests of defendant,\\nthe government, and the public). In short, we cannot, under these facts and given the\\nsurrounding context, find that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in granting an ends-of-\\njustice continuance. Williams, 753 F.3d at 635.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 13\\n\\n\\n _______________________________________________________\\n\\n CONCURRING IN PART AND IN THE JUDGMENT\\n _______________________________________________________\\n\\n RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. I concur in the judgment and concur with Judge\\nGriffin’s opinion, except as to part III.B. In my view, White did not forfeit his argument about\\n18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) because I fail to see when he was required to raise the argument.\\n\\n Consider the order of events. Fourteen days after White was arrested, his court-appointed\\nattorney signed the stipulation at issue in this case. The magistrate judge entered the order the\\nnext day. A few weeks later, White filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment due to a\\nSpeedy Trial Act violation and also moved for a new attorney. The court allowed White to hire a\\nnew attorney, denied the pro se motion without prejudice, and invited the new attorney to file a\\nnew motion. The new attorney did file a new motion under the Speedy Trial Act and the\\ngovernment filed a response. White declined to file a reply. The court held a hearing and\\nultimately denied the motion in a written order.\\n\\n Then consider the content of the briefs. The pro se motion simply pointed out\\n§ 3161(b)’s 30-day deadline, while making no reference to the stipulation or the order finding\\nexcludable delay. The subsequent attorney-drafted motion was more specific, but it observed\\nonly that 33 calendar days elapsed and concluded that there was necessarily a violation of\\n§ 3161(b). It too failed to mention the stipulation and order. The government finally brought up\\nthe order in its response brief, but with little elaboration. The government merely observed that\\n“the parties agreed, and the court ordered, that the period of delay from May 23, 2013, through\\nJune 4, 2013 (in fact June 7, 2013) was excludable delay under the [Speedy Trial Act].” It did\\nnot, however, identify how the Speedy Trial Act enabled this exclusion—whether through\\n§ 3161(h)(1), (h)(7), or some other means. In all, no brief mentioned automatic exclusion or\\n§ 3161(h)(1).\\n\\n Automatic exclusion never came up at the hearing either. The government never\\nmentioned it and argument about the Speedy Trial Act focused exclusively on the validity of the\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 14\\n\\n\\nstipulation. White’s new attorney recounted how the old attorney had signed the stipulation and\\nexplained:\\n\\n If that extension is effective to the Defendant, then that would be credited against\\n him; the issue would be moot, he would lose. His claim is that he did not agree to\\n that, had no knowledge of it, that that extension was taking place. . . . Our\\n argument is very simple: He didn’t agree to it.\\n\\nUltimately, the district court found that the stipulation was valid and that finding has never been\\nat issue on appeal.\\n\\n White did not raise the automatic-exclusion issue, but it was not his issue to raise. White\\ndid what the Speedy Trial Act requires: he provided proof of a violation (a list of the dates) and\\nmoved for dismissal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1). The government was then required to prove,\\nby a preponderance of the evidence, that sufficient time was excluded. See United States v.\\nJenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir. 1996). It did so by merely pointing to the magistrate judge’s\\norder. Notably, though, § 3161(h)(1)—when it does apply—does not require a judicial finding;\\nit is automatic. See Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 203 (2010); Henderson v. United\\nStates, 476 U.S. 321, 327, 332 (1986). If the government had argued that even without the order,\\nthe time was automatically excluded under § 3161(h)(1), it would have behooved White to raise\\na Bloate-based challenge in a reply brief—but the government did not raise that argument.\\nWhite therefore had no obligation to argue why the unmentioned provision did not apply to him.\\n\\n Ultimately, the waiver of the § 3161(h)(1) argument—whether by White or the\\ngovernment—is inconsequential. All now agree that under Bloate, § 3161(h)(1) does not apply\\nhere, which leaves us with the matter actually considered and relied upon by the district court:\\nexclusion under § 3161(h)(7). I agree that under the circumstances the magistrate judge’s order,\\nwhich was explicitly premised on the parties’ stipulation, satisfied the requirement of an on-the-\\nrecord finding for an ends-of-justice continuance. I therefore concur in the judgment.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 15\\n\\n\\n _______________________________________________________\\n\\n CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART\\n _______________________________________________________\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385769/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"CLAY, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"CLAY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. This case comes before\\nus pursuant to a grant, vacate, and remand order (“GVR”) from the Supreme Court. All that\\nremains at issue is whether the district court properly excluded a period of two weeks when\\ndetermining whether Defendant was indicted more than thirty days after his arrest, in violation of\\nthe Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). During that two-week period, Defendant was\\nengaged in plea negotiations with the government. The majority holds (1) that time spent in plea\\nnegotiations is not automatically excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), and (2) that\\nDefendant nevertheless is not entitled to relief either because he forfeited that argument, or,\\nalternatively, because his time spent in plea negotiations was properly excluded under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3161(h)(7). I concur in the majority’s first holding, set out in Section III.A. However,\\nI respectfully dissent from the majority’s second holding because the majority’s reasoning is\\ninconsistent with Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n The relevant facts are straightforward. On May 14, 2010, federal law enforcement agents\\nexecuted a search warrant at Defendant’s home and found drugs and a firearm. See United\\nStates v. White, 679 F. App’x 426, 428–30 (6th Cir. 2017). On April 29, 2013, the government\\nfiled a criminal complaint against Defendant in connection with that search. Id. And on May 2,\\n2013, Defendant was arrested in connection with that complaint. Id.\\n\\n After his arrest, Defendant engaged in plea negotiations with the government. Id. To\\nthat end, on May 16, 2013, Defendant and the government filed a joint stipulation with the\\ndistrict court, stating in part that:\\n\\n [T]he period from May 23, 2013 to June 7, 2013, should be excluded from\\n computing the time within which an information or indictment must be filed\\n because the parties are engaged in plea negotiations, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), and\\n because the ends of justice served by such continuance outweigh the interests of\\n the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 16\\n\\n\\n(RE 12, PageID # 30–31.) On May 17, 2013, a magistrate judge issued an order stating in part\\nthat:\\n\\n This matter coming before the court on the stipulation of the parties, it is\\n hereby . . . ORDERED that the period from May 23, 2013, to the new date of the\\n preliminary hearing, June 7, 2013 should be excluded in calculating the time\\n within which the defendant shall be indicted under the Speedy Trial Act.\\n 18 U.S.C. § 3161.\\n\\n(Id. at PageID # 32.) And on June 4, 2013, Defendant was indicted for various drug and firearm\\noffenses, of which he was later convicted. White, 679 F. App’x at 428–30.\\n\\n The relevant procedural history is less straightforward, but no less significant. As his\\ncase progressed, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the\\ngovernment had indicted him more than thirty days after his arrest, in violation of the Speedy\\nTrial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). In response, the government argued that Defendant had agreed\\nthat the time Defendant spent in plea negotiations would be excluded, and that taking that\\nexcluded time into account, Defendant was permissibly indicted twenty days after his arrest. The\\ndistrict court agreed with the government and denied Defendant’s motion, reasoning that the time\\nDefendant spent in plea negotiations was excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) because\\nDefendant and the government “agreed that the time period should be [excluded].” (RE 42,\\nPageID # 143–44.)\\n\\n Defendant appealed, arguing that neither the magistrate judge nor the district court had\\nmade the statutorily mandated findings necessary to exclude the time Defendant spent in plea\\nnegotiations under § 3161(h)(7). In response, the government argued both that the magistrate\\njudge and the district court had made the statutorily mandated findings, and, for the first time,\\nthat Defendant’s time spent in plea negotiations was also automatically excludable under\\n18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1). In reply, Defendant addressed the government’s new argument,\\ncountering that “section 3161(h)(1) only mentions the exclusion of time for the district court to\\nconsider a plea agreement. It says nothing about plea negotiations. . . [and] it is consistent with\\nthe purposes of the [Speedy Trial] Act to interpret the exclusion of delay due to ‘other\\nproceedings’ in section (h)(1) to apply only to other proceedings like those described in the\\nsection.” (Initial Reply Brief for Appellant at 2–3) (emphasis added). We agreed with the\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 17\\n\\n\\ngovernment’s new argument and affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion, reasoning that time\\nspent in plea negotiations is “automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1)” because “[a]lthough\\nthe plea bargaining process is not expressly specified in § 3161(h)(1)[’s] [subparagraphs], the\\nlisted proceedings are only examples . . . and are not intended to be exclusive.” White, 679 F.\\nApp’x at 430–31.\\n\\n Defendant filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. In his petition,\\nDefendant maintained that time spent in plea negotiations is not automatically excludable under\\n§ 3161(h)(1), and cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196\\n(2010). The government then abandoned the position it had taken before this Court on direct\\nappeal, and agreed with Defendant. Accordingly, the Supreme Court issued a GVR directing us\\nto further consider this case in light of the government’s confession of error. On remand,\\nDefendant continues to argue that time spent in plea negotiations is not automatically excludable\\nunder § 3161(h)(1) pursuant to Bloate. The government continues to agree, but now argues that\\nDefendant is nevertheless not entitled to relief because he waived and forfeited that argument, or,\\nalternatively, because his time spent in plea negotiations was properly excluded under\\n§ 3161(h)(7).\\n\\n II. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)1\\n\\n I concur in the majority’s holding that time spent in plea negotiations is not automatically\\nexcludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1). The Supreme Court’s decision in Bloate abrogated\\nthis Court’s contrary decisions in United States v. Dunbar, 357 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 2004) and\\nUnited States v. Bowers, 834 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1987).\\n\\n III. Forfeiture\\n\\n Judge Griffin, writing for himself, holds that Defendant is not entitled to relief because he\\nforfeited his § 3161(h)(1) argument by failing to make it before the district court or in his initial\\n\\n\\n 1\\n 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) provides, in relevant part: “The following periods of delay shall be excluded in\\ncomputing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed[:] . . . Any period of delay resulting\\nfrom other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to . . . delay resulting from consideration\\nby the court of a proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the defendant and the attorney for the Government.”\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 18\\n\\n\\nopening brief to this Court, and that as a result, we are limited to plain error review. For several\\nreasons, this holding is unpersuasive.\\n\\n First, it is the government that forfeited its § 3161(h)(1) argument by failing to make it\\nbefore the district court. This Court has held that once a defendant makes a “prima facie”\\nshowing of a violation—“a simple matter of producing a calendar” and showing that more than\\nthe allowed amount of time has passed, United States v. Sherer, 770 F.3d 407, 411 (6th Cir.\\n2014)—“the government bears the burden of proving sufficient excludable time by a\\npreponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Sobh, 571 F.3d 600, 602 (6th Cir. 2009); see\\nalso United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 717 (6th Cir. 2007). Yet, faced with Defendant’s\\nshowing that he was indicted more than thirty days after his arrest, the government never argued\\nthat the time Defendant spent in plea negotiations was automatically excludable under\\n§ 3161(h)(1). And the United States, like all litigants, forfeits arguments not raised before the\\ndistrict court. Cradler v. United States, 891 F.3d 659, 666 (6th Cir. 2018). I concur with Judge\\nGuy’s opinion on this point. See Con. Op. at 14 (“White did not raise the automatic-exclusion\\nissue, but it was not his issue to raise.”).\\n\\n Second, and relatedly, even if the government did not bear the burden of proving\\nsufficient excludable time, because neither party argued that the time Defendant spent in plea\\nnegotiations was automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1), the district court did not address\\nor analyze § 3161(h)(1) in its denial of Defendant’s motion. Rather, the district court addressed\\nand analyzed only § 3161(h)(7).2 Accordingly, when the government made its § 3161(h)(1)\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Though the district court’s written denial of Defendant’s motion cited neither § 3161(h)(1) nor\\n§ 3161(h)(7), the district court’s statements at the hearing on Defendant’s motion demonstrate that it denied\\nDefendant’s motion pursuant to § 3161(h)(7). The district court reasoned that the joint stipulation stated that “the\\nends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the interest of the public and the Defendant in a speedy trial,\\nwhich [are] the magic words . . . that we’re familiar with.” (RE 88, PageID # 624.) The district court also reasoned\\nthat “[t]he [magistrate judge’s] order was based in some measure on [the] stipulation, but [was] also based on the\\nindependent finding of a judicial officer, as it must be under the Speedy Trial Act. . . . The magistrate judge made a\\nfinding and I can rely on that. . . . So that’s my ruling on that.” (Id. at PageID # 631–33.) Such magic words and\\nindependent findings are relevant only to § 3161(h)(7). Compare United States v. Brown, 819 F.3d 800, 822 (6th\\nCir. 2016) (“[I]n order to grant an ends of justice continuance based on the considerations articulated under\\n[§ 3161(h)(7)], the district court was required to set forth on-the-record findings, orally or in writing, that the ends of\\njustice served by the continuance outweighed the interests of [the defendant] and society in a speedy trial.”) with\\nUnited States v. Robinson, 887 F.2d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The exclusion is automatic if it falls within one of\\nthe [§ 3161(h)(1)] exceptions.”).\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 19\\n\\n\\nargument on appeal, it was as an alternative basis for affirmance. And this Court has held that in\\nsuch situations, the appellant forfeits its argument in response only if it fails to make that\\nargument in its reply brief. See Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E., Inc., 694 F.3d 723, 729 (6th\\nCir. 2012) (“[The appellant] would not have been on notice that it needed to address in its initial\\nbrief an issue not even discussed by the district court. Consequently, there is no [forfeiture], and\\nwe find that [the appellant] properly responded [in its reply brief] to the alternative basis for\\naffirmance raised on appeal . . . .”); see also Golden Living Center-Frankfort v. Sec’y of Health\\n& Human Servs., 656 F.3d 421, 42 (6th Cir. 2011). In his initial reply brief, Defendant properly\\nresponded to the government’s argument, countering that “section 3161(h)(1) only mentions the\\nexclusion of time for the district court to consider a plea agreement. It says nothing about plea\\nnegotiations. . . [and] it is consistent with the purposes of the [Speedy Trial] Act to interpret the\\nexclusion of delay due to ‘other proceedings’ in section (h)(1) to apply only to other proceedings\\nlike those described in the section.” (Initial Reply Brief for Appellant at 2–3) (emphasis added).3\\n\\n Third, even if Defendant did forfeit his § 3161(h)(1) argument, that forfeiture was cured\\nby subsequent proceedings in this Court and the Supreme Court. This Court’s decision in Clark\\nv. Chrysler Corp., 436 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006) is instructive.4 In Clark, the defendant failed to\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Accord Maj. Op. at 5 (“Subparagraph (h)(1)(G) expressly excludes the time attributable to ‘delay resulting\\nfrom consideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the defendant and the attorney\\nfor the government.’ . . . Plea negotiations, which necessarily occur before a proposed plea agreement comes to\\nfruition, are therefore outside the limited universe contemplated by this subparagraph and may not be automatically\\nexcluded.”).\\n 4\\n Judge Griffin, writing for himself, acknowledges the persuasiveness of Clark, but erroneously limits its\\ndiscussion of Clark to its analysis of waiver. “The terms waiver and forfeiture—though often used interchangeably\\nby jurists and litigants—are not synonymous.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17\\nn.1 (2017). “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional\\nrelinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 57 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); see also Lucaj\\nv. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 852 F.3d 541, 547 n.4 (6th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, a defendant waives an\\nargument by, for instance, withdrawing a motion or objection, see United States v. Collins, 683 F.3d 697, 701 (6th\\nCir. 2012), stating that a proposition is not disputed, see United States v. Walker, 615 F.3d 728, 733 (6th Cir. 2010),\\nor stating that they are not pressing an argument. See United States v. Tasis, 696 F.3d 623, 625–26 (6th Cir. 2012).\\nIn contrast, a defendant forfeits an argument by, for instance, failing to make it before the district court, see Pittman\\nv. Experian Information Sols, Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 630 n.6 (6th Cir. 2018), failing to make it in its opening appellate\\nbrief, see Automated Sols. Corp. v. Paragon Data Sys., Inc., 756 F.3d 504, 521–22 (6th Cir. 2014), or identifying it\\nwithout pressing it. See Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 898 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2018). Significantly, in\\nClark, the defendant failed to raise the argument at issue in its post-trial motions before the district court. 436 F.3d\\nat 598. Thus, while this Court used the term “waiver,” it was more accurately referring to forfeiture, see Pittman,\\n901 F.3d at 630 n.6, and as a result, Clark is applicable to this forfeiture analysis.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 20\\n\\n\\nargue before the district court that the verdict against it was unconstitutionally excessive.\\n436 F.3d at 599. Accordingly, Chrysler forfeited that argument. Yet despite that forfeiture, this\\nCourt addressed the issue on appeal and held that the verdict was not unconstitutionally\\nexcessive. Id. Chrysler appealed, and the Supreme Court issued a GVR, instructing this Court to\\nreconsider the case in light of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).\\nId. On remand, this Court held that its addressing the issue on direct appeal—despite the\\nforfeiture—preserved the issue for Supreme Court review, and that the Supreme Court’s GVR—\\ndespite the forfeiture—preserved the issue for reconsideration. Id. at 599–600. “[E]ven though\\n[t]he defendant initially [forfeited] [its] challenge by failing to raise it in its post-trial motions\\nbefore the district court, subsequent proceedings in the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court\\npreserved the issue for review.” Id. at 598.\\n\\n The same is true in this case. Defendant allegedly forfeited his § 3161(h)(1) argument by\\nnot making it before the district court. Yet despite that alleged forfeiture, this Court addressed\\nthe issue on appeal and held that that time spent in plea negotiations is “automatically excludable\\nunder § 3161(h)(1)” because “[a]lthough the plea bargaining process is not expressly specified in\\n§ 3161(h)(1)[’s] [subparagraphs], the listed proceedings are only examples . . . and are not\\nintended to be exclusive.” White, 679 F. App’x at 430–31. Defendant appealed, and the\\nSupreme Court issued a GVR in light of the government’s confession of error. Thus, as in Clark,\\nsubsequent proceedings before this Court and before the Supreme Court cured Defendant’s\\nforfeiture. See Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996) (“[A] GVR order promotes\\nfairness and respects the dignity of the Court of Appeals by enabling it to consider potentially\\nrelevant decisions and arguments that were not previously before it.”).5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Judge Griffin’s holding on this issue eliminated any need for him to address waiver. However, because I\\ndisagree with that holding, I address waiver as well. The government argues that Defendant waived his § 3161(h)(1)\\nargument pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a), which provides that “[f]ailure of the defendant to move for dismissal\\nprior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under\\nthis section.” This argument is unpersuasive, as this Court has held that § 3162(a) is satisfied “so long as the\\ndefendant brings to the court’s attention his belief that his [Speedy Trial Act] rights have been violated.” Brown,\\n819 F.3d at 823. In this case, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the government had\\nindicted him more than thirty days after his arrest, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). Thus,\\nDefendant did not waive his § 3161(h)(1) argument.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 21\\n\\n\\n IV. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)6\\n\\n The majority holds that the magistrate judge and the district court made the statutorily\\nmandated findings necessary to exclude Defendant’s time spent in plea negotiations under\\n18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7). This holding is also unpersuasive.\\n\\n By its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) permits a court to exclude a period of time by\\ngranting an ends-of-justice continuance only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis\\nof his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of\\nthe public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” The provision explains that “no such period of\\ndelay resulting from a continuance granted by the court . . . shall be excludable under this\\nsubsection unless the court sets forth in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its\\nreasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh\\nthe best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id. Section 3161(h)(7)(B)\\nthen lists “[t]he factors, among others, which a judge shall consider” in determining whether to\\ngrant an ends-of-justice continuance.\\n\\n Thus, § 3161(h)(7) “is explicit.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 507 (2006).\\n“[W]ithout the on-the-record-findings, there can be no exclusion.” Id. “[I]f a judge fails to make\\nthe requisite findings regarding the need for the ends-of-justice continuance, the delay resulting\\nfrom the continuance must be counted, and if as a result the trial does not begin on time, the\\nindictment or information must be dismissed.” Id. at 508. In this way, § 3161(h)(7) “gives the\\ndistrict court discretion—within limits and subject to specific procedures—to accommodate\\nlimited delays for case-specific needs.” Id. at 499. As the Supreme Court has explained:\\n\\n The exclusion of delay resulting from an ends-of-justice continuance is the most\\n open-ended type of exclusion recognized under the [Speedy Trial] Act and, in\\n allowing district courts to grant such continuances, Congress clearly meant to give\\n district judges a measure of flexibility in accommodating unusual, complex, and\\n difficult cases. But it is equally clear that Congress, knowing that the many sound\\n\\n 6\\n 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) provides, in relevant part: “The following periods of delay shall be excluded in\\ncomputing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed[:] . . . Any period of delay resulting\\nfrom a continuance granted by the judge . . . if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that\\nthe ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy\\ntrial.”\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 22\\n\\n\\n grounds for granting ends-of-justice continuances could not be rigidly structured,\\n saw a danger that such continuances could get out of hand and subvert the Act’s\\n detailed scheme. The strategy of [§ 3161(h)(7)], then, is to counteract substantive\\n openendedness with procedural strictness. The provision demands on-the-record\\n findings and specifies in some detail certain factors that a judge must consider in\\n making those findings.\\n\\nId. at 508–09.\\n\\n “[T]he Sixth Circuit has placed great emphasis on the need for a district court to comply\\nwith this statutory requirement.” Greenup v. United States, 401 F.3d 758, 764 n.3 (6th Cir.\\n2005); see, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 544 F.3d 656, 665 (6th Cir. 2008) (“We believe that in\\norder to assure that the district court adequately considers whether the ends-of-justice outweigh\\nthe public’s and defendant’s interest in a speedy trial, the district court should also generally hold\\nan adversarial hearing in which both sides participate.”). “This Court will not countenance\\nmaneuvers aimed at merely paying lip service to the Speedy Trial Act’s requirements.” Brown,\\n819 F.3d at 815.\\n\\n In this case, the magistrate judge issued an order stating only that “[t]his matter coming\\nbefore the court on the stipulation of the parties, it is hereby . . . ORDERED that the period from\\nMay 23, 2013, to the new date of the preliminary hearing, June 7, 2013 should be excluded in\\ncalculating the time within which the defendant shall be indicted under the Speedy Trial Act.\\n18 U.S.C. § 3161.” (RE 12, Page ID # 32.) The order did not mention the ends of justice or the\\ninterest of the defendant and the public in a speedy trial, let alone any reasons for finding that\\none outweighed the other. Accordingly, the magistrate judge plainly did not comply with\\n§ 3161(h)(7), and that should be the end of the matter. See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 507.\\n\\n However, the majority attempts to circumvent this conclusion by relying on the joint\\nstipulation, which the magistrate judge attached to its order. According to the majority, the order\\n“incorporates” the joint stipulation, and thereby complies with § 3161(h)(7). Maj. Op. at 11.\\nThis holding is starkly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s and this Court’s emphasis on the\\nimportance of complying with § 3161(h)(7)’s procedural strictness. Zedner, 547 U.S. at 508–09;\\nBrown, 819 F.3d at 822.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 23\\n\\n\\n As an initial matter, it is doubtful that the order actually incorporated the joint stipulation,\\nas the order lacks any “explicit language of incorporation.” See Bender v. Newell Window\\nFurnishings, Inc., 681 F.3d 253, 264 (6th Cir. 2012). Moreover, the mere agreement of the\\nparties that the ends of justice outweigh the interest of the defendant and the public in a speedy\\ntrial cannot substitute for the district court’s own findings to that effect. See United States v.\\nAmmar, 842 F.3d 1203, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The best interests of the parties—and even\\nthose of the court—cannot alone justify deviation from the [Speedy Trial] Act’s requirements,\\nabsent the determination that those interests outweigh the public interest.”); Parisi v. United\\nStates, 529 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The ends-of-justice determination is . . . entrusted to\\nthe court, not the parties, and the parties cannot stipulate to its satisfaction as a substitute for the\\ndistrict court’s finding to that effect.”). Congress unequivocally imposed the procedural\\nrequirements of § 3161(h)(7) on the district court. See United States v. Richmond, 735 F.2d 208,\\n216 (6th Cir. 1984).7\\n\\n Regardless, even if the magistrate judge “adopted the parties’ stipulation as part of its\\nown reasoning,” the joint stipulation stated only that the time Defendant spent in plea\\nnegotiations should be excluded “because the ends of justice served by such continuance\\noutweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Maj. Op. at 11. Such a\\nconclusory statement does not comply with § 3161(h)(7). See United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d\\n1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2009) (“A record consisting of only short, conclusory statements lacking\\nin detail is insufficient [to comply with § 3161(h)(7)].”); United States v. Bryant, 523 F.3d 349,\\n361 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The passing reference to the ‘interest of justice’ made by the trial\\njudge . . . does not indicate that the judge seriously considered the [§ 3161(h)(7)(B) factors].\\nZedner makes clear that trial judges are obligated to seriously weigh the benefits of granting the\\ncontinuance against the strong public and private interests served by speedy trials. . . .”). Rather,\\nit is a “maneuver[] aimed at merely paying lip service to the Speedy Trial Act’s requirements.”\\nBrown, 819 F.3d at 815.\\n\\n For all of the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part.\\n\\n 7\\n Accordingly, this case is distinguishable from those relied upon by the majority. In none of those cases\\ndid the district court rely solely on the mere agreement of, or findings made by, the parties.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385769/\", \"author_raw\": \"CLAY, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRIFFIN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"CLAY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRIFFIN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608516/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmie Eugene WHITE, II, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0070p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n > No. 16-1009\n v. │\n │\n │\n JIMMIE EUGENE WHITE, II, │\n Defendant-Appellant. │\n ┘\n\n On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.\n United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.\n No. 2:13-cr-20423—David M. Lawson, District Judge.\n\n Reargued: October 18, 2018\n\n Decided and Filed: April 10, 2019\n\n Before: GUY, CLAY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nREARGUED: Christian D. Sheehan, VINSON & ELKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., for\nAppellant. Andrew Goetz, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for\nAppellee. ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF: Christian D. Sheehan, Jeremy C. Marwell,\nVINSON & ELKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., Kenneth P. Tableman, KENNETH P.\nTABLEMAN, P.C., Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Andrew Goetz, UNITED STATES\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.\n\n GRIFFIN, J. delivered the opinion of the court except with regard to the issue discussed\nin Section III.B, and delivered a separate opinion with regard to the issue discussed in Section\nIII.B. GUY, J. (pp. 13–14), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the majority opinion and\nin the judgment. CLAY, J. (pp. 15–23), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the majority\nopinion in part and dissenting in part.\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 2\n\n\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.\n\n Following our circuit’s binding precedent, we previously held in this case that\npreindictment plea negotiations are “period[s] of delay resulting from other proceedings\nconcerning the defendant” that are automatically excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) of the\nSpeedy Trial Act. United States v. White, 679 F. App’x 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing United\nStates v. Dunbar, 357 F.3d 582, 593 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded on other grounds,\n543 U.S. 1099 (2005); United States v. Bowers, 834 F.2d 607, 609–10 (6th Cir. 1987) (per\ncuriam)). Defendant challenged this precedent for the first time in his petition for a writ of\ncertiorari as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Bloate v. United\nStates, 559 U.S. 196 (2010). Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22–23, White v. United States,\n138 S. Ct. 641 (2018) (No. 17-270). The government then changed horses in midstream,\nconceding—also for the first time before the Supreme Court—that our circuit precedent was\nincorrect and inconsistent with Bloate, and that the roughly two-week continuance to engage in\npreindictment plea negotiations here did not qualify for automatic exclusion under § 3161(h)(1).\nResponse to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–11, White v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 641 (2018)\n(No. 17-270). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the\ncase back to us “for further consideration in light of the confession of error by the Solicitor\nGeneral.” White v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 641, 641 (2018).\n\n On remand, we now hold that Bloate abrogated Dunbar and Bowers. Nevertheless, we\ndeny defendant relief for two independent reasons. First, he cannot overcome plain-error review\nof his Bloate argument. Second, and alternatively, the time for preindictment plea negotiations\nwas properly excluded as an ends-of-justice continuance under § 3161(h)(7) of the Speedy Trial\nAct. Therefore, we again affirm the judgment of the district court.\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 3\n\n\n I.\n\n Our prior opinion sets forth the facts pertinent to this remand:\n\n On April 29, 2013, the government filed a complaint against White charging him\n with drug distribution and firearm crimes related to the May 14, 2010, search and\n seizure. White was arrested on those charges, and an order of temporary\n detention was entered, on May 2, 2013. He made his initial appearance the next\n day and was released on bond.\n After his arrest, the parties engaged in preindictment plea negotiations. To that\n end, they filed a stipulation with the district court on May 17, 2013, agreeing to\n adjourn White’s preliminary hearing and exclude the time between May 23, 2013,\n and June 7, 2013, from White’s Speedy Trial Act clock. Plea negotiations were\n not successful, and a grand jury indicted White on June 4, 2013.\n\nWhite, 679 F. App’x at 429. Including those days expressly excluded by the court, thirty-three\ndays passed between White’s arrest and indictment.\n\n While he filed a bevy of motions before the district court, pertinent to our inquiry is only\nWhite’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment because the government violated his speedy\ntrial rights. Defendant’s motion simply announced that the government failed to indict him\nwithin thirty days of his arrest in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., but\nsubstantively argued only his rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment to\nthe Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The district court held a hearing on the motion to\ndismiss, denied it, a jury convicted White of multiple crimes, and the district court sentenced him\nto 84 months in prison. We affirmed his conviction and sentence, rejecting his claim the district\ncourt erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for violations of the Speedy Trial Act\nand the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause. See White, 679 F. App’x at 430–33.\nFollowing remand from the Supreme Court, we give a fresh look to this issue.\n\n II.\n\n The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall\nenjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Speedy Trial Act strengthens\nthis constitutional mandate by establishing time limits for completing the various stages of a\nfederal criminal prosecution. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174. Among these limits is an obligation that\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 4\n\n\nthe government file an indictment within thirty days of arresting a defendant, excepting the time\nspent on certain events that can be automatically excluded from that calculation and for other\nevents if sufficient reasons are given by the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (h). We\ntypically review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act and its factual\nfindings for clear error. United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir. 2012). And\n“[w]e review the district court’s decision to grant an ends-of-justice continuance under an abuse-\nof-discretion standard.” United States v. Williams, 753 F.3d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 2014).\n\n The issue on remand is whether the fourteen days spent on preindictment plea\nnegotiations are excludable under that Act. White argues that our precedent holding that\npreindictment plea negotiations are automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1) no longer\npasses muster after the Supreme Court’s Bloate decision. The government counters that this\ncourt should affirm the district court because (1) White forfeited the argument that Bloate\nprecludes automatic exclusion of preindictment plea negotiations and cannot show plain error,\nand (2) even if preindictment plea negotiations are not automatically excludable under\n§ 3161(h)(1), that time was excludable as an ends-of-justice continuance pursuant to\n§ 3161(h)(7). We address these arguments in turn.\n\n III.\n\n A.\n\n We first hold that Bloate abrogated our prior decisions concluding that preindictment plea\nnegotiations are automatically excludable under the Act.\n\n Section 3161(h)(1) provides for the automatic exclusion of “[a]ny period of delay\nresulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to” eight\nenumerated subcategories. One of those categories expressly excludes the time “resulting from\nconsideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the defendant and\nthe attorney for the Government.” § 3161(h)(1)(G). Based primarily on that subparagraph and\nthe “including but not limited to” language, we have long held that time spent on preindictment\nplea negotiations between the parties is automatically excludable. Dunbar, 357 F.3d at 593;\nBowers, 834 F.2d at 609–10. And yet, in Bloate the Supreme Court held that the time a court\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 5\n\n\ngrants to a party to prepare pretrial motions was not automatically excludable under\n§ 3161(h)(1), notwithstanding § 3161(h)(1)(D)’s express exclusion of the time attributable to\n“delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of\nthe hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 559 U.S. at 203–07. The Court\nheld that “because a specific provision . . . controls one of more general application,” id. at 207\n(cleaned up), Congress’s express language in subparagraph (h)(1)(D) communicates the decision\nto make automatically excludable the time for pretrial motions “only from the time a motion is\nfiled through the hearing or disposition point specified in the subparagraph, and that other\nperiods of pretrial motion-related delay are excludable only when accompanied by district court\nfindings,” id. at 206.\n\n Given the above reasoning, the Solicitor General’s concession of error in our precedent,\nand the Supreme Court’s order vacating our prior decision and remanding for reconsideration in\nlight of that concession of error, we take this opportunity to revisit our prior precedent. Although\nit is generally true that one panel cannot overrule the binding precedent of a prior panel, United\nStates v. Ferguson, 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 2017), that rule yields when the prior panel’s\nreasoning has been undercut or abrogated by a decision of the Supreme Court. See Ne. Ohio\nCoal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686, 720–21 (6th Cir. 2016). And, as we have held,\nsuch Supreme Court authority need not be exactly on point, so long as the legal reasoning is\ndirectly applicable to the issue at hand. Id. at 721; see also Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 571 (6th\nCir. 2008).\n\n Just as the Supreme Court held that the time a court grants to a party to prepare pretrial\nmotions is not automatically excludable, the same is true for preindictment plea negotiations.\nThe parties now agree on this point. Subparagraph (h)(1)(G) expressly excludes the time\nattributable to “delay resulting from consideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to\nbe entered into by the defendant and the attorney for the Government.” § 3161(h)(1)(G)\n(emphasis added). This specific provision caps the time to be excluded as beginning at the\nmoment the proposed plea is given to the court for its consideration. Plea negotiations, which\nnecessarily occur before a proposed plea agreement comes to fruition, are therefore outside the\nlimited universe contemplated by this subparagraph and may not be automatically excluded. See\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 6\n\n\nUnited States v. Mathurin, 690 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2012) (“According to the Supreme\nCourt, when the category of delay at issue is ‘governed by’ one of § 3161(h)(1)’s eight\nsubparagraphs, a court must look only to that subparagraph to see if the delay is automatically\nexcludable. In other words, the ‘including but not limited to’ clause of § 3161(h)(1) does not\nmodify the contents of the enumerated subcategories themselves.” (citations omitted)). Thus,\napplying Bloate’s reasoning to this analogous subparagraph, we now hold that (1) Bloate\nabrogated Dunbar and Bowers, and (2) the time spent on preindictment plea negotiations is not\nautomatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1) of the Speedy Trial Act.\n\n B.\n\n This conclusion, however, does not end our consideration § 3161(h)(1)’s automatic\nexclusion in this appeal. The government, though accepting that Bloate abrogated our precedent,\nnow argues that White has at a minimum forfeited the issue by not raising it before the district\ncourt.1 I agree.\n\n Before the district court, White specifically challenged the excludability of the fifteen-\nday delay for plea negotiations, and the validity of the stipulation. However, he now presents a\nnew reason why the district court erroneously concluded that the plea-negotiation time was\nexcludable, arguing for the first time on appeal that Bloate’s reasoning applied to remove\npreindictment plea negotiations from the automatic excludability provisions of § 3161(h)(1).\nThis is insufficient to preserve the issue for de novo review on appeal. See United States v.\nHuntington Nat. Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 2009) (“To preserve the argument, then, the\nlitigant not only must identify the issue but also must provide some minimal level of\nargumentation in support of it.”); United States v. Seals, 450 F. App’x 769, 771 (10th Cir. 2011)\n(Gorsuch, J.) (declining to review the defendant’s new Speedy Trial Act argument because “not\n\n 1\n The government also argues waiver, which we need not address given our conclusion that White forfeited\nthis issue. But even if we were so inclined to address the argument, it is unlikely that we could hold this issue\ncompletely waived in this context, given the Supreme Court’s explicit direction that we “further consider[]” this\nissue “in light of the confession of error by the Solicitor General.” White, 138 S. Ct. at 641; see Clark v. Chrysler\nCorp., 436 F.3d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven though Chrysler initially waived its constitutional claim by failing\nto raise it in the district court, our earlier decision and the Supreme Court’s GVR order indicates that the issue has\nbeen preserved, and should be considered further on remand”); Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 168 (1996)\n(“GVR orders are premised on matters that [the Supreme Court] . . . believe[s] the court below did not fully\nconsider, and . . . require only further consideration . . . .” (emphasis added)).\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 7\n\n\nonly must the defendant seek dismissal prior to trial, but he must do so for the reasons he seeks\nto press on appeal”); see also United States v. Loughrin, 710 F.3d 1111, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013)\n(citing Seals as “persuasive” and declining to consider the defendant’s challenge on appeal to an\norder of continuance he did not challenge in the district court). And generally, an appellant’s\nfailure to raise an argument in his appellate brief forfeits that issue on appeal. Radvansky v. City\nof Olmstead Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 310–11 (6th Cir. 2005).\n\n Although the Supreme Court’s remand order requires this court to “further consider[]”\nthe Speedy Trial Act issue, it does not similarly require us to engage in de novo review or to\ngrant White relief. Cf. Bloate, 559 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[N]othing in the\n[Supreme Court’s] opinion bars the [circuit court] from considering, on remand, the\nGovernment’s argument that the indictment, and convictions under it, remain effective”). As\nWhite himself acknowledges, forfeiture of a specific Speedy Trial Act claim of error can result in\nplain-error review, see, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 395 F. App’x 177, 181 n.4, 184 n.7\n(6th Cir. 2010), and we see no reason why the Supreme Court’s remand order would require\notherwise. Thus, we are limited to plain-error consideration of the district court’s determination\nthat the preindictment plea-negotiation period was automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1).\nSee United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\n52(b), which governs on appeal from criminal proceedings, provides a court of appeals a limited\npower to correct errors that were forfeited because not timely raised in district court.”).\n\n Plain error is, as it should be, a difficult hurdle to clear. The burden is on White “to show\n(1) error that (2) was plain, (3) affected [his] substantial rights, and (4) seriously affected the\nfairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Ushery,\n785 F.3d 210, 218 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). “An error is ‘plain’ when, at\na minimum, it ‘is clear under current law.’” United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th\nCir. 2015) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).\n\n We have noted that “[a] ‘circuit split precludes a finding of plain error,’ for the split is\ngood evidence that the issue is ‘subject to reasonable dispute.’” Id. (quoting United States v.\nWilliams, 53 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1995); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).\nAnd we have also explained that “[a] lack of binding case law that answers the question\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 8\n\n\npresented will also preclude our finding of plain error.” Id. Here, the district court could not\nhave plainly erred because we are in a realm beyond either a circuit split or lack of binding\ncaselaw—at the time of the district court’s decision, the binding precedent of this circuit held\nthat the time for preindictment plea negotiations was automatically excludable. See Dunbar,\n357 F.3d at 593; Bowers, 834 F.2d at 609–10.\n\n Although we now overrule those decisions in light of their abrogation by Bloate, the\nanalysis supporting that conclusion shows that we had to extend Bloate’s reasoning to an\nanalogous, but different, section of the Speedy Trial Act. See, supra, Section III.A. Our\ndecision today shows that it took no great inferential leap to apply Bloate in this instance, but it\nstill required both an extension of Bloate’s reasoning and the overruling of two of our published\ndecisions. We cannot fault a district court for following our binding caselaw, as it was required\nto do. Cf. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a\nprecedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in\nsome other line of decisions, the [lower courts] should follow the case which directly controls,\nleaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”). Thus, White cannot\nshow that the district court committed plain error in denying his motion to dismiss on Speedy\nTrial Act grounds.\n\n IV.\n\n Finally, we turn to the government’s alternate argument—that the district court’s order\ngranting the parties’ stipulation to exclude the preindictment-plea-negotiation period from\nSpeedy Trial Act calculations satisfied the requirements for an ends-of-justice continuance under\nthe Act. We agree and hold this to be adequate alternative grounds for affirmance.\n\n Regardless of whether a period of time is automatically excludable, the Speedy Trial Act\nallows for a continuance whenever the judge finds “that the ends of justice served by taking such\naction outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3161(h)(7)(A). This is a common ground for excluding time and the Supreme Court has noted\nthat ends-of-justice continuances furnish “[m]uch of the Act’s flexibility.” Zedner v. United\nStates, 547 U.S. 489, 498 (2006).\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 9\n\n\n To exclude time under this exception, the court must consider certain factors, such as\nwhether the failure to grant the continuance would “result in a miscarriage of justice,”\n§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(i); whether due to the nature of the case (or other factors), the case is too\ncomplex to reasonably expect adequate preparation within the Act’s time limits,\n§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii); or whether a refusal to continue the case would deny the defendant\n“reasonable time to obtain counsel,” or would unreasonably deny either party time for “effective\npreparation,” § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). Notably, the list of enumerated factors is not exhaustive,\n§ 3161(h)(7)(B) (“The factors, among others, which a judge shall consider . . . .” (emphasis\nadded)), but preindictment plea negotiations are not expressly included. See § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)–\n(iv).\n\n The Supreme Court has held that other types of delay that are not excludable under\nsubsection (h)(1) are excludable under the more flexible framework of subsection (h)(7). See\nBloate, 559 U.S. at 214 (holding that the time spent to prepare pretrial motions, while not\nexcludable under subsection (h)(1), is excludable under subsection (h)(7)). And a number of our\nsister circuits have concluded that time spent negotiating preindictment plea agreements can be\nexcluded under subsection (h)(7)’s ends-of-justice exclusion. See Mathurin, 690 F.3d at 1241–\n42; United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 1994) (Alito, J.); United States v. Williams,\n12 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wells,\n519 U.S. 482, 492 (1997). We agree, and hold that the time spent on preindictment plea\nnegotiations may be excludable under subsection (h)(7).2 A conclusion to the contrary would\npervert the Speedy Trial Act and ignore the central importance that the plea bargaining process\nhas in our modern system of criminal justice—“[i]t is not some adjunct to the criminal justice\nsystem; it is the criminal justice system.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (internal\nquotation marks omitted); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“[C]riminal\njustice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”).\n\n 2\n This conclusion does not suffer from the same defect that our prior caselaw on automatic exclusions did—\nthere is no subpart of § 3161(h)(7) that speaks narrowly to plea agreements or plea negotiations, so we are not\nforeclosed from permitting plea negotiations as a reasonable basis for an ends-of-justice continuance. Cf. Bloate,\n559 U.S. at 208–09 (holding that though “the list of categories [in § 3161(h)(1)] is illustrative rather than exhaustive\nin no way undermines our conclusion that a delay that falls within the category of delay addressed by [a]\nsubparagraph . . . is governed by the limits in that subparagraph”). Because none of the subparagraphs of\n§ 3161(h)(7) address pleas at all, we are not similarly constrained here.\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 10\n\n\n Therefore, because the time spent on pretrial plea negotiations may be excludable under\nsubsection (h)(7), we must determine whether the magistrate judge’s order provided sufficient\nexplanation for the continuance, as required by the Act. Subsection 3161(h)(7) requires a district\ncourt to “show its work,” before granting an ends-of-justice continuance:\n\n No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in\n accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless\n the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons\n for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance\n outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.\n\nId. “[T]he Act requires express findings” when granting an ends-of-justice continuance, and\n“without on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion” pursuant to § 3161(h)(7). See\nZedner, 547 U.S. at 506–07.3 The public interest in a speedy trial is also protected by the Act, so\na defendant’s agreement to waive its protections cannot, by itself, justify an ends-of-justice\ncontinuance. See id. at 500–01 (finding that a defendant cannot prospectively waive or “opt out\nof the Act” meant to balance the defendant’s and the government’s interests against those of the\npublic); see also Bloate, 559 U.S. at 211–12 (noting that a defendant may not opt out of the Act\neven if he believes it would be in his interest because the Act also “vindicate[s] the public\ninterest in the swift administration of justice”).\n\n Given its unique structure and appearance, it is important to discuss exactly what the\ncombined stipulation and order granting the continuance said in this case. The first two pages of\nthe court’s filed order was nothing more than the parties’ stipulation. There, the parties provided\nthat “the period from May 23, 2013, to June 7, 2013, should be excluded from computing the\ntime within which an information or indictment must be filed because the parties are engaged in\nplea negotiations, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), and because the ends of justice served by such\ncontinuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See\n18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).” The third page of the court’s order began by noting that the “matter\n[came] before the court on the stipulation of the parties” and provided, simply, that “the period\nfrom May 23, 2013, to the new date of the preliminary hearing, June 7, 2013, should be excluded\n\n 3\n The Zedner Court, interpreting an older version of the Act, refers to the pertinent section as § 3161(h)(8).\nIn a 2008 amendment, this subsection was redesignated as (h)(7). Pub. L. No. 110–406 § 13(3) (2008). The text\nand substance of the statutory subsection did not change.\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 11\n\n\nin calculating the time within which the defendant shall be indicted under the Speedy Trial Act.\n18 U.S.C. § 3161.”\n\n This order sufficiently supports an ends-of-justice exclusion under § 3161(h)(7). First,\nthe order clearly incorporates the parties’ two-page stipulation, both by attachment and reference.\nIn the past we’ve upheld a continuance when the reasons for it are clear from the context or\nrecord. United States v. Richardson, 681 F.3d 736, 741 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[G]iven the context,\nthe record clearly establishes that a continuance serves the ends of justice.”). That the magistrate\nattached the parties’ stipulation to its order only bolsters the conclusion that the parties’ proposed\njustifications for the continuance found their way into the magistrate’s determination. Thus, we\nagree with the district court and the government that the magistrate adopted the parties’\nstipulation as part of its own reasoning in support of the roughly two-week continuance.\n\n Second, the contents of the order are sufficient to support the continuance. We have\npreviously affirmed a district court’s ends-of-justice continuance when it simply held that “the\nends of justice served outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy\ntrial.” Anderson, 695 F.3d at 397. Given the context surrounding the issue in Anderson—the\njudge was considering a motion to suppress for some, but not all, of the period for which the\ncontinuance was granted—this court held that the defendant’s challenge to the district court’s\nends-of-justice continuance was meritless. Id. at 397–98. In a similar vein, here, the\nmagistrate’s order and the surrounding context support the continuance. As noted above, time\nfor preindictment plea negotiations may be excluded under subsection (h)(7) as a valid ends-of-\njustice exception to the Act’s strict deadlines. Given the relatively short continuance\nrequested—only approximately two weeks’ time—the magistrate did not err in concluding that\nthe parties’ efforts to come to a mutually agreeable plea agreement “outweigh[ed] the best\ninterest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” § 3161(h)(7)(A). And the fact that the\nmagistrate’s order did not explicitly say “ends of justice” poses no alternate barrier to this\nconclusion. “An ends-of-justice continuance can be found even when a delay is not designated\nas such by the court.” United States v. Stone, 461 F. App’x 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing\nUnited States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1457 (10th Cir. 1996)). The Act does not require such\n“magic words.” United States v. Breen, 243 F.3d 591, 597 (2d Cir. 2001).\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 12\n\n\n Finally, despite White’s arguments to the contrary, this case is distinguishable from\nZedner because it does not present the sort of wide-ranging and open-ended error that the Zedner\nCourt sought to remedy. There, the Court was faced with an open-ended stipulation, which\nprevented the defendant from raising any Speedy Trial Act issues “for all time.” Zedner,\n547 U.S. at 494. This universal Speedy Trial Act waiver ultimately led to over seven years\npassing from the defendant’s indictment to his trial. Id. at 496. Unlike the “waiver for all time”\nand for all reasons in Zedner, id. at 493–94, here the magistrate accepted a mere two-week\nexclusion of time for the express purpose of preindictment plea negotiations.\n\n Sure, an order more fully explaining the magistrate’s reasoning would have been well\ntaken by this court, but we cannot forget that the Act does not require a novella of explanation.\nSee Anderson, 695 F.3d at 397. The magistrate’s succinct and plain statement here, when\ncombined with the parties’ attached stipulation, granted a short and definite continuance\n(approximately two weeks), for a permissible reason (preindictment plea negotiations), after\nexpressly considering the three-pronged interests relevant to the Act (the interests of defendant,\nthe government, and the public). In short, we cannot, under these facts and given the\nsurrounding context, find that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in granting an ends-of-\njustice continuance. Williams, 753 F.3d at 635.\n\n V.\n\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 13\n\n\n _______________________________________________________\n\n CONCURRING IN PART AND IN THE JUDGMENT\n _______________________________________________________\n\n RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. I concur in the judgment and concur with Judge\nGriffin’s opinion, except as to part III.B. In my view, White did not forfeit his argument about\n18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) because I fail to see when he was required to raise the argument.\n\n Consider the order of events. Fourteen days after White was arrested, his court-appointed\nattorney signed the stipulation at issue in this case. The magistrate judge entered the order the\nnext day. A few weeks later, White filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment due to a\nSpeedy Trial Act violation and also moved for a new attorney. The court allowed White to hire a\nnew attorney, denied the pro se motion without prejudice, and invited the new attorney to file a\nnew motion. The new attorney did file a new motion under the Speedy Trial Act and the\ngovernment filed a response. White declined to file a reply. The court held a hearing and\nultimately denied the motion in a written order.\n\n Then consider the content of the briefs. The pro se motion simply pointed out\n§ 3161(b)’s 30-day deadline, while making no reference to the stipulation or the order finding\nexcludable delay. The subsequent attorney-drafted motion was more specific, but it observed\nonly that 33 calendar days elapsed and concluded that there was necessarily a violation of\n§ 3161(b). It too failed to mention the stipulation and order. The government finally brought up\nthe order in its response brief, but with little elaboration. The government merely observed that\n“the parties agreed, and the court ordered, that the period of delay from May 23, 2013, through\nJune 4, 2013 (in fact June 7, 2013) was excludable delay under the [Speedy Trial Act].” It did\nnot, however, identify how the Speedy Trial Act enabled this exclusion—whether through\n§ 3161(h)(1), (h)(7), or some other means. In all, no brief mentioned automatic exclusion or\n§ 3161(h)(1).\n\n Automatic exclusion never came up at the hearing either. The government never\nmentioned it and argument about the Speedy Trial Act focused exclusively on the validity of the\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 14\n\n\nstipulation. White’s new attorney recounted how the old attorney had signed the stipulation and\nexplained:\n\n If that extension is effective to the Defendant, then that would be credited against\n him; the issue would be moot, he would lose. His claim is that he did not agree to\n that, had no knowledge of it, that that extension was taking place. . . . Our\n argument is very simple: He didn’t agree to it.\n\nUltimately, the district court found that the stipulation was valid and that finding has never been\nat issue on appeal.\n\n White did not raise the automatic-exclusion issue, but it was not his issue to raise. White\ndid what the Speedy Trial Act requires: he provided proof of a violation (a list of the dates) and\nmoved for dismissal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1). The government was then required to prove,\nby a preponderance of the evidence, that sufficient time was excluded. See United States v.\nJenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir. 1996). It did so by merely pointing to the magistrate judge’s\norder. Notably, though, § 3161(h)(1)—when it does apply—does not require a judicial finding;\nit is automatic. See Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 203 (2010); Henderson v. United\nStates, 476 U.S. 321, 327, 332 (1986). If the government had argued that even without the order,\nthe time was automatically excluded under § 3161(h)(1), it would have behooved White to raise\na Bloate-based challenge in a reply brief—but the government did not raise that argument.\nWhite therefore had no obligation to argue why the unmentioned provision did not apply to him.\n\n Ultimately, the waiver of the § 3161(h)(1) argument—whether by White or the\ngovernment—is inconsequential. All now agree that under Bloate, § 3161(h)(1) does not apply\nhere, which leaves us with the matter actually considered and relied upon by the district court:\nexclusion under § 3161(h)(7). I agree that under the circumstances the magistrate judge’s order,\nwhich was explicitly premised on the parties’ stipulation, satisfied the requirement of an on-the-\nrecord finding for an ends-of-justice continuance. I therefore concur in the judgment.\n\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 15\n\n\n _______________________________________________________\n\n CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART\n _______________________________________________________\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmie Eugene WHITE, II, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0070p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 16-1009\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n JIMMIE EUGENE WHITE, II, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.\\n United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.\\n No. 2:13-cr-20423—David M. Lawson, District Judge.\\n\\n Reargued: October 18, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 10, 2019\\n\\n Before: GUY, CLAY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nREARGUED: Christian D. Sheehan, VINSON & ELKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., for\\nAppellant. Andrew Goetz, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for\\nAppellee. ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF: Christian D. Sheehan, Jeremy C. Marwell,\\nVINSON & ELKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., Kenneth P. Tableman, KENNETH P.\\nTABLEMAN, P.C., Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Andrew Goetz, UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.\\n\\n GRIFFIN, J. delivered the opinion of the court except with regard to the issue discussed\\nin Section III.B, and delivered a separate opinion with regard to the issue discussed in Section\\nIII.B. GUY, J. (pp. 13–14), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the majority opinion and\\nin the judgment. CLAY, J. (pp. 15–23), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the majority\\nopinion in part and dissenting in part.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Following our circuit’s binding precedent, we previously held in this case that\\npreindictment plea negotiations are “period[s] of delay resulting from other proceedings\\nconcerning the defendant” that are automatically excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) of the\\nSpeedy Trial Act. United States v. White, 679 F. App’x 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing United\\nStates v. Dunbar, 357 F.3d 582, 593 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded on other grounds,\\n543 U.S. 1099 (2005); United States v. Bowers, 834 F.2d 607, 609–10 (6th Cir. 1987) (per\\ncuriam)). Defendant challenged this precedent for the first time in his petition for a writ of\\ncertiorari as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Bloate v. United\\nStates, 559 U.S. 196 (2010). Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22–23, White v. United States,\\n138 S. Ct. 641 (2018) (No. 17-270). The government then changed horses in midstream,\\nconceding—also for the first time before the Supreme Court—that our circuit precedent was\\nincorrect and inconsistent with Bloate, and that the roughly two-week continuance to engage in\\npreindictment plea negotiations here did not qualify for automatic exclusion under § 3161(h)(1).\\nResponse to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–11, White v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 641 (2018)\\n(No. 17-270). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the\\ncase back to us “for further consideration in light of the confession of error by the Solicitor\\nGeneral.” White v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 641, 641 (2018).\\n\\n On remand, we now hold that Bloate abrogated Dunbar and Bowers. Nevertheless, we\\ndeny defendant relief for two independent reasons. First, he cannot overcome plain-error review\\nof his Bloate argument. Second, and alternatively, the time for preindictment plea negotiations\\nwas properly excluded as an ends-of-justice continuance under § 3161(h)(7) of the Speedy Trial\\nAct. Therefore, we again affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 3\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Our prior opinion sets forth the facts pertinent to this remand:\\n\\n On April 29, 2013, the government filed a complaint against White charging him\\n with drug distribution and firearm crimes related to the May 14, 2010, search and\\n seizure. White was arrested on those charges, and an order of temporary\\n detention was entered, on May 2, 2013. He made his initial appearance the next\\n day and was released on bond.\\n After his arrest, the parties engaged in preindictment plea negotiations. To that\\n end, they filed a stipulation with the district court on May 17, 2013, agreeing to\\n adjourn White’s preliminary hearing and exclude the time between May 23, 2013,\\n and June 7, 2013, from White’s Speedy Trial Act clock. Plea negotiations were\\n not successful, and a grand jury indicted White on June 4, 2013.\\n\\nWhite, 679 F. App’x at 429. Including those days expressly excluded by the court, thirty-three\\ndays passed between White’s arrest and indictment.\\n\\n While he filed a bevy of motions before the district court, pertinent to our inquiry is only\\nWhite’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment because the government violated his speedy\\ntrial rights. Defendant’s motion simply announced that the government failed to indict him\\nwithin thirty days of his arrest in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., but\\nsubstantively argued only his rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment to\\nthe Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The district court held a hearing on the motion to\\ndismiss, denied it, a jury convicted White of multiple crimes, and the district court sentenced him\\nto 84 months in prison. We affirmed his conviction and sentence, rejecting his claim the district\\ncourt erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for violations of the Speedy Trial Act\\nand the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause. See White, 679 F. App’x at 430–33.\\nFollowing remand from the Supreme Court, we give a fresh look to this issue.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall\\nenjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Speedy Trial Act strengthens\\nthis constitutional mandate by establishing time limits for completing the various stages of a\\nfederal criminal prosecution. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174. Among these limits is an obligation that\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 4\\n\\n\\nthe government file an indictment within thirty days of arresting a defendant, excepting the time\\nspent on certain events that can be automatically excluded from that calculation and for other\\nevents if sufficient reasons are given by the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (h). We\\ntypically review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act and its factual\\nfindings for clear error. United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir. 2012). And\\n“[w]e review the district court’s decision to grant an ends-of-justice continuance under an abuse-\\nof-discretion standard.” United States v. Williams, 753 F.3d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n The issue on remand is whether the fourteen days spent on preindictment plea\\nnegotiations are excludable under that Act. White argues that our precedent holding that\\npreindictment plea negotiations are automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1) no longer\\npasses muster after the Supreme Court’s Bloate decision. The government counters that this\\ncourt should affirm the district court because (1) White forfeited the argument that Bloate\\nprecludes automatic exclusion of preindictment plea negotiations and cannot show plain error,\\nand (2) even if preindictment plea negotiations are not automatically excludable under\\n§ 3161(h)(1), that time was excludable as an ends-of-justice continuance pursuant to\\n§ 3161(h)(7). We address these arguments in turn.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We first hold that Bloate abrogated our prior decisions concluding that preindictment plea\\nnegotiations are automatically excludable under the Act.\\n\\n Section 3161(h)(1) provides for the automatic exclusion of “[a]ny period of delay\\nresulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to” eight\\nenumerated subcategories. One of those categories expressly excludes the time “resulting from\\nconsideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the defendant and\\nthe attorney for the Government.” § 3161(h)(1)(G). Based primarily on that subparagraph and\\nthe “including but not limited to” language, we have long held that time spent on preindictment\\nplea negotiations between the parties is automatically excludable. Dunbar, 357 F.3d at 593;\\nBowers, 834 F.2d at 609–10. And yet, in Bloate the Supreme Court held that the time a court\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 5\\n\\n\\ngrants to a party to prepare pretrial motions was not automatically excludable under\\n§ 3161(h)(1), notwithstanding § 3161(h)(1)(D)’s express exclusion of the time attributable to\\n“delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of\\nthe hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 559 U.S. at 203–07. The Court\\nheld that “because a specific provision . . . controls one of more general application,” id. at 207\\n(cleaned up), Congress’s express language in subparagraph (h)(1)(D) communicates the decision\\nto make automatically excludable the time for pretrial motions “only from the time a motion is\\nfiled through the hearing or disposition point specified in the subparagraph, and that other\\nperiods of pretrial motion-related delay are excludable only when accompanied by district court\\nfindings,” id. at 206.\\n\\n Given the above reasoning, the Solicitor General’s concession of error in our precedent,\\nand the Supreme Court’s order vacating our prior decision and remanding for reconsideration in\\nlight of that concession of error, we take this opportunity to revisit our prior precedent. Although\\nit is generally true that one panel cannot overrule the binding precedent of a prior panel, United\\nStates v. Ferguson, 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 2017), that rule yields when the prior panel’s\\nreasoning has been undercut or abrogated by a decision of the Supreme Court. See Ne. Ohio\\nCoal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686, 720–21 (6th Cir. 2016). And, as we have held,\\nsuch Supreme Court authority need not be exactly on point, so long as the legal reasoning is\\ndirectly applicable to the issue at hand. Id. at 721; see also Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 571 (6th\\nCir. 2008).\\n\\n Just as the Supreme Court held that the time a court grants to a party to prepare pretrial\\nmotions is not automatically excludable, the same is true for preindictment plea negotiations.\\nThe parties now agree on this point. Subparagraph (h)(1)(G) expressly excludes the time\\nattributable to “delay resulting from consideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to\\nbe entered into by the defendant and the attorney for the Government.” § 3161(h)(1)(G)\\n(emphasis added). This specific provision caps the time to be excluded as beginning at the\\nmoment the proposed plea is given to the court for its consideration. Plea negotiations, which\\nnecessarily occur before a proposed plea agreement comes to fruition, are therefore outside the\\nlimited universe contemplated by this subparagraph and may not be automatically excluded. See\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 6\\n\\n\\nUnited States v. Mathurin, 690 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2012) (“According to the Supreme\\nCourt, when the category of delay at issue is ‘governed by’ one of § 3161(h)(1)’s eight\\nsubparagraphs, a court must look only to that subparagraph to see if the delay is automatically\\nexcludable. In other words, the ‘including but not limited to’ clause of § 3161(h)(1) does not\\nmodify the contents of the enumerated subcategories themselves.” (citations omitted)). Thus,\\napplying Bloate’s reasoning to this analogous subparagraph, we now hold that (1) Bloate\\nabrogated Dunbar and Bowers, and (2) the time spent on preindictment plea negotiations is not\\nautomatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1) of the Speedy Trial Act.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n This conclusion, however, does not end our consideration § 3161(h)(1)’s automatic\\nexclusion in this appeal. The government, though accepting that Bloate abrogated our precedent,\\nnow argues that White has at a minimum forfeited the issue by not raising it before the district\\ncourt.1 I agree.\\n\\n Before the district court, White specifically challenged the excludability of the fifteen-\\nday delay for plea negotiations, and the validity of the stipulation. However, he now presents a\\nnew reason why the district court erroneously concluded that the plea-negotiation time was\\nexcludable, arguing for the first time on appeal that Bloate’s reasoning applied to remove\\npreindictment plea negotiations from the automatic excludability provisions of § 3161(h)(1).\\nThis is insufficient to preserve the issue for de novo review on appeal. See United States v.\\nHuntington Nat. Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 2009) (“To preserve the argument, then, the\\nlitigant not only must identify the issue but also must provide some minimal level of\\nargumentation in support of it.”); United States v. Seals, 450 F. App’x 769, 771 (10th Cir. 2011)\\n(Gorsuch, J.) (declining to review the defendant’s new Speedy Trial Act argument because “not\\n\\n 1\\n The government also argues waiver, which we need not address given our conclusion that White forfeited\\nthis issue. But even if we were so inclined to address the argument, it is unlikely that we could hold this issue\\ncompletely waived in this context, given the Supreme Court’s explicit direction that we “further consider[]” this\\nissue “in light of the confession of error by the Solicitor General.” White, 138 S. Ct. at 641; see Clark v. Chrysler\\nCorp., 436 F.3d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven though Chrysler initially waived its constitutional claim by failing\\nto raise it in the district court, our earlier decision and the Supreme Court’s GVR order indicates that the issue has\\nbeen preserved, and should be considered further on remand”); Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 168 (1996)\\n(“GVR orders are premised on matters that [the Supreme Court] . . . believe[s] the court below did not fully\\nconsider, and . . . require only further consideration . . . .” (emphasis added)).\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 7\\n\\n\\nonly must the defendant seek dismissal prior to trial, but he must do so for the reasons he seeks\\nto press on appeal”); see also United States v. Loughrin, 710 F.3d 1111, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013)\\n(citing Seals as “persuasive” and declining to consider the defendant’s challenge on appeal to an\\norder of continuance he did not challenge in the district court). And generally, an appellant’s\\nfailure to raise an argument in his appellate brief forfeits that issue on appeal. Radvansky v. City\\nof Olmstead Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 310–11 (6th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n Although the Supreme Court’s remand order requires this court to “further consider[]”\\nthe Speedy Trial Act issue, it does not similarly require us to engage in de novo review or to\\ngrant White relief. Cf. Bloate, 559 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[N]othing in the\\n[Supreme Court’s] opinion bars the [circuit court] from considering, on remand, the\\nGovernment’s argument that the indictment, and convictions under it, remain effective”). As\\nWhite himself acknowledges, forfeiture of a specific Speedy Trial Act claim of error can result in\\nplain-error review, see, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 395 F. App’x 177, 181 n.4, 184 n.7\\n(6th Cir. 2010), and we see no reason why the Supreme Court’s remand order would require\\notherwise. Thus, we are limited to plain-error consideration of the district court’s determination\\nthat the preindictment plea-negotiation period was automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1).\\nSee United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\\n52(b), which governs on appeal from criminal proceedings, provides a court of appeals a limited\\npower to correct errors that were forfeited because not timely raised in district court.”).\\n\\n Plain error is, as it should be, a difficult hurdle to clear. The burden is on White “to show\\n(1) error that (2) was plain, (3) affected [his] substantial rights, and (4) seriously affected the\\nfairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Ushery,\\n785 F.3d 210, 218 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). “An error is ‘plain’ when, at\\na minimum, it ‘is clear under current law.’” United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th\\nCir. 2015) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).\\n\\n We have noted that “[a] ‘circuit split precludes a finding of plain error,’ for the split is\\ngood evidence that the issue is ‘subject to reasonable dispute.’” Id. (quoting United States v.\\nWilliams, 53 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1995); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).\\nAnd we have also explained that “[a] lack of binding case law that answers the question\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 8\\n\\n\\npresented will also preclude our finding of plain error.” Id. Here, the district court could not\\nhave plainly erred because we are in a realm beyond either a circuit split or lack of binding\\ncaselaw—at the time of the district court’s decision, the binding precedent of this circuit held\\nthat the time for preindictment plea negotiations was automatically excludable. See Dunbar,\\n357 F.3d at 593; Bowers, 834 F.2d at 609–10.\\n\\n Although we now overrule those decisions in light of their abrogation by Bloate, the\\nanalysis supporting that conclusion shows that we had to extend Bloate’s reasoning to an\\nanalogous, but different, section of the Speedy Trial Act. See, supra, Section III.A. Our\\ndecision today shows that it took no great inferential leap to apply Bloate in this instance, but it\\nstill required both an extension of Bloate’s reasoning and the overruling of two of our published\\ndecisions. We cannot fault a district court for following our binding caselaw, as it was required\\nto do. Cf. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a\\nprecedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in\\nsome other line of decisions, the [lower courts] should follow the case which directly controls,\\nleaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”). Thus, White cannot\\nshow that the district court committed plain error in denying his motion to dismiss on Speedy\\nTrial Act grounds.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Finally, we turn to the government’s alternate argument—that the district court’s order\\ngranting the parties’ stipulation to exclude the preindictment-plea-negotiation period from\\nSpeedy Trial Act calculations satisfied the requirements for an ends-of-justice continuance under\\nthe Act. We agree and hold this to be adequate alternative grounds for affirmance.\\n\\n Regardless of whether a period of time is automatically excludable, the Speedy Trial Act\\nallows for a continuance whenever the judge finds “that the ends of justice served by taking such\\naction outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3161(h)(7)(A). This is a common ground for excluding time and the Supreme Court has noted\\nthat ends-of-justice continuances furnish “[m]uch of the Act’s flexibility.” Zedner v. United\\nStates, 547 U.S. 489, 498 (2006).\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 9\\n\\n\\n To exclude time under this exception, the court must consider certain factors, such as\\nwhether the failure to grant the continuance would “result in a miscarriage of justice,”\\n§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(i); whether due to the nature of the case (or other factors), the case is too\\ncomplex to reasonably expect adequate preparation within the Act’s time limits,\\n§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii); or whether a refusal to continue the case would deny the defendant\\n“reasonable time to obtain counsel,” or would unreasonably deny either party time for “effective\\npreparation,” § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). Notably, the list of enumerated factors is not exhaustive,\\n§ 3161(h)(7)(B) (“The factors, among others, which a judge shall consider . . . .” (emphasis\\nadded)), but preindictment plea negotiations are not expressly included. See § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)–\\n(iv).\\n\\n The Supreme Court has held that other types of delay that are not excludable under\\nsubsection (h)(1) are excludable under the more flexible framework of subsection (h)(7). See\\nBloate, 559 U.S. at 214 (holding that the time spent to prepare pretrial motions, while not\\nexcludable under subsection (h)(1), is excludable under subsection (h)(7)). And a number of our\\nsister circuits have concluded that time spent negotiating preindictment plea agreements can be\\nexcluded under subsection (h)(7)’s ends-of-justice exclusion. See Mathurin, 690 F.3d at 1241–\\n42; United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 1994) (Alito, J.); United States v. Williams,\\n12 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wells,\\n519 U.S. 482, 492 (1997). We agree, and hold that the time spent on preindictment plea\\nnegotiations may be excludable under subsection (h)(7).2 A conclusion to the contrary would\\npervert the Speedy Trial Act and ignore the central importance that the plea bargaining process\\nhas in our modern system of criminal justice—“[i]t is not some adjunct to the criminal justice\\nsystem; it is the criminal justice system.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“[C]riminal\\njustice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”).\\n\\n 2\\n This conclusion does not suffer from the same defect that our prior caselaw on automatic exclusions did—\\nthere is no subpart of § 3161(h)(7) that speaks narrowly to plea agreements or plea negotiations, so we are not\\nforeclosed from permitting plea negotiations as a reasonable basis for an ends-of-justice continuance. Cf. Bloate,\\n559 U.S. at 208–09 (holding that though “the list of categories [in § 3161(h)(1)] is illustrative rather than exhaustive\\nin no way undermines our conclusion that a delay that falls within the category of delay addressed by [a]\\nsubparagraph . . . is governed by the limits in that subparagraph”). Because none of the subparagraphs of\\n§ 3161(h)(7) address pleas at all, we are not similarly constrained here.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 10\\n\\n\\n Therefore, because the time spent on pretrial plea negotiations may be excludable under\\nsubsection (h)(7), we must determine whether the magistrate judge’s order provided sufficient\\nexplanation for the continuance, as required by the Act. Subsection 3161(h)(7) requires a district\\ncourt to “show its work,” before granting an ends-of-justice continuance:\\n\\n No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in\\n accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless\\n the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons\\n for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance\\n outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.\\n\\nId. “[T]he Act requires express findings” when granting an ends-of-justice continuance, and\\n“without on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion” pursuant to § 3161(h)(7). See\\nZedner, 547 U.S. at 506–07.3 The public interest in a speedy trial is also protected by the Act, so\\na defendant’s agreement to waive its protections cannot, by itself, justify an ends-of-justice\\ncontinuance. See id. at 500–01 (finding that a defendant cannot prospectively waive or “opt out\\nof the Act” meant to balance the defendant’s and the government’s interests against those of the\\npublic); see also Bloate, 559 U.S. at 211–12 (noting that a defendant may not opt out of the Act\\neven if he believes it would be in his interest because the Act also “vindicate[s] the public\\ninterest in the swift administration of justice”).\\n\\n Given its unique structure and appearance, it is important to discuss exactly what the\\ncombined stipulation and order granting the continuance said in this case. The first two pages of\\nthe court’s filed order was nothing more than the parties’ stipulation. There, the parties provided\\nthat “the period from May 23, 2013, to June 7, 2013, should be excluded from computing the\\ntime within which an information or indictment must be filed because the parties are engaged in\\nplea negotiations, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), and because the ends of justice served by such\\ncontinuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See\\n18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).” The third page of the court’s order began by noting that the “matter\\n[came] before the court on the stipulation of the parties” and provided, simply, that “the period\\nfrom May 23, 2013, to the new date of the preliminary hearing, June 7, 2013, should be excluded\\n\\n 3\\n The Zedner Court, interpreting an older version of the Act, refers to the pertinent section as § 3161(h)(8).\\nIn a 2008 amendment, this subsection was redesignated as (h)(7). Pub. L. No. 110–406 § 13(3) (2008). The text\\nand substance of the statutory subsection did not change.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 11\\n\\n\\nin calculating the time within which the defendant shall be indicted under the Speedy Trial Act.\\n18 U.S.C. § 3161.”\\n\\n This order sufficiently supports an ends-of-justice exclusion under § 3161(h)(7). First,\\nthe order clearly incorporates the parties’ two-page stipulation, both by attachment and reference.\\nIn the past we’ve upheld a continuance when the reasons for it are clear from the context or\\nrecord. United States v. Richardson, 681 F.3d 736, 741 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[G]iven the context,\\nthe record clearly establishes that a continuance serves the ends of justice.”). That the magistrate\\nattached the parties’ stipulation to its order only bolsters the conclusion that the parties’ proposed\\njustifications for the continuance found their way into the magistrate’s determination. Thus, we\\nagree with the district court and the government that the magistrate adopted the parties’\\nstipulation as part of its own reasoning in support of the roughly two-week continuance.\\n\\n Second, the contents of the order are sufficient to support the continuance. We have\\npreviously affirmed a district court’s ends-of-justice continuance when it simply held that “the\\nends of justice served outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy\\ntrial.” Anderson, 695 F.3d at 397. Given the context surrounding the issue in Anderson—the\\njudge was considering a motion to suppress for some, but not all, of the period for which the\\ncontinuance was granted—this court held that the defendant’s challenge to the district court’s\\nends-of-justice continuance was meritless. Id. at 397–98. In a similar vein, here, the\\nmagistrate’s order and the surrounding context support the continuance. As noted above, time\\nfor preindictment plea negotiations may be excluded under subsection (h)(7) as a valid ends-of-\\njustice exception to the Act’s strict deadlines. Given the relatively short continuance\\nrequested—only approximately two weeks’ time—the magistrate did not err in concluding that\\nthe parties’ efforts to come to a mutually agreeable plea agreement “outweigh[ed] the best\\ninterest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” § 3161(h)(7)(A). And the fact that the\\nmagistrate’s order did not explicitly say “ends of justice” poses no alternate barrier to this\\nconclusion. “An ends-of-justice continuance can be found even when a delay is not designated\\nas such by the court.” United States v. Stone, 461 F. App’x 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing\\nUnited States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1457 (10th Cir. 1996)). The Act does not require such\\n“magic words.” United States v. Breen, 243 F.3d 591, 597 (2d Cir. 2001).\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 12\\n\\n\\n Finally, despite White’s arguments to the contrary, this case is distinguishable from\\nZedner because it does not present the sort of wide-ranging and open-ended error that the Zedner\\nCourt sought to remedy. There, the Court was faced with an open-ended stipulation, which\\nprevented the defendant from raising any Speedy Trial Act issues “for all time.” Zedner,\\n547 U.S. at 494. This universal Speedy Trial Act waiver ultimately led to over seven years\\npassing from the defendant’s indictment to his trial. Id. at 496. Unlike the “waiver for all time”\\nand for all reasons in Zedner, id. at 493–94, here the magistrate accepted a mere two-week\\nexclusion of time for the express purpose of preindictment plea negotiations.\\n\\n Sure, an order more fully explaining the magistrate’s reasoning would have been well\\ntaken by this court, but we cannot forget that the Act does not require a novella of explanation.\\nSee Anderson, 695 F.3d at 397. The magistrate’s succinct and plain statement here, when\\ncombined with the parties’ attached stipulation, granted a short and definite continuance\\n(approximately two weeks), for a permissible reason (preindictment plea negotiations), after\\nexpressly considering the three-pronged interests relevant to the Act (the interests of defendant,\\nthe government, and the public). In short, we cannot, under these facts and given the\\nsurrounding context, find that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in granting an ends-of-\\njustice continuance. Williams, 753 F.3d at 635.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 13\\n\\n\\n _______________________________________________________\\n\\n CONCURRING IN PART AND IN THE JUDGMENT\\n _______________________________________________________\\n\\n RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. I concur in the judgment and concur with Judge\\nGriffin’s opinion, except as to part III.B. In my view, White did not forfeit his argument about\\n18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) because I fail to see when he was required to raise the argument.\\n\\n Consider the order of events. Fourteen days after White was arrested, his court-appointed\\nattorney signed the stipulation at issue in this case. The magistrate judge entered the order the\\nnext day. A few weeks later, White filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment due to a\\nSpeedy Trial Act violation and also moved for a new attorney. The court allowed White to hire a\\nnew attorney, denied the pro se motion without prejudice, and invited the new attorney to file a\\nnew motion. The new attorney did file a new motion under the Speedy Trial Act and the\\ngovernment filed a response. White declined to file a reply. The court held a hearing and\\nultimately denied the motion in a written order.\\n\\n Then consider the content of the briefs. The pro se motion simply pointed out\\n§ 3161(b)’s 30-day deadline, while making no reference to the stipulation or the order finding\\nexcludable delay. The subsequent attorney-drafted motion was more specific, but it observed\\nonly that 33 calendar days elapsed and concluded that there was necessarily a violation of\\n§ 3161(b). It too failed to mention the stipulation and order. The government finally brought up\\nthe order in its response brief, but with little elaboration. The government merely observed that\\n“the parties agreed, and the court ordered, that the period of delay from May 23, 2013, through\\nJune 4, 2013 (in fact June 7, 2013) was excludable delay under the [Speedy Trial Act].” It did\\nnot, however, identify how the Speedy Trial Act enabled this exclusion—whether through\\n§ 3161(h)(1), (h)(7), or some other means. In all, no brief mentioned automatic exclusion or\\n§ 3161(h)(1).\\n\\n Automatic exclusion never came up at the hearing either. The government never\\nmentioned it and argument about the Speedy Trial Act focused exclusively on the validity of the\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 14\\n\\n\\nstipulation. White’s new attorney recounted how the old attorney had signed the stipulation and\\nexplained:\\n\\n If that extension is effective to the Defendant, then that would be credited against\\n him; the issue would be moot, he would lose. His claim is that he did not agree to\\n that, had no knowledge of it, that that extension was taking place. . . . Our\\n argument is very simple: He didn’t agree to it.\\n\\nUltimately, the district court found that the stipulation was valid and that finding has never been\\nat issue on appeal.\\n\\n White did not raise the automatic-exclusion issue, but it was not his issue to raise. White\\ndid what the Speedy Trial Act requires: he provided proof of a violation (a list of the dates) and\\nmoved for dismissal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1). The government was then required to prove,\\nby a preponderance of the evidence, that sufficient time was excluded. See United States v.\\nJenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir. 1996). It did so by merely pointing to the magistrate judge’s\\norder. Notably, though, § 3161(h)(1)—when it does apply—does not require a judicial finding;\\nit is automatic. See Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 203 (2010); Henderson v. United\\nStates, 476 U.S. 321, 327, 332 (1986). If the government had argued that even without the order,\\nthe time was automatically excluded under § 3161(h)(1), it would have behooved White to raise\\na Bloate-based challenge in a reply brief—but the government did not raise that argument.\\nWhite therefore had no obligation to argue why the unmentioned provision did not apply to him.\\n\\n Ultimately, the waiver of the § 3161(h)(1) argument—whether by White or the\\ngovernment—is inconsequential. All now agree that under Bloate, § 3161(h)(1) does not apply\\nhere, which leaves us with the matter actually considered and relied upon by the district court:\\nexclusion under § 3161(h)(7). I agree that under the circumstances the magistrate judge’s order,\\nwhich was explicitly premised on the parties’ stipulation, satisfied the requirement of an on-the-\\nrecord finding for an ends-of-justice continuance. I therefore concur in the judgment.\\n\\n No. 16-1009 United States v. White Page 15\\n\\n\\n _______________________________________________________\\n\\n CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART\\n _______________________________________________________\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1662,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4608518,"string":"4,608,518"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry J. WINGET; Larry J. Winget Living Trust, Defendants-Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Larry J. Winget"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1143"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Donald, Larsen, Nalbandian\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0069p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-1143\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n LARRY J. WINGET; LARRY J. WINGET LIVING TRUST, │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.\\n Nos. 2:08-cv-13845; 2:15-cv-13469—Avern Cohn, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: December 5, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 10, 2019\\n\\n Before: DONALD, LARSEN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Thomas V. Hubbard, DREW, COOPER & ANDING, P.C., Grand Rapids,\\nMichigan, for Appellants. James W. Ducayet, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for\\nAppellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas V. Hubbard, John E. Anding, DREW, COOPER & ANDING,\\nP.C., Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellants. James W. Ducayet, Kendra L. Stead, SIDLEY\\nAUSTIN LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. This appeal is not the first time we have seen Larry\\nWinget and JPMorgan Chase. Nor will it likely be the last. Winget’s appeal du jour follows the\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\ndistrict court’s award of interim attorneys’ fees to Chase. But because this order is not a “final\\ndecision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we lack jurisdiction and therefore dismiss Winget’s appeal.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n We need not revisit each “chapter in [this] longstanding dispute between the parties.”\\nJPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 602 F. App’x 246, 248 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Winget I”).\\nSuffice it to say, Chase sued Winget “to recover millions of dollars owed to it under a credit\\nagreement between Chase and entities owned and operated by [Winget].” JPMorgan Chase\\nBank, N.A. v. Winget, 678 F. App’x 355, 356 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Winget II”). We decided the\\nmerits of the dispute and awarded Chase over $425 million. But there was a catch. While\\nWinget’s personal trust was on the hook for the full amount, Winget himself—protected by a\\nlimitation in his personal guaranty—owed Chase only $50 million (which he has since paid).\\nWinget I, 602 F. App’x at 258–59.\\n\\n The parties then litigated attorneys’ fees—and whether Winget was personally liable for\\nChase’s $12.6 million in fees and expenses. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 704 F.\\nApp’x 410, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Winget III”). Chase won again. Id. at 414–16. And we\\nexplained in that appeal that despite Winget’s limited personal guaranty, he “is still liable for\\nChase’s costs and expenses associated with collection of the Guaranteed Obligation.” Id. at 418.\\nThe district court then entered a final amended judgment against Winget and his trust. So one\\nthing is clear: Winget and his personal trust owe Chase a lot of money.\\n\\n But Chase’s final judgment against Winget did not end this decade-long saga. Rather\\nthan use the trust’s assets to pay Chase, Winget transferred the assets out of his trust and filed a\\nnew lawsuit—asking the district court to declare that Chase had no recourse against those assets.\\nIn response, Chase filed counterclaims against Winget, alleging that the transfers were fraudulent\\nconveyances designed to avoid paying Chase. The district court consolidated the new lawsuit\\nwith the previous litigation, characterizing it as “the functional equivalent of post-judgment\\nproceedings.” (Order, R. 686 at 2.)\\n\\n The parties are still engaged in these post-judgment proceedings. For example, Winget is\\nfighting over what assets Chase can collect, how Chase can collect those assets, and what those\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\nassets are worth. And as these collection efforts drag on, Chase periodically asks the district\\ncourt for more attorneys’ fees. The district court granted one such motion—awarding Chase\\nanother $2 million. These fees covered Chase’s expenses from June 2015 through November\\n2016. But in doing so, the district court recognized the interim nature of the award, noting that\\n“Chase’s efforts to collect the Guaranteed Obligations are ongoing.” (Order, R. 773 at 1.) These\\nongoing efforts include charging orders, depositions, requests for constructive trusts, writs of\\nexecutions on stocks, continued discovery on the value of the assets in the trust, a potential trial\\nto determine Chase’s damages from Winget’s fraudulent conveyances, and more requests for\\nattorneys’ fees. In sum, Chase’s collection efforts continue in the district court.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Winget now appeals the $2 million interim attorneys’ fees award. To start, however, we\\n“must determine that [we] have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.” Lance v. Coffman,\\n549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007). We generally have jurisdiction only from “final decisions of the\\ndistrict courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision “generally is one which ends the litigation\\non the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Gnesys, Inc. v.\\nGreene, 437 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,\\n486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988)). But this definition is not entirely helpful here. As the Supreme\\nCourt explained, “a claim for attorney’s fees is not part of the merits of the action to which the\\nfees pertain.” Budinich, 486 U.S. at 200. In other words, an award of attorneys’ fees cannot end\\nthe litigation on the merits.\\n\\n So how then do we determine when a fee award is appealable? In most cases, the timing\\nof the award provides the answer. For example, the district court can award attorneys’ fees\\nbefore it decides the merits of the case. We know the answer in this situation; “orders awarding\\ninterim fees in the course of litigation are not appealable.” Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032,\\n1035 (6th Cir. 1988); see also In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Lit., 401 F.3d 143, 156 (3d Cir.\\n2005) (collecting cases) (“[A]n interim award of attorneys’ fees is not, in almost all cases, an\\nappealable final order because it foresees further and additional action by the district court, thus\\ncontinuing, but not concluding, the fee litigation.”). And we would lack jurisdiction because the\\nappeal would be too early. Instead, the general rule would apply: “a party is entitled to a single\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\nappeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,\\n558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863,\\n868 (1994)).\\n\\n The district court can also award attorneys’ fees at the same time it decides the merits of\\nthe case. Or it can give itself time to award attorneys’ fees at substantially the same time.\\nCompare Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i) (requiring a party to move for attorneys’ fees “no later\\nthan 14 days after the entry of judgment”); with id. 58(e) (allowing the district court to extend the\\ntime for filing a notice of appeal to award fees if it “act[s] before a notice of appeal has been\\nfiled”), and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iii) (explaining that the “time to file an appeal runs from\\nthe entry of . . . attorney’s fees under Rule 54 if the district court extends the time to appeal\\nunder Rule 58”); Wikol ex rel. Wikol v. Birmingham Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 360 F.3d 604, 607–\\n10 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining the complexity of these rules). Either way, the result is the same.\\nWhen the district court resolves the merits of the case and the issue of fees together, the general\\nrule applies: a party is entitled to a single appeal.\\n\\n Still, the district court can award attorneys’ fees after it decides the merits of the case.\\nThis scenario is a familiar one—courts routinely resolve attorneys’ fees and costs post-judgment.\\nSee Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e) (“Ordinarily, the entry of judgment may not be delayed, nor the time\\nfor appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees.”); see also, e.g., White v. New\\nHampshire Dep’t. of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 453–54 (1982). But in this situation, the timing\\nof the award is not as helpful. Although some post-judgment awards of attorneys’ fees are\\nimmediately appealable, others are not. To solve this problem, our sister circuits employ a useful\\nrule: “a postjudgment proceeding, for purposes of appeal, must be viewed as a separate lawsuit\\nfrom the action which produced the underlying judgment.” In re Joint E. & So. Dists. Asbestos\\nLitig., 22 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 1994); see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d 479, 490\\n(5th Cir. 2015) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction following a post-judgment discovery\\norder); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Express Freight Lines, Inc., 971 F.2d 5, 6\\n(7th Cir. 1992) (same); Rouse Constr. Int’l, Inc. v. Rouse Constr. Corp., 680 F.2d 743, 745–46\\n(11th Cir. 1982) (same); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, Inc., 937 F.2d 1444,\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\n1449 (9th Cir. 1991) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction following a post-judgment order\\ngranting a debtor examination).\\n\\n This approach especially makes sense here, where the post-judgment proceedings, in\\nlarge part, were prompted by a new lawsuit—albeit one the district court consolidated into the\\nexisting case. Thus, while “[a] postjudgment order might seem final by definition because the\\njudgment is already behind it,” we still do not have a “final decision” under § 1291 until the\\ndistrict court completes the post-judgment proceedings. In re Asbestos Litig., 22 F.3d at 761\\n(quoting Cent. States, 971 F.2d at 6); Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3916 (2d ed. 2018)\\n(“Appeal ordinarily should not be available as to any particular post-judgment proceeding before\\nthe trial court has reached its final disposition. Once the district court has completely disposed\\nof the matter, its decision should be found final.”).\\n\\n This rule is easily applied in most post-judgment cases. A district court typically resolves\\nall attorneys’ fees in a single, final order; completing the post-judgment proceedings. In this\\nsituation, we would have independent jurisdiction over an appeal from the final fee award\\n(distinct from any previous appeal on the merits). See Budinich, 486 U.S. at 202; Gnesys, Inc.,\\n437 F.3d at 488. Indeed, this is the scenario we faced in Winget III. After we decided the merits\\nof the dispute and the district court entered final judgment on remand, it awarded Chase\\nattorneys’ fees post-judgment. Winget III, 704 F. App’x at 414. These attorneys’ fees covered\\nChase’s expenses for the previous years of litigation. We affirmed these fees. And if Winget\\nhad used the trust’s assets to pay the judgment and attorneys’ fees, this case would be over.\\n\\n But he did not—and so we now find ourselves in a different scenario. Winget appeals an\\ninterim award of attorneys’ fees post-judgment, where the post-judgment proceedings are\\nongoing. In other words, this award of attorneys’ fees did not end the post-judgment litigation.\\nThus, applying the post-judgment completeness rule, this appeal is not from a final, appealable\\norder.\\n\\n The Eleventh Circuit confirmed this rule and result—dealing specifically with a post-\\njudgment fee award. Mayer v. Wall Street Equity Grp., Inc., 672 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir.\\n2012) (per curiam) (citing Delaney’s Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 1300, 1304 (11th\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\nCir. 1990)). The district court had competing post-judgment motions for attorneys’ fees. After\\nthe district court denied one motion—but before the court decided the other motion—the\\nplaintiff appealed the decision. The Eleventh Circuit treated the post-judgment proceedings as a\\nseparate and “free-standing” lawsuit—and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because\\nthe post-judgment litigation was ongoing—i.e., “the other fee motion . . . remain[ed]\\noutstanding.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained when the parties should appeal in this\\nsituation: “Only if a postjudgment order is ‘apparently the last order to be entered in the action’\\nis it final and appealable.” Id. (quoting Delaney’s Inc., 894 F.2d at 1304 (quoting 9 Moore’s\\nFed. Prac. ¶ 100.14[1], 196–97 (2d ed. 1988))). This rule makes sense, “to hold otherwise\\ninvites litigants to appeal every attorney’s fees order, even if other requests remain outstanding,\\nresulting in a proliferation of piecemeal or repetitious appeals.” Id.\\n\\n This is the situation we face here. The district court has not completed the post-judgment\\nlitigation. The parties are still fighting over what assets Chase can collect, how Chase can collect\\nthose assets, and what those assets are worth. See supra p. 3. And Chase continues to incur\\nattorneys’ fees in these collection efforts. Indeed, both parties admit that the post-judgment\\nlitigation is not final. According to Winget, the $2 million fee award is “premature” because\\n“there is no final judgment.”1 (Winget’s Reply Br. at 4; Winget Supp. Br. at 3.) And while\\nChase prefers to confirm its fees sooner rather than later (arguing that we have jurisdiction),\\nChase still described its motion for fees as “interim in nature” and that it “will from time to time\\nreturn to this Court to seek further orders for the recovery of costs and expenses.” (Mot. for\\nCosts, R. 709 at 4; see also Chase’s Br. at 14 (explaining that Chase is still “endeavoring to\\ncollect” and has not “finally prevailed in its second collection action”).) This is exactly what\\nChase did in October 2018—filing another motion for attorneys’ fees. (Mot. for Costs, R. 862\\n\\n\\n 1Winget’s main argument is that the district court mistakenly considered the 2015 litigation as part of the\\n2008 litigation. But this distinction does not matter. Whether we consider the ongoing litigation as “post-judgment”\\ncollection efforts—or instead, a separate lawsuit—Winget concedes that “there is no final judgment in the 2015\\nAction.” (See Winget Supp. Br. at 3.) Essentially, Winget wants to eat his cake and have it, too. Winget wants us\\nto have jurisdiction to reverse the fee award—but he wants us to reverse the fee award because there is no final\\njudgment. But if the 2015 litigation is a separate lawsuit, then the general rule applies and “orders awarding interim\\nfees in the course of litigation are not appealable.” Webster, 846 F.2d at 1035; see also Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac.\\n& Proc. § 3915.6 (2d ed. 2018) (“Ordinarily[,] [an] appeal is not allowed from an order granting an interim award\\n[of fees], even if it is immediately enforceable.”).\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nat 1 (asking for fees from December 2016 through June 2018).) The district court has not\\nresolved this latest motion.\\n\\n In sum, it is undisputed that this award for attorneys’ fees is not the last order to be\\nentered in the action. Instead, there is plenty left for the district court to resolve. Thus, viewing\\nChase’s post-judgment collection efforts as separate and ongoing litigation, the interim award of\\nattorneys’ fees is not a final, appealable decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n There are, of course, exceptions to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, such as the “collateral order”\\ndoctrine. See Webster, 846 F.2d at 1035. “[T]he collateral order doctrine accommodates a\\n‘small class’ of rulings” that do not end the litigation—but which we still consider “final.” Will\\nv. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996)).\\nThe Supreme Court has refused to expand this “small class” of cases—choosing instead to keep\\n“it narrow and selective in its membership.” Id. at 350. This “small category includes only\\ndecisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that\\nare effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.”\\nMohawk Indus., Inc., 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42\\n(1995)).\\n\\n Chase argues that this case fits within one of these narrow exceptions: post-judgment\\nmonitoring cases. In these “monitoring” cases, our sister circuits have allowed parties to appeal\\ninterim awards of attorneys’ fees. But these cases are unique. They typically stem from consent\\ndecrees between parties—agreeing that long open-ended monitoring is needed to cure\\nconstitutional violations. For example, in one of the cases Chase relies on, Balla v. Idaho, there\\nwas a “twenty-year-old injunction” in place to fix constitutional violations in prisons. 677 F.3d\\n910, 912 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 994 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990)\\n(finding that it had jurisdiction to review “[a] periodic fee award made during the remedial phase\\nof a prisoner civil-rights” matter in a similar long-term monitoring case).\\n\\n This reveals the key commonality in the monitoring cases that is missing here—the\\ninability to obtain post-judgment finality. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1450 (9th Cir.\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\n1994) (“The compliance period has not been limited to a definite time frame.”). Because\\nmonitoring cases can go on indefinitely, a party can immediately appeal an interim fee award;\\notherwise, in some circumstances, the parties could never appeal. See Gautreaux v. Chicago\\nHous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Another reason for allowing an immediate\\nappeal is that a decree might never be dissolved, so that to treat fee awards as interlocutory might\\ndefer appeal to the end of time.”) (citation omitted); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 426 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We are persuaded by this logic [in Gates]. In a complex\\nenvironmental [clean-up], monitoring will likely continue well into the future . . . for years if not\\ndecades.”); Walker v. U.S. Dep’t. of HUD, 99 F.3d 761, 766 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]onsidering the\\nongoing and possibly permanent nature of monitoring and preventing further changes to the City\\nConsent Decree, it is unlikely that there ever will be a ‘final judgment’ for this court to review.”).\\n\\n We have recognized this same commonality. Webster, 846 F.2d at 1035. In Webster, we\\nhad jurisdiction to resolve an appeal from an interim fee award. But unlike typical interim fee\\nawards, the district court “imposed . . . a prospective burden of large monthly fee payments with\\nno definite cutoff date,” and it was undisputed that “repayment in the event of appellate reversal\\ncould not be assured.” Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 721 (9th Cir. 1988)\\n(distinguishing Webster); see also Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The post-\\nsettlement fees and costs . . . could continue indefinitely[.]”).\\n\\n But here, despite the long litigation between the parties, Chase’s collection efforts will\\nhave an end date. The district court will eventually enter a final amended judgment, resolving\\nwhich assets Chase can collect from, and calculating Chase’s total attorneys’ fees. See, e.g.,\\nCent. States, 971 F.2d at 6 (“A contested collection proceeding [unlike monitoring cases] will\\nend in a judgment or a series of judgments granting supplementary relief to the plaintiff.”). And\\nneither Winget nor Chase suggest that irreparable harm would result if we defer review of this\\ninterim award until the district court completes the rest of the post-judgment litigation.\\n\\n As a result, the $2 million interim attorneys’ fee award is not a “final decision.” And\\nbecause our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the district courts,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we\\nlack jurisdiction to decide whether the district court correctly awarded Chase additional fees.\\nWe dismiss the appeal without addressing the merits. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\nRisjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981) (“If the appellate court finds that the order from which a party\\nseeks to appeal does not fall within [its appellate jurisdiction], its inquiry is over.”).\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385771/\", \"author_raw\": \"NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"DONALD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LARSEN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"NALBANDIAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608518/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry J. WINGET; Larry J. Winget Living Trust, Defendants-Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0069p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n > No. 18-1143\n v. │\n │\n │\n LARRY J. WINGET; LARRY J. WINGET LIVING TRUST, │\n Defendants-Appellants. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.\n Nos. 2:08-cv-13845; 2:15-cv-13469—Avern Cohn, District Judge.\n\n Argued: December 5, 2018\n\n Decided and Filed: April 10, 2019\n\n Before: DONALD, LARSEN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: Thomas V. Hubbard, DREW, COOPER & ANDING, P.C., Grand Rapids,\nMichigan, for Appellants. James W. Ducayet, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for\nAppellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas V. Hubbard, John E. Anding, DREW, COOPER & ANDING,\nP.C., Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellants. James W. Ducayet, Kendra L. Stead, SIDLEY\nAUSTIN LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. This appeal is not the first time we have seen Larry\nWinget and JPMorgan Chase. Nor will it likely be the last. Winget’s appeal du jour follows the\n\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 2\n\n\ndistrict court’s award of interim attorneys’ fees to Chase. But because this order is not a “final\ndecision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we lack jurisdiction and therefore dismiss Winget’s appeal.\n\n I.\n\n We need not revisit each “chapter in [this] longstanding dispute between the parties.”\nJPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 602 F. App’x 246, 248 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Winget I”).\nSuffice it to say, Chase sued Winget “to recover millions of dollars owed to it under a credit\nagreement between Chase and entities owned and operated by [Winget].” JPMorgan Chase\nBank, N.A. v. Winget, 678 F. App’x 355, 356 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Winget II”). We decided the\nmerits of the dispute and awarded Chase over $425 million. But there was a catch. While\nWinget’s personal trust was on the hook for the full amount, Winget himself—protected by a\nlimitation in his personal guaranty—owed Chase only $50 million (which he has since paid).\nWinget I, 602 F. App’x at 258–59.\n\n The parties then litigated attorneys’ fees—and whether Winget was personally liable for\nChase’s $12.6 million in fees and expenses. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 704 F.\nApp’x 410, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Winget III”). Chase won again. Id. at 414–16. And we\nexplained in that appeal that despite Winget’s limited personal guaranty, he “is still liable for\nChase’s costs and expenses associated with collection of the Guaranteed Obligation.” Id. at 418.\nThe district court then entered a final amended judgment against Winget and his trust. So one\nthing is clear: Winget and his personal trust owe Chase a lot of money.\n\n But Chase’s final judgment against Winget did not end this decade-long saga. Rather\nthan use the trust’s assets to pay Chase, Winget transferred the assets out of his trust and filed a\nnew lawsuit—asking the district court to declare that Chase had no recourse against those assets.\nIn response, Chase filed counterclaims against Winget, alleging that the transfers were fraudulent\nconveyances designed to avoid paying Chase. The district court consolidated the new lawsuit\nwith the previous litigation, characterizing it as “the functional equivalent of post-judgment\nproceedings.” (Order, R. 686 at 2.)\n\n The parties are still engaged in these post-judgment proceedings. For example, Winget is\nfighting over what assets Chase can collect, how Chase can collect those assets, and what those\n\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 3\n\n\nassets are worth. And as these collection efforts drag on, Chase periodically asks the district\ncourt for more attorneys’ fees. The district court granted one such motion—awarding Chase\nanother $2 million. These fees covered Chase’s expenses from June 2015 through November\n2016. But in doing so, the district court recognized the interim nature of the award, noting that\n“Chase’s efforts to collect the Guaranteed Obligations are ongoing.” (Order, R. 773 at 1.) These\nongoing efforts include charging orders, depositions, requests for constructive trusts, writs of\nexecutions on stocks, continued discovery on the value of the assets in the trust, a potential trial\nto determine Chase’s damages from Winget’s fraudulent conveyances, and more requests for\nattorneys’ fees. In sum, Chase’s collection efforts continue in the district court.\n\n II.\n\n Winget now appeals the $2 million interim attorneys’ fees award. To start, however, we\n“must determine that [we] have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.” Lance v. Coffman,\n549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007). We generally have jurisdiction only from “final decisions of the\ndistrict courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision “generally is one which ends the litigation\non the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Gnesys, Inc. v.\nGreene, 437 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,\n486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988)). But this definition is not entirely helpful here. As the Supreme\nCourt explained, “a claim for attorney’s fees is not part of the merits of the action to which the\nfees pertain.” Budinich, 486 U.S. at 200. In other words, an award of attorneys’ fees cannot end\nthe litigation on the merits.\n\n So how then do we determine when a fee award is appealable? In most cases, the timing\nof the award provides the answer. For example, the district court can award attorneys’ fees\nbefore it decides the merits of the case. We know the answer in this situation; “orders awarding\ninterim fees in the course of litigation are not appealable.” Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032,\n1035 (6th Cir. 1988); see also In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Lit., 401 F.3d 143, 156 (3d Cir.\n2005) (collecting cases) (“[A]n interim award of attorneys’ fees is not, in almost all cases, an\nappealable final order because it foresees further and additional action by the district court, thus\ncontinuing, but not concluding, the fee litigation.”). And we would lack jurisdiction because the\nappeal would be too early. Instead, the general rule would apply: “a party is entitled to a single\n\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 4\n\n\nappeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,\n558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863,\n868 (1994)).\n\n The district court can also award attorneys’ fees at the same time it decides the merits of\nthe case. Or it can give itself time to award attorneys’ fees at substantially the same time.\nCompare Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i) (requiring a party to move for attorneys’ fees “no later\nthan 14 days after the entry of judgment”); with id. 58(e) (allowing the district court to extend the\ntime for filing a notice of appeal to award fees if it “act[s] before a notice of appeal has been\nfiled”), and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iii) (explaining that the “time to file an appeal runs from\nthe entry of . . . attorney’s fees under Rule 54 if the district court extends the time to appeal\nunder Rule 58”); Wikol ex rel. Wikol v. Birmingham Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 360 F.3d 604, 607–\n10 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining the complexity of these rules). Either way, the result is the same.\nWhen the district court resolves the merits of the case and the issue of fees together, the general\nrule applies: a party is entitled to a single appeal.\n\n Still, the district court can award attorneys’ fees after it decides the merits of the case.\nThis scenario is a familiar one—courts routinely resolve attorneys’ fees and costs post-judgment.\nSee Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e) (“Ordinarily, the entry of judgment may not be delayed, nor the time\nfor appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees.”); see also, e.g., White v. New\nHampshire Dep’t. of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 453–54 (1982). But in this situation, the timing\nof the award is not as helpful. Although some post-judgment awards of attorneys’ fees are\nimmediately appealable, others are not. To solve this problem, our sister circuits employ a useful\nrule: “a postjudgment proceeding, for purposes of appeal, must be viewed as a separate lawsuit\nfrom the action which produced the underlying judgment.” In re Joint E. & So. Dists. Asbestos\nLitig., 22 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 1994); see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d 479, 490\n(5th Cir. 2015) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction following a post-judgment discovery\norder); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Express Freight Lines, Inc., 971 F.2d 5, 6\n(7th Cir. 1992) (same); Rouse Constr. Int’l, Inc. v. Rouse Constr. Corp., 680 F.2d 743, 745–46\n(11th Cir. 1982) (same); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, Inc., 937 F.2d 1444,\n\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 5\n\n\n1449 (9th Cir. 1991) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction following a post-judgment order\ngranting a debtor examination).\n\n This approach especially makes sense here, where the post-judgment proceedings, in\nlarge part, were prompted by a new lawsuit—albeit one the district court consolidated into the\nexisting case. Thus, while “[a] postjudgment order might seem final by definition because the\njudgment is already behind it,” we still do not have a “final decision” under § 1291 until the\ndistrict court completes the post-judgment proceedings. In re Asbestos Litig., 22 F.3d at 761\n(quoting Cent. States, 971 F.2d at 6); Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3916 (2d ed. 2018)\n(“Appeal ordinarily should not be available as to any particular post-judgment proceeding before\nthe trial court has reached its final disposition. Once the district court has completely disposed\nof the matter, its decision should be found final.”).\n\n This rule is easily applied in most post-judgment cases. A district court typically resolves\nall attorneys’ fees in a single, final order; completing the post-judgment proceedings. In this\nsituation, we would have independent jurisdiction over an appeal from the final fee award\n(distinct from any previous appeal on the merits). See Budinich, 486 U.S. at 202; Gnesys, Inc.,\n437 F.3d at 488. Indeed, this is the scenario we faced in Winget III. After we decided the merits\nof the dispute and the district court entered final judgment on remand, it awarded Chase\nattorneys’ fees post-judgment. Winget III, 704 F. App’x at 414. These attorneys’ fees covered\nChase’s expenses for the previous years of litigation. We affirmed these fees. And if Winget\nhad used the trust’s assets to pay the judgment and attorneys’ fees, this case would be over.\n\n But he did not—and so we now find ourselves in a different scenario. Winget appeals an\ninterim award of attorneys’ fees post-judgment, where the post-judgment proceedings are\nongoing. In other words, this award of attorneys’ fees did not end the post-judgment litigation.\nThus, applying the post-judgment completeness rule, this appeal is not from a final, appealable\norder.\n\n The Eleventh Circuit confirmed this rule and result—dealing specifically with a post-\njudgment fee award. Mayer v. Wall Street Equity Grp., Inc., 672 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir.\n2012) (per curiam) (citing Delaney’s Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 1300, 1304 (11th\n\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 6\n\n\nCir. 1990)). The district court had competing post-judgment motions for attorneys’ fees. After\nthe district court denied one motion—but before the court decided the other motion—the\nplaintiff appealed the decision. The Eleventh Circuit treated the post-judgment proceedings as a\nseparate and “free-standing” lawsuit—and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because\nthe post-judgment litigation was ongoing—i.e., “the other fee motion . . . remain[ed]\noutstanding.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained when the parties should appeal in this\nsituation: “Only if a postjudgment order is ‘apparently the last order to be entered in the action’\nis it final and appealable.” Id. (quoting Delaney’s Inc., 894 F.2d at 1304 (quoting 9 Moore’s\nFed. Prac. ¶ 100.14[1], 196–97 (2d ed. 1988))). This rule makes sense, “to hold otherwise\ninvites litigants to appeal every attorney’s fees order, even if other requests remain outstanding,\nresulting in a proliferation of piecemeal or repetitious appeals.” Id.\n\n This is the situation we face here. The district court has not completed the post-judgment\nlitigation. The parties are still fighting over what assets Chase can collect, how Chase can collect\nthose assets, and what those assets are worth. See supra p. 3. And Chase continues to incur\nattorneys’ fees in these collection efforts. Indeed, both parties admit that the post-judgment\nlitigation is not final. According to Winget, the $2 million fee award is “premature” because\n“there is no final judgment.”1 (Winget’s Reply Br. at 4; Winget Supp. Br. at 3.) And while\nChase prefers to confirm its fees sooner rather than later (arguing that we have jurisdiction),\nChase still described its motion for fees as “interim in nature” and that it “will from time to time\nreturn to this Court to seek further orders for the recovery of costs and expenses.” (Mot. for\nCosts, R. 709 at 4; see also Chase’s Br. at 14 (explaining that Chase is still “endeavoring to\ncollect” and has not “finally prevailed in its second collection action”).) This is exactly what\nChase did in October 2018—filing another motion for attorneys’ fees. (Mot. for Costs, R. 862\n\n\n 1Winget’s main argument is that the district court mistakenly considered the 2015 litigation as part of the\n2008 litigation. But this distinction does not matter. Whether we consider the ongoing litigation as “post-judgment”\ncollection efforts—or instead, a separate lawsuit—Winget concedes that “there is no final judgment in the 2015\nAction.” (See Winget Supp. Br. at 3.) Essentially, Winget wants to eat his cake and have it, too. Winget wants us\nto have jurisdiction to reverse the fee award—but he wants us to reverse the fee award because there is no final\njudgment. But if the 2015 litigation is a separate lawsuit, then the general rule applies and “orders awarding interim\nfees in the course of litigation are not appealable.” Webster, 846 F.2d at 1035; see also Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac.\n& Proc. § 3915.6 (2d ed. 2018) (“Ordinarily[,] [an] appeal is not allowed from an order granting an interim award\n[of fees], even if it is immediately enforceable.”).\n\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 7\n\n\nat 1 (asking for fees from December 2016 through June 2018).) The district court has not\nresolved this latest motion.\n\n In sum, it is undisputed that this award for attorneys’ fees is not the last order to be\nentered in the action. Instead, there is plenty left for the district court to resolve. Thus, viewing\nChase’s post-judgment collection efforts as separate and ongoing litigation, the interim award of\nattorneys’ fees is not a final, appealable decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\n\n III.\n\n There are, of course, exceptions to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, such as the “collateral order”\ndoctrine. See Webster, 846 F.2d at 1035. “[T]he collateral order doctrine accommodates a\n‘small class’ of rulings” that do not end the litigation—but which we still consider “final.” Will\nv. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996)).\nThe Supreme Court has refused to expand this “small class” of cases—choosing instead to keep\n“it narrow and selective in its membership.” Id. at 350. This “small category includes only\ndecisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that\nare effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.”\nMohawk Indus., Inc., 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42\n(1995)).\n\n Chase argues that this case fits within one of these narrow exceptions: post-judgment\nmonitoring cases. In these “monitoring” cases, our sister circuits have allowed parties to appeal\ninterim awards of attorneys’ fees. But these cases are unique. They typically stem from consent\ndecrees between parties—agreeing that long open-ended monitoring is needed to cure\nconstitutional violations. For example, in one of the cases Chase relies on, Balla v. Idaho, there\nwas a “twenty-year-old injunction” in place to fix constitutional violations in prisons. 677 F.3d\n910, 912 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 994 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990)\n(finding that it had jurisdiction to review “[a] periodic fee award made during the remedial phase\nof a prisoner civil-rights” matter in a similar long-term monitoring case).\n\n This reveals the key commonality in the monitoring cases that is missing here—the\ninability to obtain post-judgment finality. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1450 (9th Cir.\n\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 8\n\n\n1994) (“The compliance period has not been limited to a definite time frame.”). Because\nmonitoring cases can go on indefinitely, a party can immediately appeal an interim fee award;\notherwise, in some circumstances, the parties could never appeal. See Gautreaux v. Chicago\nHous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Another reason for allowing an immediate\nappeal is that a decree might never be dissolved, so that to treat fee awards as interlocutory might\ndefer appeal to the end of time.”) (citation omitted); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\nInc., 426 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We are persuaded by this logic [in Gates]. In a complex\nenvironmental [clean-up], monitoring will likely continue well into the future . . . for years if not\ndecades.”); Walker v. U.S. Dep’t. of HUD, 99 F.3d 761, 766 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]onsidering the\nongoing and possibly permanent nature of monitoring and preventing further changes to the City\nConsent Decree, it is unlikely that there ever will be a ‘final judgment’ for this court to review.”).\n\n We have recognized this same commonality. Webster, 846 F.2d at 1035. In Webster, we\nhad jurisdiction to resolve an appeal from an interim fee award. But unlike typical interim fee\nawards, the district court “imposed . . . a prospective burden of large monthly fee payments with\nno definite cutoff date,” and it was undisputed that “repayment in the event of appellate reversal\ncould not be assured.” Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 721 (9th Cir. 1988)\n(distinguishing Webster); see also Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The post-\nsettlement fees and costs . . . could continue indefinitely[.]”).\n\n But here, despite the long litigation between the parties, Chase’s collection efforts will\nhave an end date. The district court will eventually enter a final amended judgment, resolving\nwhich assets Chase can collect from, and calculating Chase’s total attorneys’ fees. See, e.g.,\nCent. States, 971 F.2d at 6 (“A contested collection proceeding [unlike monitoring cases] will\nend in a judgment or a series of judgments granting supplementary relief to the plaintiff.”). And\nneither Winget nor Chase suggest that irreparable harm would result if we defer review of this\ninterim award until the district court completes the rest of the post-judgment litigation.\n\n As a result, the $2 million interim attorneys’ fee award is not a “final decision.” And\nbecause our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the district courts,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we\nlack jurisdiction to decide whether the district court correctly awarded Chase additional fees.\nWe dismiss the appeal without addressing the merits. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.\n\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 9\n\n\nRisjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981) (“If the appellate court finds that the order from which a party\nseeks to appeal does not fall within [its appellate jurisdiction], its inquiry is over.”).\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry J. WINGET; Larry J. Winget Living Trust, Defendants-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0069p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-1143\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n LARRY J. WINGET; LARRY J. WINGET LIVING TRUST, │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.\\n Nos. 2:08-cv-13845; 2:15-cv-13469—Avern Cohn, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: December 5, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 10, 2019\\n\\n Before: DONALD, LARSEN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Thomas V. Hubbard, DREW, COOPER & ANDING, P.C., Grand Rapids,\\nMichigan, for Appellants. James W. Ducayet, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for\\nAppellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas V. Hubbard, John E. Anding, DREW, COOPER & ANDING,\\nP.C., Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellants. James W. Ducayet, Kendra L. Stead, SIDLEY\\nAUSTIN LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. This appeal is not the first time we have seen Larry\\nWinget and JPMorgan Chase. Nor will it likely be the last. Winget’s appeal du jour follows the\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\ndistrict court’s award of interim attorneys’ fees to Chase. But because this order is not a “final\\ndecision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we lack jurisdiction and therefore dismiss Winget’s appeal.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n We need not revisit each “chapter in [this] longstanding dispute between the parties.”\\nJPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 602 F. App’x 246, 248 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Winget I”).\\nSuffice it to say, Chase sued Winget “to recover millions of dollars owed to it under a credit\\nagreement between Chase and entities owned and operated by [Winget].” JPMorgan Chase\\nBank, N.A. v. Winget, 678 F. App’x 355, 356 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Winget II”). We decided the\\nmerits of the dispute and awarded Chase over $425 million. But there was a catch. While\\nWinget’s personal trust was on the hook for the full amount, Winget himself—protected by a\\nlimitation in his personal guaranty—owed Chase only $50 million (which he has since paid).\\nWinget I, 602 F. App’x at 258–59.\\n\\n The parties then litigated attorneys’ fees—and whether Winget was personally liable for\\nChase’s $12.6 million in fees and expenses. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 704 F.\\nApp’x 410, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Winget III”). Chase won again. Id. at 414–16. And we\\nexplained in that appeal that despite Winget’s limited personal guaranty, he “is still liable for\\nChase’s costs and expenses associated with collection of the Guaranteed Obligation.” Id. at 418.\\nThe district court then entered a final amended judgment against Winget and his trust. So one\\nthing is clear: Winget and his personal trust owe Chase a lot of money.\\n\\n But Chase’s final judgment against Winget did not end this decade-long saga. Rather\\nthan use the trust’s assets to pay Chase, Winget transferred the assets out of his trust and filed a\\nnew lawsuit—asking the district court to declare that Chase had no recourse against those assets.\\nIn response, Chase filed counterclaims against Winget, alleging that the transfers were fraudulent\\nconveyances designed to avoid paying Chase. The district court consolidated the new lawsuit\\nwith the previous litigation, characterizing it as “the functional equivalent of post-judgment\\nproceedings.” (Order, R. 686 at 2.)\\n\\n The parties are still engaged in these post-judgment proceedings. For example, Winget is\\nfighting over what assets Chase can collect, how Chase can collect those assets, and what those\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\nassets are worth. And as these collection efforts drag on, Chase periodically asks the district\\ncourt for more attorneys’ fees. The district court granted one such motion—awarding Chase\\nanother $2 million. These fees covered Chase’s expenses from June 2015 through November\\n2016. But in doing so, the district court recognized the interim nature of the award, noting that\\n“Chase’s efforts to collect the Guaranteed Obligations are ongoing.” (Order, R. 773 at 1.) These\\nongoing efforts include charging orders, depositions, requests for constructive trusts, writs of\\nexecutions on stocks, continued discovery on the value of the assets in the trust, a potential trial\\nto determine Chase’s damages from Winget’s fraudulent conveyances, and more requests for\\nattorneys’ fees. In sum, Chase’s collection efforts continue in the district court.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Winget now appeals the $2 million interim attorneys’ fees award. To start, however, we\\n“must determine that [we] have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.” Lance v. Coffman,\\n549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007). We generally have jurisdiction only from “final decisions of the\\ndistrict courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision “generally is one which ends the litigation\\non the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Gnesys, Inc. v.\\nGreene, 437 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,\\n486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988)). But this definition is not entirely helpful here. As the Supreme\\nCourt explained, “a claim for attorney’s fees is not part of the merits of the action to which the\\nfees pertain.” Budinich, 486 U.S. at 200. In other words, an award of attorneys’ fees cannot end\\nthe litigation on the merits.\\n\\n So how then do we determine when a fee award is appealable? In most cases, the timing\\nof the award provides the answer. For example, the district court can award attorneys’ fees\\nbefore it decides the merits of the case. We know the answer in this situation; “orders awarding\\ninterim fees in the course of litigation are not appealable.” Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032,\\n1035 (6th Cir. 1988); see also In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Lit., 401 F.3d 143, 156 (3d Cir.\\n2005) (collecting cases) (“[A]n interim award of attorneys’ fees is not, in almost all cases, an\\nappealable final order because it foresees further and additional action by the district court, thus\\ncontinuing, but not concluding, the fee litigation.”). And we would lack jurisdiction because the\\nappeal would be too early. Instead, the general rule would apply: “a party is entitled to a single\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\nappeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,\\n558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863,\\n868 (1994)).\\n\\n The district court can also award attorneys’ fees at the same time it decides the merits of\\nthe case. Or it can give itself time to award attorneys’ fees at substantially the same time.\\nCompare Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i) (requiring a party to move for attorneys’ fees “no later\\nthan 14 days after the entry of judgment”); with id. 58(e) (allowing the district court to extend the\\ntime for filing a notice of appeal to award fees if it “act[s] before a notice of appeal has been\\nfiled”), and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iii) (explaining that the “time to file an appeal runs from\\nthe entry of . . . attorney’s fees under Rule 54 if the district court extends the time to appeal\\nunder Rule 58”); Wikol ex rel. Wikol v. Birmingham Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 360 F.3d 604, 607–\\n10 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining the complexity of these rules). Either way, the result is the same.\\nWhen the district court resolves the merits of the case and the issue of fees together, the general\\nrule applies: a party is entitled to a single appeal.\\n\\n Still, the district court can award attorneys’ fees after it decides the merits of the case.\\nThis scenario is a familiar one—courts routinely resolve attorneys’ fees and costs post-judgment.\\nSee Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e) (“Ordinarily, the entry of judgment may not be delayed, nor the time\\nfor appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees.”); see also, e.g., White v. New\\nHampshire Dep’t. of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 453–54 (1982). But in this situation, the timing\\nof the award is not as helpful. Although some post-judgment awards of attorneys’ fees are\\nimmediately appealable, others are not. To solve this problem, our sister circuits employ a useful\\nrule: “a postjudgment proceeding, for purposes of appeal, must be viewed as a separate lawsuit\\nfrom the action which produced the underlying judgment.” In re Joint E. & So. Dists. Asbestos\\nLitig., 22 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 1994); see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d 479, 490\\n(5th Cir. 2015) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction following a post-judgment discovery\\norder); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Express Freight Lines, Inc., 971 F.2d 5, 6\\n(7th Cir. 1992) (same); Rouse Constr. Int’l, Inc. v. Rouse Constr. Corp., 680 F.2d 743, 745–46\\n(11th Cir. 1982) (same); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, Inc., 937 F.2d 1444,\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\n1449 (9th Cir. 1991) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction following a post-judgment order\\ngranting a debtor examination).\\n\\n This approach especially makes sense here, where the post-judgment proceedings, in\\nlarge part, were prompted by a new lawsuit—albeit one the district court consolidated into the\\nexisting case. Thus, while “[a] postjudgment order might seem final by definition because the\\njudgment is already behind it,” we still do not have a “final decision” under § 1291 until the\\ndistrict court completes the post-judgment proceedings. In re Asbestos Litig., 22 F.3d at 761\\n(quoting Cent. States, 971 F.2d at 6); Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3916 (2d ed. 2018)\\n(“Appeal ordinarily should not be available as to any particular post-judgment proceeding before\\nthe trial court has reached its final disposition. Once the district court has completely disposed\\nof the matter, its decision should be found final.”).\\n\\n This rule is easily applied in most post-judgment cases. A district court typically resolves\\nall attorneys’ fees in a single, final order; completing the post-judgment proceedings. In this\\nsituation, we would have independent jurisdiction over an appeal from the final fee award\\n(distinct from any previous appeal on the merits). See Budinich, 486 U.S. at 202; Gnesys, Inc.,\\n437 F.3d at 488. Indeed, this is the scenario we faced in Winget III. After we decided the merits\\nof the dispute and the district court entered final judgment on remand, it awarded Chase\\nattorneys’ fees post-judgment. Winget III, 704 F. App’x at 414. These attorneys’ fees covered\\nChase’s expenses for the previous years of litigation. We affirmed these fees. And if Winget\\nhad used the trust’s assets to pay the judgment and attorneys’ fees, this case would be over.\\n\\n But he did not—and so we now find ourselves in a different scenario. Winget appeals an\\ninterim award of attorneys’ fees post-judgment, where the post-judgment proceedings are\\nongoing. In other words, this award of attorneys’ fees did not end the post-judgment litigation.\\nThus, applying the post-judgment completeness rule, this appeal is not from a final, appealable\\norder.\\n\\n The Eleventh Circuit confirmed this rule and result—dealing specifically with a post-\\njudgment fee award. Mayer v. Wall Street Equity Grp., Inc., 672 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir.\\n2012) (per curiam) (citing Delaney’s Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 1300, 1304 (11th\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\nCir. 1990)). The district court had competing post-judgment motions for attorneys’ fees. After\\nthe district court denied one motion—but before the court decided the other motion—the\\nplaintiff appealed the decision. The Eleventh Circuit treated the post-judgment proceedings as a\\nseparate and “free-standing” lawsuit—and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because\\nthe post-judgment litigation was ongoing—i.e., “the other fee motion . . . remain[ed]\\noutstanding.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained when the parties should appeal in this\\nsituation: “Only if a postjudgment order is ‘apparently the last order to be entered in the action’\\nis it final and appealable.” Id. (quoting Delaney’s Inc., 894 F.2d at 1304 (quoting 9 Moore’s\\nFed. Prac. ¶ 100.14[1], 196–97 (2d ed. 1988))). This rule makes sense, “to hold otherwise\\ninvites litigants to appeal every attorney’s fees order, even if other requests remain outstanding,\\nresulting in a proliferation of piecemeal or repetitious appeals.” Id.\\n\\n This is the situation we face here. The district court has not completed the post-judgment\\nlitigation. The parties are still fighting over what assets Chase can collect, how Chase can collect\\nthose assets, and what those assets are worth. See supra p. 3. And Chase continues to incur\\nattorneys’ fees in these collection efforts. Indeed, both parties admit that the post-judgment\\nlitigation is not final. According to Winget, the $2 million fee award is “premature” because\\n“there is no final judgment.”1 (Winget’s Reply Br. at 4; Winget Supp. Br. at 3.) And while\\nChase prefers to confirm its fees sooner rather than later (arguing that we have jurisdiction),\\nChase still described its motion for fees as “interim in nature” and that it “will from time to time\\nreturn to this Court to seek further orders for the recovery of costs and expenses.” (Mot. for\\nCosts, R. 709 at 4; see also Chase’s Br. at 14 (explaining that Chase is still “endeavoring to\\ncollect” and has not “finally prevailed in its second collection action”).) This is exactly what\\nChase did in October 2018—filing another motion for attorneys’ fees. (Mot. for Costs, R. 862\\n\\n\\n 1Winget’s main argument is that the district court mistakenly considered the 2015 litigation as part of the\\n2008 litigation. But this distinction does not matter. Whether we consider the ongoing litigation as “post-judgment”\\ncollection efforts—or instead, a separate lawsuit—Winget concedes that “there is no final judgment in the 2015\\nAction.” (See Winget Supp. Br. at 3.) Essentially, Winget wants to eat his cake and have it, too. Winget wants us\\nto have jurisdiction to reverse the fee award—but he wants us to reverse the fee award because there is no final\\njudgment. But if the 2015 litigation is a separate lawsuit, then the general rule applies and “orders awarding interim\\nfees in the course of litigation are not appealable.” Webster, 846 F.2d at 1035; see also Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac.\\n& Proc. § 3915.6 (2d ed. 2018) (“Ordinarily[,] [an] appeal is not allowed from an order granting an interim award\\n[of fees], even if it is immediately enforceable.”).\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nat 1 (asking for fees from December 2016 through June 2018).) The district court has not\\nresolved this latest motion.\\n\\n In sum, it is undisputed that this award for attorneys’ fees is not the last order to be\\nentered in the action. Instead, there is plenty left for the district court to resolve. Thus, viewing\\nChase’s post-judgment collection efforts as separate and ongoing litigation, the interim award of\\nattorneys’ fees is not a final, appealable decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n There are, of course, exceptions to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, such as the “collateral order”\\ndoctrine. See Webster, 846 F.2d at 1035. “[T]he collateral order doctrine accommodates a\\n‘small class’ of rulings” that do not end the litigation—but which we still consider “final.” Will\\nv. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996)).\\nThe Supreme Court has refused to expand this “small class” of cases—choosing instead to keep\\n“it narrow and selective in its membership.” Id. at 350. This “small category includes only\\ndecisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that\\nare effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.”\\nMohawk Indus., Inc., 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42\\n(1995)).\\n\\n Chase argues that this case fits within one of these narrow exceptions: post-judgment\\nmonitoring cases. In these “monitoring” cases, our sister circuits have allowed parties to appeal\\ninterim awards of attorneys’ fees. But these cases are unique. They typically stem from consent\\ndecrees between parties—agreeing that long open-ended monitoring is needed to cure\\nconstitutional violations. For example, in one of the cases Chase relies on, Balla v. Idaho, there\\nwas a “twenty-year-old injunction” in place to fix constitutional violations in prisons. 677 F.3d\\n910, 912 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 994 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990)\\n(finding that it had jurisdiction to review “[a] periodic fee award made during the remedial phase\\nof a prisoner civil-rights” matter in a similar long-term monitoring case).\\n\\n This reveals the key commonality in the monitoring cases that is missing here—the\\ninability to obtain post-judgment finality. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1450 (9th Cir.\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\n1994) (“The compliance period has not been limited to a definite time frame.”). Because\\nmonitoring cases can go on indefinitely, a party can immediately appeal an interim fee award;\\notherwise, in some circumstances, the parties could never appeal. See Gautreaux v. Chicago\\nHous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Another reason for allowing an immediate\\nappeal is that a decree might never be dissolved, so that to treat fee awards as interlocutory might\\ndefer appeal to the end of time.”) (citation omitted); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 426 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We are persuaded by this logic [in Gates]. In a complex\\nenvironmental [clean-up], monitoring will likely continue well into the future . . . for years if not\\ndecades.”); Walker v. U.S. Dep’t. of HUD, 99 F.3d 761, 766 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]onsidering the\\nongoing and possibly permanent nature of monitoring and preventing further changes to the City\\nConsent Decree, it is unlikely that there ever will be a ‘final judgment’ for this court to review.”).\\n\\n We have recognized this same commonality. Webster, 846 F.2d at 1035. In Webster, we\\nhad jurisdiction to resolve an appeal from an interim fee award. But unlike typical interim fee\\nawards, the district court “imposed . . . a prospective burden of large monthly fee payments with\\nno definite cutoff date,” and it was undisputed that “repayment in the event of appellate reversal\\ncould not be assured.” Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 721 (9th Cir. 1988)\\n(distinguishing Webster); see also Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The post-\\nsettlement fees and costs . . . could continue indefinitely[.]”).\\n\\n But here, despite the long litigation between the parties, Chase’s collection efforts will\\nhave an end date. The district court will eventually enter a final amended judgment, resolving\\nwhich assets Chase can collect from, and calculating Chase’s total attorneys’ fees. See, e.g.,\\nCent. States, 971 F.2d at 6 (“A contested collection proceeding [unlike monitoring cases] will\\nend in a judgment or a series of judgments granting supplementary relief to the plaintiff.”). And\\nneither Winget nor Chase suggest that irreparable harm would result if we defer review of this\\ninterim award until the district court completes the rest of the post-judgment litigation.\\n\\n As a result, the $2 million interim attorneys’ fee award is not a “final decision.” And\\nbecause our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the district courts,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we\\nlack jurisdiction to decide whether the district court correctly awarded Chase additional fees.\\nWe dismiss the appeal without addressing the merits. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.\\n\\f No. 18-1143 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\nRisjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981) (“If the appellate court finds that the order from which a party\\nseeks to appeal does not fall within [its appellate jurisdiction], its inquiry is over.”).\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1663,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4608519,"string":"4,608,519"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"GOLD FOREVER MUSIC, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1789"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"McKeague, Griffin, Nalbandian\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"McKEAGUE\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0068p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n GOLD FOREVER MUSIC, INC., ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-1789\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │\\n Defendant-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.\\n No. 2:17-cv-13927—George Caram Steeh, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 10, 2019\\n\\n Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Neal Nusholtz, NEAL NUSHOLTZ, P.L.L.C., Troy, Michigan, for Appellant.\\nJoan I. Oppenheimer, Geoffrey J. Klimas, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. The statute of limitations for a wrongful levy action cannot\\nbegin until there has been a levy that attaches to the property at issue. In this case, notices of\\nlevy in 2012 did not constitute levies on royalties generated after the notices were served. For\\nthe reasons set forth below, the statute of limitations does not bar Gold Forever’s wrongful levy\\naction. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for\\nfurther proceedings.\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 2\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Gold Forever Music, Inc. (Gold Forever) is a music publishing company that has entered\\ninto agreements with various artists entitling it to half of the royalties collected for the sale and\\nperformance of those artists’ work. Instead of directly licensing third parties to use music from\\nits catalog, Gold Forever works with Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and Universal Music\\nPublishing (Universal) to do so. These companies license others to use Gold Forever’s music,\\ncollect the royalties pursuant to those licensing agreements, and remit those royalties to Gold\\nForever.\\n\\n Edward Holland, Jr. is the sole owner of Gold Forever. He was a Motown artist and has\\nco-written several famous songs such as “You Can’t Hurry Love” by the Supremes and Phil\\nCollins, “Where Did Our Love Go” and “Stop In the Name of Love” by the Supremes, “How\\nSweet It Is (To Be Loved by You)” by Marvin Gaye and James Taylor, “You Keep Me Hangin’\\nOn” by Vanilla Fudge and Kim Wilde, “Just a Little Bit of You” by Michael Jackson, and many\\nmore. His music forms some, but not all, of Gold Forever’s catalog. Holland owes millions of\\ndollars to the IRS in taxes, interest, and penalties.\\n\\n In 2012, to collect on Holland’s tax deficiency, the IRS served two notices of levy, one to\\nBMI and one to Universal. The notices identified Gold Forever as the “alter ego/nominee\\ntransferee of Edward Holland, Jr.” The notices of levy required the companies to remit to the\\nIRS “property and rights to property . . . that you have or which you are already obligated to pay\\n[Gold Forever].” It is unclear from the complaint whether BMI and Universal remitted any\\nmonies to the IRS between 2012 and 2016. Beginning on October 6, 2016, through the date of\\nthe complaint, BMI and Universal remitted a combined $967,140.76 to the IRS. Gold Forever\\nmade requests for refunds to the IRS within nine months of BMI and Universal remitting the\\nfunds.\\n\\n On December 6, 2017, Gold Forever filed a wrongful levy action for the funds remitted\\nbeginning on October 6, 2016. Gold Forever’s complaint alleged that it has never been the alter\\nego or nominee of Holland and that most, if not all, of the money remitted by BMI and Universal\\nbelongs either to Gold Forever or to artists other than Holland. The government moved to\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 3\\n\\n\\ndismiss Gold Forever’s wrongful levy suit as untimely, having been filed after the statute of\\nlimitations had run. The district court agreed with the government and granted the motion to\\ndismiss.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, construing the complaint in the light\\nmost favorable to the non-movant, accepting their well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and\\ndrawing all reasonable inferences in their favor. Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,\\n731 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n The IRS has several methods to collect monies owed by delinquent taxpayers, one of\\nwhich is the power of levy. See 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a). Levy “includes the power of distraint and\\nseizure by any means.” Id. § 6331(b). A levy can reach “all property and rights to property . . .\\nbelonging to [the taxpayer].” Id. § 6331(a). In addition to levying on property in the taxpayer’s\\ncontrol, the IRS can levy on property belonging to the taxpayer under another’s control.\\n\\n In the situation where a taxpayer’s property is held by another, a notice of levy\\n upon the custodian is customarily served pursuant to § 6332(a). This notice gives\\n the IRS the right to all property levied upon, and creates a custodial relationship\\n between the person holding the property and the IRS so that the property comes\\n into the constructive possession of the Government. If the custodian honors the\\n levy, he is “discharged from any obligation or liability to the delinquent taxpayer\\n with respect to such property or rights to property arising from such surrender or\\n payment.” § 6332(d). If, on the other hand, the custodian refuses to honor a levy,\\n he incurs liability to the Government for his refusal.\\n\\nUnited States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 720–21 (1985) (some citations omitted).\\n\\n There are only two defenses for failing to comply with the levy demand. First, that the\\nthird party is “neither ‘in possession of’ nor ‘obligated with respect to’ property or rights to\\nproperty belonging to the delinquent taxpayer” and second, that the property is “subject to a prior\\njudicial attachment.” Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 722 (citation omitted). The third\\nparty must comply with the levy demand even if it or any other party claims an interest in the\\nlevied property.\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 4\\n\\n\\n Any person other than the taxpayer who claims an interest in the levied property may\\npursue a wrongful levy action against the United States under 26 U.S.C. § 7426(a) for recovery\\nof the levied property. An action under § 7426(a) is “the exclusive remedy for an innocent third\\nparty whose property is confiscated by the IRS to satisfy another person’s tax liability.”\\nEC Term of Years Tr. v. United States, 550 U.S. 429, 433 (2007) (citation omitted). The\\nwrongful levy action “may be brought without regard to whether such property has been\\nsurrendered.” 26 U.S.C. § 7426.\\n\\n At the time relevant to this appeal, a wrongful levy action could be brought only within\\nnine months “from the date of the levy or agreement giving rise to such action.” Id. § 6532(c)(1)\\n(2017).1 A request for the return of the levied property under 26 U.S.C. § 6342 extended the\\nnine-month period by twelve months from the date of filing the request so long as the request fell\\nwithin the nine-month limitations period. Id. § 6532(c)(2) (2017); see Carter v. United States,\\n110 F. App’x 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004). When the property or obligation levied on is intangible,\\nwe have held that the notice of levy qualifies as the “date of the levy” sufficient to start running\\nthe statute of limitations for a wrongful levy action. See State Bank of Fraser v. United States,\\n861 F.2d 954, 967 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[S]ervice of the notices of levy on [taxpayer’s] accounts\\nreceivable debtors commenced the running of the statute of limitations.”); see also Phelps v.\\nUnited States, 421 U.S. 330, 337 (1975) (“Historically, service of notice has been sufficient to\\nseize a debt, and notice of levy and demand are equivalent to seizure.” (citations omitted)).\\n\\n As relevant here, a levy may “extend only to property possessed and obligations existing\\nat the time thereof.”2 26 U.S.C. § 6331(b). An applicable regulation in the CFR explains, by\\nway of example, that a bank account can be levied on, which attaches the entirety of the contents\\nto which the taxpayer has a property right. 26 C.F.R § 301.6331-1(a). But, the regulation notes,\\nif there is a deposit made into the same bank account subsequent to the levy, the levy does not\\nreach that new deposit, and the IRS must issue a subsequent levy to attach those funds. Id.\\n“Obligations exist when the liability of the obligor is fixed and determinable although the right to\\n\\n 1The current limitations period is two years. 26 U.S.C. § 6532(c)(1).\\n 2The statute makes narrow exceptions to this rule, permitting continuing levies for salary, wages, and\\ncertain specified payments. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6331(e), (h).\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 5\\n\\n\\nreceive payment thereof may be deferred until a later date.” Id.; see also Tull v. United States,\\n69 F.3d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1995). An obligation can come due after the date of the levy and still\\nbe fixed and determinable. As the CFR points out, where a taxpayer has sold personal property\\non the first day of the month and has agreed that the purchaser will remit payment on the last day\\nof the month, that obligation is fixed and determinable such that a levy made in the middle of\\nthat month still reaches the payment when it comes due. 26 C.F.R § 301.6331-1(a).\\n\\n Taking the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to Gold Forever, the\\nroyalties remitted beginning in 2016 were generated after the 2012 notices of levy. The only\\nproperty or obligation to which the levy could potentially attach in 2012 were Gold Forever’s\\nagreements with BMI and Universal to remit future royalties to Gold Forever. So, the question\\non appeal is whether the 2012 notices of levy reach the royalties generated after 2012 by virtue\\nof the agreements in place when the notices of levy were served.\\n\\n The answer to that question depends on whether the royalties remitted to the IRS\\nbeginning in 2016 were fixed and determinable in 2012 when the notices of levy issued. If they\\nwere not fixed and determinable, the notices of levy could not reach the royalties and the\\nlimitations period could not begin to run. If they were fixed and determinable, the notices of\\nlevy would have been sufficient to qualify as the “date of the levy” under § 6532(c)(1),\\nbeginning the limitations period.\\n\\n Determining whether the 2012 levies attached to royalties acquired after the notices of\\nlevy is necessary to finding when the limitations period began to run for a wrongful levy action\\non those royalties. The government insists, without explanation, that determining the scope of\\nthe 2012 levies affects only the relief that could be awarded in the wrongful levy action and that\\nconsidering the scope of the levies conflates “the statute of limitations with the merits of the\\nclaim.” The government’s concern is misplaced. Whether the levy attached to property is not\\npart of the merits of a wrongful levy action—i.e., that the levy was made on property or a right to\\nproperty in which the non-taxpayer has an interest. See Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at\\n739 (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 695 (1983)). A levy attaching to property\\nor the right to property is necessarily antecedent for the statute of limitations to begin running on\\na wrongful levy action concerning that property.\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 6\\n\\n\\n We have not previously addressed when an existing contractual obligation to pay the\\ntaxpayer in the future is sufficiently fixed and determinable such that a levy can attach to that\\nfuture payment. Decisions from our sister circuits provide useful guiderails.\\n\\n Prior to the levy statute being amended to permit continuing levies on wages and salaries,\\nthe Second Circuit noted that a levy could not reach future earnings from salary or wages\\nbecause “[t]hey are contingent upon performance of a contract of service and represent no\\nexisting rights of property.” United States v. Long Island Drug Co., 115 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir.\\n1940); see also Wagner v. United States, 573 F.2d 447, 454 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[Taxpayer’s] future\\nwages and commissions were contingent on his continued employment and thus did not\\nrepresent an existing property right to which a lien[3] could attach. [Taxpayer] had no present\\nright to the wages and commissions.”).\\n\\n Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that a levy could not reach the proceeds of an auction\\nof the taxpayer’s property that had not been conducted when the levy was served. Tull, 69 F.3d\\n394. The taxpayer had negotiated with an auctioneer to auction some of the taxpayer’s assets.\\nPrior to the auction, the auctioneer received a notice of levy seeking the auction proceeds. Id. at\\n395. The question on appeal was whether the future auction proceeds were fixed and\\ndeterminable in light of the agreement between the taxpayer and the auctioneer and the\\nsignificant preparations that had been made by the auctioneer such as circulating advertising\\nbrochures and cleaning some of the assets to be sold. Id. at 396. The Ninth Circuit observed that\\n“an obligation to attempt to sell some as yet undetermined amount of property for an as yet\\nundetermined price to as yet undetermined buyers” was not fixed and determinable. Id. at 397.\\nThe court commented:\\n\\n An actual sale of property would establish both the price of that property and the\\n duty of the buyer to pay the price, even if the date of payment were deferred. On\\n the other hand, if a prospective buyer had not yet agreed to pay anything and was\\n only thinking about whether he would buy at all, it could hardly be argued that the\\n possible ultimate payment was property of the prospective seller. If the buyer did\\n later agree to purchase at a certain price, a new levy would reach that amount, just\\n as it would reach a later deposit in a bank. But to call an obligation both fixed\\n\\n 3The definition of property and rights to property is the same for liens under § 6321 and levies under\\n§ 6331. See Dominion Tr. Co. of Tenn. v. United States, 7 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1993).\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 7\\n\\n\\n and determinable when there has been no sale at all, no prospective buyer, no\\n final determination of what will be sold, and no notion of the price is to strip the\\n words “fixed and determinable” of all meaning.\\n\\nId. at 398.\\n\\n The Ninth Circuit distinguished Tull from its prior decision in United States v. Hemmen,\\n51 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995). In Hemmen, the court held that an allowed administrative claim in\\nan unsettled bankruptcy was fixed and determinable. Id. at 885. The taxpayer had briefly\\nadministered a Chapter 11 bankruptcy as the debtor-in-possession before the proceeding was\\nconverted to a Chapter 7 liquidation and a trustee was appointed. Id. at 886. The bankruptcy\\ncourt awarded the taxpayer an allowed administrative expense for his work as administrator prior\\nto the conversion to Chapter 7. While bankruptcy proceedings were ongoing, the Chapter 7\\ntrustee received a notice of levy to surrender property belonging to the taxpayer. The trustee did\\nnot surrender any property at that time. The IRS sought to hold the trustee personally\\nresponsible for failing to honor the levy. The trustee defended on the basis that he was not in\\npossession of, or obligated with respect to, the taxpayer’s property when the levy was served\\nbecause bankruptcy was ongoing and the amount available to pay administrative claims had not\\nbeen determined. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the allowed administrative expense was fixed\\nand determinable because the underlying performance giving rise to the claim was complete and\\nthe claim had been allowed. Id. at 890. The mere possibility of “defeasance due to factors\\nhaving no bearing on the underlying performance” did not affect the fact that the obligation was\\ndeterminable because “[u]nlike a requirement that the extent of an obligation be ‘determined,’\\nthe term ‘determinable’ requires only that the sum be capable of precise measurement in the\\nfuture.” Id.\\n\\n These cases stand for the principle that a contractual obligation to pay money (or remit\\nproperty) to the taxpayer after the date of the levy is “fixed” where performance is complete and\\nall that remains under the contract is payment (or provision of property) to the taxpayer, and\\n“determinable” if, at the time the levy is served, the amount that the taxpayer will be owed can\\nbe ascertained with reasonable accuracy, regardless of whether that amount is subject to potential\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 8\\n\\n\\ndefeasance.4 This makes sense. “The underlying principle justifying the administrative levy is\\nthe need of the government promptly to secure its revenues.” Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S.\\nat 721 (quoting Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931) (cleaned up)). Third parties\\nwill be able to determine at the time they receive the notice of levy precisely what the levy\\nreaches, rather than guessing at whether it creates a persistent nebulous liability. This means the\\nIRS will know immediately whether its levy will satisfy the delinquent tax obligation or if it will\\nneed to seek additional monies elsewhere.\\n\\n Although the district court was correct that service of the notice of levy can start the\\nstatute of limitations running for intangible property, it is necessary for the notice of levy to\\nattach to the property that is the subject of the wrongful levy action before the statute can run. In\\nsupplemental briefing submitted at this court’s direction, the government concedes that “[t]he\\nrecord does not contain sufficient information to determine whether Gold Forever’s right to\\nreceive future royalties was attached by the 2012 levies.” Appellee Suppl. Br. 5. Therefore,\\nunder the motion to dismiss standard, the district court should have drawn factual inferences in\\nGold Forever’s favor and concluded that nothing remitted in 2016 and beyond represented any\\nobligation owed in 2012—i.e., the royalties had not yet been generated and so there was more\\nremaining to be done under the contract, such as finding licensees and collecting royalties, than\\nto simply remit royalties to Gold Forever. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Gold\\nForever, the only thing that existed in 2012 was the obligation to remit royalties generated in the\\nfuture. These royalties are similar to, if not even more indefinite than, the property to be\\nauctioned in Tull. Gold Forever’s agreements with Universal and BMI, therefore should have\\nbeen construed as merely “an obligation to attempt to sell some as yet undetermined amount of\\nproperty for an as yet undetermined price to as yet undetermined buyers.” Tull, 69 F.3d at 397.\\n\\n 4We find additional support for this formulation in the body of tax law concerning whether an expense is\\nsufficiently incurred to entitle an accrual-basis taxpayer to deduct it under 26 U.S.C. §162(a). That determination\\nrests on whether “all events” have occurred to “fix the amount of the tax and determine the liability of the taxpayer\\nto pay it.” United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926). The “all events” test has two prongs: “First, all the\\nevents must have occurred which establish the fact of the liability. Second, the amount must be capable of being\\ndetermined with reasonable accuracy.” Chrysler Corp. v. Comm’r, 436 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting\\nChrysler Corp. v. Comm’r, No. 22148–97, 2000 WL 1231528, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 334, T.C.M. (RIA) 2000–283\\n(Aug. 31, 2000) (cleaned up)). In explaining the first prong, the Supreme Court noted that a liability is fixed when\\n“the obligation to pay[] has become final and definite in amount.” Sec. Flour Mills Co. v. Comm’r, 321 U.S. 281,\\n287 (1944).\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 9\\n\\n\\n Further, the district court should have drawn an inference in Gold Forever’s favor that the\\nearliest the statute of limitations could have begun running on Gold Forever’s claim was when\\nthe IRS seized Gold Forever’s funds held by BMI and Universal. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6331(b)\\n(“The term ‘levy’ as used in this title includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means.”);\\nId. § 6532(c)(l) (2017) (providing that a wrongful levy action can only be brought within nine\\nmonths “from the date of the levy or agreement giving rise to such action”). Here, the complaint\\nalleges that Gold Forever filed requests for the return of the remitted funds within that nine-\\nmonth period, and the complaint was filed within the twelve-month extension period provided to\\nindividuals who file such requests with the IRS. Id. § 6532(c)(2). Therefore, the district court\\nshould have concluded that, on the face of the complaint, this case was properly filed within the\\nstatute of limitations.\\n\\n It may be, as the government suggests, that nothing the IRS did after 2012 constituted a\\nsubsequent levy. Thus, the funds remitted beginning in 2016 were not sent pursuant to a levy\\nand therefore there could be no wrongful levy. See Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Johnson City v.\\nUnited States, 367 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), aff’d, 486 F.2d 1405 (6th Cir. 1973)\\n(“If there was no levy, certainly there could have been no ‘wrongful’ levy.”). This argument,\\nhowever, was not raised by the government in its motion to dismiss below, nor was it addressed\\nby the district court. “In general, we will not review arguments or issues that a party raises for\\nthe first time on appeal.” Estate of Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 714 F.3d 920, 925 (6th Cir.\\n2013) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918, 922\\n(6th Cir. 2006)). We decline to do so here.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and\\nREMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385772/\", \"author_raw\": \"McKEAGUE\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MCKEAGUE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRIFFIN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"NALBANDIAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608519/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: GOLD FOREVER MUSIC, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0068p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n GOLD FOREVER MUSIC, INC., ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\n │\n > No. 18-1789\n v. │\n │\n │\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │\n Defendant-Appellee. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.\n No. 2:17-cv-13927—George Caram Steeh, District Judge.\n\n Decided and Filed: April 10, 2019\n\n Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nON BRIEF: Neal Nusholtz, NEAL NUSHOLTZ, P.L.L.C., Troy, Michigan, for Appellant.\nJoan I. Oppenheimer, Geoffrey J. Klimas, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. The statute of limitations for a wrongful levy action cannot\nbegin until there has been a levy that attaches to the property at issue. In this case, notices of\nlevy in 2012 did not constitute levies on royalties generated after the notices were served. For\nthe reasons set forth below, the statute of limitations does not bar Gold Forever’s wrongful levy\naction. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for\nfurther proceedings.\n\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 2\n\n\n I.\n\n Gold Forever Music, Inc. (Gold Forever) is a music publishing company that has entered\ninto agreements with various artists entitling it to half of the royalties collected for the sale and\nperformance of those artists’ work. Instead of directly licensing third parties to use music from\nits catalog, Gold Forever works with Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and Universal Music\nPublishing (Universal) to do so. These companies license others to use Gold Forever’s music,\ncollect the royalties pursuant to those licensing agreements, and remit those royalties to Gold\nForever.\n\n Edward Holland, Jr. is the sole owner of Gold Forever. He was a Motown artist and has\nco-written several famous songs such as “You Can’t Hurry Love” by the Supremes and Phil\nCollins, “Where Did Our Love Go” and “Stop In the Name of Love” by the Supremes, “How\nSweet It Is (To Be Loved by You)” by Marvin Gaye and James Taylor, “You Keep Me Hangin’\nOn” by Vanilla Fudge and Kim Wilde, “Just a Little Bit of You” by Michael Jackson, and many\nmore. His music forms some, but not all, of Gold Forever’s catalog. Holland owes millions of\ndollars to the IRS in taxes, interest, and penalties.\n\n In 2012, to collect on Holland’s tax deficiency, the IRS served two notices of levy, one to\nBMI and one to Universal. The notices identified Gold Forever as the “alter ego/nominee\ntransferee of Edward Holland, Jr.” The notices of levy required the companies to remit to the\nIRS “property and rights to property . . . that you have or which you are already obligated to pay\n[Gold Forever].” It is unclear from the complaint whether BMI and Universal remitted any\nmonies to the IRS between 2012 and 2016. Beginning on October 6, 2016, through the date of\nthe complaint, BMI and Universal remitted a combined $967,140.76 to the IRS. Gold Forever\nmade requests for refunds to the IRS within nine months of BMI and Universal remitting the\nfunds.\n\n On December 6, 2017, Gold Forever filed a wrongful levy action for the funds remitted\nbeginning on October 6, 2016. Gold Forever’s complaint alleged that it has never been the alter\nego or nominee of Holland and that most, if not all, of the money remitted by BMI and Universal\nbelongs either to Gold Forever or to artists other than Holland. The government moved to\n\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 3\n\n\ndismiss Gold Forever’s wrongful levy suit as untimely, having been filed after the statute of\nlimitations had run. The district court agreed with the government and granted the motion to\ndismiss.\n\n II.\n\n We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, construing the complaint in the light\nmost favorable to the non-movant, accepting their well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and\ndrawing all reasonable inferences in their favor. Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,\n731 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 2013).\n\n The IRS has several methods to collect monies owed by delinquent taxpayers, one of\nwhich is the power of levy. See 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a). Levy “includes the power of distraint and\nseizure by any means.” Id. § 6331(b). A levy can reach “all property and rights to property . . .\nbelonging to [the taxpayer].” Id. § 6331(a). In addition to levying on property in the taxpayer’s\ncontrol, the IRS can levy on property belonging to the taxpayer under another’s control.\n\n In the situation where a taxpayer’s property is held by another, a notice of levy\n upon the custodian is customarily served pursuant to § 6332(a). This notice gives\n the IRS the right to all property levied upon, and creates a custodial relationship\n between the person holding the property and the IRS so that the property comes\n into the constructive possession of the Government. If the custodian honors the\n levy, he is “discharged from any obligation or liability to the delinquent taxpayer\n with respect to such property or rights to property arising from such surrender or\n payment.” § 6332(d). If, on the other hand, the custodian refuses to honor a levy,\n he incurs liability to the Government for his refusal.\n\nUnited States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 720–21 (1985) (some citations omitted).\n\n There are only two defenses for failing to comply with the levy demand. First, that the\nthird party is “neither ‘in possession of’ nor ‘obligated with respect to’ property or rights to\nproperty belonging to the delinquent taxpayer” and second, that the property is “subject to a prior\njudicial attachment.” Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 722 (citation omitted). The third\nparty must comply with the levy demand even if it or any other party claims an interest in the\nlevied property.\n\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 4\n\n\n Any person other than the taxpayer who claims an interest in the levied property may\npursue a wrongful levy action against the United States under 26 U.S.C. § 7426(a) for recovery\nof the levied property. An action under § 7426(a) is “the exclusive remedy for an innocent third\nparty whose property is confiscated by the IRS to satisfy another person’s tax liability.”\nEC Term of Years Tr. v. United States, 550 U.S. 429, 433 (2007) (citation omitted). The\nwrongful levy action “may be brought without regard to whether such property has been\nsurrendered.” 26 U.S.C. § 7426.\n\n At the time relevant to this appeal, a wrongful levy action could be brought only within\nnine months “from the date of the levy or agreement giving rise to such action.” Id. § 6532(c)(1)\n(2017).1 A request for the return of the levied property under 26 U.S.C. § 6342 extended the\nnine-month period by twelve months from the date of filing the request so long as the request fell\nwithin the nine-month limitations period. Id. § 6532(c)(2) (2017); see Carter v. United States,\n110 F. App’x 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004). When the property or obligation levied on is intangible,\nwe have held that the notice of levy qualifies as the “date of the levy” sufficient to start running\nthe statute of limitations for a wrongful levy action. See State Bank of Fraser v. United States,\n861 F.2d 954, 967 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[S]ervice of the notices of levy on [taxpayer’s] accounts\nreceivable debtors commenced the running of the statute of limitations.”); see also Phelps v.\nUnited States, 421 U.S. 330, 337 (1975) (“Historically, service of notice has been sufficient to\nseize a debt, and notice of levy and demand are equivalent to seizure.” (citations omitted)).\n\n As relevant here, a levy may “extend only to property possessed and obligations existing\nat the time thereof.”2 26 U.S.C. § 6331(b). An applicable regulation in the CFR explains, by\nway of example, that a bank account can be levied on, which attaches the entirety of the contents\nto which the taxpayer has a property right. 26 C.F.R § 301.6331-1(a). But, the regulation notes,\nif there is a deposit made into the same bank account subsequent to the levy, the levy does not\nreach that new deposit, and the IRS must issue a subsequent levy to attach those funds. Id.\n“Obligations exist when the liability of the obligor is fixed and determinable although the right to\n\n 1The current limitations period is two years. 26 U.S.C. § 6532(c)(1).\n 2The statute makes narrow exceptions to this rule, permitting continuing levies for salary, wages, and\ncertain specified payments. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6331(e), (h).\n\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 5\n\n\nreceive payment thereof may be deferred until a later date.” Id.; see also Tull v. United States,\n69 F.3d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1995). An obligation can come due after the date of the levy and still\nbe fixed and determinable. As the CFR points out, where a taxpayer has sold personal property\non the first day of the month and has agreed that the purchaser will remit payment on the last day\nof the month, that obligation is fixed and determinable such that a levy made in the middle of\nthat month still reaches the payment when it comes due. 26 C.F.R § 301.6331-1(a).\n\n Taking the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to Gold Forever, the\nroyalties remitted beginning in 2016 were generated after the 2012 notices of levy. The only\nproperty or obligation to which the levy could potentially attach in 2012 were Gold Forever’s\nagreements with BMI and Universal to remit future royalties to Gold Forever. So, the question\non appeal is whether the 2012 notices of levy reach the royalties generated after 2012 by virtue\nof the agreements in place when the notices of levy were served.\n\n The answer to that question depends on whether the royalties remitted to the IRS\nbeginning in 2016 were fixed and determinable in 2012 when the notices of levy issued. If they\nwere not fixed and determinable, the notices of levy could not reach the royalties and the\nlimitations period could not begin to run. If they were fixed and determinable, the notices of\nlevy would have been sufficient to qualify as the “date of the levy” under § 6532(c)(1),\nbeginning the limitations period.\n\n Determining whether the 2012 levies attached to royalties acquired after the notices of\nlevy is necessary to finding when the limitations period began to run for a wrongful levy action\non those royalties. The government insists, without explanation, that determining the scope of\nthe 2012 levies affects only the relief that could be awarded in the wrongful levy action and that\nconsidering the scope of the levies conflates “the statute of limitations with the merits of the\nclaim.” The government’s concern is misplaced. Whether the levy attached to property is not\npart of the merits of a wrongful levy action—i.e., that the levy was made on property or a right to\nproperty in which the non-taxpayer has an interest. See Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at\n739 (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 695 (1983)). A levy attaching to property\nor the right to property is necessarily antecedent for the statute of limitations to begin running on\na wrongful levy action concerning that property.\n\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 6\n\n\n We have not previously addressed when an existing contractual obligation to pay the\ntaxpayer in the future is sufficiently fixed and determinable such that a levy can attach to that\nfuture payment. Decisions from our sister circuits provide useful guiderails.\n\n Prior to the levy statute being amended to permit continuing levies on wages and salaries,\nthe Second Circuit noted that a levy could not reach future earnings from salary or wages\nbecause “[t]hey are contingent upon performance of a contract of service and represent no\nexisting rights of property.” United States v. Long Island Drug Co., 115 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir.\n1940); see also Wagner v. United States, 573 F.2d 447, 454 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[Taxpayer’s] future\nwages and commissions were contingent on his continued employment and thus did not\nrepresent an existing property right to which a lien[3] could attach. [Taxpayer] had no present\nright to the wages and commissions.”).\n\n Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that a levy could not reach the proceeds of an auction\nof the taxpayer’s property that had not been conducted when the levy was served. Tull, 69 F.3d\n394. The taxpayer had negotiated with an auctioneer to auction some of the taxpayer’s assets.\nPrior to the auction, the auctioneer received a notice of levy seeking the auction proceeds. Id. at\n395. The question on appeal was whether the future auction proceeds were fixed and\ndeterminable in light of the agreement between the taxpayer and the auctioneer and the\nsignificant preparations that had been made by the auctioneer such as circulating advertising\nbrochures and cleaning some of the assets to be sold. Id. at 396. The Ninth Circuit observed that\n“an obligation to attempt to sell some as yet undetermined amount of property for an as yet\nundetermined price to as yet undetermined buyers” was not fixed and determinable. Id. at 397.\nThe court commented:\n\n An actual sale of property would establish both the price of that property and the\n duty of the buyer to pay the price, even if the date of payment were deferred. On\n the other hand, if a prospective buyer had not yet agreed to pay anything and was\n only thinking about whether he would buy at all, it could hardly be argued that the\n possible ultimate payment was property of the prospective seller. If the buyer did\n later agree to purchase at a certain price, a new levy would reach that amount, just\n as it would reach a later deposit in a bank. But to call an obligation both fixed\n\n 3The definition of property and rights to property is the same for liens under § 6321 and levies under\n§ 6331. See Dominion Tr. Co. of Tenn. v. United States, 7 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1993).\n\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 7\n\n\n and determinable when there has been no sale at all, no prospective buyer, no\n final determination of what will be sold, and no notion of the price is to strip the\n words “fixed and determinable” of all meaning.\n\nId. at 398.\n\n The Ninth Circuit distinguished Tull from its prior decision in United States v. Hemmen,\n51 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995). In Hemmen, the court held that an allowed administrative claim in\nan unsettled bankruptcy was fixed and determinable. Id. at 885. The taxpayer had briefly\nadministered a Chapter 11 bankruptcy as the debtor-in-possession before the proceeding was\nconverted to a Chapter 7 liquidation and a trustee was appointed. Id. at 886. The bankruptcy\ncourt awarded the taxpayer an allowed administrative expense for his work as administrator prior\nto the conversion to Chapter 7. While bankruptcy proceedings were ongoing, the Chapter 7\ntrustee received a notice of levy to surrender property belonging to the taxpayer. The trustee did\nnot surrender any property at that time. The IRS sought to hold the trustee personally\nresponsible for failing to honor the levy. The trustee defended on the basis that he was not in\npossession of, or obligated with respect to, the taxpayer’s property when the levy was served\nbecause bankruptcy was ongoing and the amount available to pay administrative claims had not\nbeen determined. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the allowed administrative expense was fixed\nand determinable because the underlying performance giving rise to the claim was complete and\nthe claim had been allowed. Id. at 890. The mere possibility of “defeasance due to factors\nhaving no bearing on the underlying performance” did not affect the fact that the obligation was\ndeterminable because “[u]nlike a requirement that the extent of an obligation be ‘determined,’\nthe term ‘determinable’ requires only that the sum be capable of precise measurement in the\nfuture.” Id.\n\n These cases stand for the principle that a contractual obligation to pay money (or remit\nproperty) to the taxpayer after the date of the levy is “fixed” where performance is complete and\nall that remains under the contract is payment (or provision of property) to the taxpayer, and\n“determinable” if, at the time the levy is served, the amount that the taxpayer will be owed can\nbe ascertained with reasonable accuracy, regardless of whether that amount is subject to potential\n\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 8\n\n\ndefeasance.4 This makes sense. “The underlying principle justifying the administrative levy is\nthe need of the government promptly to secure its revenues.” Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S.\nat 721 (quoting Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931) (cleaned up)). Third parties\nwill be able to determine at the time they receive the notice of levy precisely what the levy\nreaches, rather than guessing at whether it creates a persistent nebulous liability. This means the\nIRS will know immediately whether its levy will satisfy the delinquent tax obligation or if it will\nneed to seek additional monies elsewhere.\n\n Although the district court was correct that service of the notice of levy can start the\nstatute of limitations running for intangible property, it is necessary for the notice of levy to\nattach to the property that is the subject of the wrongful levy action before the statute can run. In\nsupplemental briefing submitted at this court’s direction, the government concedes that “[t]he\nrecord does not contain sufficient information to determine whether Gold Forever’s right to\nreceive future royalties was attached by the 2012 levies.” Appellee Suppl. Br. 5. Therefore,\nunder the motion to dismiss standard, the district court should have drawn factual inferences in\nGold Forever’s favor and concluded that nothing remitted in 2016 and beyond represented any\nobligation owed in 2012—i.e., the royalties had not yet been generated and so there was more\nremaining to be done under the contract, such as finding licensees and collecting royalties, than\nto simply remit royalties to Gold Forever. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Gold\nForever, the only thing that existed in 2012 was the obligation to remit royalties generated in the\nfuture. These royalties are similar to, if not even more indefinite than, the property to be\nauctioned in Tull. Gold Forever’s agreements with Universal and BMI, therefore should have\nbeen construed as merely “an obligation to attempt to sell some as yet undetermined amount of\nproperty for an as yet undetermined price to as yet undetermined buyers.” Tull, 69 F.3d at 397.\n\n 4We find additional support for this formulation in the body of tax law concerning whether an expense is\nsufficiently incurred to entitle an accrual-basis taxpayer to deduct it under 26 U.S.C. §162(a). That determination\nrests on whether “all events” have occurred to “fix the amount of the tax and determine the liability of the taxpayer\nto pay it.” United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926). The “all events” test has two prongs: “First, all the\nevents must have occurred which establish the fact of the liability. Second, the amount must be capable of being\ndetermined with reasonable accuracy.” Chrysler Corp. v. Comm’r, 436 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting\nChrysler Corp. v. Comm’r, No. 22148–97, 2000 WL 1231528, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 334, T.C.M. (RIA) 2000–283\n(Aug. 31, 2000) (cleaned up)). In explaining the first prong, the Supreme Court noted that a liability is fixed when\n“the obligation to pay[] has become final and definite in amount.” Sec. Flour Mills Co. v. Comm’r, 321 U.S. 281,\n287 (1944).\n\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 9\n\n\n Further, the district court should have drawn an inference in Gold Forever’s favor that the\nearliest the statute of limitations could have begun running on Gold Forever’s claim was when\nthe IRS seized Gold Forever’s funds held by BMI and Universal. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6331(b)\n(“The term ‘levy’ as used in this title includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means.”);\nId. § 6532(c)(l) (2017) (providing that a wrongful levy action can only be brought within nine\nmonths “from the date of the levy or agreement giving rise to such action”). Here, the complaint\nalleges that Gold Forever filed requests for the return of the remitted funds within that nine-\nmonth period, and the complaint was filed within the twelve-month extension period provided to\nindividuals who file such requests with the IRS. Id. § 6532(c)(2). Therefore, the district court\nshould have concluded that, on the face of the complaint, this case was properly filed within the\nstatute of limitations.\n\n It may be, as the government suggests, that nothing the IRS did after 2012 constituted a\nsubsequent levy. Thus, the funds remitted beginning in 2016 were not sent pursuant to a levy\nand therefore there could be no wrongful levy. See Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Johnson City v.\nUnited States, 367 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), aff’d, 486 F.2d 1405 (6th Cir. 1973)\n(“If there was no levy, certainly there could have been no ‘wrongful’ levy.”). This argument,\nhowever, was not raised by the government in its motion to dismiss below, nor was it addressed\nby the district court. “In general, we will not review arguments or issues that a party raises for\nthe first time on appeal.” Estate of Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 714 F.3d 920, 925 (6th Cir.\n2013) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918, 922\n(6th Cir. 2006)). We decline to do so here.\n\n III.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and\nREMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: GOLD FOREVER MUSIC, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0068p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n GOLD FOREVER MUSIC, INC., ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-1789\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │\\n Defendant-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.\\n No. 2:17-cv-13927—George Caram Steeh, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 10, 2019\\n\\n Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Neal Nusholtz, NEAL NUSHOLTZ, P.L.L.C., Troy, Michigan, for Appellant.\\nJoan I. Oppenheimer, Geoffrey J. Klimas, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. The statute of limitations for a wrongful levy action cannot\\nbegin until there has been a levy that attaches to the property at issue. In this case, notices of\\nlevy in 2012 did not constitute levies on royalties generated after the notices were served. For\\nthe reasons set forth below, the statute of limitations does not bar Gold Forever’s wrongful levy\\naction. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for\\nfurther proceedings.\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 2\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Gold Forever Music, Inc. (Gold Forever) is a music publishing company that has entered\\ninto agreements with various artists entitling it to half of the royalties collected for the sale and\\nperformance of those artists’ work. Instead of directly licensing third parties to use music from\\nits catalog, Gold Forever works with Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and Universal Music\\nPublishing (Universal) to do so. These companies license others to use Gold Forever’s music,\\ncollect the royalties pursuant to those licensing agreements, and remit those royalties to Gold\\nForever.\\n\\n Edward Holland, Jr. is the sole owner of Gold Forever. He was a Motown artist and has\\nco-written several famous songs such as “You Can’t Hurry Love” by the Supremes and Phil\\nCollins, “Where Did Our Love Go” and “Stop In the Name of Love” by the Supremes, “How\\nSweet It Is (To Be Loved by You)” by Marvin Gaye and James Taylor, “You Keep Me Hangin’\\nOn” by Vanilla Fudge and Kim Wilde, “Just a Little Bit of You” by Michael Jackson, and many\\nmore. His music forms some, but not all, of Gold Forever’s catalog. Holland owes millions of\\ndollars to the IRS in taxes, interest, and penalties.\\n\\n In 2012, to collect on Holland’s tax deficiency, the IRS served two notices of levy, one to\\nBMI and one to Universal. The notices identified Gold Forever as the “alter ego/nominee\\ntransferee of Edward Holland, Jr.” The notices of levy required the companies to remit to the\\nIRS “property and rights to property . . . that you have or which you are already obligated to pay\\n[Gold Forever].” It is unclear from the complaint whether BMI and Universal remitted any\\nmonies to the IRS between 2012 and 2016. Beginning on October 6, 2016, through the date of\\nthe complaint, BMI and Universal remitted a combined $967,140.76 to the IRS. Gold Forever\\nmade requests for refunds to the IRS within nine months of BMI and Universal remitting the\\nfunds.\\n\\n On December 6, 2017, Gold Forever filed a wrongful levy action for the funds remitted\\nbeginning on October 6, 2016. Gold Forever’s complaint alleged that it has never been the alter\\nego or nominee of Holland and that most, if not all, of the money remitted by BMI and Universal\\nbelongs either to Gold Forever or to artists other than Holland. The government moved to\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 3\\n\\n\\ndismiss Gold Forever’s wrongful levy suit as untimely, having been filed after the statute of\\nlimitations had run. The district court agreed with the government and granted the motion to\\ndismiss.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, construing the complaint in the light\\nmost favorable to the non-movant, accepting their well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and\\ndrawing all reasonable inferences in their favor. Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,\\n731 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n The IRS has several methods to collect monies owed by delinquent taxpayers, one of\\nwhich is the power of levy. See 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a). Levy “includes the power of distraint and\\nseizure by any means.” Id. § 6331(b). A levy can reach “all property and rights to property . . .\\nbelonging to [the taxpayer].” Id. § 6331(a). In addition to levying on property in the taxpayer’s\\ncontrol, the IRS can levy on property belonging to the taxpayer under another’s control.\\n\\n In the situation where a taxpayer’s property is held by another, a notice of levy\\n upon the custodian is customarily served pursuant to § 6332(a). This notice gives\\n the IRS the right to all property levied upon, and creates a custodial relationship\\n between the person holding the property and the IRS so that the property comes\\n into the constructive possession of the Government. If the custodian honors the\\n levy, he is “discharged from any obligation or liability to the delinquent taxpayer\\n with respect to such property or rights to property arising from such surrender or\\n payment.” § 6332(d). If, on the other hand, the custodian refuses to honor a levy,\\n he incurs liability to the Government for his refusal.\\n\\nUnited States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 720–21 (1985) (some citations omitted).\\n\\n There are only two defenses for failing to comply with the levy demand. First, that the\\nthird party is “neither ‘in possession of’ nor ‘obligated with respect to’ property or rights to\\nproperty belonging to the delinquent taxpayer” and second, that the property is “subject to a prior\\njudicial attachment.” Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 722 (citation omitted). The third\\nparty must comply with the levy demand even if it or any other party claims an interest in the\\nlevied property.\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 4\\n\\n\\n Any person other than the taxpayer who claims an interest in the levied property may\\npursue a wrongful levy action against the United States under 26 U.S.C. § 7426(a) for recovery\\nof the levied property. An action under § 7426(a) is “the exclusive remedy for an innocent third\\nparty whose property is confiscated by the IRS to satisfy another person’s tax liability.”\\nEC Term of Years Tr. v. United States, 550 U.S. 429, 433 (2007) (citation omitted). The\\nwrongful levy action “may be brought without regard to whether such property has been\\nsurrendered.” 26 U.S.C. § 7426.\\n\\n At the time relevant to this appeal, a wrongful levy action could be brought only within\\nnine months “from the date of the levy or agreement giving rise to such action.” Id. § 6532(c)(1)\\n(2017).1 A request for the return of the levied property under 26 U.S.C. § 6342 extended the\\nnine-month period by twelve months from the date of filing the request so long as the request fell\\nwithin the nine-month limitations period. Id. § 6532(c)(2) (2017); see Carter v. United States,\\n110 F. App’x 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004). When the property or obligation levied on is intangible,\\nwe have held that the notice of levy qualifies as the “date of the levy” sufficient to start running\\nthe statute of limitations for a wrongful levy action. See State Bank of Fraser v. United States,\\n861 F.2d 954, 967 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[S]ervice of the notices of levy on [taxpayer’s] accounts\\nreceivable debtors commenced the running of the statute of limitations.”); see also Phelps v.\\nUnited States, 421 U.S. 330, 337 (1975) (“Historically, service of notice has been sufficient to\\nseize a debt, and notice of levy and demand are equivalent to seizure.” (citations omitted)).\\n\\n As relevant here, a levy may “extend only to property possessed and obligations existing\\nat the time thereof.”2 26 U.S.C. § 6331(b). An applicable regulation in the CFR explains, by\\nway of example, that a bank account can be levied on, which attaches the entirety of the contents\\nto which the taxpayer has a property right. 26 C.F.R § 301.6331-1(a). But, the regulation notes,\\nif there is a deposit made into the same bank account subsequent to the levy, the levy does not\\nreach that new deposit, and the IRS must issue a subsequent levy to attach those funds. Id.\\n“Obligations exist when the liability of the obligor is fixed and determinable although the right to\\n\\n 1The current limitations period is two years. 26 U.S.C. § 6532(c)(1).\\n 2The statute makes narrow exceptions to this rule, permitting continuing levies for salary, wages, and\\ncertain specified payments. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6331(e), (h).\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 5\\n\\n\\nreceive payment thereof may be deferred until a later date.” Id.; see also Tull v. United States,\\n69 F.3d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1995). An obligation can come due after the date of the levy and still\\nbe fixed and determinable. As the CFR points out, where a taxpayer has sold personal property\\non the first day of the month and has agreed that the purchaser will remit payment on the last day\\nof the month, that obligation is fixed and determinable such that a levy made in the middle of\\nthat month still reaches the payment when it comes due. 26 C.F.R § 301.6331-1(a).\\n\\n Taking the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to Gold Forever, the\\nroyalties remitted beginning in 2016 were generated after the 2012 notices of levy. The only\\nproperty or obligation to which the levy could potentially attach in 2012 were Gold Forever’s\\nagreements with BMI and Universal to remit future royalties to Gold Forever. So, the question\\non appeal is whether the 2012 notices of levy reach the royalties generated after 2012 by virtue\\nof the agreements in place when the notices of levy were served.\\n\\n The answer to that question depends on whether the royalties remitted to the IRS\\nbeginning in 2016 were fixed and determinable in 2012 when the notices of levy issued. If they\\nwere not fixed and determinable, the notices of levy could not reach the royalties and the\\nlimitations period could not begin to run. If they were fixed and determinable, the notices of\\nlevy would have been sufficient to qualify as the “date of the levy” under § 6532(c)(1),\\nbeginning the limitations period.\\n\\n Determining whether the 2012 levies attached to royalties acquired after the notices of\\nlevy is necessary to finding when the limitations period began to run for a wrongful levy action\\non those royalties. The government insists, without explanation, that determining the scope of\\nthe 2012 levies affects only the relief that could be awarded in the wrongful levy action and that\\nconsidering the scope of the levies conflates “the statute of limitations with the merits of the\\nclaim.” The government’s concern is misplaced. Whether the levy attached to property is not\\npart of the merits of a wrongful levy action—i.e., that the levy was made on property or a right to\\nproperty in which the non-taxpayer has an interest. See Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at\\n739 (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 695 (1983)). A levy attaching to property\\nor the right to property is necessarily antecedent for the statute of limitations to begin running on\\na wrongful levy action concerning that property.\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 6\\n\\n\\n We have not previously addressed when an existing contractual obligation to pay the\\ntaxpayer in the future is sufficiently fixed and determinable such that a levy can attach to that\\nfuture payment. Decisions from our sister circuits provide useful guiderails.\\n\\n Prior to the levy statute being amended to permit continuing levies on wages and salaries,\\nthe Second Circuit noted that a levy could not reach future earnings from salary or wages\\nbecause “[t]hey are contingent upon performance of a contract of service and represent no\\nexisting rights of property.” United States v. Long Island Drug Co., 115 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir.\\n1940); see also Wagner v. United States, 573 F.2d 447, 454 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[Taxpayer’s] future\\nwages and commissions were contingent on his continued employment and thus did not\\nrepresent an existing property right to which a lien[3] could attach. [Taxpayer] had no present\\nright to the wages and commissions.”).\\n\\n Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that a levy could not reach the proceeds of an auction\\nof the taxpayer’s property that had not been conducted when the levy was served. Tull, 69 F.3d\\n394. The taxpayer had negotiated with an auctioneer to auction some of the taxpayer’s assets.\\nPrior to the auction, the auctioneer received a notice of levy seeking the auction proceeds. Id. at\\n395. The question on appeal was whether the future auction proceeds were fixed and\\ndeterminable in light of the agreement between the taxpayer and the auctioneer and the\\nsignificant preparations that had been made by the auctioneer such as circulating advertising\\nbrochures and cleaning some of the assets to be sold. Id. at 396. The Ninth Circuit observed that\\n“an obligation to attempt to sell some as yet undetermined amount of property for an as yet\\nundetermined price to as yet undetermined buyers” was not fixed and determinable. Id. at 397.\\nThe court commented:\\n\\n An actual sale of property would establish both the price of that property and the\\n duty of the buyer to pay the price, even if the date of payment were deferred. On\\n the other hand, if a prospective buyer had not yet agreed to pay anything and was\\n only thinking about whether he would buy at all, it could hardly be argued that the\\n possible ultimate payment was property of the prospective seller. If the buyer did\\n later agree to purchase at a certain price, a new levy would reach that amount, just\\n as it would reach a later deposit in a bank. But to call an obligation both fixed\\n\\n 3The definition of property and rights to property is the same for liens under § 6321 and levies under\\n§ 6331. See Dominion Tr. Co. of Tenn. v. United States, 7 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1993).\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 7\\n\\n\\n and determinable when there has been no sale at all, no prospective buyer, no\\n final determination of what will be sold, and no notion of the price is to strip the\\n words “fixed and determinable” of all meaning.\\n\\nId. at 398.\\n\\n The Ninth Circuit distinguished Tull from its prior decision in United States v. Hemmen,\\n51 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995). In Hemmen, the court held that an allowed administrative claim in\\nan unsettled bankruptcy was fixed and determinable. Id. at 885. The taxpayer had briefly\\nadministered a Chapter 11 bankruptcy as the debtor-in-possession before the proceeding was\\nconverted to a Chapter 7 liquidation and a trustee was appointed. Id. at 886. The bankruptcy\\ncourt awarded the taxpayer an allowed administrative expense for his work as administrator prior\\nto the conversion to Chapter 7. While bankruptcy proceedings were ongoing, the Chapter 7\\ntrustee received a notice of levy to surrender property belonging to the taxpayer. The trustee did\\nnot surrender any property at that time. The IRS sought to hold the trustee personally\\nresponsible for failing to honor the levy. The trustee defended on the basis that he was not in\\npossession of, or obligated with respect to, the taxpayer’s property when the levy was served\\nbecause bankruptcy was ongoing and the amount available to pay administrative claims had not\\nbeen determined. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the allowed administrative expense was fixed\\nand determinable because the underlying performance giving rise to the claim was complete and\\nthe claim had been allowed. Id. at 890. The mere possibility of “defeasance due to factors\\nhaving no bearing on the underlying performance” did not affect the fact that the obligation was\\ndeterminable because “[u]nlike a requirement that the extent of an obligation be ‘determined,’\\nthe term ‘determinable’ requires only that the sum be capable of precise measurement in the\\nfuture.” Id.\\n\\n These cases stand for the principle that a contractual obligation to pay money (or remit\\nproperty) to the taxpayer after the date of the levy is “fixed” where performance is complete and\\nall that remains under the contract is payment (or provision of property) to the taxpayer, and\\n“determinable” if, at the time the levy is served, the amount that the taxpayer will be owed can\\nbe ascertained with reasonable accuracy, regardless of whether that amount is subject to potential\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 8\\n\\n\\ndefeasance.4 This makes sense. “The underlying principle justifying the administrative levy is\\nthe need of the government promptly to secure its revenues.” Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S.\\nat 721 (quoting Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931) (cleaned up)). Third parties\\nwill be able to determine at the time they receive the notice of levy precisely what the levy\\nreaches, rather than guessing at whether it creates a persistent nebulous liability. This means the\\nIRS will know immediately whether its levy will satisfy the delinquent tax obligation or if it will\\nneed to seek additional monies elsewhere.\\n\\n Although the district court was correct that service of the notice of levy can start the\\nstatute of limitations running for intangible property, it is necessary for the notice of levy to\\nattach to the property that is the subject of the wrongful levy action before the statute can run. In\\nsupplemental briefing submitted at this court’s direction, the government concedes that “[t]he\\nrecord does not contain sufficient information to determine whether Gold Forever’s right to\\nreceive future royalties was attached by the 2012 levies.” Appellee Suppl. Br. 5. Therefore,\\nunder the motion to dismiss standard, the district court should have drawn factual inferences in\\nGold Forever’s favor and concluded that nothing remitted in 2016 and beyond represented any\\nobligation owed in 2012—i.e., the royalties had not yet been generated and so there was more\\nremaining to be done under the contract, such as finding licensees and collecting royalties, than\\nto simply remit royalties to Gold Forever. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Gold\\nForever, the only thing that existed in 2012 was the obligation to remit royalties generated in the\\nfuture. These royalties are similar to, if not even more indefinite than, the property to be\\nauctioned in Tull. Gold Forever’s agreements with Universal and BMI, therefore should have\\nbeen construed as merely “an obligation to attempt to sell some as yet undetermined amount of\\nproperty for an as yet undetermined price to as yet undetermined buyers.” Tull, 69 F.3d at 397.\\n\\n 4We find additional support for this formulation in the body of tax law concerning whether an expense is\\nsufficiently incurred to entitle an accrual-basis taxpayer to deduct it under 26 U.S.C. §162(a). That determination\\nrests on whether “all events” have occurred to “fix the amount of the tax and determine the liability of the taxpayer\\nto pay it.” United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926). The “all events” test has two prongs: “First, all the\\nevents must have occurred which establish the fact of the liability. Second, the amount must be capable of being\\ndetermined with reasonable accuracy.” Chrysler Corp. v. Comm’r, 436 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting\\nChrysler Corp. v. Comm’r, No. 22148–97, 2000 WL 1231528, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 334, T.C.M. (RIA) 2000–283\\n(Aug. 31, 2000) (cleaned up)). In explaining the first prong, the Supreme Court noted that a liability is fixed when\\n“the obligation to pay[] has become final and definite in amount.” Sec. Flour Mills Co. v. Comm’r, 321 U.S. 281,\\n287 (1944).\\n\\f No. 18-1789 Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States Page 9\\n\\n\\n Further, the district court should have drawn an inference in Gold Forever’s favor that the\\nearliest the statute of limitations could have begun running on Gold Forever’s claim was when\\nthe IRS seized Gold Forever’s funds held by BMI and Universal. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6331(b)\\n(“The term ‘levy’ as used in this title includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means.”);\\nId. § 6532(c)(l) (2017) (providing that a wrongful levy action can only be brought within nine\\nmonths “from the date of the levy or agreement giving rise to such action”). Here, the complaint\\nalleges that Gold Forever filed requests for the return of the remitted funds within that nine-\\nmonth period, and the complaint was filed within the twelve-month extension period provided to\\nindividuals who file such requests with the IRS. Id. § 6532(c)(2). Therefore, the district court\\nshould have concluded that, on the face of the complaint, this case was properly filed within the\\nstatute of limitations.\\n\\n It may be, as the government suggests, that nothing the IRS did after 2012 constituted a\\nsubsequent levy. Thus, the funds remitted beginning in 2016 were not sent pursuant to a levy\\nand therefore there could be no wrongful levy. See Hamilton Nat’l Bank of Johnson City v.\\nUnited States, 367 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), aff’d, 486 F.2d 1405 (6th Cir. 1973)\\n(“If there was no levy, certainly there could have been no ‘wrongful’ levy.”). This argument,\\nhowever, was not raised by the government in its motion to dismiss below, nor was it addressed\\nby the district court. “In general, we will not review arguments or issues that a party raises for\\nthe first time on appeal.” Estate of Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 714 F.3d 920, 925 (6th Cir.\\n2013) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918, 922\\n(6th Cir. 2006)). We decline to do so here.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and\\nREMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1664,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4609149,"string":"4,609,149"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Alvin CHANEY, M.D. (17-6239/6351); Lesa L. Chaney (17-6167/6314); Ace Clinique of Medicine, LLC (17-6240/6315), Defendants-Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Lesa Chaney"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-6314"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Cole, Suhrheinrich, Moore\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0071p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n │ Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/6314/6315/6351\\n v. >\\n │\\n │\\n JAMES ALVIN CHANEY, M.D. (17-6239/6351); LESA │\\n L. CHANEY (17-6167/6314); ACE CLINIQUE OF │\\n MEDICINE, LLC (17-6240/6315), │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London.\\n No. 6:14-cr-00037—Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: January 16, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 11, 2019\\n\\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and MOORE, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Robert L. Abell, ROBERT ABELL LAW, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant Lesa\\nChaney. Christy J. Love, LOVE LAW FIRM, PLLC, London, Kentucky for Appellants James\\nChaney and Ace Clinique of Medicine, LLC. Amanda B. Harris, UNITED STATES\\nDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert L. Abell,\\nROBERT ABELL LAW, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant Lesa Chaney. Christy J. Love,\\nLOVE LAW FIRM, PLLC, London, Kentucky for Appellants James Chaney and Ace Clinique\\nof Medicine, LLC. Amanda B. Harris, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\\nWashington, D.C., Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., Roger West, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S\\nOFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 2\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. James Alvin Chaney (“Ace”) and Lesa\\nChaney owned and operated a highly profitable clinic in Hazard, Kentucky called Ace Clinique\\nof Medicine. Eventually, the clinic attracted suspicion that it was a “pill mill”: a clinic that\\ndistributes addictive prescription pills without a legitimate medical purpose. Law enforcement\\nobtained a warrant and searched Ace Clinique’s files, where they discovered evidence of many\\ncrimes—some related to the suspected pill-mill operation, and some distinct. The Chaneys and\\nAce Clinique were charged, convicted by a jury, and sentenced. They raise on appeal four\\nissues: (1) the constitutionality of the warrant that allowed the search of the clinic; (2) the\\nsufficiency of the evidence at trial; (3) whether jury misconduct occurred and whether it warrants\\na new trial; and (4) whether the district court correctly calculated the guidelines range at\\nsentencing. For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the district court on all grounds.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n Ace and Lesa Chaney are a married couple who owned and operated Ace Clinique of\\nMedicine, LLC, in Hazard, Kentucky. R. 190 (Second Superseding Indictment at 1–2) (Page ID\\n#1877–78). Ace was a licensed physician in Kentucky; Lesa was the President and Chief\\nExecutive Officer of Ace Clinique. Id.\\n\\n The government started paying attention to Ace Clinique and the Chaneys in June 2010.\\nR. 71-2 (Warrant One at 5) (Page ID #658). An anonymous caller contacted Chris Johnson, an\\ninvestigator for the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, and told him that Ace pre-\\nsigned prescriptions for use at Ace Clinique while absent. Id. Johnson, assisted by state law\\nenforcement, investigated the claims. Id.\\n\\n The investigation revealed that Ace was out of town on the same day that several\\nprescriptions signed by Ace and dated that day were filled at a nearby pharmacy. Id. at 5–6\\n(Page ID #658–59). Officers interviewed Ace Clinique employees, who admitted to using pre-\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 3\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nsigned prescription blanks, and the employees showed the officers three partial prescription pads\\nof pre-signed blanks. Id. at 6–7 (Page ID #659–60). The state officers contacted the DEA, and\\ninvestigators conducted multiple interviews of people who had worked for or with Ace Clinique,\\nas well as former patients. Id. at 21–37 (Page ID #674–91). The investigation led to warrants to\\nsearch Ace Clinique and the Chaneys’ home and airplane hangar for evidence of violations of\\n21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which proscribes knowing or intentional distribution of controlled\\nsubstances, and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), which proscribes conspiracies to commit money\\nlaundering. R. 71-2 (Warrant One) (Page ID #653).1\\n\\n Eventually, a grand jury issued a 256-count indictment that charged Ace, Lesa, and Ace\\nClinique with various offenses. R. 190 (Second Superseding Indictment) (Page ID #1877–1920).\\nThe charges fell into three general categories: controlled substance charges (Counts 1–64),\\nmoney laundering charges (Counts 65 and 235–55), and fraud charges (Counts 66–234 and 256).\\nSee Appellee Br. at 4–6.2\\n\\n The defendants sought to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrants, but had only\\npartial success. R. 71 (Joint Mot. to Suppress) (Page ID #611); R. 159 (May 26, 2015 Order at\\n24) (Page ID #1760). The evidence seized from the airplane hangar was suppressed, as was\\nevidence seized from the clinic that dated to any time before March 2006. R. 159 (May 26, 2015\\nOrder at 24) (Page ID #1760). The district court rejected the defendants’ arguments that the\\nwarrants’ enumeration of “patient files” as an item to be seized was overly broad and\\ninsufficiently particular. Id. at 10 (Page ID #1746).\\n\\n A 25-day trial followed. Ultimately, the jury returned a mixed verdict. R. 281 (Verdict\\nForm) (Page ID #2954–2984); see also Appellee Br. at 4–6.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1The description and list of items to be seized is identical in each of the three warrants, as are the portions\\nof the affidavit discussed herein. See generally R. 125 (R. & R. at 3–19) (Page ID #1231–47). Therefore we do not\\ndistinguish among the warrants.\\n 2Counts 69, 84, 101, 196, 205, 216, and 219 were dismissed by the government. Appellee Br. at 4–6.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 4\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n The defendants argue now that the trial was infected by jury misconduct. During the\\ntrial, an alternate juror reported to court staff some “concerns about how serious[ly] the jury was\\ntaking their duty,” and the staff reported those concerns to the district court. R. 371 (Sept. 30,\\n2016 Op. at 18) (Page ID #5925) (alteration in original) (quoting R. 291 (Apr. 20, 2016 Tr. at 3)\\n(Page ID #3028)). The district court told the jury that if any issues related to the jury instructions\\narose they should report those to the court, but the court did not tell counsel that a juror had\\nraised concerns. Id. at 19 (Page ID #5926). After the entry of the verdict, the same alternate\\njuror—who did not participate in deliberations—contacted defense counsel to complain of\\nmisconduct; defense counsel contacted the court, and the court conducted an in camera interview\\nwith the alternate. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at 20) (Page ID #5927). The defendants moved\\nfor a new trial following the interview, but the district court denied their motions. R. 297 (Mot.\\nfor New Trial [Lesa]) (Page ID #3246); R. 299 (Mot. for New Trial [Ace]) (Page ID #3279); R.\\n371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. & Order) (Page ID #5908).\\n\\n Prior to sentencing, the district court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing regarding\\nthe drug quantity and loss amount that would be used to calculate the sentencing guidelines\\nrange. R. 459 (Aug. 17, 2017 Tr. at 1) (Page ID #9443); R. 460 (Aug. 18, 2017 Tr. at 1) (Page\\nID #9572). Put simply, the defendants argued that drug quantity and loss amount should be\\ncalculated from the counts of conviction only; the government argued that every Schedule II or\\nIII prescription drug Ace prescribed during the relevant time period and every billing to\\nMedicaid from Ace Clinique or a pharmacy filling an Ace Clinique prescription should be used\\nto calculate drug quantity and loss amount. R. 460 (Aug. 18, 2017 Tr. at 44–66) (Page ID\\n#9615–37); R. 459 (Aug. 17, 2017 Tr. at 10–11, 64–66) (Page ID #9452–53, 9506–08).\\n\\n The Presentence Report (“PSR”) for each defendant used the government’s method to\\ncalculate a guidelines range, and the defendants objected. At sentencing, the district court\\nrefused to adopt wholesale either proposed method and instead found that 60 percent of the drugs\\nand billings the government used to calculate drug quantity and loss amount were fraudulent. R.\\n508 (Sentencing Tr. at 25–29) (Page ID #10066–69). The district court varied downward from\\nthe guidelines-recommended life sentences for Ace and Lesa and sentenced Ace to a total\\nsentence of 180 months in custody and Lesa to a total sentence of 80 months in custody. Id. at\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 5\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n86–87, 98–99 (Page ID #10126–27, 10138–39). Ace Clinique was sentenced to five years’\\nprobation. Id. at 103 (Page ID #10143).\\n\\n These appeals followed.\\n\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n\\nA. The Search Warrant\\n\\n All defendants appeal the district court’s determination that the search warrants were\\nconstitutional. They focus their appeals on the warrants’ enumeration of “patient files” as an\\nitem to be seized. When considering a motion to suppress, we review a district court’s legal\\nconclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d\\n527, 536 (6th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n 1. Background: The Warrant and Motions to Suppress\\n\\n On September 9, 2013, the government applied for and was granted three search\\nwarrants: one to search the premises of Ace Clinique of Medicine, one to search James and Lesa\\nChaney’s home, and one to search their airplane hangar. R. 71-2 (Warrant One) (Page ID #653);\\nR. 71-3 (Warrant Two) (Page ID #700); R. 71-4 (Warrant Three) (Page ID #745). All three\\nwarrants expressly incorporate a detailed affidavit describing Special Agent Thad Lambdin’s\\ninvestigation of Ace Clinique and the Chaneys.\\n\\n Each warrant contains a list of items to be seized. The list opens with the preamble:\\n“The items to be seized are evidence of violations of Title 21, United States Code Sections\\n841(a)(1), 846 and 856, as well as Title 18 United States Code, Section 1956(h).” R. 71-2\\n(Warrant One at 46) (Page ID #698). The warrants then list various sorts of items, including\\n“[p]atient files for patients.” R. 71-2 (Warrant One at 47) (Page ID #699). The agents who\\nexecuted the warrant to search the clinic seized nearly all the patient files. R. 317 (Mar. 23, 2016\\nTrial Tr. at 31) (Page ID #3839).\\n\\n The defendants moved to suppress evidence seized from the searches. R. 71 (Joint Mot.\\nto Suppress) (Page ID #611). They argued the warrants were insufficiently particular and were\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 6\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\noverbroad, among other things. R. 71-1 (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress at 19) (Page ID\\n#635). The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who recommended\\nsuppression of evidence that existed prior to March 2006 and of evidence seized from the\\nairplane hangar, but otherwise rejected the defendants’ arguments that the warrants’ instruction\\nto seize “[p]atient files” was improper. R. 125 (R. & R. at 39, 46–47) (Page ID #1267, 1274–\\n75). The defendants entered objections to the Report and Recommendation, R. 134 (Objs. to R.\\n& R.) (Page ID #1330), but the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations.\\nR. 159 (May 26, 2015 Order at 24) (Page ID #1760).\\n\\n Among the recommendations that the district court adopted was the finding that “the\\nfacts [in the affidavit] do not support the finding that the ‘whole [of Ace Clinique’s] business’\\nwas fraudulent,” and therefore there was not probable cause to support a general “all records”\\nsearch. R. 125 (R. & R. at 38) (Page ID #1266). Naturally, the defendants did not object to this\\nconclusion, and the district court adopted the relevant portion of the Report and\\nRecommendation without comment. R. 159 (May 26, 2015 Order at 24) (Page ID #1760).\\n\\n Although the district court did not find there was probable cause to seize all patient files,\\nit nevertheless upheld the warrant on the theory that the preamble to the list of items to be seized\\nacted as a limit on the list—law enforcement could seize patient files only if those files were\\nevidence of violations of the listed statutes. R. 125 (R. & R. at 38–39) (Page ID #1266–67).\\nThis, the district court reasoned, guided the executing agents’ discretion, and so the warrants\\npassed constitutional muster.\\n\\n At trial, Agent Thad Lambdin testified. The defense cross-examined him about the\\nsearch of the clinic, and he explained that during the search the FBI took “not every [file], but\\nmost of them” and that the FBI intended to take all of the patient files in the clinic. R. 317 (Mar.\\n23, 2016 Trial Tr. at 31) (Page ID #3839). Defense counsel asked Agent Lambdin whether the\\nFBI tried to distinguish between files that were potential evidence and files that were not; Agent\\nLambdin answered that the FBI “took [files] from the different areas of the clinic because [the\\nagents] could not, on that day, determine what all was being used or not used.” Id. at 31–32\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 7\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n(Page ID #3839–40). Upon further questioning, Agent Lambdin reiterated that, at the time of the\\nsearch, the FBI did not attempt to distinguish between files, but rather “just took them all.” Id.\\n\\n The defendants renewed their motion to suppress after Agent Lambdin testified. R. 262\\n(Trial Min. for Mar. 30, 2016) (Page ID #2784). They argued that Agent Lambdin’s testimony\\ndemonstrated that the “the limitation upon which the magistrate judge and the Court relied was,\\nin fact, no limitation at all.” R. 261 (Renewed Mot. to Suppress at 3) (Page ID #2778). The\\nrenewed motion appears to assert that the testimony showed that the warrant was insufficiently\\nparticular; the district court construed the motion to argue also that “even if the warrant itself was\\nconstitutional, the agents’ supposed ‘deliberate and willful disregard’ of the warrant’s scope\\nrequires a blanket suppression of the patient files seized in the raid.” R. 273 (Apr. 19, 2016 Op.\\nat 3) (Page ID #2905).\\n\\n The district court denied this motion because (1) agents’ actions cannot affect the\\nparticularity of the warrant, which is determined by the four corners of the warrant itself; (2) the\\nofficers may not have exceeded the scope of the warrant because all patient files were potentially\\nrelevant to the alleged violations and there was no way agents in the field could have determined\\nwhich files were potentially relevant evidence; and, (3) even if the search exceeded the scope of\\nthe warrant, the defendants did not argue that the patient files actually introduced at trial were\\nbeyond the scope of the warrant. Id. at 3–5 (Page ID #2905–07).\\n\\n The defendants now argue, on appeal, that the warrant was facially unconstitutional.\\n\\n 2. The Search Warrant Was Constitutional\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution says that “no Warrants shall\\nissue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the\\npersons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The chief purpose of the particularity\\nrequirement [is] to prevent general searches by requiring a neutral judicial officer to cabin the\\nscope of the search to those areas and items for which there exists probable cause that a crime\\nhas been committed.” Richards, 659 F.3d at 537 (alteration in original) (quoting Baranski v.\\nFifteen Unknown Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 452 F.3d 433, 441\\n(6th Cir. 2006)). The constitutionality of a warrant is determined by what is contained in the\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 8\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nfour corners of the warrant, although the government can incorporate by express reference\\naffidavits and other material. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557–58 (2004).\\n\\n Two sorts of infirmities can lead to an insufficiently particular, and therefore\\nunconstitutional, warrant. Richards, 659 F.3d at 537. The first is when a warrant provides\\ninformation insufficient “to guide and control the agent’s judgment in selecting what to take.”\\nId. (quoting United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999)). The second is when the\\ncategory of things specified “is too broad in the sense that it includes items that should not be\\nseized.” Id. This is often referred to as “overbreadth.” “The degree of specificity required\\ndepends on the crime involved and the types of items sought.” United States v. Abboud, 438\\nF.3d 554, 575 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1026 (6th Cir.\\n1991)) (for example, “[i]n a business fraud case, the authorization to search for general business\\nrecords is not overbroad”).\\n\\n The appellants argue that paragraph 13 of the warrant, which lists “[p]atient files” as an\\nitem to be seized, is insufficiently particular because the government did not have probable cause\\nto search all patient files, and the preamble clause of the warrant—limiting it to evidence of\\nviolations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 856 and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)—is inadequate to guide\\nthe agents’ discretion.\\n\\n The United States presents two defenses of the warrant. First, it argues that Ace Clinique\\nwas so permeated with fraud that there was probable cause to seize all patient files. Second, it\\nargues that the preamble clause is a sufficient limitation on the agents’ discretion. The first\\nargument fails, but the second does not.\\n\\n a. Pervasive Fraud\\n\\n Although general warrants are prohibited, “‘where there is probable cause to find that\\nthere exists a pervasive scheme to defraud, all the business records of an enterprise may be\\nseized,’ and consequently a description merely of records of that business will suffice” to satisfy\\nthe particularity requirement. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(d) (5th ed. 2018) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 309 (1st Cir. 1980)) (footnotes omitted). In other words, if\\nan organization or business is permeated with fraud, then there is probable cause to believe that\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 9\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nall its records are instrumentalities or evidence of a crime. In those circumstances, a warrant\\nauthorizing a search of all records is not a general warrant, but rather a warrant describing\\nexactly the items officers have probable cause to search or seize.\\n\\n The court below considered and rejected the applicability in this case of the pervasive\\nfraud doctrine. Appellee Br. at 57; R. 125 (R. & R. at 38) (Page ID #1266); R. 159 (May 26,\\n2015 Order) (Page ID #1737). The magistrate judge who issued the Report and\\nRecommendation addressed this issue by first considering statements in the warrant affidavit\\ndiscussing the percentage of patients who were pain patients: “The Government at times\\nestimates 50% of Ace Clinique’s patients to be legitimate. [One person] stated that she believed\\napproximately 90% of the patient load was pain management, but [another person] estimated that\\nnumber at 50-60%.” R. 125 (R. & R. at 38) (Page ID #1266). Based on these numbers, the\\nmagistrate judge concluded that the “evidence does not support probable cause to find that ‘the\\nwhole business is fraudulent.’ Therefore, the Affidavit does not establish that Ace Clinique is\\n‘permeated with fraud.’” Id. at 37–38 (Page ID #1265–66) (quoting United States v. Roos, No.\\n12-09-2-ART, 2013 WL 1136629, at *3 (E.D. Ky. March 18, 2014)). The district judge adopted\\nthis aspect of the Report and Recommendation without comment.\\n\\n To the extent that this is a question of law, we review de novo. United States v. Ford,\\n184 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 1999). To the extent that the district court’s conclusion that Ace\\nClinique was not permeated with fraud was a finding of fact, we review for clear error; clear\\nerror occurs when, as here, the district applied an incorrect legal standard to reach the factual\\nfinding. See United States v. Mahbub, 818 F.3d 213, 223 (6th Cir. 2016). We discuss first the\\nproper factors for deciding whether the pervasive-fraud doctrine applies, and then we consider\\nwhether it existed in this case.\\n\\n The court below applied a standard it derived from United States v. Roos: the “whole\\nbusiness” must be fraudulent to justify an all-records search. R. 125 (R. & R. at 37) (Page ID\\n#1265) (quoting Roos, 2013 WL 1136629, at *3). Given the focus on the alleged percentages of\\npatients who were pain patients, it is clear that the court below understood “whole business” to\\nmean that every transaction in which a business engages is fraudulent; otherwise, probable cause\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 10\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nfor an all-records search would be lacking. This is an incomplete, if not erroneous,\\nunderstanding of pervasive fraud. Certainly one factor in determining whether there was\\npervasive fraud is the amount of fraud3, but a large quantity of fraud is neither necessary nor\\nsufficient for the exception to apply.\\n\\n First, to the extent that the magistrate judge predicated the recommendation on an\\nunderstanding that, for a business to be permeated with fraud, every transaction must be\\nfraudulent—that is not the case. That could not be the case. Even the most fraudulent of\\nbusinesses might conduct a legitimate transaction from time to time.\\n\\n Even if the magistrate judge’s understanding was not so cramped, it erred in considering\\nonly the quantity of fraudulent business when determining whether Ace Clinique was permeated\\nwith fraud. Other factors, such as the separability of the fraudulent aspect of the business from\\nthe legitimate and the central purpose of the business, are relevant.\\n\\n The first factor not considered by the district court is the separability of the fraudulent\\nfrom the legitimate. A broad warrant is justified if “every aspect” of the business operation it\\ntargets is “pervaded” with fraud. Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1985). One\\nguiding principle of cases applying this doctrine is whether it is possible to separate the\\nfraudulent aspects of the business from the legitimate. If it is possible, then the business is not\\npermeated with fraud and a broad warrant is unjustified; if it is not, then a broad warrant can\\nstand. For example, a business “incorporated solely as a conduit for the flow of kickback\\nmonies” might be so permeated with fraud that a broad warrant would be justified. United States\\nv. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1479 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985). So too a business in which “the alleged\\nfraud supposedly infected [the business], its principals and officers, its suppliers, and numerous\\nother individuals and businesses with whom it did or had done business . . . [and] traces of that\\n\\n\\n\\n 3At least one other circuit has said that “‘pervasive fraud’ does not refer to the percentage of a defendant’s\\nbusiness that is fraudulent.” United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1259 (11th Cir. 2011). Because at least half\\nof Ace Clinique’s business was potentially fraudulent, we do not answer the question here of whether the pervasive-\\nfraud doctrine can apply when the fraud is small but “traces of that fraud were likely to be found spread out amongst\\nthe myriad of records” in the business, as the Eleventh Circuit held in Bradley. Id. at 1259–60. In other words,\\nalthough quantity of fraud is not the only factor, we need not decide here whether it is a necessary factor.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 11\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nfraud were likely to be found spread out amongst the myriad of records in [the business’s]\\npossession.” United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n Conversely, we have made clear that when the fraudulent aspect of a business is\\nseparable from and unrelated to a legitimate aspect of the business, an all-records search warrant\\nis not justified. Ford, 184 F.3d at 576–77 (“Even if one business carried on at a site is permeated\\nwith fraud, if other businesses run at the same site are separable and are not shown to be related\\nto the suspected crime, a warrant permitting seizure of all documents at the site is not justified.”\\n(emphasis added)); see also Voss, 774 F.2d at 406 (“Even if the allegedly fraudulent activity\\nconstitutes a large portion, or even the bulk, of the [target business’s] activities, there is no\\njustification for seizing records and documents relating to its legitimate activities” in a case\\nwhere an organization conducted fraudulent transactions on behalf of clients but also engaged in\\nunrelated advocacy work); United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1980) (finding an all-\\nrecords search to be overbroad because it could have been limited to the automobile insurance\\nportion of the defendant’s insurance agencies).\\n\\n Another guiding principle is whether “the alleged criminal activity was the ‘central\\npurpose’ of the place to be searched.” United States v. Asker, 676 F. App’x 447, 462 (6th Cir.\\n2017) (quoting United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1551 (9th Cir. 1996)); United States v\\nLogan, 250 F.3d 350, 365 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding a warrant because “the warrant’s general\\nnature was due to the investigators’ belief that [fraudulent activity] constituted [the business’s]\\nentire operation”).\\n\\n Consideration of these factors harmonizes legal doctrine and common sense. If the\\nfraudulent portion of a business is in a silo separate from the legitimate portion, then there is no\\nprobable cause to think evidence of a crime would be found in the legitimate silo. On the other\\nhand, if half of a business’s transactions are fraudulent but are interspersed with and inseparable\\nfrom the records of the legitimate transactions, then it is probable that evidence of a crime would\\nbe found in any record seized. Therefore, an all-records search would be supported by probable\\ncause. Likewise, if a business’s central purpose is fraud, it is far more likely that probable cause\\nexists to seize all records than if only a portion of the business’s purpose is fraudulent.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 12\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n United States v. Roos, on which the court below relied, does not contradict the idea that\\nprobable cause to seize all records requires consideration of both the percentage of the business\\nthat is fraudulent as well as the separability of the fraudulent aspect of the business and the\\npurpose of the business. 2013 WL 1136629, at *3. Furthermore, Roos does not suggest that all,\\nor even the vast majority, of a business’s transactions must be fraudulent to support an all-\\nrecords search on the theory it is pervaded with fraud.\\n\\n Roos is, in fact, quite different from the case at bar. It did address a warrant to search a\\ndoctor’s office for patient files, and Dr. Roos was prescribing prescription painkillers, but there\\nthe resemblance stops. Dr. Roos came under suspicion after the police searched the house of two\\npeople suspected of unlawfully distributing painkillers and found oxycodone prescribed by\\nDr. Roos and reminders for appointments with Dr. Roos. Id. at *1. The suspected drug dealers\\nwere in Kentucky; Dr. Roos was based in Houston, Texas. Id. Kentucky State Police\\ninterviewed three Kentucky residents who said they traveled to Houston to get oxycodone\\nprescriptions from Dr. Roos. Id. They would either travel to Houston, be examined quickly, and\\nget prescriptions for large amounts of painkillers, or Dr. Roos “would call in the Texas\\nprescriptions to a Kentucky pharmacy.” Id. at *1. Based on this evidence, the police executed a\\nwarrant for “patient files for patients who have indicated they are from Kentucky.” Id. After the\\nsearch was executed, Dr. Roos argued “that the warrant lacked probable cause because the search\\nwarrant application did not establish that her whole medical practice was fraudulent.” Id. at *3.\\nIn response to this argument, the district court correctly distinguished Dr. Roos’s situation from\\nthe cases in which an all-records search was justified because the business was permeated with\\nfraud. For one, the warrant at issue in Roos was limited to the Texas doctor’s files on patients\\nfrom Kentucky. Furthermore, to the extent that Roos suggests a broader warrant would not have\\nbeen justified, that has no bearing on this case. In Roos, the government had evidence that\\nDr. Roos was conspiring with patients in Kentucky to distribute drugs unlawfully. See United\\nStates v. Roos, No. 12-09-2-ART, 2013 WL 1136638, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 24, 2013). Even if\\nRoos were binding on this court, it would not alter the outcome in this case.\\n\\n Turning back to the Chaneys and the Clinique, the question remains whether there was\\npervasive fraud justifying an all-records search. The first relevant factor is the quantity of fraud.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 13\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nThe affidavit accompanying and incorporated into the warrants showed that anywhere from one\\nhalf to 90 percent of its patients were pain patients—that is, potentially fraudulent. Next, the\\nseparability of the fraudulent from the legitimate: although it is uncontested that the clinic saw\\nsome legitimate patients, there is no indication that the pain practice was at all separate. Ace\\nClinique did not have a “pain clinic” separate from the rest of its practice; it was one clinic. On\\nthe other hand, there is nothing to suggest that evidence of fraud might “infect” the files of non-\\npain patients. Finally, the central-purpose inquiry. It cannot be said with certainty that the\\ncentral purpose of Ace Clinique was to operate as a “pill mill.” Certainly it did operate as such,\\nbut the conceded non-negligible amount of legitimate patients at least suggests a dual purpose.\\nThe evidence is close, but there is not quite enough evidence to suggest that Ace Clinique was\\npermeated with fraud. This means that there was not probable cause to seize all of its records\\nwholesale based on the “permeated with fraud” theory.\\n\\n b. Particularity\\n\\n This leads to the government’s second argument—that the warrant was limited to files\\nthat were “evidence of violations of [21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 856 and 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 1956(h)],” and therefore it was sufficiently particular. R. 71-3 (Warrant Two) (Page ID #743);\\nAppellee Br. at 50. This is the theory under which the district court upheld the warrant. The\\ndefendants argue now that this clause did not provide any meaningful guidance to the officers\\nexecuting the warrants, and so the warrants remain insufficiently particular.\\n\\n There is no formula that determines whether a warrant is sufficiently particular.\\nA sufficiently particular warrant “supplies enough information to guide and control the\\n[executing] agent’s judgment in selecting what to take.” Richards, 659 F.3d at 537 (quoting\\nUnited States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999)). Whether this bar has been cleared is\\n“best resolved upon examination of the circumstances of the particular case.” Logan, 250 F.3d at\\n365. “[T]he degree of specificity in a warrant must be flexible, depending upon the type of items\\nto be seized and the crime involved.” United States v. Blair, 214 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir. 2000).\\nFinally, “where a warrant adequately describes ‘a category of seizable papers,’ it is not lacking in\\nspecificity merely ‘because the officers executing the warrant must exercise some minimal\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 14\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\njudgment as to whether a particular document falls within the described category.’” United\\nStates v. Bruce, 396 F.3d 697, 709 (6th Cir. 2005), vacated in part on other grounds, 405 F.3d\\n1034 (mem.) (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1034 (6th Cir.\\n1999)).\\n\\n Furthermore, it is established law in this circuit that, in some circumstances, “[a] warrant\\nthat empowers police to search for something satisfies the particularity requirement if its text\\nconstrains the search to evidence of a specific crime.” United States v. Castro, 881 F.3d 961,\\n965 (6th Cir. 2018). The defendants nevertheless persist, arguing that “where the referenced\\nstatutes are broad in scope, courts have held that the warrant contains no limitation at all and fails\\nthe particularity requirement.” Lesa Chaney Br. at 34. They then argue that the statutes\\nreferenced here are so broad that they provide no meaningful guidance, and therefore the warrant\\nis invalid. This argument, which was not made to the district court, is incorrect even if it were\\navailable to make for the first time on appeal.\\n\\n First, the defendants’ attack on 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)4 as a meaningful limit on the warrant\\nis unavailing because it fails to view the warrant as a whole. Section 1956(h) deals with money\\nlaundering, and the defendants are correct that § 1956(h) is a broad statute that criminalizes\\n“more than 250 predicate offenses.” Lesa Chaney Br. at 35 (quoting United States v. Santos,\\n553 U.S. 507, 516 (2005)). Perhaps a warrant that described the items to be seized only by\\nreference to a statute as broad as § 1956(h), and which offered the executing officers no\\nadditional guidance or details regarding the suspected criminal conduct, would fail for lack of\\nparticularity. That is not the case here, however. Instead, the warrant expressly incorporated a\\ndetailed affidavit that described the conduct at issue. Courts must take a common-sense,\\ncontextual approach when interpreting warrants. Castro, 881 F.3d at 965. Here, common sense\\ndictates that the evidence of money laundering authorized by the warrant is that related to the\\n“pill mill” operation described in the affidavit. The out-of-circuit cases cited by defendants are\\n\\n\\n 4“Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be subject\\nto the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.”\\n18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Section 1956(h) proscribes money laundering; § 1957 proscribes “[e]ngaging in monetary\\ntransactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity.”\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 15\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\ninapposite. The warrant at issue in United States v. Roche failed to incorporate expressly a\\ndetailed affidavit, and would have likely been saved had it done so. 614 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.\\n1980). Similarly lacking were the warrants at issue in United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 604\\n(10th Cir. 1988), and United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 967 (9th Cir. 1986). In sum, the\\nwarrant at issue here directed the officers to seize evidence of money-laundering violations\\nrelated to the pill-mill scheme described in detail and at length in the affidavit. Therefore the\\nofficers’ discretion was sufficiently guided. Cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479–82\\n(1976) (upholding a warrant that authorized seizure of “fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of\\ncrime” because that phrase must be read in context with the rest of the warrant).\\n\\n Moreover, even if § 1956(h) were so broad as to provide no guidance at all, three statutes\\nremain that would limit the scope of the warrant: 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)5, 846, and 8566. These\\nstatutes are far narrower than the statute prohibiting conspiracy to commit money laundering,\\nand therefore provide specific guidance as to what sorts of patient files were authorized to be\\nseized—namely, those that were evidence of drug distribution. The defendants argue otherwise,\\nmainly relying on United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 2010), for support, but Lazar\\naddresses a different situation entirely. The warrant at issue in Lazar incorporated a list of\\npatients, and that list served as a limit on the scope of the warrant. Id. at 236–38 (describing the\\nwarrant as including an affidavit referring to the “below listed” and “following” patients). This\\ncourt held that any files seized in addition to the listed patients were beyond the scope of the\\nwarrant. Id. Lazar presents a very different situation from this case because the warrant was\\nlimited to specific patients. It does not stand for the proposition that any warrant ordering the\\nseizure of patient files without a list of names is de facto unconstitutional.\\n\\n The remainder of the defendants’ arguments can be dealt with quickly. They rely on\\nUnited States v. Abrams for support, and not illogically: Abrams does say that a warrant that\\nallowed a seizure of all Medicare and Medicaid records from the office of doctors accused of\\n\\n\\n 5“Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to\\nmanufacture, distribute, or dispense . . . a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\\n 621 U.S.C. 856 prohibits and penalizes “[m]aintaining drug-involved premises.”\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 16\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nMedicare/Medicaid fraud, even though limited only by reference to a particular criminal statute,\\nwas unconstitutional. 615 F.2d 541, 542–44 (1st Cir. 1980). Abrams, however, is unpersuasive.\\nThe opinion in Abrams was published only four years after the Supreme Court held in Andresen\\nv. Maryland that a seizure of business records was constitutional based on a warrant’s language\\nallowing seizure of listed items “together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of\\ncrime.” 427 U.S. at 479. In Abrams, the First Circuit distinguished Andresen and noted that:\\n\\n Business records, although they may contain evidence of fraud, do not fall\\n into the category of stolen or contraband goods. The government has cited no\\n case and we have found none in which a seizure of all records was held valid\\n pursuant to a generally worded warrant such as we have here. In the cases we\\n have canvassed where a seizure of records was upheld, there has been some\\n limitation in the warrant as to the records to be seized.\\n\\n615 F.2d at 545. Time has shown otherwise. We have upheld numerous seizures of the majority\\nof a person or business’s records based on “generally worded warrant[s].” In United States v.\\nGardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 471 (6th Cir. 2006), we upheld a warrant that “specifically stated the\\nrecords to be seized included: financial documents; . . . business records involving [certain of\\nthe defendants], . . . travel records; investment records; telephone records; records related to\\npayment of personal and business expenses and cash purchases; . . . records and notes of\\nfinancial transactions.” We held “the warrant stated with particularity all items to be seized” and\\nthat, because the defendant was implicated in a broad scheme, a broad warrant was justified. Id.\\n\\n Likewise, we have upheld warrants allowing seizure of “papers ‘showing ownership\\nand/or control’ of illegal drugs,” Bruce, 396 F.3d at 710, and “records and documents ‘relating\\nto the ownership, partnership, investment, construction and equipment costs, operating income\\nand expenses, losses and/or distribution of income and/or profits attributable to each [restaurant\\nfranchise],’” Asker, 676 F. App’x at 462. In the latter case, we noted that “[g]iven the scope of\\nthe alleged money laundering, this list is unsurprisingly large, but nonetheless tailored.” Asker,\\n676 F. App’x at 462.\\n\\n So too with the Chaneys. The warrant authorized the seizure of all “[p]atient files . . . .\\n[p]atient lists [and] [a]ppointment books, patient profiles, receipt books, ledgers of activity, notes\\nregarding patient information, directions to pharmacies and other related documents as it pertains\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 17\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nto patients,” so long as those files or patient-related documents contained evidence of money\\nlaundering or drug distribution. R. 71-3 (Warrant Two) (Page ID #744). This category surely\\ncontains numerous documents, but it is nevertheless tailored: the scheme was large, and so too\\nthe quantity of files seized.\\n\\n This leads to the defendants’ final argument: “The government was capable of\\ndescribing the patient files and records and other items to be seized with more particularity.”\\nLesa Chaney Br. at 41. They posit limiting the warrant to (1) files of patients who had been\\nprescribed a controlled substance, (2) files of “those 50% of patients receiving controlled\\nsubstance prescriptions that the government had some basis to conclude were [not] legitimate or\\nprobably legitimate,” (3) files of individuals the government had already identified as being\\n“unlawfully prescribed medication by Dr. Chaney,” or (4) files of “individuals that received\\ncontrolled substance prescriptions in June 2010, that are the genesis of this case.” Id. at 41–42.\\n\\n None of these proposed formulations show that the warrant was insufficiently particular\\nor overbroad. The final two proposed formulations restrict the warrant to a far narrower group of\\nfiles than the government had probable cause to seize. It is crucial to remember that the\\ninvestigation of Ace Clinique revealed both specific instances in which patients were\\nillegitimately prescribed controlled substances and evidence suggesting a larger fraud (for\\nexample, a pad of pre-signed prescriptions left for use while the doctor was away). These two\\nformulations would limit the seizure to the specific instances already identified, ignoring the\\nprobable cause to search for other instances of fraud. It would be as though the government saw\\na person move drugs into a suspected stash house, but could authorize a warrant for only the\\nquantity observed rather than any drugs found within.\\n\\n The third formulation—limit the seizure to “those 50% of patients receiving controlled\\nsubstance prescriptions that the government had some basis to conclude were [not] legitimate or\\nprobably legitimate”—is a gross misreading of the warrant affidavit. One person told an agent\\nthat 50 or 60 percent of Ace Clinique’s patients were pain patients; there was never a distinction\\nbetween a legitimate 50 percent and an illegitimate 50 percent. Therefore, this would not have\\nbeen a valid formulation for the warrant.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 18\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n We are left with the first proposed formulation: limit the warrant to patients who had\\nbeen prescribed a controlled substance. This does not render illegitimate the warrant because it\\nis no more particular than the warrant issued, which authorized the officers to seize evidence of\\ndrug-distribution crimes. It is, if anything, more broad—rather than restricting officers to only\\nthose patient files that are evidence of crimes, the defendants would authorize officers to seize\\nevery file of a person who was prescribed a controlled substance, regardless of the apparent\\nlegitimacy of the prescription. The defendants’ failure to propose a more particular warrant\\nformulation reveals the truth of the matter here: the warrant was as particular as was possible, in\\nthe circumstances. “When a more specific description of the items to be seized is unavailable, a\\ngeneral description will suffice.” Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1027. True, this formulation required\\nthe executing agents to use their judgment to determine whether a particular file could be seized,\\nbut that is not a fatal flaw. See Bruce, 396 F.3d at 710; Ables, 167 F.3d at 1034; cf. United States\\nv. Hanna, 661 F.3d 271, 286 (6th Cir. 2011) (“We have allowed the search of electronic files\\nbeyond their titles, recognizing the risk of ‘shielded’ evidence otherwise.”).\\n\\n A final point deserves emphasis: the defendants do not challenge on appeal the execution\\nof the warrant. Rather, they focus their arguments on the constitutionality of the warrant.\\nTherefore, the manner in which the agents executed the search—namely, that they took all of the\\nclinic’s files, seemingly without review to see whether they constituted evidence of the named\\ncrimes—is of no moment. The defendants could have objected to the introduction of specific\\npieces of evidence as seized beyond the scope of the warrant, and, had the district court ruled\\nagainst the defendants on those objections, we could have considered that on appeal. Those\\narguments, however, were not made below. We consider only the facial constitutionality of the\\nwarrant, and on those grounds the defendants’ arguments all fail.\\n\\n In sum, the warrant, as written, was constitutional.\\n\\nB. There Was Sufficient Evidence For The Jury to Convict the Defendants\\n\\n All the defendants argue that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain\\ntheir convictions. We review jury verdicts using a deferential standard: we may “reverse a\\njudgment for insufficiency of evidence only if, viewing the record as a whole, the judgment is\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 19\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nnot supported by substantial and competent evidence.” United States v. Taylor, 800 F.3d 701,\\n711 (6th Cir. 2015). The evidence must be “viewed in the light most favorable to the\\ngovernment” and “all reasonable inferences” must be drawn “in support of the jury’s verdict.”\\nUnited States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Stewart, 729 F.3d\\n517, 526 (6th Cir. 2013). “[A] defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence bears a very\\nheavy burden.” United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United\\nStates v. Jackson, 473 F.3d 660, 669 (6th Cir. 2007)). It must be borne in mind, however, that\\nthe government bears the burden of proof of all elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the\\nevidence did not meet that burden, the jury verdict must be reversed. United States v. Parkes,\\n668 F.3d 295, 300–03 (6th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n 1. The Drug-Distribution Counts\\n\\n The first group of charges at issue are the drug-distribution counts. Ace and the clinic\\nwere found guilty of multiple counts of unlawfully distributing controlled substances, namely,\\noxycodone and hydrocodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Lesa\\nChaney was not charged with these counts.) “In order to obtain a conviction under 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1) against a licensed physician such as defendant, the government must show: ‘(1) That\\ndefendant distributed a controlled substance; (2) That he acted intentionally or knowingly; and\\n(3) That defendant prescribed the drug without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the\\ncourse of professional practice.’” United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 539, 542 (6th Cir. 1995)\\n(quoting United States v. Varma, 691 F.2d 460, 462 (10th Cir. 1982)).\\n\\n All defendants were found guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled\\nsubstances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. “To prove a drug conspiracy, the\\nUnited States must establish ‘(1) an agreement to violate the drug laws, and (2) each\\nconspirator’s knowledge of, intent to join, and participation in the conspiracy.’” United States v.\\nSingleton, 626 F. App’x 589, 595 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d\\n503, 517 (6th Cir. 2001)).\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 20\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Finally, all defendants were found guilty of two counts of maintaining drug-involved\\npremises in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856. “To convict a defendant on these charges, the\\ngovernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) knowingly\\n(2) maintained any place, whether permanently or temporarily, (3) for the purpose of distributing\\na controlled substance.” United States v. Lang, 717 F. App’x 523, 545 (6th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n a. Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance\\n\\n First, Ace and Ace Clinique challenge their convictions for unlawfully distributing\\noxycodone and hydrocodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Counts 2–62).\\n\\n Ace7 argues that the government’s evidence was insufficient for two reasons. First, Ace\\nmakes much of the fact that the government’s witness, Dr. Stephen Loyd, found only two\\nprescriptions—both not pre-signed—that, in Dr. Loyd’s opinion, were not justified by a patient’s\\nunderlying medical condition. And those were not from the patient files listed in Counts 2–62.\\nAce Br. at 45. Ace points to the fact that Dr. Loyd noted the various, serious underlying\\nconditions that Ace’s patients suffered and from this Ace concludes that the government failed to\\nshow the prescriptions were issued without a legitimate medical purpose. Id. at 45–46. In other\\nwords, Ace argues that the existence of an underlying medical condition that would justify the\\nprescription of a controlled substance means that the substance was, de facto, issued with a\\nlegitimate medical purpose. Ace’s second argument is that, per United States v. Binder, 26 F.\\nSupp. 3d 656 (E.D. Mich. 2014), the government was required to prove through expert testimony\\nthat Ace issued prescriptions “outside the usual course of his professional practice and for no\\nlegitimate medical purpose.” Ace Br. at 44–45 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04).\\n\\n Ace’s arguments are incorrect. His first argument begins with a flawed premise, as the\\ndistrict court explained in its post-trial opinion. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. & Order at 4) (Page\\nID #5911). Ace conflates “legitimate medical purpose” with “legitimate need” or, broader still,\\nany condition that might justify the prescription of pain pills. Id. But the district court explained\\nneatly the flaw in this logic:\\n\\n 7Ace and Ace Clinique’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence are identical, and so, for\\npurposes of this section, “Ace” refers to Ace Chaney and Ace Clinique unless otherwise distinguished.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 21\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Accepting the Chaneys’ premise, no physician could be held criminally liable for\\n distributing opioid prescriptions to users who incidentally carried some legitimate\\n need for painkillers, regardless of where, why, or how those prescriptions were\\n issued. Suppose, for example, that a physician began dispensing prescriptions for\\n powerful narcotics to strangers on a street corner, without asking for their medical\\n history or performing a medical examination of any kind. Under the Chaneys’\\n proposed construction of the law, the Government could not prosecute this\\n physician for dispensing painkillers “without a legitimate medical purpose”\\n absent some expert testimony that proved each stranger did not have a legitimate\\n need for the pills.\\n\\nId. (footnote omitted). Instead, as the word “purpose” implies, we look at a provider’s reason for\\nissuing the prescription when determining whether it was issued for a legitimate medical\\npurpose, rather than the patient’s underlying conditions. As the district court made abundantly\\nclear, a doctor prescribing opioid painkillers to anyone walking through the door is not saved if a\\nperson happens to have an underlying condition that could justify the prescription; likewise, a\\ndoctor who acts in good faith and with all due care but nevertheless issues a prescription to a\\npatient who was merely faking symptoms is nevertheless acting with a legitimate medical\\npurpose. To say otherwise would be absurdity.\\n\\n Other “pill mill” cases support our common-sense reading of the statute. We have upheld\\nsimilar convictions based on evidence of the doctor’s intent—or purpose—rather than the\\npatient’s underlying condition. See United States v. Elliott, 876 F.3d 855, 864 (6th Cir. 2017)\\n(noting that “the extremely short time [the defendant] spent with patients and her knowledge of\\nthe distances they traveled to obtain prescriptions at the clinic” supported the conviction); United\\nStates v. Guzman, 571 F. App’x 356, 363 (6th Cir. 2014) (the fact that the defendant “met with\\ncustomers on an expedited basis and issued thousands of prescriptions for narcotics, with . . .\\nprescription forms that [the doctor] had pre-signed” supported the conviction); United States v.\\nWord, 806 F.2d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that “[writing] prescriptions for various\\nindividuals whom [the defendant] did not examine” is evidence of illegitimate purpose).\\nEvidence of the circumstances surrounding a prescription allows juries to infer that a physician’s\\npurpose was something other than legitimate medical treatment; the underlying conditions a\\npatient may have had are not dispositive. Of course, the distinction between a physician’s\\npurpose and the patient’s condition collapses when a provider’s reason is to address the patient’s\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 22\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nneed; whether that was Ace’s reason for prescribing pain pills is exactly the question in this case.\\nThe jury concluded that his reasons were illegitimate, a conclusion well supported by the\\nevidence presented at trial.\\n\\n This leads to Ace’s second, equally flawed, argument. Expert testimony was not\\nnecessary to show illegitimate purpose in this case. First, the law in the Sixth Circuit is clear that\\nexpert testimony is not necessary. Elliott, 876 F.3d at 865. Second, there was plenty of evidence\\nfrom which the jury could have concluded—absent expert testimony—that Ace was operating\\nwithout a legitimate medical purpose. For example, a former patient named Charles Hicks\\ntestified that he was prescribed Percocet on his first visit to the clinic; that he was physically\\nexamined only once; that after a drug screening was negative for opiates, 8 he told Ace he was\\nonly taking drugs as needed, to which Ace responded that Hicks would have to start taking the\\npills more regularly; that Ace increased the dosage of Hicks’s prescription after Hicks’s drug\\nscreening was negative; and that Ace suggested to Hicks he could sell his additional OxyContin\\nfor cash. R. 400 (Mar. 3, 2016 Trial Tr. at 31–45) (Page ID #6411–25). Another example is the\\nevidence that Ace was altering urine drug screens. R. 316 (Mar. 22, 2016 Trial Tr. at 38–42)\\n(Page ID #3724–29). This, along with the myriad evidence summarized in the district court’s\\nopinions on the defendants’ motions for acquittal, shows that in this case it was entirely\\nappropriate for a jury to determine that Ace was operating without a legitimate medical purpose.\\nSee R. 267 (Apr. 12, 2016 Order) (Page ID #2794); R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. & Order) (Page\\nID #5908).\\n\\n b. Drug-Distribution Conspiracy\\n\\n Next, the defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions\\nfor conspiracy to distribute Schedule II and III controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (Count 1).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8In this instance, a negative drug screening is a bad outcome. The idea behind the screenings is to test\\nwhether patients are actually taking the drugs they are being prescribed; thus, a positive result for opiates is the\\ndesired outcome.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 23\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Ace’s argument as to this count is similar to his argument regarding Counts 2–62: he\\nclaims that the government has failed to prove an agreement to distribute controlled substances\\noutside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose\\nbecause the government did not provide expert testimony showing that all prescriptions\\ndistributed by Ace were illegitimate. Ace Br. at 47.\\n\\n This count was supported by sufficient evidence for largely the same reasons that Counts\\n2–62 were proven. In addition, the government introduced evidence showing that Ace and Ace\\nClinique had a general practice of distributing medication for illegitimate purposes that went\\nbeyond the specific prescriptions charged in Counts 2–62. See Appellee Br. at 75–76.9\\n\\n Lesa Chaney also challenges the jury’s verdict as to Count One. She argues that the\\ngovernment failed “to identify even one patient that received a controlled substance prescription\\nboth outside the usual course of medical practice and for no legitimate medical purpose.” Lesa\\nChaney Br. at 47. But this statement is, of course, incorrect. As discussed above, the\\ngovernment proved that 60 prescriptions were issued “outside the usual course of medical\\npractice and for no legitimate medical purpose.” Lesa was not charged in those counts, but the\\ngovernment offered evidence that she knew of Ace’s practice of using pre-signed prescriptions\\nand that she distributed the slips on occasion. E.g. R. 321 (Mar. 8, 2016 Trial Tr. at 18) (Page ID\\n#4655); see also United States v. Sadler, 750 F.3d 585, 593 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The government\\nhad no obligation to produce ‘direct evidence’ against [the defendant], as ‘guilty knowledge and\\nvoluntary participation may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.’ Those circumstances\\nall pointed in one direction—that this pain-treatment operation was a charade, and [the\\ndefendant] played a critical part in facilitating the charade.” (quoting United States v. Hodges,\\n935 F.2d 766, 773 (6th Cir. 1991))). This was sufficient evidence to show Lesa’s involvement in\\nthe conspiracy.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9Lesa, Ace, and the clinic argue that if the drug distribution and drug conspiracy counts fall, so too should\\nthe counts for maintaining drug-involved premises. But the drug distribution and conspiracy counts survive, and so\\ntoo the drug-involved premises.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 24\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Lesa’s final argument is that the government is attempting to turn the use of pre-signed\\nprescriptions into a “strict liability” offense. But that is simply not the case. If that were, so a\\n25-day trial would not have been warranted. Rather, the government presented the use of pre-\\nsigned prescription pads in conjunction with other evidence of illegitimate purpose, all of which\\nallowed the jury to infer malfeasance.\\n\\n 2. The Health-Care Fraud Counts\\n\\n The next group of charges are the healthcare fraud counts.\\n\\n All the defendants were found guilty of multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1347, which\\nproscribes knowingly and willfully executing (or attempting to execute) a scheme or artifice to\\ndefraud any health-care benefit program. This requires the government to prove that the\\ndefendants “(1) created ‘a scheme or artifice to defraud’ a health care program, (2) implemented\\nthe plan, and (3) acted with ‘intent to defraud.’” United States v. Bertram, 900 F.3d 743, 748\\n(6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 314 (6th Cir. 2009)). The\\nconvictions under this statute were based on the following conduct:\\n\\n ● Ace and Ace Clinique: medically unnecessary urine drug screens (counts\\n 112–122); altered urine drug screens (counts 123–147); hospital visit billings\\n (counts 150–163, 165–168, 171–171, 175, 177, 180, 182, 186, 188, 191–192);\\n hospital visits on the high-volume day of March 19, 2013 (count 197); nerve\\n conduction studies conducted by unqualified personnel (count 234).\\n ● Lesa: medically unnecessary urine drug screens (counts 112–122); hospital\\n visits on the high-volume day of March 19, 2013 (count 197); nerve\\n conduction studies conducted by unqualified personnel (count 234).\\n\\n In addition, all defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and Ace and the clinic were found guilty of making false\\nstatements relating to health-care matters in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1035. “The elements of\\nhealth care fraud conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 are (1) an agreement between two or more\\npersons to (2) ‘knowingly and willfully execute[ ], or attempt[ ] to execute, a scheme or artifice\\n. . . to defraud any health care benefit program; or . . . to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent\\npretenses, representations, or promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under the\\ncustody or control of, any health care benefit program, in connection with the delivery of or\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 25\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\npayment for health care benefits, items, or services.’” United States v. Pamatmat, No. 17-1611,\\n2018 WL 6173401, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 2018) (quoting United States v. Patel, 579 F. App’x\\n449, 460 (6th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 2019 WL 936741 (Apr. 1, 2019). To convict the\\ndefendants for false statements, “the government had to show that [their] false statements were\\nwillful and that [they] acted with intent to defraud.” United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 277\\n(6th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n a. Medically Unnecessary Urine Drug Screens\\n\\n All the defendants were found guilty of health-care fraud based on administering and\\nbilling for medically unnecessary urine drug screens, and all now appeal these convictions.\\nUrine drug screens, when properly used, are a tool to help prevent patient abuse of pain\\nmedication. Doctors can test patients for the presence of the prescribed opioid—in which case, a\\npositive result is desired—and for the presence of illicit drugs—in which case, a negative result\\nis required. R. 354 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 11) (Page ID #5668). These tests are medically\\nindicated only at “the right frequency” and for “the right patient.” Id. at 12 (Page ID #5669). If\\na patient is high risk, screening three or four times a year would be appropriate; for low-risk\\npatients, once a year is adequate, per guidelines. R. 244 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 66–67) (Page\\nID #2648–49). Ace Clinique was screening patients at much more frequent intervals. E.g., id. at\\n82 (Page ID #2664) (describing a low-risk patient being screened 35 times in 35 months; another\\nlow-risk patient being screened 24 times in 42 months).\\n\\n Ace argues that the government has failed to prove specific intent to defraud because it\\nrelied on “generalized” expert testimony rather than patient testimony or expert testimony\\n“sufficiently specific to the patient, date, and services in the indictment.” Ace Br. at 48. He\\npoints also to testimony of an expert witness that any drug screening is generally good. In\\naddition, Lesa argues that the government failed to prove specific intent because: (1) she is not a\\nhealthcare professional; (2) there were divergent opinions in the medical community regarding\\nhow frequently urine drug screening should be conducted, therefore; (3) “[f]or [Lesa] to be found\\nguilty of the healthcare fraud charges regarding the urine drug screens . . . it would have to be\\nshown that she knew better than all these medical professionals.” Lesa Chaney Br. at 52–53.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 26\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n These arguments all fail.\\n\\n First, the specificity of the government’s proof. The defendants are correct that this court\\nhas said that “[i]f expert testimony is offered in lieu of patient testimony, the expert testimony\\nshould be sufficiently specific to the patient, date, and services in the indictment, [although] the\\npatients’ names need not be specifically mentioned during the expert’s testimony.” United States\\nv. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 315 (6th Cir. 2009). The problem with the defendants’ argument is\\nthat the government’s expert did testify specifically as to each charged count. See R. 244 (Mar.\\n9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 81–89) (Page ID #2663–71) (“These are tables that I have performed for\\neach patient and to kind of document their Opioid Risk Tool and also how many urine drug\\nscreens they had per month.” (emphasis added)). This accords with Martinez:\\n\\n [The defendant’s] records for each patient named in the indictment and the claims\\n that [the defendant] submitted for reimbursement were admitted into evidence and\\n available for the jury to review. [A doctor] testified that he reviewed the bills [the\\n defendant] submitted and his patient files, and concluded that the billing was “not\\n appropriate in any fashion” and that the procedures claimed in the billing “were\\n not medically necessary in any way.” Considering the evidence that [the\\n defendant] performed procedures and prescribed medication that expert witnesses\\n deemed medically unnecessary, a rational jury could infer that [the defendant]\\n knowingly devised a billing scheme with the intent to defraud.\\n\\n588 F.3d at 316 (internal citations omitted).\\n\\n Similarly, in this case, Dr. Parker testified that only 31 of the 311 urine drug screens\\nperformed were medically indicated, and the complete medical files were admitted into evidence.\\nR. 244 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 86, 88–91) (Page ID #2668, 2670–73). Thus, the defendants’\\nfirst argument fails.\\n\\n Next, the defendants argue that one expert witness, Dr. Stephen Loyd, “testified for the\\ngovernment that he does not have a problem with [Ace Clinique’s] drug screening regimen.”\\nAce Br. at 48. The argument seems to be that Dr. Loyd’s testimony rendered it impossible to\\nshow that the drug screens were illegitimate. This, however, is untrue. First, “courts may not\\n‘independently weigh[ ] the evidence, nor judge[ ] the credibility of witnesses.’ This rule applies\\nwith equal force to the testimony and conclusions of the government’s expert witnesses.”\\nPaulus, 894 F.3d at 275 (quoting United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 1999))\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 27\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n(alteration in original). We cannot now say that the jury erred by crediting Dr. Parker’s\\nassessment that the urine screens were unnecessary over Dr. Loyd’s testimony.\\n\\n The second problem with this argument is that it overstates Dr. Loyd’s testimony. He did\\nsay that “I don’t have a problem with the drug screening regimen . . . . [P]articularly [in] rural\\nAppalachia, I’m excited when people are drug-screened.” R. 415 (Mar. 15, 2016 Trial Tr. at\\n160) (Page ID #7732). But Dr. Loyd said also that random drug screens (which Ace did not\\nadminister) are “preferable to a drug screen every time,” and he noted instances where a patient\\ntested negative for a drug the patient ought to have had in his system (because it was prescribed)\\nbut there was no indication Ace addressed this negative result. Id. at 48–52 (Page ID #7620–24).\\n\\n Finally, this argument ignores the evidence of altered and ineffective drug screens (a\\nviolation for which Ace was convicted separately). See generally Appellee Br. at 31–33. The\\nfact that Ace was altering drug screens adds to the potential inference that he had an illegitimate\\npurpose and intent to defraud.\\n\\n Last, there is Lesa’s argument that she, as a layperson, could not have committed this\\nfraud. But this argument is hollow. It is clear that someone need not be a medical professional\\nto commit health-care fraud. E.g., United States v. Davis, 490 F.3d 541, 549–50 (6th Cir. 2007).\\nAs the government points out, Lesa was aware that conducting screens was part of the regular\\npatient visits to the clinic. R. 408 (Mar. 16, 2016 Trial Tr. at 19–20) (Page ID #7061–62). She\\nwas the owner of the clinic. Most damning, she knew about the altered tests, showing she was\\naware that the testing protocol at the clinic was not legitimate. R. 340 (Mar. 15, 2016 Trial Tr. at\\n15–16) (Page ID #5486–87). The jury could have legitimately concluded that she was aware of\\nthe fraud being conducted at her place of business.10\\n\\n b. Making False Statements by Using Pre-Signed Prescription Pads\\n\\n Next, Ace and Ace Clinique contest their convictions for violations of 18 U.S.C § 1035\\nfor making false statements relating to health-care matters by using pre-signed prescriptions.\\n\\n 10Lesa makes similar, undeveloped arguments as to all of her fraud convictions. These arguments fail for\\nthe same reason—record evidence showed that Lesa was aware of the activities at the clinic, from which the jury\\ncould have inferred fraud.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 28\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nThey argue that the government failed to prove that Ace and the clinic intentionally hid the fact\\nthat the prescriptions were pre-signed. Ace Br. at 49. This is not so: Roy Combs, the “IT guy”\\nat the clinic who kept the pre-signed pads, testified that Ace told him “not to tell anybody about\\nthe [the pre-signed prescriptions]. R. 321 (Mar. 8, 2016 Trial Tr. at 19–20) (Page ID #4656–57).\\nThis alone is evidence from which the jury could have concluded Ace intentionally hid the fact\\nthat the prescriptions were pre-signed.\\n\\n c. The Nerve Conduction Studies\\n\\n All the defendants challenge their convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1347 by\\nfraudulently charging for nerve conduction studies. According to the government’s expert\\nwitness, Dr. Earl J. Berman, a true nerve conduction study is a “complex procedure” that tells a\\nqualified practitioner whether a nerve is damaged by generating wave forms showing “how\\nquickly a nerve impulse flows from a designated spot to a designated electrode.” R. 354 (Mar. 9,\\n2016 Trial Tr. at 20) (Page ID #5677). Because “certain diseases . . . have . . . a certain\\nneuropathy,” for example, “[d]iabetes has a different characteristic wave form and flow rate than\\nsomething that has a mass in the spine,” “the technician has got to know very precisely how to\\nset the electrodes, and the physician has to have special training as well to understand and\\ninterpret the wave forms and the latencies.” Id. at 20 (Page ID #5677). “Medicare requires that\\na technician has special training and recognition by a nationally-recognized organization, and the\\nphysician also has to have certain nationally-recognized training.” Id. at 21 (Page ID #5678).\\n\\n Combs, the IT director at Ace Clinique, performed the nerve conduction studies there.\\nR. 321 (Mar. 8, 2016 Trial Tr. at 4) (Page ID #4641). His only qualification to do so was a\\n“couple days”-long course he attended that was led by the inventor of the machine. Id. at 7\\n(Page ID #4644). Combs’s procedure involved “a machine that had eight D batteries in it that\\nconnected to a sponge that [he] had to get wet.” Id. at 92 (Page ID #4729). He would then\\n“connect [the machine] to a probe with a Q-tip on the end of it. . . . And then [he] would use the\\nQ-tip and dip it in water, and hold it to different points on the [patient’s] body.” Id. The\\nmachine would generate a current, and when the patient felt “a sensation” Combs would write\\ndown the number on the machine’s dial. Id.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 29\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Ace and the clinic argue that there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction\\nbecause there was “confusion concerning whether a nerve conduction study involves a neural\\nscan machine or an electromyogram (EMG).” Ace Br. at 50. They argue that the machine they\\nused—what they term a neural scan machine—was different than the complex machine Dr.\\nBerman described, and did not require the same training. This argument fails for two reasons.\\nFirst, there was no such confusion. Dr. Berman very clearly testified that the procedure he was\\ndescribing was the approved procedure for nerve conduction studies and not limited to EMGs or\\nmachines that use needles. R. 354 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 39–44) (Page ID #5696–5701).\\nDr. Berman did testify that he was unfamiliar with the specific machine used at Ace Clinique,\\nbut the procedure he described for nerve conduction studies is from the Medicare/Medicaid\\nbilling manual. Id. This leads to the second reason why the arguments of Ace and the clinic fail:\\nDr. Berman’s familiarity with their machine and what it may or may not require in terms of\\ntraining is immaterial. Dr. Berman described the characteristics of the nerve conduction study\\nfor which the clinic billed Medicare. Id. By using that billing code, Ace and the clinic were\\nrepresenting that they were performing the type of procedure Dr. Berman described. They of\\ncourse were not. Thus, they committed fraud, and no attempt to create confusion about EMGs as\\nopposed to wet Q-Tips can undermine their convictions.\\n\\n Finally, Lesa asserts broadly that the government “failed in its proof.” Lesa Chaney Br.\\nat 54. The record shows, however, that Lesa knew about the fraudulent practices at the clinic\\nand was responsible for billing and administrative procedures at the clinic. That is sufficient\\nevidence from which a jury could have found she knew of and committed (or aided and abetted)\\nthe fraud related to the nerve conduction studies.\\n\\n For the reasons stated above, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted\\nthe defendants on all counts.11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11Ace argues also that there was “cumulative error,” and all the defendants argue that the money-\\nlaundering charges fail because the drug-distribution counts fail. Because all of the defendants’ arguments\\nregarding the drug-distribution and health-care fraud counts are rejected, the money-laundering counts stand and\\nthere was no cumulative error.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 30\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nC. Jury Misconduct\\n\\n Next, all of the defendants argue that a new trial is warranted due to alleged jury\\nmisconduct. A new trial is warranted based on juror misconduct only if the misconduct “resulted\\nin prejudice to [the defendant].” United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 935 (6th Cir. 1990).\\n“We apply the abuse-of-discretion standard in jury-misconduct cases.” United States v.\\nWheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 361 (6th Cir. 2008).\\n\\n 1. Background\\n\\n The allegations of jury misconduct in this case come from one alternate juror, juror\\nnumber 116. On the fifth day of trial, a court clerk told the district court that she had received\\nfrom the jury administrator some information about a recent conversation between the\\nadministrator and juror 116. “The administrator told the court clerk—and the clerk then told the\\n[district court]—that this alternate had expressed ‘some frustration with the process’ and\\n‘concerns about how serious[ly] the jury was taking their duty.’” R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at\\n18) (Page ID #5925) (quoting R. 285 (Telephone Conf.) (Page ID #2988)); R. 291 (Apr. 20,\\n2016 Tr. at 3) (Page ID #3028)). The district court did not investigate the concerns directly, nor\\ndid it alert counsel to the concerns. Instead, it “instructed the jury that ‘if any issues . . . relate[d]\\nto the jury instructions’ arose, they should ‘bring those to [the Court’s] attention.’” Id. at 19\\n(Page ID #5926). The district court heard nothing further during the trial.\\n\\n The day after the entry of the verdict, juror 116 contacted Ace’s defense counsel and left\\na voicemail. Defense counsel reported the message to the court, and the parties held a telephone\\nconference the next day. Id.; R. 285 (Telephone Conf.) (Page ID #2988). The district court\\ndetermined that the appropriate course of conduct would be to conduct an in camera interview\\nwith the alternate to determine whether the concerns had to do with external influences on the\\njury or the jury’s internal decisionmaking process. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at 20) (Page ID\\n#5927).\\n\\n The in camera interview revealed details about the initial “concerns” that the district\\ncourt was told about via the court clerk and jury administrator. The first incident occurred\\nduring opening statements. R. 291 (Apr. 27, 2016 Tr. at 6) (Page ID #3031) (describing the first\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 31\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nincident as happening during “the first statements”). Two jurors were discussing the Chaneys’\\nhouse in the jury room during a break. The alternate told them “I don’t think we should be\\ntalking about that.” Id. One of the men who was discussing the house responded by saying\\n“[w]e can talk about it in here” and asked “who said [that we cannot]?” Id. The alternate said\\nthat “[t]he Judge told us we couldn’t.” Id. Then another woman agreed with the alternate and\\nsaid they could not discuss the case and “[i]t’s right on the wall there.” Id. This was the incident\\nthat was reported to the court.\\n\\n Juror 116 reported another incident to the jury administrator. The jury administrator told\\nthe alternate juror to “tell [the other jurors] not to do that.” Id. at 7 (Page ID #3032). It is\\nunclear what exactly the alternate described to the administrator. Juror 116 did, however,\\ndescribe to the court what the other incidents of misconduct were in her opinion. First, jurors\\nwere saying that they did not like the way one of the attorneys was treating an “elderly lady”\\nwitness. Id. Next, one of the jurors “got attracted to . . . Dr. Chaney’s attorney, and he made it\\nbe known.” Id. Finally, the alternate juror said that another woman was expressing her boredom\\nat the trial (saying, for example, “I know how many lights . . . [are] in the ceiling.”). Id. at 8\\n(Page ID #3033).\\n\\n Based on these incidents the defendants moved for a new trial, but their motions were\\ndenied. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at 34) (Page ID #5941).\\n\\n 2. A New Trial Was Not Warranted\\n\\n The defendants rely nearly exclusively on United States v. Resko to support their\\nargument that the alleged juror misconduct necessitated a new trial. See 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir.\\n1993). In Resko, “approximately seven days into a nine-day trial . . . a juror approached a court\\nofficer and told him that the members of the jury had been discussing the case during their\\nrecesses and while waiting in the jury room. The court officer informed the trial court of this\\nfact, and the court informed counsel.” Id. at 687. The trial court declined the defendants’\\nrequest for individualized voir dire, and instead gave a written questionnaire to each juror asking\\nwhether they participated in discussions and, if yes, whether they had “formed an opinion about\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 32\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nthe guilt or non-guilt of either defendant as a result of your discussions with other jurors.” Id. at\\n688. All jurors answered yes to the first question and no to the second. Id.\\n\\n On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the district court erred by failing to conduct\\nindividualized voir dire because the questionnaire left the court with “no way to know the nature\\nof [the jurors’] discussions” and whether those discussions were prejudicial. Id. at 690–95.\\n\\n Here, the district court acted recklessly by choosing to keep information about potential\\njuror misconduct from defense counsel. Nevertheless, a new trial is not warranted because the\\npost-verdict interview with juror 116 revealed there was no juror misconduct that could have\\nwarranted a new trial, and thus there was no prejudice. See Bowling, 900 F.2d at 935. During\\nthe in camera interview, the alternate described one instance of potential misconduct\\n(deliberating before close of evidence) that occurred during opening statements and was\\nimmediately quashed by other jurors. R. 291 (Apr. 20, 2016 Tr. at 6) (Page ID #3031). The rest\\nof the supposed “misconduct” the juror reported could be characterized as less-than-ideal\\nbehavior (commenting on the appearance of a lawyer; complaining of boredom), but nothing that\\nwould warrant a new trial. Id. at 7 (Page ID #3032). Simply put, juror 116 was given a chance\\nto air all her grievances, and nothing came close to conduct that would have warranted a new\\ntrial.\\n\\n The defendants attempt to inject confusion by saying that there are a number of\\nunresolved questions. See Lesa Chaney Br. at 58. But those attempts are fruitless. Juror 116\\nwas clear when she spoke with the district judge, and the nature of the supposed misconduct is\\nclear. It is nothing that could have possibly prejudiced the defendants. In sum, the district\\ncourt’s decision to withhold from the defendants an allegation of juror misconduct may have\\nbeen imprudent, but in this case it is clear that, even if counsel had been informed of every\\n“incident,” nothing would have even approached necessitating a new trial. Therefore we affirm\\nthe decision of the district court.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 33\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nD. Procedural Reasonableness at Sentencing\\n\\n Finally, the defendants argue that their sentences were procedurally unreasonable because\\nthe district court failed to address their arguments for a lower drug-amount calculation and erred\\nin calculating the loss amount.\\n\\n We review factual findings at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Valentine,\\n694 F.3d 665, 672 (6th Cir. 2012). We review de novo the methodology the district court used to\\ncalculate loss amount. United States v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975, 984 (6th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n First, the defendants argue that the district court erred by failing to explain sufficiently its\\nrejection of the defendants’ method of drug amount calculation. See Ace Br. at 53–54. The\\ndistrict court did, however, explain its reasoning “enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it]\\nhas considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal\\ndecisionmaking authority.” United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). This is apparent from a review of the\\nsentencing transcript. First, the district court explained its reasons for doubting the defendants’\\nexpert and method:\\n\\n I’ve read carefully the briefing that was filed, of course, listened carefully, for\\n example, to [defense expert] Dr. Russell’s testimony, the expert testimony that\\n was raised here. And, I mean, I think one of the problems with the expert\\n testimony, it’s clear, as I’ve gone back and looked at that, is that it provides kind\\n of this narrow bit of information, but not a real complete set of information as it\\n relates to the alleged fraud that took place in this particular case. And I think it’s\\n very appropriate for guideline purposes to consider conduct that’s much broader\\n than simply the counts of conviction, for example, for, you know, presigned\\n prescriptions, you know.\\n\\nR. 508 (Sentencing Tr. at 15–16) (Page ID #10055–56). Then, the court gave a lengthy\\nexplanation of its reasoning for reaching the conclusions on drug and loss amount that it did. Id.\\nat 25–29 (Page ID #10065–68).\\n\\n The defendants’ assertion that the district court’s explanation was “very brief” or\\notherwise insufficient simply does not accord with reality. Therefore, this argument fails.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 34\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Finally, the defendants argue that the district court erred in calculating the loss amount.\\nThis argument is a rehash of the previous argument. The error of which the defendants complain\\nis the district court’s decision not to adopt the findings of their expert. Again, the district court\\nsufficiently explained its decision regarding drug and loss amount, and specifically why it did\\nnot adopt the defense expert’s methodology.\\n\\n The defendants claim that the district court committed procedural error, but it is clear\\nupon examination that their true complaint is the district court’s decision to reject their expert’s\\nmethodology. Because the district court committed no procedural error during sentencing, this\\nclaim fails.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment regarding\\neach defendant.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4386402/\", \"author_raw\": \"KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SUHRHEINRICH"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MOORE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609149/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Alvin CHANEY, M.D. (17-6239/6351); Lesa L. Chaney (17-6167/6314); Ace Clinique of Medicine, LLC (17-6240/6315), Defendants-Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0071p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n │ Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/6314/6315/6351\n v. >\n │\n │\n JAMES ALVIN CHANEY, M.D. (17-6239/6351); LESA │\n L. CHANEY (17-6167/6314); ACE CLINIQUE OF │\n MEDICINE, LLC (17-6240/6315), │\n Defendants-Appellants. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London.\n No. 6:14-cr-00037—Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, District Judge.\n\n Argued: January 16, 2019\n\n Decided and Filed: April 11, 2019\n\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and MOORE, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\n\nARGUED: Robert L. Abell, ROBERT ABELL LAW, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant Lesa\nChaney. Christy J. Love, LOVE LAW FIRM, PLLC, London, Kentucky for Appellants James\nChaney and Ace Clinique of Medicine, LLC. Amanda B. Harris, UNITED STATES\nDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert L. Abell,\nROBERT ABELL LAW, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant Lesa Chaney. Christy J. Love,\nLOVE LAW FIRM, PLLC, London, Kentucky for Appellants James Chaney and Ace Clinique\nof Medicine, LLC. Amanda B. Harris, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\nWashington, D.C., Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., Roger West, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S\nOFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 2\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. James Alvin Chaney (“Ace”) and Lesa\nChaney owned and operated a highly profitable clinic in Hazard, Kentucky called Ace Clinique\nof Medicine. Eventually, the clinic attracted suspicion that it was a “pill mill”: a clinic that\ndistributes addictive prescription pills without a legitimate medical purpose. Law enforcement\nobtained a warrant and searched Ace Clinique’s files, where they discovered evidence of many\ncrimes—some related to the suspected pill-mill operation, and some distinct. The Chaneys and\nAce Clinique were charged, convicted by a jury, and sentenced. They raise on appeal four\nissues: (1) the constitutionality of the warrant that allowed the search of the clinic; (2) the\nsufficiency of the evidence at trial; (3) whether jury misconduct occurred and whether it warrants\na new trial; and (4) whether the district court correctly calculated the guidelines range at\nsentencing. For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the district court on all grounds.\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n\n Ace and Lesa Chaney are a married couple who owned and operated Ace Clinique of\nMedicine, LLC, in Hazard, Kentucky. R. 190 (Second Superseding Indictment at 1–2) (Page ID\n#1877–78). Ace was a licensed physician in Kentucky; Lesa was the President and Chief\nExecutive Officer of Ace Clinique. Id.\n\n The government started paying attention to Ace Clinique and the Chaneys in June 2010.\nR. 71-2 (Warrant One at 5) (Page ID #658). An anonymous caller contacted Chris Johnson, an\ninvestigator for the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, and told him that Ace pre-\nsigned prescriptions for use at Ace Clinique while absent. Id. Johnson, assisted by state law\nenforcement, investigated the claims. Id.\n\n The investigation revealed that Ace was out of town on the same day that several\nprescriptions signed by Ace and dated that day were filled at a nearby pharmacy. Id. at 5–6\n(Page ID #658–59). Officers interviewed Ace Clinique employees, who admitted to using pre-\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 3\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nsigned prescription blanks, and the employees showed the officers three partial prescription pads\nof pre-signed blanks. Id. at 6–7 (Page ID #659–60). The state officers contacted the DEA, and\ninvestigators conducted multiple interviews of people who had worked for or with Ace Clinique,\nas well as former patients. Id. at 21–37 (Page ID #674–91). The investigation led to warrants to\nsearch Ace Clinique and the Chaneys’ home and airplane hangar for evidence of violations of\n21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which proscribes knowing or intentional distribution of controlled\nsubstances, and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), which proscribes conspiracies to commit money\nlaundering. R. 71-2 (Warrant One) (Page ID #653).1\n\n Eventually, a grand jury issued a 256-count indictment that charged Ace, Lesa, and Ace\nClinique with various offenses. R. 190 (Second Superseding Indictment) (Page ID #1877–1920).\nThe charges fell into three general categories: controlled substance charges (Counts 1–64),\nmoney laundering charges (Counts 65 and 235–55), and fraud charges (Counts 66–234 and 256).\nSee Appellee Br. at 4–6.2\n\n The defendants sought to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrants, but had only\npartial success. R. 71 (Joint Mot. to Suppress) (Page ID #611); R. 159 (May 26, 2015 Order at\n24) (Page ID #1760). The evidence seized from the airplane hangar was suppressed, as was\nevidence seized from the clinic that dated to any time before March 2006. R. 159 (May 26, 2015\nOrder at 24) (Page ID #1760). The district court rejected the defendants’ arguments that the\nwarrants’ enumeration of “patient files” as an item to be seized was overly broad and\ninsufficiently particular. Id. at 10 (Page ID #1746).\n\n A 25-day trial followed. Ultimately, the jury returned a mixed verdict. R. 281 (Verdict\nForm) (Page ID #2954–2984); see also Appellee Br. at 4–6.\n\n\n\n\n 1The description and list of items to be seized is identical in each of the three warrants, as are the portions\nof the affidavit discussed herein. See generally R. 125 (R. & R. at 3–19) (Page ID #1231–47). Therefore we do not\ndistinguish among the warrants.\n 2Counts 69, 84, 101, 196, 205, 216, and 219 were dismissed by the government. Appellee Br. at 4–6.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 4\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n The defendants argue now that the trial was infected by jury misconduct. During the\ntrial, an alternate juror reported to court staff some “concerns about how serious[ly] the jury was\ntaking their duty,” and the staff reported those concerns to the district court. R. 371 (Sept. 30,\n2016 Op. at 18) (Page ID #5925) (alteration in original) (quoting R. 291 (Apr. 20, 2016 Tr. at 3)\n(Page ID #3028)). The district court told the jury that if any issues related to the jury instructions\narose they should report those to the court, but the court did not tell counsel that a juror had\nraised concerns. Id. at 19 (Page ID #5926). After the entry of the verdict, the same alternate\njuror—who did not participate in deliberations—contacted defense counsel to complain of\nmisconduct; defense counsel contacted the court, and the court conducted an in camera interview\nwith the alternate. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at 20) (Page ID #5927). The defendants moved\nfor a new trial following the interview, but the district court denied their motions. R. 297 (Mot.\nfor New Trial [Lesa]) (Page ID #3246); R. 299 (Mot. for New Trial [Ace]) (Page ID #3279); R.\n371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. & Order) (Page ID #5908).\n\n Prior to sentencing, the district court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing regarding\nthe drug quantity and loss amount that would be used to calculate the sentencing guidelines\nrange. R. 459 (Aug. 17, 2017 Tr. at 1) (Page ID #9443); R. 460 (Aug. 18, 2017 Tr. at 1) (Page\nID #9572). Put simply, the defendants argued that drug quantity and loss amount should be\ncalculated from the counts of conviction only; the government argued that every Schedule II or\nIII prescription drug Ace prescribed during the relevant time period and every billing to\nMedicaid from Ace Clinique or a pharmacy filling an Ace Clinique prescription should be used\nto calculate drug quantity and loss amount. R. 460 (Aug. 18, 2017 Tr. at 44–66) (Page ID\n#9615–37); R. 459 (Aug. 17, 2017 Tr. at 10–11, 64–66) (Page ID #9452–53, 9506–08).\n\n The Presentence Report (“PSR”) for each defendant used the government’s method to\ncalculate a guidelines range, and the defendants objected. At sentencing, the district court\nrefused to adopt wholesale either proposed method and instead found that 60 percent of the drugs\nand billings the government used to calculate drug quantity and loss amount were fraudulent. R.\n508 (Sentencing Tr. at 25–29) (Page ID #10066–69). The district court varied downward from\nthe guidelines-recommended life sentences for Ace and Lesa and sentenced Ace to a total\nsentence of 180 months in custody and Lesa to a total sentence of 80 months in custody. Id. at\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 5\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n86–87, 98–99 (Page ID #10126–27, 10138–39). Ace Clinique was sentenced to five years’\nprobation. Id. at 103 (Page ID #10143).\n\n These appeals followed.\n\n II. DISCUSSION\n\nA. The Search Warrant\n\n All defendants appeal the district court’s determination that the search warrants were\nconstitutional. They focus their appeals on the warrants’ enumeration of “patient files” as an\nitem to be seized. When considering a motion to suppress, we review a district court’s legal\nconclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d\n527, 536 (6th Cir. 2011).\n\n 1. Background: The Warrant and Motions to Suppress\n\n On September 9, 2013, the government applied for and was granted three search\nwarrants: one to search the premises of Ace Clinique of Medicine, one to search James and Lesa\nChaney’s home, and one to search their airplane hangar. R. 71-2 (Warrant One) (Page ID #653);\nR. 71-3 (Warrant Two) (Page ID #700); R. 71-4 (Warrant Three) (Page ID #745). All three\nwarrants expressly incorporate a detailed affidavit describing Special Agent Thad Lambdin’s\ninvestigation of Ace Clinique and the Chaneys.\n\n Each warrant contains a list of items to be seized. The list opens with the preamble:\n“The items to be seized are evidence of violations of Title 21, United States Code Sections\n841(a)(1), 846 and 856, as well as Title 18 United States Code, Section 1956(h).” R. 71-2\n(Warrant One at 46) (Page ID #698). The warrants then list various sorts of items, including\n“[p]atient files for patients.” R. 71-2 (Warrant One at 47) (Page ID #699). The agents who\nexecuted the warrant to search the clinic seized nearly all the patient files. R. 317 (Mar. 23, 2016\nTrial Tr. at 31) (Page ID #3839).\n\n The defendants moved to suppress evidence seized from the searches. R. 71 (Joint Mot.\nto Suppress) (Page ID #611). They argued the warrants were insufficiently particular and were\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 6\n 6314/6315/6351\n\noverbroad, among other things. R. 71-1 (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress at 19) (Page ID\n#635). The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who recommended\nsuppression of evidence that existed prior to March 2006 and of evidence seized from the\nairplane hangar, but otherwise rejected the defendants’ arguments that the warrants’ instruction\nto seize “[p]atient files” was improper. R. 125 (R. & R. at 39, 46–47) (Page ID #1267, 1274–\n75). The defendants entered objections to the Report and Recommendation, R. 134 (Objs. to R.\n& R.) (Page ID #1330), but the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations.\nR. 159 (May 26, 2015 Order at 24) (Page ID #1760).\n\n Among the recommendations that the district court adopted was the finding that “the\nfacts [in the affidavit] do not support the finding that the ‘whole [of Ace Clinique’s] business’\nwas fraudulent,” and therefore there was not probable cause to support a general “all records”\nsearch. R. 125 (R. & R. at 38) (Page ID #1266). Naturally, the defendants did not object to this\nconclusion, and the district court adopted the relevant portion of the Report and\nRecommendation without comment. R. 159 (May 26, 2015 Order at 24) (Page ID #1760).\n\n Although the district court did not find there was probable cause to seize all patient files,\nit nevertheless upheld the warrant on the theory that the preamble to the list of items to be seized\nacted as a limit on the list—law enforcement could seize patient files only if those files were\nevidence of violations of the listed statutes. R. 125 (R. & R. at 38–39) (Page ID #1266–67).\nThis, the district court reasoned, guided the executing agents’ discretion, and so the warrants\npassed constitutional muster.\n\n At trial, Agent Thad Lambdin testified. The defense cross-examined him about the\nsearch of the clinic, and he explained that during the search the FBI took “not every [file], but\nmost of them” and that the FBI intended to take all of the patient files in the clinic. R. 317 (Mar.\n23, 2016 Trial Tr. at 31) (Page ID #3839). Defense counsel asked Agent Lambdin whether the\nFBI tried to distinguish between files that were potential evidence and files that were not; Agent\nLambdin answered that the FBI “took [files] from the different areas of the clinic because [the\nagents] could not, on that day, determine what all was being used or not used.” Id. at 31–32\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 7\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n(Page ID #3839–40). Upon further questioning, Agent Lambdin reiterated that, at the time of the\nsearch, the FBI did not attempt to distinguish between files, but rather “just took them all.” Id.\n\n The defendants renewed their motion to suppress after Agent Lambdin testified. R. 262\n(Trial Min. for Mar. 30, 2016) (Page ID #2784). They argued that Agent Lambdin’s testimony\ndemonstrated that the “the limitation upon which the magistrate judge and the Court relied was,\nin fact, no limitation at all.” R. 261 (Renewed Mot. to Suppress at 3) (Page ID #2778). The\nrenewed motion appears to assert that the testimony showed that the warrant was insufficiently\nparticular; the district court construed the motion to argue also that “even if the warrant itself was\nconstitutional, the agents’ supposed ‘deliberate and willful disregard’ of the warrant’s scope\nrequires a blanket suppression of the patient files seized in the raid.” R. 273 (Apr. 19, 2016 Op.\nat 3) (Page ID #2905).\n\n The district court denied this motion because (1) agents’ actions cannot affect the\nparticularity of the warrant, which is determined by the four corners of the warrant itself; (2) the\nofficers may not have exceeded the scope of the warrant because all patient files were potentially\nrelevant to the alleged violations and there was no way agents in the field could have determined\nwhich files were potentially relevant evidence; and, (3) even if the search exceeded the scope of\nthe warrant, the defendants did not argue that the patient files actually introduced at trial were\nbeyond the scope of the warrant. Id. at 3–5 (Page ID #2905–07).\n\n The defendants now argue, on appeal, that the warrant was facially unconstitutional.\n\n 2. The Search Warrant Was Constitutional\n\n The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution says that “no Warrants shall\nissue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the\npersons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The chief purpose of the particularity\nrequirement [is] to prevent general searches by requiring a neutral judicial officer to cabin the\nscope of the search to those areas and items for which there exists probable cause that a crime\nhas been committed.” Richards, 659 F.3d at 537 (alteration in original) (quoting Baranski v.\nFifteen Unknown Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 452 F.3d 433, 441\n(6th Cir. 2006)). The constitutionality of a warrant is determined by what is contained in the\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 8\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nfour corners of the warrant, although the government can incorporate by express reference\naffidavits and other material. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557–58 (2004).\n\n Two sorts of infirmities can lead to an insufficiently particular, and therefore\nunconstitutional, warrant. Richards, 659 F.3d at 537. The first is when a warrant provides\ninformation insufficient “to guide and control the agent’s judgment in selecting what to take.”\nId. (quoting United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999)). The second is when the\ncategory of things specified “is too broad in the sense that it includes items that should not be\nseized.” Id. This is often referred to as “overbreadth.” “The degree of specificity required\ndepends on the crime involved and the types of items sought.” United States v. Abboud, 438\nF.3d 554, 575 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1026 (6th Cir.\n1991)) (for example, “[i]n a business fraud case, the authorization to search for general business\nrecords is not overbroad”).\n\n The appellants argue that paragraph 13 of the warrant, which lists “[p]atient files” as an\nitem to be seized, is insufficiently particular because the government did not have probable cause\nto search all patient files, and the preamble clause of the warrant—limiting it to evidence of\nviolations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 856 and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)—is inadequate to guide\nthe agents’ discretion.\n\n The United States presents two defenses of the warrant. First, it argues that Ace Clinique\nwas so permeated with fraud that there was probable cause to seize all patient files. Second, it\nargues that the preamble clause is a sufficient limitation on the agents’ discretion. The first\nargument fails, but the second does not.\n\n a. Pervasive Fraud\n\n Although general warrants are prohibited, “‘where there is probable cause to find that\nthere exists a pervasive scheme to defraud, all the business records of an enterprise may be\nseized,’ and consequently a description merely of records of that business will suffice” to satisfy\nthe particularity requirement. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(d) (5th ed. 2018) (quoting\nUnited States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 309 (1st Cir. 1980)) (footnotes omitted). In other words, if\nan organization or business is permeated with fraud, then there is probable cause to believe that\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 9\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nall its records are instrumentalities or evidence of a crime. In those circumstances, a warrant\nauthorizing a search of all records is not a general warrant, but rather a warrant describing\nexactly the items officers have probable cause to search or seize.\n\n The court below considered and rejected the applicability in this case of the pervasive\nfraud doctrine. Appellee Br. at 57; R. 125 (R. & R. at 38) (Page ID #1266); R. 159 (May 26,\n2015 Order) (Page ID #1737). The magistrate judge who issued the Report and\nRecommendation addressed this issue by first considering statements in the warrant affidavit\ndiscussing the percentage of patients who were pain patients: “The Government at times\nestimates 50% of Ace Clinique’s patients to be legitimate. [One person] stated that she believed\napproximately 90% of the patient load was pain management, but [another person] estimated that\nnumber at 50-60%.” R. 125 (R. & R. at 38) (Page ID #1266). Based on these numbers, the\nmagistrate judge concluded that the “evidence does not support probable cause to find that ‘the\nwhole business is fraudulent.’ Therefore, the Affidavit does not establish that Ace Clinique is\n‘permeated with fraud.’” Id. at 37–38 (Page ID #1265–66) (quoting United States v. Roos, No.\n12-09-2-ART, 2013 WL 1136629, at *3 (E.D. Ky. March 18, 2014)). The district judge adopted\nthis aspect of the Report and Recommendation without comment.\n\n To the extent that this is a question of law, we review de novo. United States v. Ford,\n184 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 1999). To the extent that the district court’s conclusion that Ace\nClinique was not permeated with fraud was a finding of fact, we review for clear error; clear\nerror occurs when, as here, the district applied an incorrect legal standard to reach the factual\nfinding. See United States v. Mahbub, 818 F.3d 213, 223 (6th Cir. 2016). We discuss first the\nproper factors for deciding whether the pervasive-fraud doctrine applies, and then we consider\nwhether it existed in this case.\n\n The court below applied a standard it derived from United States v. Roos: the “whole\nbusiness” must be fraudulent to justify an all-records search. R. 125 (R. & R. at 37) (Page ID\n#1265) (quoting Roos, 2013 WL 1136629, at *3). Given the focus on the alleged percentages of\npatients who were pain patients, it is clear that the court below understood “whole business” to\nmean that every transaction in which a business engages is fraudulent; otherwise, probable cause\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 10\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nfor an all-records search would be lacking. This is an incomplete, if not erroneous,\nunderstanding of pervasive fraud. Certainly one factor in determining whether there was\npervasive fraud is the amount of fraud3, but a large quantity of fraud is neither necessary nor\nsufficient for the exception to apply.\n\n First, to the extent that the magistrate judge predicated the recommendation on an\nunderstanding that, for a business to be permeated with fraud, every transaction must be\nfraudulent—that is not the case. That could not be the case. Even the most fraudulent of\nbusinesses might conduct a legitimate transaction from time to time.\n\n Even if the magistrate judge’s understanding was not so cramped, it erred in considering\nonly the quantity of fraudulent business when determining whether Ace Clinique was permeated\nwith fraud. Other factors, such as the separability of the fraudulent aspect of the business from\nthe legitimate and the central purpose of the business, are relevant.\n\n The first factor not considered by the district court is the separability of the fraudulent\nfrom the legitimate. A broad warrant is justified if “every aspect” of the business operation it\ntargets is “pervaded” with fraud. Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1985). One\nguiding principle of cases applying this doctrine is whether it is possible to separate the\nfraudulent aspects of the business from the legitimate. If it is possible, then the business is not\npermeated with fraud and a broad warrant is unjustified; if it is not, then a broad warrant can\nstand. For example, a business “incorporated solely as a conduit for the flow of kickback\nmonies” might be so permeated with fraud that a broad warrant would be justified. United States\nv. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1479 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985). So too a business in which “the alleged\nfraud supposedly infected [the business], its principals and officers, its suppliers, and numerous\nother individuals and businesses with whom it did or had done business . . . [and] traces of that\n\n\n\n 3At least one other circuit has said that “‘pervasive fraud’ does not refer to the percentage of a defendant’s\nbusiness that is fraudulent.” United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1259 (11th Cir. 2011). Because at least half\nof Ace Clinique’s business was potentially fraudulent, we do not answer the question here of whether the pervasive-\nfraud doctrine can apply when the fraud is small but “traces of that fraud were likely to be found spread out amongst\nthe myriad of records” in the business, as the Eleventh Circuit held in Bradley. Id. at 1259–60. In other words,\nalthough quantity of fraud is not the only factor, we need not decide here whether it is a necessary factor.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 11\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nfraud were likely to be found spread out amongst the myriad of records in [the business’s]\npossession.” United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2011).\n\n Conversely, we have made clear that when the fraudulent aspect of a business is\nseparable from and unrelated to a legitimate aspect of the business, an all-records search warrant\nis not justified. Ford, 184 F.3d at 576–77 (“Even if one business carried on at a site is permeated\nwith fraud, if other businesses run at the same site are separable and are not shown to be related\nto the suspected crime, a warrant permitting seizure of all documents at the site is not justified.”\n(emphasis added)); see also Voss, 774 F.2d at 406 (“Even if the allegedly fraudulent activity\nconstitutes a large portion, or even the bulk, of the [target business’s] activities, there is no\njustification for seizing records and documents relating to its legitimate activities” in a case\nwhere an organization conducted fraudulent transactions on behalf of clients but also engaged in\nunrelated advocacy work); United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1980) (finding an all-\nrecords search to be overbroad because it could have been limited to the automobile insurance\nportion of the defendant’s insurance agencies).\n\n Another guiding principle is whether “the alleged criminal activity was the ‘central\npurpose’ of the place to be searched.” United States v. Asker, 676 F. App’x 447, 462 (6th Cir.\n2017) (quoting United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1551 (9th Cir. 1996)); United States v\nLogan, 250 F.3d 350, 365 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding a warrant because “the warrant’s general\nnature was due to the investigators’ belief that [fraudulent activity] constituted [the business’s]\nentire operation”).\n\n Consideration of these factors harmonizes legal doctrine and common sense. If the\nfraudulent portion of a business is in a silo separate from the legitimate portion, then there is no\nprobable cause to think evidence of a crime would be found in the legitimate silo. On the other\nhand, if half of a business’s transactions are fraudulent but are interspersed with and inseparable\nfrom the records of the legitimate transactions, then it is probable that evidence of a crime would\nbe found in any record seized. Therefore, an all-records search would be supported by probable\ncause. Likewise, if a business’s central purpose is fraud, it is far more likely that probable cause\nexists to seize all records than if only a portion of the business’s purpose is fraudulent.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 12\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n United States v. Roos, on which the court below relied, does not contradict the idea that\nprobable cause to seize all records requires consideration of both the percentage of the business\nthat is fraudulent as well as the separability of the fraudulent aspect of the business and the\npurpose of the business. 2013 WL 1136629, at *3. Furthermore, Roos does not suggest that all,\nor even the vast majority, of a business’s transactions must be fraudulent to support an all-\nrecords search on the theory it is pervaded with fraud.\n\n Roos is, in fact, quite different from the case at bar. It did address a warrant to search a\ndoctor’s office for patient files, and Dr. Roos was prescribing prescription painkillers, but there\nthe resemblance stops. Dr. Roos came under suspicion after the police searched the house of two\npeople suspected of unlawfully distributing painkillers and found oxycodone prescribed by\nDr. Roos and reminders for appointments with Dr. Roos. Id. at *1. The suspected drug dealers\nwere in Kentucky; Dr. Roos was based in Houston, Texas. Id. Kentucky State Police\ninterviewed three Kentucky residents who said they traveled to Houston to get oxycodone\nprescriptions from Dr. Roos. Id. They would either travel to Houston, be examined quickly, and\nget prescriptions for large amounts of painkillers, or Dr. Roos “would call in the Texas\nprescriptions to a Kentucky pharmacy.” Id. at *1. Based on this evidence, the police executed a\nwarrant for “patient files for patients who have indicated they are from Kentucky.” Id. After the\nsearch was executed, Dr. Roos argued “that the warrant lacked probable cause because the search\nwarrant application did not establish that her whole medical practice was fraudulent.” Id. at *3.\nIn response to this argument, the district court correctly distinguished Dr. Roos’s situation from\nthe cases in which an all-records search was justified because the business was permeated with\nfraud. For one, the warrant at issue in Roos was limited to the Texas doctor’s files on patients\nfrom Kentucky. Furthermore, to the extent that Roos suggests a broader warrant would not have\nbeen justified, that has no bearing on this case. In Roos, the government had evidence that\nDr. Roos was conspiring with patients in Kentucky to distribute drugs unlawfully. See United\nStates v. Roos, No. 12-09-2-ART, 2013 WL 1136638, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 24, 2013). Even if\nRoos were binding on this court, it would not alter the outcome in this case.\n\n Turning back to the Chaneys and the Clinique, the question remains whether there was\npervasive fraud justifying an all-records search. The first relevant factor is the quantity of fraud.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 13\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nThe affidavit accompanying and incorporated into the warrants showed that anywhere from one\nhalf to 90 percent of its patients were pain patients—that is, potentially fraudulent. Next, the\nseparability of the fraudulent from the legitimate: although it is uncontested that the clinic saw\nsome legitimate patients, there is no indication that the pain practice was at all separate. Ace\nClinique did not have a “pain clinic” separate from the rest of its practice; it was one clinic. On\nthe other hand, there is nothing to suggest that evidence of fraud might “infect” the files of non-\npain patients. Finally, the central-purpose inquiry. It cannot be said with certainty that the\ncentral purpose of Ace Clinique was to operate as a “pill mill.” Certainly it did operate as such,\nbut the conceded non-negligible amount of legitimate patients at least suggests a dual purpose.\nThe evidence is close, but there is not quite enough evidence to suggest that Ace Clinique was\npermeated with fraud. This means that there was not probable cause to seize all of its records\nwholesale based on the “permeated with fraud” theory.\n\n b. Particularity\n\n This leads to the government’s second argument—that the warrant was limited to files\nthat were “evidence of violations of [21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 856 and 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1956(h)],” and therefore it was sufficiently particular. R. 71-3 (Warrant Two) (Page ID #743);\nAppellee Br. at 50. This is the theory under which the district court upheld the warrant. The\ndefendants argue now that this clause did not provide any meaningful guidance to the officers\nexecuting the warrants, and so the warrants remain insufficiently particular.\n\n There is no formula that determines whether a warrant is sufficiently particular.\nA sufficiently particular warrant “supplies enough information to guide and control the\n[executing] agent’s judgment in selecting what to take.” Richards, 659 F.3d at 537 (quoting\nUnited States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999)). Whether this bar has been cleared is\n“best resolved upon examination of the circumstances of the particular case.” Logan, 250 F.3d at\n365. “[T]he degree of specificity in a warrant must be flexible, depending upon the type of items\nto be seized and the crime involved.” United States v. Blair, 214 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir. 2000).\nFinally, “where a warrant adequately describes ‘a category of seizable papers,’ it is not lacking in\nspecificity merely ‘because the officers executing the warrant must exercise some minimal\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 14\n 6314/6315/6351\n\njudgment as to whether a particular document falls within the described category.’” United\nStates v. Bruce, 396 F.3d 697, 709 (6th Cir. 2005), vacated in part on other grounds, 405 F.3d\n1034 (mem.) (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1034 (6th Cir.\n1999)).\n\n Furthermore, it is established law in this circuit that, in some circumstances, “[a] warrant\nthat empowers police to search for something satisfies the particularity requirement if its text\nconstrains the search to evidence of a specific crime.” United States v. Castro, 881 F.3d 961,\n965 (6th Cir. 2018). The defendants nevertheless persist, arguing that “where the referenced\nstatutes are broad in scope, courts have held that the warrant contains no limitation at all and fails\nthe particularity requirement.” Lesa Chaney Br. at 34. They then argue that the statutes\nreferenced here are so broad that they provide no meaningful guidance, and therefore the warrant\nis invalid. This argument, which was not made to the district court, is incorrect even if it were\navailable to make for the first time on appeal.\n\n First, the defendants’ attack on 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)4 as a meaningful limit on the warrant\nis unavailing because it fails to view the warrant as a whole. Section 1956(h) deals with money\nlaundering, and the defendants are correct that § 1956(h) is a broad statute that criminalizes\n“more than 250 predicate offenses.” Lesa Chaney Br. at 35 (quoting United States v. Santos,\n553 U.S. 507, 516 (2005)). Perhaps a warrant that described the items to be seized only by\nreference to a statute as broad as § 1956(h), and which offered the executing officers no\nadditional guidance or details regarding the suspected criminal conduct, would fail for lack of\nparticularity. That is not the case here, however. Instead, the warrant expressly incorporated a\ndetailed affidavit that described the conduct at issue. Courts must take a common-sense,\ncontextual approach when interpreting warrants. Castro, 881 F.3d at 965. Here, common sense\ndictates that the evidence of money laundering authorized by the warrant is that related to the\n“pill mill” operation described in the affidavit. The out-of-circuit cases cited by defendants are\n\n\n 4“Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be subject\nto the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.”\n18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Section 1956(h) proscribes money laundering; § 1957 proscribes “[e]ngaging in monetary\ntransactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity.”\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 15\n 6314/6315/6351\n\ninapposite. The warrant at issue in United States v. Roche failed to incorporate expressly a\ndetailed affidavit, and would have likely been saved had it done so. 614 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.\n1980). Similarly lacking were the warrants at issue in United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 604\n(10th Cir. 1988), and United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 967 (9th Cir. 1986). In sum, the\nwarrant at issue here directed the officers to seize evidence of money-laundering violations\nrelated to the pill-mill scheme described in detail and at length in the affidavit. Therefore the\nofficers’ discretion was sufficiently guided. Cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479–82\n(1976) (upholding a warrant that authorized seizure of “fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of\ncrime” because that phrase must be read in context with the rest of the warrant).\n\n Moreover, even if § 1956(h) were so broad as to provide no guidance at all, three statutes\nremain that would limit the scope of the warrant: 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)5, 846, and 8566. These\nstatutes are far narrower than the statute prohibiting conspiracy to commit money laundering,\nand therefore provide specific guidance as to what sorts of patient files were authorized to be\nseized—namely, those that were evidence of drug distribution. The defendants argue otherwise,\nmainly relying on United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 2010), for support, but Lazar\naddresses a different situation entirely. The warrant at issue in Lazar incorporated a list of\npatients, and that list served as a limit on the scope of the warrant. Id. at 236–38 (describing the\nwarrant as including an affidavit referring to the “below listed” and “following” patients). This\ncourt held that any files seized in addition to the listed patients were beyond the scope of the\nwarrant. Id. Lazar presents a very different situation from this case because the warrant was\nlimited to specific patients. It does not stand for the proposition that any warrant ordering the\nseizure of patient files without a list of names is de facto unconstitutional.\n\n The remainder of the defendants’ arguments can be dealt with quickly. They rely on\nUnited States v. Abrams for support, and not illogically: Abrams does say that a warrant that\nallowed a seizure of all Medicare and Medicaid records from the office of doctors accused of\n\n\n 5“Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to\nmanufacture, distribute, or dispense . . . a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\n 621 U.S.C. 856 prohibits and penalizes “[m]aintaining drug-involved premises.”\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 16\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nMedicare/Medicaid fraud, even though limited only by reference to a particular criminal statute,\nwas unconstitutional. 615 F.2d 541, 542–44 (1st Cir. 1980). Abrams, however, is unpersuasive.\nThe opinion in Abrams was published only four years after the Supreme Court held in Andresen\nv. Maryland that a seizure of business records was constitutional based on a warrant’s language\nallowing seizure of listed items “together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of\ncrime.” 427 U.S. at 479. In Abrams, the First Circuit distinguished Andresen and noted that:\n\n Business records, although they may contain evidence of fraud, do not fall\n into the category of stolen or contraband goods. The government has cited no\n case and we have found none in which a seizure of all records was held valid\n pursuant to a generally worded warrant such as we have here. In the cases we\n have canvassed where a seizure of records was upheld, there has been some\n limitation in the warrant as to the records to be seized.\n\n615 F.2d at 545. Time has shown otherwise. We have upheld numerous seizures of the majority\nof a person or business’s records based on “generally worded warrant[s].” In United States v.\nGardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 471 (6th Cir. 2006), we upheld a warrant that “specifically stated the\nrecords to be seized included: financial documents; . . . business records involving [certain of\nthe defendants], . . . travel records; investment records; telephone records; records related to\npayment of personal and business expenses and cash purchases; . . . records and notes of\nfinancial transactions.” We held “the warrant stated with particularity all items to be seized” and\nthat, because the defendant was implicated in a broad scheme, a broad warrant was justified. Id.\n\n Likewise, we have upheld warrants allowing seizure of “papers ‘showing ownership\nand/or control’ of illegal drugs,” Bruce, 396 F.3d at 710, and “records and documents ‘relating\nto the ownership, partnership, investment, construction and equipment costs, operating income\nand expenses, losses and/or distribution of income and/or profits attributable to each [restaurant\nfranchise],’” Asker, 676 F. App’x at 462. In the latter case, we noted that “[g]iven the scope of\nthe alleged money laundering, this list is unsurprisingly large, but nonetheless tailored.” Asker,\n676 F. App’x at 462.\n\n So too with the Chaneys. The warrant authorized the seizure of all “[p]atient files . . . .\n[p]atient lists [and] [a]ppointment books, patient profiles, receipt books, ledgers of activity, notes\nregarding patient information, directions to pharmacies and other related documents as it pertains\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 17\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nto patients,” so long as those files or patient-related documents contained evidence of money\nlaundering or drug distribution. R. 71-3 (Warrant Two) (Page ID #744). This category surely\ncontains numerous documents, but it is nevertheless tailored: the scheme was large, and so too\nthe quantity of files seized.\n\n This leads to the defendants’ final argument: “The government was capable of\ndescribing the patient files and records and other items to be seized with more particularity.”\nLesa Chaney Br. at 41. They posit limiting the warrant to (1) files of patients who had been\nprescribed a controlled substance, (2) files of “those 50% of patients receiving controlled\nsubstance prescriptions that the government had some basis to conclude were [not] legitimate or\nprobably legitimate,” (3) files of individuals the government had already identified as being\n“unlawfully prescribed medication by Dr. Chaney,” or (4) files of “individuals that received\ncontrolled substance prescriptions in June 2010, that are the genesis of this case.” Id. at 41–42.\n\n None of these proposed formulations show that the warrant was insufficiently particular\nor overbroad. The final two proposed formulations restrict the warrant to a far narrower group of\nfiles than the government had probable cause to seize. It is crucial to remember that the\ninvestigation of Ace Clinique revealed both specific instances in which patients were\nillegitimately prescribed controlled substances and evidence suggesting a larger fraud (for\nexample, a pad of pre-signed prescriptions left for use while the doctor was away). These two\nformulations would limit the seizure to the specific instances already identified, ignoring the\nprobable cause to search for other instances of fraud. It would be as though the government saw\na person move drugs into a suspected stash house, but could authorize a warrant for only the\nquantity observed rather than any drugs found within.\n\n The third formulation—limit the seizure to “those 50% of patients receiving controlled\nsubstance prescriptions that the government had some basis to conclude were [not] legitimate or\nprobably legitimate”—is a gross misreading of the warrant affidavit. One person told an agent\nthat 50 or 60 percent of Ace Clinique’s patients were pain patients; there was never a distinction\nbetween a legitimate 50 percent and an illegitimate 50 percent. Therefore, this would not have\nbeen a valid formulation for the warrant.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 18\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n We are left with the first proposed formulation: limit the warrant to patients who had\nbeen prescribed a controlled substance. This does not render illegitimate the warrant because it\nis no more particular than the warrant issued, which authorized the officers to seize evidence of\ndrug-distribution crimes. It is, if anything, more broad—rather than restricting officers to only\nthose patient files that are evidence of crimes, the defendants would authorize officers to seize\nevery file of a person who was prescribed a controlled substance, regardless of the apparent\nlegitimacy of the prescription. The defendants’ failure to propose a more particular warrant\nformulation reveals the truth of the matter here: the warrant was as particular as was possible, in\nthe circumstances. “When a more specific description of the items to be seized is unavailable, a\ngeneral description will suffice.” Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1027. True, this formulation required\nthe executing agents to use their judgment to determine whether a particular file could be seized,\nbut that is not a fatal flaw. See Bruce, 396 F.3d at 710; Ables, 167 F.3d at 1034; cf. United States\nv. Hanna, 661 F.3d 271, 286 (6th Cir. 2011) (“We have allowed the search of electronic files\nbeyond their titles, recognizing the risk of ‘shielded’ evidence otherwise.”).\n\n A final point deserves emphasis: the defendants do not challenge on appeal the execution\nof the warrant. Rather, they focus their arguments on the constitutionality of the warrant.\nTherefore, the manner in which the agents executed the search—namely, that they took all of the\nclinic’s files, seemingly without review to see whether they constituted evidence of the named\ncrimes—is of no moment. The defendants could have objected to the introduction of specific\npieces of evidence as seized beyond the scope of the warrant, and, had the district court ruled\nagainst the defendants on those objections, we could have considered that on appeal. Those\narguments, however, were not made below. We consider only the facial constitutionality of the\nwarrant, and on those grounds the defendants’ arguments all fail.\n\n In sum, the warrant, as written, was constitutional.\n\nB. There Was Sufficient Evidence For The Jury to Convict the Defendants\n\n All the defendants argue that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain\ntheir convictions. We review jury verdicts using a deferential standard: we may “reverse a\njudgment for insufficiency of evidence only if, viewing the record as a whole, the judgment is\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 19\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nnot supported by substantial and competent evidence.” United States v. Taylor, 800 F.3d 701,\n711 (6th Cir. 2015). The evidence must be “viewed in the light most favorable to the\ngovernment” and “all reasonable inferences” must be drawn “in support of the jury’s verdict.”\nUnited States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Stewart, 729 F.3d\n517, 526 (6th Cir. 2013). “[A] defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence bears a very\nheavy burden.” United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United\nStates v. Jackson, 473 F.3d 660, 669 (6th Cir. 2007)). It must be borne in mind, however, that\nthe government bears the burden of proof of all elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the\nevidence did not meet that burden, the jury verdict must be reversed. United States v. Parkes,\n668 F.3d 295, 300–03 (6th Cir. 2012).\n\n 1. The Drug-Distribution Counts\n\n The first group of charges at issue are the drug-distribution counts. Ace and the clinic\nwere found guilty of multiple counts of unlawfully distributing controlled substances, namely,\noxycodone and hydrocodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Lesa\nChaney was not charged with these counts.) “In order to obtain a conviction under 21 U.S.C.\n§ 841(a)(1) against a licensed physician such as defendant, the government must show: ‘(1) That\ndefendant distributed a controlled substance; (2) That he acted intentionally or knowingly; and\n(3) That defendant prescribed the drug without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the\ncourse of professional practice.’” United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 539, 542 (6th Cir. 1995)\n(quoting United States v. Varma, 691 F.2d 460, 462 (10th Cir. 1982)).\n\n All defendants were found guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled\nsubstances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. “To prove a drug conspiracy, the\nUnited States must establish ‘(1) an agreement to violate the drug laws, and (2) each\nconspirator’s knowledge of, intent to join, and participation in the conspiracy.’” United States v.\nSingleton, 626 F. App’x 589, 595 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d\n503, 517 (6th Cir. 2001)).\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 20\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n Finally, all defendants were found guilty of two counts of maintaining drug-involved\npremises in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856. “To convict a defendant on these charges, the\ngovernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) knowingly\n(2) maintained any place, whether permanently or temporarily, (3) for the purpose of distributing\na controlled substance.” United States v. Lang, 717 F. App’x 523, 545 (6th Cir. 2017).\n\n a. Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance\n\n First, Ace and Ace Clinique challenge their convictions for unlawfully distributing\noxycodone and hydrocodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Counts 2–62).\n\n Ace7 argues that the government’s evidence was insufficient for two reasons. First, Ace\nmakes much of the fact that the government’s witness, Dr. Stephen Loyd, found only two\nprescriptions—both not pre-signed—that, in Dr. Loyd’s opinion, were not justified by a patient’s\nunderlying medical condition. And those were not from the patient files listed in Counts 2–62.\nAce Br. at 45. Ace points to the fact that Dr. Loyd noted the various, serious underlying\nconditions that Ace’s patients suffered and from this Ace concludes that the government failed to\nshow the prescriptions were issued without a legitimate medical purpose. Id. at 45–46. In other\nwords, Ace argues that the existence of an underlying medical condition that would justify the\nprescription of a controlled substance means that the substance was, de facto, issued with a\nlegitimate medical purpose. Ace’s second argument is that, per United States v. Binder, 26 F.\nSupp. 3d 656 (E.D. Mich. 2014), the government was required to prove through expert testimony\nthat Ace issued prescriptions “outside the usual course of his professional practice and for no\nlegitimate medical purpose.” Ace Br. at 44–45 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04).\n\n Ace’s arguments are incorrect. His first argument begins with a flawed premise, as the\ndistrict court explained in its post-trial opinion. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. & Order at 4) (Page\nID #5911). Ace conflates “legitimate medical purpose” with “legitimate need” or, broader still,\nany condition that might justify the prescription of pain pills. Id. But the district court explained\nneatly the flaw in this logic:\n\n 7Ace and Ace Clinique’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence are identical, and so, for\npurposes of this section, “Ace” refers to Ace Chaney and Ace Clinique unless otherwise distinguished.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 21\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n Accepting the Chaneys’ premise, no physician could be held criminally liable for\n distributing opioid prescriptions to users who incidentally carried some legitimate\n need for painkillers, regardless of where, why, or how those prescriptions were\n issued. Suppose, for example, that a physician began dispensing prescriptions for\n powerful narcotics to strangers on a street corner, without asking for their medical\n history or performing a medical examination of any kind. Under the Chaneys’\n proposed construction of the law, the Government could not prosecute this\n physician for dispensing painkillers “without a legitimate medical purpose”\n absent some expert testimony that proved each stranger did not have a legitimate\n need for the pills.\n\nId. (footnote omitted). Instead, as the word “purpose” implies, we look at a provider’s reason for\nissuing the prescription when determining whether it was issued for a legitimate medical\npurpose, rather than the patient’s underlying conditions. As the district court made abundantly\nclear, a doctor prescribing opioid painkillers to anyone walking through the door is not saved if a\nperson happens to have an underlying condition that could justify the prescription; likewise, a\ndoctor who acts in good faith and with all due care but nevertheless issues a prescription to a\npatient who was merely faking symptoms is nevertheless acting with a legitimate medical\npurpose. To say otherwise would be absurdity.\n\n Other “pill mill” cases support our common-sense reading of the statute. We have upheld\nsimilar convictions based on evidence of the doctor’s intent—or purpose—rather than the\npatient’s underlying condition. See United States v. Elliott, 876 F.3d 855, 864 (6th Cir. 2017)\n(noting that “the extremely short time [the defendant] spent with patients and her knowledge of\nthe distances they traveled to obtain prescriptions at the clinic” supported the conviction); United\nStates v. Guzman, 571 F. App’x 356, 363 (6th Cir. 2014) (the fact that the defendant “met with\ncustomers on an expedited basis and issued thousands of prescriptions for narcotics, with . . .\nprescription forms that [the doctor] had pre-signed” supported the conviction); United States v.\nWord, 806 F.2d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that “[writing] prescriptions for various\nindividuals whom [the defendant] did not examine” is evidence of illegitimate purpose).\nEvidence of the circumstances surrounding a prescription allows juries to infer that a physician’s\npurpose was something other than legitimate medical treatment; the underlying conditions a\npatient may have had are not dispositive. Of course, the distinction between a physician’s\npurpose and the patient’s condition collapses when a provider’s reason is to address the patient’s\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 22\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nneed; whether that was Ace’s reason for prescribing pain pills is exactly the question in this case.\nThe jury concluded that his reasons were illegitimate, a conclusion well supported by the\nevidence presented at trial.\n\n This leads to Ace’s second, equally flawed, argument. Expert testimony was not\nnecessary to show illegitimate purpose in this case. First, the law in the Sixth Circuit is clear that\nexpert testimony is not necessary. Elliott, 876 F.3d at 865. Second, there was plenty of evidence\nfrom which the jury could have concluded—absent expert testimony—that Ace was operating\nwithout a legitimate medical purpose. For example, a former patient named Charles Hicks\ntestified that he was prescribed Percocet on his first visit to the clinic; that he was physically\nexamined only once; that after a drug screening was negative for opiates, 8 he told Ace he was\nonly taking drugs as needed, to which Ace responded that Hicks would have to start taking the\npills more regularly; that Ace increased the dosage of Hicks’s prescription after Hicks’s drug\nscreening was negative; and that Ace suggested to Hicks he could sell his additional OxyContin\nfor cash. R. 400 (Mar. 3, 2016 Trial Tr. at 31–45) (Page ID #6411–25). Another example is the\nevidence that Ace was altering urine drug screens. R. 316 (Mar. 22, 2016 Trial Tr. at 38–42)\n(Page ID #3724–29). This, along with the myriad evidence summarized in the district court’s\nopinions on the defendants’ motions for acquittal, shows that in this case it was entirely\nappropriate for a jury to determine that Ace was operating without a legitimate medical purpose.\nSee R. 267 (Apr. 12, 2016 Order) (Page ID #2794); R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. & Order) (Page\nID #5908).\n\n b. Drug-Distribution Conspiracy\n\n Next, the defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions\nfor conspiracy to distribute Schedule II and III controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C.\n§§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (Count 1).\n\n\n\n\n 8In this instance, a negative drug screening is a bad outcome. The idea behind the screenings is to test\nwhether patients are actually taking the drugs they are being prescribed; thus, a positive result for opiates is the\ndesired outcome.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 23\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n Ace’s argument as to this count is similar to his argument regarding Counts 2–62: he\nclaims that the government has failed to prove an agreement to distribute controlled substances\noutside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose\nbecause the government did not provide expert testimony showing that all prescriptions\ndistributed by Ace were illegitimate. Ace Br. at 47.\n\n This count was supported by sufficient evidence for largely the same reasons that Counts\n2–62 were proven. In addition, the government introduced evidence showing that Ace and Ace\nClinique had a general practice of distributing medication for illegitimate purposes that went\nbeyond the specific prescriptions charged in Counts 2–62. See Appellee Br. at 75–76.9\n\n Lesa Chaney also challenges the jury’s verdict as to Count One. She argues that the\ngovernment failed “to identify even one patient that received a controlled substance prescription\nboth outside the usual course of medical practice and for no legitimate medical purpose.” Lesa\nChaney Br. at 47. But this statement is, of course, incorrect. As discussed above, the\ngovernment proved that 60 prescriptions were issued “outside the usual course of medical\npractice and for no legitimate medical purpose.” Lesa was not charged in those counts, but the\ngovernment offered evidence that she knew of Ace’s practice of using pre-signed prescriptions\nand that she distributed the slips on occasion. E.g. R. 321 (Mar. 8, 2016 Trial Tr. at 18) (Page ID\n#4655); see also United States v. Sadler, 750 F.3d 585, 593 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The government\nhad no obligation to produce ‘direct evidence’ against [the defendant], as ‘guilty knowledge and\nvoluntary participation may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.’ Those circumstances\nall pointed in one direction—that this pain-treatment operation was a charade, and [the\ndefendant] played a critical part in facilitating the charade.” (quoting United States v. Hodges,\n935 F.2d 766, 773 (6th Cir. 1991))). This was sufficient evidence to show Lesa’s involvement in\nthe conspiracy.\n\n\n\n\n 9Lesa, Ace, and the clinic argue that if the drug distribution and drug conspiracy counts fall, so too should\nthe counts for maintaining drug-involved premises. But the drug distribution and conspiracy counts survive, and so\ntoo the drug-involved premises.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 24\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n Lesa’s final argument is that the government is attempting to turn the use of pre-signed\nprescriptions into a “strict liability” offense. But that is simply not the case. If that were, so a\n25-day trial would not have been warranted. Rather, the government presented the use of pre-\nsigned prescription pads in conjunction with other evidence of illegitimate purpose, all of which\nallowed the jury to infer malfeasance.\n\n 2. The Health-Care Fraud Counts\n\n The next group of charges are the healthcare fraud counts.\n\n All the defendants were found guilty of multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1347, which\nproscribes knowingly and willfully executing (or attempting to execute) a scheme or artifice to\ndefraud any health-care benefit program. This requires the government to prove that the\ndefendants “(1) created ‘a scheme or artifice to defraud’ a health care program, (2) implemented\nthe plan, and (3) acted with ‘intent to defraud.’” United States v. Bertram, 900 F.3d 743, 748\n(6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 314 (6th Cir. 2009)). The\nconvictions under this statute were based on the following conduct:\n\n ● Ace and Ace Clinique: medically unnecessary urine drug screens (counts\n 112–122); altered urine drug screens (counts 123–147); hospital visit billings\n (counts 150–163, 165–168, 171–171, 175, 177, 180, 182, 186, 188, 191–192);\n hospital visits on the high-volume day of March 19, 2013 (count 197); nerve\n conduction studies conducted by unqualified personnel (count 234).\n ● Lesa: medically unnecessary urine drug screens (counts 112–122); hospital\n visits on the high-volume day of March 19, 2013 (count 197); nerve\n conduction studies conducted by unqualified personnel (count 234).\n\n In addition, all defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and Ace and the clinic were found guilty of making false\nstatements relating to health-care matters in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1035. “The elements of\nhealth care fraud conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 are (1) an agreement between two or more\npersons to (2) ‘knowingly and willfully execute[ ], or attempt[ ] to execute, a scheme or artifice\n. . . to defraud any health care benefit program; or . . . to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent\npretenses, representations, or promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under the\ncustody or control of, any health care benefit program, in connection with the delivery of or\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 25\n 6314/6315/6351\n\npayment for health care benefits, items, or services.’” United States v. Pamatmat, No. 17-1611,\n2018 WL 6173401, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 2018) (quoting United States v. Patel, 579 F. App’x\n449, 460 (6th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 2019 WL 936741 (Apr. 1, 2019). To convict the\ndefendants for false statements, “the government had to show that [their] false statements were\nwillful and that [they] acted with intent to defraud.” United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 277\n(6th Cir. 2018).\n\n a. Medically Unnecessary Urine Drug Screens\n\n All the defendants were found guilty of health-care fraud based on administering and\nbilling for medically unnecessary urine drug screens, and all now appeal these convictions.\nUrine drug screens, when properly used, are a tool to help prevent patient abuse of pain\nmedication. Doctors can test patients for the presence of the prescribed opioid—in which case, a\npositive result is desired—and for the presence of illicit drugs—in which case, a negative result\nis required. R. 354 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 11) (Page ID #5668). These tests are medically\nindicated only at “the right frequency” and for “the right patient.” Id. at 12 (Page ID #5669). If\na patient is high risk, screening three or four times a year would be appropriate; for low-risk\npatients, once a year is adequate, per guidelines. R. 244 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 66–67) (Page\nID #2648–49). Ace Clinique was screening patients at much more frequent intervals. E.g., id. at\n82 (Page ID #2664) (describing a low-risk patient being screened 35 times in 35 months; another\nlow-risk patient being screened 24 times in 42 months).\n\n Ace argues that the government has failed to prove specific intent to defraud because it\nrelied on “generalized” expert testimony rather than patient testimony or expert testimony\n“sufficiently specific to the patient, date, and services in the indictment.” Ace Br. at 48. He\npoints also to testimony of an expert witness that any drug screening is generally good. In\naddition, Lesa argues that the government failed to prove specific intent because: (1) she is not a\nhealthcare professional; (2) there were divergent opinions in the medical community regarding\nhow frequently urine drug screening should be conducted, therefore; (3) “[f]or [Lesa] to be found\nguilty of the healthcare fraud charges regarding the urine drug screens . . . it would have to be\nshown that she knew better than all these medical professionals.” Lesa Chaney Br. at 52–53.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 26\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n These arguments all fail.\n\n First, the specificity of the government’s proof. The defendants are correct that this court\nhas said that “[i]f expert testimony is offered in lieu of patient testimony, the expert testimony\nshould be sufficiently specific to the patient, date, and services in the indictment, [although] the\npatients’ names need not be specifically mentioned during the expert’s testimony.” United States\nv. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 315 (6th Cir. 2009). The problem with the defendants’ argument is\nthat the government’s expert did testify specifically as to each charged count. See R. 244 (Mar.\n9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 81–89) (Page ID #2663–71) (“These are tables that I have performed for\neach patient and to kind of document their Opioid Risk Tool and also how many urine drug\nscreens they had per month.” (emphasis added)). This accords with Martinez:\n\n [The defendant’s] records for each patient named in the indictment and the claims\n that [the defendant] submitted for reimbursement were admitted into evidence and\n available for the jury to review. [A doctor] testified that he reviewed the bills [the\n defendant] submitted and his patient files, and concluded that the billing was “not\n appropriate in any fashion” and that the procedures claimed in the billing “were\n not medically necessary in any way.” Considering the evidence that [the\n defendant] performed procedures and prescribed medication that expert witnesses\n deemed medically unnecessary, a rational jury could infer that [the defendant]\n knowingly devised a billing scheme with the intent to defraud.\n\n588 F.3d at 316 (internal citations omitted).\n\n Similarly, in this case, Dr. Parker testified that only 31 of the 311 urine drug screens\nperformed were medically indicated, and the complete medical files were admitted into evidence.\nR. 244 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 86, 88–91) (Page ID #2668, 2670–73). Thus, the defendants’\nfirst argument fails.\n\n Next, the defendants argue that one expert witness, Dr. Stephen Loyd, “testified for the\ngovernment that he does not have a problem with [Ace Clinique’s] drug screening regimen.”\nAce Br. at 48. The argument seems to be that Dr. Loyd’s testimony rendered it impossible to\nshow that the drug screens were illegitimate. This, however, is untrue. First, “courts may not\n‘independently weigh[ ] the evidence, nor judge[ ] the credibility of witnesses.’ This rule applies\nwith equal force to the testimony and conclusions of the government’s expert witnesses.”\nPaulus, 894 F.3d at 275 (quoting United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 1999))\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 27\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n(alteration in original). We cannot now say that the jury erred by crediting Dr. Parker’s\nassessment that the urine screens were unnecessary over Dr. Loyd’s testimony.\n\n The second problem with this argument is that it overstates Dr. Loyd’s testimony. He did\nsay that “I don’t have a problem with the drug screening regimen . . . . [P]articularly [in] rural\nAppalachia, I’m excited when people are drug-screened.” R. 415 (Mar. 15, 2016 Trial Tr. at\n160) (Page ID #7732). But Dr. Loyd said also that random drug screens (which Ace did not\nadminister) are “preferable to a drug screen every time,” and he noted instances where a patient\ntested negative for a drug the patient ought to have had in his system (because it was prescribed)\nbut there was no indication Ace addressed this negative result. Id. at 48–52 (Page ID #7620–24).\n\n Finally, this argument ignores the evidence of altered and ineffective drug screens (a\nviolation for which Ace was convicted separately). See generally Appellee Br. at 31–33. The\nfact that Ace was altering drug screens adds to the potential inference that he had an illegitimate\npurpose and intent to defraud.\n\n Last, there is Lesa’s argument that she, as a layperson, could not have committed this\nfraud. But this argument is hollow. It is clear that someone need not be a medical professional\nto commit health-care fraud. E.g., United States v. Davis, 490 F.3d 541, 549–50 (6th Cir. 2007).\nAs the government points out, Lesa was aware that conducting screens was part of the regular\npatient visits to the clinic. R. 408 (Mar. 16, 2016 Trial Tr. at 19–20) (Page ID #7061–62). She\nwas the owner of the clinic. Most damning, she knew about the altered tests, showing she was\naware that the testing protocol at the clinic was not legitimate. R. 340 (Mar. 15, 2016 Trial Tr. at\n15–16) (Page ID #5486–87). The jury could have legitimately concluded that she was aware of\nthe fraud being conducted at her place of business.10\n\n b. Making False Statements by Using Pre-Signed Prescription Pads\n\n Next, Ace and Ace Clinique contest their convictions for violations of 18 U.S.C § 1035\nfor making false statements relating to health-care matters by using pre-signed prescriptions.\n\n 10Lesa makes similar, undeveloped arguments as to all of her fraud convictions. These arguments fail for\nthe same reason—record evidence showed that Lesa was aware of the activities at the clinic, from which the jury\ncould have inferred fraud.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 28\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nThey argue that the government failed to prove that Ace and the clinic intentionally hid the fact\nthat the prescriptions were pre-signed. Ace Br. at 49. This is not so: Roy Combs, the “IT guy”\nat the clinic who kept the pre-signed pads, testified that Ace told him “not to tell anybody about\nthe [the pre-signed prescriptions]. R. 321 (Mar. 8, 2016 Trial Tr. at 19–20) (Page ID #4656–57).\nThis alone is evidence from which the jury could have concluded Ace intentionally hid the fact\nthat the prescriptions were pre-signed.\n\n c. The Nerve Conduction Studies\n\n All the defendants challenge their convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1347 by\nfraudulently charging for nerve conduction studies. According to the government’s expert\nwitness, Dr. Earl J. Berman, a true nerve conduction study is a “complex procedure” that tells a\nqualified practitioner whether a nerve is damaged by generating wave forms showing “how\nquickly a nerve impulse flows from a designated spot to a designated electrode.” R. 354 (Mar. 9,\n2016 Trial Tr. at 20) (Page ID #5677). Because “certain diseases . . . have . . . a certain\nneuropathy,” for example, “[d]iabetes has a different characteristic wave form and flow rate than\nsomething that has a mass in the spine,” “the technician has got to know very precisely how to\nset the electrodes, and the physician has to have special training as well to understand and\ninterpret the wave forms and the latencies.” Id. at 20 (Page ID #5677). “Medicare requires that\na technician has special training and recognition by a nationally-recognized organization, and the\nphysician also has to have certain nationally-recognized training.” Id. at 21 (Page ID #5678).\n\n Combs, the IT director at Ace Clinique, performed the nerve conduction studies there.\nR. 321 (Mar. 8, 2016 Trial Tr. at 4) (Page ID #4641). His only qualification to do so was a\n“couple days”-long course he attended that was led by the inventor of the machine. Id. at 7\n(Page ID #4644). Combs’s procedure involved “a machine that had eight D batteries in it that\nconnected to a sponge that [he] had to get wet.” Id. at 92 (Page ID #4729). He would then\n“connect [the machine] to a probe with a Q-tip on the end of it. . . . And then [he] would use the\nQ-tip and dip it in water, and hold it to different points on the [patient’s] body.” Id. The\nmachine would generate a current, and when the patient felt “a sensation” Combs would write\ndown the number on the machine’s dial. Id.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 29\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n Ace and the clinic argue that there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction\nbecause there was “confusion concerning whether a nerve conduction study involves a neural\nscan machine or an electromyogram (EMG).” Ace Br. at 50. They argue that the machine they\nused—what they term a neural scan machine—was different than the complex machine Dr.\nBerman described, and did not require the same training. This argument fails for two reasons.\nFirst, there was no such confusion. Dr. Berman very clearly testified that the procedure he was\ndescribing was the approved procedure for nerve conduction studies and not limited to EMGs or\nmachines that use needles. R. 354 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 39–44) (Page ID #5696–5701).\nDr. Berman did testify that he was unfamiliar with the specific machine used at Ace Clinique,\nbut the procedure he described for nerve conduction studies is from the Medicare/Medicaid\nbilling manual. Id. This leads to the second reason why the arguments of Ace and the clinic fail:\nDr. Berman’s familiarity with their machine and what it may or may not require in terms of\ntraining is immaterial. Dr. Berman described the characteristics of the nerve conduction study\nfor which the clinic billed Medicare. Id. By using that billing code, Ace and the clinic were\nrepresenting that they were performing the type of procedure Dr. Berman described. They of\ncourse were not. Thus, they committed fraud, and no attempt to create confusion about EMGs as\nopposed to wet Q-Tips can undermine their convictions.\n\n Finally, Lesa asserts broadly that the government “failed in its proof.” Lesa Chaney Br.\nat 54. The record shows, however, that Lesa knew about the fraudulent practices at the clinic\nand was responsible for billing and administrative procedures at the clinic. That is sufficient\nevidence from which a jury could have found she knew of and committed (or aided and abetted)\nthe fraud related to the nerve conduction studies.\n\n For the reasons stated above, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted\nthe defendants on all counts.11\n\n\n\n\n 11Ace argues also that there was “cumulative error,” and all the defendants argue that the money-\nlaundering charges fail because the drug-distribution counts fail. Because all of the defendants’ arguments\nregarding the drug-distribution and health-care fraud counts are rejected, the money-laundering counts stand and\nthere was no cumulative error.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 30\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nC. Jury Misconduct\n\n Next, all of the defendants argue that a new trial is warranted due to alleged jury\nmisconduct. A new trial is warranted based on juror misconduct only if the misconduct “resulted\nin prejudice to [the defendant].” United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 935 (6th Cir. 1990).\n“We apply the abuse-of-discretion standard in jury-misconduct cases.” United States v.\nWheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 361 (6th Cir. 2008).\n\n 1. Background\n\n The allegations of jury misconduct in this case come from one alternate juror, juror\nnumber 116. On the fifth day of trial, a court clerk told the district court that she had received\nfrom the jury administrator some information about a recent conversation between the\nadministrator and juror 116. “The administrator told the court clerk—and the clerk then told the\n[district court]—that this alternate had expressed ‘some frustration with the process’ and\n‘concerns about how serious[ly] the jury was taking their duty.’” R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at\n18) (Page ID #5925) (quoting R. 285 (Telephone Conf.) (Page ID #2988)); R. 291 (Apr. 20,\n2016 Tr. at 3) (Page ID #3028)). The district court did not investigate the concerns directly, nor\ndid it alert counsel to the concerns. Instead, it “instructed the jury that ‘if any issues . . . relate[d]\nto the jury instructions’ arose, they should ‘bring those to [the Court’s] attention.’” Id. at 19\n(Page ID #5926). The district court heard nothing further during the trial.\n\n The day after the entry of the verdict, juror 116 contacted Ace’s defense counsel and left\na voicemail. Defense counsel reported the message to the court, and the parties held a telephone\nconference the next day. Id.; R. 285 (Telephone Conf.) (Page ID #2988). The district court\ndetermined that the appropriate course of conduct would be to conduct an in camera interview\nwith the alternate to determine whether the concerns had to do with external influences on the\njury or the jury’s internal decisionmaking process. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at 20) (Page ID\n#5927).\n\n The in camera interview revealed details about the initial “concerns” that the district\ncourt was told about via the court clerk and jury administrator. The first incident occurred\nduring opening statements. R. 291 (Apr. 27, 2016 Tr. at 6) (Page ID #3031) (describing the first\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 31\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nincident as happening during “the first statements”). Two jurors were discussing the Chaneys’\nhouse in the jury room during a break. The alternate told them “I don’t think we should be\ntalking about that.” Id. One of the men who was discussing the house responded by saying\n“[w]e can talk about it in here” and asked “who said [that we cannot]?” Id. The alternate said\nthat “[t]he Judge told us we couldn’t.” Id. Then another woman agreed with the alternate and\nsaid they could not discuss the case and “[i]t’s right on the wall there.” Id. This was the incident\nthat was reported to the court.\n\n Juror 116 reported another incident to the jury administrator. The jury administrator told\nthe alternate juror to “tell [the other jurors] not to do that.” Id. at 7 (Page ID #3032). It is\nunclear what exactly the alternate described to the administrator. Juror 116 did, however,\ndescribe to the court what the other incidents of misconduct were in her opinion. First, jurors\nwere saying that they did not like the way one of the attorneys was treating an “elderly lady”\nwitness. Id. Next, one of the jurors “got attracted to . . . Dr. Chaney’s attorney, and he made it\nbe known.” Id. Finally, the alternate juror said that another woman was expressing her boredom\nat the trial (saying, for example, “I know how many lights . . . [are] in the ceiling.”). Id. at 8\n(Page ID #3033).\n\n Based on these incidents the defendants moved for a new trial, but their motions were\ndenied. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at 34) (Page ID #5941).\n\n 2. A New Trial Was Not Warranted\n\n The defendants rely nearly exclusively on United States v. Resko to support their\nargument that the alleged juror misconduct necessitated a new trial. See 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir.\n1993). In Resko, “approximately seven days into a nine-day trial . . . a juror approached a court\nofficer and told him that the members of the jury had been discussing the case during their\nrecesses and while waiting in the jury room. The court officer informed the trial court of this\nfact, and the court informed counsel.” Id. at 687. The trial court declined the defendants’\nrequest for individualized voir dire, and instead gave a written questionnaire to each juror asking\nwhether they participated in discussions and, if yes, whether they had “formed an opinion about\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 32\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nthe guilt or non-guilt of either defendant as a result of your discussions with other jurors.” Id. at\n688. All jurors answered yes to the first question and no to the second. Id.\n\n On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the district court erred by failing to conduct\nindividualized voir dire because the questionnaire left the court with “no way to know the nature\nof [the jurors’] discussions” and whether those discussions were prejudicial. Id. at 690–95.\n\n Here, the district court acted recklessly by choosing to keep information about potential\njuror misconduct from defense counsel. Nevertheless, a new trial is not warranted because the\npost-verdict interview with juror 116 revealed there was no juror misconduct that could have\nwarranted a new trial, and thus there was no prejudice. See Bowling, 900 F.2d at 935. During\nthe in camera interview, the alternate described one instance of potential misconduct\n(deliberating before close of evidence) that occurred during opening statements and was\nimmediately quashed by other jurors. R. 291 (Apr. 20, 2016 Tr. at 6) (Page ID #3031). The rest\nof the supposed “misconduct” the juror reported could be characterized as less-than-ideal\nbehavior (commenting on the appearance of a lawyer; complaining of boredom), but nothing that\nwould warrant a new trial. Id. at 7 (Page ID #3032). Simply put, juror 116 was given a chance\nto air all her grievances, and nothing came close to conduct that would have warranted a new\ntrial.\n\n The defendants attempt to inject confusion by saying that there are a number of\nunresolved questions. See Lesa Chaney Br. at 58. But those attempts are fruitless. Juror 116\nwas clear when she spoke with the district judge, and the nature of the supposed misconduct is\nclear. It is nothing that could have possibly prejudiced the defendants. In sum, the district\ncourt’s decision to withhold from the defendants an allegation of juror misconduct may have\nbeen imprudent, but in this case it is clear that, even if counsel had been informed of every\n“incident,” nothing would have even approached necessitating a new trial. Therefore we affirm\nthe decision of the district court.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 33\n 6314/6315/6351\n\nD. Procedural Reasonableness at Sentencing\n\n Finally, the defendants argue that their sentences were procedurally unreasonable because\nthe district court failed to address their arguments for a lower drug-amount calculation and erred\nin calculating the loss amount.\n\n We review factual findings at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Valentine,\n694 F.3d 665, 672 (6th Cir. 2012). We review de novo the methodology the district court used to\ncalculate loss amount. United States v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975, 984 (6th Cir. 2013).\n\n First, the defendants argue that the district court erred by failing to explain sufficiently its\nrejection of the defendants’ method of drug amount calculation. See Ace Br. at 53–54. The\ndistrict court did, however, explain its reasoning “enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it]\nhas considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal\ndecisionmaking authority.” United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting\nUnited States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). This is apparent from a review of the\nsentencing transcript. First, the district court explained its reasons for doubting the defendants’\nexpert and method:\n\n I’ve read carefully the briefing that was filed, of course, listened carefully, for\n example, to [defense expert] Dr. Russell’s testimony, the expert testimony that\n was raised here. And, I mean, I think one of the problems with the expert\n testimony, it’s clear, as I’ve gone back and looked at that, is that it provides kind\n of this narrow bit of information, but not a real complete set of information as it\n relates to the alleged fraud that took place in this particular case. And I think it’s\n very appropriate for guideline purposes to consider conduct that’s much broader\n than simply the counts of conviction, for example, for, you know, presigned\n prescriptions, you know.\n\nR. 508 (Sentencing Tr. at 15–16) (Page ID #10055–56). Then, the court gave a lengthy\nexplanation of its reasoning for reaching the conclusions on drug and loss amount that it did. Id.\nat 25–29 (Page ID #10065–68).\n\n The defendants’ assertion that the district court’s explanation was “very brief” or\notherwise insufficient simply does not accord with reality. Therefore, this argument fails.\n\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 34\n 6314/6315/6351\n\n Finally, the defendants argue that the district court erred in calculating the loss amount.\nThis argument is a rehash of the previous argument. The error of which the defendants complain\nis the district court’s decision not to adopt the findings of their expert. Again, the district court\nsufficiently explained its decision regarding drug and loss amount, and specifically why it did\nnot adopt the defense expert’s methodology.\n\n The defendants claim that the district court committed procedural error, but it is clear\nupon examination that their true complaint is the district court’s decision to reject their expert’s\nmethodology. Because the district court committed no procedural error during sentencing, this\nclaim fails.\n\n III. CONCLUSION\n\n For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment regarding\neach defendant.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Alvin CHANEY, M.D. (17-6239/6351); Lesa L. Chaney (17-6167/6314); Ace Clinique of Medicine, LLC (17-6240/6315), Defendants-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0071p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n │ Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/6314/6315/6351\\n v. >\\n │\\n │\\n JAMES ALVIN CHANEY, M.D. (17-6239/6351); LESA │\\n L. CHANEY (17-6167/6314); ACE CLINIQUE OF │\\n MEDICINE, LLC (17-6240/6315), │\\n Defendants-Appellants. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London.\\n No. 6:14-cr-00037—Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: January 16, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 11, 2019\\n\\n Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and MOORE, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Robert L. Abell, ROBERT ABELL LAW, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant Lesa\\nChaney. Christy J. Love, LOVE LAW FIRM, PLLC, London, Kentucky for Appellants James\\nChaney and Ace Clinique of Medicine, LLC. Amanda B. Harris, UNITED STATES\\nDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert L. Abell,\\nROBERT ABELL LAW, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant Lesa Chaney. Christy J. Love,\\nLOVE LAW FIRM, PLLC, London, Kentucky for Appellants James Chaney and Ace Clinique\\nof Medicine, LLC. Amanda B. Harris, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\\nWashington, D.C., Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., Roger West, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S\\nOFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 2\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. James Alvin Chaney (“Ace”) and Lesa\\nChaney owned and operated a highly profitable clinic in Hazard, Kentucky called Ace Clinique\\nof Medicine. Eventually, the clinic attracted suspicion that it was a “pill mill”: a clinic that\\ndistributes addictive prescription pills without a legitimate medical purpose. Law enforcement\\nobtained a warrant and searched Ace Clinique’s files, where they discovered evidence of many\\ncrimes—some related to the suspected pill-mill operation, and some distinct. The Chaneys and\\nAce Clinique were charged, convicted by a jury, and sentenced. They raise on appeal four\\nissues: (1) the constitutionality of the warrant that allowed the search of the clinic; (2) the\\nsufficiency of the evidence at trial; (3) whether jury misconduct occurred and whether it warrants\\na new trial; and (4) whether the district court correctly calculated the guidelines range at\\nsentencing. For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the district court on all grounds.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n Ace and Lesa Chaney are a married couple who owned and operated Ace Clinique of\\nMedicine, LLC, in Hazard, Kentucky. R. 190 (Second Superseding Indictment at 1–2) (Page ID\\n#1877–78). Ace was a licensed physician in Kentucky; Lesa was the President and Chief\\nExecutive Officer of Ace Clinique. Id.\\n\\n The government started paying attention to Ace Clinique and the Chaneys in June 2010.\\nR. 71-2 (Warrant One at 5) (Page ID #658). An anonymous caller contacted Chris Johnson, an\\ninvestigator for the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, and told him that Ace pre-\\nsigned prescriptions for use at Ace Clinique while absent. Id. Johnson, assisted by state law\\nenforcement, investigated the claims. Id.\\n\\n The investigation revealed that Ace was out of town on the same day that several\\nprescriptions signed by Ace and dated that day were filled at a nearby pharmacy. Id. at 5–6\\n(Page ID #658–59). Officers interviewed Ace Clinique employees, who admitted to using pre-\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 3\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nsigned prescription blanks, and the employees showed the officers three partial prescription pads\\nof pre-signed blanks. Id. at 6–7 (Page ID #659–60). The state officers contacted the DEA, and\\ninvestigators conducted multiple interviews of people who had worked for or with Ace Clinique,\\nas well as former patients. Id. at 21–37 (Page ID #674–91). The investigation led to warrants to\\nsearch Ace Clinique and the Chaneys’ home and airplane hangar for evidence of violations of\\n21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which proscribes knowing or intentional distribution of controlled\\nsubstances, and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), which proscribes conspiracies to commit money\\nlaundering. R. 71-2 (Warrant One) (Page ID #653).1\\n\\n Eventually, a grand jury issued a 256-count indictment that charged Ace, Lesa, and Ace\\nClinique with various offenses. R. 190 (Second Superseding Indictment) (Page ID #1877–1920).\\nThe charges fell into three general categories: controlled substance charges (Counts 1–64),\\nmoney laundering charges (Counts 65 and 235–55), and fraud charges (Counts 66–234 and 256).\\nSee Appellee Br. at 4–6.2\\n\\n The defendants sought to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrants, but had only\\npartial success. R. 71 (Joint Mot. to Suppress) (Page ID #611); R. 159 (May 26, 2015 Order at\\n24) (Page ID #1760). The evidence seized from the airplane hangar was suppressed, as was\\nevidence seized from the clinic that dated to any time before March 2006. R. 159 (May 26, 2015\\nOrder at 24) (Page ID #1760). The district court rejected the defendants’ arguments that the\\nwarrants’ enumeration of “patient files” as an item to be seized was overly broad and\\ninsufficiently particular. Id. at 10 (Page ID #1746).\\n\\n A 25-day trial followed. Ultimately, the jury returned a mixed verdict. R. 281 (Verdict\\nForm) (Page ID #2954–2984); see also Appellee Br. at 4–6.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1The description and list of items to be seized is identical in each of the three warrants, as are the portions\\nof the affidavit discussed herein. See generally R. 125 (R. & R. at 3–19) (Page ID #1231–47). Therefore we do not\\ndistinguish among the warrants.\\n 2Counts 69, 84, 101, 196, 205, 216, and 219 were dismissed by the government. Appellee Br. at 4–6.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 4\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n The defendants argue now that the trial was infected by jury misconduct. During the\\ntrial, an alternate juror reported to court staff some “concerns about how serious[ly] the jury was\\ntaking their duty,” and the staff reported those concerns to the district court. R. 371 (Sept. 30,\\n2016 Op. at 18) (Page ID #5925) (alteration in original) (quoting R. 291 (Apr. 20, 2016 Tr. at 3)\\n(Page ID #3028)). The district court told the jury that if any issues related to the jury instructions\\narose they should report those to the court, but the court did not tell counsel that a juror had\\nraised concerns. Id. at 19 (Page ID #5926). After the entry of the verdict, the same alternate\\njuror—who did not participate in deliberations—contacted defense counsel to complain of\\nmisconduct; defense counsel contacted the court, and the court conducted an in camera interview\\nwith the alternate. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at 20) (Page ID #5927). The defendants moved\\nfor a new trial following the interview, but the district court denied their motions. R. 297 (Mot.\\nfor New Trial [Lesa]) (Page ID #3246); R. 299 (Mot. for New Trial [Ace]) (Page ID #3279); R.\\n371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. & Order) (Page ID #5908).\\n\\n Prior to sentencing, the district court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing regarding\\nthe drug quantity and loss amount that would be used to calculate the sentencing guidelines\\nrange. R. 459 (Aug. 17, 2017 Tr. at 1) (Page ID #9443); R. 460 (Aug. 18, 2017 Tr. at 1) (Page\\nID #9572). Put simply, the defendants argued that drug quantity and loss amount should be\\ncalculated from the counts of conviction only; the government argued that every Schedule II or\\nIII prescription drug Ace prescribed during the relevant time period and every billing to\\nMedicaid from Ace Clinique or a pharmacy filling an Ace Clinique prescription should be used\\nto calculate drug quantity and loss amount. R. 460 (Aug. 18, 2017 Tr. at 44–66) (Page ID\\n#9615–37); R. 459 (Aug. 17, 2017 Tr. at 10–11, 64–66) (Page ID #9452–53, 9506–08).\\n\\n The Presentence Report (“PSR”) for each defendant used the government’s method to\\ncalculate a guidelines range, and the defendants objected. At sentencing, the district court\\nrefused to adopt wholesale either proposed method and instead found that 60 percent of the drugs\\nand billings the government used to calculate drug quantity and loss amount were fraudulent. R.\\n508 (Sentencing Tr. at 25–29) (Page ID #10066–69). The district court varied downward from\\nthe guidelines-recommended life sentences for Ace and Lesa and sentenced Ace to a total\\nsentence of 180 months in custody and Lesa to a total sentence of 80 months in custody. Id. at\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 5\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n86–87, 98–99 (Page ID #10126–27, 10138–39). Ace Clinique was sentenced to five years’\\nprobation. Id. at 103 (Page ID #10143).\\n\\n These appeals followed.\\n\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n\\nA. The Search Warrant\\n\\n All defendants appeal the district court’s determination that the search warrants were\\nconstitutional. They focus their appeals on the warrants’ enumeration of “patient files” as an\\nitem to be seized. When considering a motion to suppress, we review a district court’s legal\\nconclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d\\n527, 536 (6th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n 1. Background: The Warrant and Motions to Suppress\\n\\n On September 9, 2013, the government applied for and was granted three search\\nwarrants: one to search the premises of Ace Clinique of Medicine, one to search James and Lesa\\nChaney’s home, and one to search their airplane hangar. R. 71-2 (Warrant One) (Page ID #653);\\nR. 71-3 (Warrant Two) (Page ID #700); R. 71-4 (Warrant Three) (Page ID #745). All three\\nwarrants expressly incorporate a detailed affidavit describing Special Agent Thad Lambdin’s\\ninvestigation of Ace Clinique and the Chaneys.\\n\\n Each warrant contains a list of items to be seized. The list opens with the preamble:\\n“The items to be seized are evidence of violations of Title 21, United States Code Sections\\n841(a)(1), 846 and 856, as well as Title 18 United States Code, Section 1956(h).” R. 71-2\\n(Warrant One at 46) (Page ID #698). The warrants then list various sorts of items, including\\n“[p]atient files for patients.” R. 71-2 (Warrant One at 47) (Page ID #699). The agents who\\nexecuted the warrant to search the clinic seized nearly all the patient files. R. 317 (Mar. 23, 2016\\nTrial Tr. at 31) (Page ID #3839).\\n\\n The defendants moved to suppress evidence seized from the searches. R. 71 (Joint Mot.\\nto Suppress) (Page ID #611). They argued the warrants were insufficiently particular and were\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 6\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\noverbroad, among other things. R. 71-1 (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress at 19) (Page ID\\n#635). The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who recommended\\nsuppression of evidence that existed prior to March 2006 and of evidence seized from the\\nairplane hangar, but otherwise rejected the defendants’ arguments that the warrants’ instruction\\nto seize “[p]atient files” was improper. R. 125 (R. & R. at 39, 46–47) (Page ID #1267, 1274–\\n75). The defendants entered objections to the Report and Recommendation, R. 134 (Objs. to R.\\n& R.) (Page ID #1330), but the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations.\\nR. 159 (May 26, 2015 Order at 24) (Page ID #1760).\\n\\n Among the recommendations that the district court adopted was the finding that “the\\nfacts [in the affidavit] do not support the finding that the ‘whole [of Ace Clinique’s] business’\\nwas fraudulent,” and therefore there was not probable cause to support a general “all records”\\nsearch. R. 125 (R. & R. at 38) (Page ID #1266). Naturally, the defendants did not object to this\\nconclusion, and the district court adopted the relevant portion of the Report and\\nRecommendation without comment. R. 159 (May 26, 2015 Order at 24) (Page ID #1760).\\n\\n Although the district court did not find there was probable cause to seize all patient files,\\nit nevertheless upheld the warrant on the theory that the preamble to the list of items to be seized\\nacted as a limit on the list—law enforcement could seize patient files only if those files were\\nevidence of violations of the listed statutes. R. 125 (R. & R. at 38–39) (Page ID #1266–67).\\nThis, the district court reasoned, guided the executing agents’ discretion, and so the warrants\\npassed constitutional muster.\\n\\n At trial, Agent Thad Lambdin testified. The defense cross-examined him about the\\nsearch of the clinic, and he explained that during the search the FBI took “not every [file], but\\nmost of them” and that the FBI intended to take all of the patient files in the clinic. R. 317 (Mar.\\n23, 2016 Trial Tr. at 31) (Page ID #3839). Defense counsel asked Agent Lambdin whether the\\nFBI tried to distinguish between files that were potential evidence and files that were not; Agent\\nLambdin answered that the FBI “took [files] from the different areas of the clinic because [the\\nagents] could not, on that day, determine what all was being used or not used.” Id. at 31–32\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 7\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n(Page ID #3839–40). Upon further questioning, Agent Lambdin reiterated that, at the time of the\\nsearch, the FBI did not attempt to distinguish between files, but rather “just took them all.” Id.\\n\\n The defendants renewed their motion to suppress after Agent Lambdin testified. R. 262\\n(Trial Min. for Mar. 30, 2016) (Page ID #2784). They argued that Agent Lambdin’s testimony\\ndemonstrated that the “the limitation upon which the magistrate judge and the Court relied was,\\nin fact, no limitation at all.” R. 261 (Renewed Mot. to Suppress at 3) (Page ID #2778). The\\nrenewed motion appears to assert that the testimony showed that the warrant was insufficiently\\nparticular; the district court construed the motion to argue also that “even if the warrant itself was\\nconstitutional, the agents’ supposed ‘deliberate and willful disregard’ of the warrant’s scope\\nrequires a blanket suppression of the patient files seized in the raid.” R. 273 (Apr. 19, 2016 Op.\\nat 3) (Page ID #2905).\\n\\n The district court denied this motion because (1) agents’ actions cannot affect the\\nparticularity of the warrant, which is determined by the four corners of the warrant itself; (2) the\\nofficers may not have exceeded the scope of the warrant because all patient files were potentially\\nrelevant to the alleged violations and there was no way agents in the field could have determined\\nwhich files were potentially relevant evidence; and, (3) even if the search exceeded the scope of\\nthe warrant, the defendants did not argue that the patient files actually introduced at trial were\\nbeyond the scope of the warrant. Id. at 3–5 (Page ID #2905–07).\\n\\n The defendants now argue, on appeal, that the warrant was facially unconstitutional.\\n\\n 2. The Search Warrant Was Constitutional\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution says that “no Warrants shall\\nissue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the\\npersons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The chief purpose of the particularity\\nrequirement [is] to prevent general searches by requiring a neutral judicial officer to cabin the\\nscope of the search to those areas and items for which there exists probable cause that a crime\\nhas been committed.” Richards, 659 F.3d at 537 (alteration in original) (quoting Baranski v.\\nFifteen Unknown Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 452 F.3d 433, 441\\n(6th Cir. 2006)). The constitutionality of a warrant is determined by what is contained in the\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 8\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nfour corners of the warrant, although the government can incorporate by express reference\\naffidavits and other material. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557–58 (2004).\\n\\n Two sorts of infirmities can lead to an insufficiently particular, and therefore\\nunconstitutional, warrant. Richards, 659 F.3d at 537. The first is when a warrant provides\\ninformation insufficient “to guide and control the agent’s judgment in selecting what to take.”\\nId. (quoting United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999)). The second is when the\\ncategory of things specified “is too broad in the sense that it includes items that should not be\\nseized.” Id. This is often referred to as “overbreadth.” “The degree of specificity required\\ndepends on the crime involved and the types of items sought.” United States v. Abboud, 438\\nF.3d 554, 575 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1026 (6th Cir.\\n1991)) (for example, “[i]n a business fraud case, the authorization to search for general business\\nrecords is not overbroad”).\\n\\n The appellants argue that paragraph 13 of the warrant, which lists “[p]atient files” as an\\nitem to be seized, is insufficiently particular because the government did not have probable cause\\nto search all patient files, and the preamble clause of the warrant—limiting it to evidence of\\nviolations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 856 and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)—is inadequate to guide\\nthe agents’ discretion.\\n\\n The United States presents two defenses of the warrant. First, it argues that Ace Clinique\\nwas so permeated with fraud that there was probable cause to seize all patient files. Second, it\\nargues that the preamble clause is a sufficient limitation on the agents’ discretion. The first\\nargument fails, but the second does not.\\n\\n a. Pervasive Fraud\\n\\n Although general warrants are prohibited, “‘where there is probable cause to find that\\nthere exists a pervasive scheme to defraud, all the business records of an enterprise may be\\nseized,’ and consequently a description merely of records of that business will suffice” to satisfy\\nthe particularity requirement. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(d) (5th ed. 2018) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 309 (1st Cir. 1980)) (footnotes omitted). In other words, if\\nan organization or business is permeated with fraud, then there is probable cause to believe that\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 9\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nall its records are instrumentalities or evidence of a crime. In those circumstances, a warrant\\nauthorizing a search of all records is not a general warrant, but rather a warrant describing\\nexactly the items officers have probable cause to search or seize.\\n\\n The court below considered and rejected the applicability in this case of the pervasive\\nfraud doctrine. Appellee Br. at 57; R. 125 (R. & R. at 38) (Page ID #1266); R. 159 (May 26,\\n2015 Order) (Page ID #1737). The magistrate judge who issued the Report and\\nRecommendation addressed this issue by first considering statements in the warrant affidavit\\ndiscussing the percentage of patients who were pain patients: “The Government at times\\nestimates 50% of Ace Clinique’s patients to be legitimate. [One person] stated that she believed\\napproximately 90% of the patient load was pain management, but [another person] estimated that\\nnumber at 50-60%.” R. 125 (R. & R. at 38) (Page ID #1266). Based on these numbers, the\\nmagistrate judge concluded that the “evidence does not support probable cause to find that ‘the\\nwhole business is fraudulent.’ Therefore, the Affidavit does not establish that Ace Clinique is\\n‘permeated with fraud.’” Id. at 37–38 (Page ID #1265–66) (quoting United States v. Roos, No.\\n12-09-2-ART, 2013 WL 1136629, at *3 (E.D. Ky. March 18, 2014)). The district judge adopted\\nthis aspect of the Report and Recommendation without comment.\\n\\n To the extent that this is a question of law, we review de novo. United States v. Ford,\\n184 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 1999). To the extent that the district court’s conclusion that Ace\\nClinique was not permeated with fraud was a finding of fact, we review for clear error; clear\\nerror occurs when, as here, the district applied an incorrect legal standard to reach the factual\\nfinding. See United States v. Mahbub, 818 F.3d 213, 223 (6th Cir. 2016). We discuss first the\\nproper factors for deciding whether the pervasive-fraud doctrine applies, and then we consider\\nwhether it existed in this case.\\n\\n The court below applied a standard it derived from United States v. Roos: the “whole\\nbusiness” must be fraudulent to justify an all-records search. R. 125 (R. & R. at 37) (Page ID\\n#1265) (quoting Roos, 2013 WL 1136629, at *3). Given the focus on the alleged percentages of\\npatients who were pain patients, it is clear that the court below understood “whole business” to\\nmean that every transaction in which a business engages is fraudulent; otherwise, probable cause\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 10\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nfor an all-records search would be lacking. This is an incomplete, if not erroneous,\\nunderstanding of pervasive fraud. Certainly one factor in determining whether there was\\npervasive fraud is the amount of fraud3, but a large quantity of fraud is neither necessary nor\\nsufficient for the exception to apply.\\n\\n First, to the extent that the magistrate judge predicated the recommendation on an\\nunderstanding that, for a business to be permeated with fraud, every transaction must be\\nfraudulent—that is not the case. That could not be the case. Even the most fraudulent of\\nbusinesses might conduct a legitimate transaction from time to time.\\n\\n Even if the magistrate judge’s understanding was not so cramped, it erred in considering\\nonly the quantity of fraudulent business when determining whether Ace Clinique was permeated\\nwith fraud. Other factors, such as the separability of the fraudulent aspect of the business from\\nthe legitimate and the central purpose of the business, are relevant.\\n\\n The first factor not considered by the district court is the separability of the fraudulent\\nfrom the legitimate. A broad warrant is justified if “every aspect” of the business operation it\\ntargets is “pervaded” with fraud. Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1985). One\\nguiding principle of cases applying this doctrine is whether it is possible to separate the\\nfraudulent aspects of the business from the legitimate. If it is possible, then the business is not\\npermeated with fraud and a broad warrant is unjustified; if it is not, then a broad warrant can\\nstand. For example, a business “incorporated solely as a conduit for the flow of kickback\\nmonies” might be so permeated with fraud that a broad warrant would be justified. United States\\nv. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1479 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985). So too a business in which “the alleged\\nfraud supposedly infected [the business], its principals and officers, its suppliers, and numerous\\nother individuals and businesses with whom it did or had done business . . . [and] traces of that\\n\\n\\n\\n 3At least one other circuit has said that “‘pervasive fraud’ does not refer to the percentage of a defendant’s\\nbusiness that is fraudulent.” United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1259 (11th Cir. 2011). Because at least half\\nof Ace Clinique’s business was potentially fraudulent, we do not answer the question here of whether the pervasive-\\nfraud doctrine can apply when the fraud is small but “traces of that fraud were likely to be found spread out amongst\\nthe myriad of records” in the business, as the Eleventh Circuit held in Bradley. Id. at 1259–60. In other words,\\nalthough quantity of fraud is not the only factor, we need not decide here whether it is a necessary factor.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 11\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nfraud were likely to be found spread out amongst the myriad of records in [the business’s]\\npossession.” United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n Conversely, we have made clear that when the fraudulent aspect of a business is\\nseparable from and unrelated to a legitimate aspect of the business, an all-records search warrant\\nis not justified. Ford, 184 F.3d at 576–77 (“Even if one business carried on at a site is permeated\\nwith fraud, if other businesses run at the same site are separable and are not shown to be related\\nto the suspected crime, a warrant permitting seizure of all documents at the site is not justified.”\\n(emphasis added)); see also Voss, 774 F.2d at 406 (“Even if the allegedly fraudulent activity\\nconstitutes a large portion, or even the bulk, of the [target business’s] activities, there is no\\njustification for seizing records and documents relating to its legitimate activities” in a case\\nwhere an organization conducted fraudulent transactions on behalf of clients but also engaged in\\nunrelated advocacy work); United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1980) (finding an all-\\nrecords search to be overbroad because it could have been limited to the automobile insurance\\nportion of the defendant’s insurance agencies).\\n\\n Another guiding principle is whether “the alleged criminal activity was the ‘central\\npurpose’ of the place to be searched.” United States v. Asker, 676 F. App’x 447, 462 (6th Cir.\\n2017) (quoting United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1551 (9th Cir. 1996)); United States v\\nLogan, 250 F.3d 350, 365 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding a warrant because “the warrant’s general\\nnature was due to the investigators’ belief that [fraudulent activity] constituted [the business’s]\\nentire operation”).\\n\\n Consideration of these factors harmonizes legal doctrine and common sense. If the\\nfraudulent portion of a business is in a silo separate from the legitimate portion, then there is no\\nprobable cause to think evidence of a crime would be found in the legitimate silo. On the other\\nhand, if half of a business’s transactions are fraudulent but are interspersed with and inseparable\\nfrom the records of the legitimate transactions, then it is probable that evidence of a crime would\\nbe found in any record seized. Therefore, an all-records search would be supported by probable\\ncause. Likewise, if a business’s central purpose is fraud, it is far more likely that probable cause\\nexists to seize all records than if only a portion of the business’s purpose is fraudulent.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 12\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n United States v. Roos, on which the court below relied, does not contradict the idea that\\nprobable cause to seize all records requires consideration of both the percentage of the business\\nthat is fraudulent as well as the separability of the fraudulent aspect of the business and the\\npurpose of the business. 2013 WL 1136629, at *3. Furthermore, Roos does not suggest that all,\\nor even the vast majority, of a business’s transactions must be fraudulent to support an all-\\nrecords search on the theory it is pervaded with fraud.\\n\\n Roos is, in fact, quite different from the case at bar. It did address a warrant to search a\\ndoctor’s office for patient files, and Dr. Roos was prescribing prescription painkillers, but there\\nthe resemblance stops. Dr. Roos came under suspicion after the police searched the house of two\\npeople suspected of unlawfully distributing painkillers and found oxycodone prescribed by\\nDr. Roos and reminders for appointments with Dr. Roos. Id. at *1. The suspected drug dealers\\nwere in Kentucky; Dr. Roos was based in Houston, Texas. Id. Kentucky State Police\\ninterviewed three Kentucky residents who said they traveled to Houston to get oxycodone\\nprescriptions from Dr. Roos. Id. They would either travel to Houston, be examined quickly, and\\nget prescriptions for large amounts of painkillers, or Dr. Roos “would call in the Texas\\nprescriptions to a Kentucky pharmacy.” Id. at *1. Based on this evidence, the police executed a\\nwarrant for “patient files for patients who have indicated they are from Kentucky.” Id. After the\\nsearch was executed, Dr. Roos argued “that the warrant lacked probable cause because the search\\nwarrant application did not establish that her whole medical practice was fraudulent.” Id. at *3.\\nIn response to this argument, the district court correctly distinguished Dr. Roos’s situation from\\nthe cases in which an all-records search was justified because the business was permeated with\\nfraud. For one, the warrant at issue in Roos was limited to the Texas doctor’s files on patients\\nfrom Kentucky. Furthermore, to the extent that Roos suggests a broader warrant would not have\\nbeen justified, that has no bearing on this case. In Roos, the government had evidence that\\nDr. Roos was conspiring with patients in Kentucky to distribute drugs unlawfully. See United\\nStates v. Roos, No. 12-09-2-ART, 2013 WL 1136638, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 24, 2013). Even if\\nRoos were binding on this court, it would not alter the outcome in this case.\\n\\n Turning back to the Chaneys and the Clinique, the question remains whether there was\\npervasive fraud justifying an all-records search. The first relevant factor is the quantity of fraud.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 13\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nThe affidavit accompanying and incorporated into the warrants showed that anywhere from one\\nhalf to 90 percent of its patients were pain patients—that is, potentially fraudulent. Next, the\\nseparability of the fraudulent from the legitimate: although it is uncontested that the clinic saw\\nsome legitimate patients, there is no indication that the pain practice was at all separate. Ace\\nClinique did not have a “pain clinic” separate from the rest of its practice; it was one clinic. On\\nthe other hand, there is nothing to suggest that evidence of fraud might “infect” the files of non-\\npain patients. Finally, the central-purpose inquiry. It cannot be said with certainty that the\\ncentral purpose of Ace Clinique was to operate as a “pill mill.” Certainly it did operate as such,\\nbut the conceded non-negligible amount of legitimate patients at least suggests a dual purpose.\\nThe evidence is close, but there is not quite enough evidence to suggest that Ace Clinique was\\npermeated with fraud. This means that there was not probable cause to seize all of its records\\nwholesale based on the “permeated with fraud” theory.\\n\\n b. Particularity\\n\\n This leads to the government’s second argument—that the warrant was limited to files\\nthat were “evidence of violations of [21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 856 and 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 1956(h)],” and therefore it was sufficiently particular. R. 71-3 (Warrant Two) (Page ID #743);\\nAppellee Br. at 50. This is the theory under which the district court upheld the warrant. The\\ndefendants argue now that this clause did not provide any meaningful guidance to the officers\\nexecuting the warrants, and so the warrants remain insufficiently particular.\\n\\n There is no formula that determines whether a warrant is sufficiently particular.\\nA sufficiently particular warrant “supplies enough information to guide and control the\\n[executing] agent’s judgment in selecting what to take.” Richards, 659 F.3d at 537 (quoting\\nUnited States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999)). Whether this bar has been cleared is\\n“best resolved upon examination of the circumstances of the particular case.” Logan, 250 F.3d at\\n365. “[T]he degree of specificity in a warrant must be flexible, depending upon the type of items\\nto be seized and the crime involved.” United States v. Blair, 214 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir. 2000).\\nFinally, “where a warrant adequately describes ‘a category of seizable papers,’ it is not lacking in\\nspecificity merely ‘because the officers executing the warrant must exercise some minimal\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 14\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\njudgment as to whether a particular document falls within the described category.’” United\\nStates v. Bruce, 396 F.3d 697, 709 (6th Cir. 2005), vacated in part on other grounds, 405 F.3d\\n1034 (mem.) (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1034 (6th Cir.\\n1999)).\\n\\n Furthermore, it is established law in this circuit that, in some circumstances, “[a] warrant\\nthat empowers police to search for something satisfies the particularity requirement if its text\\nconstrains the search to evidence of a specific crime.” United States v. Castro, 881 F.3d 961,\\n965 (6th Cir. 2018). The defendants nevertheless persist, arguing that “where the referenced\\nstatutes are broad in scope, courts have held that the warrant contains no limitation at all and fails\\nthe particularity requirement.” Lesa Chaney Br. at 34. They then argue that the statutes\\nreferenced here are so broad that they provide no meaningful guidance, and therefore the warrant\\nis invalid. This argument, which was not made to the district court, is incorrect even if it were\\navailable to make for the first time on appeal.\\n\\n First, the defendants’ attack on 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)4 as a meaningful limit on the warrant\\nis unavailing because it fails to view the warrant as a whole. Section 1956(h) deals with money\\nlaundering, and the defendants are correct that § 1956(h) is a broad statute that criminalizes\\n“more than 250 predicate offenses.” Lesa Chaney Br. at 35 (quoting United States v. Santos,\\n553 U.S. 507, 516 (2005)). Perhaps a warrant that described the items to be seized only by\\nreference to a statute as broad as § 1956(h), and which offered the executing officers no\\nadditional guidance or details regarding the suspected criminal conduct, would fail for lack of\\nparticularity. That is not the case here, however. Instead, the warrant expressly incorporated a\\ndetailed affidavit that described the conduct at issue. Courts must take a common-sense,\\ncontextual approach when interpreting warrants. Castro, 881 F.3d at 965. Here, common sense\\ndictates that the evidence of money laundering authorized by the warrant is that related to the\\n“pill mill” operation described in the affidavit. The out-of-circuit cases cited by defendants are\\n\\n\\n 4“Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be subject\\nto the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.”\\n18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Section 1956(h) proscribes money laundering; § 1957 proscribes “[e]ngaging in monetary\\ntransactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity.”\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 15\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\ninapposite. The warrant at issue in United States v. Roche failed to incorporate expressly a\\ndetailed affidavit, and would have likely been saved had it done so. 614 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.\\n1980). Similarly lacking were the warrants at issue in United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 604\\n(10th Cir. 1988), and United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 967 (9th Cir. 1986). In sum, the\\nwarrant at issue here directed the officers to seize evidence of money-laundering violations\\nrelated to the pill-mill scheme described in detail and at length in the affidavit. Therefore the\\nofficers’ discretion was sufficiently guided. Cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479–82\\n(1976) (upholding a warrant that authorized seizure of “fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of\\ncrime” because that phrase must be read in context with the rest of the warrant).\\n\\n Moreover, even if § 1956(h) were so broad as to provide no guidance at all, three statutes\\nremain that would limit the scope of the warrant: 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)5, 846, and 8566. These\\nstatutes are far narrower than the statute prohibiting conspiracy to commit money laundering,\\nand therefore provide specific guidance as to what sorts of patient files were authorized to be\\nseized—namely, those that were evidence of drug distribution. The defendants argue otherwise,\\nmainly relying on United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 2010), for support, but Lazar\\naddresses a different situation entirely. The warrant at issue in Lazar incorporated a list of\\npatients, and that list served as a limit on the scope of the warrant. Id. at 236–38 (describing the\\nwarrant as including an affidavit referring to the “below listed” and “following” patients). This\\ncourt held that any files seized in addition to the listed patients were beyond the scope of the\\nwarrant. Id. Lazar presents a very different situation from this case because the warrant was\\nlimited to specific patients. It does not stand for the proposition that any warrant ordering the\\nseizure of patient files without a list of names is de facto unconstitutional.\\n\\n The remainder of the defendants’ arguments can be dealt with quickly. They rely on\\nUnited States v. Abrams for support, and not illogically: Abrams does say that a warrant that\\nallowed a seizure of all Medicare and Medicaid records from the office of doctors accused of\\n\\n\\n 5“Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to\\nmanufacture, distribute, or dispense . . . a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\\n 621 U.S.C. 856 prohibits and penalizes “[m]aintaining drug-involved premises.”\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 16\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nMedicare/Medicaid fraud, even though limited only by reference to a particular criminal statute,\\nwas unconstitutional. 615 F.2d 541, 542–44 (1st Cir. 1980). Abrams, however, is unpersuasive.\\nThe opinion in Abrams was published only four years after the Supreme Court held in Andresen\\nv. Maryland that a seizure of business records was constitutional based on a warrant’s language\\nallowing seizure of listed items “together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of\\ncrime.” 427 U.S. at 479. In Abrams, the First Circuit distinguished Andresen and noted that:\\n\\n Business records, although they may contain evidence of fraud, do not fall\\n into the category of stolen or contraband goods. The government has cited no\\n case and we have found none in which a seizure of all records was held valid\\n pursuant to a generally worded warrant such as we have here. In the cases we\\n have canvassed where a seizure of records was upheld, there has been some\\n limitation in the warrant as to the records to be seized.\\n\\n615 F.2d at 545. Time has shown otherwise. We have upheld numerous seizures of the majority\\nof a person or business’s records based on “generally worded warrant[s].” In United States v.\\nGardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 471 (6th Cir. 2006), we upheld a warrant that “specifically stated the\\nrecords to be seized included: financial documents; . . . business records involving [certain of\\nthe defendants], . . . travel records; investment records; telephone records; records related to\\npayment of personal and business expenses and cash purchases; . . . records and notes of\\nfinancial transactions.” We held “the warrant stated with particularity all items to be seized” and\\nthat, because the defendant was implicated in a broad scheme, a broad warrant was justified. Id.\\n\\n Likewise, we have upheld warrants allowing seizure of “papers ‘showing ownership\\nand/or control’ of illegal drugs,” Bruce, 396 F.3d at 710, and “records and documents ‘relating\\nto the ownership, partnership, investment, construction and equipment costs, operating income\\nand expenses, losses and/or distribution of income and/or profits attributable to each [restaurant\\nfranchise],’” Asker, 676 F. App’x at 462. In the latter case, we noted that “[g]iven the scope of\\nthe alleged money laundering, this list is unsurprisingly large, but nonetheless tailored.” Asker,\\n676 F. App’x at 462.\\n\\n So too with the Chaneys. The warrant authorized the seizure of all “[p]atient files . . . .\\n[p]atient lists [and] [a]ppointment books, patient profiles, receipt books, ledgers of activity, notes\\nregarding patient information, directions to pharmacies and other related documents as it pertains\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 17\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nto patients,” so long as those files or patient-related documents contained evidence of money\\nlaundering or drug distribution. R. 71-3 (Warrant Two) (Page ID #744). This category surely\\ncontains numerous documents, but it is nevertheless tailored: the scheme was large, and so too\\nthe quantity of files seized.\\n\\n This leads to the defendants’ final argument: “The government was capable of\\ndescribing the patient files and records and other items to be seized with more particularity.”\\nLesa Chaney Br. at 41. They posit limiting the warrant to (1) files of patients who had been\\nprescribed a controlled substance, (2) files of “those 50% of patients receiving controlled\\nsubstance prescriptions that the government had some basis to conclude were [not] legitimate or\\nprobably legitimate,” (3) files of individuals the government had already identified as being\\n“unlawfully prescribed medication by Dr. Chaney,” or (4) files of “individuals that received\\ncontrolled substance prescriptions in June 2010, that are the genesis of this case.” Id. at 41–42.\\n\\n None of these proposed formulations show that the warrant was insufficiently particular\\nor overbroad. The final two proposed formulations restrict the warrant to a far narrower group of\\nfiles than the government had probable cause to seize. It is crucial to remember that the\\ninvestigation of Ace Clinique revealed both specific instances in which patients were\\nillegitimately prescribed controlled substances and evidence suggesting a larger fraud (for\\nexample, a pad of pre-signed prescriptions left for use while the doctor was away). These two\\nformulations would limit the seizure to the specific instances already identified, ignoring the\\nprobable cause to search for other instances of fraud. It would be as though the government saw\\na person move drugs into a suspected stash house, but could authorize a warrant for only the\\nquantity observed rather than any drugs found within.\\n\\n The third formulation—limit the seizure to “those 50% of patients receiving controlled\\nsubstance prescriptions that the government had some basis to conclude were [not] legitimate or\\nprobably legitimate”—is a gross misreading of the warrant affidavit. One person told an agent\\nthat 50 or 60 percent of Ace Clinique’s patients were pain patients; there was never a distinction\\nbetween a legitimate 50 percent and an illegitimate 50 percent. Therefore, this would not have\\nbeen a valid formulation for the warrant.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 18\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n We are left with the first proposed formulation: limit the warrant to patients who had\\nbeen prescribed a controlled substance. This does not render illegitimate the warrant because it\\nis no more particular than the warrant issued, which authorized the officers to seize evidence of\\ndrug-distribution crimes. It is, if anything, more broad—rather than restricting officers to only\\nthose patient files that are evidence of crimes, the defendants would authorize officers to seize\\nevery file of a person who was prescribed a controlled substance, regardless of the apparent\\nlegitimacy of the prescription. The defendants’ failure to propose a more particular warrant\\nformulation reveals the truth of the matter here: the warrant was as particular as was possible, in\\nthe circumstances. “When a more specific description of the items to be seized is unavailable, a\\ngeneral description will suffice.” Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1027. True, this formulation required\\nthe executing agents to use their judgment to determine whether a particular file could be seized,\\nbut that is not a fatal flaw. See Bruce, 396 F.3d at 710; Ables, 167 F.3d at 1034; cf. United States\\nv. Hanna, 661 F.3d 271, 286 (6th Cir. 2011) (“We have allowed the search of electronic files\\nbeyond their titles, recognizing the risk of ‘shielded’ evidence otherwise.”).\\n\\n A final point deserves emphasis: the defendants do not challenge on appeal the execution\\nof the warrant. Rather, they focus their arguments on the constitutionality of the warrant.\\nTherefore, the manner in which the agents executed the search—namely, that they took all of the\\nclinic’s files, seemingly without review to see whether they constituted evidence of the named\\ncrimes—is of no moment. The defendants could have objected to the introduction of specific\\npieces of evidence as seized beyond the scope of the warrant, and, had the district court ruled\\nagainst the defendants on those objections, we could have considered that on appeal. Those\\narguments, however, were not made below. We consider only the facial constitutionality of the\\nwarrant, and on those grounds the defendants’ arguments all fail.\\n\\n In sum, the warrant, as written, was constitutional.\\n\\nB. There Was Sufficient Evidence For The Jury to Convict the Defendants\\n\\n All the defendants argue that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain\\ntheir convictions. We review jury verdicts using a deferential standard: we may “reverse a\\njudgment for insufficiency of evidence only if, viewing the record as a whole, the judgment is\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 19\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nnot supported by substantial and competent evidence.” United States v. Taylor, 800 F.3d 701,\\n711 (6th Cir. 2015). The evidence must be “viewed in the light most favorable to the\\ngovernment” and “all reasonable inferences” must be drawn “in support of the jury’s verdict.”\\nUnited States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Stewart, 729 F.3d\\n517, 526 (6th Cir. 2013). “[A] defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence bears a very\\nheavy burden.” United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United\\nStates v. Jackson, 473 F.3d 660, 669 (6th Cir. 2007)). It must be borne in mind, however, that\\nthe government bears the burden of proof of all elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the\\nevidence did not meet that burden, the jury verdict must be reversed. United States v. Parkes,\\n668 F.3d 295, 300–03 (6th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n 1. The Drug-Distribution Counts\\n\\n The first group of charges at issue are the drug-distribution counts. Ace and the clinic\\nwere found guilty of multiple counts of unlawfully distributing controlled substances, namely,\\noxycodone and hydrocodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Lesa\\nChaney was not charged with these counts.) “In order to obtain a conviction under 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1) against a licensed physician such as defendant, the government must show: ‘(1) That\\ndefendant distributed a controlled substance; (2) That he acted intentionally or knowingly; and\\n(3) That defendant prescribed the drug without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the\\ncourse of professional practice.’” United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 539, 542 (6th Cir. 1995)\\n(quoting United States v. Varma, 691 F.2d 460, 462 (10th Cir. 1982)).\\n\\n All defendants were found guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled\\nsubstances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. “To prove a drug conspiracy, the\\nUnited States must establish ‘(1) an agreement to violate the drug laws, and (2) each\\nconspirator’s knowledge of, intent to join, and participation in the conspiracy.’” United States v.\\nSingleton, 626 F. App’x 589, 595 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d\\n503, 517 (6th Cir. 2001)).\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 20\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Finally, all defendants were found guilty of two counts of maintaining drug-involved\\npremises in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856. “To convict a defendant on these charges, the\\ngovernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) knowingly\\n(2) maintained any place, whether permanently or temporarily, (3) for the purpose of distributing\\na controlled substance.” United States v. Lang, 717 F. App’x 523, 545 (6th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n a. Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance\\n\\n First, Ace and Ace Clinique challenge their convictions for unlawfully distributing\\noxycodone and hydrocodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Counts 2–62).\\n\\n Ace7 argues that the government’s evidence was insufficient for two reasons. First, Ace\\nmakes much of the fact that the government’s witness, Dr. Stephen Loyd, found only two\\nprescriptions—both not pre-signed—that, in Dr. Loyd’s opinion, were not justified by a patient’s\\nunderlying medical condition. And those were not from the patient files listed in Counts 2–62.\\nAce Br. at 45. Ace points to the fact that Dr. Loyd noted the various, serious underlying\\nconditions that Ace’s patients suffered and from this Ace concludes that the government failed to\\nshow the prescriptions were issued without a legitimate medical purpose. Id. at 45–46. In other\\nwords, Ace argues that the existence of an underlying medical condition that would justify the\\nprescription of a controlled substance means that the substance was, de facto, issued with a\\nlegitimate medical purpose. Ace’s second argument is that, per United States v. Binder, 26 F.\\nSupp. 3d 656 (E.D. Mich. 2014), the government was required to prove through expert testimony\\nthat Ace issued prescriptions “outside the usual course of his professional practice and for no\\nlegitimate medical purpose.” Ace Br. at 44–45 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04).\\n\\n Ace’s arguments are incorrect. His first argument begins with a flawed premise, as the\\ndistrict court explained in its post-trial opinion. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. & Order at 4) (Page\\nID #5911). Ace conflates “legitimate medical purpose” with “legitimate need” or, broader still,\\nany condition that might justify the prescription of pain pills. Id. But the district court explained\\nneatly the flaw in this logic:\\n\\n 7Ace and Ace Clinique’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence are identical, and so, for\\npurposes of this section, “Ace” refers to Ace Chaney and Ace Clinique unless otherwise distinguished.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 21\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Accepting the Chaneys’ premise, no physician could be held criminally liable for\\n distributing opioid prescriptions to users who incidentally carried some legitimate\\n need for painkillers, regardless of where, why, or how those prescriptions were\\n issued. Suppose, for example, that a physician began dispensing prescriptions for\\n powerful narcotics to strangers on a street corner, without asking for their medical\\n history or performing a medical examination of any kind. Under the Chaneys’\\n proposed construction of the law, the Government could not prosecute this\\n physician for dispensing painkillers “without a legitimate medical purpose”\\n absent some expert testimony that proved each stranger did not have a legitimate\\n need for the pills.\\n\\nId. (footnote omitted). Instead, as the word “purpose” implies, we look at a provider’s reason for\\nissuing the prescription when determining whether it was issued for a legitimate medical\\npurpose, rather than the patient’s underlying conditions. As the district court made abundantly\\nclear, a doctor prescribing opioid painkillers to anyone walking through the door is not saved if a\\nperson happens to have an underlying condition that could justify the prescription; likewise, a\\ndoctor who acts in good faith and with all due care but nevertheless issues a prescription to a\\npatient who was merely faking symptoms is nevertheless acting with a legitimate medical\\npurpose. To say otherwise would be absurdity.\\n\\n Other “pill mill” cases support our common-sense reading of the statute. We have upheld\\nsimilar convictions based on evidence of the doctor’s intent—or purpose—rather than the\\npatient’s underlying condition. See United States v. Elliott, 876 F.3d 855, 864 (6th Cir. 2017)\\n(noting that “the extremely short time [the defendant] spent with patients and her knowledge of\\nthe distances they traveled to obtain prescriptions at the clinic” supported the conviction); United\\nStates v. Guzman, 571 F. App’x 356, 363 (6th Cir. 2014) (the fact that the defendant “met with\\ncustomers on an expedited basis and issued thousands of prescriptions for narcotics, with . . .\\nprescription forms that [the doctor] had pre-signed” supported the conviction); United States v.\\nWord, 806 F.2d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that “[writing] prescriptions for various\\nindividuals whom [the defendant] did not examine” is evidence of illegitimate purpose).\\nEvidence of the circumstances surrounding a prescription allows juries to infer that a physician’s\\npurpose was something other than legitimate medical treatment; the underlying conditions a\\npatient may have had are not dispositive. Of course, the distinction between a physician’s\\npurpose and the patient’s condition collapses when a provider’s reason is to address the patient’s\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 22\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nneed; whether that was Ace’s reason for prescribing pain pills is exactly the question in this case.\\nThe jury concluded that his reasons were illegitimate, a conclusion well supported by the\\nevidence presented at trial.\\n\\n This leads to Ace’s second, equally flawed, argument. Expert testimony was not\\nnecessary to show illegitimate purpose in this case. First, the law in the Sixth Circuit is clear that\\nexpert testimony is not necessary. Elliott, 876 F.3d at 865. Second, there was plenty of evidence\\nfrom which the jury could have concluded—absent expert testimony—that Ace was operating\\nwithout a legitimate medical purpose. For example, a former patient named Charles Hicks\\ntestified that he was prescribed Percocet on his first visit to the clinic; that he was physically\\nexamined only once; that after a drug screening was negative for opiates, 8 he told Ace he was\\nonly taking drugs as needed, to which Ace responded that Hicks would have to start taking the\\npills more regularly; that Ace increased the dosage of Hicks’s prescription after Hicks’s drug\\nscreening was negative; and that Ace suggested to Hicks he could sell his additional OxyContin\\nfor cash. R. 400 (Mar. 3, 2016 Trial Tr. at 31–45) (Page ID #6411–25). Another example is the\\nevidence that Ace was altering urine drug screens. R. 316 (Mar. 22, 2016 Trial Tr. at 38–42)\\n(Page ID #3724–29). This, along with the myriad evidence summarized in the district court’s\\nopinions on the defendants’ motions for acquittal, shows that in this case it was entirely\\nappropriate for a jury to determine that Ace was operating without a legitimate medical purpose.\\nSee R. 267 (Apr. 12, 2016 Order) (Page ID #2794); R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. & Order) (Page\\nID #5908).\\n\\n b. Drug-Distribution Conspiracy\\n\\n Next, the defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions\\nfor conspiracy to distribute Schedule II and III controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (Count 1).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8In this instance, a negative drug screening is a bad outcome. The idea behind the screenings is to test\\nwhether patients are actually taking the drugs they are being prescribed; thus, a positive result for opiates is the\\ndesired outcome.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 23\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Ace’s argument as to this count is similar to his argument regarding Counts 2–62: he\\nclaims that the government has failed to prove an agreement to distribute controlled substances\\noutside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose\\nbecause the government did not provide expert testimony showing that all prescriptions\\ndistributed by Ace were illegitimate. Ace Br. at 47.\\n\\n This count was supported by sufficient evidence for largely the same reasons that Counts\\n2–62 were proven. In addition, the government introduced evidence showing that Ace and Ace\\nClinique had a general practice of distributing medication for illegitimate purposes that went\\nbeyond the specific prescriptions charged in Counts 2–62. See Appellee Br. at 75–76.9\\n\\n Lesa Chaney also challenges the jury’s verdict as to Count One. She argues that the\\ngovernment failed “to identify even one patient that received a controlled substance prescription\\nboth outside the usual course of medical practice and for no legitimate medical purpose.” Lesa\\nChaney Br. at 47. But this statement is, of course, incorrect. As discussed above, the\\ngovernment proved that 60 prescriptions were issued “outside the usual course of medical\\npractice and for no legitimate medical purpose.” Lesa was not charged in those counts, but the\\ngovernment offered evidence that she knew of Ace’s practice of using pre-signed prescriptions\\nand that she distributed the slips on occasion. E.g. R. 321 (Mar. 8, 2016 Trial Tr. at 18) (Page ID\\n#4655); see also United States v. Sadler, 750 F.3d 585, 593 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The government\\nhad no obligation to produce ‘direct evidence’ against [the defendant], as ‘guilty knowledge and\\nvoluntary participation may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.’ Those circumstances\\nall pointed in one direction—that this pain-treatment operation was a charade, and [the\\ndefendant] played a critical part in facilitating the charade.” (quoting United States v. Hodges,\\n935 F.2d 766, 773 (6th Cir. 1991))). This was sufficient evidence to show Lesa’s involvement in\\nthe conspiracy.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9Lesa, Ace, and the clinic argue that if the drug distribution and drug conspiracy counts fall, so too should\\nthe counts for maintaining drug-involved premises. But the drug distribution and conspiracy counts survive, and so\\ntoo the drug-involved premises.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 24\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Lesa’s final argument is that the government is attempting to turn the use of pre-signed\\nprescriptions into a “strict liability” offense. But that is simply not the case. If that were, so a\\n25-day trial would not have been warranted. Rather, the government presented the use of pre-\\nsigned prescription pads in conjunction with other evidence of illegitimate purpose, all of which\\nallowed the jury to infer malfeasance.\\n\\n 2. The Health-Care Fraud Counts\\n\\n The next group of charges are the healthcare fraud counts.\\n\\n All the defendants were found guilty of multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1347, which\\nproscribes knowingly and willfully executing (or attempting to execute) a scheme or artifice to\\ndefraud any health-care benefit program. This requires the government to prove that the\\ndefendants “(1) created ‘a scheme or artifice to defraud’ a health care program, (2) implemented\\nthe plan, and (3) acted with ‘intent to defraud.’” United States v. Bertram, 900 F.3d 743, 748\\n(6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 314 (6th Cir. 2009)). The\\nconvictions under this statute were based on the following conduct:\\n\\n ● Ace and Ace Clinique: medically unnecessary urine drug screens (counts\\n 112–122); altered urine drug screens (counts 123–147); hospital visit billings\\n (counts 150–163, 165–168, 171–171, 175, 177, 180, 182, 186, 188, 191–192);\\n hospital visits on the high-volume day of March 19, 2013 (count 197); nerve\\n conduction studies conducted by unqualified personnel (count 234).\\n ● Lesa: medically unnecessary urine drug screens (counts 112–122); hospital\\n visits on the high-volume day of March 19, 2013 (count 197); nerve\\n conduction studies conducted by unqualified personnel (count 234).\\n\\n In addition, all defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and Ace and the clinic were found guilty of making false\\nstatements relating to health-care matters in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1035. “The elements of\\nhealth care fraud conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 are (1) an agreement between two or more\\npersons to (2) ‘knowingly and willfully execute[ ], or attempt[ ] to execute, a scheme or artifice\\n. . . to defraud any health care benefit program; or . . . to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent\\npretenses, representations, or promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under the\\ncustody or control of, any health care benefit program, in connection with the delivery of or\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 25\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\npayment for health care benefits, items, or services.’” United States v. Pamatmat, No. 17-1611,\\n2018 WL 6173401, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 2018) (quoting United States v. Patel, 579 F. App’x\\n449, 460 (6th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 2019 WL 936741 (Apr. 1, 2019). To convict the\\ndefendants for false statements, “the government had to show that [their] false statements were\\nwillful and that [they] acted with intent to defraud.” United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 277\\n(6th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n a. Medically Unnecessary Urine Drug Screens\\n\\n All the defendants were found guilty of health-care fraud based on administering and\\nbilling for medically unnecessary urine drug screens, and all now appeal these convictions.\\nUrine drug screens, when properly used, are a tool to help prevent patient abuse of pain\\nmedication. Doctors can test patients for the presence of the prescribed opioid—in which case, a\\npositive result is desired—and for the presence of illicit drugs—in which case, a negative result\\nis required. R. 354 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 11) (Page ID #5668). These tests are medically\\nindicated only at “the right frequency” and for “the right patient.” Id. at 12 (Page ID #5669). If\\na patient is high risk, screening three or four times a year would be appropriate; for low-risk\\npatients, once a year is adequate, per guidelines. R. 244 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 66–67) (Page\\nID #2648–49). Ace Clinique was screening patients at much more frequent intervals. E.g., id. at\\n82 (Page ID #2664) (describing a low-risk patient being screened 35 times in 35 months; another\\nlow-risk patient being screened 24 times in 42 months).\\n\\n Ace argues that the government has failed to prove specific intent to defraud because it\\nrelied on “generalized” expert testimony rather than patient testimony or expert testimony\\n“sufficiently specific to the patient, date, and services in the indictment.” Ace Br. at 48. He\\npoints also to testimony of an expert witness that any drug screening is generally good. In\\naddition, Lesa argues that the government failed to prove specific intent because: (1) she is not a\\nhealthcare professional; (2) there were divergent opinions in the medical community regarding\\nhow frequently urine drug screening should be conducted, therefore; (3) “[f]or [Lesa] to be found\\nguilty of the healthcare fraud charges regarding the urine drug screens . . . it would have to be\\nshown that she knew better than all these medical professionals.” Lesa Chaney Br. at 52–53.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 26\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n These arguments all fail.\\n\\n First, the specificity of the government’s proof. The defendants are correct that this court\\nhas said that “[i]f expert testimony is offered in lieu of patient testimony, the expert testimony\\nshould be sufficiently specific to the patient, date, and services in the indictment, [although] the\\npatients’ names need not be specifically mentioned during the expert’s testimony.” United States\\nv. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 315 (6th Cir. 2009). The problem with the defendants’ argument is\\nthat the government’s expert did testify specifically as to each charged count. See R. 244 (Mar.\\n9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 81–89) (Page ID #2663–71) (“These are tables that I have performed for\\neach patient and to kind of document their Opioid Risk Tool and also how many urine drug\\nscreens they had per month.” (emphasis added)). This accords with Martinez:\\n\\n [The defendant’s] records for each patient named in the indictment and the claims\\n that [the defendant] submitted for reimbursement were admitted into evidence and\\n available for the jury to review. [A doctor] testified that he reviewed the bills [the\\n defendant] submitted and his patient files, and concluded that the billing was “not\\n appropriate in any fashion” and that the procedures claimed in the billing “were\\n not medically necessary in any way.” Considering the evidence that [the\\n defendant] performed procedures and prescribed medication that expert witnesses\\n deemed medically unnecessary, a rational jury could infer that [the defendant]\\n knowingly devised a billing scheme with the intent to defraud.\\n\\n588 F.3d at 316 (internal citations omitted).\\n\\n Similarly, in this case, Dr. Parker testified that only 31 of the 311 urine drug screens\\nperformed were medically indicated, and the complete medical files were admitted into evidence.\\nR. 244 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 86, 88–91) (Page ID #2668, 2670–73). Thus, the defendants’\\nfirst argument fails.\\n\\n Next, the defendants argue that one expert witness, Dr. Stephen Loyd, “testified for the\\ngovernment that he does not have a problem with [Ace Clinique’s] drug screening regimen.”\\nAce Br. at 48. The argument seems to be that Dr. Loyd’s testimony rendered it impossible to\\nshow that the drug screens were illegitimate. This, however, is untrue. First, “courts may not\\n‘independently weigh[ ] the evidence, nor judge[ ] the credibility of witnesses.’ This rule applies\\nwith equal force to the testimony and conclusions of the government’s expert witnesses.”\\nPaulus, 894 F.3d at 275 (quoting United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 1999))\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 27\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n(alteration in original). We cannot now say that the jury erred by crediting Dr. Parker’s\\nassessment that the urine screens were unnecessary over Dr. Loyd’s testimony.\\n\\n The second problem with this argument is that it overstates Dr. Loyd’s testimony. He did\\nsay that “I don’t have a problem with the drug screening regimen . . . . [P]articularly [in] rural\\nAppalachia, I’m excited when people are drug-screened.” R. 415 (Mar. 15, 2016 Trial Tr. at\\n160) (Page ID #7732). But Dr. Loyd said also that random drug screens (which Ace did not\\nadminister) are “preferable to a drug screen every time,” and he noted instances where a patient\\ntested negative for a drug the patient ought to have had in his system (because it was prescribed)\\nbut there was no indication Ace addressed this negative result. Id. at 48–52 (Page ID #7620–24).\\n\\n Finally, this argument ignores the evidence of altered and ineffective drug screens (a\\nviolation for which Ace was convicted separately). See generally Appellee Br. at 31–33. The\\nfact that Ace was altering drug screens adds to the potential inference that he had an illegitimate\\npurpose and intent to defraud.\\n\\n Last, there is Lesa’s argument that she, as a layperson, could not have committed this\\nfraud. But this argument is hollow. It is clear that someone need not be a medical professional\\nto commit health-care fraud. E.g., United States v. Davis, 490 F.3d 541, 549–50 (6th Cir. 2007).\\nAs the government points out, Lesa was aware that conducting screens was part of the regular\\npatient visits to the clinic. R. 408 (Mar. 16, 2016 Trial Tr. at 19–20) (Page ID #7061–62). She\\nwas the owner of the clinic. Most damning, she knew about the altered tests, showing she was\\naware that the testing protocol at the clinic was not legitimate. R. 340 (Mar. 15, 2016 Trial Tr. at\\n15–16) (Page ID #5486–87). The jury could have legitimately concluded that she was aware of\\nthe fraud being conducted at her place of business.10\\n\\n b. Making False Statements by Using Pre-Signed Prescription Pads\\n\\n Next, Ace and Ace Clinique contest their convictions for violations of 18 U.S.C § 1035\\nfor making false statements relating to health-care matters by using pre-signed prescriptions.\\n\\n 10Lesa makes similar, undeveloped arguments as to all of her fraud convictions. These arguments fail for\\nthe same reason—record evidence showed that Lesa was aware of the activities at the clinic, from which the jury\\ncould have inferred fraud.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 28\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nThey argue that the government failed to prove that Ace and the clinic intentionally hid the fact\\nthat the prescriptions were pre-signed. Ace Br. at 49. This is not so: Roy Combs, the “IT guy”\\nat the clinic who kept the pre-signed pads, testified that Ace told him “not to tell anybody about\\nthe [the pre-signed prescriptions]. R. 321 (Mar. 8, 2016 Trial Tr. at 19–20) (Page ID #4656–57).\\nThis alone is evidence from which the jury could have concluded Ace intentionally hid the fact\\nthat the prescriptions were pre-signed.\\n\\n c. The Nerve Conduction Studies\\n\\n All the defendants challenge their convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1347 by\\nfraudulently charging for nerve conduction studies. According to the government’s expert\\nwitness, Dr. Earl J. Berman, a true nerve conduction study is a “complex procedure” that tells a\\nqualified practitioner whether a nerve is damaged by generating wave forms showing “how\\nquickly a nerve impulse flows from a designated spot to a designated electrode.” R. 354 (Mar. 9,\\n2016 Trial Tr. at 20) (Page ID #5677). Because “certain diseases . . . have . . . a certain\\nneuropathy,” for example, “[d]iabetes has a different characteristic wave form and flow rate than\\nsomething that has a mass in the spine,” “the technician has got to know very precisely how to\\nset the electrodes, and the physician has to have special training as well to understand and\\ninterpret the wave forms and the latencies.” Id. at 20 (Page ID #5677). “Medicare requires that\\na technician has special training and recognition by a nationally-recognized organization, and the\\nphysician also has to have certain nationally-recognized training.” Id. at 21 (Page ID #5678).\\n\\n Combs, the IT director at Ace Clinique, performed the nerve conduction studies there.\\nR. 321 (Mar. 8, 2016 Trial Tr. at 4) (Page ID #4641). His only qualification to do so was a\\n“couple days”-long course he attended that was led by the inventor of the machine. Id. at 7\\n(Page ID #4644). Combs’s procedure involved “a machine that had eight D batteries in it that\\nconnected to a sponge that [he] had to get wet.” Id. at 92 (Page ID #4729). He would then\\n“connect [the machine] to a probe with a Q-tip on the end of it. . . . And then [he] would use the\\nQ-tip and dip it in water, and hold it to different points on the [patient’s] body.” Id. The\\nmachine would generate a current, and when the patient felt “a sensation” Combs would write\\ndown the number on the machine’s dial. Id.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 29\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Ace and the clinic argue that there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction\\nbecause there was “confusion concerning whether a nerve conduction study involves a neural\\nscan machine or an electromyogram (EMG).” Ace Br. at 50. They argue that the machine they\\nused—what they term a neural scan machine—was different than the complex machine Dr.\\nBerman described, and did not require the same training. This argument fails for two reasons.\\nFirst, there was no such confusion. Dr. Berman very clearly testified that the procedure he was\\ndescribing was the approved procedure for nerve conduction studies and not limited to EMGs or\\nmachines that use needles. R. 354 (Mar. 9, 2016 Trial Tr. at 39–44) (Page ID #5696–5701).\\nDr. Berman did testify that he was unfamiliar with the specific machine used at Ace Clinique,\\nbut the procedure he described for nerve conduction studies is from the Medicare/Medicaid\\nbilling manual. Id. This leads to the second reason why the arguments of Ace and the clinic fail:\\nDr. Berman’s familiarity with their machine and what it may or may not require in terms of\\ntraining is immaterial. Dr. Berman described the characteristics of the nerve conduction study\\nfor which the clinic billed Medicare. Id. By using that billing code, Ace and the clinic were\\nrepresenting that they were performing the type of procedure Dr. Berman described. They of\\ncourse were not. Thus, they committed fraud, and no attempt to create confusion about EMGs as\\nopposed to wet Q-Tips can undermine their convictions.\\n\\n Finally, Lesa asserts broadly that the government “failed in its proof.” Lesa Chaney Br.\\nat 54. The record shows, however, that Lesa knew about the fraudulent practices at the clinic\\nand was responsible for billing and administrative procedures at the clinic. That is sufficient\\nevidence from which a jury could have found she knew of and committed (or aided and abetted)\\nthe fraud related to the nerve conduction studies.\\n\\n For the reasons stated above, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted\\nthe defendants on all counts.11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11Ace argues also that there was “cumulative error,” and all the defendants argue that the money-\\nlaundering charges fail because the drug-distribution counts fail. Because all of the defendants’ arguments\\nregarding the drug-distribution and health-care fraud counts are rejected, the money-laundering counts stand and\\nthere was no cumulative error.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 30\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nC. Jury Misconduct\\n\\n Next, all of the defendants argue that a new trial is warranted due to alleged jury\\nmisconduct. A new trial is warranted based on juror misconduct only if the misconduct “resulted\\nin prejudice to [the defendant].” United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 935 (6th Cir. 1990).\\n“We apply the abuse-of-discretion standard in jury-misconduct cases.” United States v.\\nWheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 361 (6th Cir. 2008).\\n\\n 1. Background\\n\\n The allegations of jury misconduct in this case come from one alternate juror, juror\\nnumber 116. On the fifth day of trial, a court clerk told the district court that she had received\\nfrom the jury administrator some information about a recent conversation between the\\nadministrator and juror 116. “The administrator told the court clerk—and the clerk then told the\\n[district court]—that this alternate had expressed ‘some frustration with the process’ and\\n‘concerns about how serious[ly] the jury was taking their duty.’” R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at\\n18) (Page ID #5925) (quoting R. 285 (Telephone Conf.) (Page ID #2988)); R. 291 (Apr. 20,\\n2016 Tr. at 3) (Page ID #3028)). The district court did not investigate the concerns directly, nor\\ndid it alert counsel to the concerns. Instead, it “instructed the jury that ‘if any issues . . . relate[d]\\nto the jury instructions’ arose, they should ‘bring those to [the Court’s] attention.’” Id. at 19\\n(Page ID #5926). The district court heard nothing further during the trial.\\n\\n The day after the entry of the verdict, juror 116 contacted Ace’s defense counsel and left\\na voicemail. Defense counsel reported the message to the court, and the parties held a telephone\\nconference the next day. Id.; R. 285 (Telephone Conf.) (Page ID #2988). The district court\\ndetermined that the appropriate course of conduct would be to conduct an in camera interview\\nwith the alternate to determine whether the concerns had to do with external influences on the\\njury or the jury’s internal decisionmaking process. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at 20) (Page ID\\n#5927).\\n\\n The in camera interview revealed details about the initial “concerns” that the district\\ncourt was told about via the court clerk and jury administrator. The first incident occurred\\nduring opening statements. R. 291 (Apr. 27, 2016 Tr. at 6) (Page ID #3031) (describing the first\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 31\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nincident as happening during “the first statements”). Two jurors were discussing the Chaneys’\\nhouse in the jury room during a break. The alternate told them “I don’t think we should be\\ntalking about that.” Id. One of the men who was discussing the house responded by saying\\n“[w]e can talk about it in here” and asked “who said [that we cannot]?” Id. The alternate said\\nthat “[t]he Judge told us we couldn’t.” Id. Then another woman agreed with the alternate and\\nsaid they could not discuss the case and “[i]t’s right on the wall there.” Id. This was the incident\\nthat was reported to the court.\\n\\n Juror 116 reported another incident to the jury administrator. The jury administrator told\\nthe alternate juror to “tell [the other jurors] not to do that.” Id. at 7 (Page ID #3032). It is\\nunclear what exactly the alternate described to the administrator. Juror 116 did, however,\\ndescribe to the court what the other incidents of misconduct were in her opinion. First, jurors\\nwere saying that they did not like the way one of the attorneys was treating an “elderly lady”\\nwitness. Id. Next, one of the jurors “got attracted to . . . Dr. Chaney’s attorney, and he made it\\nbe known.” Id. Finally, the alternate juror said that another woman was expressing her boredom\\nat the trial (saying, for example, “I know how many lights . . . [are] in the ceiling.”). Id. at 8\\n(Page ID #3033).\\n\\n Based on these incidents the defendants moved for a new trial, but their motions were\\ndenied. R. 371 (Sept. 30, 2016 Op. at 34) (Page ID #5941).\\n\\n 2. A New Trial Was Not Warranted\\n\\n The defendants rely nearly exclusively on United States v. Resko to support their\\nargument that the alleged juror misconduct necessitated a new trial. See 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir.\\n1993). In Resko, “approximately seven days into a nine-day trial . . . a juror approached a court\\nofficer and told him that the members of the jury had been discussing the case during their\\nrecesses and while waiting in the jury room. The court officer informed the trial court of this\\nfact, and the court informed counsel.” Id. at 687. The trial court declined the defendants’\\nrequest for individualized voir dire, and instead gave a written questionnaire to each juror asking\\nwhether they participated in discussions and, if yes, whether they had “formed an opinion about\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 32\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nthe guilt or non-guilt of either defendant as a result of your discussions with other jurors.” Id. at\\n688. All jurors answered yes to the first question and no to the second. Id.\\n\\n On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the district court erred by failing to conduct\\nindividualized voir dire because the questionnaire left the court with “no way to know the nature\\nof [the jurors’] discussions” and whether those discussions were prejudicial. Id. at 690–95.\\n\\n Here, the district court acted recklessly by choosing to keep information about potential\\njuror misconduct from defense counsel. Nevertheless, a new trial is not warranted because the\\npost-verdict interview with juror 116 revealed there was no juror misconduct that could have\\nwarranted a new trial, and thus there was no prejudice. See Bowling, 900 F.2d at 935. During\\nthe in camera interview, the alternate described one instance of potential misconduct\\n(deliberating before close of evidence) that occurred during opening statements and was\\nimmediately quashed by other jurors. R. 291 (Apr. 20, 2016 Tr. at 6) (Page ID #3031). The rest\\nof the supposed “misconduct” the juror reported could be characterized as less-than-ideal\\nbehavior (commenting on the appearance of a lawyer; complaining of boredom), but nothing that\\nwould warrant a new trial. Id. at 7 (Page ID #3032). Simply put, juror 116 was given a chance\\nto air all her grievances, and nothing came close to conduct that would have warranted a new\\ntrial.\\n\\n The defendants attempt to inject confusion by saying that there are a number of\\nunresolved questions. See Lesa Chaney Br. at 58. But those attempts are fruitless. Juror 116\\nwas clear when she spoke with the district judge, and the nature of the supposed misconduct is\\nclear. It is nothing that could have possibly prejudiced the defendants. In sum, the district\\ncourt’s decision to withhold from the defendants an allegation of juror misconduct may have\\nbeen imprudent, but in this case it is clear that, even if counsel had been informed of every\\n“incident,” nothing would have even approached necessitating a new trial. Therefore we affirm\\nthe decision of the district court.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 33\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\nD. Procedural Reasonableness at Sentencing\\n\\n Finally, the defendants argue that their sentences were procedurally unreasonable because\\nthe district court failed to address their arguments for a lower drug-amount calculation and erred\\nin calculating the loss amount.\\n\\n We review factual findings at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Valentine,\\n694 F.3d 665, 672 (6th Cir. 2012). We review de novo the methodology the district court used to\\ncalculate loss amount. United States v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975, 984 (6th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n First, the defendants argue that the district court erred by failing to explain sufficiently its\\nrejection of the defendants’ method of drug amount calculation. See Ace Br. at 53–54. The\\ndistrict court did, however, explain its reasoning “enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it]\\nhas considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal\\ndecisionmaking authority.” United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). This is apparent from a review of the\\nsentencing transcript. First, the district court explained its reasons for doubting the defendants’\\nexpert and method:\\n\\n I’ve read carefully the briefing that was filed, of course, listened carefully, for\\n example, to [defense expert] Dr. Russell’s testimony, the expert testimony that\\n was raised here. And, I mean, I think one of the problems with the expert\\n testimony, it’s clear, as I’ve gone back and looked at that, is that it provides kind\\n of this narrow bit of information, but not a real complete set of information as it\\n relates to the alleged fraud that took place in this particular case. And I think it’s\\n very appropriate for guideline purposes to consider conduct that’s much broader\\n than simply the counts of conviction, for example, for, you know, presigned\\n prescriptions, you know.\\n\\nR. 508 (Sentencing Tr. at 15–16) (Page ID #10055–56). Then, the court gave a lengthy\\nexplanation of its reasoning for reaching the conclusions on drug and loss amount that it did. Id.\\nat 25–29 (Page ID #10065–68).\\n\\n The defendants’ assertion that the district court’s explanation was “very brief” or\\notherwise insufficient simply does not accord with reality. Therefore, this argument fails.\\n\\f Nos. 17-6167/6239/6240/ United States v. Chaney et al. Page 34\\n 6314/6315/6351\\n\\n Finally, the defendants argue that the district court erred in calculating the loss amount.\\nThis argument is a rehash of the previous argument. The error of which the defendants complain\\nis the district court’s decision not to adopt the findings of their expert. Again, the district court\\nsufficiently explained its decision regarding drug and loss amount, and specifically why it did\\nnot adopt the defense expert’s methodology.\\n\\n The defendants claim that the district court committed procedural error, but it is clear\\nupon examination that their true complaint is the district court’s decision to reject their expert’s\\nmethodology. Because the district court committed no procedural error during sentencing, this\\nclaim fails.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment regarding\\neach defendant.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1665,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443964,"string":"8,443,964"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Debra REDLIN v. GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Redlin v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-1641"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Clay, Pearson, Stranch\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415398/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"CLAY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"PEARSON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRANCH"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443964/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Debra REDLIN v. GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Debra REDLIN v. GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1666,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443965,"string":"8,443,965"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Earl CROSBY v. TWITTER, INC. Google, LLC Facebook, Inc."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Crosby v. Twitter, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-1426"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gibbons, Merritt, Nalbandian\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415399/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GIBBONS"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MERRITT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"NALBANDIAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443965/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Earl CROSBY v. TWITTER, INC. Google, LLC Facebook, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Earl CROSBY v. TWITTER, INC. Google, LLC Facebook, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1667,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4610920,"string":"4,610,920"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"LEXINGTON H-L SERVICES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Lexington H-L Servs., Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-17"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-5851"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Clay, Gibbons, Cook\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0074p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n LEXINGTON H-L SERVICES, INC., ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-5851\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, │\\n Defendant-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.\\n No. 5:17-cv-00154—Karen K. Caldwell, Chief District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 17, 2019\\n\\n Before: CLAY, GIBBONS, and COOK, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Jeff Nobles, SMITH NOBLES, Houston, Texas, for Appellant. Keith Moorman,\\nFROST BROWN TODD LLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n ORDER\\n _________________\\n\\n This matter was previously before the Court. See Lexington H-L Servs., Inc. v.\\nLexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 879 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Jan. 30, 2018).\\nIn our previous opinion and order, dated January 9, 2018, we reversed the district court’s order\\ngranting a preliminary injunction that had enjoined Defendant Lexington-Fayette Urban County\\nGovernment (the “City”) from enforcing Ordinance 25-2017, which restricts the delivery of\\n“unsolicited written materials” to six enumerated locations and provides for civil penalties for\\n\\f No. 18-5851 Lexington H-L Servs., Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urb Cty Gov’t Page 2\\n\\n\\nviolations. We vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further\\nproceedings consistent with our opinion. Id. at 236.\\n\\n Upon remand, further proceedings were taken in the district court, in connection with\\nwhich both parties expressed their view that a trial proceeding was not necessary or warranted.\\nThe district court thereafter entertained cross motions for summary judgment. On July 19, 2018,\\nthe district court filed a well-reasoned opinion and order finding that Ordinance 25-2017\\nconstitutes a valid time, place, and manner regulation of speech. (See ECF No. 62.)\\nAccordingly, the district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, denied the\\nmotion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff, and entered judgment for the City. (See id.)\\nThe district court’s July 19, 2018 opinion and order closely follows the legal analysis and\\nreasoning set out in this Court’s opinion of January 9, 2018. Plaintiff has timely appealed.\\n\\n Plaintiff’s appeal has been referred to a panel of the Court that, upon examination,\\nunanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). We have\\nreviewed the record below, including the district court’s July 19, 2018 opinion and order, and\\nconclude that the district court properly addressed, analyzed, and disposed of the issues. We\\ntherefore AFFIRM the July 19, 2018 order of the district court.\\n\\n IT IS SO ORDERED.\\n\\n ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n __________________________________\\n Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4388173/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"CLAY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GIBBONS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"COOK"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610920/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: LEXINGTON H-L SERVICES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-17\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0074p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n LEXINGTON H-L SERVICES, INC., ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\n │\n > No. 18-5851\n v. │\n │\n │\n LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, │\n Defendant-Appellee. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.\n No. 5:17-cv-00154—Karen K. Caldwell, Chief District Judge.\n\n Decided and Filed: April 17, 2019\n\n Before: CLAY, GIBBONS, and COOK, Circuit Judges.\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nON BRIEF: Jeff Nobles, SMITH NOBLES, Houston, Texas, for Appellant. Keith Moorman,\nFROST BROWN TODD LLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.\n _________________\n\n ORDER\n _________________\n\n This matter was previously before the Court. See Lexington H-L Servs., Inc. v.\nLexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 879 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Jan. 30, 2018).\nIn our previous opinion and order, dated January 9, 2018, we reversed the district court’s order\ngranting a preliminary injunction that had enjoined Defendant Lexington-Fayette Urban County\nGovernment (the “City”) from enforcing Ordinance 25-2017, which restricts the delivery of\n“unsolicited written materials” to six enumerated locations and provides for civil penalties for\n\f No. 18-5851 Lexington H-L Servs., Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urb Cty Gov’t Page 2\n\n\nviolations. We vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further\nproceedings consistent with our opinion. Id. at 236.\n\n Upon remand, further proceedings were taken in the district court, in connection with\nwhich both parties expressed their view that a trial proceeding was not necessary or warranted.\nThe district court thereafter entertained cross motions for summary judgment. On July 19, 2018,\nthe district court filed a well-reasoned opinion and order finding that Ordinance 25-2017\nconstitutes a valid time, place, and manner regulation of speech. (See ECF No. 62.)\nAccordingly, the district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, denied the\nmotion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff, and entered judgment for the City. (See id.)\nThe district court’s July 19, 2018 opinion and order closely follows the legal analysis and\nreasoning set out in this Court’s opinion of January 9, 2018. Plaintiff has timely appealed.\n\n Plaintiff’s appeal has been referred to a panel of the Court that, upon examination,\nunanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). We have\nreviewed the record below, including the district court’s July 19, 2018 opinion and order, and\nconclude that the district court properly addressed, analyzed, and disposed of the issues. We\ntherefore AFFIRM the July 19, 2018 order of the district court.\n\n IT IS SO ORDERED.\n\n ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT\n\n\n\n\n __________________________________\n Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: LEXINGTON H-L SERVICES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-17\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0074p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n LEXINGTON H-L SERVICES, INC., ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-5851\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, │\\n Defendant-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.\\n No. 5:17-cv-00154—Karen K. Caldwell, Chief District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 17, 2019\\n\\n Before: CLAY, GIBBONS, and COOK, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: Jeff Nobles, SMITH NOBLES, Houston, Texas, for Appellant. Keith Moorman,\\nFROST BROWN TODD LLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n ORDER\\n _________________\\n\\n This matter was previously before the Court. See Lexington H-L Servs., Inc. v.\\nLexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 879 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Jan. 30, 2018).\\nIn our previous opinion and order, dated January 9, 2018, we reversed the district court’s order\\ngranting a preliminary injunction that had enjoined Defendant Lexington-Fayette Urban County\\nGovernment (the “City”) from enforcing Ordinance 25-2017, which restricts the delivery of\\n“unsolicited written materials” to six enumerated locations and provides for civil penalties for\\n\\f No. 18-5851 Lexington H-L Servs., Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urb Cty Gov’t Page 2\\n\\n\\nviolations. We vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further\\nproceedings consistent with our opinion. Id. at 236.\\n\\n Upon remand, further proceedings were taken in the district court, in connection with\\nwhich both parties expressed their view that a trial proceeding was not necessary or warranted.\\nThe district court thereafter entertained cross motions for summary judgment. On July 19, 2018,\\nthe district court filed a well-reasoned opinion and order finding that Ordinance 25-2017\\nconstitutes a valid time, place, and manner regulation of speech. (See ECF No. 62.)\\nAccordingly, the district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, denied the\\nmotion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff, and entered judgment for the City. (See id.)\\nThe district court’s July 19, 2018 opinion and order closely follows the legal analysis and\\nreasoning set out in this Court’s opinion of January 9, 2018. Plaintiff has timely appealed.\\n\\n Plaintiff’s appeal has been referred to a panel of the Court that, upon examination,\\nunanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). We have\\nreviewed the record below, including the district court’s July 19, 2018 opinion and order, and\\nconclude that the district court properly addressed, analyzed, and disposed of the issues. We\\ntherefore AFFIRM the July 19, 2018 order of the district court.\\n\\n IT IS SO ORDERED.\\n\\n ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n __________________________________\\n Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1668,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4611254,"string":"4,611,254"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jeffery Havis"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-5772"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; MOORE, CLAY, GIBBONS, SUTTON, GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, WHITE, STRANCH, DONALD, THAPAR, BUSH, LARSEN, NALBANDIAN, READLER and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0075p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-5772\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n JEFFERY HAVIS, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Tennessee of Chattanooga.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00121-1—Travis R. McDonough, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 18, 2019\\n\\n BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; MOORE, CLAY, GIBBONS, SUTTON, GRIFFIN,\\n KETHLEDGE, WHITE, STRANCH, DONALD, THAPAR, BUSH, LARSEN,\\n NALBANDIAN, READLER and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n ORDER\\n _________________\\n\\n A majority of the Judges of this Court in regular active service has voted for rehearing en\\nbanc of this case. Sixth Circuit Rule 35(b) provides as follows:\\n\\n The effect of the granting of a hearing en banc shall be to vacate the previous\\n opinion and judgment of this court, to stay the mandate and to restore the case on\\n the docket sheet as a pending appeal.\\n\\n Accordingly, it is ORDERED, that the previous decision and judgment of this court are\\nvacated, the mandate is stayed and this case is restored to the docket as a pending appeal.\\n\\f No. 17-5772 United States v. Havis Page 2\\n\\n\\n Briefing and scheduling of this case for oral argument will follow as the Clerk may\\ndirect.\\n\\n ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4388507/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MOORE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"CLAY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":"GIBBONS; SUTTON; GRIFFIN; KETHLEDGE; WHITE; STRANCH; DONALD; THAPAR; BUSH; LARSEN; NALBANDIAN; READLER; MURPHY"},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"COLE\": \", Chief\", \"MOORE\": \", Circuit\", \"CLAY\": \", Circuit\", \"GIBBONS\": \", Circuit\", \"SUTTON\": \", Circuit\", \"GRIFFIN\": \", Circuit\", \"KETHLEDGE\": \", Circuit\", \"WHITE\": \", Circuit\", \"STRANCH\": \", Circuit\", \"DONALD\": \", Circuit\", \"THAPAR\": \", Circuit\", \"BUSH\": \", Circuit\", \"LARSEN\": \", Circuit\", \"NALBANDIAN\": \", Circuit\", \"READLER\": \", Circuit\", \"MURPHY\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611254/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Jeffery Havis\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0075p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n > No. 17-5772\n v. │\n │\n │\n JEFFERY HAVIS, │\n Defendant-Appellant. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Tennessee of Chattanooga.\n No. 1:16-cr-00121-1—Travis R. McDonough, District Judge.\n\n Decided and Filed: April 18, 2019\n\n BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; MOORE, CLAY, GIBBONS, SUTTON, GRIFFIN,\n KETHLEDGE, WHITE, STRANCH, DONALD, THAPAR, BUSH, LARSEN,\n NALBANDIAN, READLER and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n ORDER\n _________________\n\n A majority of the Judges of this Court in regular active service has voted for rehearing en\nbanc of this case. Sixth Circuit Rule 35(b) provides as follows:\n\n The effect of the granting of a hearing en banc shall be to vacate the previous\n opinion and judgment of this court, to stay the mandate and to restore the case on\n the docket sheet as a pending appeal.\n\n Accordingly, it is ORDERED, that the previous decision and judgment of this court are\nvacated, the mandate is stayed and this case is restored to the docket as a pending appeal.\n\f No. 17-5772 United States v. Havis Page 2\n\n\n Briefing and scheduling of this case for oral argument will follow as the Clerk may\ndirect.\n\n ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT\n\n\n\n\n Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Jeffery Havis\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0075p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-5772\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n JEFFERY HAVIS, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Tennessee of Chattanooga.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00121-1—Travis R. McDonough, District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 18, 2019\\n\\n BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; MOORE, CLAY, GIBBONS, SUTTON, GRIFFIN,\\n KETHLEDGE, WHITE, STRANCH, DONALD, THAPAR, BUSH, LARSEN,\\n NALBANDIAN, READLER and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n ORDER\\n _________________\\n\\n A majority of the Judges of this Court in regular active service has voted for rehearing en\\nbanc of this case. Sixth Circuit Rule 35(b) provides as follows:\\n\\n The effect of the granting of a hearing en banc shall be to vacate the previous\\n opinion and judgment of this court, to stay the mandate and to restore the case on\\n the docket sheet as a pending appeal.\\n\\n Accordingly, it is ORDERED, that the previous decision and judgment of this court are\\nvacated, the mandate is stayed and this case is restored to the docket as a pending appeal.\\n\\f No. 17-5772 United States v. Havis Page 2\\n\\n\\n Briefing and scheduling of this case for oral argument will follow as the Clerk may\\ndirect.\\n\\n ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1669,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443966,"string":"8,443,966"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jeffery HAVIS"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Havis"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 17-5772"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415400/\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443966/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Jeffery HAVIS\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Jeffery HAVIS\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1670,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4612123,"string":"4,612,123"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Alison Patricia TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SAGINAW; Tabitha Hoskins, Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Alison Taylor v. City of Saginaw"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2126"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Keith, Kethledge, Donald\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0076p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n ALISON PATRICIA TAYLOR, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-2126\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n CITY OF SAGINAW; TABITHA HOSKINS, │\\n Defendants-Appellees. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City.\\n No. 1:17-cv-11067—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: October 2, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 22, 2019\\n\\n Before: KEITH, KETHLEDGE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Philip L. Ellison, OUTSIDE LEGAL COUNSEL PLC, Hemlock, Michigan, for\\nAppellant. Brett Meyer, O’NEILL, WALLACE & DOYLE, P.C., Saginaw, Michigan, for\\nAppellees. ON BRIEF: Philip L. Ellison, OUTSIDE LEGAL COUNSEL PLC, Hemlock,\\nMichigan, for Appellant. Brett Meyer, O’NEILL, WALLACE & DOYLE, P.C., Saginaw,\\nMichigan, for Appellees.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. The City of Saginaw (the “City”) uses a\\ncommon parking enforcement practice known as “chalking,” whereby City parking enforcement\\nofficers use chalk to mark the tires of parked vehicles to track how long they have been parked.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\nParking enforcement officers return to the car after the posted time for parking has passed, and if\\nthe chalk marks are still there—a sign that the vehicle has not moved—the officer issues a\\ncitation. Alison Taylor, a frequent recipient of parking tickets, sued the City and its parking\\nenforcement officer Tabitha Hoskins, alleging that chalking violated her Fourth Amendment\\nright to be free from unreasonable search. The City moved to dismiss the action. The district\\ncourt granted the City’s motion, finding that, while chalking may have constituted a search under\\nthe Fourth Amendment, the search was reasonable. Because we chalk this practice up to a\\nregulatory exercise, rather than a community-caretaking function, we REVERSE.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n BACKGROUND\\n\\n Between 2014 and 2017, Tabitha Hoskins chalked Taylor’s tires on fifteen separate\\noccasions and issued her citations in kind. Each citation included the date and time the chalk\\nwas placed on her vehicle’s tires. The cost of a citation starts at $15 and increases from there.\\n\\n On April 5, 2017, Taylor filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City, alleging\\ndefendants violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches by placing chalk\\nmarks on her tires without her consent or a valid search warrant. Taylor also sued Hoskins in her\\nindividual capacity. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n12(b)(6), asserting that chalking was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,\\nor alternatively, if it was a search, it was reasonable under the community caretaker exception.1\\nHoskins also asserted a qualified immunity defense.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1The City also argued that the search fell within the administrative search exception. However, the City\\ndoes not raise this on appeal. Therefore, we do not address it here.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\n The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the City\\nengaged in a search as defined by the Fourth Amendment by placing chalk marks on Taylor’s\\ntires to gather evidence of a parking violation. The district court, however, agreed with the\\ndefendants that the search was reasonable because: (1) there is a lesser expectation of privacy in\\nautomobiles; and (2) the search was subject to the community caretaker exception to the warrant\\nrequirement.2 Taylor timely appeals.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n ANALYSIS\\n\\nA. Standard of Review\\n\\n “We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to\\nstate a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab.\\nLitig., 756 F.3d 917, 926 (6th Cir. 2014). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must\\ncontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\\nface.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). “A claim has\\nfacial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the\\nreasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation\\nomitted). On a motion to dismiss, “[w]e must construe the complaint in the light most favorable\\nto the plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th\\nCir. 2012). “The defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff has failed to state a\\n[plausible] claim for relief.” DirectTV, Inc., v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing\\nCarver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454–55 (6th Cir. 1991)).\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,\\nhouses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.\\n“The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of [the Supreme]\\nCourt, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by\\ngovernmental officials.” Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528\\n\\n 2Because the district court found that the search did not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation, it did\\nnot address Hoskins’ qualified immunity defense.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\n(1967). The Fourth Amendment “gives concrete expression to a right of the people which ‘is\\nbasic to a free society.’” Id. (quoting Wolf v. People of State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27\\n(1949)).\\n\\n To determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, we ask two primary\\nquestions: first, whether the alleged government conduct constitutes a search within the meaning\\nof the Fourth Amendment; and second, whether the search was reasonable. We address each in\\nturn.\\n\\nB. Search\\n\\n The answer to the first question is yes, chalking is a search for Fourth Amendment\\npurposes. The Supreme Court has articulated two distinct approaches to determine when\\nconduct by a governmental agent constitutes a search. Under the most prevalent and widely-\\nused search analysis articulated in Katz. v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), a search occurs\\nwhen a government official invades an area in which “a person has a constitutionally protected\\nreasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). Under Katz, a search is\\nanalyzed in two parts: “first that a person exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy\\nand, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”\\nId. at 361. A “physical intrusion” is not necessary for a search to occur under Katz. See id. at\\n360.\\n\\n In recent years, however, the Supreme Court revisited the seldom used “property-based”\\napproach to the Fourth Amendment search inquiry in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400\\n(2012). Under Jones, when governmental invasions are accompanied by physical intrusions, a\\nsearch occurs when the government: (1) trespasses upon a constitutionally protected area, (2) to\\nobtain information. Id. at 404–405.\\n\\n In Jones, the government surreptitiously attached a GPS device to a car to track the car’s\\nmovements. Id. at 403. The Supreme Court held that the government’s trespass upon an\\neffect—the vehicle—to obtain information related to the car’s movement was a search. Id. at\\n404–405. Jones echoed the understanding that the “[t]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy\\ntest has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Id. at 409.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\n(emphasis in original). For our purposes, Jones provides the appropriate analytical framework\\nfor determining whether chalking constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n In accordance with Jones, the threshold question is whether chalking constitutes\\ncommon-law trespass upon a constitutionally protected area. Though Jones does not provide\\nclear boundaries for the meaning of common-law trespass, the Restatement offers some\\nassistance. As defined by the Restatement, common-law trespass is “an act which brings [about]\\nintended physical contact with a chattel in the possession of another.” Restatement (Second) of\\nTorts § 217 cmt. e (1965). Moreover, “[a]n actor may . . . commit a trespass by so acting upon a\\nchattel as intentionally to cause it to come in contact with some other object.” Id. Adopting this\\ndefinition, there has been a trespass in this case because the City made intentional physical\\ncontact with Taylor’s vehicle. As the district court properly found, this physical intrusion,\\nregardless of how slight, constitutes common-law trespass. This is so, even though “no damage\\n[is done] at all.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817\\n(C.P. 1765)).\\n\\n Our search analysis under Jones does not end there. Rather, once we determine the\\ngovernment has trespassed upon a constitutionally protected area, we must then determine\\nwhether the trespass was “conjoined with . . . an attempt to find something or to obtain\\ninformation.” Id. at 408 n.5. Here, it was. Neither party disputes that the City uses the chalk\\nmarks for the purpose of identifying vehicles that have been parked in the same location for a\\ncertain period of time. That information is then used by the City to issue citations. As the\\ndistrict court aptly noted, “[d]espite the low-tech nature of the investigative technique . . . , the\\nchalk marks clearly provided information to Hoskins.”3 This practice amounts to an attempt to\\nobtain information under Jones.4\\n\\n\\n 3For the first time on appeal, the City latches on to the district court’s passing implication that chalking is\\nso widespread and long-standing, that society may have granted it an implied license. Therefore, the City contends,\\nchalking is not a trespass, and thus not a search. As support, the City relies on Florida v. Jardines. 569 U.S. 1, 8\\n(2013), where the Supreme Court held that when the government engages in activity that is expected from ordinary\\ncitizens, an implied license might exist for the activity. But Jardines does little to further the City’s argument.\\nJardines does not broadly proposition that every “widespread” trespass by the government constitutes an implied\\nlicense. Rather, only when a government trespass is “no more than any private citizen might do” (i.e. to approach a\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\n Having answered the first question under our Fourth Amendment analysis, we now turn\\nto whether the search was reasonable.\\n\\nC. Reasonableness\\n\\n Taylor argues that the search was unreasonable because the City fails to establish an\\nexception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, Taylor argues that the search at issue is not\\ncovered by the community caretaker exception and that the City fails to establish that any other\\nexception applies to their warrantless search. The City responds that, even if chalking is a search\\nunder Jones, the search was reasonable because there is a reduced expectation of privacy in an\\nautomobile. The City further contends that the search was subject to the community caretaker\\nexception. We disagree with the City.\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches, “but only those that are\\nunreasonable.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). “[W]e must\\nbegin with the basic rule that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior\\napproval by [a] judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—\\nsubject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” United States v.\\nHockenberry, 730 F.3d 645, 658 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). The government\\nbears the burden of demonstrating an exception to the warrant requirement. United States v.\\nJeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).\\n\\n The district court found that the City’s warrantless search of Taylor’s vehicle was\\nreasonable because there is a lesser expectation of privacy with automobiles. We disagree.\\nThough an automobile enjoys a “reduced expectation[] of privacy” due to its “ready mobility,”\\n\\n\\nperson’s home and knock on the front door), might a license be implied. Id. On this record, the City fails to\\nestablish a common practice among private citizens to place chalk marks on other individual’s tires—much less to\\nobtain evidence of wrongdoing—that would amount to the type of “customary invitation” described in Jardines. Id.\\nat 9.\\n 4Employing a similar Jones analysis, the district court in Schmidt v. Stassi, 250 F.Supp.3d 99, 101 (E.D.\\nLa. 2017), found that an officer’s collection of DNA from the defendant’s car door while it was parked at a shopping\\nmall was a search under the Fourth Amendment. The court made clear that it was not the collection of Schmidt’s\\nDNA that made it a search, rather, it was that the DNA swab “involved the physical touching” of Schmidt’s vehicle\\nto obtain information. Id. at 103–04. The fact that it occurred in a public parking lot and “did not damage the\\n[vehicle] in any way,” was not significant to the search inquiry. Id. The same is true here.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nCalifornia v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985), we explained that this diminished expectation of\\nprivacy is what justified the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Autoworld\\nSpecialty Cars, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1987). The automobile\\nexception permits officers to search a vehicle without a warrant if they have “probable cause to\\nbelieve that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 647\\n(6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). No such probable cause existed here. Thus, the automobile\\nexception is inapplicable.\\n\\n Undeterred, the City relies on the Supreme Court’s pre-Jones decision in Cardwell v.\\nLewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974), to justify its warrantless search based solely on a vehicle’s\\nreduced expectation of privacy. In Cardwell, after the police secured a warrant for Lewis’ arrest\\nand arrested him, the police towed his car to a police impoundment lot, where a warrantless\\nsearch of the outside of his car revealed paint scrapings tying Lewis’ car to the fender of the\\nvictim’s car. Id. at 587, 588. Lewis was later tried and convicted of murder. Id. at 585. As the\\nCity’s argument goes, if scraping paint from a car without a warrant was held reasonable in\\nCardwell, then certainly placing washable chalk on a vehicle’s tire is reasonable.\\n\\n Crucial distinctions in Cardwell deflate the City’s argument. First, the vehicle in\\nCardwell was towed by the police following Lewis’ arrest. Id. at 587. Second, and most\\nimportant, the warrantless search in Cardwell was upheld on the basis that it was conducted upon\\n“probable cause,” id. at 589—an, “established” exception to the warrant requirement, Carney,\\n471 U.S. at 392—not simply the vehicle’s reduced expectation of privacy. Here, unlike\\nCardwell, the City commences its search on vehicles that are parked legally, without probable\\ncause or even so much as “individualized suspicion of wrongdoing”—the touchstone of the\\nreasonableness standard. See Relford v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 390 F.3d 452, 458\\n(6th Cir. 2004) (“[A] search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of\\nwrongdoing.”). Thus, we reject the City’s contention that searching Taylor’s vehicle was\\nreasonable based solely on its reduced expectation of privacy.\\n\\n Next, the City attempts to seek refuge in the community caretaker exception. This\\nexception applies “whe[n] . . . government actors [are] performing ‘community-caretaker’\\nfunctions rather than traditional law-enforcement functions.” Ziegler v. Aukerman, 512 F.3d\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\n777, 785 (6th Cir. 2008). Unlike other exceptions, it requires that we “look at the function\\nperformed by a [government agent]” when a search occurs. Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546,\\n554 (4th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). To apply, this function must be “totally divorced\\nfrom the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal\\nstatute.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).\\n\\n This exception has its genesis in the Supreme Court’s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski.\\nThere, the defendant’s vehicle was disabled as a result of an accident and left on the side of the\\nroad following his arrest for drunk-driving. Id. at 443. Pursuant to “standard procedure,” police\\nofficers conducted a search of the defendant’s vehicle to retrieve a revolver reasonably suspected\\nof being in the trunk. Id. The Court found the search was reasonable, as it was “to protect the\\npublic from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands.”\\nId.\\n\\n We explained that “the community caretaker exception does not provide the government\\nwith refuge from the warrant requirement except when delay is reasonably likely to result in\\ninjury or ongoing harm to the community at large.” United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279,\\n289 (6th Cir. 2009). Courts have applied the community caretaker exception in narrow instances\\nwhen public safety is at risk. See e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)\\n(applying the community caretaker exception to a warrantless inventory search of a vehicle after\\nit was impounded for violating parking ordinances, which had jeopardized the public safety and\\nthe efficient movement of vehicular traffic); see also United States v. Sanchez, 612 F.3d 1, 7 (1st\\nCir. 2010) (upholding the community caretaker exception to a warrantless vehicle impoundment,\\nwhen officers were acting “not as investigators but as community caretakers, responsible for\\nprotecting public safety and preventing hazards by removing vehicles that impede traffic, risk\\nvandalism, or create inconvenience.”) (Lynch, J., concurring).\\n\\n The City fails to carry its burden of establishing that the community caretaker exception\\napplies in this instance. First, on these facts, the City fails to demonstrate how this search bears a\\nrelation to public safety. The City does not show that the location or length of time that Taylor’s\\nvehicle was parked created the type of “hazard” or traffic impediment amounting to a public\\nsafety concern. Nor does the City demonstrate that delaying a search would result in “injury or\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\nongoing harm to the community.” Washington, 573 F.3d at 289. To the contrary, at the time of\\nthe search, Taylor’s vehicle was lawfully parked in a proper parking location, imposing no safety\\nrisk whatsoever. Because the purpose of chalking is to raise revenue, and not to mitigate public\\nhazard, the City was not acting in its “role as [a] community caretake[.]” Id. at 287.\\n\\n The cases the City cites in support of its position that it is engaging in a community\\ncaretaking are distinguishable. First, the City relies on United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506,\\n1509 (6th Cir. 1996), where we applied the community caretaker exception to an officer’s\\nwarrantless entry of a home after neighbors complained of excessively loud music and the\\ndefendant could not hear the officer’s constant knocks at the door. There, we recognized that\\n“strict adherence to the warrant requirement would subject the community to a continuing and\\nnoxious disturbance for an extended period of time.” Id. at 1522. No similar ongoing public\\ndisturbance exists here to justify a warrantless search.\\n\\n The City also relies on two First Circuit cases, United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 239\\n(1st Cir. 2006) and United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991), that\\nare likewise distinguishable (and not controlling). In Coccia, the First Circuit upheld the\\nwarrantless search of a vehicle based in part on the officer’s belief that the vehicle “might\\ncontain items constituting a threat to public safety, such as explosive material, chemicals or\\nbiological agents.” Coccia, 446 F.3d at 240. Similarly, in Rodriguez-Morales, following the\\ndefendant’s arrest, the officer impounded his vehicle. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 785.\\nApplying the community caretaker exception, the court explained that leaving the vehicle on the\\nshoulder of the highway “not only . . . posed a safety threat, but also would have been easy prey\\nfor vandals.” Id. at 786. Again, the common ingredient in both Coccia and Rodriguez-Morales,\\nbut not present here, is the threat to “public safety.”5\\n\\n The City points to the importance of “maintaining efficient, orderly parking.” While the\\nCity is entitled to maintain efficient, orderly parking, the manner in which it chooses to do so is\\n\\n\\n 5Placing emphasis on the phrase “criminal statute” in Cady, the City advances the argument that, because\\nthe search here was conducted to obtain evidence relating to the violation of a “civil statute,” it cannot be barred\\nfrom invoking the community caretaker exception. However, because we hold that the community caretaker\\nexception fails in other regards, we need not reach this issue.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\nnot without constitutional limitation. As the Supreme Court explains, “the [Fourth] Amendment\\ndoes not place an unduly oppressive weight on [the government] but merely . . . an orderly\\nprocedure. . . .” Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted).\\n\\n The City does not demonstrate, in law or logic, that the need to deter drivers from\\nexceeding the time permitted for parking—before they have even done so—is sufficient to\\njustify a warrantless search under the community caretaker rationale. This is not to say that this\\nexception can never apply to the warrantless search of a lawfully parked vehicle. Nor does our\\nholding suggest that no other exceptions to the warrant requirement might apply in this case.\\nHowever, on these facts and on the arguments the City proffers, the City fails to meet its burden\\nin establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the reasons above, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting the City’s\\nmotion to dismiss and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4389376/\", \"author_raw\": \"BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KEITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KETHLEDGE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DONALD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612123/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Alison Patricia TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SAGINAW; Tabitha Hoskins, Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0076p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n ALISON PATRICIA TAYLOR, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\n │\n > No. 17-2126\n v. │\n │\n │\n CITY OF SAGINAW; TABITHA HOSKINS, │\n Defendants-Appellees. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City.\n No. 1:17-cv-11067—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge.\n\n Argued: October 2, 2018\n\n Decided and Filed: April 22, 2019\n\n Before: KEITH, KETHLEDGE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: Philip L. Ellison, OUTSIDE LEGAL COUNSEL PLC, Hemlock, Michigan, for\nAppellant. Brett Meyer, O’NEILL, WALLACE & DOYLE, P.C., Saginaw, Michigan, for\nAppellees. ON BRIEF: Philip L. Ellison, OUTSIDE LEGAL COUNSEL PLC, Hemlock,\nMichigan, for Appellant. Brett Meyer, O’NEILL, WALLACE & DOYLE, P.C., Saginaw,\nMichigan, for Appellees.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. The City of Saginaw (the “City”) uses a\ncommon parking enforcement practice known as “chalking,” whereby City parking enforcement\nofficers use chalk to mark the tires of parked vehicles to track how long they have been parked.\n\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 2\n\n\nParking enforcement officers return to the car after the posted time for parking has passed, and if\nthe chalk marks are still there—a sign that the vehicle has not moved—the officer issues a\ncitation. Alison Taylor, a frequent recipient of parking tickets, sued the City and its parking\nenforcement officer Tabitha Hoskins, alleging that chalking violated her Fourth Amendment\nright to be free from unreasonable search. The City moved to dismiss the action. The district\ncourt granted the City’s motion, finding that, while chalking may have constituted a search under\nthe Fourth Amendment, the search was reasonable. Because we chalk this practice up to a\nregulatory exercise, rather than a community-caretaking function, we REVERSE.\n\n I.\n\n BACKGROUND\n\n Between 2014 and 2017, Tabitha Hoskins chalked Taylor’s tires on fifteen separate\noccasions and issued her citations in kind. Each citation included the date and time the chalk\nwas placed on her vehicle’s tires. The cost of a citation starts at $15 and increases from there.\n\n On April 5, 2017, Taylor filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City, alleging\ndefendants violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches by placing chalk\nmarks on her tires without her consent or a valid search warrant. Taylor also sued Hoskins in her\nindividual capacity. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.\n12(b)(6), asserting that chalking was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,\nor alternatively, if it was a search, it was reasonable under the community caretaker exception.1\nHoskins also asserted a qualified immunity defense.\n\n\n\n\n 1The City also argued that the search fell within the administrative search exception. However, the City\ndoes not raise this on appeal. Therefore, we do not address it here.\n\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 3\n\n\n The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the City\nengaged in a search as defined by the Fourth Amendment by placing chalk marks on Taylor’s\ntires to gather evidence of a parking violation. The district court, however, agreed with the\ndefendants that the search was reasonable because: (1) there is a lesser expectation of privacy in\nautomobiles; and (2) the search was subject to the community caretaker exception to the warrant\nrequirement.2 Taylor timely appeals.\n\n II.\n\n ANALYSIS\n\nA. Standard of Review\n\n “We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to\nstate a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab.\nLitig., 756 F.3d 917, 926 (6th Cir. 2014). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must\ncontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\nface.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). “A claim has\nfacial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the\nreasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation\nomitted). On a motion to dismiss, “[w]e must construe the complaint in the light most favorable\nto the plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th\nCir. 2012). “The defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff has failed to state a\n[plausible] claim for relief.” DirectTV, Inc., v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing\nCarver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454–55 (6th Cir. 1991)).\n\n The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,\nhouses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.\n“The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of [the Supreme]\nCourt, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by\ngovernmental officials.” Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528\n\n 2Because the district court found that the search did not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation, it did\nnot address Hoskins’ qualified immunity defense.\n\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 4\n\n\n(1967). The Fourth Amendment “gives concrete expression to a right of the people which ‘is\nbasic to a free society.’” Id. (quoting Wolf v. People of State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27\n(1949)).\n\n To determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, we ask two primary\nquestions: first, whether the alleged government conduct constitutes a search within the meaning\nof the Fourth Amendment; and second, whether the search was reasonable. We address each in\nturn.\n\nB. Search\n\n The answer to the first question is yes, chalking is a search for Fourth Amendment\npurposes. The Supreme Court has articulated two distinct approaches to determine when\nconduct by a governmental agent constitutes a search. Under the most prevalent and widely-\nused search analysis articulated in Katz. v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), a search occurs\nwhen a government official invades an area in which “a person has a constitutionally protected\nreasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). Under Katz, a search is\nanalyzed in two parts: “first that a person exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy\nand, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”\nId. at 361. A “physical intrusion” is not necessary for a search to occur under Katz. See id. at\n360.\n\n In recent years, however, the Supreme Court revisited the seldom used “property-based”\napproach to the Fourth Amendment search inquiry in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400\n(2012). Under Jones, when governmental invasions are accompanied by physical intrusions, a\nsearch occurs when the government: (1) trespasses upon a constitutionally protected area, (2) to\nobtain information. Id. at 404–405.\n\n In Jones, the government surreptitiously attached a GPS device to a car to track the car’s\nmovements. Id. at 403. The Supreme Court held that the government’s trespass upon an\neffect—the vehicle—to obtain information related to the car’s movement was a search. Id. at\n404–405. Jones echoed the understanding that the “[t]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy\ntest has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Id. at 409.\n\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 5\n\n\n(emphasis in original). For our purposes, Jones provides the appropriate analytical framework\nfor determining whether chalking constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth\nAmendment.\n\n In accordance with Jones, the threshold question is whether chalking constitutes\ncommon-law trespass upon a constitutionally protected area. Though Jones does not provide\nclear boundaries for the meaning of common-law trespass, the Restatement offers some\nassistance. As defined by the Restatement, common-law trespass is “an act which brings [about]\nintended physical contact with a chattel in the possession of another.” Restatement (Second) of\nTorts § 217 cmt. e (1965). Moreover, “[a]n actor may . . . commit a trespass by so acting upon a\nchattel as intentionally to cause it to come in contact with some other object.” Id. Adopting this\ndefinition, there has been a trespass in this case because the City made intentional physical\ncontact with Taylor’s vehicle. As the district court properly found, this physical intrusion,\nregardless of how slight, constitutes common-law trespass. This is so, even though “no damage\n[is done] at all.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817\n(C.P. 1765)).\n\n Our search analysis under Jones does not end there. Rather, once we determine the\ngovernment has trespassed upon a constitutionally protected area, we must then determine\nwhether the trespass was “conjoined with . . . an attempt to find something or to obtain\ninformation.” Id. at 408 n.5. Here, it was. Neither party disputes that the City uses the chalk\nmarks for the purpose of identifying vehicles that have been parked in the same location for a\ncertain period of time. That information is then used by the City to issue citations. As the\ndistrict court aptly noted, “[d]espite the low-tech nature of the investigative technique . . . , the\nchalk marks clearly provided information to Hoskins.”3 This practice amounts to an attempt to\nobtain information under Jones.4\n\n\n 3For the first time on appeal, the City latches on to the district court’s passing implication that chalking is\nso widespread and long-standing, that society may have granted it an implied license. Therefore, the City contends,\nchalking is not a trespass, and thus not a search. As support, the City relies on Florida v. Jardines. 569 U.S. 1, 8\n(2013), where the Supreme Court held that when the government engages in activity that is expected from ordinary\ncitizens, an implied license might exist for the activity. But Jardines does little to further the City’s argument.\nJardines does not broadly proposition that every “widespread” trespass by the government constitutes an implied\nlicense. Rather, only when a government trespass is “no more than any private citizen might do” (i.e. to approach a\n\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 6\n\n\n Having answered the first question under our Fourth Amendment analysis, we now turn\nto whether the search was reasonable.\n\nC. Reasonableness\n\n Taylor argues that the search was unreasonable because the City fails to establish an\nexception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, Taylor argues that the search at issue is not\ncovered by the community caretaker exception and that the City fails to establish that any other\nexception applies to their warrantless search. The City responds that, even if chalking is a search\nunder Jones, the search was reasonable because there is a reduced expectation of privacy in an\nautomobile. The City further contends that the search was subject to the community caretaker\nexception. We disagree with the City.\n\n The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches, “but only those that are\nunreasonable.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). “[W]e must\nbegin with the basic rule that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior\napproval by [a] judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—\nsubject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” United States v.\nHockenberry, 730 F.3d 645, 658 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). The government\nbears the burden of demonstrating an exception to the warrant requirement. United States v.\nJeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).\n\n The district court found that the City’s warrantless search of Taylor’s vehicle was\nreasonable because there is a lesser expectation of privacy with automobiles. We disagree.\nThough an automobile enjoys a “reduced expectation[] of privacy” due to its “ready mobility,”\n\n\nperson’s home and knock on the front door), might a license be implied. Id. On this record, the City fails to\nestablish a common practice among private citizens to place chalk marks on other individual’s tires—much less to\nobtain evidence of wrongdoing—that would amount to the type of “customary invitation” described in Jardines. Id.\nat 9.\n 4Employing a similar Jones analysis, the district court in Schmidt v. Stassi, 250 F.Supp.3d 99, 101 (E.D.\nLa. 2017), found that an officer’s collection of DNA from the defendant’s car door while it was parked at a shopping\nmall was a search under the Fourth Amendment. The court made clear that it was not the collection of Schmidt’s\nDNA that made it a search, rather, it was that the DNA swab “involved the physical touching” of Schmidt’s vehicle\nto obtain information. Id. at 103–04. The fact that it occurred in a public parking lot and “did not damage the\n[vehicle] in any way,” was not significant to the search inquiry. Id. The same is true here.\n\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 7\n\n\nCalifornia v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985), we explained that this diminished expectation of\nprivacy is what justified the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Autoworld\nSpecialty Cars, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1987). The automobile\nexception permits officers to search a vehicle without a warrant if they have “probable cause to\nbelieve that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 647\n(6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). No such probable cause existed here. Thus, the automobile\nexception is inapplicable.\n\n Undeterred, the City relies on the Supreme Court’s pre-Jones decision in Cardwell v.\nLewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974), to justify its warrantless search based solely on a vehicle’s\nreduced expectation of privacy. In Cardwell, after the police secured a warrant for Lewis’ arrest\nand arrested him, the police towed his car to a police impoundment lot, where a warrantless\nsearch of the outside of his car revealed paint scrapings tying Lewis’ car to the fender of the\nvictim’s car. Id. at 587, 588. Lewis was later tried and convicted of murder. Id. at 585. As the\nCity’s argument goes, if scraping paint from a car without a warrant was held reasonable in\nCardwell, then certainly placing washable chalk on a vehicle’s tire is reasonable.\n\n Crucial distinctions in Cardwell deflate the City’s argument. First, the vehicle in\nCardwell was towed by the police following Lewis’ arrest. Id. at 587. Second, and most\nimportant, the warrantless search in Cardwell was upheld on the basis that it was conducted upon\n“probable cause,” id. at 589—an, “established” exception to the warrant requirement, Carney,\n471 U.S. at 392—not simply the vehicle’s reduced expectation of privacy. Here, unlike\nCardwell, the City commences its search on vehicles that are parked legally, without probable\ncause or even so much as “individualized suspicion of wrongdoing”—the touchstone of the\nreasonableness standard. See Relford v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 390 F.3d 452, 458\n(6th Cir. 2004) (“[A] search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of\nwrongdoing.”). Thus, we reject the City’s contention that searching Taylor’s vehicle was\nreasonable based solely on its reduced expectation of privacy.\n\n Next, the City attempts to seek refuge in the community caretaker exception. This\nexception applies “whe[n] . . . government actors [are] performing ‘community-caretaker’\nfunctions rather than traditional law-enforcement functions.” Ziegler v. Aukerman, 512 F.3d\n\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 8\n\n\n777, 785 (6th Cir. 2008). Unlike other exceptions, it requires that we “look at the function\nperformed by a [government agent]” when a search occurs. Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546,\n554 (4th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). To apply, this function must be “totally divorced\nfrom the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal\nstatute.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).\n\n This exception has its genesis in the Supreme Court’s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski.\nThere, the defendant’s vehicle was disabled as a result of an accident and left on the side of the\nroad following his arrest for drunk-driving. Id. at 443. Pursuant to “standard procedure,” police\nofficers conducted a search of the defendant’s vehicle to retrieve a revolver reasonably suspected\nof being in the trunk. Id. The Court found the search was reasonable, as it was “to protect the\npublic from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands.”\nId.\n\n We explained that “the community caretaker exception does not provide the government\nwith refuge from the warrant requirement except when delay is reasonably likely to result in\ninjury or ongoing harm to the community at large.” United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279,\n289 (6th Cir. 2009). Courts have applied the community caretaker exception in narrow instances\nwhen public safety is at risk. See e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)\n(applying the community caretaker exception to a warrantless inventory search of a vehicle after\nit was impounded for violating parking ordinances, which had jeopardized the public safety and\nthe efficient movement of vehicular traffic); see also United States v. Sanchez, 612 F.3d 1, 7 (1st\nCir. 2010) (upholding the community caretaker exception to a warrantless vehicle impoundment,\nwhen officers were acting “not as investigators but as community caretakers, responsible for\nprotecting public safety and preventing hazards by removing vehicles that impede traffic, risk\nvandalism, or create inconvenience.”) (Lynch, J., concurring).\n\n The City fails to carry its burden of establishing that the community caretaker exception\napplies in this instance. First, on these facts, the City fails to demonstrate how this search bears a\nrelation to public safety. The City does not show that the location or length of time that Taylor’s\nvehicle was parked created the type of “hazard” or traffic impediment amounting to a public\nsafety concern. Nor does the City demonstrate that delaying a search would result in “injury or\n\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 9\n\n\nongoing harm to the community.” Washington, 573 F.3d at 289. To the contrary, at the time of\nthe search, Taylor’s vehicle was lawfully parked in a proper parking location, imposing no safety\nrisk whatsoever. Because the purpose of chalking is to raise revenue, and not to mitigate public\nhazard, the City was not acting in its “role as [a] community caretake[.]” Id. at 287.\n\n The cases the City cites in support of its position that it is engaging in a community\ncaretaking are distinguishable. First, the City relies on United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506,\n1509 (6th Cir. 1996), where we applied the community caretaker exception to an officer’s\nwarrantless entry of a home after neighbors complained of excessively loud music and the\ndefendant could not hear the officer’s constant knocks at the door. There, we recognized that\n“strict adherence to the warrant requirement would subject the community to a continuing and\nnoxious disturbance for an extended period of time.” Id. at 1522. No similar ongoing public\ndisturbance exists here to justify a warrantless search.\n\n The City also relies on two First Circuit cases, United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 239\n(1st Cir. 2006) and United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991), that\nare likewise distinguishable (and not controlling). In Coccia, the First Circuit upheld the\nwarrantless search of a vehicle based in part on the officer’s belief that the vehicle “might\ncontain items constituting a threat to public safety, such as explosive material, chemicals or\nbiological agents.” Coccia, 446 F.3d at 240. Similarly, in Rodriguez-Morales, following the\ndefendant’s arrest, the officer impounded his vehicle. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 785.\nApplying the community caretaker exception, the court explained that leaving the vehicle on the\nshoulder of the highway “not only . . . posed a safety threat, but also would have been easy prey\nfor vandals.” Id. at 786. Again, the common ingredient in both Coccia and Rodriguez-Morales,\nbut not present here, is the threat to “public safety.”5\n\n The City points to the importance of “maintaining efficient, orderly parking.” While the\nCity is entitled to maintain efficient, orderly parking, the manner in which it chooses to do so is\n\n\n 5Placing emphasis on the phrase “criminal statute” in Cady, the City advances the argument that, because\nthe search here was conducted to obtain evidence relating to the violation of a “civil statute,” it cannot be barred\nfrom invoking the community caretaker exception. However, because we hold that the community caretaker\nexception fails in other regards, we need not reach this issue.\n\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 10\n\n\nnot without constitutional limitation. As the Supreme Court explains, “the [Fourth] Amendment\ndoes not place an unduly oppressive weight on [the government] but merely . . . an orderly\nprocedure. . . .” Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted).\n\n The City does not demonstrate, in law or logic, that the need to deter drivers from\nexceeding the time permitted for parking—before they have even done so—is sufficient to\njustify a warrantless search under the community caretaker rationale. This is not to say that this\nexception can never apply to the warrantless search of a lawfully parked vehicle. Nor does our\nholding suggest that no other exceptions to the warrant requirement might apply in this case.\nHowever, on these facts and on the arguments the City proffers, the City fails to meet its burden\nin establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.\n\n III.\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n For the reasons above, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting the City’s\nmotion to dismiss and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Alison Patricia TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SAGINAW; Tabitha Hoskins, Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0076p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n ALISON PATRICIA TAYLOR, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-2126\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n CITY OF SAGINAW; TABITHA HOSKINS, │\\n Defendants-Appellees. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City.\\n No. 1:17-cv-11067—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: October 2, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 22, 2019\\n\\n Before: KEITH, KETHLEDGE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Philip L. Ellison, OUTSIDE LEGAL COUNSEL PLC, Hemlock, Michigan, for\\nAppellant. Brett Meyer, O’NEILL, WALLACE & DOYLE, P.C., Saginaw, Michigan, for\\nAppellees. ON BRIEF: Philip L. Ellison, OUTSIDE LEGAL COUNSEL PLC, Hemlock,\\nMichigan, for Appellant. Brett Meyer, O’NEILL, WALLACE & DOYLE, P.C., Saginaw,\\nMichigan, for Appellees.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. The City of Saginaw (the “City”) uses a\\ncommon parking enforcement practice known as “chalking,” whereby City parking enforcement\\nofficers use chalk to mark the tires of parked vehicles to track how long they have been parked.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\nParking enforcement officers return to the car after the posted time for parking has passed, and if\\nthe chalk marks are still there—a sign that the vehicle has not moved—the officer issues a\\ncitation. Alison Taylor, a frequent recipient of parking tickets, sued the City and its parking\\nenforcement officer Tabitha Hoskins, alleging that chalking violated her Fourth Amendment\\nright to be free from unreasonable search. The City moved to dismiss the action. The district\\ncourt granted the City’s motion, finding that, while chalking may have constituted a search under\\nthe Fourth Amendment, the search was reasonable. Because we chalk this practice up to a\\nregulatory exercise, rather than a community-caretaking function, we REVERSE.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n BACKGROUND\\n\\n Between 2014 and 2017, Tabitha Hoskins chalked Taylor’s tires on fifteen separate\\noccasions and issued her citations in kind. Each citation included the date and time the chalk\\nwas placed on her vehicle’s tires. The cost of a citation starts at $15 and increases from there.\\n\\n On April 5, 2017, Taylor filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City, alleging\\ndefendants violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches by placing chalk\\nmarks on her tires without her consent or a valid search warrant. Taylor also sued Hoskins in her\\nindividual capacity. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n12(b)(6), asserting that chalking was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,\\nor alternatively, if it was a search, it was reasonable under the community caretaker exception.1\\nHoskins also asserted a qualified immunity defense.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1The City also argued that the search fell within the administrative search exception. However, the City\\ndoes not raise this on appeal. Therefore, we do not address it here.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\n The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the City\\nengaged in a search as defined by the Fourth Amendment by placing chalk marks on Taylor’s\\ntires to gather evidence of a parking violation. The district court, however, agreed with the\\ndefendants that the search was reasonable because: (1) there is a lesser expectation of privacy in\\nautomobiles; and (2) the search was subject to the community caretaker exception to the warrant\\nrequirement.2 Taylor timely appeals.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n ANALYSIS\\n\\nA. Standard of Review\\n\\n “We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to\\nstate a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab.\\nLitig., 756 F.3d 917, 926 (6th Cir. 2014). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must\\ncontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\\nface.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). “A claim has\\nfacial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the\\nreasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation\\nomitted). On a motion to dismiss, “[w]e must construe the complaint in the light most favorable\\nto the plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th\\nCir. 2012). “The defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff has failed to state a\\n[plausible] claim for relief.” DirectTV, Inc., v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing\\nCarver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454–55 (6th Cir. 1991)).\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,\\nhouses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.\\n“The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of [the Supreme]\\nCourt, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by\\ngovernmental officials.” Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528\\n\\n 2Because the district court found that the search did not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation, it did\\nnot address Hoskins’ qualified immunity defense.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\n(1967). The Fourth Amendment “gives concrete expression to a right of the people which ‘is\\nbasic to a free society.’” Id. (quoting Wolf v. People of State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27\\n(1949)).\\n\\n To determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, we ask two primary\\nquestions: first, whether the alleged government conduct constitutes a search within the meaning\\nof the Fourth Amendment; and second, whether the search was reasonable. We address each in\\nturn.\\n\\nB. Search\\n\\n The answer to the first question is yes, chalking is a search for Fourth Amendment\\npurposes. The Supreme Court has articulated two distinct approaches to determine when\\nconduct by a governmental agent constitutes a search. Under the most prevalent and widely-\\nused search analysis articulated in Katz. v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), a search occurs\\nwhen a government official invades an area in which “a person has a constitutionally protected\\nreasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). Under Katz, a search is\\nanalyzed in two parts: “first that a person exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy\\nand, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”\\nId. at 361. A “physical intrusion” is not necessary for a search to occur under Katz. See id. at\\n360.\\n\\n In recent years, however, the Supreme Court revisited the seldom used “property-based”\\napproach to the Fourth Amendment search inquiry in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400\\n(2012). Under Jones, when governmental invasions are accompanied by physical intrusions, a\\nsearch occurs when the government: (1) trespasses upon a constitutionally protected area, (2) to\\nobtain information. Id. at 404–405.\\n\\n In Jones, the government surreptitiously attached a GPS device to a car to track the car’s\\nmovements. Id. at 403. The Supreme Court held that the government’s trespass upon an\\neffect—the vehicle—to obtain information related to the car’s movement was a search. Id. at\\n404–405. Jones echoed the understanding that the “[t]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy\\ntest has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Id. at 409.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\n(emphasis in original). For our purposes, Jones provides the appropriate analytical framework\\nfor determining whether chalking constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n In accordance with Jones, the threshold question is whether chalking constitutes\\ncommon-law trespass upon a constitutionally protected area. Though Jones does not provide\\nclear boundaries for the meaning of common-law trespass, the Restatement offers some\\nassistance. As defined by the Restatement, common-law trespass is “an act which brings [about]\\nintended physical contact with a chattel in the possession of another.” Restatement (Second) of\\nTorts § 217 cmt. e (1965). Moreover, “[a]n actor may . . . commit a trespass by so acting upon a\\nchattel as intentionally to cause it to come in contact with some other object.” Id. Adopting this\\ndefinition, there has been a trespass in this case because the City made intentional physical\\ncontact with Taylor’s vehicle. As the district court properly found, this physical intrusion,\\nregardless of how slight, constitutes common-law trespass. This is so, even though “no damage\\n[is done] at all.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817\\n(C.P. 1765)).\\n\\n Our search analysis under Jones does not end there. Rather, once we determine the\\ngovernment has trespassed upon a constitutionally protected area, we must then determine\\nwhether the trespass was “conjoined with . . . an attempt to find something or to obtain\\ninformation.” Id. at 408 n.5. Here, it was. Neither party disputes that the City uses the chalk\\nmarks for the purpose of identifying vehicles that have been parked in the same location for a\\ncertain period of time. That information is then used by the City to issue citations. As the\\ndistrict court aptly noted, “[d]espite the low-tech nature of the investigative technique . . . , the\\nchalk marks clearly provided information to Hoskins.”3 This practice amounts to an attempt to\\nobtain information under Jones.4\\n\\n\\n 3For the first time on appeal, the City latches on to the district court’s passing implication that chalking is\\nso widespread and long-standing, that society may have granted it an implied license. Therefore, the City contends,\\nchalking is not a trespass, and thus not a search. As support, the City relies on Florida v. Jardines. 569 U.S. 1, 8\\n(2013), where the Supreme Court held that when the government engages in activity that is expected from ordinary\\ncitizens, an implied license might exist for the activity. But Jardines does little to further the City’s argument.\\nJardines does not broadly proposition that every “widespread” trespass by the government constitutes an implied\\nlicense. Rather, only when a government trespass is “no more than any private citizen might do” (i.e. to approach a\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\n Having answered the first question under our Fourth Amendment analysis, we now turn\\nto whether the search was reasonable.\\n\\nC. Reasonableness\\n\\n Taylor argues that the search was unreasonable because the City fails to establish an\\nexception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, Taylor argues that the search at issue is not\\ncovered by the community caretaker exception and that the City fails to establish that any other\\nexception applies to their warrantless search. The City responds that, even if chalking is a search\\nunder Jones, the search was reasonable because there is a reduced expectation of privacy in an\\nautomobile. The City further contends that the search was subject to the community caretaker\\nexception. We disagree with the City.\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches, “but only those that are\\nunreasonable.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). “[W]e must\\nbegin with the basic rule that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior\\napproval by [a] judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—\\nsubject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” United States v.\\nHockenberry, 730 F.3d 645, 658 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). The government\\nbears the burden of demonstrating an exception to the warrant requirement. United States v.\\nJeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).\\n\\n The district court found that the City’s warrantless search of Taylor’s vehicle was\\nreasonable because there is a lesser expectation of privacy with automobiles. We disagree.\\nThough an automobile enjoys a “reduced expectation[] of privacy” due to its “ready mobility,”\\n\\n\\nperson’s home and knock on the front door), might a license be implied. Id. On this record, the City fails to\\nestablish a common practice among private citizens to place chalk marks on other individual’s tires—much less to\\nobtain evidence of wrongdoing—that would amount to the type of “customary invitation” described in Jardines. Id.\\nat 9.\\n 4Employing a similar Jones analysis, the district court in Schmidt v. Stassi, 250 F.Supp.3d 99, 101 (E.D.\\nLa. 2017), found that an officer’s collection of DNA from the defendant’s car door while it was parked at a shopping\\nmall was a search under the Fourth Amendment. The court made clear that it was not the collection of Schmidt’s\\nDNA that made it a search, rather, it was that the DNA swab “involved the physical touching” of Schmidt’s vehicle\\nto obtain information. Id. at 103–04. The fact that it occurred in a public parking lot and “did not damage the\\n[vehicle] in any way,” was not significant to the search inquiry. Id. The same is true here.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nCalifornia v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985), we explained that this diminished expectation of\\nprivacy is what justified the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Autoworld\\nSpecialty Cars, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1987). The automobile\\nexception permits officers to search a vehicle without a warrant if they have “probable cause to\\nbelieve that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 647\\n(6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). No such probable cause existed here. Thus, the automobile\\nexception is inapplicable.\\n\\n Undeterred, the City relies on the Supreme Court’s pre-Jones decision in Cardwell v.\\nLewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974), to justify its warrantless search based solely on a vehicle’s\\nreduced expectation of privacy. In Cardwell, after the police secured a warrant for Lewis’ arrest\\nand arrested him, the police towed his car to a police impoundment lot, where a warrantless\\nsearch of the outside of his car revealed paint scrapings tying Lewis’ car to the fender of the\\nvictim’s car. Id. at 587, 588. Lewis was later tried and convicted of murder. Id. at 585. As the\\nCity’s argument goes, if scraping paint from a car without a warrant was held reasonable in\\nCardwell, then certainly placing washable chalk on a vehicle’s tire is reasonable.\\n\\n Crucial distinctions in Cardwell deflate the City’s argument. First, the vehicle in\\nCardwell was towed by the police following Lewis’ arrest. Id. at 587. Second, and most\\nimportant, the warrantless search in Cardwell was upheld on the basis that it was conducted upon\\n“probable cause,” id. at 589—an, “established” exception to the warrant requirement, Carney,\\n471 U.S. at 392—not simply the vehicle’s reduced expectation of privacy. Here, unlike\\nCardwell, the City commences its search on vehicles that are parked legally, without probable\\ncause or even so much as “individualized suspicion of wrongdoing”—the touchstone of the\\nreasonableness standard. See Relford v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 390 F.3d 452, 458\\n(6th Cir. 2004) (“[A] search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of\\nwrongdoing.”). Thus, we reject the City’s contention that searching Taylor’s vehicle was\\nreasonable based solely on its reduced expectation of privacy.\\n\\n Next, the City attempts to seek refuge in the community caretaker exception. This\\nexception applies “whe[n] . . . government actors [are] performing ‘community-caretaker’\\nfunctions rather than traditional law-enforcement functions.” Ziegler v. Aukerman, 512 F.3d\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\n777, 785 (6th Cir. 2008). Unlike other exceptions, it requires that we “look at the function\\nperformed by a [government agent]” when a search occurs. Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546,\\n554 (4th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). To apply, this function must be “totally divorced\\nfrom the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal\\nstatute.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).\\n\\n This exception has its genesis in the Supreme Court’s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski.\\nThere, the defendant’s vehicle was disabled as a result of an accident and left on the side of the\\nroad following his arrest for drunk-driving. Id. at 443. Pursuant to “standard procedure,” police\\nofficers conducted a search of the defendant’s vehicle to retrieve a revolver reasonably suspected\\nof being in the trunk. Id. The Court found the search was reasonable, as it was “to protect the\\npublic from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands.”\\nId.\\n\\n We explained that “the community caretaker exception does not provide the government\\nwith refuge from the warrant requirement except when delay is reasonably likely to result in\\ninjury or ongoing harm to the community at large.” United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279,\\n289 (6th Cir. 2009). Courts have applied the community caretaker exception in narrow instances\\nwhen public safety is at risk. See e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)\\n(applying the community caretaker exception to a warrantless inventory search of a vehicle after\\nit was impounded for violating parking ordinances, which had jeopardized the public safety and\\nthe efficient movement of vehicular traffic); see also United States v. Sanchez, 612 F.3d 1, 7 (1st\\nCir. 2010) (upholding the community caretaker exception to a warrantless vehicle impoundment,\\nwhen officers were acting “not as investigators but as community caretakers, responsible for\\nprotecting public safety and preventing hazards by removing vehicles that impede traffic, risk\\nvandalism, or create inconvenience.”) (Lynch, J., concurring).\\n\\n The City fails to carry its burden of establishing that the community caretaker exception\\napplies in this instance. First, on these facts, the City fails to demonstrate how this search bears a\\nrelation to public safety. The City does not show that the location or length of time that Taylor’s\\nvehicle was parked created the type of “hazard” or traffic impediment amounting to a public\\nsafety concern. Nor does the City demonstrate that delaying a search would result in “injury or\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\nongoing harm to the community.” Washington, 573 F.3d at 289. To the contrary, at the time of\\nthe search, Taylor’s vehicle was lawfully parked in a proper parking location, imposing no safety\\nrisk whatsoever. Because the purpose of chalking is to raise revenue, and not to mitigate public\\nhazard, the City was not acting in its “role as [a] community caretake[.]” Id. at 287.\\n\\n The cases the City cites in support of its position that it is engaging in a community\\ncaretaking are distinguishable. First, the City relies on United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506,\\n1509 (6th Cir. 1996), where we applied the community caretaker exception to an officer’s\\nwarrantless entry of a home after neighbors complained of excessively loud music and the\\ndefendant could not hear the officer’s constant knocks at the door. There, we recognized that\\n“strict adherence to the warrant requirement would subject the community to a continuing and\\nnoxious disturbance for an extended period of time.” Id. at 1522. No similar ongoing public\\ndisturbance exists here to justify a warrantless search.\\n\\n The City also relies on two First Circuit cases, United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 239\\n(1st Cir. 2006) and United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991), that\\nare likewise distinguishable (and not controlling). In Coccia, the First Circuit upheld the\\nwarrantless search of a vehicle based in part on the officer’s belief that the vehicle “might\\ncontain items constituting a threat to public safety, such as explosive material, chemicals or\\nbiological agents.” Coccia, 446 F.3d at 240. Similarly, in Rodriguez-Morales, following the\\ndefendant’s arrest, the officer impounded his vehicle. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 785.\\nApplying the community caretaker exception, the court explained that leaving the vehicle on the\\nshoulder of the highway “not only . . . posed a safety threat, but also would have been easy prey\\nfor vandals.” Id. at 786. Again, the common ingredient in both Coccia and Rodriguez-Morales,\\nbut not present here, is the threat to “public safety.”5\\n\\n The City points to the importance of “maintaining efficient, orderly parking.” While the\\nCity is entitled to maintain efficient, orderly parking, the manner in which it chooses to do so is\\n\\n\\n 5Placing emphasis on the phrase “criminal statute” in Cady, the City advances the argument that, because\\nthe search here was conducted to obtain evidence relating to the violation of a “civil statute,” it cannot be barred\\nfrom invoking the community caretaker exception. However, because we hold that the community caretaker\\nexception fails in other regards, we need not reach this issue.\\n\\f No. 17-2126 Taylor v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\nnot without constitutional limitation. As the Supreme Court explains, “the [Fourth] Amendment\\ndoes not place an unduly oppressive weight on [the government] but merely . . . an orderly\\nprocedure. . . .” Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted).\\n\\n The City does not demonstrate, in law or logic, that the need to deter drivers from\\nexceeding the time permitted for parking—before they have even done so—is sufficient to\\njustify a warrantless search under the community caretaker rationale. This is not to say that this\\nexception can never apply to the warrantless search of a lawfully parked vehicle. Nor does our\\nholding suggest that no other exceptions to the warrant requirement might apply in this case.\\nHowever, on these facts and on the arguments the City proffers, the City fails to meet its burden\\nin establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the reasons above, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting the City’s\\nmotion to dismiss and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1671,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4613618,"string":"4,613,618"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Henry ICKES, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Charles Ickes"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-5708"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Clay, Gilman, Kethledge\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0077p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-5708\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n CHARLES HENRY ICKES, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Kentucky at Bowling Green.\\n No. 1:15-cr-00004-2—Greg N. Stivers, Chief District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 25, 2019\\n\\n Before: CLAY, GILMAN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: David Goin, HARRISON & GOIN LAW FIRM, Scottsville, Kentucky, for\\nAppellant. Monica Wheatley, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Louisville,\\nKentucky, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Charles Henry Ickes was convicted by a jury\\nof multiple drug crimes, including a conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to\\ndistribute the drug. He challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence\\nand the court’s refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we\\nAFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 2\\n\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n A United States Postal Inspector had probable cause to believe that a package being\\nshipped from California to Kentucky contained drugs. The inspector obtained a search warrant\\nfor the package and examined its contents. After discovering that the package contained\\napproximately 1.5 pounds of crystal methamphetamine, the Postal Inspector and other\\nlaw-enforcement agencies conducted a controlled delivery of the package and arrested the\\nrecipient. The recipient then agreed to serve as a confidential informant, identified Ickes as the\\nsource of the methamphetamine, and provided additional evidence that correlated with Ickes’s\\naddress in California. With this information, federal law-enforcement officers obtained a\\nwarrant to arrest Ickes.\\n\\n Because of a prior drug-related conviction, Ickes was subject to state-court-ordered\\nprobation. His probation conditions included the following provision:\\n\\n Defendant shall submit to search and seizure of his/her person, place of residence\\n or area under his/her control, or vehicle, by any probation officer or peace officer,\\n during the day or night, with or without his/her consent, with or without a search\\n warrant, and without regard to probable cause.\\n\\nLaw-enforcement officers arrested Ickes when he arrived at a scheduled appointment with his\\nprobation officer. Later that day, the officers and Ickes’s probation officer conducted a\\nwarrantless search of Ickes’s residence and vehicle. They obtained evidence, including United\\nStates Postal Service labels and tracking information, that was used against Ickes at trial.\\n\\n Ickes moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his residence and vehicle, arguing\\nthat the search was unconstitutional. The district court denied Ickes’s motion without an\\nevidentiary hearing. Ickes was then convicted by a jury, after which the court sentenced him to\\n280 months of imprisonment. In this appeal, Ickes argues that (1) the court should have\\nsuppressed the evidence obtained from the search, and (2) the court should have held an\\nevidentiary hearing regarding his motion to suppress.\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 3\\n\\n\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n\\nA. Standard of review\\n\\n 1. Motion to suppress evidence\\n\\n When a defendant appeals the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the\\ndistrict court’s findings of fact under the clear-error standard and we review its conclusions of\\nlaw de novo. United States v. Quinney, 583 F.3d 891, 893 (6th Cir. 2009). All evidence is\\nreviewed in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472,\\n479 (6th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n 2. Evidentiary hearing\\n\\n We review a district court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to\\nsuppress under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Schreiber, 866 F.3d 776, 782\\n(7th Cir. 2017). “An evidentiary hearing is required only if the motion is sufficiently definite,\\nspecific, detailed, and non-conjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of\\nfact going to the validity of the search are in question.” United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554,\\n577 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a defendant is not\\nentitled to an evidentiary hearing if his argument is “entirely legal in nature.” Id.\\n\\nB. Motion to suppress evidence\\n\\n Ickes claims that law-enforcement officers conducted an illegal search of his residence\\nand vehicle. First, he claims that the “stalking horse” caveat prevents law-enforcement officers\\nfrom evading the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement by bringing a state probation officer\\nto the search. Second, Ickes argues that his arrest terminated the probation officer’s right to\\nsearch his residence and vehicle.\\n\\n 1. The “stalking horse” caveat\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.\\nU.S. Const. amend. IV. And “[a] probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the\\nFourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be ‘reasonable.’” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 4\\n\\n\\n868, 873 (1987). But the usual Fourth Amendment analysis is different for individuals subject to\\nprobation. United States v. Herndon, 501 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2007). Two Supreme Court\\ncases, Griffin and United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), delineate the scope of a\\nprobationer’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.\\n\\n In Griffin, a probation officer conducted a warrantless search of the probationer’s home\\nbased on the “reasonable grounds” that the probationer possessed contraband. Griffin, 483 U.S.\\nat 870–71. The Supreme Court upheld the search, concluding that the supervision of\\nprobationers constituted a “special need” that justified a comparatively greater intrusion on\\nindividual privacy. Id. at 875. After Griffin, some courts concluded that this “special needs”\\nexception did not permit a probation officer to act as a “stalking horse” to help the police evade\\nthe Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293,\\n296 (6th Cir. 1994). They concluded that probation officers could cooperate with police to\\nachieve joint objectives, but probation officers could not use their authority to eliminate the\\nwarrant requirement for police investigations. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894,\\n897 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (per\\ncuriam).\\n\\n The Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Knights that the police can search a\\nprobationer’s residence when the probationer is subject to a search provision and the police have\\na reasonable suspicion that the probationer is engaging in illegal activity. Knights, 534 U.S. at\\n121. In Knights, the individual’s probation order contained a search provision that allowed\\nlaw-enforcement officers to search his “person, property, place of residence, vehicle, or personal\\neffects” in the absence of a search warrant, arrest warrant, or reasonable cause. Id. at 114. The\\nCourt held that the search was reasonable under the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 118.\\nBut it did not invoke the “special needs” exception discussed in Griffin. Rather, the Court\\nexplained that the probationer had a reduced expectation of privacy and that the government had\\na strong interest in monitoring probationers. Id. at 121. Because the police had a reasonable\\nsuspicion that the probationer was engaging in illegal activity and the probationer was subject to\\na search provision, the search was deemed constitutional. Id.\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 5\\n\\n\\n Several courts have suggested that Knights eliminated the “stalking horse” caveat to the\\n“special needs” exception. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir.\\n2005); United States v. Brown, 346 F.3d 808, 810–12 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Stokes,\\n292 F.3d 964, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2002). Other courts have rejected the “stalking horse” caveat on\\ndifferent grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 463–65 (2d Cir. 2002)\\n(concluding that probation officers were not acting as “stalking horses” for unrelated\\nlaw-enforcement investigations because “the objectives and duties of probation officers and law\\nenforcement personnel are unavoidably parallel and are frequently intertwined”). And this court,\\nciting Knights, has concluded that a police officer’s warrantless search of a probationer’s\\ncomputer and external hard drive was constitutional because the probationer was subject to a\\nsearch provision and the search was supported by reasonable suspicion that the probationer had\\nviolated a condition of his probation. Herndon, 501 F.3d at 688–92. In addition, this court held\\nin United States v. Sweeney, 891 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 2018), that the “stalking horse” caveat does\\nnot apply when a parolee is subject to a search provision and the search is reasonable under the\\ntotality of the circumstances. Id. at 237. We note, however, that “parolees have fewer\\nexpectations of privacy than probationers” and the Fourth Amendment analysis is not the same\\nfor these two groups. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006); see also United\\nStates v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n All this being said, we conclude that the “stalking horse” caveat, if it survives Knights at\\nall, does not apply when a probationer is subject to a valid search provision and law-enforcement\\nofficers have a reasonable suspicion that the probationer is engaging in illegal activity. In this\\ncase, Ickes was subject to state-ordered probation that included a search provision and the\\nlaw-enforcement officers had a reasonable suspicion that Ickes was conspiring to distribute\\nmethamphetamine. For the duration of Ickes’s probation, he had diminished privacy interests\\nand the government had a comparatively substantial interest in monitoring Ickes’s activities, so\\nthe police needed no more than a reasonable suspicion to search his residence and vehicle. See\\nKnights, 534 U.S. at 119–21; Herndon, 501 F.3d at 691.\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 6\\n\\n\\n 2. Post-arrest searches\\n\\n This brings us to Ickes’s second argument—that federal officials cannot conduct a\\nwarrantless search of a probationer’s residence and vehicle after the probationer has been\\narrested. But he cites no authority (and we have found none) that supports his argument. In the\\nanalogous situation of a search provision in a parole agreement, several of our sister circuits have\\nconcluded that an arrest does not immediately terminate the right of law-enforcement officers to\\nconduct a warrantless search. See e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238, 1242–44 (10th\\nCir. 2005) (holding that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting a\\nwarrantless post-arrest search of the parolee’s residence on the same day as his arrest); United\\nStates v. Jones, 152 F.3d 680, 685–86 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e do not believe that the State’s\\nspecial supervisory need is diminished when a parolee is in its custody, or that the parolee enjoys\\na heightened expectation of privacy in his home due to his custodial status.”); United States v.\\nHill, 967 F.2d 902, 910 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding that a warrantless search of a parolee’s\\nbusiness one day after his arrest and incarceration did not violate the Fourth Amendment).\\n\\n On this issue, we see no reason to distinguish between a parolee and a probationer. The\\ngovernment maintains an interest in supervising both and in protecting society from illegal\\nactivity. This court, moreover, has previously upheld a probation officer’s post-arrest search of a\\nprobationer’s residence in the case of United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 1994), even\\nthough the probationer in that case did not argue that her arrest affected the search’s\\nconstitutionality. Id. at 296. We now expressly conclude that a probationer’s arrest does not\\nimmediately terminate the ability of law-enforcement officers to conduct an otherwise\\nconstitutional search. The law-enforcement officers therefore did not violate Ickes’s\\nconstitutional rights by searching his residence and vehicle after arresting him.\\n\\nC. Evidentiary hearing\\n\\n We finally reach Ickes’s argument that the district court erred by not holding an\\nevidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress. He does not dispute, however, any of the facts\\nrelating to the search. Because Ickes’s argument is “entirely legal in nature,” an evidentiary\\nhearing was unnecessary. See United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 577 (6th Cir. 2006).\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 7\\n\\n\\nAnd, as discussed in the prior sections, clear precedent establishes that the search of Ickes’s\\nresidence and vehicle was legally proper. We therefore find no error in the court’s decision to\\nforgo an evidentiary hearing.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4390871/\", \"author_raw\": \"RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"CLAY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GILMAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KETHLEDGE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613618/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Henry ICKES, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0077p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\n │\n > No. 18-5708\n v. │\n │\n │\n CHARLES HENRY ICKES, │\n Defendant-Appellant. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Kentucky at Bowling Green.\n No. 1:15-cr-00004-2—Greg N. Stivers, Chief District Judge.\n\n Decided and Filed: April 25, 2019\n\n Before: CLAY, GILMAN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nON BRIEF: David Goin, HARRISON & GOIN LAW FIRM, Scottsville, Kentucky, for\nAppellant. Monica Wheatley, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Louisville,\nKentucky, for Appellee.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Charles Henry Ickes was convicted by a jury\nof multiple drug crimes, including a conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to\ndistribute the drug. He challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence\nand the court’s refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we\nAFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\n\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 2\n\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n\n A United States Postal Inspector had probable cause to believe that a package being\nshipped from California to Kentucky contained drugs. The inspector obtained a search warrant\nfor the package and examined its contents. After discovering that the package contained\napproximately 1.5 pounds of crystal methamphetamine, the Postal Inspector and other\nlaw-enforcement agencies conducted a controlled delivery of the package and arrested the\nrecipient. The recipient then agreed to serve as a confidential informant, identified Ickes as the\nsource of the methamphetamine, and provided additional evidence that correlated with Ickes’s\naddress in California. With this information, federal law-enforcement officers obtained a\nwarrant to arrest Ickes.\n\n Because of a prior drug-related conviction, Ickes was subject to state-court-ordered\nprobation. His probation conditions included the following provision:\n\n Defendant shall submit to search and seizure of his/her person, place of residence\n or area under his/her control, or vehicle, by any probation officer or peace officer,\n during the day or night, with or without his/her consent, with or without a search\n warrant, and without regard to probable cause.\n\nLaw-enforcement officers arrested Ickes when he arrived at a scheduled appointment with his\nprobation officer. Later that day, the officers and Ickes’s probation officer conducted a\nwarrantless search of Ickes’s residence and vehicle. They obtained evidence, including United\nStates Postal Service labels and tracking information, that was used against Ickes at trial.\n\n Ickes moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his residence and vehicle, arguing\nthat the search was unconstitutional. The district court denied Ickes’s motion without an\nevidentiary hearing. Ickes was then convicted by a jury, after which the court sentenced him to\n280 months of imprisonment. In this appeal, Ickes argues that (1) the court should have\nsuppressed the evidence obtained from the search, and (2) the court should have held an\nevidentiary hearing regarding his motion to suppress.\n\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 3\n\n\n II. ANALYSIS\n\nA. Standard of review\n\n 1. Motion to suppress evidence\n\n When a defendant appeals the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the\ndistrict court’s findings of fact under the clear-error standard and we review its conclusions of\nlaw de novo. United States v. Quinney, 583 F.3d 891, 893 (6th Cir. 2009). All evidence is\nreviewed in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472,\n479 (6th Cir. 2009).\n\n 2. Evidentiary hearing\n\n We review a district court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to\nsuppress under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Schreiber, 866 F.3d 776, 782\n(7th Cir. 2017). “An evidentiary hearing is required only if the motion is sufficiently definite,\nspecific, detailed, and non-conjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of\nfact going to the validity of the search are in question.” United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554,\n577 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a defendant is not\nentitled to an evidentiary hearing if his argument is “entirely legal in nature.” Id.\n\nB. Motion to suppress evidence\n\n Ickes claims that law-enforcement officers conducted an illegal search of his residence\nand vehicle. First, he claims that the “stalking horse” caveat prevents law-enforcement officers\nfrom evading the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement by bringing a state probation officer\nto the search. Second, Ickes argues that his arrest terminated the probation officer’s right to\nsearch his residence and vehicle.\n\n 1. The “stalking horse” caveat\n\n The Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.\nU.S. Const. amend. IV. And “[a] probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the\nFourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be ‘reasonable.’” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.\n\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 4\n\n\n868, 873 (1987). But the usual Fourth Amendment analysis is different for individuals subject to\nprobation. United States v. Herndon, 501 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2007). Two Supreme Court\ncases, Griffin and United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), delineate the scope of a\nprobationer’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.\n\n In Griffin, a probation officer conducted a warrantless search of the probationer’s home\nbased on the “reasonable grounds” that the probationer possessed contraband. Griffin, 483 U.S.\nat 870–71. The Supreme Court upheld the search, concluding that the supervision of\nprobationers constituted a “special need” that justified a comparatively greater intrusion on\nindividual privacy. Id. at 875. After Griffin, some courts concluded that this “special needs”\nexception did not permit a probation officer to act as a “stalking horse” to help the police evade\nthe Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293,\n296 (6th Cir. 1994). They concluded that probation officers could cooperate with police to\nachieve joint objectives, but probation officers could not use their authority to eliminate the\nwarrant requirement for police investigations. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894,\n897 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (per\ncuriam).\n\n The Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Knights that the police can search a\nprobationer’s residence when the probationer is subject to a search provision and the police have\na reasonable suspicion that the probationer is engaging in illegal activity. Knights, 534 U.S. at\n121. In Knights, the individual’s probation order contained a search provision that allowed\nlaw-enforcement officers to search his “person, property, place of residence, vehicle, or personal\neffects” in the absence of a search warrant, arrest warrant, or reasonable cause. Id. at 114. The\nCourt held that the search was reasonable under the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 118.\nBut it did not invoke the “special needs” exception discussed in Griffin. Rather, the Court\nexplained that the probationer had a reduced expectation of privacy and that the government had\na strong interest in monitoring probationers. Id. at 121. Because the police had a reasonable\nsuspicion that the probationer was engaging in illegal activity and the probationer was subject to\na search provision, the search was deemed constitutional. Id.\n\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 5\n\n\n Several courts have suggested that Knights eliminated the “stalking horse” caveat to the\n“special needs” exception. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir.\n2005); United States v. Brown, 346 F.3d 808, 810–12 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Stokes,\n292 F.3d 964, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2002). Other courts have rejected the “stalking horse” caveat on\ndifferent grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 463–65 (2d Cir. 2002)\n(concluding that probation officers were not acting as “stalking horses” for unrelated\nlaw-enforcement investigations because “the objectives and duties of probation officers and law\nenforcement personnel are unavoidably parallel and are frequently intertwined”). And this court,\nciting Knights, has concluded that a police officer’s warrantless search of a probationer’s\ncomputer and external hard drive was constitutional because the probationer was subject to a\nsearch provision and the search was supported by reasonable suspicion that the probationer had\nviolated a condition of his probation. Herndon, 501 F.3d at 688–92. In addition, this court held\nin United States v. Sweeney, 891 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 2018), that the “stalking horse” caveat does\nnot apply when a parolee is subject to a search provision and the search is reasonable under the\ntotality of the circumstances. Id. at 237. We note, however, that “parolees have fewer\nexpectations of privacy than probationers” and the Fourth Amendment analysis is not the same\nfor these two groups. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006); see also United\nStates v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012).\n\n All this being said, we conclude that the “stalking horse” caveat, if it survives Knights at\nall, does not apply when a probationer is subject to a valid search provision and law-enforcement\nofficers have a reasonable suspicion that the probationer is engaging in illegal activity. In this\ncase, Ickes was subject to state-ordered probation that included a search provision and the\nlaw-enforcement officers had a reasonable suspicion that Ickes was conspiring to distribute\nmethamphetamine. For the duration of Ickes’s probation, he had diminished privacy interests\nand the government had a comparatively substantial interest in monitoring Ickes’s activities, so\nthe police needed no more than a reasonable suspicion to search his residence and vehicle. See\nKnights, 534 U.S. at 119–21; Herndon, 501 F.3d at 691.\n\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 6\n\n\n 2. Post-arrest searches\n\n This brings us to Ickes’s second argument—that federal officials cannot conduct a\nwarrantless search of a probationer’s residence and vehicle after the probationer has been\narrested. But he cites no authority (and we have found none) that supports his argument. In the\nanalogous situation of a search provision in a parole agreement, several of our sister circuits have\nconcluded that an arrest does not immediately terminate the right of law-enforcement officers to\nconduct a warrantless search. See e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238, 1242–44 (10th\nCir. 2005) (holding that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting a\nwarrantless post-arrest search of the parolee’s residence on the same day as his arrest); United\nStates v. Jones, 152 F.3d 680, 685–86 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e do not believe that the State’s\nspecial supervisory need is diminished when a parolee is in its custody, or that the parolee enjoys\na heightened expectation of privacy in his home due to his custodial status.”); United States v.\nHill, 967 F.2d 902, 910 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding that a warrantless search of a parolee’s\nbusiness one day after his arrest and incarceration did not violate the Fourth Amendment).\n\n On this issue, we see no reason to distinguish between a parolee and a probationer. The\ngovernment maintains an interest in supervising both and in protecting society from illegal\nactivity. This court, moreover, has previously upheld a probation officer’s post-arrest search of a\nprobationer’s residence in the case of United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 1994), even\nthough the probationer in that case did not argue that her arrest affected the search’s\nconstitutionality. Id. at 296. We now expressly conclude that a probationer’s arrest does not\nimmediately terminate the ability of law-enforcement officers to conduct an otherwise\nconstitutional search. The law-enforcement officers therefore did not violate Ickes’s\nconstitutional rights by searching his residence and vehicle after arresting him.\n\nC. Evidentiary hearing\n\n We finally reach Ickes’s argument that the district court erred by not holding an\nevidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress. He does not dispute, however, any of the facts\nrelating to the search. Because Ickes’s argument is “entirely legal in nature,” an evidentiary\nhearing was unnecessary. See United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 577 (6th Cir. 2006).\n\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 7\n\n\nAnd, as discussed in the prior sections, clear precedent establishes that the search of Ickes’s\nresidence and vehicle was legally proper. We therefore find no error in the court’s decision to\nforgo an evidentiary hearing.\n\n III. CONCLUSION\n\n For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Henry ICKES, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0077p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, │\\n │\\n > No. 18-5708\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n CHARLES HENRY ICKES, │\\n Defendant-Appellant. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Kentucky at Bowling Green.\\n No. 1:15-cr-00004-2—Greg N. Stivers, Chief District Judge.\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 25, 2019\\n\\n Before: CLAY, GILMAN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nON BRIEF: David Goin, HARRISON & GOIN LAW FIRM, Scottsville, Kentucky, for\\nAppellant. Monica Wheatley, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Louisville,\\nKentucky, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Charles Henry Ickes was convicted by a jury\\nof multiple drug crimes, including a conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to\\ndistribute the drug. He challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence\\nand the court’s refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we\\nAFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 2\\n\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n A United States Postal Inspector had probable cause to believe that a package being\\nshipped from California to Kentucky contained drugs. The inspector obtained a search warrant\\nfor the package and examined its contents. After discovering that the package contained\\napproximately 1.5 pounds of crystal methamphetamine, the Postal Inspector and other\\nlaw-enforcement agencies conducted a controlled delivery of the package and arrested the\\nrecipient. The recipient then agreed to serve as a confidential informant, identified Ickes as the\\nsource of the methamphetamine, and provided additional evidence that correlated with Ickes’s\\naddress in California. With this information, federal law-enforcement officers obtained a\\nwarrant to arrest Ickes.\\n\\n Because of a prior drug-related conviction, Ickes was subject to state-court-ordered\\nprobation. His probation conditions included the following provision:\\n\\n Defendant shall submit to search and seizure of his/her person, place of residence\\n or area under his/her control, or vehicle, by any probation officer or peace officer,\\n during the day or night, with or without his/her consent, with or without a search\\n warrant, and without regard to probable cause.\\n\\nLaw-enforcement officers arrested Ickes when he arrived at a scheduled appointment with his\\nprobation officer. Later that day, the officers and Ickes’s probation officer conducted a\\nwarrantless search of Ickes’s residence and vehicle. They obtained evidence, including United\\nStates Postal Service labels and tracking information, that was used against Ickes at trial.\\n\\n Ickes moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his residence and vehicle, arguing\\nthat the search was unconstitutional. The district court denied Ickes’s motion without an\\nevidentiary hearing. Ickes was then convicted by a jury, after which the court sentenced him to\\n280 months of imprisonment. In this appeal, Ickes argues that (1) the court should have\\nsuppressed the evidence obtained from the search, and (2) the court should have held an\\nevidentiary hearing regarding his motion to suppress.\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 3\\n\\n\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n\\nA. Standard of review\\n\\n 1. Motion to suppress evidence\\n\\n When a defendant appeals the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the\\ndistrict court’s findings of fact under the clear-error standard and we review its conclusions of\\nlaw de novo. United States v. Quinney, 583 F.3d 891, 893 (6th Cir. 2009). All evidence is\\nreviewed in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472,\\n479 (6th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n 2. Evidentiary hearing\\n\\n We review a district court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to\\nsuppress under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Schreiber, 866 F.3d 776, 782\\n(7th Cir. 2017). “An evidentiary hearing is required only if the motion is sufficiently definite,\\nspecific, detailed, and non-conjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of\\nfact going to the validity of the search are in question.” United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554,\\n577 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a defendant is not\\nentitled to an evidentiary hearing if his argument is “entirely legal in nature.” Id.\\n\\nB. Motion to suppress evidence\\n\\n Ickes claims that law-enforcement officers conducted an illegal search of his residence\\nand vehicle. First, he claims that the “stalking horse” caveat prevents law-enforcement officers\\nfrom evading the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement by bringing a state probation officer\\nto the search. Second, Ickes argues that his arrest terminated the probation officer’s right to\\nsearch his residence and vehicle.\\n\\n 1. The “stalking horse” caveat\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.\\nU.S. Const. amend. IV. And “[a] probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the\\nFourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be ‘reasonable.’” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 4\\n\\n\\n868, 873 (1987). But the usual Fourth Amendment analysis is different for individuals subject to\\nprobation. United States v. Herndon, 501 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2007). Two Supreme Court\\ncases, Griffin and United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), delineate the scope of a\\nprobationer’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.\\n\\n In Griffin, a probation officer conducted a warrantless search of the probationer’s home\\nbased on the “reasonable grounds” that the probationer possessed contraband. Griffin, 483 U.S.\\nat 870–71. The Supreme Court upheld the search, concluding that the supervision of\\nprobationers constituted a “special need” that justified a comparatively greater intrusion on\\nindividual privacy. Id. at 875. After Griffin, some courts concluded that this “special needs”\\nexception did not permit a probation officer to act as a “stalking horse” to help the police evade\\nthe Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293,\\n296 (6th Cir. 1994). They concluded that probation officers could cooperate with police to\\nachieve joint objectives, but probation officers could not use their authority to eliminate the\\nwarrant requirement for police investigations. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894,\\n897 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (per\\ncuriam).\\n\\n The Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Knights that the police can search a\\nprobationer’s residence when the probationer is subject to a search provision and the police have\\na reasonable suspicion that the probationer is engaging in illegal activity. Knights, 534 U.S. at\\n121. In Knights, the individual’s probation order contained a search provision that allowed\\nlaw-enforcement officers to search his “person, property, place of residence, vehicle, or personal\\neffects” in the absence of a search warrant, arrest warrant, or reasonable cause. Id. at 114. The\\nCourt held that the search was reasonable under the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 118.\\nBut it did not invoke the “special needs” exception discussed in Griffin. Rather, the Court\\nexplained that the probationer had a reduced expectation of privacy and that the government had\\na strong interest in monitoring probationers. Id. at 121. Because the police had a reasonable\\nsuspicion that the probationer was engaging in illegal activity and the probationer was subject to\\na search provision, the search was deemed constitutional. Id.\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 5\\n\\n\\n Several courts have suggested that Knights eliminated the “stalking horse” caveat to the\\n“special needs” exception. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir.\\n2005); United States v. Brown, 346 F.3d 808, 810–12 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Stokes,\\n292 F.3d 964, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2002). Other courts have rejected the “stalking horse” caveat on\\ndifferent grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 463–65 (2d Cir. 2002)\\n(concluding that probation officers were not acting as “stalking horses” for unrelated\\nlaw-enforcement investigations because “the objectives and duties of probation officers and law\\nenforcement personnel are unavoidably parallel and are frequently intertwined”). And this court,\\nciting Knights, has concluded that a police officer’s warrantless search of a probationer’s\\ncomputer and external hard drive was constitutional because the probationer was subject to a\\nsearch provision and the search was supported by reasonable suspicion that the probationer had\\nviolated a condition of his probation. Herndon, 501 F.3d at 688–92. In addition, this court held\\nin United States v. Sweeney, 891 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 2018), that the “stalking horse” caveat does\\nnot apply when a parolee is subject to a search provision and the search is reasonable under the\\ntotality of the circumstances. Id. at 237. We note, however, that “parolees have fewer\\nexpectations of privacy than probationers” and the Fourth Amendment analysis is not the same\\nfor these two groups. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006); see also United\\nStates v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n All this being said, we conclude that the “stalking horse” caveat, if it survives Knights at\\nall, does not apply when a probationer is subject to a valid search provision and law-enforcement\\nofficers have a reasonable suspicion that the probationer is engaging in illegal activity. In this\\ncase, Ickes was subject to state-ordered probation that included a search provision and the\\nlaw-enforcement officers had a reasonable suspicion that Ickes was conspiring to distribute\\nmethamphetamine. For the duration of Ickes’s probation, he had diminished privacy interests\\nand the government had a comparatively substantial interest in monitoring Ickes’s activities, so\\nthe police needed no more than a reasonable suspicion to search his residence and vehicle. See\\nKnights, 534 U.S. at 119–21; Herndon, 501 F.3d at 691.\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 6\\n\\n\\n 2. Post-arrest searches\\n\\n This brings us to Ickes’s second argument—that federal officials cannot conduct a\\nwarrantless search of a probationer’s residence and vehicle after the probationer has been\\narrested. But he cites no authority (and we have found none) that supports his argument. In the\\nanalogous situation of a search provision in a parole agreement, several of our sister circuits have\\nconcluded that an arrest does not immediately terminate the right of law-enforcement officers to\\nconduct a warrantless search. See e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238, 1242–44 (10th\\nCir. 2005) (holding that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting a\\nwarrantless post-arrest search of the parolee’s residence on the same day as his arrest); United\\nStates v. Jones, 152 F.3d 680, 685–86 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e do not believe that the State’s\\nspecial supervisory need is diminished when a parolee is in its custody, or that the parolee enjoys\\na heightened expectation of privacy in his home due to his custodial status.”); United States v.\\nHill, 967 F.2d 902, 910 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding that a warrantless search of a parolee’s\\nbusiness one day after his arrest and incarceration did not violate the Fourth Amendment).\\n\\n On this issue, we see no reason to distinguish between a parolee and a probationer. The\\ngovernment maintains an interest in supervising both and in protecting society from illegal\\nactivity. This court, moreover, has previously upheld a probation officer’s post-arrest search of a\\nprobationer’s residence in the case of United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 1994), even\\nthough the probationer in that case did not argue that her arrest affected the search’s\\nconstitutionality. Id. at 296. We now expressly conclude that a probationer’s arrest does not\\nimmediately terminate the ability of law-enforcement officers to conduct an otherwise\\nconstitutional search. The law-enforcement officers therefore did not violate Ickes’s\\nconstitutional rights by searching his residence and vehicle after arresting him.\\n\\nC. Evidentiary hearing\\n\\n We finally reach Ickes’s argument that the district court erred by not holding an\\nevidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress. He does not dispute, however, any of the facts\\nrelating to the search. Because Ickes’s argument is “entirely legal in nature,” an evidentiary\\nhearing was unnecessary. See United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 577 (6th Cir. 2006).\\n\\f No. 18-5708 United States v. Ickes Page 7\\n\\n\\nAnd, as discussed in the prior sections, clear precedent establishes that the search of Ickes’s\\nresidence and vehicle was legally proper. We therefore find no error in the court’s decision to\\nforgo an evidentiary hearing.\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1672,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4613620,"string":"4,613,620"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"The MEDICAL CENTER AT ELIZABETH PLACE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ATRIUM HEALTH SYSTEM, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3863"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Batchelder, Sutton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888399/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"030concurrence\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888400/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0078p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n THE MEDICAL CENTER AT ELIZABETH PLACE, LLC, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-3863\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n ATRIUM HEALTH SYSTEM, et al., │\\n Defendants-Appellees. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Ohio at Dayton.\\n No. 3:12-cv-00026—Walter H. Rice, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: April 25, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 25, 2019\\n\\n Before: BATCHELDER, SUTTON, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Richard A. Ripley, RUYAK CHERIAN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.\\nShay Dvoretzky, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Richard A.\\nRipley, Brittany V. Ruyak, RUYAK CHERIAN LLP, Washington, D.C., James A. Dyer, Patrick\\nO’Shaughnessy, SEBALY, SHILLITO + DYER, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellant. Shay Dvoretzky,\\nRobert Stander, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., Melinda K. Burton, FARUKI IRELAND COX\\nRHINEHART & DUSING P.L.L., Dayton, Ohio, Thomas Demitrack, JONES DAY, Cleveland,\\nOhio, for Appellees.\\n\\n BATCHELDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which SUTTON, J., joined, and\\nWHITE J., joined in part. SUTTON, J. (pp. 24–26), delivered a separate concurring opinion.\\nWHITE, J. (pp. 27–30), delivered a separate opinion dissenting in part.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. This is a case about competition among\\nhospitals in Dayton, Ohio. When Medical Center at Elizabeth Place, LLC (“MCEP”) opened in\\n2006, it was an acute care, for-profit hospital owned by 60 physicians and one corporate\\nshareholder. By 2009, MCEP’s existence as a physician-owned enterprise came to an end when\\nit sold an ownership interest to Kettering Health Network, a competitor in the Dayton healthcare\\nmarket. MCEP alleges that it failed because of the anticompetitive actions of Premier Health\\nPartners (“Premier”), a dominant healthcare network in the Dayton area. MCEP alleges that\\nPremier contracted with area physicians and payers (insurers and managed-care plan providers)\\non the condition that they did not do business with MCEP. Because payers provide patients and\\nphysicians provide services, it is difficult to run a viable hospital when one, let alone both, is in\\nshort supply.\\n\\n So, whether by licit or illicit means, Premier won that competition. In this litigation, the\\nparties competed again. This time, MCEP pushed all its chips to the center of the table on one\\nhand of cards: a claim that Premier had engaged in conduct so devoid of benefit to the market as\\nto be per se illegal under the Sherman Act. Such claims apply only to a limited range of conduct.\\nTo be per se illegal, a defendant’s conduct has to be so obviously anticompetitive that it has no\\nplausibly procompetitive features—a high hurdle for plaintiffs claiming restraint of trade. Once\\nthey clear it, however, plaintiffs receive a corresponding reward: they need not undergo the often\\narduous process of showing that the challenged conduct was anticompetitive. As one of our\\nsister circuits has described it, “[t]he per se rule is the trump card of antitrust law. When an\\nantitrust plaintiff successfully plays it, he need only tally his score.” United States v. Realty\\nMulti-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1980).1\\n\\n\\n 1The other approach to determining whether a restraint of trade is “unreasonable” is the “rule of reason.”\\nIn re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litigation, 739 F.3d 262, 270 (6th Cir. 2014). “If the rule of reason is used,\\nplaintiffs must additionally show that the restraint produced anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and\\ngeographic markets, while the per se rule is reserved for restraints that are so clearly unreasonable that their\\nanticompetitive effects within geographic and product markets are inferred.” Id.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\n The question before us is whether MCEP successfully played its hand. The district court\\nfrom which MCEP appeals found that MCEP’s per se claim failed because the record showed\\nthat Premier’s contracts with payers and physicians had plausibly procompetitive features. That\\nholding says nothing about whether Premier’s conduct was on balance procompetitive or\\nanticompetitive. This opinion likewise reaches no decision on the ultimate economic merits of\\nPremier’s actions because to do so would go beyond our charge. We must address only the\\nquestion of per se illegality, and as to that, we agree with the district court that MCEP failed to\\nmeet the high standard required for per se claims. We AFFIRM.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n MCEP alleges a conspiracy between the Premier hospitals that implicates, without\\nnaming as defendants, payers and physicians in the Dayton area. During the course of this multi-\\nyear litigation, various legal issues raised in this case have been ruled on by U.S. District Judge\\nBlack, a Sixth Circuit appellate panel, and then, after the matter was remanded and Judge Black\\nrecused himself, District Judge Rice, who granted the motion for summary judgment presently\\nbefore us.\\n\\n Factual Background\\n\\n MCEP is an acute-care hospital located in Dayton, Ohio, that opened in September 2006\\nwith 60 physician owners and one corporate shareholder, Regent Surgical Health. Defendants in\\nthis case comprise four hospitals—Miami Valley Hospital (owned by MedAmerica Health),\\nGood Samaritan Hospital (owned by Catholic Health Initiatives), Atrium Medical Center (owned\\nby Atrium Health Systems), and Upper Valley Medical Center—as well as a joint operating\\ncompany, Premier Health Partners (“Premier”), formed through a joint operating agreement\\namong those four hospitals.2 This joint operating agreement merged some of the hospitals’\\nhealthcare functions but allowed them to retain control of others. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place v.\\nAtrium Health Sys. (“MCEP I”), 817 F.3d 934, 936-37 (6th Cir. 2016). Hospital Defendants\\n\\n\\n\\n 2In this opinion, we refer to the four hospitals and the joint operating company collectively as “Hospital\\nDefendants” except where otherwise noted.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\ncomprise a dominant healthcare network in the Dayton area, with more than a 55% share of\\nDayton’s inpatient surgical services.\\n\\n In spite of its dominant market position, the record leaves no doubt that Hospital\\nDefendants felt threatened by the possibility of MCEP’s presence in the Dayton medical market.\\nFive months before MCEP opened for business, Hospital Defendants held a board meeting at\\nwhich, “[b]y consensus, the Board supported management’s efforts” to oppose MCEP.\\nExecutives from Premier told an MCEP shareholder that Hospital Defendants “would do\\nwhatever they needed to do in order to stop [MCEP] from opening.”\\n\\n Hospital Defendants’ underlying concern appears to have been that MCEP’s for-profit,\\nphysician-owned model of healthcare would “bankrupt” their hospitals. A letter written by\\nprimary care physicians (most of whom were affiliated with Hospital Defendants), addressed to\\nphysicians in the Dayton healthcare market, expressed the dynamic they found worrisome:\\n\\n There is currently widespread opposition among not-for-profit community\\n hospitals across the country toward physician owned inpatients [sic] hospitals\\n such as this. The physician investors are doing so for reasons of profitability.\\n MVH and GSH offer the range of services and the quality of care necessary to\\n enable surgeons to care for their patients. A physician owned specialty hospital\\n will take the better-insured and more profitable patients away from Premier\\n (along with ancillary services), leaving our local hospitals with only the more\\n complex and underinsured patients.\\n\\nMCEP, for its part, wrote a “Dear Colleague” letter the next month, responding:\\n\\n • While MCEP’s business model will “create a competitive environment to\\n deliver better and more efficient healthcare in Dayton,” it will not drive\\n hospitals out of business;\\n • MCEP “will not turn away patients on the basis of payor classification”;\\n • “Premier generates about $1 billion in revenues and currently has a cash\\n reserve of over $1 billion. As a non-profit, Premier pays no taxes. . . .\\n [MCEP] will have revenues that are a fraction of Premier’s, and our\\n physician-owned hospital will pay corporate, personal and property taxes”;\\n • “[C]omprehensive studies have confirmed that physician-run hospitals have\\n fewer medical errors, shorter turnover times, fewer infections and greater cost\\n efficiencies.”\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\nCiting Hospital Defendants’ board-meeting consensus and their letter to physicians, MCEP\\nalleges that Hospital Defendants blocked MCEP from gaining meaningful access to the Dayton\\nmarket through a series of anticompetitive acts that amounted to a group boycott of MCEP. In\\nits Amended Complaint, MCEP made only a per se claim; MCEP made no claim under the rule\\nof reason. MCEP’s Amended Complaint alleges that Hospital Defendants:\\n\\n • financially coerced commercial health insurers or managed care plan\\n providers (such as Anthem, UnitedHealthcare, Private Healthcare Systems,\\n etc.) “to refuse to permit [MCEP] full access to their respective networks”;\\n • financially coerced commercial health insurers or managed care plans to\\n reimburse MCEP at suppressed rates far below what Hospital Defendants\\n demanded for the same services;\\n • threatened retributive financial consequences to physicians who affiliated with\\n MCEP, and followed through on threats, “including terminating leases that the\\n physicians had with the Defendants for office space”;\\n • offered payments to physicians “who agreed not to work with or at [MCEP];\\n and who agreed to divest ownership in the Medical Center”;\\n • financially coerced physicians affiliated with Hospital Defendants from\\n “admitting patients to [MCEP] or referring patients to physicians who treated\\n patients at [MCEP]”; and\\n • deliberately poached physicians from MCEP who made up a\\n “disproportionately high number of admissions and then prohibited them from\\n admitting patients to [MCEP].”\\n\\n Beyond these allegations, MCEP claims that, in the course of litigation, it discovered two\\nadditional agreements that comprised part of the actionable group boycott.3 First, MCEP alleges\\nan agreement among the payers, induced by Hospital Defendants, not to offer MCEP a managed\\ncare contract. Second, MCEP alleges an agreement among primary care physicians not to do\\nbusiness with physicians who invested in MCEP (Hospital Defendants refer to this as the\\n“physician conspiracy”). Hospital Defendants describe the relationship of these agreements to\\nthe original allegation using the metaphor of a hub, spoke, and rim. For these claims, the\\nHospital Defendants form the hub; the vertical agreements the Hospital Defendants made with\\n\\n 3While there is some dispute about exactly when these claims were first brought to Hospital Defendants’\\nattention, there does not appear to be any dispute that the claims were raised (though the Complaint was not\\namended to reflect the new claims) in MCEP’s opposition to Hospital Defendants’ initial motion for summary\\njudgment before Judge Black.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\npayers and physicians to exclude MCEP are the spokes; and the discrete agreements to boycott\\nMCEP, among the payers and among the physicians, are at the rim.\\n\\n MCEP alleged only the “hub” agreement in its Amended Complaint. Hospital\\nDefendants argue that the “rim conspiracy” claim is a new, and untimely, Sherman Act Section 1\\nclaim. MCEP, for its part, maintains that the additional agreements are simply evidence of the\\noverarching Section 1 conspiracy alleged in their Amended Complaint. Regardless of the exact\\nscope of the alleged boycott, MCEP alleges that one existed, that it was orchestrated by Hospital\\nDefendants, and that it prevented MCEP from succeeding as a going concern. MCEP claims\\nthat, but for Hospital Defendants’ conduct, it would have been able to contract with payers and\\nphysicians, which would have, in turn, increased competition in the Dayton healthcare market for\\nconsumers of general inpatient surgical services.\\n\\n Procedural History\\n\\n This case was before Judge Black in Cincinnati from January 30, 2012, to April 19, 2017.\\nDuring that time, Judge Black granted Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on\\nthe ground that the MCEP’s antitrust claim lacked the necessary plurality of actors.\\n\\n On appeal to this court, a divided panel reversed Judge Black and rejected Hospital\\nDefendants’ motion for summary judgment. The panel held that a reasonable juror could find\\nthat Premier comprised multiple competing entities and, therefore, could engage in concerted\\naction. MCEP I, 817 F.3d at 945. The panel did not address other issues raised before it, such as\\nwhether MCEP’s additional rim conspiracy claims were untimely. Id. at 939.\\n\\n On remand, Hospital Defendants moved again for summary judgment arguing, among\\nother things, that MCEP’s allegation of a per se antitrust violation failed as a matter of law.\\nHospital Defendants argued that their alleged restraints on trade were plausibly procompetitive\\nwhich, they argued, is sufficient to defeat a per se antitrust claim. Because MCEP pleaded only a\\nper se claim, if Hospital Defendants had succeeded in this argument, the case would have been\\ndismissed. Judge Black denied Hospital Defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment,\\nrejecting Hospital Defendants’ argument on two alternative bases: first, the claimed\\nprocompetitive effects of the challenged conduct are subject to genuine dispute and are therefore\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nan improper basis for summary judgment, and second, Hospital Defendants “failed to evidence\\nthat their joint contracting has any efficiency-enhancing purpose to which such an agreement is\\nnecessary.” Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place v. Premier Health Partners, 2016 WL 9460026, at *5\\n(S.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2016).\\n\\n The case was set for trial. But on April 19, 2017, Judge Black recused himself and the\\ncase was re-assigned to Judge Rice.4 Before Judge Rice, Hospital Defendants moved to “Clarify\\nIssues for Trial,” which all parties now agree amounted to a motion for reconsideration of Judge\\nBlack’s October 6, 2016, order denying Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.\\nLess than a week before trial was set to begin, Judge Rice granted Hospital Defendants’ motion\\nfor summary judgment and dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice. Judge Rice\\ndeclined to apply the “law of the case” doctrine, holding that Judge Black had clearly erred. He\\nfound that while Judge Black correctly articulated the standard for a per se claim—that the\\nchallenged conduct must have no plausible procompetitive effect—Judge Black failed to\\nacknowledge that the record showed that the Hospital Defendants’ challenged restraints had such\\nplausible procompetitive effects. Judge Rice also rejected MCEP’s argument that the Amended\\nComplaint implicitly included claims of rim conspiracies among the payers and among the\\nphysicians—claims that all agree, if proven, would constitute a per se violation—explaining that\\nthose claims were not contained in the Amended Complaint, that MCEP’s attempt to “wedge this\\nnew claim into the existing allegations” was improper, and that the Hospital “Defendants would\\nbe severely prejudiced if MCEP were permitted to amend its Complaint [again] at this late date.”\\nMCEP asks us to reverse Judge Rice’s decision granting Hospital Defendants’ motion for\\nsummary judgment and to remand the case for trial.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Summary judgment is warranted if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the\\nnonmoving party, no material fact is subject to a genuine dispute. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4Judge Black explained that, as a “Cincinnati duty-stationed Judge,” he could not preside over a trial in\\nDayton.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\nZenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986).5 We review de novo grants of summary\\njudgment. Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone Cty., 440 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2006).\\n\\n The parties dispute what de novo review should entail in this case. MCEP claims that\\nJudge Rice’s decision to not apply the “law of the case” doctrine was critical to his decision to\\ngrant Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and therefore we must review Judge\\nRice’s “law of the case” decision de novo. According to MCEP, Judge Rice could reconsider\\nJudge Black’s denial of summary judgment only by finding that Judge Black clearly erred. So,\\nMCEP says, if Judge Rice was wrong that Judge Black committed clear error, then we must\\nreverse his “law of the case” judgment. For their part, Hospital Defendants argue that we should\\nsimply review de novo Judge Rice’s substantive legal conclusions, separate and apart from Judge\\nRice’s “law of the case” conclusion.\\n\\n Ultimately, the Hospital Defendants have the better of this argument. First, we review\\nfor abuse of discretion Judge Rice’s decision to reconsider Judge Black’s pre-transfer order. See\\nUnited States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1990). MCEP argues that abuse of discretion\\nis not the proper standard of review in a case transferred from one district court to another, in\\nwhich a pre-transfer ruling of one judge is altered by a post-transfer decision of a different judge.\\nWe have foreclosed this argument by holding—in precisely the scenario identified by MCEP—\\nthat abuse of discretion remains the proper standard of review. See Gillig v. Advanced\\nCardiovascular Sys. Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 1995).6\\n\\n\\n 5If a presumption against summary judgment in antitrust cases is ever appropriate, it is not here. This\\ncircuit has applied a presumption against summary judgment in antitrust actions only when the case demanded a\\nfact-intensive inquiry under the rule of reason into issues of intent and motive. In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust\\nLitig., 739 F.3d 262, 270 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone Cty., 440 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir.\\n2006)); but see In re ATM Antitrust Litigation, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (N. D. Cal. 2008) (opining that “any\\npresumption against the granting of summary judgment in complex antitrust cases has now disappeared”) (citation\\nomitted). Unlike in a rule of reason claim, in a per se claim intent and motive are not critical determinations. See\\nPhillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1910a (3rd ed. 2011).\\n 6MCEP cites Jimkoski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 247 F. App’x 654 (6th Cir. 2007), for the\\nproposition that Judge Rice’s “law of the case” decision—specifically his finding that Judge Black committed clear\\nerror—should be reviewed de novo. This misapplies Jimkoski. Read in context, Jimkoski simply acknowledged that\\nwhere a motion for reconsideration concerns summary judgment, we do not review the district court’s decision to\\ngrant summary judgment for abuse of discretion. Id. at 659. To do so would insulate the district court’s merits\\ndecision from the proper standard of review—de novo—simply because the motion that the district court ruled on\\nwas a motion for reconsideration. That concern is not present in this case because we review for abuse of discretion\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\n Second, we can find that Judge Rice abused his discretion in disturbing Judge Black’s\\ndenial of summary judgment only if we have a “definite and firm conviction that [Judge Rice]\\ncommitted a clear error in judgment” such as “rel[ying] upon clearly erroneous factual findings,\\nappl[ying] the law improperly, or us[ing] an erroneous legal standard.” See Garner v. Cuyahoga\\nCty. Juvenile Ct., 554 F.3d 624, 634 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Of\\nthese potential bases for abuse of discretion, MCEP argues only that Judge Rice improperly\\napplied the law, a question that we review de novo.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n MCEP’s raises two substantive claims on appeal. First, MCEP argues that the district\\ncourt erred by declining to apply the per se rule to Hospital Defendants’ allegedly\\nanticompetitive conduct. Second, MCEP argues that the district court erred in rejecting MCEP’s\\n“horizontal rim claims” due to untimeliness. Neither argument has merit.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Per se claim\\n\\n Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of\\ntrust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or\\nwith foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Because virtually every\\nagreement between parties has the potential to be considered a restraint of trade, antitrust\\njurisprudence limits the range of restraints within the reach of antitrust law to agreements that\\nunreasonably restrain trade. In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 270 (6th Cir.\\n2014). A restraint on trade may be found to be unreasonable per se or under the “rule of reason.”\\nId. As MCEP makes only a per se claim, the question before us is whether Judge Rice erred in\\ngranting Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Hospital\\nDefendants’ conduct falls outside per se illegality. Judges Black and Rice did not agree in their\\nanswer to the underlying question and the prior Sixth Circuit panel declined to address it. MCEP\\n\\n\\n\\nthe decision to grant a motion for reconsideration (here that means we review the “law of the case” decision for\\nabuse of discretion). But we still review de novo the merits of the district court’s grant of summary judgment.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\nI, 817 F.3d at 939 (explaining that “[t]his appeal looks only at . . . whether defendants’ conduct is\\nthe result of two or more entities acting in concert”).\\n\\n Although a motion for summary judgment against a per se claim involves underlying\\nfacts, the propriety of per se treatment “is normally a question of legal characterization that can\\noften be resolved by the judge on a motion . . . for summary judgment.” Stop & Shop\\nSupermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 373 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 2004). There is a\\npresumption against applying the per se rule “[u]nless the restraint falls squarely into a per se\\ncategory.” Southeastern Milk, 739 F.3d at 271. As explained in Expert Masonry, “a plaintiff\\nmust satisfy each element of the per se . . . test[] . . . in its allegations in order to survive pre-trial\\ntermination.” 440 F.3d at 344 (emphasis added). In Southeastern Milk, the court held that, even\\nwhere a factual dispute exists between the parties over whether a challenged restraint is\\nobviously anticompetitive—and therefore deserving of per se treatment—the defendants\\nproducing “evidence that the agreement at issue may have had procompetitive\\naspects . . . indicate[s] that this situation would not fall into the categories of per se unreasonable\\nrestraints on trade.” 739 F.3d at 274. The court concluded that “[t]herefore, especially at the\\nsummary judgment stage, this is not a ‘clear cut’ case of an obviously anticompetitive trade\\nrestraint, and thus the district court was correct to apply the default standard of the rule of\\nreason.” Id. Hence, at the summary judgment phase, the right question to ask regarding per se\\nclaims is whether the plaintiff has shown that the challenged restraint is so obviously\\nanticompetitive that it should be condemned as per se illegal. If, in spite of the plaintiff’s efforts,\\nthe record indicates that the challenged restraint is plausibly procompetitive, then summary\\njudgment for the defendants is appropriate.\\n\\n Per se claims against joint ventures\\n\\n The question before us is further delineated by the fact that the challenged restraints exist\\nwithin a joint venture, which the Supreme Court has noted “hold the promise of increasing a\\nfirm’s efficiency and enabling it to compete more effectively.” Copperweld Corp v. Indep. Tube\\nCorp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). At the same time, joint ventures often superficially resemble\\nhorizontal concerted action because they involve horizontal competitors joining together to\\nrestrain trade in some way, such as by coordinating prices. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n1, 4 (2006) (denying a per se horizontal price fixing claim brought by a plaintiff against a joint\\nventure created by Texaco and Shell Oil that unified their respective gasoline refining and\\nmarketing operations in the western United States under two brands).\\n\\n Because joint ventures often have procompetitive efficiencies, when a joint venture is\\nitself challenged as anticompetitive, that claim is reviewed under the rule of reason. Copperweld\\nCorp., 467 U.S. at 768. But when the conduct of the joint venture is challenged, the relationship\\nof the challenged conduct to the joint venture is analyzed to see if the conduct is reasonably\\nrelated to the joint venture’s procompetitive features (and therefore should be judged under the\\nrule of reason), or is a naked restraint lurking beneath the veneer of a legitimate joint venture\\n(and therefore deserves per se condemnation). See Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Bd. of\\nRegents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113-15 (1984) (observing that a “naked” restraint, subject\\nto the per se rule, can exist even though it is contained in a joint venture agreement that is,\\noverall, quite competitive). The Supreme Court has distinguished three categories of restraints:\\n(1) restraints that are core to the joint venture’s efficiency enhancing purpose; (2) restraints that\\nare ancillary to the joint venture’s efficiency enhancing purpose; and (3) restraints that are\\nnakedly unrelated to the purpose of the joint venture. See Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7-8. Only the last\\nof these three justifies per se treatment. Id.\\n\\n Core activity\\n\\n Core activity is activity that is “integral to the running” of the venture. Id. at 7-8. In\\nDagher, the Supreme Court rejected a per se claim against horizontal price-setting by two\\ncompetitors on the ground that the price-setting “involve[d] the core activity of the joint venture\\nitself.” Id. at 7.\\n\\n Hospital Defendants claim that the challenged panel limitation—but not the other\\nchallenged restraints—qualifies as core activity. They argue that because Dagher described\\nprice setting as a core activity for the joint venture in that case, and because panel limitations are\\na “pricing term” in Hospital Defendants’ contracts with payers, the panel limitations are “core\\nactivity.”\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 12\\n\\n\\n This argument is not persuasive. Dagher does not stand for the general proposition that\\nrestraints in contracts that are price related are always core activity for joint ventures. Dagher’s\\nholding was tailored to the specific joint venture before it. Id. at 5-6. This argument may be\\ndismissed simply by noting that the definition of “core activity” provided by Dagher, “integral to\\nthe running” of the joint venture, id. at 7-8, cannot seriously be argued of Hospital Defendants’\\npanel limitations. Hospital Defendants continue to operate as a joint venture today even though\\nthe panel limitation clauses have been removed from their contracts with payers.\\n\\n Joint venture’s ancillary restraints\\n\\n Restraints that are “ancillary to the legitimate and competitive purposes of the business\\nassociation” fall between “core” activity and “naked” restraints. Id. at 7. These are restraints by\\na joint venture that are not “integral to the running” of the joint venture, id. at 8, “but may\\ncontribute to the success of a cooperative venture.” Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc.,\\n776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985). A restraint is ancillary if it bears a reasonable relationship to\\nthe joint venture’s success. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, 542 F.3d 290,\\n339-40 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).\\n\\n Predictably, the parties spill considerable ink contesting what counts as “reasonable.”\\nMCEP urges the panel to accept Judge Black’s version of the ancillary-restraints doctrine. We\\ndecline to do so because Judge Black framed the ancillary-restraints inquiry incorrectly in two\\nways: by applying too high a standard to determine what qualifies as “reasonable” and by\\nplacing an evidentiary burden on Hospital Defendants to meet that standard. Judge Black\\nrejected Hospital Defendants’ argument that their restraints bore a reasonable relationship to the\\njoint venture’s success, holding that they “failed to evidence that their joint contracting has any\\nefficiency-enhancing purpose to which such an agreement is necessary.” Under this standard,\\nonly restraints that are necessary to a joint venture’s efficiency-enhancing purposes qualify as\\nancillary. Further, Judge Black held that Hospital Defendants must provide “undisputed proof”\\nthat the restraint is necessary to prevent a per se claim from proceeding to trial.\\n\\n Judge Black’s sole source of authority for this version of the ancillary-restraints doctrine\\nis a guidance document put out by the Federal Trade Commission and the United States\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 13\\n\\n\\nDepartment of Justice on collaboration among competitors. See Dep’t of Justice & FTC,\\nAntitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.3, at 10-25 (Apr. 2000). But the\\ncitation is of dubious relevance to the ancillary-restraints doctrine because the cited section deals\\nwith joint ventures only under the rule of reason, not the per se rule.\\n\\n To bolster Judge Black’s approach, MCEP cites NaBanco v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d\\n592, 601 (11th Cir. 1986), and In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 827, 872\\n(N.D. Ill. 2010), for the proposition that an ancillary restraint must be necessary to achieve the\\njoint venture’s efficiency-enhancing purpose. NaBanco supports MCEP’s preferred formulation,\\nbut In re Sulfuric Acid does not. In re Sulfuric Acid echoes the ancillary-restraints inquiry\\narticulated by the Seventh Circuit in Polk Brothers: “A court must ask whether an agreement\\npromoted enterprise and productivity at the time it was adopted. If it arguably did, then the court\\nmust apply the Rule of Reason to make a more discriminating assessment.” 743 F. Supp. 2d at\\n872 (quoting Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189) (emphasis added).\\n\\n Hospital Defendants, on the other hand, describe the standard as whether there exists a\\nplausible procompetitive rationale for the restraint.7 The Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth\\nCircuits adopt this approach.8\\n\\n Perhaps most destructive to MCEP’s argument is then-Judge Sotomayor’s concurrence in\\nMLB Properties, 542 F.3d at 338. Although MCEP cites that concurrence five times in its\\nbriefing, Judge Sotomayor categorically rejected the position MCEP asks this court to adopt.\\nShe described ancillary restraints as requiring “a reasonable procompetitive justification, related\\nto the efficiency-enhancing purposes of the joint venture.” Id. at 339 (emphasis added). Then, in\\n\\n 7Hospital Defendants, at one point, argue that the correct legal standard for determining whether a restraint\\nis ancillary or naked is whether the challenged restraint is “completely unrelated to the purpose of a lawful joint\\nventure.” But this mischaracterizes the ancillary-restraints doctrine. “The per se rule would collapse if every claim\\nof economies from restricting competition, however implausible, could be used to move a horizontal agreement not\\nto compete from the per se rule to the Rule of Reason category.” Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n,\\n744 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1984).\\n 8See MLB Properties, 542 F.3d at 338-39 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Craftsmen Limo,, Inc. v. Ford Motor\\nCo., 363 F.3d 761, 776 (8th Cir. 2004) (“When determining whether to apply the rule of reason analysis to non-price\\nadvertising restrictions related to product safety, the issue is not whether the restrictions were procompetitive, but\\nwhether they could be.”); Paladin Assoc., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2003) (“When\\na defendant advances plausible arguments that a practice enhances overall efficiency and makes markets more\\ncompetitive, per se treatment is inappropriate, and the rule of reason applies.”); Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 14\\n\\n\\ndefining what qualifies as “reasonable,” she expressly rejected the formulation that MCEP\\nargues here: “Under the ancillary restraints doctrine, a challenged restraint need not be essential,\\nbut rather only reasonably ancillary to the legitimate cooperative aspects of the venture.” Id. at\\n340 n.11 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189\\n(explaining that a restraint is ancillary if it may promote the success of a joint venture).\\n\\n The question of what relationship a challenged restraint must have to a joint venture in\\norder to qualify as ancillary splits the Circuits—the Eleventh Circuit on the one hand, and the\\nSecond, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits on the other. We follow the majority of Circuits\\nand hold that a joint venture’s restraint is ancillary and therefore inappropriate for per se\\ncategorization when, viewed at the time it was adopted, the restraint “may contribute to the\\nsuccess of a cooperative venture.” Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189. That approach better accords\\nwith Supreme Court guidance. As the Ninth Circuit in Paladin Associates explained:\\n\\n The Supreme Court generally has treated as per se illegal joint efforts by firms to\\n disadvantage a competitor by persuading customers to deny that competitor\\n relationships the competitor needs in the competitive struggle. But in these cases,\\n the practices generally were not justified by plausible arguments that the practices\\n enhanced overall efficiency and made markets more competitive.\\n\\n328 F.3d at 1154-55. In a footnote that follows the court elaborated:\\n\\n This is so because plausible arguments that a practice is procompetitive make us\\n unable to conclude “the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is clear and the\\n possibility of countervailing procompetitive effects is remote.”\\n\\nId. at 1155 n.8 (quoting Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294).\\n\\n Paladin faithfully applies the Supreme Court’s holding in Stationers. Condemning as per\\nse illegal restraints that, while not necessary to achieving a joint venture’s efficiency-enhancing\\npurpose nevertheless plausibly relate to that purpose, would run counter to the Supreme Court’s\\ninstruction to avoid applying the per se rule to situations where efficiencies are being served.\\nSee Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 894 (2007) (holding that\\nper se treatment is inappropriate where “it cannot be stated with any degree of confidence that\\n[the challenged restraint] ‘always or almost always tends to restrict competition and decrease\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 15\\n\\n\\noutput’”) (quoting Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723\\n(1988)).\\n\\n MCEP’s second but related argument, which was adopted by Judge Black, is that\\nHospital Defendants bear the burden of proving that a challenged restraint is procompetitive, and\\ntherefore ancillary, because the question of the procompetitiveness of a restraint is\\n“quintessentially one of fact.” Judge Black’s inclination to defer to the fact finder has an\\nintuitive appeal in the summary judgment context. And it would be correct had MCEP brought a\\nclaim under the rule of reason. See Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Mach., Inc., 221 F.3d\\n913, 919 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he rule of reason requires the factfinder to decide whether under all\\nthe circumstances of the case the restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on\\ncompetition.”) (citation omitted). For a per se claim, however, Judge Black’s conclusion is\\nerroneous. Whether challenged conduct belongs in the per se category is a question of law. See\\nAriz. v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Socy., 457 U.S. 332, 337 n.3, 354 (1982) (characterizing the per se\\nrule as a “rule of law”); MM Steel, L.P. v. JSW Steel (USA) Inc., 806 F.3d 835, 847 (5th Cir.\\n2015) (“The decision to analyze the conspiracy under a per se theory of liability is a question of\\nlaw that we review de novo.”). In Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., the Eighth\\nCircuit likewise found that whether a given restraint falls within the per se category is a question\\nof law, citing a well-respected treatise on antitrust law for the proposition that “although a\\ncourt’s determination that the per se rule applies ‘might involve many fact questions, the\\nselection of a mode of analysis is entirely a question of law.’” 363 F.3d 761, 772 (8th Cir. 2004)\\n(citing Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1909b (1998)). And it is a\\nquestion of law where certain presumptions apply. As we explained in Expert Masonry, the\\n“plaintiff must satisfy each element of the per se . . . test[] . . . in its allegations in order to\\nsurvive pre-trial termination.” 440 F.3d at 344 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has\\nlikewise held that because a plaintiff failed to make a threshold showing that the challenged\\nconduct had the characteristics necessary to justify per se condemnation, rule of reason analysis\\nshould apply instead. Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298 (“A plaintiff seeking application of the per se\\nrule must present a threshold case that the challenged activity falls into a category likely to have\\npredominantly anticompetitive effects.”).\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 16\\n\\n\\n If the record in this case reveals a plausible way in which the challenged restraints\\ncontribute to the procompetitive efficiencies of the joint venture, then “the possibility of\\ncountervailing procompetitive effects” is not remote and per se treatment is improper. Id. at 294.\\nWhat are Premier’s procompetitive efficiencies? The joint operating agreement of Hospital\\nDefendants’ joint venture, Premier, states the following goals:\\n\\n (1) To provide a broad scope and a continuum of health care services with a focus\\n upon community health benefit.\\n (2) To improve cost effectiveness and efficiencies in the delivery of health care\\n services.\\n (3) To increase the quality of health care services in the greater Miami Valley\\n Region.\\n (4) To integrate physicians and other health care providers with the JOC Network.\\n (5) To have the capacity to assume and manage financial risk.\\n (6) To improve the health status of the greater Miami Valley Region.\\n\\nWe analyze Hospital Defendants’ challenged restraints in light of these goals.9\\n\\n MCEP challenges two kinds of conduct on the part of Hospital Defendants. First, MCEP\\nargues that Hospital Defendants restrained trade through “panel limitations,” wherein Hospital\\nDefendants stipulated to payers that if they added MCEP to their networks, Hospital Defendants\\nwould be able to renegotiate prices. Second, MCEP alleges that Hospital Defendants took direct\\nconcerted action against MCEP by cutting off patient referrals to MCEP-affiliated physicians,\\nevicting MCEP-affiliated physicians from office space owned by Hospital Defendants, and\\nagreeing with third parties to refuse to deal with MCEP-affiliated physicians.\\n\\n Panel limitations. Courts have found such restraints of trade supported by\\nprocompetitive justifications. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 373\\nF.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that closed networks can allow payers to reduce customer\\npremiums because providers will exchange better rates for guaranteed volume). Likewise in\\n\\n\\n 9The challenged conduct evaluated in this section is limited to MCEP’s claim of illegal concerted action\\namong the Hospital Defendants, not the additional “rim conspiracy” claims. The reason for this is that we conclude\\nin the next section that Judge Rice did not abuse his discretion by ruling that MCEP’s effort to plead those claims\\nwas untimely.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 17\\n\\n\\nMethodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., where the Seventh Circuit addressed\\npanel limitations as a mere variant on the accepted restraint of exclusive dealing arrangements:\\n\\n But what is more common than exclusive dealing? It is illustrated by\\n requirements contracts, which are common, and legal, and obligate a buyer to\\n purchase all, or a substantial portion of, its requirements of specific goods or\\n services from one supplier. [The Hospital Defendants’] deals with the health\\n insurance companies are a form of requirements contract, for the deals require the\\n companies to limit the network of providers from which they obtain the health\\n care that their insurance contracts obligate them to obtain for their insureds. And\\n an insurance company may get better rates from a hospital in exchange for\\n agreeing to an exclusive contract, as exclusivity will drive a higher volume of\\n business to the hospital.\\n\\n859 F.3d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n MCEP claims that Hospital Defendants’ argument that panel limitations help ensure\\nvolume is a pretext. In support of this claim, MCEP points to evidence showing that Premier’s\\ncontract with insurer Aetna had a volume-based discount that automatically lowered Premier’s\\nrates when billing volume increased past certain benchmarks. Thus, even without panel\\nlimitations, Hospital Defendants had financially incentivized insurers to maintain a high volume\\nof patients getting services from Hospital Defendants. To MCEP, this evidence reveals that the\\nonly possible purpose of the panel limitation in Hospital Defendants’ contract with Aetna was\\n“purely punitive.”\\n\\n We are not persuaded. A panel limitation and a price schedule are two distinct methods\\ndirected toward the common goal of keeping patients (customers) coming through the doors. A\\npricing schedule is a discount that incentivizes payers to keep volume up. A panel limitation,\\nmeanwhile, forces payers to confront the risk of renegotiating their contract with Hospital\\nDefendants if they choose to send their insureds (customers) to a competing provider. Moreover,\\nit is plausible that Hospital Defendants would deploy a “belt and suspenders” approach to a\\nmatter as crucial for a hospital system as maintaining patient (customer) volume. It is plausible\\nthat panel limitations, by lowering the cost of Hospital Defendants’ services, contribute to the\\nefficiency-enhancing purposes of the joint venture, specifically improving “cost effectiveness\\nand efficiencies in the delivery of health care services.”\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 18\\n\\n\\n Concerted action regarding physicians. MCEP’s claims concerning Hospital\\nDefendants’ direct concerted action toward physicians can be divided into two categories:\\n(1) threatened loss of patient referrals; and (2) non-compete agreements.\\n\\n 1. Threatened loss of patient referrals10\\n\\n This alleged restraint centers around evidence found in a letter sent by Hospital\\nDefendants to Dayton-area doctors informing them of Hospital Defendants’ opposition to\\nMCEP. The letter, signed by 94 primary care physicians, discusses the consequences that\\nMCEP’s presence could have on the Dayton healthcare market. The primary concern expressed\\nin the letter was that the profit-driven MCEP “will take the better insured and more profitable\\npatients away from Premier” and leave “local hospitals with only the more complex and\\nunderinsured patients.” At the conclusion of the letter, the physicians wrote:\\n\\n We, the primary care network of physicians for Premier, strongly oppose\\n [MCEP]. We believe it will have only negative impacts on our community, our\\n hospitals and our network. We do not support the physicians who invest in these\\n inpatient hospitals. We do look forward, however, to our continued efforts to\\n work with the specialists of our hospital medical staffs and do our part within\\n Premier to continue to improve the delivery of cost-effective, highest quality\\n healthcare to the people of our community.\\n\\nMCEP claims that doctors who signed the letter “understood [it] to mean that signatories would\\nstop referring patients to anyone who invested in MCEP.”\\n\\n Hospital Defendants argue that the letter, in expressing the opinion of Premier and its\\naffiliated physicians, does not constitute a restraint, and therefore cannot qualify as illegal\\nconduct under antitrust laws. They are right. In Am. Council of Podiatrists v. Am. Bd. of\\n\\n 10MCEP also argues that Hospital Defendants waived the right to move for summary judgment on this\\ntheory of liability because they failed to argue before Judge Black that their direct concerted action should be\\nviewed under the rule of reason. Likely, MCEP intends to say that Hospital Defendants’ forfeited the argument.\\n“Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or\\nabandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). Under forfeiture doctrine,\\n“parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.” Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992). At\\nworst, MCEP is claiming that Hospital Defendants are making a “new argument to support what has been [their]\\nconsistent claim.” Lebron v. Natl’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995). Hospital Defendants did not\\nforfeit the right to move for summary judgment on MCEP’s claim that Hospital Defendants’ direct concerted action\\nis per se illegal because Hospital Defendants have consistently argued that MCEP’s per se claim does not apply to\\nthe challenged conduct.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 19\\n\\n\\nPodiatric Surgery, Inc., we held that, in the absence of a showing by the plaintiff that allegedly\\nanticompetitive communication was (1) “false” and (2) “difficult or costly for the plaintiff to\\ncounter,” we would apply a presumption that speech has “de minimis effect on competition.”\\n323 F.3d 366, 370-72 (6th Cir. 2003). MCEP’s claim fails under both of these prongs. MCEP\\nhas not shown that Hospital Defendants’ “Dear Physician” letter was untrue, and MCEP\\ncountered the “Dear Physician” letter, without any apparent difficulty, with a “Dear Colleague”\\nletter of its own.\\n\\n 2. Non-compete agreements\\n\\n MCEP claims that Hospital Defendants terminated the leases of multiple MCEP-affiliated\\ndoctors who rented space in Hospital Defendants’ hospitals. Judge Rice rejected this argument\\non the grounds that Hospital Defendants have a legitimate interest as a joint venture in\\npreventing free riding by physicians who will reap the benefits of training and convenient office\\nspace at their hospitals and “then refer their patients elsewhere or invest in other hospitals.”\\nHospital Defendants had a plausible concern that, without these contracts, physicians who\\ninvested in MCEP could rent office space at a Premier-associated hospital, free ride on the\\nreputation and facilities of that hospital, and then refer patients out to MCEP. Preventing such a\\nmisalignment of incentives is plausibly related to Hospital Defendants’ goal of “integrat[ing]\\nphysicians and other health care providers with the JOC Network.”\\n\\n MCEP also alleges that Hospital Defendants’ non-compete agreements with physicians in\\nthe Dayton area qualify as concerted conduct subject to per se condemnation. Hospital\\nDefendant Good Samaritan purchased the Dayton Heart Hospital in 2008. As characterized by\\nMCEP, a condition of the purchase by Good Samaritan Hospital was that individual owners of\\nDayton Heart Hospital were paid in full only if they agreed “(i) not to invest in MCEP, and (ii) if\\nthey already owned shares, they would divest if MCEP began to offer cardiac services” over the\\nnext five years. MCEP cites no case law holding that vertical non-compete contracts entered into\\nby joint ventures qualify as conduct that is anticompetitive per se.11 And this circuit, as well as\\n\\n\\n\\n 11Instead MCEP cites to E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Assoc. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914),\\nand United States v. Coop. Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Neither case\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 20\\n\\n\\nthe common law,12 have long recognized that “[l]egitimate reasons exist to uphold\\nnoncompetition covenants even though by nature they necessarily restrain trade to some degree.”\\nPerceptron, Inc., 221 F.3d at 919 (quoting Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265\\n(7th Cir. 1981)). It is MCEP’s burden to show that per se treatment of allegedly anticompetitive\\nconduct is justified. Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298. In this context, MCEP’s failure to produce any\\non-point precedent is damning, as we refuse to apply the per se rule in the absence of judicial\\nexperience with the challenged restraint. See Broad. Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc.,\\n441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (concluding that “it is only after considerable experience with certain\\nbusiness relationships that courts classify them as per se violations”) (quoting United States v.\\nTopco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972)).\\n\\n MCEP’s other arguments in support of its per se claim. First, MCEP argues that we are\\nbound by precedent to find that Hospital Defendants’ restraints qualify for per se treatment. To\\nthat end, MCEP cites to Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Klor’s,\\nhowever, did not concern a legitimate joint venture, so its approach to alleged horizontal\\nrestraints does not bear on the legal framework established above. Id. at 208-09. MCEP also\\nargues that Com-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982), which followed Klor’s\\napproach, controls. But Com-Tel, like Klor’s, does not contain ancillary-restraints analysis\\nbecause it does not concern a joint venture.\\n\\n Second, MCEP argues that we are bound by “law of the case” to find in its favor because,\\nin MCEP I, we implicitly rejected a number of the arguments that Hospital Defendants make\\nhere. We need not guess at the contours of MCEP I’s holding—we said expressly that it\\nconcerned “only . . . whether defendants’ conduct is the result of two or more entities acting in\\n\\n\\n\\nconcerns joint ventures or the ancillary-restraints doctrine. Coop. Theatres of Ohio is inapposite, as it concerns\\nmarket allocation rather than a group boycott. 845 F.2d at 1368.\\n 12“It must have been obvious from the beginning that the flat ban against such restraints of trade covered\\nmore than the rationale of the rule required. The rule might prevent desirable transfers of property. The most\\nvaluable asset of a business might be the good will of the public toward its owner. Should he wish to sell the\\nbusiness the owner could not get a price reflecting the asset of good will or the true going concern value of his\\nbusiness unless he could promise the purchaser not to return to compete with the business sold.” Robert Bork,\\nAncillary Restraints & the Sherman Act, 15 ABA Section of Antitrust Law Proceedings 211, 213 (1959) (footnote\\nomitted).\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 21\\n\\n\\nconcert or whether defendants, based on their participation in the joint operating agreement,\\nfunction as a single entity in the market place.” MCEP I, 817 F.3d at 939.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Rim Conspiracy claims\\n\\n MCEP argues that Judge Rice erred in dismissing its Section 1 claims of concerted action\\nbased on “rim” conspiracies—that is, agreements (induced by Hospital Defendants) to boycott\\nMCEP made among the payers as well as independent physicians. The rim conspiracies are\\ndistinct from the alleged conspiracy among the Hospital Defendants. MCEP argues that Hospital\\nDefendants orchestrated two additional conspiracies—one among payers to collectively “hold\\nthe line” against MCEP by excluding it from their market, the other a “physician conspiracy” in\\nwhich Hospital Defendants induced Dayton-area physicians to collectively refuse to refer\\npatients to MCEP. As Judge Rice noted, this issue is significant. Hospital Defendants\\n“conceded that, if MCEP could prove that the payers agreed among themselves not to offer\\nMCEP a managed care contract and that Premier orchestrated that agreement, the per se rule\\nwould apply to that claim.” If the district court erred by precluding these rim conspiracy claims,\\nthen even if Judge Rice was correct that MCEP has no triable per se claim of concerted action\\namong Hospital Defendants (the “hub” claim), the case would need to be remanded and set for\\ntrial on MCEP’s rim conspiracy claim.\\n\\n MCEP argues that the rim conspiracy claims are not new. Instead, MCEP characterizes\\nthe rim agreements as additional evidence found through discovery that supports the overarching\\ngroup boycott claim advanced in the Amended Complaint. MCEP undermines that position,\\nhowever, by claiming simultaneously that “[t]he payer agreement and physician agreement . . .\\nrepresent additional horizontal concerted action that independently requires imposition of the per\\nse rule whether the jury finds the Defendants to be a single entity or multiple actors.”\\n\\n But MCEP’s Amended Complaint includes neither an allegation of an agreement among\\nthe payers nor an agreement among the physicians.13 Instead, the Amended Complaint alleges\\n\\n 13MCEP’s counsel acknowledged this fact in the course of a deposition, asserting: “I’ll represent to you [to\\nthe deponent] that there was not an allegation of an outer rim in the complaint, but that MCEP contends that the\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 22\\n\\n\\nan agreement among the Hospital Defendants to financially induce payers and physicians to\\nboycott MCEP. There is no “rim” conspiracy without alleged agreement among the parties at\\nthe rim (among the payers and physicians, respectively). See Total Benefits Planning Agency,\\nInc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 2008). Because the\\nAmended Complaint lacks an essential element for MCEP’s “rim” conspiracy claims, the\\nAmended Complaint does not include those claims.\\n\\n Faced with that omission, MCEP claims that Judge Rice erred by not permitting MCEP\\nto submit a Second Amended Complaint to add the rim conspiracy claims. We review for abuse\\nof discretion the district court’s decision to deny such a motion. Super Sulky, Inc. v. U.S.\\nTrotting Ass’n, 174 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1999). We will overturn the district court’s decision\\nonly if we have a “definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error in\\njudgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Taylor v. United\\nStates Parole Comm’n, 734 F.2d 1152, 1155 (6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); see also John B.\\nv. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 2008). The standard for a motion to amend is governed by\\nthe general principle that “cases should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of\\npleadings,” which is in turn moderated by the exception that judges should allow amendment\\nonly when doing so does not “cause prejudice to the defendants” or undue delay. Tefft v.\\nSeward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1982).\\n\\n The district court found that Hospital Defendants “would be severely prejudiced if MCEP\\nwere permitted to amend its Complaint at this late date” primarily for the reason that a proper\\nadjudication of the rim conspiracy claims would require a new round of discovery that could last\\nwell over a year. The district court was unmoved by MCEP’s arguments that amending its\\ncomplaint would not cause prejudice because Hospital Defendants had been “on notice” of the\\nrim conspiracy claims since MCEP filed its Omnibus Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for\\nSummary Judgment.\\n\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that its allowing MCEP to\\namend its complaint for a second time would require a new round of discovery that would cause\\n\\nevidence developed through discovery establishes the existence of an outer rim, meaning an understanding among\\ntwo or more payers that each had agreed with the defendants not to expand their hospital panel.”\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 23\\n\\n\\nundue delay and prejudice Hospital Defendants by significantly extending litigation that began in\\n2012. Tefft does not save MCEP on this point. In that case, it was “obvious that the facts as set\\nforth in Tefft’s original complaint would support [the new] cause of action . . . as well as [the\\noriginal cause of action].” Id. at 639. That is not the case here, where the facts as set forth in\\nMCEP’s Amended Complaint do not support MCEP’s different rim conspiracy claims. This\\ncase is more like Super Sulky, where a plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to add an\\nadditional Section 1 theory that was absent from the original complaint, but had been raised in\\nresponse to a motion for summary judgment—in short, the circumstance here. The district court\\ndenied that plaintiff’s motion to amend and we affirmed. Super Sulky, 174 F.3d at 740-41.\\n\\n Judge Rice did not abuse his discretion when he denied MCEP’s motion to amend its\\ncomplaint.14\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Because Judge Rice was correct to find that the challenged restraints do not fall within\\nthe circumscribed categories of per se condemnation, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of\\nsummary judgment.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14MCEP raised two additional claims on appeal—that the district court erred in dismissing Catholic Heath\\nInitiatives and that the case should be remanded to Judge Black rather than Judge Rice. Both arguments are mooted\\nbecause we affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Hospital Defendants.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 24\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n CONCURRENCE\\n _________________\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4390873/\", \"author_raw\": \"ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"SUTTON, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"SUTTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join Judge Batchelder’s thoughtful opinion in\\nfull. I write separately to discuss the law-of-the-case doctrine and to explain why it does not\\napply to the prior panel’s decision.\\n\\n What we call law of the case has two parts. The first part, known as the “mandate rule,”\\nis vertical. A lower court “is bound by the decree [of a higher court] as the law of the case, and\\nmust carry it into execution according to the mandate.” In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S.\\n247, 255 (1895). The rule springs from the hierarchical structure of our judicial system and\\nleaves no room for discretion. If the U.S. Supreme Court resolves an issue in a case and remands\\nthe matter to us, we are duty bound to follow the mandate of the superior court. So too at the\\ntrial level. If we decide an issue and remand the case, the trial court must carry out its duties in\\naccordance with that mandate. See Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 459–\\n60 (2016).\\n\\n The second part, the part implicated by this case, is horizontal. It “expresses the practice\\nof courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided” by an earlier panel of the same\\ncourt in the same case. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912) (Holmes, J.). Unlike\\nits upward counterpart, the sideways version of the law of the case is “not a limit to [a court’s]\\npower.” Id. A later panel of an appellate court, like a district court, “has the power to revisit\\nprior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance.” Christianson v. Colt\\nIndus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988). That is what happened when Judge Rice took\\nover this case, reconsidered Judge Black’s opinion, came to a different conclusion, and granted\\nsummary judgment to Premier. See supra at 7; Garner, supra, at 474, 487–88.\\n\\n Today, we sit in essentially the same position as Judge Rice. A prior panel of our court\\ndecided that Premier was not a single entity under the Sherman Act. See Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth\\nPlace, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys., 817 F.3d 934, 936 (6th Cir. 2016). One judge dissented. Id.\\nat 945 (Griffin, J., dissenting). Now the case has returned.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 25\\n\\n\\n As I see it, the dissent got it right. Section 1 of the Sherman Act “does not reach conduct\\nthat is wholly unilateral.” Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)\\n(quotation omitted). Officers and divisions within a single entity cannot collude in a way that\\nviolates § 1. Single-entity status depends on economic realities rather than labels. Whether or\\nnot they keep their separate corporate identities, participants in a joint venture merge into a\\nsingle entity if (1) their agreement creates a “complete unity of interest,” id. at 771, and (2) they\\nreceive orders from a single decisionmaking center, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League,\\n560 U.S. 183, 194 (2010).\\n\\n Premier qualified as a single entity.\\n\\n Complete unity of interest? Check. The hospitals shared profits and losses according to\\na distribution schedule that did not change based on any one hospital’s performance. That means\\nthat each hospital in the joint venture benefited when another hospital succeeded even if that\\nother hospital drew patients and profits away.\\n\\n Single decisionmaking center? Check again. Premier served as the “operator” for all the\\njoint venture’s health system activities and had the power to negotiate managed care contracts,\\nfire hospital executives, dictate their budgets, and plot the strategic course each hospital took.\\nMed. Ctr., 817 F.3d at 950 (Griffin, J., dissenting).\\n\\n The law-of-the-case doctrine does not prohibit us from reviewing that ruling. And I\\nwould suggest we do so in this case save for one reality: It makes no difference to the outcome.\\nEither way, Premier rightfully prevails.\\n\\n No doubt, it’s often said that courts at all levels should be “loathe” to overturn their\\nearlier opinions unless they are “clearly erroneous” and cause a “manifest injustice.”\\nChristianson, 486 U.S. at 817 (quotations omitted). But what does that mean? Surely, a legal\\nruling does not become more insulated from reversal by a senior court every time the junior court\\nrefuses to reconsider a prior ruling. The “clear error” and “manifest injustice” phrases must refer\\nto something else. They instead are a reminder that courts should not lightly reconsider prior\\nrulings in the same case—lest we scramble the expectations of the parties and encourage serial\\nefforts to revisit prior rulings. These are, in other words, self-enforced standards, not the\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 26\\n\\n\\nstandard a senior court uses to review a reconsidered ruling. There is no such thing as upholding\\nan erroneous, but not clearly erroneous, legal ruling in this setting. Accordingly, if a court\\nrevisits a prior legal ruling, that does not transform the standard of review from de novo to clear\\nerror. See Garner, supra, at 447.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 27\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n DISSENT\\n _________________\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4390873/\", \"author_raw\": \"SUTTON, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}, {\"author\": \"HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. I agree with the majority’s\\nconclusion that the rule of reason applies to the alleged conspiracy involving concerted action by\\nthe Hospital Defendants. However, I disagree with the majority’s determination regarding the\\nrim conspiracy involving the payers.\\n\\n The majority acknowledges that there is evidence of horizontal concerted action among\\nthe payers, orchestrated by Defendants, not to provide MCEP a managed-care contract (i.e., the\\n“rim conspiracy”), and that the per se rule would apply to that conspiracy. The majority\\nnevertheless concludes that MCEP cannot present that evidence to a jury because (1) it\\nconstitutes a separate, unpled claim from the conspiracy claim that MCEP pled; and (2) Judge\\nRice did not abuse his discretion in determining that allowing MCEP to amend its complaint to\\ninclude this claim would prejudice Defendants. Because the allegations in MCEP’s Amended\\nComplaint encompass this rim conspiracy; the evidence was known by Defendants early in the\\nproceedings; this court discussed the evidence of a rim conspiracy in the first appeal; Judge\\nBlack relied on the evidence of a rim conspiracy in denying Defendants’ summary judgment\\nmotions after remand; and Defendants failed to seek the purported necessary additional\\ndiscovery in a timely fashion, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for\\ntrial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.\\n\\n The majority’s recitation of the procedural history of this case omits important details\\nthat bear on whether the rim conspiracy should proceed to trial. After Defendants moved for\\nsummary judgment on the basis that they were a single entity and thus incapable of conspiring,\\nMCEP affirmatively raised the rim conspiracy, arguing in opposition to Defendants’ motion that\\nevidence of concerted action by the payers—what MCEP called “an additional facet to th[e]\\nconspiracy” it pled (R. 139, PID 10136)—meant that the plurality requirement was met and that\\nthe alleged conspiracy would still be subject to per se treatment even if Defendants were a single\\nentity. In reply, Defendants did not argue that the rim conspiracy constituted a separate and\\nuntimely alleged conspiracy; and they did not argue that they needed additional discovery\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 28\\n\\n\\nregarding this concerted action. Rather, they argued only that there was insufficient evidence of\\nthe rim conspiracy, forfeiting any timeliness argument.\\n\\n It was not until the first appeal that Defendants challenged the rim-conspiracy claim as\\nnot encompassed within MCEP’s Amended Complaint, and therefore untimely. Defendants also\\nargued that they would be prejudiced by adding this new theory to the case, and stressed at oral\\nargument in the first appeal that they would need additional discovery to defend against the\\nallegation of horizontal concerted action by the payers. Despite Defendants’ argument, the prior\\npanel expressly considered evidence of the rim conspiracy in its majority opinion:\\n\\n Plaintiff has submitted evidence that each insurer knew that the other insurers had\\n included this [panel] limitation in their contracts, as demonstrated by the excerpt\\n below from a Dayton industry publication:\\n Premier has threatened to revoke privileges for physicians\\n participating in [plaintiff hospital] and contracts with health plans\\n such as Anthem and UnitedHealth are known to be contingent on\\n excluding [plaintiff hospital] from the network.\\n In addition to this published account, plaintiff also offered evidence from\\n insurance company emails and defendant hospitals’ Board of Directors meetings\\n that, in addition to demonstrating knowledge among the insurers of the restriction\\n on adding new hospitals to their networks in their managed-care contracts with\\n defendant hospitals, the insurance companies regularly monitored each other to\\n ensure that the other insurance companies were complying with the contract\\n restriction on dealing with a new hospital.\\n\\nMed. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys., 817 F.3d 934, 941–42 (6th Cir. 2016)\\n(hereafter MCEP I) (second and third alterations in original) (internal citation omitted).\\n\\n After remand, Judge Black issued an order requesting briefing regarding the effects of the\\nopinion in MCEP I on Defendants’ previously filed summary judgment motions. In their reply\\nbrief, Defendants summarily argued, for the first time before the district court, that the horizontal\\nconcerted action by the payers was not pled and that adding that theory to the case would\\nprejudice them. Defendants did not request additional discovery on that issue, however.\\n\\n In denying Defendants’ remaining summary judgment motions, to support his conclusion\\nthat the per se rule applies to MCEP’s antitrust claim, Judge Black discussed and relied on\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 29\\n\\n\\nevidence that at the behest of Defendants, the payers joined in an agreement not to deal with\\nMCEP.1\\n\\n After Judge Black denied Defendants’ remaining summary judgment motions, and\\ndespite this court’s and Judge Black’s opinions indicating that the rim conspiracy was part of the\\ncase and Defendants’ representation to this court that they would need additional discovery to\\ndefend against that theory, Defendants still did not request additional discovery. Instead, more\\nthan seven months later, after Judge Black recused himself and only a couple of months before\\ntrial was scheduled to begin, Defendants made the same untimeliness argument to Judge Rice,\\narguing that they would be prejudiced if the rim conspiracy was included at trial and that they\\nwould need 12–18 months of additional discovery. As the majority explains, Judge Rice\\naccepted those arguments, finding that the rim conspiracy was not alleged in the Amended\\nComplaint and that MCEP could not file a Second Amended Complaint because Defendants\\nwould be prejudiced by the delay.\\n\\n Given this chronology, I would reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment\\nand allow the rim conspiracy, which all agree is subject to the per se rule, to proceed to trial.\\nThis conclusion is not dependent on whether the law of the case applies, but rather on whether\\nthe issue was fairly included in the case. First, MCEP’s Amended Complaint expressly alleges a\\ngroup boycott subject to per se condemnation involving Defendants and the payers. The\\nhorizontal concerted action by the payers, orchestrated and monitored by Defendants, can\\nreasonably be construed as part of this single, overarching conspiracy. This conclusion is\\nreinforced by Defendants’ failure to argue in their summary judgment briefs before the first\\nappeal that the rim conspiracy was not encompassed within the Amended Complaint; and this\\n\\n\\n 1Because Judge Black construed MCEP’s claim as encompassing the rim conspiracy, his conclusion that\\nthe per se rule applied to MCEP’s claim is reasonable. Further, despite the majority’s conclusion “that then-Judge\\nSotomayor’s concurrence in MLB Properties” is “[p]erhaps most destructive to” Judge Black’s framing of the\\nancillary-restraints doctrine (Maj. Op. at 13), then-Judge Sotomayor’s concurrence in MLB Properties stated at\\nseveral points that the restraint must be “reasonably necessary” to the efficiency-enhancing benefits of the joint\\nventure. See, e.g., 542 F.3d at 338 (explaining that a per se approach may apply to joint ventures where “a particular\\nchallenged restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve any of the efficiency-enhancing benefits of a joint\\nventure and serves only as naked restraint against competition”). Thus, the majority’s critique of Judge Black’s\\nformulation of the ancillary-restraints doctrine—requiring the restraint to be necessary to an efficiency-enhancing\\npurpose of the joint venture—is not entirely fair given the broader context of his ruling.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 30\\n\\n\\ncourt’s and Judge Black’s express reliance on evidence of the rim conspiracy when discussing\\nthe merits of this case.\\n\\n Second, Defendants’ prejudice argument is unavailing in light of their failure to (1) argue\\nprejudice in their initial summary judgment briefing, and (2) seek the discovery they told this\\ncourt they would need in October 2015, despite the opportunity to do so for months. Rather than\\nseek the discovery they claimed to need, Defendants moved forward with trial preparations\\nbefore deciding to try their untimeliness argument a third time on a different judge after it failed\\nto persuade either this court or Judge Black.\\n\\n More fundamentally, the majority’s affirmance of the dismissal of the rim conspiracy\\ndeprives MCEP of any remedy based on a pleading technicality even though all agree that there\\nis sufficient evidence that Defendants and the payers conspired to exclude MCEP from the\\nmarket in a way that is per se illegal—i.e., in a way that is “so inherently anticompetitive that\\n[the agreement] is illegal per se without inquiry into the harm it has actually caused.”\\nCopperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (citation omitted). Because\\n“cases should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings,” Tefft v. Seward,\\n689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1982), I would remand the rim conspiracy for trial.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4390873/\", \"author_raw\": \"HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BATCHELDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SUTTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BATCHELDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":5,"string":"5"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613620/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: The MEDICAL CENTER AT ELIZABETH PLACE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ATRIUM HEALTH SYSTEM, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0078p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n THE MEDICAL CENTER AT ELIZABETH PLACE, LLC, ┐\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\n │\n > No. 17-3863\n v. │\n │\n │\n ATRIUM HEALTH SYSTEM, et al., │\n Defendants-Appellees. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Ohio at Dayton.\n No. 3:12-cv-00026—Walter H. Rice, District Judge.\n\n Argued: April 25, 2018\n\n Decided and Filed: April 25, 2019\n\n Before: BATCHELDER, SUTTON, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: Richard A. Ripley, RUYAK CHERIAN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.\nShay Dvoretzky, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Richard A.\nRipley, Brittany V. Ruyak, RUYAK CHERIAN LLP, Washington, D.C., James A. Dyer, Patrick\nO’Shaughnessy, SEBALY, SHILLITO + DYER, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellant. Shay Dvoretzky,\nRobert Stander, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., Melinda K. Burton, FARUKI IRELAND COX\nRHINEHART & DUSING P.L.L., Dayton, Ohio, Thomas Demitrack, JONES DAY, Cleveland,\nOhio, for Appellees.\n\n BATCHELDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which SUTTON, J., joined, and\nWHITE J., joined in part. SUTTON, J. (pp. 24–26), delivered a separate concurring opinion.\nWHITE, J. (pp. 27–30), delivered a separate opinion dissenting in part.\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 2\n\n\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. This is a case about competition among\nhospitals in Dayton, Ohio. When Medical Center at Elizabeth Place, LLC (“MCEP”) opened in\n2006, it was an acute care, for-profit hospital owned by 60 physicians and one corporate\nshareholder. By 2009, MCEP’s existence as a physician-owned enterprise came to an end when\nit sold an ownership interest to Kettering Health Network, a competitor in the Dayton healthcare\nmarket. MCEP alleges that it failed because of the anticompetitive actions of Premier Health\nPartners (“Premier”), a dominant healthcare network in the Dayton area. MCEP alleges that\nPremier contracted with area physicians and payers (insurers and managed-care plan providers)\non the condition that they did not do business with MCEP. Because payers provide patients and\nphysicians provide services, it is difficult to run a viable hospital when one, let alone both, is in\nshort supply.\n\n So, whether by licit or illicit means, Premier won that competition. In this litigation, the\nparties competed again. This time, MCEP pushed all its chips to the center of the table on one\nhand of cards: a claim that Premier had engaged in conduct so devoid of benefit to the market as\nto be per se illegal under the Sherman Act. Such claims apply only to a limited range of conduct.\nTo be per se illegal, a defendant’s conduct has to be so obviously anticompetitive that it has no\nplausibly procompetitive features—a high hurdle for plaintiffs claiming restraint of trade. Once\nthey clear it, however, plaintiffs receive a corresponding reward: they need not undergo the often\narduous process of showing that the challenged conduct was anticompetitive. As one of our\nsister circuits has described it, “[t]he per se rule is the trump card of antitrust law. When an\nantitrust plaintiff successfully plays it, he need only tally his score.” United States v. Realty\nMulti-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1980).1\n\n\n 1The other approach to determining whether a restraint of trade is “unreasonable” is the “rule of reason.”\nIn re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litigation, 739 F.3d 262, 270 (6th Cir. 2014). “If the rule of reason is used,\nplaintiffs must additionally show that the restraint produced anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and\ngeographic markets, while the per se rule is reserved for restraints that are so clearly unreasonable that their\nanticompetitive effects within geographic and product markets are inferred.” Id.\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 3\n\n\n The question before us is whether MCEP successfully played its hand. The district court\nfrom which MCEP appeals found that MCEP’s per se claim failed because the record showed\nthat Premier’s contracts with payers and physicians had plausibly procompetitive features. That\nholding says nothing about whether Premier’s conduct was on balance procompetitive or\nanticompetitive. This opinion likewise reaches no decision on the ultimate economic merits of\nPremier’s actions because to do so would go beyond our charge. We must address only the\nquestion of per se illegality, and as to that, we agree with the district court that MCEP failed to\nmeet the high standard required for per se claims. We AFFIRM.\n\n I.\n\n MCEP alleges a conspiracy between the Premier hospitals that implicates, without\nnaming as defendants, payers and physicians in the Dayton area. During the course of this multi-\nyear litigation, various legal issues raised in this case have been ruled on by U.S. District Judge\nBlack, a Sixth Circuit appellate panel, and then, after the matter was remanded and Judge Black\nrecused himself, District Judge Rice, who granted the motion for summary judgment presently\nbefore us.\n\n Factual Background\n\n MCEP is an acute-care hospital located in Dayton, Ohio, that opened in September 2006\nwith 60 physician owners and one corporate shareholder, Regent Surgical Health. Defendants in\nthis case comprise four hospitals—Miami Valley Hospital (owned by MedAmerica Health),\nGood Samaritan Hospital (owned by Catholic Health Initiatives), Atrium Medical Center (owned\nby Atrium Health Systems), and Upper Valley Medical Center—as well as a joint operating\ncompany, Premier Health Partners (“Premier”), formed through a joint operating agreement\namong those four hospitals.2 This joint operating agreement merged some of the hospitals’\nhealthcare functions but allowed them to retain control of others. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place v.\nAtrium Health Sys. (“MCEP I”), 817 F.3d 934, 936-37 (6th Cir. 2016). Hospital Defendants\n\n\n\n 2In this opinion, we refer to the four hospitals and the joint operating company collectively as “Hospital\nDefendants” except where otherwise noted.\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 4\n\n\ncomprise a dominant healthcare network in the Dayton area, with more than a 55% share of\nDayton’s inpatient surgical services.\n\n In spite of its dominant market position, the record leaves no doubt that Hospital\nDefendants felt threatened by the possibility of MCEP’s presence in the Dayton medical market.\nFive months before MCEP opened for business, Hospital Defendants held a board meeting at\nwhich, “[b]y consensus, the Board supported management’s efforts” to oppose MCEP.\nExecutives from Premier told an MCEP shareholder that Hospital Defendants “would do\nwhatever they needed to do in order to stop [MCEP] from opening.”\n\n Hospital Defendants’ underlying concern appears to have been that MCEP’s for-profit,\nphysician-owned model of healthcare would “bankrupt” their hospitals. A letter written by\nprimary care physicians (most of whom were affiliated with Hospital Defendants), addressed to\nphysicians in the Dayton healthcare market, expressed the dynamic they found worrisome:\n\n There is currently widespread opposition among not-for-profit community\n hospitals across the country toward physician owned inpatients [sic] hospitals\n such as this. The physician investors are doing so for reasons of profitability.\n MVH and GSH offer the range of services and the quality of care necessary to\n enable surgeons to care for their patients. A physician owned specialty hospital\n will take the better-insured and more profitable patients away from Premier\n (along with ancillary services), leaving our local hospitals with only the more\n complex and underinsured patients.\n\nMCEP, for its part, wrote a “Dear Colleague” letter the next month, responding:\n\n • While MCEP’s business model will “create a competitive environment to\n deliver better and more efficient healthcare in Dayton,” it will not drive\n hospitals out of business;\n • MCEP “will not turn away patients on the basis of payor classification”;\n • “Premier generates about $1 billion in revenues and currently has a cash\n reserve of over $1 billion. As a non-profit, Premier pays no taxes. . . .\n [MCEP] will have revenues that are a fraction of Premier’s, and our\n physician-owned hospital will pay corporate, personal and property taxes”;\n • “[C]omprehensive studies have confirmed that physician-run hospitals have\n fewer medical errors, shorter turnover times, fewer infections and greater cost\n efficiencies.”\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 5\n\n\nCiting Hospital Defendants’ board-meeting consensus and their letter to physicians, MCEP\nalleges that Hospital Defendants blocked MCEP from gaining meaningful access to the Dayton\nmarket through a series of anticompetitive acts that amounted to a group boycott of MCEP. In\nits Amended Complaint, MCEP made only a per se claim; MCEP made no claim under the rule\nof reason. MCEP’s Amended Complaint alleges that Hospital Defendants:\n\n • financially coerced commercial health insurers or managed care plan\n providers (such as Anthem, UnitedHealthcare, Private Healthcare Systems,\n etc.) “to refuse to permit [MCEP] full access to their respective networks”;\n • financially coerced commercial health insurers or managed care plans to\n reimburse MCEP at suppressed rates far below what Hospital Defendants\n demanded for the same services;\n • threatened retributive financial consequences to physicians who affiliated with\n MCEP, and followed through on threats, “including terminating leases that the\n physicians had with the Defendants for office space”;\n • offered payments to physicians “who agreed not to work with or at [MCEP];\n and who agreed to divest ownership in the Medical Center”;\n • financially coerced physicians affiliated with Hospital Defendants from\n “admitting patients to [MCEP] or referring patients to physicians who treated\n patients at [MCEP]”; and\n • deliberately poached physicians from MCEP who made up a\n “disproportionately high number of admissions and then prohibited them from\n admitting patients to [MCEP].”\n\n Beyond these allegations, MCEP claims that, in the course of litigation, it discovered two\nadditional agreements that comprised part of the actionable group boycott.3 First, MCEP alleges\nan agreement among the payers, induced by Hospital Defendants, not to offer MCEP a managed\ncare contract. Second, MCEP alleges an agreement among primary care physicians not to do\nbusiness with physicians who invested in MCEP (Hospital Defendants refer to this as the\n“physician conspiracy”). Hospital Defendants describe the relationship of these agreements to\nthe original allegation using the metaphor of a hub, spoke, and rim. For these claims, the\nHospital Defendants form the hub; the vertical agreements the Hospital Defendants made with\n\n 3While there is some dispute about exactly when these claims were first brought to Hospital Defendants’\nattention, there does not appear to be any dispute that the claims were raised (though the Complaint was not\namended to reflect the new claims) in MCEP’s opposition to Hospital Defendants’ initial motion for summary\njudgment before Judge Black.\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 6\n\n\npayers and physicians to exclude MCEP are the spokes; and the discrete agreements to boycott\nMCEP, among the payers and among the physicians, are at the rim.\n\n MCEP alleged only the “hub” agreement in its Amended Complaint. Hospital\nDefendants argue that the “rim conspiracy” claim is a new, and untimely, Sherman Act Section 1\nclaim. MCEP, for its part, maintains that the additional agreements are simply evidence of the\noverarching Section 1 conspiracy alleged in their Amended Complaint. Regardless of the exact\nscope of the alleged boycott, MCEP alleges that one existed, that it was orchestrated by Hospital\nDefendants, and that it prevented MCEP from succeeding as a going concern. MCEP claims\nthat, but for Hospital Defendants’ conduct, it would have been able to contract with payers and\nphysicians, which would have, in turn, increased competition in the Dayton healthcare market for\nconsumers of general inpatient surgical services.\n\n Procedural History\n\n This case was before Judge Black in Cincinnati from January 30, 2012, to April 19, 2017.\nDuring that time, Judge Black granted Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on\nthe ground that the MCEP’s antitrust claim lacked the necessary plurality of actors.\n\n On appeal to this court, a divided panel reversed Judge Black and rejected Hospital\nDefendants’ motion for summary judgment. The panel held that a reasonable juror could find\nthat Premier comprised multiple competing entities and, therefore, could engage in concerted\naction. MCEP I, 817 F.3d at 945. The panel did not address other issues raised before it, such as\nwhether MCEP’s additional rim conspiracy claims were untimely. Id. at 939.\n\n On remand, Hospital Defendants moved again for summary judgment arguing, among\nother things, that MCEP’s allegation of a per se antitrust violation failed as a matter of law.\nHospital Defendants argued that their alleged restraints on trade were plausibly procompetitive\nwhich, they argued, is sufficient to defeat a per se antitrust claim. Because MCEP pleaded only a\nper se claim, if Hospital Defendants had succeeded in this argument, the case would have been\ndismissed. Judge Black denied Hospital Defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment,\nrejecting Hospital Defendants’ argument on two alternative bases: first, the claimed\nprocompetitive effects of the challenged conduct are subject to genuine dispute and are therefore\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 7\n\n\nan improper basis for summary judgment, and second, Hospital Defendants “failed to evidence\nthat their joint contracting has any efficiency-enhancing purpose to which such an agreement is\nnecessary.” Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place v. Premier Health Partners, 2016 WL 9460026, at *5\n(S.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2016).\n\n The case was set for trial. But on April 19, 2017, Judge Black recused himself and the\ncase was re-assigned to Judge Rice.4 Before Judge Rice, Hospital Defendants moved to “Clarify\nIssues for Trial,” which all parties now agree amounted to a motion for reconsideration of Judge\nBlack’s October 6, 2016, order denying Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.\nLess than a week before trial was set to begin, Judge Rice granted Hospital Defendants’ motion\nfor summary judgment and dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice. Judge Rice\ndeclined to apply the “law of the case” doctrine, holding that Judge Black had clearly erred. He\nfound that while Judge Black correctly articulated the standard for a per se claim—that the\nchallenged conduct must have no plausible procompetitive effect—Judge Black failed to\nacknowledge that the record showed that the Hospital Defendants’ challenged restraints had such\nplausible procompetitive effects. Judge Rice also rejected MCEP’s argument that the Amended\nComplaint implicitly included claims of rim conspiracies among the payers and among the\nphysicians—claims that all agree, if proven, would constitute a per se violation—explaining that\nthose claims were not contained in the Amended Complaint, that MCEP’s attempt to “wedge this\nnew claim into the existing allegations” was improper, and that the Hospital “Defendants would\nbe severely prejudiced if MCEP were permitted to amend its Complaint [again] at this late date.”\nMCEP asks us to reverse Judge Rice’s decision granting Hospital Defendants’ motion for\nsummary judgment and to remand the case for trial.\n\n II.\n\n Summary judgment is warranted if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the\nnonmoving party, no material fact is subject to a genuine dispute. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.\n\n\n\n\n 4Judge Black explained that, as a “Cincinnati duty-stationed Judge,” he could not preside over a trial in\nDayton.\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 8\n\n\nZenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986).5 We review de novo grants of summary\njudgment. Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone Cty., 440 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2006).\n\n The parties dispute what de novo review should entail in this case. MCEP claims that\nJudge Rice’s decision to not apply the “law of the case” doctrine was critical to his decision to\ngrant Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and therefore we must review Judge\nRice’s “law of the case” decision de novo. According to MCEP, Judge Rice could reconsider\nJudge Black’s denial of summary judgment only by finding that Judge Black clearly erred. So,\nMCEP says, if Judge Rice was wrong that Judge Black committed clear error, then we must\nreverse his “law of the case” judgment. For their part, Hospital Defendants argue that we should\nsimply review de novo Judge Rice’s substantive legal conclusions, separate and apart from Judge\nRice’s “law of the case” conclusion.\n\n Ultimately, the Hospital Defendants have the better of this argument. First, we review\nfor abuse of discretion Judge Rice’s decision to reconsider Judge Black’s pre-transfer order. See\nUnited States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1990). MCEP argues that abuse of discretion\nis not the proper standard of review in a case transferred from one district court to another, in\nwhich a pre-transfer ruling of one judge is altered by a post-transfer decision of a different judge.\nWe have foreclosed this argument by holding—in precisely the scenario identified by MCEP—\nthat abuse of discretion remains the proper standard of review. See Gillig v. Advanced\nCardiovascular Sys. Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 1995).6\n\n\n 5If a presumption against summary judgment in antitrust cases is ever appropriate, it is not here. This\ncircuit has applied a presumption against summary judgment in antitrust actions only when the case demanded a\nfact-intensive inquiry under the rule of reason into issues of intent and motive. In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust\nLitig., 739 F.3d 262, 270 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone Cty., 440 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir.\n2006)); but see In re ATM Antitrust Litigation, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (N. D. Cal. 2008) (opining that “any\npresumption against the granting of summary judgment in complex antitrust cases has now disappeared”) (citation\nomitted). Unlike in a rule of reason claim, in a per se claim intent and motive are not critical determinations. See\nPhillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1910a (3rd ed. 2011).\n 6MCEP cites Jimkoski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 247 F. App’x 654 (6th Cir. 2007), for the\nproposition that Judge Rice’s “law of the case” decision—specifically his finding that Judge Black committed clear\nerror—should be reviewed de novo. This misapplies Jimkoski. Read in context, Jimkoski simply acknowledged that\nwhere a motion for reconsideration concerns summary judgment, we do not review the district court’s decision to\ngrant summary judgment for abuse of discretion. Id. at 659. To do so would insulate the district court’s merits\ndecision from the proper standard of review—de novo—simply because the motion that the district court ruled on\nwas a motion for reconsideration. That concern is not present in this case because we review for abuse of discretion\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 9\n\n\n Second, we can find that Judge Rice abused his discretion in disturbing Judge Black’s\ndenial of summary judgment only if we have a “definite and firm conviction that [Judge Rice]\ncommitted a clear error in judgment” such as “rel[ying] upon clearly erroneous factual findings,\nappl[ying] the law improperly, or us[ing] an erroneous legal standard.” See Garner v. Cuyahoga\nCty. Juvenile Ct., 554 F.3d 624, 634 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Of\nthese potential bases for abuse of discretion, MCEP argues only that Judge Rice improperly\napplied the law, a question that we review de novo.\n\n III.\n\n MCEP’s raises two substantive claims on appeal. First, MCEP argues that the district\ncourt erred by declining to apply the per se rule to Hospital Defendants’ allegedly\nanticompetitive conduct. Second, MCEP argues that the district court erred in rejecting MCEP’s\n“horizontal rim claims” due to untimeliness. Neither argument has merit.\n\n A.\n\n Per se claim\n\n Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of\ntrust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or\nwith foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Because virtually every\nagreement between parties has the potential to be considered a restraint of trade, antitrust\njurisprudence limits the range of restraints within the reach of antitrust law to agreements that\nunreasonably restrain trade. In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 270 (6th Cir.\n2014). A restraint on trade may be found to be unreasonable per se or under the “rule of reason.”\nId. As MCEP makes only a per se claim, the question before us is whether Judge Rice erred in\ngranting Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Hospital\nDefendants’ conduct falls outside per se illegality. Judges Black and Rice did not agree in their\nanswer to the underlying question and the prior Sixth Circuit panel declined to address it. MCEP\n\n\n\nthe decision to grant a motion for reconsideration (here that means we review the “law of the case” decision for\nabuse of discretion). But we still review de novo the merits of the district court’s grant of summary judgment.\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 10\n\n\nI, 817 F.3d at 939 (explaining that “[t]his appeal looks only at . . . whether defendants’ conduct is\nthe result of two or more entities acting in concert”).\n\n Although a motion for summary judgment against a per se claim involves underlying\nfacts, the propriety of per se treatment “is normally a question of legal characterization that can\noften be resolved by the judge on a motion . . . for summary judgment.” Stop & Shop\nSupermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 373 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 2004). There is a\npresumption against applying the per se rule “[u]nless the restraint falls squarely into a per se\ncategory.” Southeastern Milk, 739 F.3d at 271. As explained in Expert Masonry, “a plaintiff\nmust satisfy each element of the per se . . . test[] . . . in its allegations in order to survive pre-trial\ntermination.” 440 F.3d at 344 (emphasis added). In Southeastern Milk, the court held that, even\nwhere a factual dispute exists between the parties over whether a challenged restraint is\nobviously anticompetitive—and therefore deserving of per se treatment—the defendants\nproducing “evidence that the agreement at issue may have had procompetitive\naspects . . . indicate[s] that this situation would not fall into the categories of per se unreasonable\nrestraints on trade.” 739 F.3d at 274. The court concluded that “[t]herefore, especially at the\nsummary judgment stage, this is not a ‘clear cut’ case of an obviously anticompetitive trade\nrestraint, and thus the district court was correct to apply the default standard of the rule of\nreason.” Id. Hence, at the summary judgment phase, the right question to ask regarding per se\nclaims is whether the plaintiff has shown that the challenged restraint is so obviously\nanticompetitive that it should be condemned as per se illegal. If, in spite of the plaintiff’s efforts,\nthe record indicates that the challenged restraint is plausibly procompetitive, then summary\njudgment for the defendants is appropriate.\n\n Per se claims against joint ventures\n\n The question before us is further delineated by the fact that the challenged restraints exist\nwithin a joint venture, which the Supreme Court has noted “hold the promise of increasing a\nfirm’s efficiency and enabling it to compete more effectively.” Copperweld Corp v. Indep. Tube\nCorp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). At the same time, joint ventures often superficially resemble\nhorizontal concerted action because they involve horizontal competitors joining together to\nrestrain trade in some way, such as by coordinating prices. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S.\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 11\n\n\n1, 4 (2006) (denying a per se horizontal price fixing claim brought by a plaintiff against a joint\nventure created by Texaco and Shell Oil that unified their respective gasoline refining and\nmarketing operations in the western United States under two brands).\n\n Because joint ventures often have procompetitive efficiencies, when a joint venture is\nitself challenged as anticompetitive, that claim is reviewed under the rule of reason. Copperweld\nCorp., 467 U.S. at 768. But when the conduct of the joint venture is challenged, the relationship\nof the challenged conduct to the joint venture is analyzed to see if the conduct is reasonably\nrelated to the joint venture’s procompetitive features (and therefore should be judged under the\nrule of reason), or is a naked restraint lurking beneath the veneer of a legitimate joint venture\n(and therefore deserves per se condemnation). See Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Bd. of\nRegents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113-15 (1984) (observing that a “naked” restraint, subject\nto the per se rule, can exist even though it is contained in a joint venture agreement that is,\noverall, quite competitive). The Supreme Court has distinguished three categories of restraints:\n(1) restraints that are core to the joint venture’s efficiency enhancing purpose; (2) restraints that\nare ancillary to the joint venture’s efficiency enhancing purpose; and (3) restraints that are\nnakedly unrelated to the purpose of the joint venture. See Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7-8. Only the last\nof these three justifies per se treatment. Id.\n\n Core activity\n\n Core activity is activity that is “integral to the running” of the venture. Id. at 7-8. In\nDagher, the Supreme Court rejected a per se claim against horizontal price-setting by two\ncompetitors on the ground that the price-setting “involve[d] the core activity of the joint venture\nitself.” Id. at 7.\n\n Hospital Defendants claim that the challenged panel limitation—but not the other\nchallenged restraints—qualifies as core activity. They argue that because Dagher described\nprice setting as a core activity for the joint venture in that case, and because panel limitations are\na “pricing term” in Hospital Defendants’ contracts with payers, the panel limitations are “core\nactivity.”\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 12\n\n\n This argument is not persuasive. Dagher does not stand for the general proposition that\nrestraints in contracts that are price related are always core activity for joint ventures. Dagher’s\nholding was tailored to the specific joint venture before it. Id. at 5-6. This argument may be\ndismissed simply by noting that the definition of “core activity” provided by Dagher, “integral to\nthe running” of the joint venture, id. at 7-8, cannot seriously be argued of Hospital Defendants’\npanel limitations. Hospital Defendants continue to operate as a joint venture today even though\nthe panel limitation clauses have been removed from their contracts with payers.\n\n Joint venture’s ancillary restraints\n\n Restraints that are “ancillary to the legitimate and competitive purposes of the business\nassociation” fall between “core” activity and “naked” restraints. Id. at 7. These are restraints by\na joint venture that are not “integral to the running” of the joint venture, id. at 8, “but may\ncontribute to the success of a cooperative venture.” Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc.,\n776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985). A restraint is ancillary if it bears a reasonable relationship to\nthe joint venture’s success. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, 542 F.3d 290,\n339-40 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).\n\n Predictably, the parties spill considerable ink contesting what counts as “reasonable.”\nMCEP urges the panel to accept Judge Black’s version of the ancillary-restraints doctrine. We\ndecline to do so because Judge Black framed the ancillary-restraints inquiry incorrectly in two\nways: by applying too high a standard to determine what qualifies as “reasonable” and by\nplacing an evidentiary burden on Hospital Defendants to meet that standard. Judge Black\nrejected Hospital Defendants’ argument that their restraints bore a reasonable relationship to the\njoint venture’s success, holding that they “failed to evidence that their joint contracting has any\nefficiency-enhancing purpose to which such an agreement is necessary.” Under this standard,\nonly restraints that are necessary to a joint venture’s efficiency-enhancing purposes qualify as\nancillary. Further, Judge Black held that Hospital Defendants must provide “undisputed proof”\nthat the restraint is necessary to prevent a per se claim from proceeding to trial.\n\n Judge Black’s sole source of authority for this version of the ancillary-restraints doctrine\nis a guidance document put out by the Federal Trade Commission and the United States\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 13\n\n\nDepartment of Justice on collaboration among competitors. See Dep’t of Justice & FTC,\nAntitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.3, at 10-25 (Apr. 2000). But the\ncitation is of dubious relevance to the ancillary-restraints doctrine because the cited section deals\nwith joint ventures only under the rule of reason, not the per se rule.\n\n To bolster Judge Black’s approach, MCEP cites NaBanco v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d\n592, 601 (11th Cir. 1986), and In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 827, 872\n(N.D. Ill. 2010), for the proposition that an ancillary restraint must be necessary to achieve the\njoint venture’s efficiency-enhancing purpose. NaBanco supports MCEP’s preferred formulation,\nbut In re Sulfuric Acid does not. In re Sulfuric Acid echoes the ancillary-restraints inquiry\narticulated by the Seventh Circuit in Polk Brothers: “A court must ask whether an agreement\npromoted enterprise and productivity at the time it was adopted. If it arguably did, then the court\nmust apply the Rule of Reason to make a more discriminating assessment.” 743 F. Supp. 2d at\n872 (quoting Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189) (emphasis added).\n\n Hospital Defendants, on the other hand, describe the standard as whether there exists a\nplausible procompetitive rationale for the restraint.7 The Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth\nCircuits adopt this approach.8\n\n Perhaps most destructive to MCEP’s argument is then-Judge Sotomayor’s concurrence in\nMLB Properties, 542 F.3d at 338. Although MCEP cites that concurrence five times in its\nbriefing, Judge Sotomayor categorically rejected the position MCEP asks this court to adopt.\nShe described ancillary restraints as requiring “a reasonable procompetitive justification, related\nto the efficiency-enhancing purposes of the joint venture.” Id. at 339 (emphasis added). Then, in\n\n 7Hospital Defendants, at one point, argue that the correct legal standard for determining whether a restraint\nis ancillary or naked is whether the challenged restraint is “completely unrelated to the purpose of a lawful joint\nventure.” But this mischaracterizes the ancillary-restraints doctrine. “The per se rule would collapse if every claim\nof economies from restricting competition, however implausible, could be used to move a horizontal agreement not\nto compete from the per se rule to the Rule of Reason category.” Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n,\n744 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1984).\n 8See MLB Properties, 542 F.3d at 338-39 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Craftsmen Limo,, Inc. v. Ford Motor\nCo., 363 F.3d 761, 776 (8th Cir. 2004) (“When determining whether to apply the rule of reason analysis to non-price\nadvertising restrictions related to product safety, the issue is not whether the restrictions were procompetitive, but\nwhether they could be.”); Paladin Assoc., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2003) (“When\na defendant advances plausible arguments that a practice enhances overall efficiency and makes markets more\ncompetitive, per se treatment is inappropriate, and the rule of reason applies.”); Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189.\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 14\n\n\ndefining what qualifies as “reasonable,” she expressly rejected the formulation that MCEP\nargues here: “Under the ancillary restraints doctrine, a challenged restraint need not be essential,\nbut rather only reasonably ancillary to the legitimate cooperative aspects of the venture.” Id. at\n340 n.11 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189\n(explaining that a restraint is ancillary if it may promote the success of a joint venture).\n\n The question of what relationship a challenged restraint must have to a joint venture in\norder to qualify as ancillary splits the Circuits—the Eleventh Circuit on the one hand, and the\nSecond, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits on the other. We follow the majority of Circuits\nand hold that a joint venture’s restraint is ancillary and therefore inappropriate for per se\ncategorization when, viewed at the time it was adopted, the restraint “may contribute to the\nsuccess of a cooperative venture.” Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189. That approach better accords\nwith Supreme Court guidance. As the Ninth Circuit in Paladin Associates explained:\n\n The Supreme Court generally has treated as per se illegal joint efforts by firms to\n disadvantage a competitor by persuading customers to deny that competitor\n relationships the competitor needs in the competitive struggle. But in these cases,\n the practices generally were not justified by plausible arguments that the practices\n enhanced overall efficiency and made markets more competitive.\n\n328 F.3d at 1154-55. In a footnote that follows the court elaborated:\n\n This is so because plausible arguments that a practice is procompetitive make us\n unable to conclude “the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is clear and the\n possibility of countervailing procompetitive effects is remote.”\n\nId. at 1155 n.8 (quoting Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294).\n\n Paladin faithfully applies the Supreme Court’s holding in Stationers. Condemning as per\nse illegal restraints that, while not necessary to achieving a joint venture’s efficiency-enhancing\npurpose nevertheless plausibly relate to that purpose, would run counter to the Supreme Court’s\ninstruction to avoid applying the per se rule to situations where efficiencies are being served.\nSee Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 894 (2007) (holding that\nper se treatment is inappropriate where “it cannot be stated with any degree of confidence that\n[the challenged restraint] ‘always or almost always tends to restrict competition and decrease\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 15\n\n\noutput’”) (quoting Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723\n(1988)).\n\n MCEP’s second but related argument, which was adopted by Judge Black, is that\nHospital Defendants bear the burden of proving that a challenged restraint is procompetitive, and\ntherefore ancillary, because the question of the procompetitiveness of a restraint is\n“quintessentially one of fact.” Judge Black’s inclination to defer to the fact finder has an\nintuitive appeal in the summary judgment context. And it would be correct had MCEP brought a\nclaim under the rule of reason. See Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Mach., Inc., 221 F.3d\n913, 919 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he rule of reason requires the factfinder to decide whether under all\nthe circumstances of the case the restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on\ncompetition.”) (citation omitted). For a per se claim, however, Judge Black’s conclusion is\nerroneous. Whether challenged conduct belongs in the per se category is a question of law. See\nAriz. v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Socy., 457 U.S. 332, 337 n.3, 354 (1982) (characterizing the per se\nrule as a “rule of law”); MM Steel, L.P. v. JSW Steel (USA) Inc., 806 F.3d 835, 847 (5th Cir.\n2015) (“The decision to analyze the conspiracy under a per se theory of liability is a question of\nlaw that we review de novo.”). In Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., the Eighth\nCircuit likewise found that whether a given restraint falls within the per se category is a question\nof law, citing a well-respected treatise on antitrust law for the proposition that “although a\ncourt’s determination that the per se rule applies ‘might involve many fact questions, the\nselection of a mode of analysis is entirely a question of law.’” 363 F.3d 761, 772 (8th Cir. 2004)\n(citing Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1909b (1998)). And it is a\nquestion of law where certain presumptions apply. As we explained in Expert Masonry, the\n“plaintiff must satisfy each element of the per se . . . test[] . . . in its allegations in order to\nsurvive pre-trial termination.” 440 F.3d at 344 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has\nlikewise held that because a plaintiff failed to make a threshold showing that the challenged\nconduct had the characteristics necessary to justify per se condemnation, rule of reason analysis\nshould apply instead. Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298 (“A plaintiff seeking application of the per se\nrule must present a threshold case that the challenged activity falls into a category likely to have\npredominantly anticompetitive effects.”).\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 16\n\n\n If the record in this case reveals a plausible way in which the challenged restraints\ncontribute to the procompetitive efficiencies of the joint venture, then “the possibility of\ncountervailing procompetitive effects” is not remote and per se treatment is improper. Id. at 294.\nWhat are Premier’s procompetitive efficiencies? The joint operating agreement of Hospital\nDefendants’ joint venture, Premier, states the following goals:\n\n (1) To provide a broad scope and a continuum of health care services with a focus\n upon community health benefit.\n (2) To improve cost effectiveness and efficiencies in the delivery of health care\n services.\n (3) To increase the quality of health care services in the greater Miami Valley\n Region.\n (4) To integrate physicians and other health care providers with the JOC Network.\n (5) To have the capacity to assume and manage financial risk.\n (6) To improve the health status of the greater Miami Valley Region.\n\nWe analyze Hospital Defendants’ challenged restraints in light of these goals.9\n\n MCEP challenges two kinds of conduct on the part of Hospital Defendants. First, MCEP\nargues that Hospital Defendants restrained trade through “panel limitations,” wherein Hospital\nDefendants stipulated to payers that if they added MCEP to their networks, Hospital Defendants\nwould be able to renegotiate prices. Second, MCEP alleges that Hospital Defendants took direct\nconcerted action against MCEP by cutting off patient referrals to MCEP-affiliated physicians,\nevicting MCEP-affiliated physicians from office space owned by Hospital Defendants, and\nagreeing with third parties to refuse to deal with MCEP-affiliated physicians.\n\n Panel limitations. Courts have found such restraints of trade supported by\nprocompetitive justifications. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 373\nF.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that closed networks can allow payers to reduce customer\npremiums because providers will exchange better rates for guaranteed volume). Likewise in\n\n\n 9The challenged conduct evaluated in this section is limited to MCEP’s claim of illegal concerted action\namong the Hospital Defendants, not the additional “rim conspiracy” claims. The reason for this is that we conclude\nin the next section that Judge Rice did not abuse his discretion by ruling that MCEP’s effort to plead those claims\nwas untimely.\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 17\n\n\nMethodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., where the Seventh Circuit addressed\npanel limitations as a mere variant on the accepted restraint of exclusive dealing arrangements:\n\n But what is more common than exclusive dealing? It is illustrated by\n requirements contracts, which are common, and legal, and obligate a buyer to\n purchase all, or a substantial portion of, its requirements of specific goods or\n services from one supplier. [The Hospital Defendants’] deals with the health\n insurance companies are a form of requirements contract, for the deals require the\n companies to limit the network of providers from which they obtain the health\n care that their insurance contracts obligate them to obtain for their insureds. And\n an insurance company may get better rates from a hospital in exchange for\n agreeing to an exclusive contract, as exclusivity will drive a higher volume of\n business to the hospital.\n\n859 F.3d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 2017).\n\n MCEP claims that Hospital Defendants’ argument that panel limitations help ensure\nvolume is a pretext. In support of this claim, MCEP points to evidence showing that Premier’s\ncontract with insurer Aetna had a volume-based discount that automatically lowered Premier’s\nrates when billing volume increased past certain benchmarks. Thus, even without panel\nlimitations, Hospital Defendants had financially incentivized insurers to maintain a high volume\nof patients getting services from Hospital Defendants. To MCEP, this evidence reveals that the\nonly possible purpose of the panel limitation in Hospital Defendants’ contract with Aetna was\n“purely punitive.”\n\n We are not persuaded. A panel limitation and a price schedule are two distinct methods\ndirected toward the common goal of keeping patients (customers) coming through the doors. A\npricing schedule is a discount that incentivizes payers to keep volume up. A panel limitation,\nmeanwhile, forces payers to confront the risk of renegotiating their contract with Hospital\nDefendants if they choose to send their insureds (customers) to a competing provider. Moreover,\nit is plausible that Hospital Defendants would deploy a “belt and suspenders” approach to a\nmatter as crucial for a hospital system as maintaining patient (customer) volume. It is plausible\nthat panel limitations, by lowering the cost of Hospital Defendants’ services, contribute to the\nefficiency-enhancing purposes of the joint venture, specifically improving “cost effectiveness\nand efficiencies in the delivery of health care services.”\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 18\n\n\n Concerted action regarding physicians. MCEP’s claims concerning Hospital\nDefendants’ direct concerted action toward physicians can be divided into two categories:\n(1) threatened loss of patient referrals; and (2) non-compete agreements.\n\n 1. Threatened loss of patient referrals10\n\n This alleged restraint centers around evidence found in a letter sent by Hospital\nDefendants to Dayton-area doctors informing them of Hospital Defendants’ opposition to\nMCEP. The letter, signed by 94 primary care physicians, discusses the consequences that\nMCEP’s presence could have on the Dayton healthcare market. The primary concern expressed\nin the letter was that the profit-driven MCEP “will take the better insured and more profitable\npatients away from Premier” and leave “local hospitals with only the more complex and\nunderinsured patients.” At the conclusion of the letter, the physicians wrote:\n\n We, the primary care network of physicians for Premier, strongly oppose\n [MCEP]. We believe it will have only negative impacts on our community, our\n hospitals and our network. We do not support the physicians who invest in these\n inpatient hospitals. We do look forward, however, to our continued efforts to\n work with the specialists of our hospital medical staffs and do our part within\n Premier to continue to improve the delivery of cost-effective, highest quality\n healthcare to the people of our community.\n\nMCEP claims that doctors who signed the letter “understood [it] to mean that signatories would\nstop referring patients to anyone who invested in MCEP.”\n\n Hospital Defendants argue that the letter, in expressing the opinion of Premier and its\naffiliated physicians, does not constitute a restraint, and therefore cannot qualify as illegal\nconduct under antitrust laws. They are right. In Am. Council of Podiatrists v. Am. Bd. of\n\n 10MCEP also argues that Hospital Defendants waived the right to move for summary judgment on this\ntheory of liability because they failed to argue before Judge Black that their direct concerted action should be\nviewed under the rule of reason. Likely, MCEP intends to say that Hospital Defendants’ forfeited the argument.\n“Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or\nabandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). Under forfeiture doctrine,\n“parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.” Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992). At\nworst, MCEP is claiming that Hospital Defendants are making a “new argument to support what has been [their]\nconsistent claim.” Lebron v. Natl’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995). Hospital Defendants did not\nforfeit the right to move for summary judgment on MCEP’s claim that Hospital Defendants’ direct concerted action\nis per se illegal because Hospital Defendants have consistently argued that MCEP’s per se claim does not apply to\nthe challenged conduct.\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 19\n\n\nPodiatric Surgery, Inc., we held that, in the absence of a showing by the plaintiff that allegedly\nanticompetitive communication was (1) “false” and (2) “difficult or costly for the plaintiff to\ncounter,” we would apply a presumption that speech has “de minimis effect on competition.”\n323 F.3d 366, 370-72 (6th Cir. 2003). MCEP’s claim fails under both of these prongs. MCEP\nhas not shown that Hospital Defendants’ “Dear Physician” letter was untrue, and MCEP\ncountered the “Dear Physician” letter, without any apparent difficulty, with a “Dear Colleague”\nletter of its own.\n\n 2. Non-compete agreements\n\n MCEP claims that Hospital Defendants terminated the leases of multiple MCEP-affiliated\ndoctors who rented space in Hospital Defendants’ hospitals. Judge Rice rejected this argument\non the grounds that Hospital Defendants have a legitimate interest as a joint venture in\npreventing free riding by physicians who will reap the benefits of training and convenient office\nspace at their hospitals and “then refer their patients elsewhere or invest in other hospitals.”\nHospital Defendants had a plausible concern that, without these contracts, physicians who\ninvested in MCEP could rent office space at a Premier-associated hospital, free ride on the\nreputation and facilities of that hospital, and then refer patients out to MCEP. Preventing such a\nmisalignment of incentives is plausibly related to Hospital Defendants’ goal of “integrat[ing]\nphysicians and other health care providers with the JOC Network.”\n\n MCEP also alleges that Hospital Defendants’ non-compete agreements with physicians in\nthe Dayton area qualify as concerted conduct subject to per se condemnation. Hospital\nDefendant Good Samaritan purchased the Dayton Heart Hospital in 2008. As characterized by\nMCEP, a condition of the purchase by Good Samaritan Hospital was that individual owners of\nDayton Heart Hospital were paid in full only if they agreed “(i) not to invest in MCEP, and (ii) if\nthey already owned shares, they would divest if MCEP began to offer cardiac services” over the\nnext five years. MCEP cites no case law holding that vertical non-compete contracts entered into\nby joint ventures qualify as conduct that is anticompetitive per se.11 And this circuit, as well as\n\n\n\n 11Instead MCEP cites to E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Assoc. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914),\nand United States v. Coop. Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Neither case\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 20\n\n\nthe common law,12 have long recognized that “[l]egitimate reasons exist to uphold\nnoncompetition covenants even though by nature they necessarily restrain trade to some degree.”\nPerceptron, Inc., 221 F.3d at 919 (quoting Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265\n(7th Cir. 1981)). It is MCEP’s burden to show that per se treatment of allegedly anticompetitive\nconduct is justified. Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298. In this context, MCEP’s failure to produce any\non-point precedent is damning, as we refuse to apply the per se rule in the absence of judicial\nexperience with the challenged restraint. See Broad. Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc.,\n441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (concluding that “it is only after considerable experience with certain\nbusiness relationships that courts classify them as per se violations”) (quoting United States v.\nTopco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972)).\n\n MCEP’s other arguments in support of its per se claim. First, MCEP argues that we are\nbound by precedent to find that Hospital Defendants’ restraints qualify for per se treatment. To\nthat end, MCEP cites to Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Klor’s,\nhowever, did not concern a legitimate joint venture, so its approach to alleged horizontal\nrestraints does not bear on the legal framework established above. Id. at 208-09. MCEP also\nargues that Com-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982), which followed Klor’s\napproach, controls. But Com-Tel, like Klor’s, does not contain ancillary-restraints analysis\nbecause it does not concern a joint venture.\n\n Second, MCEP argues that we are bound by “law of the case” to find in its favor because,\nin MCEP I, we implicitly rejected a number of the arguments that Hospital Defendants make\nhere. We need not guess at the contours of MCEP I’s holding—we said expressly that it\nconcerned “only . . . whether defendants’ conduct is the result of two or more entities acting in\n\n\n\nconcerns joint ventures or the ancillary-restraints doctrine. Coop. Theatres of Ohio is inapposite, as it concerns\nmarket allocation rather than a group boycott. 845 F.2d at 1368.\n 12“It must have been obvious from the beginning that the flat ban against such restraints of trade covered\nmore than the rationale of the rule required. The rule might prevent desirable transfers of property. The most\nvaluable asset of a business might be the good will of the public toward its owner. Should he wish to sell the\nbusiness the owner could not get a price reflecting the asset of good will or the true going concern value of his\nbusiness unless he could promise the purchaser not to return to compete with the business sold.” Robert Bork,\nAncillary Restraints & the Sherman Act, 15 ABA Section of Antitrust Law Proceedings 211, 213 (1959) (footnote\nomitted).\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 21\n\n\nconcert or whether defendants, based on their participation in the joint operating agreement,\nfunction as a single entity in the market place.” MCEP I, 817 F.3d at 939.\n\n B.\n\n Rim Conspiracy claims\n\n MCEP argues that Judge Rice erred in dismissing its Section 1 claims of concerted action\nbased on “rim” conspiracies—that is, agreements (induced by Hospital Defendants) to boycott\nMCEP made among the payers as well as independent physicians. The rim conspiracies are\ndistinct from the alleged conspiracy among the Hospital Defendants. MCEP argues that Hospital\nDefendants orchestrated two additional conspiracies—one among payers to collectively “hold\nthe line” against MCEP by excluding it from their market, the other a “physician conspiracy” in\nwhich Hospital Defendants induced Dayton-area physicians to collectively refuse to refer\npatients to MCEP. As Judge Rice noted, this issue is significant. Hospital Defendants\n“conceded that, if MCEP could prove that the payers agreed among themselves not to offer\nMCEP a managed care contract and that Premier orchestrated that agreement, the per se rule\nwould apply to that claim.” If the district court erred by precluding these rim conspiracy claims,\nthen even if Judge Rice was correct that MCEP has no triable per se claim of concerted action\namong Hospital Defendants (the “hub” claim), the case would need to be remanded and set for\ntrial on MCEP’s rim conspiracy claim.\n\n MCEP argues that the rim conspiracy claims are not new. Instead, MCEP characterizes\nthe rim agreements as additional evidence found through discovery that supports the overarching\ngroup boycott claim advanced in the Amended Complaint. MCEP undermines that position,\nhowever, by claiming simultaneously that “[t]he payer agreement and physician agreement . . .\nrepresent additional horizontal concerted action that independently requires imposition of the per\nse rule whether the jury finds the Defendants to be a single entity or multiple actors.”\n\n But MCEP’s Amended Complaint includes neither an allegation of an agreement among\nthe payers nor an agreement among the physicians.13 Instead, the Amended Complaint alleges\n\n 13MCEP’s counsel acknowledged this fact in the course of a deposition, asserting: “I’ll represent to you [to\nthe deponent] that there was not an allegation of an outer rim in the complaint, but that MCEP contends that the\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 22\n\n\nan agreement among the Hospital Defendants to financially induce payers and physicians to\nboycott MCEP. There is no “rim” conspiracy without alleged agreement among the parties at\nthe rim (among the payers and physicians, respectively). See Total Benefits Planning Agency,\nInc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 2008). Because the\nAmended Complaint lacks an essential element for MCEP’s “rim” conspiracy claims, the\nAmended Complaint does not include those claims.\n\n Faced with that omission, MCEP claims that Judge Rice erred by not permitting MCEP\nto submit a Second Amended Complaint to add the rim conspiracy claims. We review for abuse\nof discretion the district court’s decision to deny such a motion. Super Sulky, Inc. v. U.S.\nTrotting Ass’n, 174 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1999). We will overturn the district court’s decision\nonly if we have a “definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error in\njudgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Taylor v. United\nStates Parole Comm’n, 734 F.2d 1152, 1155 (6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); see also John B.\nv. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 2008). The standard for a motion to amend is governed by\nthe general principle that “cases should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of\npleadings,” which is in turn moderated by the exception that judges should allow amendment\nonly when doing so does not “cause prejudice to the defendants” or undue delay. Tefft v.\nSeward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1982).\n\n The district court found that Hospital Defendants “would be severely prejudiced if MCEP\nwere permitted to amend its Complaint at this late date” primarily for the reason that a proper\nadjudication of the rim conspiracy claims would require a new round of discovery that could last\nwell over a year. The district court was unmoved by MCEP’s arguments that amending its\ncomplaint would not cause prejudice because Hospital Defendants had been “on notice” of the\nrim conspiracy claims since MCEP filed its Omnibus Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for\nSummary Judgment.\n\n The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that its allowing MCEP to\namend its complaint for a second time would require a new round of discovery that would cause\n\nevidence developed through discovery establishes the existence of an outer rim, meaning an understanding among\ntwo or more payers that each had agreed with the defendants not to expand their hospital panel.”\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 23\n\n\nundue delay and prejudice Hospital Defendants by significantly extending litigation that began in\n2012. Tefft does not save MCEP on this point. In that case, it was “obvious that the facts as set\nforth in Tefft’s original complaint would support [the new] cause of action . . . as well as [the\noriginal cause of action].” Id. at 639. That is not the case here, where the facts as set forth in\nMCEP’s Amended Complaint do not support MCEP’s different rim conspiracy claims. This\ncase is more like Super Sulky, where a plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to add an\nadditional Section 1 theory that was absent from the original complaint, but had been raised in\nresponse to a motion for summary judgment—in short, the circumstance here. The district court\ndenied that plaintiff’s motion to amend and we affirmed. Super Sulky, 174 F.3d at 740-41.\n\n Judge Rice did not abuse his discretion when he denied MCEP’s motion to amend its\ncomplaint.14\n\n IV.\n\n Because Judge Rice was correct to find that the challenged restraints do not fall within\nthe circumscribed categories of per se condemnation, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of\nsummary judgment.\n\n\n\n\n 14MCEP raised two additional claims on appeal—that the district court erred in dismissing Catholic Heath\nInitiatives and that the case should be remanded to Judge Black rather than Judge Rice. Both arguments are mooted\nbecause we affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Hospital Defendants.\n\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 24\n\n\n _________________\n\n CONCURRENCE\n _________________\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: The MEDICAL CENTER AT ELIZABETH PLACE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ATRIUM HEALTH SYSTEM, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0078p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n THE MEDICAL CENTER AT ELIZABETH PLACE, LLC, ┐\\n Plaintiff-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-3863\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n ATRIUM HEALTH SYSTEM, et al., │\\n Defendants-Appellees. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Ohio at Dayton.\\n No. 3:12-cv-00026—Walter H. Rice, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: April 25, 2018\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 25, 2019\\n\\n Before: BATCHELDER, SUTTON, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Richard A. Ripley, RUYAK CHERIAN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.\\nShay Dvoretzky, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Richard A.\\nRipley, Brittany V. Ruyak, RUYAK CHERIAN LLP, Washington, D.C., James A. Dyer, Patrick\\nO’Shaughnessy, SEBALY, SHILLITO + DYER, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellant. Shay Dvoretzky,\\nRobert Stander, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., Melinda K. Burton, FARUKI IRELAND COX\\nRHINEHART & DUSING P.L.L., Dayton, Ohio, Thomas Demitrack, JONES DAY, Cleveland,\\nOhio, for Appellees.\\n\\n BATCHELDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which SUTTON, J., joined, and\\nWHITE J., joined in part. SUTTON, J. (pp. 24–26), delivered a separate concurring opinion.\\nWHITE, J. (pp. 27–30), delivered a separate opinion dissenting in part.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 2\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. This is a case about competition among\\nhospitals in Dayton, Ohio. When Medical Center at Elizabeth Place, LLC (“MCEP”) opened in\\n2006, it was an acute care, for-profit hospital owned by 60 physicians and one corporate\\nshareholder. By 2009, MCEP’s existence as a physician-owned enterprise came to an end when\\nit sold an ownership interest to Kettering Health Network, a competitor in the Dayton healthcare\\nmarket. MCEP alleges that it failed because of the anticompetitive actions of Premier Health\\nPartners (“Premier”), a dominant healthcare network in the Dayton area. MCEP alleges that\\nPremier contracted with area physicians and payers (insurers and managed-care plan providers)\\non the condition that they did not do business with MCEP. Because payers provide patients and\\nphysicians provide services, it is difficult to run a viable hospital when one, let alone both, is in\\nshort supply.\\n\\n So, whether by licit or illicit means, Premier won that competition. In this litigation, the\\nparties competed again. This time, MCEP pushed all its chips to the center of the table on one\\nhand of cards: a claim that Premier had engaged in conduct so devoid of benefit to the market as\\nto be per se illegal under the Sherman Act. Such claims apply only to a limited range of conduct.\\nTo be per se illegal, a defendant’s conduct has to be so obviously anticompetitive that it has no\\nplausibly procompetitive features—a high hurdle for plaintiffs claiming restraint of trade. Once\\nthey clear it, however, plaintiffs receive a corresponding reward: they need not undergo the often\\narduous process of showing that the challenged conduct was anticompetitive. As one of our\\nsister circuits has described it, “[t]he per se rule is the trump card of antitrust law. When an\\nantitrust plaintiff successfully plays it, he need only tally his score.” United States v. Realty\\nMulti-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1980).1\\n\\n\\n 1The other approach to determining whether a restraint of trade is “unreasonable” is the “rule of reason.”\\nIn re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litigation, 739 F.3d 262, 270 (6th Cir. 2014). “If the rule of reason is used,\\nplaintiffs must additionally show that the restraint produced anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and\\ngeographic markets, while the per se rule is reserved for restraints that are so clearly unreasonable that their\\nanticompetitive effects within geographic and product markets are inferred.” Id.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 3\\n\\n\\n The question before us is whether MCEP successfully played its hand. The district court\\nfrom which MCEP appeals found that MCEP’s per se claim failed because the record showed\\nthat Premier’s contracts with payers and physicians had plausibly procompetitive features. That\\nholding says nothing about whether Premier’s conduct was on balance procompetitive or\\nanticompetitive. This opinion likewise reaches no decision on the ultimate economic merits of\\nPremier’s actions because to do so would go beyond our charge. We must address only the\\nquestion of per se illegality, and as to that, we agree with the district court that MCEP failed to\\nmeet the high standard required for per se claims. We AFFIRM.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n MCEP alleges a conspiracy between the Premier hospitals that implicates, without\\nnaming as defendants, payers and physicians in the Dayton area. During the course of this multi-\\nyear litigation, various legal issues raised in this case have been ruled on by U.S. District Judge\\nBlack, a Sixth Circuit appellate panel, and then, after the matter was remanded and Judge Black\\nrecused himself, District Judge Rice, who granted the motion for summary judgment presently\\nbefore us.\\n\\n Factual Background\\n\\n MCEP is an acute-care hospital located in Dayton, Ohio, that opened in September 2006\\nwith 60 physician owners and one corporate shareholder, Regent Surgical Health. Defendants in\\nthis case comprise four hospitals—Miami Valley Hospital (owned by MedAmerica Health),\\nGood Samaritan Hospital (owned by Catholic Health Initiatives), Atrium Medical Center (owned\\nby Atrium Health Systems), and Upper Valley Medical Center—as well as a joint operating\\ncompany, Premier Health Partners (“Premier”), formed through a joint operating agreement\\namong those four hospitals.2 This joint operating agreement merged some of the hospitals’\\nhealthcare functions but allowed them to retain control of others. Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place v.\\nAtrium Health Sys. (“MCEP I”), 817 F.3d 934, 936-37 (6th Cir. 2016). Hospital Defendants\\n\\n\\n\\n 2In this opinion, we refer to the four hospitals and the joint operating company collectively as “Hospital\\nDefendants” except where otherwise noted.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 4\\n\\n\\ncomprise a dominant healthcare network in the Dayton area, with more than a 55% share of\\nDayton’s inpatient surgical services.\\n\\n In spite of its dominant market position, the record leaves no doubt that Hospital\\nDefendants felt threatened by the possibility of MCEP’s presence in the Dayton medical market.\\nFive months before MCEP opened for business, Hospital Defendants held a board meeting at\\nwhich, “[b]y consensus, the Board supported management’s efforts” to oppose MCEP.\\nExecutives from Premier told an MCEP shareholder that Hospital Defendants “would do\\nwhatever they needed to do in order to stop [MCEP] from opening.”\\n\\n Hospital Defendants’ underlying concern appears to have been that MCEP’s for-profit,\\nphysician-owned model of healthcare would “bankrupt” their hospitals. A letter written by\\nprimary care physicians (most of whom were affiliated with Hospital Defendants), addressed to\\nphysicians in the Dayton healthcare market, expressed the dynamic they found worrisome:\\n\\n There is currently widespread opposition among not-for-profit community\\n hospitals across the country toward physician owned inpatients [sic] hospitals\\n such as this. The physician investors are doing so for reasons of profitability.\\n MVH and GSH offer the range of services and the quality of care necessary to\\n enable surgeons to care for their patients. A physician owned specialty hospital\\n will take the better-insured and more profitable patients away from Premier\\n (along with ancillary services), leaving our local hospitals with only the more\\n complex and underinsured patients.\\n\\nMCEP, for its part, wrote a “Dear Colleague” letter the next month, responding:\\n\\n • While MCEP’s business model will “create a competitive environment to\\n deliver better and more efficient healthcare in Dayton,” it will not drive\\n hospitals out of business;\\n • MCEP “will not turn away patients on the basis of payor classification”;\\n • “Premier generates about $1 billion in revenues and currently has a cash\\n reserve of over $1 billion. As a non-profit, Premier pays no taxes. . . .\\n [MCEP] will have revenues that are a fraction of Premier’s, and our\\n physician-owned hospital will pay corporate, personal and property taxes”;\\n • “[C]omprehensive studies have confirmed that physician-run hospitals have\\n fewer medical errors, shorter turnover times, fewer infections and greater cost\\n efficiencies.”\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 5\\n\\n\\nCiting Hospital Defendants’ board-meeting consensus and their letter to physicians, MCEP\\nalleges that Hospital Defendants blocked MCEP from gaining meaningful access to the Dayton\\nmarket through a series of anticompetitive acts that amounted to a group boycott of MCEP. In\\nits Amended Complaint, MCEP made only a per se claim; MCEP made no claim under the rule\\nof reason. MCEP’s Amended Complaint alleges that Hospital Defendants:\\n\\n • financially coerced commercial health insurers or managed care plan\\n providers (such as Anthem, UnitedHealthcare, Private Healthcare Systems,\\n etc.) “to refuse to permit [MCEP] full access to their respective networks”;\\n • financially coerced commercial health insurers or managed care plans to\\n reimburse MCEP at suppressed rates far below what Hospital Defendants\\n demanded for the same services;\\n • threatened retributive financial consequences to physicians who affiliated with\\n MCEP, and followed through on threats, “including terminating leases that the\\n physicians had with the Defendants for office space”;\\n • offered payments to physicians “who agreed not to work with or at [MCEP];\\n and who agreed to divest ownership in the Medical Center”;\\n • financially coerced physicians affiliated with Hospital Defendants from\\n “admitting patients to [MCEP] or referring patients to physicians who treated\\n patients at [MCEP]”; and\\n • deliberately poached physicians from MCEP who made up a\\n “disproportionately high number of admissions and then prohibited them from\\n admitting patients to [MCEP].”\\n\\n Beyond these allegations, MCEP claims that, in the course of litigation, it discovered two\\nadditional agreements that comprised part of the actionable group boycott.3 First, MCEP alleges\\nan agreement among the payers, induced by Hospital Defendants, not to offer MCEP a managed\\ncare contract. Second, MCEP alleges an agreement among primary care physicians not to do\\nbusiness with physicians who invested in MCEP (Hospital Defendants refer to this as the\\n“physician conspiracy”). Hospital Defendants describe the relationship of these agreements to\\nthe original allegation using the metaphor of a hub, spoke, and rim. For these claims, the\\nHospital Defendants form the hub; the vertical agreements the Hospital Defendants made with\\n\\n 3While there is some dispute about exactly when these claims were first brought to Hospital Defendants’\\nattention, there does not appear to be any dispute that the claims were raised (though the Complaint was not\\namended to reflect the new claims) in MCEP’s opposition to Hospital Defendants’ initial motion for summary\\njudgment before Judge Black.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 6\\n\\n\\npayers and physicians to exclude MCEP are the spokes; and the discrete agreements to boycott\\nMCEP, among the payers and among the physicians, are at the rim.\\n\\n MCEP alleged only the “hub” agreement in its Amended Complaint. Hospital\\nDefendants argue that the “rim conspiracy” claim is a new, and untimely, Sherman Act Section 1\\nclaim. MCEP, for its part, maintains that the additional agreements are simply evidence of the\\noverarching Section 1 conspiracy alleged in their Amended Complaint. Regardless of the exact\\nscope of the alleged boycott, MCEP alleges that one existed, that it was orchestrated by Hospital\\nDefendants, and that it prevented MCEP from succeeding as a going concern. MCEP claims\\nthat, but for Hospital Defendants’ conduct, it would have been able to contract with payers and\\nphysicians, which would have, in turn, increased competition in the Dayton healthcare market for\\nconsumers of general inpatient surgical services.\\n\\n Procedural History\\n\\n This case was before Judge Black in Cincinnati from January 30, 2012, to April 19, 2017.\\nDuring that time, Judge Black granted Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on\\nthe ground that the MCEP’s antitrust claim lacked the necessary plurality of actors.\\n\\n On appeal to this court, a divided panel reversed Judge Black and rejected Hospital\\nDefendants’ motion for summary judgment. The panel held that a reasonable juror could find\\nthat Premier comprised multiple competing entities and, therefore, could engage in concerted\\naction. MCEP I, 817 F.3d at 945. The panel did not address other issues raised before it, such as\\nwhether MCEP’s additional rim conspiracy claims were untimely. Id. at 939.\\n\\n On remand, Hospital Defendants moved again for summary judgment arguing, among\\nother things, that MCEP’s allegation of a per se antitrust violation failed as a matter of law.\\nHospital Defendants argued that their alleged restraints on trade were plausibly procompetitive\\nwhich, they argued, is sufficient to defeat a per se antitrust claim. Because MCEP pleaded only a\\nper se claim, if Hospital Defendants had succeeded in this argument, the case would have been\\ndismissed. Judge Black denied Hospital Defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment,\\nrejecting Hospital Defendants’ argument on two alternative bases: first, the claimed\\nprocompetitive effects of the challenged conduct are subject to genuine dispute and are therefore\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 7\\n\\n\\nan improper basis for summary judgment, and second, Hospital Defendants “failed to evidence\\nthat their joint contracting has any efficiency-enhancing purpose to which such an agreement is\\nnecessary.” Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place v. Premier Health Partners, 2016 WL 9460026, at *5\\n(S.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2016).\\n\\n The case was set for trial. But on April 19, 2017, Judge Black recused himself and the\\ncase was re-assigned to Judge Rice.4 Before Judge Rice, Hospital Defendants moved to “Clarify\\nIssues for Trial,” which all parties now agree amounted to a motion for reconsideration of Judge\\nBlack’s October 6, 2016, order denying Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.\\nLess than a week before trial was set to begin, Judge Rice granted Hospital Defendants’ motion\\nfor summary judgment and dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice. Judge Rice\\ndeclined to apply the “law of the case” doctrine, holding that Judge Black had clearly erred. He\\nfound that while Judge Black correctly articulated the standard for a per se claim—that the\\nchallenged conduct must have no plausible procompetitive effect—Judge Black failed to\\nacknowledge that the record showed that the Hospital Defendants’ challenged restraints had such\\nplausible procompetitive effects. Judge Rice also rejected MCEP’s argument that the Amended\\nComplaint implicitly included claims of rim conspiracies among the payers and among the\\nphysicians—claims that all agree, if proven, would constitute a per se violation—explaining that\\nthose claims were not contained in the Amended Complaint, that MCEP’s attempt to “wedge this\\nnew claim into the existing allegations” was improper, and that the Hospital “Defendants would\\nbe severely prejudiced if MCEP were permitted to amend its Complaint [again] at this late date.”\\nMCEP asks us to reverse Judge Rice’s decision granting Hospital Defendants’ motion for\\nsummary judgment and to remand the case for trial.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Summary judgment is warranted if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the\\nnonmoving party, no material fact is subject to a genuine dispute. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4Judge Black explained that, as a “Cincinnati duty-stationed Judge,” he could not preside over a trial in\\nDayton.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 8\\n\\n\\nZenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986).5 We review de novo grants of summary\\njudgment. Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone Cty., 440 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2006).\\n\\n The parties dispute what de novo review should entail in this case. MCEP claims that\\nJudge Rice’s decision to not apply the “law of the case” doctrine was critical to his decision to\\ngrant Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and therefore we must review Judge\\nRice’s “law of the case” decision de novo. According to MCEP, Judge Rice could reconsider\\nJudge Black’s denial of summary judgment only by finding that Judge Black clearly erred. So,\\nMCEP says, if Judge Rice was wrong that Judge Black committed clear error, then we must\\nreverse his “law of the case” judgment. For their part, Hospital Defendants argue that we should\\nsimply review de novo Judge Rice’s substantive legal conclusions, separate and apart from Judge\\nRice’s “law of the case” conclusion.\\n\\n Ultimately, the Hospital Defendants have the better of this argument. First, we review\\nfor abuse of discretion Judge Rice’s decision to reconsider Judge Black’s pre-transfer order. See\\nUnited States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1990). MCEP argues that abuse of discretion\\nis not the proper standard of review in a case transferred from one district court to another, in\\nwhich a pre-transfer ruling of one judge is altered by a post-transfer decision of a different judge.\\nWe have foreclosed this argument by holding—in precisely the scenario identified by MCEP—\\nthat abuse of discretion remains the proper standard of review. See Gillig v. Advanced\\nCardiovascular Sys. Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 1995).6\\n\\n\\n 5If a presumption against summary judgment in antitrust cases is ever appropriate, it is not here. This\\ncircuit has applied a presumption against summary judgment in antitrust actions only when the case demanded a\\nfact-intensive inquiry under the rule of reason into issues of intent and motive. In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust\\nLitig., 739 F.3d 262, 270 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone Cty., 440 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir.\\n2006)); but see In re ATM Antitrust Litigation, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (N. D. Cal. 2008) (opining that “any\\npresumption against the granting of summary judgment in complex antitrust cases has now disappeared”) (citation\\nomitted). Unlike in a rule of reason claim, in a per se claim intent and motive are not critical determinations. See\\nPhillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1910a (3rd ed. 2011).\\n 6MCEP cites Jimkoski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 247 F. App’x 654 (6th Cir. 2007), for the\\nproposition that Judge Rice’s “law of the case” decision—specifically his finding that Judge Black committed clear\\nerror—should be reviewed de novo. This misapplies Jimkoski. Read in context, Jimkoski simply acknowledged that\\nwhere a motion for reconsideration concerns summary judgment, we do not review the district court’s decision to\\ngrant summary judgment for abuse of discretion. Id. at 659. To do so would insulate the district court’s merits\\ndecision from the proper standard of review—de novo—simply because the motion that the district court ruled on\\nwas a motion for reconsideration. That concern is not present in this case because we review for abuse of discretion\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 9\\n\\n\\n Second, we can find that Judge Rice abused his discretion in disturbing Judge Black’s\\ndenial of summary judgment only if we have a “definite and firm conviction that [Judge Rice]\\ncommitted a clear error in judgment” such as “rel[ying] upon clearly erroneous factual findings,\\nappl[ying] the law improperly, or us[ing] an erroneous legal standard.” See Garner v. Cuyahoga\\nCty. Juvenile Ct., 554 F.3d 624, 634 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Of\\nthese potential bases for abuse of discretion, MCEP argues only that Judge Rice improperly\\napplied the law, a question that we review de novo.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n MCEP’s raises two substantive claims on appeal. First, MCEP argues that the district\\ncourt erred by declining to apply the per se rule to Hospital Defendants’ allegedly\\nanticompetitive conduct. Second, MCEP argues that the district court erred in rejecting MCEP’s\\n“horizontal rim claims” due to untimeliness. Neither argument has merit.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Per se claim\\n\\n Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of\\ntrust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or\\nwith foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Because virtually every\\nagreement between parties has the potential to be considered a restraint of trade, antitrust\\njurisprudence limits the range of restraints within the reach of antitrust law to agreements that\\nunreasonably restrain trade. In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 270 (6th Cir.\\n2014). A restraint on trade may be found to be unreasonable per se or under the “rule of reason.”\\nId. As MCEP makes only a per se claim, the question before us is whether Judge Rice erred in\\ngranting Hospital Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Hospital\\nDefendants’ conduct falls outside per se illegality. Judges Black and Rice did not agree in their\\nanswer to the underlying question and the prior Sixth Circuit panel declined to address it. MCEP\\n\\n\\n\\nthe decision to grant a motion for reconsideration (here that means we review the “law of the case” decision for\\nabuse of discretion). But we still review de novo the merits of the district court’s grant of summary judgment.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 10\\n\\n\\nI, 817 F.3d at 939 (explaining that “[t]his appeal looks only at . . . whether defendants’ conduct is\\nthe result of two or more entities acting in concert”).\\n\\n Although a motion for summary judgment against a per se claim involves underlying\\nfacts, the propriety of per se treatment “is normally a question of legal characterization that can\\noften be resolved by the judge on a motion . . . for summary judgment.” Stop & Shop\\nSupermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 373 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 2004). There is a\\npresumption against applying the per se rule “[u]nless the restraint falls squarely into a per se\\ncategory.” Southeastern Milk, 739 F.3d at 271. As explained in Expert Masonry, “a plaintiff\\nmust satisfy each element of the per se . . . test[] . . . in its allegations in order to survive pre-trial\\ntermination.” 440 F.3d at 344 (emphasis added). In Southeastern Milk, the court held that, even\\nwhere a factual dispute exists between the parties over whether a challenged restraint is\\nobviously anticompetitive—and therefore deserving of per se treatment—the defendants\\nproducing “evidence that the agreement at issue may have had procompetitive\\naspects . . . indicate[s] that this situation would not fall into the categories of per se unreasonable\\nrestraints on trade.” 739 F.3d at 274. The court concluded that “[t]herefore, especially at the\\nsummary judgment stage, this is not a ‘clear cut’ case of an obviously anticompetitive trade\\nrestraint, and thus the district court was correct to apply the default standard of the rule of\\nreason.” Id. Hence, at the summary judgment phase, the right question to ask regarding per se\\nclaims is whether the plaintiff has shown that the challenged restraint is so obviously\\nanticompetitive that it should be condemned as per se illegal. If, in spite of the plaintiff’s efforts,\\nthe record indicates that the challenged restraint is plausibly procompetitive, then summary\\njudgment for the defendants is appropriate.\\n\\n Per se claims against joint ventures\\n\\n The question before us is further delineated by the fact that the challenged restraints exist\\nwithin a joint venture, which the Supreme Court has noted “hold the promise of increasing a\\nfirm’s efficiency and enabling it to compete more effectively.” Copperweld Corp v. Indep. Tube\\nCorp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). At the same time, joint ventures often superficially resemble\\nhorizontal concerted action because they involve horizontal competitors joining together to\\nrestrain trade in some way, such as by coordinating prices. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 11\\n\\n\\n1, 4 (2006) (denying a per se horizontal price fixing claim brought by a plaintiff against a joint\\nventure created by Texaco and Shell Oil that unified their respective gasoline refining and\\nmarketing operations in the western United States under two brands).\\n\\n Because joint ventures often have procompetitive efficiencies, when a joint venture is\\nitself challenged as anticompetitive, that claim is reviewed under the rule of reason. Copperweld\\nCorp., 467 U.S. at 768. But when the conduct of the joint venture is challenged, the relationship\\nof the challenged conduct to the joint venture is analyzed to see if the conduct is reasonably\\nrelated to the joint venture’s procompetitive features (and therefore should be judged under the\\nrule of reason), or is a naked restraint lurking beneath the veneer of a legitimate joint venture\\n(and therefore deserves per se condemnation). See Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Bd. of\\nRegents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113-15 (1984) (observing that a “naked” restraint, subject\\nto the per se rule, can exist even though it is contained in a joint venture agreement that is,\\noverall, quite competitive). The Supreme Court has distinguished three categories of restraints:\\n(1) restraints that are core to the joint venture’s efficiency enhancing purpose; (2) restraints that\\nare ancillary to the joint venture’s efficiency enhancing purpose; and (3) restraints that are\\nnakedly unrelated to the purpose of the joint venture. See Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7-8. Only the last\\nof these three justifies per se treatment. Id.\\n\\n Core activity\\n\\n Core activity is activity that is “integral to the running” of the venture. Id. at 7-8. In\\nDagher, the Supreme Court rejected a per se claim against horizontal price-setting by two\\ncompetitors on the ground that the price-setting “involve[d] the core activity of the joint venture\\nitself.” Id. at 7.\\n\\n Hospital Defendants claim that the challenged panel limitation—but not the other\\nchallenged restraints—qualifies as core activity. They argue that because Dagher described\\nprice setting as a core activity for the joint venture in that case, and because panel limitations are\\na “pricing term” in Hospital Defendants’ contracts with payers, the panel limitations are “core\\nactivity.”\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 12\\n\\n\\n This argument is not persuasive. Dagher does not stand for the general proposition that\\nrestraints in contracts that are price related are always core activity for joint ventures. Dagher’s\\nholding was tailored to the specific joint venture before it. Id. at 5-6. This argument may be\\ndismissed simply by noting that the definition of “core activity” provided by Dagher, “integral to\\nthe running” of the joint venture, id. at 7-8, cannot seriously be argued of Hospital Defendants’\\npanel limitations. Hospital Defendants continue to operate as a joint venture today even though\\nthe panel limitation clauses have been removed from their contracts with payers.\\n\\n Joint venture’s ancillary restraints\\n\\n Restraints that are “ancillary to the legitimate and competitive purposes of the business\\nassociation” fall between “core” activity and “naked” restraints. Id. at 7. These are restraints by\\na joint venture that are not “integral to the running” of the joint venture, id. at 8, “but may\\ncontribute to the success of a cooperative venture.” Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc.,\\n776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985). A restraint is ancillary if it bears a reasonable relationship to\\nthe joint venture’s success. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, 542 F.3d 290,\\n339-40 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).\\n\\n Predictably, the parties spill considerable ink contesting what counts as “reasonable.”\\nMCEP urges the panel to accept Judge Black’s version of the ancillary-restraints doctrine. We\\ndecline to do so because Judge Black framed the ancillary-restraints inquiry incorrectly in two\\nways: by applying too high a standard to determine what qualifies as “reasonable” and by\\nplacing an evidentiary burden on Hospital Defendants to meet that standard. Judge Black\\nrejected Hospital Defendants’ argument that their restraints bore a reasonable relationship to the\\njoint venture’s success, holding that they “failed to evidence that their joint contracting has any\\nefficiency-enhancing purpose to which such an agreement is necessary.” Under this standard,\\nonly restraints that are necessary to a joint venture’s efficiency-enhancing purposes qualify as\\nancillary. Further, Judge Black held that Hospital Defendants must provide “undisputed proof”\\nthat the restraint is necessary to prevent a per se claim from proceeding to trial.\\n\\n Judge Black’s sole source of authority for this version of the ancillary-restraints doctrine\\nis a guidance document put out by the Federal Trade Commission and the United States\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 13\\n\\n\\nDepartment of Justice on collaboration among competitors. See Dep’t of Justice & FTC,\\nAntitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.3, at 10-25 (Apr. 2000). But the\\ncitation is of dubious relevance to the ancillary-restraints doctrine because the cited section deals\\nwith joint ventures only under the rule of reason, not the per se rule.\\n\\n To bolster Judge Black’s approach, MCEP cites NaBanco v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d\\n592, 601 (11th Cir. 1986), and In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 827, 872\\n(N.D. Ill. 2010), for the proposition that an ancillary restraint must be necessary to achieve the\\njoint venture’s efficiency-enhancing purpose. NaBanco supports MCEP’s preferred formulation,\\nbut In re Sulfuric Acid does not. In re Sulfuric Acid echoes the ancillary-restraints inquiry\\narticulated by the Seventh Circuit in Polk Brothers: “A court must ask whether an agreement\\npromoted enterprise and productivity at the time it was adopted. If it arguably did, then the court\\nmust apply the Rule of Reason to make a more discriminating assessment.” 743 F. Supp. 2d at\\n872 (quoting Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189) (emphasis added).\\n\\n Hospital Defendants, on the other hand, describe the standard as whether there exists a\\nplausible procompetitive rationale for the restraint.7 The Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth\\nCircuits adopt this approach.8\\n\\n Perhaps most destructive to MCEP’s argument is then-Judge Sotomayor’s concurrence in\\nMLB Properties, 542 F.3d at 338. Although MCEP cites that concurrence five times in its\\nbriefing, Judge Sotomayor categorically rejected the position MCEP asks this court to adopt.\\nShe described ancillary restraints as requiring “a reasonable procompetitive justification, related\\nto the efficiency-enhancing purposes of the joint venture.” Id. at 339 (emphasis added). Then, in\\n\\n 7Hospital Defendants, at one point, argue that the correct legal standard for determining whether a restraint\\nis ancillary or naked is whether the challenged restraint is “completely unrelated to the purpose of a lawful joint\\nventure.” But this mischaracterizes the ancillary-restraints doctrine. “The per se rule would collapse if every claim\\nof economies from restricting competition, however implausible, could be used to move a horizontal agreement not\\nto compete from the per se rule to the Rule of Reason category.” Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n,\\n744 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1984).\\n 8See MLB Properties, 542 F.3d at 338-39 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Craftsmen Limo,, Inc. v. Ford Motor\\nCo., 363 F.3d 761, 776 (8th Cir. 2004) (“When determining whether to apply the rule of reason analysis to non-price\\nadvertising restrictions related to product safety, the issue is not whether the restrictions were procompetitive, but\\nwhether they could be.”); Paladin Assoc., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2003) (“When\\na defendant advances plausible arguments that a practice enhances overall efficiency and makes markets more\\ncompetitive, per se treatment is inappropriate, and the rule of reason applies.”); Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 14\\n\\n\\ndefining what qualifies as “reasonable,” she expressly rejected the formulation that MCEP\\nargues here: “Under the ancillary restraints doctrine, a challenged restraint need not be essential,\\nbut rather only reasonably ancillary to the legitimate cooperative aspects of the venture.” Id. at\\n340 n.11 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189\\n(explaining that a restraint is ancillary if it may promote the success of a joint venture).\\n\\n The question of what relationship a challenged restraint must have to a joint venture in\\norder to qualify as ancillary splits the Circuits—the Eleventh Circuit on the one hand, and the\\nSecond, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits on the other. We follow the majority of Circuits\\nand hold that a joint venture’s restraint is ancillary and therefore inappropriate for per se\\ncategorization when, viewed at the time it was adopted, the restraint “may contribute to the\\nsuccess of a cooperative venture.” Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189. That approach better accords\\nwith Supreme Court guidance. As the Ninth Circuit in Paladin Associates explained:\\n\\n The Supreme Court generally has treated as per se illegal joint efforts by firms to\\n disadvantage a competitor by persuading customers to deny that competitor\\n relationships the competitor needs in the competitive struggle. But in these cases,\\n the practices generally were not justified by plausible arguments that the practices\\n enhanced overall efficiency and made markets more competitive.\\n\\n328 F.3d at 1154-55. In a footnote that follows the court elaborated:\\n\\n This is so because plausible arguments that a practice is procompetitive make us\\n unable to conclude “the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is clear and the\\n possibility of countervailing procompetitive effects is remote.”\\n\\nId. at 1155 n.8 (quoting Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294).\\n\\n Paladin faithfully applies the Supreme Court’s holding in Stationers. Condemning as per\\nse illegal restraints that, while not necessary to achieving a joint venture’s efficiency-enhancing\\npurpose nevertheless plausibly relate to that purpose, would run counter to the Supreme Court’s\\ninstruction to avoid applying the per se rule to situations where efficiencies are being served.\\nSee Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 894 (2007) (holding that\\nper se treatment is inappropriate where “it cannot be stated with any degree of confidence that\\n[the challenged restraint] ‘always or almost always tends to restrict competition and decrease\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 15\\n\\n\\noutput’”) (quoting Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723\\n(1988)).\\n\\n MCEP’s second but related argument, which was adopted by Judge Black, is that\\nHospital Defendants bear the burden of proving that a challenged restraint is procompetitive, and\\ntherefore ancillary, because the question of the procompetitiveness of a restraint is\\n“quintessentially one of fact.” Judge Black’s inclination to defer to the fact finder has an\\nintuitive appeal in the summary judgment context. And it would be correct had MCEP brought a\\nclaim under the rule of reason. See Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Mach., Inc., 221 F.3d\\n913, 919 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he rule of reason requires the factfinder to decide whether under all\\nthe circumstances of the case the restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on\\ncompetition.”) (citation omitted). For a per se claim, however, Judge Black’s conclusion is\\nerroneous. Whether challenged conduct belongs in the per se category is a question of law. See\\nAriz. v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Socy., 457 U.S. 332, 337 n.3, 354 (1982) (characterizing the per se\\nrule as a “rule of law”); MM Steel, L.P. v. JSW Steel (USA) Inc., 806 F.3d 835, 847 (5th Cir.\\n2015) (“The decision to analyze the conspiracy under a per se theory of liability is a question of\\nlaw that we review de novo.”). In Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., the Eighth\\nCircuit likewise found that whether a given restraint falls within the per se category is a question\\nof law, citing a well-respected treatise on antitrust law for the proposition that “although a\\ncourt’s determination that the per se rule applies ‘might involve many fact questions, the\\nselection of a mode of analysis is entirely a question of law.’” 363 F.3d 761, 772 (8th Cir. 2004)\\n(citing Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1909b (1998)). And it is a\\nquestion of law where certain presumptions apply. As we explained in Expert Masonry, the\\n“plaintiff must satisfy each element of the per se . . . test[] . . . in its allegations in order to\\nsurvive pre-trial termination.” 440 F.3d at 344 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has\\nlikewise held that because a plaintiff failed to make a threshold showing that the challenged\\nconduct had the characteristics necessary to justify per se condemnation, rule of reason analysis\\nshould apply instead. Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298 (“A plaintiff seeking application of the per se\\nrule must present a threshold case that the challenged activity falls into a category likely to have\\npredominantly anticompetitive effects.”).\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 16\\n\\n\\n If the record in this case reveals a plausible way in which the challenged restraints\\ncontribute to the procompetitive efficiencies of the joint venture, then “the possibility of\\ncountervailing procompetitive effects” is not remote and per se treatment is improper. Id. at 294.\\nWhat are Premier’s procompetitive efficiencies? The joint operating agreement of Hospital\\nDefendants’ joint venture, Premier, states the following goals:\\n\\n (1) To provide a broad scope and a continuum of health care services with a focus\\n upon community health benefit.\\n (2) To improve cost effectiveness and efficiencies in the delivery of health care\\n services.\\n (3) To increase the quality of health care services in the greater Miami Valley\\n Region.\\n (4) To integrate physicians and other health care providers with the JOC Network.\\n (5) To have the capacity to assume and manage financial risk.\\n (6) To improve the health status of the greater Miami Valley Region.\\n\\nWe analyze Hospital Defendants’ challenged restraints in light of these goals.9\\n\\n MCEP challenges two kinds of conduct on the part of Hospital Defendants. First, MCEP\\nargues that Hospital Defendants restrained trade through “panel limitations,” wherein Hospital\\nDefendants stipulated to payers that if they added MCEP to their networks, Hospital Defendants\\nwould be able to renegotiate prices. Second, MCEP alleges that Hospital Defendants took direct\\nconcerted action against MCEP by cutting off patient referrals to MCEP-affiliated physicians,\\nevicting MCEP-affiliated physicians from office space owned by Hospital Defendants, and\\nagreeing with third parties to refuse to deal with MCEP-affiliated physicians.\\n\\n Panel limitations. Courts have found such restraints of trade supported by\\nprocompetitive justifications. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 373\\nF.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that closed networks can allow payers to reduce customer\\npremiums because providers will exchange better rates for guaranteed volume). Likewise in\\n\\n\\n 9The challenged conduct evaluated in this section is limited to MCEP’s claim of illegal concerted action\\namong the Hospital Defendants, not the additional “rim conspiracy” claims. The reason for this is that we conclude\\nin the next section that Judge Rice did not abuse his discretion by ruling that MCEP’s effort to plead those claims\\nwas untimely.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 17\\n\\n\\nMethodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., where the Seventh Circuit addressed\\npanel limitations as a mere variant on the accepted restraint of exclusive dealing arrangements:\\n\\n But what is more common than exclusive dealing? It is illustrated by\\n requirements contracts, which are common, and legal, and obligate a buyer to\\n purchase all, or a substantial portion of, its requirements of specific goods or\\n services from one supplier. [The Hospital Defendants’] deals with the health\\n insurance companies are a form of requirements contract, for the deals require the\\n companies to limit the network of providers from which they obtain the health\\n care that their insurance contracts obligate them to obtain for their insureds. And\\n an insurance company may get better rates from a hospital in exchange for\\n agreeing to an exclusive contract, as exclusivity will drive a higher volume of\\n business to the hospital.\\n\\n859 F.3d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n MCEP claims that Hospital Defendants’ argument that panel limitations help ensure\\nvolume is a pretext. In support of this claim, MCEP points to evidence showing that Premier’s\\ncontract with insurer Aetna had a volume-based discount that automatically lowered Premier’s\\nrates when billing volume increased past certain benchmarks. Thus, even without panel\\nlimitations, Hospital Defendants had financially incentivized insurers to maintain a high volume\\nof patients getting services from Hospital Defendants. To MCEP, this evidence reveals that the\\nonly possible purpose of the panel limitation in Hospital Defendants’ contract with Aetna was\\n“purely punitive.”\\n\\n We are not persuaded. A panel limitation and a price schedule are two distinct methods\\ndirected toward the common goal of keeping patients (customers) coming through the doors. A\\npricing schedule is a discount that incentivizes payers to keep volume up. A panel limitation,\\nmeanwhile, forces payers to confront the risk of renegotiating their contract with Hospital\\nDefendants if they choose to send their insureds (customers) to a competing provider. Moreover,\\nit is plausible that Hospital Defendants would deploy a “belt and suspenders” approach to a\\nmatter as crucial for a hospital system as maintaining patient (customer) volume. It is plausible\\nthat panel limitations, by lowering the cost of Hospital Defendants’ services, contribute to the\\nefficiency-enhancing purposes of the joint venture, specifically improving “cost effectiveness\\nand efficiencies in the delivery of health care services.”\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 18\\n\\n\\n Concerted action regarding physicians. MCEP’s claims concerning Hospital\\nDefendants’ direct concerted action toward physicians can be divided into two categories:\\n(1) threatened loss of patient referrals; and (2) non-compete agreements.\\n\\n 1. Threatened loss of patient referrals10\\n\\n This alleged restraint centers around evidence found in a letter sent by Hospital\\nDefendants to Dayton-area doctors informing them of Hospital Defendants’ opposition to\\nMCEP. The letter, signed by 94 primary care physicians, discusses the consequences that\\nMCEP’s presence could have on the Dayton healthcare market. The primary concern expressed\\nin the letter was that the profit-driven MCEP “will take the better insured and more profitable\\npatients away from Premier” and leave “local hospitals with only the more complex and\\nunderinsured patients.” At the conclusion of the letter, the physicians wrote:\\n\\n We, the primary care network of physicians for Premier, strongly oppose\\n [MCEP]. We believe it will have only negative impacts on our community, our\\n hospitals and our network. We do not support the physicians who invest in these\\n inpatient hospitals. We do look forward, however, to our continued efforts to\\n work with the specialists of our hospital medical staffs and do our part within\\n Premier to continue to improve the delivery of cost-effective, highest quality\\n healthcare to the people of our community.\\n\\nMCEP claims that doctors who signed the letter “understood [it] to mean that signatories would\\nstop referring patients to anyone who invested in MCEP.”\\n\\n Hospital Defendants argue that the letter, in expressing the opinion of Premier and its\\naffiliated physicians, does not constitute a restraint, and therefore cannot qualify as illegal\\nconduct under antitrust laws. They are right. In Am. Council of Podiatrists v. Am. Bd. of\\n\\n 10MCEP also argues that Hospital Defendants waived the right to move for summary judgment on this\\ntheory of liability because they failed to argue before Judge Black that their direct concerted action should be\\nviewed under the rule of reason. Likely, MCEP intends to say that Hospital Defendants’ forfeited the argument.\\n“Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or\\nabandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). Under forfeiture doctrine,\\n“parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.” Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992). At\\nworst, MCEP is claiming that Hospital Defendants are making a “new argument to support what has been [their]\\nconsistent claim.” Lebron v. Natl’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995). Hospital Defendants did not\\nforfeit the right to move for summary judgment on MCEP’s claim that Hospital Defendants’ direct concerted action\\nis per se illegal because Hospital Defendants have consistently argued that MCEP’s per se claim does not apply to\\nthe challenged conduct.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 19\\n\\n\\nPodiatric Surgery, Inc., we held that, in the absence of a showing by the plaintiff that allegedly\\nanticompetitive communication was (1) “false” and (2) “difficult or costly for the plaintiff to\\ncounter,” we would apply a presumption that speech has “de minimis effect on competition.”\\n323 F.3d 366, 370-72 (6th Cir. 2003). MCEP’s claim fails under both of these prongs. MCEP\\nhas not shown that Hospital Defendants’ “Dear Physician” letter was untrue, and MCEP\\ncountered the “Dear Physician” letter, without any apparent difficulty, with a “Dear Colleague”\\nletter of its own.\\n\\n 2. Non-compete agreements\\n\\n MCEP claims that Hospital Defendants terminated the leases of multiple MCEP-affiliated\\ndoctors who rented space in Hospital Defendants’ hospitals. Judge Rice rejected this argument\\non the grounds that Hospital Defendants have a legitimate interest as a joint venture in\\npreventing free riding by physicians who will reap the benefits of training and convenient office\\nspace at their hospitals and “then refer their patients elsewhere or invest in other hospitals.”\\nHospital Defendants had a plausible concern that, without these contracts, physicians who\\ninvested in MCEP could rent office space at a Premier-associated hospital, free ride on the\\nreputation and facilities of that hospital, and then refer patients out to MCEP. Preventing such a\\nmisalignment of incentives is plausibly related to Hospital Defendants’ goal of “integrat[ing]\\nphysicians and other health care providers with the JOC Network.”\\n\\n MCEP also alleges that Hospital Defendants’ non-compete agreements with physicians in\\nthe Dayton area qualify as concerted conduct subject to per se condemnation. Hospital\\nDefendant Good Samaritan purchased the Dayton Heart Hospital in 2008. As characterized by\\nMCEP, a condition of the purchase by Good Samaritan Hospital was that individual owners of\\nDayton Heart Hospital were paid in full only if they agreed “(i) not to invest in MCEP, and (ii) if\\nthey already owned shares, they would divest if MCEP began to offer cardiac services” over the\\nnext five years. MCEP cites no case law holding that vertical non-compete contracts entered into\\nby joint ventures qualify as conduct that is anticompetitive per se.11 And this circuit, as well as\\n\\n\\n\\n 11Instead MCEP cites to E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Assoc. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914),\\nand United States v. Coop. Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Neither case\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 20\\n\\n\\nthe common law,12 have long recognized that “[l]egitimate reasons exist to uphold\\nnoncompetition covenants even though by nature they necessarily restrain trade to some degree.”\\nPerceptron, Inc., 221 F.3d at 919 (quoting Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265\\n(7th Cir. 1981)). It is MCEP’s burden to show that per se treatment of allegedly anticompetitive\\nconduct is justified. Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298. In this context, MCEP’s failure to produce any\\non-point precedent is damning, as we refuse to apply the per se rule in the absence of judicial\\nexperience with the challenged restraint. See Broad. Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc.,\\n441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (concluding that “it is only after considerable experience with certain\\nbusiness relationships that courts classify them as per se violations”) (quoting United States v.\\nTopco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972)).\\n\\n MCEP’s other arguments in support of its per se claim. First, MCEP argues that we are\\nbound by precedent to find that Hospital Defendants’ restraints qualify for per se treatment. To\\nthat end, MCEP cites to Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Klor’s,\\nhowever, did not concern a legitimate joint venture, so its approach to alleged horizontal\\nrestraints does not bear on the legal framework established above. Id. at 208-09. MCEP also\\nargues that Com-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982), which followed Klor’s\\napproach, controls. But Com-Tel, like Klor’s, does not contain ancillary-restraints analysis\\nbecause it does not concern a joint venture.\\n\\n Second, MCEP argues that we are bound by “law of the case” to find in its favor because,\\nin MCEP I, we implicitly rejected a number of the arguments that Hospital Defendants make\\nhere. We need not guess at the contours of MCEP I’s holding—we said expressly that it\\nconcerned “only . . . whether defendants’ conduct is the result of two or more entities acting in\\n\\n\\n\\nconcerns joint ventures or the ancillary-restraints doctrine. Coop. Theatres of Ohio is inapposite, as it concerns\\nmarket allocation rather than a group boycott. 845 F.2d at 1368.\\n 12“It must have been obvious from the beginning that the flat ban against such restraints of trade covered\\nmore than the rationale of the rule required. The rule might prevent desirable transfers of property. The most\\nvaluable asset of a business might be the good will of the public toward its owner. Should he wish to sell the\\nbusiness the owner could not get a price reflecting the asset of good will or the true going concern value of his\\nbusiness unless he could promise the purchaser not to return to compete with the business sold.” Robert Bork,\\nAncillary Restraints & the Sherman Act, 15 ABA Section of Antitrust Law Proceedings 211, 213 (1959) (footnote\\nomitted).\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 21\\n\\n\\nconcert or whether defendants, based on their participation in the joint operating agreement,\\nfunction as a single entity in the market place.” MCEP I, 817 F.3d at 939.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Rim Conspiracy claims\\n\\n MCEP argues that Judge Rice erred in dismissing its Section 1 claims of concerted action\\nbased on “rim” conspiracies—that is, agreements (induced by Hospital Defendants) to boycott\\nMCEP made among the payers as well as independent physicians. The rim conspiracies are\\ndistinct from the alleged conspiracy among the Hospital Defendants. MCEP argues that Hospital\\nDefendants orchestrated two additional conspiracies—one among payers to collectively “hold\\nthe line” against MCEP by excluding it from their market, the other a “physician conspiracy” in\\nwhich Hospital Defendants induced Dayton-area physicians to collectively refuse to refer\\npatients to MCEP. As Judge Rice noted, this issue is significant. Hospital Defendants\\n“conceded that, if MCEP could prove that the payers agreed among themselves not to offer\\nMCEP a managed care contract and that Premier orchestrated that agreement, the per se rule\\nwould apply to that claim.” If the district court erred by precluding these rim conspiracy claims,\\nthen even if Judge Rice was correct that MCEP has no triable per se claim of concerted action\\namong Hospital Defendants (the “hub” claim), the case would need to be remanded and set for\\ntrial on MCEP’s rim conspiracy claim.\\n\\n MCEP argues that the rim conspiracy claims are not new. Instead, MCEP characterizes\\nthe rim agreements as additional evidence found through discovery that supports the overarching\\ngroup boycott claim advanced in the Amended Complaint. MCEP undermines that position,\\nhowever, by claiming simultaneously that “[t]he payer agreement and physician agreement . . .\\nrepresent additional horizontal concerted action that independently requires imposition of the per\\nse rule whether the jury finds the Defendants to be a single entity or multiple actors.”\\n\\n But MCEP’s Amended Complaint includes neither an allegation of an agreement among\\nthe payers nor an agreement among the physicians.13 Instead, the Amended Complaint alleges\\n\\n 13MCEP’s counsel acknowledged this fact in the course of a deposition, asserting: “I’ll represent to you [to\\nthe deponent] that there was not an allegation of an outer rim in the complaint, but that MCEP contends that the\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 22\\n\\n\\nan agreement among the Hospital Defendants to financially induce payers and physicians to\\nboycott MCEP. There is no “rim” conspiracy without alleged agreement among the parties at\\nthe rim (among the payers and physicians, respectively). See Total Benefits Planning Agency,\\nInc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 2008). Because the\\nAmended Complaint lacks an essential element for MCEP’s “rim” conspiracy claims, the\\nAmended Complaint does not include those claims.\\n\\n Faced with that omission, MCEP claims that Judge Rice erred by not permitting MCEP\\nto submit a Second Amended Complaint to add the rim conspiracy claims. We review for abuse\\nof discretion the district court’s decision to deny such a motion. Super Sulky, Inc. v. U.S.\\nTrotting Ass’n, 174 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1999). We will overturn the district court’s decision\\nonly if we have a “definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error in\\njudgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Taylor v. United\\nStates Parole Comm’n, 734 F.2d 1152, 1155 (6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); see also John B.\\nv. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 2008). The standard for a motion to amend is governed by\\nthe general principle that “cases should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of\\npleadings,” which is in turn moderated by the exception that judges should allow amendment\\nonly when doing so does not “cause prejudice to the defendants” or undue delay. Tefft v.\\nSeward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1982).\\n\\n The district court found that Hospital Defendants “would be severely prejudiced if MCEP\\nwere permitted to amend its Complaint at this late date” primarily for the reason that a proper\\nadjudication of the rim conspiracy claims would require a new round of discovery that could last\\nwell over a year. The district court was unmoved by MCEP’s arguments that amending its\\ncomplaint would not cause prejudice because Hospital Defendants had been “on notice” of the\\nrim conspiracy claims since MCEP filed its Omnibus Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for\\nSummary Judgment.\\n\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that its allowing MCEP to\\namend its complaint for a second time would require a new round of discovery that would cause\\n\\nevidence developed through discovery establishes the existence of an outer rim, meaning an understanding among\\ntwo or more payers that each had agreed with the defendants not to expand their hospital panel.”\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 23\\n\\n\\nundue delay and prejudice Hospital Defendants by significantly extending litigation that began in\\n2012. Tefft does not save MCEP on this point. In that case, it was “obvious that the facts as set\\nforth in Tefft’s original complaint would support [the new] cause of action . . . as well as [the\\noriginal cause of action].” Id. at 639. That is not the case here, where the facts as set forth in\\nMCEP’s Amended Complaint do not support MCEP’s different rim conspiracy claims. This\\ncase is more like Super Sulky, where a plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to add an\\nadditional Section 1 theory that was absent from the original complaint, but had been raised in\\nresponse to a motion for summary judgment—in short, the circumstance here. The district court\\ndenied that plaintiff’s motion to amend and we affirmed. Super Sulky, 174 F.3d at 740-41.\\n\\n Judge Rice did not abuse his discretion when he denied MCEP’s motion to amend its\\ncomplaint.14\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Because Judge Rice was correct to find that the challenged restraints do not fall within\\nthe circumscribed categories of per se condemnation, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of\\nsummary judgment.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14MCEP raised two additional claims on appeal—that the district court erred in dismissing Catholic Heath\\nInitiatives and that the case should be remanded to Judge Black rather than Judge Rice. Both arguments are mooted\\nbecause we affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Hospital Defendants.\\n\\n No. 17-3863 Med. Center at Elizabeth Pl. v. Atrium Health Sys., et al. Page 24\\n\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n CONCURRENCE\\n _________________\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1673,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4614033,"string":"4,614,033"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Derek Rene EDMONDS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Aaron SMITH, Warden, Respondent-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Derek Edmonds v. Aaron Smith"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-5982"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Batchelder, Rogers, Thapar\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ROGERS, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0080p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n DEREK RENE EDMONDS, ┐\\n Petitioner-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-5982\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n AARON SMITH, Warden, │\\n Respondent-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.\\n No. 3:15-cv-00859—Charles R. Simpson, III, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: March 20, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 26, 2019\\n\\n Before: BATCHELDER, ROGERS, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Alex Potapov, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Thomas A. Van De\\nRostyne, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY, Frankfort, Kentucky,\\nfor Appellee. ON BRIEF: Alex Potapov, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.\\nThomas A. Van De Rostyne, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY,\\nFrankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Derek Edmonds and Tyreese Hall were together tried and\\nconvicted in state court of brutally beating and sodomizing a homeless man to death. After their\\n\\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 2\\n\\n\\njoint state appeals were rejected, Hall brought a federal habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254\\nchallenging his conviction. The district court rejected Hall’s habeas petition on the merits, and\\nthis court affirmed. Then Edmonds brought a § 2254 collateral attack of his own, arguing that\\nhis conviction was similarly infected by constitutional error. Rather than assess all of\\nEdmonds’s claims on the merits, the district court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine\\nprecluded Edmonds from obtaining relief on four claims that it said were raised and rejected in\\nHall’s collateral action. But the law-of-the-case doctrine applies only to later decisions in the\\nsame case, and different habeas actions brought by different petitioners are different cases.\\n\\n In their joint state appeals and individual federal habeas actions, Hall and Edmonds\\nraised, among others, four overlapping claims. Edmonds’s versions of those claims are before us\\non this appeal. First, Edmonds argues, as Hall did previously, that he was deprived of a fair trial\\nunder the Due Process Clause because the trial court erroneously allowed prejudicial victim-\\nimpact testimony by Kaye Thomas, a victim advocate who testified about her emotional hospital\\nvisits to see the victim before he died. Second, Edmonds argues that he was denied his\\nconstitutional right to present a complete defense when the trial court instructed the jury not to\\nconsider exculpatory hearsay statements of a non-testifying eyewitness, Larry Milligan, who\\nidentified Hall as an attacker but not Edmonds. Hall, on the other hand, argued that he was\\nprejudiced by the trial court’s initial introduction of those statements, which were inculpatory as\\nto him. Third, Edmonds argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to an impartial\\njury by restricting voir dire in three ways: limiting each defendant to two minutes of questioning\\nper prospective juror, curtailing certain lines of questioning about mitigation (including race-\\nbased mitigation), and prohibiting certain leading questions. Finally, Edmonds argues that the\\ntrial court further violated his right to an impartial jury by refusing to strike two potential jurors\\nfor cause. Hall raised versions of these last two claims in his own § 2254 action but did not\\nappeal their denial to this court.\\n\\n The defining feature of the law-of-the-case doctrine is that it applies only within the same\\ncase. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815–16 (1988) (quoting\\nArizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)); Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606, 618 (6th Cir.\\n2016); 18B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 (2d ed. Nov. 2018\\n\\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 3\\n\\n\\nupdate). A post-conviction habeas action is not a subsequent stage of the underlying criminal\\nproceedings; it is a separate civil case. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S 551, 556–57 (1987).\\nIt follows that separate habeas actions brought by petitioners who were codefendants in the\\nunderlying criminal proceedings are separate also—from the criminal proceedings and from each\\nother. Thus, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply across separate habeas actions brought\\nindependently by petitioners who were codefendants in the underlying criminal proceedings.\\n\\n While the doctrine is a judicially created one, and so potentially open to modification or\\nextension, extending it here would unmoor the doctrine from its core purposes. As the doctrine\\ngoes, “findings made at one stage in the litigation should not be reconsidered at subsequent\\nstages of that same litigation.” Burley, 834 F.3d at 618. The doctrine does not mark a limit on a\\ncourt’s authority—courts are free to revisit their own rulings before final judgment—but is\\ninstead a recognition that for cases to reach resolution, issues cannot be argued and reargued\\nwithout end. See Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). In other words, the\\ndoctrine aims to “maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during\\nthe course of a single continuing lawsuit,” not to govern the effects that final decisions have on\\nother courts or cases. See 18B Wright & Miller § 4478. Other doctrines govern the effects that\\nfinal decisions have on later courts and cases to ensure consistency and order—doctrines such as\\nstare decisis, res judicata, and the mandate rule. The law-of-the-case doctrine does not need to\\ndo that work too.\\n\\n More importantly, applying the law-of-the-case doctrine across separate habeas cases\\nwould deprive the second petitioner of the opportunity to present his own arguments and would\\ntherefore implicate due process concerns. Due process limits res judicata, for instance, to\\npreclude parties from contesting only matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to\\nlitigate. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979). That means that one must\\ngenerally have been a party to a litigation to be bound by its judgment. As the Supreme Court\\nexplained in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008),\\n\\n [a] person who was not a party to a suit generally has not had a “full and fair\\n opportunity to litigate” the claims and issues settled in that suit. The application\\n of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties thus runs up against the “deep-rooted\\n\\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 4\\n\\n\\n historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” Richards v.\\n Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).\\n\\nNothing about the law-of-the-case doctrine suggests that it can apply across cases to bind new\\nparties, when generally not even res judicata—the doctrine actually charged to determine the\\npreclusive effects of judgments—can do that.\\n\\n The Fifth Circuit has similarly ruled that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply\\nbetween separate § 2255 motions by federal defendants who were tried together. See United\\nStates v. Lawrence, 179 F.3d 343, 351 (5th Cir. 1999).1 As the Lawrence court put it:\\n\\n The conviction and its appeal constituted a discrete case. The subsequent post-\\n conviction motions are distinct both from the initial proceeding, which became\\n final with our affirmance of the convictions, and from each other. Thus, there is\\n no law of the case that binds the instant motion to vacate, and the doctrine did not\\n require the district court to reach the same result in considering the respective\\n motions filed by Lawrence and Tolliver in separate proceedings.\\n\\nId. Although this court has not addressed this issue, in certain circumstances we have held that\\nthe law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply even to a second post-conviction action by the same\\npetitioner. See Patterson v. Haskins, 470 F.3d 645, 660–61 (6th Cir. 2006). In Rosales-Garcia\\nv. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 398 n.11 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), we also suggested as much in dicta.\\nIf the doctrine does not apply across post-conviction actions by the same petitioner, it follows\\nthat it should not apply across actions by different petitioners.\\n\\n In response to all of this, the State merely insists that because a codefendant’s appeal can\\ncreate law of the case for an ongoing criminal case, a once-codefendant’s habeas action must do\\nthe same. The district court similarly extrapolated from the doctrine’s application to a\\ncodefendant’s appeal. But resolution of a codefendant’s appeal in an ongoing case satisfies the\\ncore “same case” requirement of the doctrine, whereas resolution of a separate habeas action\\ndoes not. That the doctrine applies to codefendants in the same case therefore says nothing about\\nits application across separate cases.\\n\\n 1In a non-precedential memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that a § 2254 petitioner’s claim was\\nbound by the law of the case established in an earlier petition by his codefendant. See Pina v. Cambra, 171 F.\\nApp’x 674, 675 (9th Cir. 2006). But there, the petitioner conceded (wrongly) that his case was controlled by the law\\nof the case established by his codefendant’s habeas action. See id. The court agreed with that concession without\\nciting a single case applying the doctrine in a similar habeas setting. Thus, Pina is not at all persuasive.\\n\\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 5\\n\\n\\n Thus, the district court erred in denying four of Edmonds’s claims on law-of-the-case\\ngrounds. That does not mean that Edmonds’s claims are necessarily winners, but rather that they\\nmust be assessed on their merits. This court is not, however, in a position to make that\\nassessment on the current record, which does not include the record from the underlying criminal\\nproceedings. We therefore reverse the district court’s decision on the four claims that are before\\nus and remand for the district court to obtain the entire state court record and assess those claims\\non the merits.\\n\\n The parties agreed at oral argument that, if there is a remand, Edmonds’s voir dire and\\nfor-cause-strikes claims should be analyzed under AEDPA’s deferential review, 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2254(d), and his claim about the exclusion of Milligan’s testimony should be analyzed de\\nnovo. The parties do not agree which standard of review applies to Edmonds’s victim-impact-\\ntestimony claim, so we leave that for the district court to determine in the first instance with the\\nbenefit of the full record and adequate briefing.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4391286/\", \"author_raw\": \"ROGERS, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BATCHELDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROGERS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"THAPAR"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614033/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Derek Rene EDMONDS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Aaron SMITH, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0080p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n DEREK RENE EDMONDS, ┐\n Petitioner-Appellant, │\n │\n > No. 17-5982\n v. │\n │\n │\n AARON SMITH, Warden, │\n Respondent-Appellee. │\n ┘\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.\n No. 3:15-cv-00859—Charles R. Simpson, III, District Judge.\n\n Argued: March 20, 2019\n\n Decided and Filed: April 26, 2019\n\n Before: BATCHELDER, ROGERS, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges\n\n _________________\n\n COUNSEL\n\nARGUED: Alex Potapov, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Thomas A. Van De\nRostyne, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY, Frankfort, Kentucky,\nfor Appellee. ON BRIEF: Alex Potapov, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.\nThomas A. Van De Rostyne, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY,\nFrankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.\n _________________\n\n OPINION\n _________________\n\n ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Derek Edmonds and Tyreese Hall were together tried and\nconvicted in state court of brutally beating and sodomizing a homeless man to death. After their\n\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 2\n\n\njoint state appeals were rejected, Hall brought a federal habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254\nchallenging his conviction. The district court rejected Hall’s habeas petition on the merits, and\nthis court affirmed. Then Edmonds brought a § 2254 collateral attack of his own, arguing that\nhis conviction was similarly infected by constitutional error. Rather than assess all of\nEdmonds’s claims on the merits, the district court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine\nprecluded Edmonds from obtaining relief on four claims that it said were raised and rejected in\nHall’s collateral action. But the law-of-the-case doctrine applies only to later decisions in the\nsame case, and different habeas actions brought by different petitioners are different cases.\n\n In their joint state appeals and individual federal habeas actions, Hall and Edmonds\nraised, among others, four overlapping claims. Edmonds’s versions of those claims are before us\non this appeal. First, Edmonds argues, as Hall did previously, that he was deprived of a fair trial\nunder the Due Process Clause because the trial court erroneously allowed prejudicial victim-\nimpact testimony by Kaye Thomas, a victim advocate who testified about her emotional hospital\nvisits to see the victim before he died. Second, Edmonds argues that he was denied his\nconstitutional right to present a complete defense when the trial court instructed the jury not to\nconsider exculpatory hearsay statements of a non-testifying eyewitness, Larry Milligan, who\nidentified Hall as an attacker but not Edmonds. Hall, on the other hand, argued that he was\nprejudiced by the trial court’s initial introduction of those statements, which were inculpatory as\nto him. Third, Edmonds argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to an impartial\njury by restricting voir dire in three ways: limiting each defendant to two minutes of questioning\nper prospective juror, curtailing certain lines of questioning about mitigation (including race-\nbased mitigation), and prohibiting certain leading questions. Finally, Edmonds argues that the\ntrial court further violated his right to an impartial jury by refusing to strike two potential jurors\nfor cause. Hall raised versions of these last two claims in his own § 2254 action but did not\nappeal their denial to this court.\n\n The defining feature of the law-of-the-case doctrine is that it applies only within the same\ncase. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815–16 (1988) (quoting\nArizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)); Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606, 618 (6th Cir.\n2016); 18B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 (2d ed. Nov. 2018\n\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 3\n\n\nupdate). A post-conviction habeas action is not a subsequent stage of the underlying criminal\nproceedings; it is a separate civil case. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S 551, 556–57 (1987).\nIt follows that separate habeas actions brought by petitioners who were codefendants in the\nunderlying criminal proceedings are separate also—from the criminal proceedings and from each\nother. Thus, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply across separate habeas actions brought\nindependently by petitioners who were codefendants in the underlying criminal proceedings.\n\n While the doctrine is a judicially created one, and so potentially open to modification or\nextension, extending it here would unmoor the doctrine from its core purposes. As the doctrine\ngoes, “findings made at one stage in the litigation should not be reconsidered at subsequent\nstages of that same litigation.” Burley, 834 F.3d at 618. The doctrine does not mark a limit on a\ncourt’s authority—courts are free to revisit their own rulings before final judgment—but is\ninstead a recognition that for cases to reach resolution, issues cannot be argued and reargued\nwithout end. See Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). In other words, the\ndoctrine aims to “maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during\nthe course of a single continuing lawsuit,” not to govern the effects that final decisions have on\nother courts or cases. See 18B Wright & Miller § 4478. Other doctrines govern the effects that\nfinal decisions have on later courts and cases to ensure consistency and order—doctrines such as\nstare decisis, res judicata, and the mandate rule. The law-of-the-case doctrine does not need to\ndo that work too.\n\n More importantly, applying the law-of-the-case doctrine across separate habeas cases\nwould deprive the second petitioner of the opportunity to present his own arguments and would\ntherefore implicate due process concerns. Due process limits res judicata, for instance, to\npreclude parties from contesting only matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to\nlitigate. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979). That means that one must\ngenerally have been a party to a litigation to be bound by its judgment. As the Supreme Court\nexplained in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008),\n\n [a] person who was not a party to a suit generally has not had a “full and fair\n opportunity to litigate” the claims and issues settled in that suit. The application\n of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties thus runs up against the “deep-rooted\n\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 4\n\n\n historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” Richards v.\n Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).\n\nNothing about the law-of-the-case doctrine suggests that it can apply across cases to bind new\nparties, when generally not even res judicata—the doctrine actually charged to determine the\npreclusive effects of judgments—can do that.\n\n The Fifth Circuit has similarly ruled that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply\nbetween separate § 2255 motions by federal defendants who were tried together. See United\nStates v. Lawrence, 179 F.3d 343, 351 (5th Cir. 1999).1 As the Lawrence court put it:\n\n The conviction and its appeal constituted a discrete case. The subsequent post-\n conviction motions are distinct both from the initial proceeding, which became\n final with our affirmance of the convictions, and from each other. Thus, there is\n no law of the case that binds the instant motion to vacate, and the doctrine did not\n require the district court to reach the same result in considering the respective\n motions filed by Lawrence and Tolliver in separate proceedings.\n\nId. Although this court has not addressed this issue, in certain circumstances we have held that\nthe law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply even to a second post-conviction action by the same\npetitioner. See Patterson v. Haskins, 470 F.3d 645, 660–61 (6th Cir. 2006). In Rosales-Garcia\nv. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 398 n.11 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), we also suggested as much in dicta.\nIf the doctrine does not apply across post-conviction actions by the same petitioner, it follows\nthat it should not apply across actions by different petitioners.\n\n In response to all of this, the State merely insists that because a codefendant’s appeal can\ncreate law of the case for an ongoing criminal case, a once-codefendant’s habeas action must do\nthe same. The district court similarly extrapolated from the doctrine’s application to a\ncodefendant’s appeal. But resolution of a codefendant’s appeal in an ongoing case satisfies the\ncore “same case” requirement of the doctrine, whereas resolution of a separate habeas action\ndoes not. That the doctrine applies to codefendants in the same case therefore says nothing about\nits application across separate cases.\n\n 1In a non-precedential memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that a § 2254 petitioner’s claim was\nbound by the law of the case established in an earlier petition by his codefendant. See Pina v. Cambra, 171 F.\nApp’x 674, 675 (9th Cir. 2006). But there, the petitioner conceded (wrongly) that his case was controlled by the law\nof the case established by his codefendant’s habeas action. See id. The court agreed with that concession without\nciting a single case applying the doctrine in a similar habeas setting. Thus, Pina is not at all persuasive.\n\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 5\n\n\n Thus, the district court erred in denying four of Edmonds’s claims on law-of-the-case\ngrounds. That does not mean that Edmonds’s claims are necessarily winners, but rather that they\nmust be assessed on their merits. This court is not, however, in a position to make that\nassessment on the current record, which does not include the record from the underlying criminal\nproceedings. We therefore reverse the district court’s decision on the four claims that are before\nus and remand for the district court to obtain the entire state court record and assess those claims\non the merits.\n\n The parties agreed at oral argument that, if there is a remand, Edmonds’s voir dire and\nfor-cause-strikes claims should be analyzed under AEDPA’s deferential review, 28 U.S.C.\n§ 2254(d), and his claim about the exclusion of Milligan’s testimony should be analyzed de\nnovo. The parties do not agree which standard of review applies to Edmonds’s victim-impact-\ntestimony claim, so we leave that for the district court to determine in the first instance with the\nbenefit of the full record and adequate briefing.\n\n The judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent\nwith this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Derek Rene EDMONDS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Aaron SMITH, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nRECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\\n File Name: 19a0080p.06\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n DEREK RENE EDMONDS, ┐\\n Petitioner-Appellant, │\\n │\\n > No. 17-5982\\n v. │\\n │\\n │\\n AARON SMITH, Warden, │\\n Respondent-Appellee. │\\n ┘\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.\\n No. 3:15-cv-00859—Charles R. Simpson, III, District Judge.\\n\\n Argued: March 20, 2019\\n\\n Decided and Filed: April 26, 2019\\n\\n Before: BATCHELDER, ROGERS, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges\\n\\n _________________\\n\\n COUNSEL\\n\\nARGUED: Alex Potapov, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Thomas A. Van De\\nRostyne, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY, Frankfort, Kentucky,\\nfor Appellee. ON BRIEF: Alex Potapov, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.\\nThomas A. Van De Rostyne, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY,\\nFrankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.\\n _________________\\n\\n OPINION\\n _________________\\n\\n ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Derek Edmonds and Tyreese Hall were together tried and\\nconvicted in state court of brutally beating and sodomizing a homeless man to death. After their\\n\\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 2\\n\\n\\njoint state appeals were rejected, Hall brought a federal habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254\\nchallenging his conviction. The district court rejected Hall’s habeas petition on the merits, and\\nthis court affirmed. Then Edmonds brought a § 2254 collateral attack of his own, arguing that\\nhis conviction was similarly infected by constitutional error. Rather than assess all of\\nEdmonds’s claims on the merits, the district court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine\\nprecluded Edmonds from obtaining relief on four claims that it said were raised and rejected in\\nHall’s collateral action. But the law-of-the-case doctrine applies only to later decisions in the\\nsame case, and different habeas actions brought by different petitioners are different cases.\\n\\n In their joint state appeals and individual federal habeas actions, Hall and Edmonds\\nraised, among others, four overlapping claims. Edmonds’s versions of those claims are before us\\non this appeal. First, Edmonds argues, as Hall did previously, that he was deprived of a fair trial\\nunder the Due Process Clause because the trial court erroneously allowed prejudicial victim-\\nimpact testimony by Kaye Thomas, a victim advocate who testified about her emotional hospital\\nvisits to see the victim before he died. Second, Edmonds argues that he was denied his\\nconstitutional right to present a complete defense when the trial court instructed the jury not to\\nconsider exculpatory hearsay statements of a non-testifying eyewitness, Larry Milligan, who\\nidentified Hall as an attacker but not Edmonds. Hall, on the other hand, argued that he was\\nprejudiced by the trial court’s initial introduction of those statements, which were inculpatory as\\nto him. Third, Edmonds argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to an impartial\\njury by restricting voir dire in three ways: limiting each defendant to two minutes of questioning\\nper prospective juror, curtailing certain lines of questioning about mitigation (including race-\\nbased mitigation), and prohibiting certain leading questions. Finally, Edmonds argues that the\\ntrial court further violated his right to an impartial jury by refusing to strike two potential jurors\\nfor cause. Hall raised versions of these last two claims in his own § 2254 action but did not\\nappeal their denial to this court.\\n\\n The defining feature of the law-of-the-case doctrine is that it applies only within the same\\ncase. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815–16 (1988) (quoting\\nArizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)); Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606, 618 (6th Cir.\\n2016); 18B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 (2d ed. Nov. 2018\\n\\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 3\\n\\n\\nupdate). A post-conviction habeas action is not a subsequent stage of the underlying criminal\\nproceedings; it is a separate civil case. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S 551, 556–57 (1987).\\nIt follows that separate habeas actions brought by petitioners who were codefendants in the\\nunderlying criminal proceedings are separate also—from the criminal proceedings and from each\\nother. Thus, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply across separate habeas actions brought\\nindependently by petitioners who were codefendants in the underlying criminal proceedings.\\n\\n While the doctrine is a judicially created one, and so potentially open to modification or\\nextension, extending it here would unmoor the doctrine from its core purposes. As the doctrine\\ngoes, “findings made at one stage in the litigation should not be reconsidered at subsequent\\nstages of that same litigation.” Burley, 834 F.3d at 618. The doctrine does not mark a limit on a\\ncourt’s authority—courts are free to revisit their own rulings before final judgment—but is\\ninstead a recognition that for cases to reach resolution, issues cannot be argued and reargued\\nwithout end. See Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). In other words, the\\ndoctrine aims to “maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during\\nthe course of a single continuing lawsuit,” not to govern the effects that final decisions have on\\nother courts or cases. See 18B Wright & Miller § 4478. Other doctrines govern the effects that\\nfinal decisions have on later courts and cases to ensure consistency and order—doctrines such as\\nstare decisis, res judicata, and the mandate rule. The law-of-the-case doctrine does not need to\\ndo that work too.\\n\\n More importantly, applying the law-of-the-case doctrine across separate habeas cases\\nwould deprive the second petitioner of the opportunity to present his own arguments and would\\ntherefore implicate due process concerns. Due process limits res judicata, for instance, to\\npreclude parties from contesting only matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to\\nlitigate. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979). That means that one must\\ngenerally have been a party to a litigation to be bound by its judgment. As the Supreme Court\\nexplained in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008),\\n\\n [a] person who was not a party to a suit generally has not had a “full and fair\\n opportunity to litigate” the claims and issues settled in that suit. The application\\n of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties thus runs up against the “deep-rooted\\n\\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 4\\n\\n\\n historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” Richards v.\\n Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).\\n\\nNothing about the law-of-the-case doctrine suggests that it can apply across cases to bind new\\nparties, when generally not even res judicata—the doctrine actually charged to determine the\\npreclusive effects of judgments—can do that.\\n\\n The Fifth Circuit has similarly ruled that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply\\nbetween separate § 2255 motions by federal defendants who were tried together. See United\\nStates v. Lawrence, 179 F.3d 343, 351 (5th Cir. 1999).1 As the Lawrence court put it:\\n\\n The conviction and its appeal constituted a discrete case. The subsequent post-\\n conviction motions are distinct both from the initial proceeding, which became\\n final with our affirmance of the convictions, and from each other. Thus, there is\\n no law of the case that binds the instant motion to vacate, and the doctrine did not\\n require the district court to reach the same result in considering the respective\\n motions filed by Lawrence and Tolliver in separate proceedings.\\n\\nId. Although this court has not addressed this issue, in certain circumstances we have held that\\nthe law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply even to a second post-conviction action by the same\\npetitioner. See Patterson v. Haskins, 470 F.3d 645, 660–61 (6th Cir. 2006). In Rosales-Garcia\\nv. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 398 n.11 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), we also suggested as much in dicta.\\nIf the doctrine does not apply across post-conviction actions by the same petitioner, it follows\\nthat it should not apply across actions by different petitioners.\\n\\n In response to all of this, the State merely insists that because a codefendant’s appeal can\\ncreate law of the case for an ongoing criminal case, a once-codefendant’s habeas action must do\\nthe same. The district court similarly extrapolated from the doctrine’s application to a\\ncodefendant’s appeal. But resolution of a codefendant’s appeal in an ongoing case satisfies the\\ncore “same case” requirement of the doctrine, whereas resolution of a separate habeas action\\ndoes not. That the doctrine applies to codefendants in the same case therefore says nothing about\\nits application across separate cases.\\n\\n 1In a non-precedential memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that a § 2254 petitioner’s claim was\\nbound by the law of the case established in an earlier petition by his codefendant. See Pina v. Cambra, 171 F.\\nApp’x 674, 675 (9th Cir. 2006). But there, the petitioner conceded (wrongly) that his case was controlled by the law\\nof the case established by his codefendant’s habeas action. See id. The court agreed with that concession without\\nciting a single case applying the doctrine in a similar habeas setting. Thus, Pina is not at all persuasive.\\n\\f No. 17-5982 Edmonds v. Smith Page 5\\n\\n\\n Thus, the district court erred in denying four of Edmonds’s claims on law-of-the-case\\ngrounds. That does not mean that Edmonds’s claims are necessarily winners, but rather that they\\nmust be assessed on their merits. This court is not, however, in a position to make that\\nassessment on the current record, which does not include the record from the underlying criminal\\nproceedings. We therefore reverse the district court’s decision on the four claims that are before\\nus and remand for the district court to obtain the entire state court record and assess those claims\\non the merits.\\n\\n The parties agreed at oral argument that, if there is a remand, Edmonds’s voir dire and\\nfor-cause-strikes claims should be analyzed under AEDPA’s deferential review, 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2254(d), and his claim about the exclusion of Milligan’s testimony should be analyzed de\\nnovo. The parties do not agree which standard of review applies to Edmonds’s victim-impact-\\ntestimony claim, so we leave that for the district court to determine in the first instance with the\\nbenefit of the full record and adequate briefing.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1674,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443982,"string":"8,443,982"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Jesse PIERCE and Michael Pierce, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants v. WYNDHAM VACATION RESORTS, INC. and Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Pierce v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"Nos. 18-5258/5298"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Sutton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415416/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SUTTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SUTTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443982/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Jesse PIERCE and Michael Pierce, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants v. WYNDHAM VACATION RESORTS, INC. and Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Jesse PIERCE and Michael Pierce, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants v. WYNDHAM VACATION RESORTS, INC. and Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1675,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4605753,"string":"4,605,753"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1889"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir- cuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\nIN THE MATTER OF:\\n STEVEN ROBERT LISSE,\\n Debtor.\\nAPPEALS OF:\\n WENDY ALISON NORA\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-617-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir-\\ncuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Attorney Wendy Alison Nora ap-\\npeals a decision requiring her and her client to pay damages\\nand costs related to this bankruptcy litigation, as well as an\\norder suspending her from the practice of law in the Western\\nDistrict of Wisconsin. These appeals, unfortunately, are not\\nNora’s first encounter with attorney discipline. See, e.g., In re\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nDisciplinary Action against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990);\\nIn re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 495 N.W.2d 99 (Wis.\\n1993); In re Rinaldi, 778 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Nora, 778\\nF.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2018). While we hope this will be\\nher last such encounter, her serial dilatory, vexatious, and un-\\nprofessional litigation practices lead us to affirm the district\\ncourt’s orders. In addition, Nora’s frivolous motion practice\\nand legal arguments in these appeals lead us to lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction against Nora.\\n I. Background\\n Proceedings in multiple venues are relevant to these ap-\\npeals, including each level of the Wisconsin state court sys-\\ntem, two Chapter 13 petitions in federal bankruptcy court,\\nand two bankruptcy appeals in the district court. Because the\\nprocedural history is pertinent to resolving Nora’s appeals,\\nwe detail it below.\\n A. Wisconsin Foreclosure Action\\n Steven and Sondra Lisse refinanced their home in 2006,\\ntaking out a new mortgage and signing a corresponding note.\\nThe Lisses fell behind on their payments, and an entity con-\\ntrolled by HSBC Bank USA, N.A. filed a foreclosure action in\\nDane County Circuit Court in 2010.1\\n Four years later, HSBC moved for summary judgment. In\\nresponse, the Lisses asked the court for additional discovery\\nthat they hoped would demonstrate HSBC could not enforce\\n\\n 1 The prolix name of the entity is HSBC Bank USA, National Associa-\\ntion for the Benefit of Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series\\n2006-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates. For simplicity, this\\nopinion refers to appellee as HSBC.\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 3\\n\\nits note. The court denied the Lisses’ request and awarded\\nHSBC summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. The Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. HSBC Bank\\nUSA v. Lisse, 877 N.W.2d 650 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016) (un-\\npublished table decision).\\n B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petitions\\n Approximately six weeks after the Wisconsin Court of Ap-\\npeals’ affirmance, Steven Lisse (by attorney Nora) filed a\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of Wis-\\nconsin. As a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended\\nthe Lisses’ deadline to petition for review of the foreclosure\\njudgment. Order, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Apr. 7, 2016).2 The practical effect was to postpone\\nHSBC’s foreclosure on the Lisses’ home as long as bankruptcy\\nproceedings remained pending in federal court.\\n Nora submitted a Chapter 13 plan for Steven Lisse that\\nproposed the Lisses would make their monthly mortgage\\npayments to Nora’s trust account while the bankruptcy court\\nconducted an adversary proceeding to identify the entity en-\\ntitled to the money. HSBC objected, noting it already litigated\\nits claim to judgment in the Wisconsin courts.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Nora acknowledged the purpose of Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy peti-\\ntion was to extend the Lisses’ deadline to appeal in state court: “Mr. Lisse’s\\nemergency Petition was necessary to preserve his right to file a Petition\\nfor Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the decision of the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals entered on March 8, 2016 which denied his Mo-\\ntion for Reconsideration.” Motion for Extension of Time to File Schedules\\nat ¶5, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-109235-cjf (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Apr.\\n3, 2016), ECF No. 9.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n After the bankruptcy court held a confirmation hearing, it\\nrejected Nora’s proposed plan and sua sponte dismissed the\\ncase without leave to amend. The bankruptcy court con-\\ncluded, “[T]his clearly is an opportunity or this plan shows all\\nthe earmarks of being an effort to continue a fight, which\\ncould be made and was made in the state foreclosure action,\\nin the Bankruptcy Court.” Transcript of Final Hearing on\\nChapter 13 Plan at 51–52, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-\\n10935 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 84. The bank-\\nruptcy judge found the plan improper, citing In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990), “because the purpose for filing the\\nplan is not to pay the creditor but to thwart paying the credi-\\ntor.” Id. at 52. Nora filed an appeal to the district court on\\nbehalf of Steven Lisse, challenging HSBC’s standing, arguing\\nHSBC’s note was a forgery, and accusing HSBC’s counsel of\\nfraud on the court.\\n Five days after the bankruptcy court dismissed Steven\\nLisse’s petition, Nora filed a separate Chapter 13 petition on\\nbehalf of his wife, Sondra Lisse. This again extended the\\nLisses’ deadline in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Order,\\nHSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 (Wis. July 28, 2016).\\nNora’s proposed Chapter 13 plan for Sondra Lisse was similar\\nto the one the bankruptcy court had just rejected in Steven\\nLisse’s case. HSBC moved to dismiss the petition for lack of\\ngood faith, arguing Nora filed it with the sole intent to delay\\nthe final disposition of the Wisconsin foreclosure action.\\nHSBC also sought relief from the automatic stay.\\n Nora responded by moving for sanctions, claiming\\nHSBC’s Rooker-Feldman and preclusion arguments were friv-\\nolous and accusing HSBC’s counsel of “completely desecrat-\\ning the integrity of these proceedings.” Motion for\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 5\\n\\nNoncompliance with Discovery at 10, No. 3:16-12556-cjf\\n(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2016), ECF No. 59. The bankruptcy\\ncourt rejected Nora’s sanctions arguments entirely. In re\\nSondra Kay Lisse, 567 B.R. 813, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017)\\n(finding “no basis” to grant the motion). It also lifted the au-\\ntomatic stay, noting the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment pre-\\ncluded Nora’s arguments that HSBC’s note was forged.\\n After these procedural rulings, Nora filed three appeals to\\nthe district court and moved to voluntarily dismiss Sondra\\nLisse’s petition pending resolution of the appeals, which the\\ndistrict court granted. With both bankruptcy cases dismissed\\n(although on appeal), the Lisses filed their petition for review\\nwith the Wisconsin Supreme Court—13 months after the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment.\\nPetition for Review, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Mar. 23, 2017).\\n C. Bankruptcy Appeals to the District Court\\n Nora began Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal by filing a\\ndocument accusing HSBC and its counsel (by name) of federal\\ncrimes, including bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157.\\nNext, she asked the district court to order HSBC to “conven-\\ntionally file” its original note with the clerk of court, as evi-\\ndence of “criminal misconduct.” Shortly thereafter, Nora\\nmoved to stay the deadline for Steven Lisse’s merits brief,\\nciting HSBC’s purportedly “ambiguous and contradictory”\\nrecord designations. Then, in a motion requesting summary\\nreversal, Nora again accused HSBC and its counsel of perpe-\\ntrating a fraud on the courts by presenting forged documents.\\n Following this initial burst of activity, Steven Lisse’s ap-\\npeal lay dormant for almost a year. Finally, on August 23,\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n2017, HSBC requested dismissal for failure to prosecute. This\\nprompted the district court to set an October 2, 2017 deadline\\nfor Nora’s opening brief on the merits.\\n Nora filed a motion to stay the appeal ten days later, citing\\nthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,\\net seq.,3 and a physician’s recommendation that Nora take a\\nleave from practicing law. Despite expressing some skepti-\\ncism as to Nora’s motives—noting her “history of frivolous\\nand dilatory tactics” and efforts to “drag[ ] out the briefing on\\nthe merits by satellite skirmishes”—the district court granted\\na three-month stay. Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2017), ECF No. 42. It did,\\nhowever, stress that “[n]o further extensions will be granted\\nto Attorney Nora absent new, extraordinary circumstances.”\\nId. Nora later testified that she continued to practice law for\\nother clients in other matters during the three-month stay.4\\n The day after the district court stayed Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the\\nLisses’ petition to review the foreclosure judgment. HSBC\\n\\n 3 Nora’s invocation of the ADA is noteworthy, given that she previ-\\nously sued a Wisconsin circuit judge in federal court for alleged ADA vi-\\nolations in depriving her of medical accommodations by not granting her\\ndeadline extensions. Complaint, Nora v. Colas, No. 10-cv-709-bbc (W.D.\\nWis. Nov. 15, 2010), ECF No. 1. In its decision suspending Nora’s Wiscon-\\nsin law license (discussed later in this opinion), the Wisconsin Supreme\\nCourt found that lawsuit “was clearly pursued in an attempt to harass or\\nmaliciously injure” the judge. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora,\\n909 N.W.2d at 164.\\n 4 Nora has previously engaged in similar inconsistent behavior. See,\\ne.g., In re Nora, 417 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (7th Cir. 2011) (“At the same time\\nthat she told the district judge that she was ‘totally disabled’ from litigat-\\ning, Nora was actively litigating in the bankruptcy court.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 7\\n\\nBank USA v. Lisse, 904 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2017) (un-\\npublished table decision). As a result, in December 2017,\\nHSBC began moving forward with a foreclosure sale in Dane\\nCounty Circuit Court.\\n With respect to Sondra Lisse’s appeal, on December 5,\\n2017, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rul-\\nings. Lisse v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2017\\nWL 6021316 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2017). It held that the preclu-\\nsive effect of the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment defeated\\nNora’s challenges to the note’s authenticity and provided\\nHSBC with standing to object to Sondra Lisse’s proposed\\nChapter 13 plan. Id. at *7. Also, the district court concluded\\nthe “appeal, like the bankruptcy litigation, plainly lacks merit\\nand was wastefully presented.” Id. at *8.5 Nora asked the dis-\\ntrict court to reconsider, but the district court declined. Lisse\\nv. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2018 WL\\n840157, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding Nora’s motion\\nprovided “no basis … to reconsider its decision”). Sondra\\nLisse did not appeal the district court’s rulings to this court.\\n After the stay expired in Steven Lisse’s appeal—and on the\\neve of Nora’s deadline to file an opening brief—the Lisses re-\\nturned to Dane County Circuit Court to file a flurry of mo-\\ntions seeking to postpone the foreclosure sale.6 The day before\\n\\n 5\\n It denied HSBC’s request for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nBANKR. P. 8020 because HSBC did not file a separate motion for such relief.\\n 6 These motions were filed by another attorney. They included a mo-\\ntion to hold HSBC and its counsel in contempt for “falsely represent[ing]”\\nthe Lisses’ note to be an original and a sanctions motion against HSBC for\\n“fraud on the court.” The state court denied the Lisses’ motions and con-\\nfirmed the foreclosure sale. The Lisses appealed, and the case remains\\npending. HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2018AP000557 (Wis. Ct. App.).\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nher opening brief was due, Nora moved for another stay\\npending resolution of her clients’ state-court motions. The\\ndistrict court denied Nora’s eleventh-hour request, finding\\n“the debtor’s sole purpose appears to be to delay an inevitable\\nforeclosure through every legal artifice available both in state\\nand federal court.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 46.\\nCharacterizing Nora’s litigation maneuvers as “plainly\\nseek[ing] to continue to postpone [the state-court foreclosure\\naction] through collateral, tag-team attacks in federal court\\nbrought separately by husband and wife,” the district court\\nstated it would “no longer be complicit in these transparent\\nefforts.” Id. at 2. It refused to stay Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy\\nappeal further.\\n The following day, instead of filing an opening brief, Nora\\nmoved to voluntarily dismiss Steven Lisse’s appeal—more\\nthan 16 months after she filed it.\\n D. Sanctions in the District Court\\n The district court dismissed Steven Lisse’s appeal, but it\\ndid not stop there. Due to her “pattern of sharp practice,” the\\ndistrict court ordered Nora to show cause “why she should\\nnot be sanctioned for her frivolous, or at best vexatious, ap-\\npeal.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc\\n(W.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 49. A week later, Nora\\nasked the district court to vacate its show cause order, alleg-\\ning that the order violated due process and that the district\\ncourt had pre-judged the merits of imposing sanctions. The\\ndistrict court scheduled an evidentiary hearing before a three-\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 9\\n\\njudge panel consisting of Chief District Judge Peterson, Dis-\\ntrict Judge Conley, and Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay.7\\n Nora, now represented by her own counsel, filed an an-\\nswer seeking to “quash” the show cause order, alleging a lack\\nof notice of the “charges” against her, objecting to Judge\\nConley’s participation at the hearing, and challenging the\\nconstitutional authority of Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay to\\nparticipate. The district court provided Nora with a 13-page\\n“supplemental notice” identifying the bases for the order to\\nshow cause. Nora’s lawyer followed up with a “rejoinder,”\\nobjecting to the lack of separate “counts” and arguing the\\ncourt could not conduct its own attorney discipline proceed-\\nings.\\n The district court held a 90-minute hearing on the show\\ncause order and issued its opinion on March 20, 2018. It\\ngrouped Nora’s misconduct into three categories: “(1) inap-\\npropriately pursuing relief in federal court; (2) dilatory litiga-\\ntion conduct, including numerous, last-minute requests for\\nlengthy extensions; and (3) filing multiple cases or appeals\\nthen failing to consolidate or join them.” Opinion and Order\\nat 8, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D.\\nWis. Mar. 20, 2018), ECF No. 88. The court decided, “Nora’s\\nadvocacy has crossed the line of professional conduct too\\nmany times to be tolerated or ignored any longer.” Id. at 11.\\nThe district court fined Nora $2,500 and suspended her from\\nappearing in new matters in the Western District for six\\n\\n 7 As the district court noted, it created the three-judge panel “in a\\ngood-faith attempt to bend over backwards to accommodate and assuage\\nNora’s concerns about a lack of impartiality.” Opinion and Order at 6 n.3,\\nLisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2018),\\nECF No. 88.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nmonths, although it stayed those sanctions if and until Nora\\nsubmitted another improper filing. Id.\\n Meanwhile, HSBC had filed a motion for $3,675 in costs\\nand attorneys’ fees under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28\\nU.S.C. § 1927. Classifying the appeal as “frivolous,” the dis-\\ntrict court held Steven Lisse and Nora “jointly and severally\\nliable for $1,837.50.” Opinion and Order at 4, 8, Lisse v. HSBC\\nBank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2018),\\nECF No. 89. This monetary sanction was in addition to the\\nsuspended fine discussed above.\\n About a week later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued\\na decision in disciplinary proceedings against Nora—for con-\\nduct not connected with this litigation—revoking her law li-\\ncense for at least one year. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d at 167. On April 13, 2018, pursuant to W.D.\\nWis. LR 83.5, the district court suspended Nora from practice\\nin the Western District until her Wisconsin law license was re-\\nstored.\\n E. Appeals in this Court\\n Nora now appeals the district court’s decisions in her in-\\ndividual capacity.8 Her opening brief was due on July 30,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8Nora, as an attorney sanctioned for professional misconduct, pos-\\nsesses standing to appeal the district court’s decisions in her own name.\\nMartinez v. City of Chicago, 823 F.3d 1050, 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 11\\n\\n2018, but on that date, in violation of Circuit Rule 26,9 Nora\\ninstead filed a motion asking for a sixty-day extension. We\\npushed the deadline back to September 14, 2018, but when\\nthat date arrived, Nora again filed a noncompliant extension\\nmotion.10 Although we again extended Nora’s deadline to\\nSeptember 19, 2018, she failed to meet it and filed her opening\\nbrief late.\\n Nora also repeatedly filed documents styled as “Requests\\nfor Judicial Notice,” asking this court to take judicial notice of\\nvarious documents filed in other cases (affidavits, deposition\\ntranscripts, court orders). After two orders denying Nora’s\\nrequests, on Nora’s third attempt Judge Easterbrook (as mo-\\ntions judge) published an opinion explaining why the\\nrequests were procedurally improper. In re Appeals of Nora,\\n905 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The right place to propose\\njudicial notice, once a case is in a court of appeals, is in a brief.\\n… There’s no need to engage in motions practice, require the\\nattention of additional appellate judges, and defer briefing.”).\\n When HSBC submitted its response, Nora moved to strike\\nportions of its brief and supplemental appendix. Nora argued\\nHSBC’s citation of documents from the Wisconsin foreclosure\\naction and Sondra Lisse’s bankruptcy case—some of which\\n\\n 9 The rule requires, in part, that a motion for a deadline extension\\n“shall be filed at least seven days before the brief is due, unless it is made\\nto appear in the motion that the facts which are the basis of the motion did\\nnot exist earlier or were not, or with due diligence could not have been,\\nknown earlier to the movant’s counsel.” 7TH CIR. R. 26 (computing and\\nextending time).\\n 10Nora’s second extension motion asked for three additional days,\\nand before the court could rule on it, she filed a third motion asking for\\ntwo more days.\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nhad been filed by Nora as exhibits in Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal—made it “unreasonably difficult, if not impos-\\nsible,” for her to file a timely reply. Nora also asked this court\\nto stay the appeal until we ruled on her motions to strike. The\\ncourt denied Nora’s motions as “frivolous,” sanctioning her\\nby docking 2,000 words from the limit for her reply. Although\\nour order stated—in no uncertain terms—that “no motion for\\nfurther time (or additional words) will be entertained,” the\\nnext day Nora filed a motion for reconsideration asking the\\ncourt “to restore her full word count limitation … and to al-\\nlow [Nora] sufficient time to file her Reply Brief … .” Motion\\nfor Reconsideration of November 20, 2018 Procedural Order\\nat 11. We denied that motion too.\\n After the completion of merits briefing, HSBC moved for\\ndamages and costs under FED. R. APP. P. 38, arguing Nora’s\\nappeals are frivolous. We ordered Nora to respond to the mo-\\ntion, and she (not to be outdone) requested sanctions against\\nHSBC. Finally, failing to heed this court’s earlier directives,\\nNora filed yet another request for judicial notice, which this\\ncourt denied again.\\n II. Discussion\\n Nora appeals two separate rulings by the district court,\\nalthough her briefs meld them together. First, Nora chal-\\nlenges the district court’s March 22, 2018 sanctions order\\nholding her and Steven Lisse jointly and severally liable to\\nHSBC for $1,837.50 under FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927. Second, Nora appeals the April 13, 2018 order sus-\\npending her from practice in the Western District of\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 13\\n\\nWisconsin.11 Although Nora purports to identify ten issues on\\nappeal, each is a variation on the central theme that she\\nshould have been permitted to relitigate the authenticity of\\nHSBC’s note in federal court. In addition, we must resolve\\nHSBC’s appellate motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38.\\n A. March 22, 2018 Sanctions Order\\n A district court may “award just damages and single or\\ndouble costs” if it determines a bankruptcy appeal is frivo-\\nlous. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020(a); see also Hill v. Norfolk & Western\\nRy. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing power\\nto sanction attorneys in addition to parties).12 An appeal is\\nfrivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appellant’s\\nargument is wholly without merit.” Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst.,\\n732 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Spiegel v. Cont’l Ill.\\nNat’l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 1986)).\\n Likewise, a court may hold an attorney personally liable\\nfor “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably in-\\ncurred because of” her unreasonable and vexatious litigation\\nconduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review a district court’s sanc-\\ntions order for abuse of discretion. In re Busson-Sokolik, 635\\n\\n 11The district court’s April 13, 2018 order incorporates its March 20,\\n2018 disciplinary order, specifying the earlier order will remain in force\\nshould Nora be reinstated to practice in the Western District.\\n 12 The advisory committee notes to FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 make clear\\nthat district courts possess the same authority to sanction frivolous bank-\\nruptcy appeals that FED. R. APP. P. 38 provides to this court. FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“[T]his rule recog-\\nnizes that the authority to award damages and costs in connection with\\nfrivolous appeals is the same for district courts sitting as appellate courts,\\nbankruptcy appellate panels, and courts of appeals.”).\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nF.3d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n8020); Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1927).\\n Under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927,\\nthe district court acted well-within its discretion in imposing\\na monetary sanction on Nora.\\n 1. Sanctions were appropriate under FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n 8020(a) because the bankruptcy appeal was frivolous.\\n The bankruptcy court found Nora filed Steven Lisse’s\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition for the improper purpose of\\nthwarting the Lisses’ creditors, rather than paying them. That\\nconclusion was not clearly erroneous. In re Wiese, 552 F.3d 584,\\n588 (7th Cir. 2009) (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion\\nwhen its decision is premised on an incorrect legal principle\\nor a clearly erroneous factual finding).\\n Unlike a Chapter 7 petition, which focuses on liquidating\\nthe debtor’s assets to satisfy his creditors, Chapter 13 allows a\\ndebtor to voluntarily propose a plan to reorganize his debts\\nfor repayment out of his future income. RICHARD I. AARON,\\nBANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 777 (2013 ed.) (“The central\\nthesis of Chapter 13 is that an individual debtor can dedicate\\nfuture income to pay accumulated debts.”); see also 8 COLLIER\\nON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.02 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer\\neds., 16th ed. 2018). The focus on repayment is highlighted by\\nthe requirement that the debtor begin making payments to\\nthe trustee within 30 days after proposing a Chapter 13 plan,\\neven before the plan is confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The\\nbasic premise is to facilitate the debtor’s ability to pay his\\ncreditors, not to frustrate the creditors’ rights. In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 15\\n\\n428 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing Congress’s idealized Chapter\\n13 case as one where “the debtor, given time and relief from\\nharassment, is able to pay all or most of his debts”).\\n A bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 petition for\\ncause if it finds the petition was filed in bad faith. 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1307(c); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992);\\n8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04[10]; see also 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1325(a)(3) (requiring a plan to have been proposed in good\\nfaith as a condition of confirmation). Given bankruptcy’s his-\\ntorical roots as an equitable remedy, “the good faith standard\\nprevents debtors from manipulating the Code for wrongful\\npurposes.” In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359. Whether a debtor filed\\nhis petition in good faith is a factual finding to be reversed\\nonly when the bankruptcy court’s determination, based on\\nthe totality of the circumstances, is clearly erroneous. In re\\nSmith, 286 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n Using a Chapter 13 petition to stave off an impending\\nhome foreclosure sale is not necessarily improper. Although\\nChapter 13 generally prohibits a plan from modifying mort-\\ngage lenders’ underlying rights, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), it\\nexpressly allows a debtor to cure defaults with respect to his\\nprincipal residence “until such residence is sold at a foreclo-\\nsure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable non-\\nbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1); see also 8 COLLIER ON\\nBANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a]; id. at § 1322.16. A debtor, thus,\\nmay use a proper Chapter 13 petition to cure past defaults on\\nhis mortgage through regular payments to the lender, pre-\\nventing the foreclosure sale. See Nobelman v. American Savings\\nBank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993).\\n But this is not what Nora proposed for the Lisses. As the\\nbankruptcy court recognized, the object of Nora’s plan was\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nnot to pay the Lisses’ creditors in an orderly fashion but, in-\\nstead, to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment. Nora sug-\\ngested directing the Lisses’ mortgage payments to her trust\\naccount (not to the Chapter 13 trustee) “during the pendency\\n[of an] adversary proceeding to be commenced, in part, for\\nthe determination of the identity of the real party in interest\\nentitled to the payment or proceeds … .” Such an effort to\\nrelitigate a creditor’s rights—already established in state-\\ncourt proceedings—is an improper, bad faith use of a Chapter\\n13 petition. See In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359 (“[F]iling a Chapter\\n13 petition in order to thwart the payment of an otherwise\\nnondischargeable income tax debt … was not one of the in-\\ntended purposes of the bankruptcy provisions. … [T]he bank-\\nruptcy court’s finding of lack of good faith is not clearly erro-\\nneous.”).\\n In the district court, Nora never presented any argument\\nabout why the bankruptcy court’s good-faith determination\\nwas clearly erroneous. Indeed, Nora never even filed a brief\\non the merits of the appeal, despite the fact it was pending in\\nthe district court for 16 months. Cf. Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d\\n754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n appellate brief that does not\\neven try to engage the reasons the appellant lost has no pro-\\nspect of success.”).\\n Nora now resurrects the argument that HSBC’s note is a\\nforgery, so the appeal to the district court was not frivolous.\\nThis only confirms the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that\\nNora intended to use the proceedings to thwart HSBC, rather\\nthan to cure the Lisses’ mortgage defaults or otherwise satisfy\\nHSBC’s claim. Many court decisions have previously in-\\nformed Nora that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal\\ncourts are bound by state-court resolutions of debtors’\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 17\\n\\ndefenses to mortgage foreclosure. See, e.g., Nora v. Residential\\nFunding Co., 543 Fed. App’x 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2013) (“By alleg-\\ning that the fraudulent assignment to Residential Funding al-\\nlowed it to succeed in foreclosing on her property in state\\ncourt, Nora is impermissibly asking a federal district court to\\nreview and reject the state court’s judgment of foreclosure of\\nher property.”); Spencer v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 246\\nF. Supp. 3d 1241, 1245 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (“As previously ex-\\nplained to [Nora], the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives fed-\\neral courts of jurisdiction to review a state court decision.”);\\nSpencer v. PNC Bank, No. 14-cv-422-wmc, 2015 WL 1520912, at\\n*4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2015) (noting Nora could challenge the\\nvalidity of endorsements and notes in state court but that\\n“those arguments do not undermine [the creditor’s] standing\\nin the bankruptcy proceeding”); Schmid v. Bank of America, 498\\nB.R. 221, 224–25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“The Rooker-Feldman\\ndoctrine applies to plaintiff’s fraud claim because plaintiff’s\\nalleged injury is the state court foreclosure judgment that de-\\nfendant Bank of America is now asserting … Many other\\ncourts have concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a\\nlitigant from challenging a foreclosure judgment in a subse-\\nquent case.”).\\n Throughout the federal proceedings, Nora has repeatedly\\nattacked HSBC’s “standing” to oppose Steven Lisse’s Chapter\\n13 plan on the theory that HSBC’s note is a forgery. She simi-\\nlarly contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction\\nher due to this alleged Article III defect. Nora is wrong on\\nboth counts. The Wisconsin foreclosure judgment established\\nHSBC as the Lisses’ judgment creditor. It is the foreclosure\\njudgment, not the note, that gives HSBC standing at this point\\nto object to Steven Lisse’s Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1324(a)\\n(providing that any “party in interest may object to\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nconfirmation of the plan”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (defining a\\n“creditor” to be a “party in interest” for purposes of Chapter\\n11); In re Rimgale, 669 F.3d at 428 (explaining that Congress\\nadopted § 1324 to allow “for creditors to be heard” while giv-\\ning the bankruptcy judge sole authority to confirm or reject a\\nplan). This makes the authenticity of HSBC’s note irrelevant\\nto the analysis in federal court. Even if the note is a forgery,\\nuntil the Lisses obtain a vacatur of the foreclosure judgment,\\nHSBC’s standing as a judgment creditor is unassailable.\\n Nora manages to flag one potentially legitimate basis to\\nchallenge the bankruptcy court’s decision: that the court de-\\ncided sua sponte to not only deny confirmation but to dismiss\\nthe petition without leave to amend the plan. Compare In re\\nTerry, 630 F.2d 634, 636 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (“As we read § 1307,\\na court cannot order dismissal or conversion on its own mo-\\ntion.”), with In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993)\\n(holding sua sponte dismissal appropriate under 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 105(a)); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04 (sug-\\ngesting § 105(a) “presumably would give the court the power\\nto dismiss a case sua sponte”). Yet Nora never briefed that ar-\\ngument for the district court. See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones\\nLang LaSalle Am., Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting\\narguments not raised below are forfeited). And she fails to ad-\\nequately do so here, simply quoting a transcript without cit-\\ning any relevant legal authorities on the topic. See M.G.\\nSkinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency v. Norman-Spencer Agency, 845\\nF.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped\\narguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by le-\\ngal authority.”). The inclusion of one plausible argument—\\namidst a plethora of frivolous arguments—will not insulate\\nan appellant from sanctions. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1200 (holding\\nsanctions may be imposed where most of the appellant’s\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 19\\n\\narguments are frivolous, even if not all of them can be classi-\\nfied that way).\\n Nora’s attempt to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment\\nin bankruptcy court was frivolous. Nora’s repeated fraud ac-\\ncusations do not change the calculus. Mains v. CitiBank, 852\\nF.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding Rooker-Feldman prohibits\\nfederal courts from reviewing whether a lender procured a\\nstate-court foreclosure judgment through fraud). If Nora be-\\nlieved she possessed new evidence of fraud, Wisconsin’s state\\ncourts were the appropriate venue to raise such arguments.\\nWIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(c) (authorizing motions to reopen judg-\\nments due to the “[f]raud, misrepresentation, or other mis-\\nconduct of an adverse party”); see also Taylor v. Federal Nat’l\\nMortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming dis-\\ntrict court’s decision to remand a fraud-on-the-court claim to\\nstate court on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Aside from delay,\\nthere was no reason for Nora to file a federal bankruptcy case\\nrather than seek relief in state court. See Mains, 852 F.3d at 676\\n(“The state’s courts are quite capable of protecting their own\\nintegrity.”). Federal courts do not exist to provide disap-\\npointed state-court losers a second bite at the apple.13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 At oral argument, Nora’s counsel contended Judge Conley misun-\\nderstood Chapter 13 bankruptcy law, citing his passing reference to Ste-\\nven Lisse’s bankruptcy petition as an “appeal” of the Wisconsin foreclo-\\nsure judgment. But, read in context, Judge Conley’s statement was noting\\nthat Nora’s arguments were only appropriate in a state-court appeal (such\\nthat Nora was, as a practical matter, attempting to bring an improper “ap-\\npeal” in federal court). Judge Conley’s thorough and careful opinions in\\nthis case dispel any concerns of the type Nora’s counsel postulates.\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n 2. Nora’s litigation tactics warranted sanctions under 28\\n U.S.C. § 1927.\\n Courts may also impose sanctions against a lawyer who\\n“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and\\nvexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A lawyer’s subjective bad faith\\nis a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for § 1927 sanc-\\ntions; objective bad faith is enough. Hunt v. Moore Bros., Inc.,\\n861 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2017). Attorneys demonstrate objec-\\ntive bad faith when they pursue “a path that a reasonably\\ncareful attorney would have known, after appropriate in-\\nquiry, to be unsound.” Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Boyer v.\\nBSNF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016)). Because trial\\njudges are best positioned to detect bad faith litigation con-\\nduct, they possess broad discretion in exercising the § 1927\\npower. Id.\\n Nora’s stall tactics are blatant when one looks back at how\\nthis litigation unfolded. Although Nora denies intentionally\\ndelaying proceedings, the record before us belies her position.\\nNora herself openly acknowledged the purpose of Steven\\nLisse’s bankruptcy petition was to extend the deadline to pe-\\ntition the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And, as Nora now boasts\\nin her brief, her strategy worked:\\n The March 22, 2018 Order [by the district court]\\n concludes that attorneys’ fees should be\\n awarded based on “dilatory conduct” whereby\\n the Lisses have maintained possession of their\\n home for six (6) years. Actually, the Lisses have\\n remained in possession of their home for over\\n eight (8) years since the fraudulent foreclosure\\n began and they are still in possession of their\\n home, contrary to Judge Peterson’s conclusion\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 21\\n\\n that the foreclosure of the Lisses’ home is “inev-\\n itable.”\\nAppellant’s Response to Motion for Sanctions at 16–17,\\nECF No. 24.\\n Using the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as a litiga-\\ntion ploy to drag out foreclosure proceedings in another juris-\\ndiction constitutes objective bad faith. See Hilgeford v. The\\nPeoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Our review of\\nthe briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious\\nlitigation. … We can think of no other reason for this [mort-\\ngagor’s] appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obsti-\\nnancy.”).\\n The conclusion of intentional delay is supported, not only\\nby the obvious motive, but also by the lack of any substantive\\nmerit to the Chapter 13 proceedings. As discussed above, the\\nplan Nora filed on behalf of Steven Lisse (and then again for\\nSondra Lisse) improperly attempted to use an adversarial\\nproceeding to relitigate the merits of a foreclosure judgment\\nHSBC had already obtained in Wisconsin state court (with\\nHSBC receiving no payments in the interim). Any reasonably\\ncareful attorney—let alone an attorney with Nora’s familiarity\\nwith bankruptcy court—would have known that this type of\\nconduct would not be tolerated. Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082; cf. Carr\\nv. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the suit\\nis not frivolous, or at least not utterly so, it is so lacking in\\nmerit … that its pursuit by the plaintiff indicates a motive to\\nharass.”).\\n Nora then compounded the delays caused by these merit-\\nless bankruptcy petitions by filing numerous, last-minute mo-\\ntions for lengthy stays or deadline extensions. For example, in\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nSteven Lisse’s appeal in the district court, Nora filed three mo-\\ntions to stay the proceedings. This strategy produced a\\n16-month delay before the district court refused any further\\nextensions, at which point Nora moved to voluntarily dismiss\\nthe appeal without filing an opening brief. Such litigation be-\\nhavior—even if one assumes pure motives—constitutes objec-\\ntive bad faith warranting sanctions under § 1927. The district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion.\\n B. Nora’s Suspension from Law Practice\\n In addition to awarding HSBC damages and costs against\\nboth Nora and Steven Lisse as a monetary sanction, two dis-\\ntrict court orders imposed professional discipline on Nora.\\nFirst, on March 20, 2018, the district court fined Nora $2,500\\nand suspended her right to practice in the Western District for\\nsix months, although it stayed the penalties until Nora com-\\nmitted another violation.\\n Ten days later, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court\\nsuspended Nora’s law license for one year. In re Disciplinary\\nProceedings against Nora, 909 N.W.2d at 167–68. As a result, on\\nApril 13, 2018, the district court issued another order sus-\\npending Nora’s right to practice based on W.D. Wis. LR\\n83.5(E). That local rule automatically imposes reciprocal dis-\\ncipline when another jurisdiction does so, although it permits\\nthe attorney to apply “for modification or vacation of the [dis-\\ntrict court’s] discipline.”\\n Although Nora appeals the district court’s April 13, 2018\\ndisciplinary order separately from its March 22, 2018 order\\nawarding HSBC its damages and costs under FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, she does not develop an inde-\\npendent argument for reversing it. To be clear, Nora is\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 23\\n\\ncurrently prohibited from practice in the Western District as\\nreciprocal discipline based on her disbarment by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, not due to her conduct in this litigation.14\\nNora does not provide a reason to reverse that discipline.\\n District courts are permitted to rely on state-court discipli-\\nnary proceedings to suspend attorneys practicing before\\nthem. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917). And this case\\nshows why a local rule making reciprocal discipline auto-\\nmatic (while also providing a process for attorneys to chal-\\nlenge that federal discipline) makes sense. Such rules align the\\nprocedure with the relevant legal presumptions. Separate fed-\\neral hearings are not required. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486\\n(7th Cir. 1995). Federal courts give “great weight” to state-\\ncourt disciplinary findings. In re Jafree, 759 F.2d 604, 608 (7th\\nCir. 1985). The attorney bears the burden to identify either a\\ndue process violation, insufficient fact findings, or “some\\nother grave reason” why the state-court’s ruling is not entitled\\nto the federal court’s respect. Selling 243 U.S. at 51. Placing the\\nonus on the attorney to raise such issues in a motion to modify\\nor vacate discipline minimizes the amount of resources di-\\nverted to (essentially) collateral attacks on state-court pro-\\nceedings. See In re Wick, 628 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2010).15\\n\\n\\n 14 The district court’s April 13, 2018 order, however, does state that its\\n\\nMarch 20, 2018 disciplinary order (holding sanctions for Nora’s conduct\\nin this litigation in abeyance until further misconduct) will remain in effect\\nshould Nora be reinstated.\\n 15 This court’s rules take a similar procedural approach. 7TH CIR. R.\\n46(d). Based on the suspension of Nora’s Wisconsin law license in 2018,\\nthis court ordered Nora removed from its roll of attorneys after she failed\\nto demonstrate why this court should not do so. Order, In re Nora, No.\\nD-18-07 (7th Cir. May 23, 2018).\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n Even setting aside the discipline imposed by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, Nora’s litigation activity in federal court\\nwarrants a suspension itself. Federal courts’ inherent author-\\nity to disbar or suspend lawyers for misconduct is longstand-\\ning and well established. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985);\\nsee also Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824) (Marshall, J.)\\n(holding the power to suspend attorneys is “incidental to all\\nCourts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and\\nfor the respectability of the profession”).\\n Again, Nora used tag-team Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings\\nby a husband and wife—each lacking a good faith basis—to\\npostpone the orderly resolution of state-court proceedings.\\nNora’s behavior in this litigation unfortunately is not an aber-\\nration for her. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650,\\n654-55 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, this appeal is frivolous, and\\nwe are troubled by Nora’s conduct in this litigation. … [W]e\\nsuspect that the removal was part of a strategy designed to\\ngum up the progress of the case.”); Spencer v. Federal Home\\nLoan Mortg. Corp., No. 15-cv-332-wmc, 2015 WL 4509159, at *1\\n(W.D. Wis. July 24, 2015) (stating that Nora’s appeals ap-\\npeared “motivated by the goal to further delay a warranted\\nstate court foreclosure.”). Courts have sanctioned Nora for\\nthis conduct before, but apparently she has not received the\\nmessage that it will not be tolerated.\\n Not only are Nora’s litigation tactics inappropriate, her\\ntreatment of opposing counsel and judicial officers is censura-\\nble. In the district court, Nora accused HSBC’s counsel (by\\nname) of committing “uncontroverted fraud on the Court,” as\\nwell as multiple federal crimes, by presenting HSBC’s claim.\\nShe repeats similar attacks in these appeals. See, e.g., Appel-\\nlants Br. at 47. This behavior is, again, not new for Nora. PNC\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 25\\n\\nBank, 763 F.3d at 655 (“Nora has accused the state court judge\\nand court reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts,\\nthe district court judge of pursuing ‘a campaign of libel\\nagainst her,’ and opposing counsel of engaging in ‘actionable\\ncivil fraud and racketeering that may constitute state and fed-\\neral criminal misconduct.’”); Nora v. Furay, No. 14-cv-527-jdp,\\n2014 WL 4209608, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2014) (“Nora con-\\ntends that Judge Furay ‘acted in reckless haste to place false\\nfindings on the public record in order to support the falsely\\nmade allegations against her former client … to make false\\nfindings of fact concerning matters which had never been ad-\\njudicated, and to damage Nora’s character and reputation.’”);\\nIn re Rinaldi, No. 11-35689-svk, 2017 WL 104749, at *1 (E.D.\\nWis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“The conversion of the case to Chapter 13\\nclearly changed the context of HSBCʹs entitlement to relief\\nfrom stay, but Attorney Nora ignored the conversion and ac-\\ncused HSBCʹs attorneys of fraud on the Court.”).\\n Flippant, unfounded accusations of misconduct and fraud\\nby opposing counsel and court officials demean the profes-\\nsion and impair the orderly operation of the judicial system.\\nIn re Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487. They also violate the ethical\\nstandards for lawyers practicing in this circuit. See 7TH CIR.\\nSTANDARDS FOR PROF. CONDUCT, Lawyer’s Duties to Other\\nCounsel at ¶4 (“We will not, absent good cause, attribute bad\\nmotives or improper conduct to other counsel or bring the\\nprofession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impro-\\npriety.”). Such behavior warrants punishment.\\n Following Nora’s repeated abuse of the judicial process\\nthrough frivolous filings and dilatory tactics, her unprofes-\\nsional conduct toward opposing counsel, and the suspension\\nof her Wisconsin law license, “the district court certainly was\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nentitled to say, ‘enough is enough.’” Salmeron v. Enter.\\nRecovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2009). We find no\\nfault with the district court’s order suspending Nora from\\npractice in the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n C. Further Appellate Sanctions\\n We must also resolve HSBC’s appellate motion for addi-\\ntional sanctions. This court may “award just damages and sin-\\ngle or double costs to the appellee” when it deems an appeal\\nfrivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Such sanctions are discretionary\\nand appropriate where an appellant simply repeats previ-\\nously rejected, frivolous arguments or pursues an appeal to\\nharass their adversary. Arnold v. Villarreal, 853 F.3d 384, 389\\n(7th Cir. 2017).\\n Nora’s arguments almost entirely regurgitate points she\\npressed before the bankruptcy court, which the district court\\nconcluded were frivolous. As we have explained to Nora pre-\\nviously, “Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 when a\\nlitigant or attorney presents appellate arguments with no rea-\\nsonable expectation of success for the purposes of delay, har-\\nassment, or sheer obstinacy.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 665. That\\naptly describes Nora’s present appeals.\\n Not only were Nora’s arguments on the merits frivolous,\\nshe also engaged in meritless and dilatory motion practice be-\\nfore this court. She moved to stay these appeals pending our\\nruling on a frivolous motion to strike that she filed. When we\\ndenied that motion, Nora immediately filed an equally frivo-\\nlous motion to reconsider. Similarly, Nora submitted four\\nseparate “Requests for Judicial Notice,” needlessly clogging\\nthis court’s motion docket. She continued to lodge these re-\\nquests, even after this court issued an opinion detailing why\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 27\\n\\nthey were unnecessary and improper. In re Appeals of Nora, 905\\nF.3d at 497 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n We find Nora’s appeals to have been frivolous and grant\\nHSBC’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. HSBC requested\\n$2,150.00 for attorneys’ fees and $446.00 for costs in its motion.\\nAlthough such figures appear reasonable, HSBC has not sub-\\nmitted an affidavit or other evidentiary record to support\\nthem. See Arnold, 853 F.3d at 389 (directing moving party to\\n“submit an affidavit and supporting papers specifying the\\ndamages” incurred); Flip Side Prod., Inc. v. Jam Prod., Ltd., 843\\nF.2d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring party seeking sanc-\\ntions to submit a “verified, itemized statement” of its dam-\\nages and costs). So, we direct HSBC to provide an accounting\\nof their costs and attorneys’ fees within 15 days.\\n For numerous reasons, including her failure to present “a\\nseparately filed motion” in compliance with FED. R. APP. P. 38,\\nwe deny Nora’s request for attorneys’ fees.\\n Finally, we must revisit our previous sanctions against\\nNora. Due to “frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings”\\nby Nora in an appeal back in 2015, we fined her $2,500 but\\nsuspended the sanction “until the time, if ever, that Nora sub-\\nmits further inappropriate filings.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 667.\\nGiven Nora’s frivolous filings in these appeals, we lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Lawyers must represent their clients’ interests responsi-\\nbly, not only zealously. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter., Inc., 886\\nF.2d 1485, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). Part of being a responsible\\ncounselor to one’s client is recognizing when the legal battle\\nis lost and advising the client how to best handle that\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\noutcome. Frivolous legal arguments, intentionally dilatory\\ntactics, and unprofessional antagonism toward opposing\\ncounsel benefits no one and improperly burdens federal\\ncourts. Nora’s conduct has crossed the boundaries of accepta-\\nble conduct for attorneys in this circuit.\\n For these reasons, we order as follows:\\n 1) On appeal number 18-1866, the district court’s March\\n22, 2018 order holding Steven Lisse and Wendy Alison Nora\\njointly and severally liable for $1,837.50 is AFFIRMED;\\n 2) On appeal number 18-1889, the district court’s March\\n20, 2018 and April 13, 2018 orders suspending Wendy Alison\\nNora’s ability to practice in the Bankruptcy and District\\nCourts for the Western District of Wisconsin (and staying an\\nadditional $2,500 fine) are AFFIRMED;\\n 3) HSBC’s motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38 is GRANTED, and HSBC is directed to provide an\\naccounting of its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in these\\nappeals within 15 days;\\n 4) Nora’s “Request for Appellant’s Attorneys Fees and\\nCosts of Defending against the Motion for Sanctions” is\\nDENIED; and\\n 5) We lift the suspension of the monetary sanction im-\\nposed in appeal number 13-2676 and order Nora to tender a\\ncheck payable to the clerk of this court for $2,500 within 60\\ndays of the date of this opinion.\\n The district court’s decisions are AFFIRMED WITH\\nSANCTIONS.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383006/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Cir cuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Cir cuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605753/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\nIN THE MATTER OF:\n STEVEN ROBERT LISSE,\n Debtor.\nAPPEALS OF:\n WENDY ALISON NORA\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-617-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir-\ncuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Attorney Wendy Alison Nora ap-\npeals a decision requiring her and her client to pay damages\nand costs related to this bankruptcy litigation, as well as an\norder suspending her from the practice of law in the Western\nDistrict of Wisconsin. These appeals, unfortunately, are not\nNora’s first encounter with attorney discipline. See, e.g., In re\n\f2 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nDisciplinary Action against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990);\nIn re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 495 N.W.2d 99 (Wis.\n1993); In re Rinaldi, 778 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Nora, 778\nF.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\nNora, 909 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2018). While we hope this will be\nher last such encounter, her serial dilatory, vexatious, and un-\nprofessional litigation practices lead us to affirm the district\ncourt’s orders. In addition, Nora’s frivolous motion practice\nand legal arguments in these appeals lead us to lift the sus-\npension of our previous monetary sanction against Nora.\n I. Background\n Proceedings in multiple venues are relevant to these ap-\npeals, including each level of the Wisconsin state court sys-\ntem, two Chapter 13 petitions in federal bankruptcy court,\nand two bankruptcy appeals in the district court. Because the\nprocedural history is pertinent to resolving Nora’s appeals,\nwe detail it below.\n A. Wisconsin Foreclosure Action\n Steven and Sondra Lisse refinanced their home in 2006,\ntaking out a new mortgage and signing a corresponding note.\nThe Lisses fell behind on their payments, and an entity con-\ntrolled by HSBC Bank USA, N.A. filed a foreclosure action in\nDane County Circuit Court in 2010.1\n Four years later, HSBC moved for summary judgment. In\nresponse, the Lisses asked the court for additional discovery\nthat they hoped would demonstrate HSBC could not enforce\n\n 1 The prolix name of the entity is HSBC Bank USA, National Associa-\ntion for the Benefit of Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series\n2006-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates. For simplicity, this\nopinion refers to appellee as HSBC.\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 3\n\nits note. The court denied the Lisses’ request and awarded\nHSBC summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. The Wis-\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. HSBC Bank\nUSA v. Lisse, 877 N.W.2d 650 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016) (un-\npublished table decision).\n B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petitions\n Approximately six weeks after the Wisconsin Court of Ap-\npeals’ affirmance, Steven Lisse (by attorney Nora) filed a\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of Wis-\nconsin. As a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended\nthe Lisses’ deadline to petition for review of the foreclosure\njudgment. Order, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\n(Wis. Apr. 7, 2016).2 The practical effect was to postpone\nHSBC’s foreclosure on the Lisses’ home as long as bankruptcy\nproceedings remained pending in federal court.\n Nora submitted a Chapter 13 plan for Steven Lisse that\nproposed the Lisses would make their monthly mortgage\npayments to Nora’s trust account while the bankruptcy court\nconducted an adversary proceeding to identify the entity en-\ntitled to the money. HSBC objected, noting it already litigated\nits claim to judgment in the Wisconsin courts.\n\n\n\n\n 2 Nora acknowledged the purpose of Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy peti-\ntion was to extend the Lisses’ deadline to appeal in state court: “Mr. Lisse’s\nemergency Petition was necessary to preserve his right to file a Petition\nfor Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the decision of the Wis-\nconsin Court of Appeals entered on March 8, 2016 which denied his Mo-\ntion for Reconsideration.” Motion for Extension of Time to File Schedules\nat ¶5, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-109235-cjf (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Apr.\n3, 2016), ECF No. 9.\n\f4 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n After the bankruptcy court held a confirmation hearing, it\nrejected Nora’s proposed plan and sua sponte dismissed the\ncase without leave to amend. The bankruptcy court con-\ncluded, “[T]his clearly is an opportunity or this plan shows all\nthe earmarks of being an effort to continue a fight, which\ncould be made and was made in the state foreclosure action,\nin the Bankruptcy Court.” Transcript of Final Hearing on\nChapter 13 Plan at 51–52, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-\n10935 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 84. The bank-\nruptcy judge found the plan improper, citing In re Schaitz, 913\nF.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990), “because the purpose for filing the\nplan is not to pay the creditor but to thwart paying the credi-\ntor.” Id. at 52. Nora filed an appeal to the district court on\nbehalf of Steven Lisse, challenging HSBC’s standing, arguing\nHSBC’s note was a forgery, and accusing HSBC’s counsel of\nfraud on the court.\n Five days after the bankruptcy court dismissed Steven\nLisse’s petition, Nora filed a separate Chapter 13 petition on\nbehalf of his wife, Sondra Lisse. This again extended the\nLisses’ deadline in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Order,\nHSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 (Wis. July 28, 2016).\nNora’s proposed Chapter 13 plan for Sondra Lisse was similar\nto the one the bankruptcy court had just rejected in Steven\nLisse’s case. HSBC moved to dismiss the petition for lack of\ngood faith, arguing Nora filed it with the sole intent to delay\nthe final disposition of the Wisconsin foreclosure action.\nHSBC also sought relief from the automatic stay.\n Nora responded by moving for sanctions, claiming\nHSBC’s Rooker-Feldman and preclusion arguments were friv-\nolous and accusing HSBC’s counsel of “completely desecrat-\ning the integrity of these proceedings.” Motion for\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 5\n\nNoncompliance with Discovery at 10, No. 3:16-12556-cjf\n(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2016), ECF No. 59. The bankruptcy\ncourt rejected Nora’s sanctions arguments entirely. In re\nSondra Kay Lisse, 567 B.R. 813, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017)\n(finding “no basis” to grant the motion). It also lifted the au-\ntomatic stay, noting the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment pre-\ncluded Nora’s arguments that HSBC’s note was forged.\n After these procedural rulings, Nora filed three appeals to\nthe district court and moved to voluntarily dismiss Sondra\nLisse’s petition pending resolution of the appeals, which the\ndistrict court granted. With both bankruptcy cases dismissed\n(although on appeal), the Lisses filed their petition for review\nwith the Wisconsin Supreme Court—13 months after the Wis-\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment.\nPetition for Review, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\n(Wis. Mar. 23, 2017).\n C. Bankruptcy Appeals to the District Court\n Nora began Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal by filing a\ndocument accusing HSBC and its counsel (by name) of federal\ncrimes, including bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157.\nNext, she asked the district court to order HSBC to “conven-\ntionally file” its original note with the clerk of court, as evi-\ndence of “criminal misconduct.” Shortly thereafter, Nora\nmoved to stay the deadline for Steven Lisse’s merits brief,\nciting HSBC’s purportedly “ambiguous and contradictory”\nrecord designations. Then, in a motion requesting summary\nreversal, Nora again accused HSBC and its counsel of perpe-\ntrating a fraud on the courts by presenting forged documents.\n Following this initial burst of activity, Steven Lisse’s ap-\npeal lay dormant for almost a year. Finally, on August 23,\n\f6 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n2017, HSBC requested dismissal for failure to prosecute. This\nprompted the district court to set an October 2, 2017 deadline\nfor Nora’s opening brief on the merits.\n Nora filed a motion to stay the appeal ten days later, citing\nthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,\net seq.,3 and a physician’s recommendation that Nora take a\nleave from practicing law. Despite expressing some skepti-\ncism as to Nora’s motives—noting her “history of frivolous\nand dilatory tactics” and efforts to “drag[ ] out the briefing on\nthe merits by satellite skirmishes”—the district court granted\na three-month stay. Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\n3:16-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2017), ECF No. 42. It did,\nhowever, stress that “[n]o further extensions will be granted\nto Attorney Nora absent new, extraordinary circumstances.”\nId. Nora later testified that she continued to practice law for\nother clients in other matters during the three-month stay.4\n The day after the district court stayed Steven Lisse’s bank-\nruptcy appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the\nLisses’ petition to review the foreclosure judgment. HSBC\n\n 3 Nora’s invocation of the ADA is noteworthy, given that she previ-\nously sued a Wisconsin circuit judge in federal court for alleged ADA vi-\nolations in depriving her of medical accommodations by not granting her\ndeadline extensions. Complaint, Nora v. Colas, No. 10-cv-709-bbc (W.D.\nWis. Nov. 15, 2010), ECF No. 1. In its decision suspending Nora’s Wiscon-\nsin law license (discussed later in this opinion), the Wisconsin Supreme\nCourt found that lawsuit “was clearly pursued in an attempt to harass or\nmaliciously injure” the judge. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora,\n909 N.W.2d at 164.\n 4 Nora has previously engaged in similar inconsistent behavior. See,\ne.g., In re Nora, 417 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (7th Cir. 2011) (“At the same time\nthat she told the district judge that she was ‘totally disabled’ from litigat-\ning, Nora was actively litigating in the bankruptcy court.”).\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 7\n\nBank USA v. Lisse, 904 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2017) (un-\npublished table decision). As a result, in December 2017,\nHSBC began moving forward with a foreclosure sale in Dane\nCounty Circuit Court.\n With respect to Sondra Lisse’s appeal, on December 5,\n2017, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rul-\nings. Lisse v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2017\nWL 6021316 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2017). It held that the preclu-\nsive effect of the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment defeated\nNora’s challenges to the note’s authenticity and provided\nHSBC with standing to object to Sondra Lisse’s proposed\nChapter 13 plan. Id. at *7. Also, the district court concluded\nthe “appeal, like the bankruptcy litigation, plainly lacks merit\nand was wastefully presented.” Id. at *8.5 Nora asked the dis-\ntrict court to reconsider, but the district court declined. Lisse\nv. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2018 WL\n840157, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding Nora’s motion\nprovided “no basis … to reconsider its decision”). Sondra\nLisse did not appeal the district court’s rulings to this court.\n After the stay expired in Steven Lisse’s appeal—and on the\neve of Nora’s deadline to file an opening brief—the Lisses re-\nturned to Dane County Circuit Court to file a flurry of mo-\ntions seeking to postpone the foreclosure sale.6 The day before\n\n 5\n It denied HSBC’s request for damages and costs under FED. R.\nBANKR. P. 8020 because HSBC did not file a separate motion for such relief.\n 6 These motions were filed by another attorney. They included a mo-\ntion to hold HSBC and its counsel in contempt for “falsely represent[ing]”\nthe Lisses’ note to be an original and a sanctions motion against HSBC for\n“fraud on the court.” The state court denied the Lisses’ motions and con-\nfirmed the foreclosure sale. The Lisses appealed, and the case remains\npending. HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2018AP000557 (Wis. Ct. App.).\n\f8 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nher opening brief was due, Nora moved for another stay\npending resolution of her clients’ state-court motions. The\ndistrict court denied Nora’s eleventh-hour request, finding\n“the debtor’s sole purpose appears to be to delay an inevitable\nforeclosure through every legal artifice available both in state\nand federal court.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\n3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 46.\nCharacterizing Nora’s litigation maneuvers as “plainly\nseek[ing] to continue to postpone [the state-court foreclosure\naction] through collateral, tag-team attacks in federal court\nbrought separately by husband and wife,” the district court\nstated it would “no longer be complicit in these transparent\nefforts.” Id. at 2. It refused to stay Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy\nappeal further.\n The following day, instead of filing an opening brief, Nora\nmoved to voluntarily dismiss Steven Lisse’s appeal—more\nthan 16 months after she filed it.\n D. Sanctions in the District Court\n The district court dismissed Steven Lisse’s appeal, but it\ndid not stop there. Due to her “pattern of sharp practice,” the\ndistrict court ordered Nora to show cause “why she should\nnot be sanctioned for her frivolous, or at best vexatious, ap-\npeal.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc\n(W.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 49. A week later, Nora\nasked the district court to vacate its show cause order, alleg-\ning that the order violated due process and that the district\ncourt had pre-judged the merits of imposing sanctions. The\ndistrict court scheduled an evidentiary hearing before a three-\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 9\n\njudge panel consisting of Chief District Judge Peterson, Dis-\ntrict Judge Conley, and Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay.7\n Nora, now represented by her own counsel, filed an an-\nswer seeking to “quash” the show cause order, alleging a lack\nof notice of the “charges” against her, objecting to Judge\nConley’s participation at the hearing, and challenging the\nconstitutional authority of Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay to\nparticipate. The district court provided Nora with a 13-page\n“supplemental notice” identifying the bases for the order to\nshow cause. Nora’s lawyer followed up with a “rejoinder,”\nobjecting to the lack of separate “counts” and arguing the\ncourt could not conduct its own attorney discipline proceed-\nings.\n The district court held a 90-minute hearing on the show\ncause order and issued its opinion on March 20, 2018. It\ngrouped Nora’s misconduct into three categories: “(1) inap-\npropriately pursuing relief in federal court; (2) dilatory litiga-\ntion conduct, including numerous, last-minute requests for\nlengthy extensions; and (3) filing multiple cases or appeals\nthen failing to consolidate or join them.” Opinion and Order\nat 8, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D.\nWis. Mar. 20, 2018), ECF No. 88. The court decided, “Nora’s\nadvocacy has crossed the line of professional conduct too\nmany times to be tolerated or ignored any longer.” Id. at 11.\nThe district court fined Nora $2,500 and suspended her from\nappearing in new matters in the Western District for six\n\n 7 As the district court noted, it created the three-judge panel “in a\ngood-faith attempt to bend over backwards to accommodate and assuage\nNora’s concerns about a lack of impartiality.” Opinion and Order at 6 n.3,\nLisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2018),\nECF No. 88.\n\f10 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nmonths, although it stayed those sanctions if and until Nora\nsubmitted another improper filing. Id.\n Meanwhile, HSBC had filed a motion for $3,675 in costs\nand attorneys’ fees under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28\nU.S.C. § 1927. Classifying the appeal as “frivolous,” the dis-\ntrict court held Steven Lisse and Nora “jointly and severally\nliable for $1,837.50.” Opinion and Order at 4, 8, Lisse v. HSBC\nBank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2018),\nECF No. 89. This monetary sanction was in addition to the\nsuspended fine discussed above.\n About a week later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued\na decision in disciplinary proceedings against Nora—for con-\nduct not connected with this litigation—revoking her law li-\ncense for at least one year. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\nNora, 909 N.W.2d at 167. On April 13, 2018, pursuant to W.D.\nWis. LR 83.5, the district court suspended Nora from practice\nin the Western District until her Wisconsin law license was re-\nstored.\n E. Appeals in this Court\n Nora now appeals the district court’s decisions in her in-\ndividual capacity.8 Her opening brief was due on July 30,\n\n\n\n\n 8Nora, as an attorney sanctioned for professional misconduct, pos-\nsesses standing to appeal the district court’s decisions in her own name.\nMartinez v. City of Chicago, 823 F.3d 1050, 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 2016).\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 11\n\n2018, but on that date, in violation of Circuit Rule 26,9 Nora\ninstead filed a motion asking for a sixty-day extension. We\npushed the deadline back to September 14, 2018, but when\nthat date arrived, Nora again filed a noncompliant extension\nmotion.10 Although we again extended Nora’s deadline to\nSeptember 19, 2018, she failed to meet it and filed her opening\nbrief late.\n Nora also repeatedly filed documents styled as “Requests\nfor Judicial Notice,” asking this court to take judicial notice of\nvarious documents filed in other cases (affidavits, deposition\ntranscripts, court orders). After two orders denying Nora’s\nrequests, on Nora’s third attempt Judge Easterbrook (as mo-\ntions judge) published an opinion explaining why the\nrequests were procedurally improper. In re Appeals of Nora,\n905 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The right place to propose\njudicial notice, once a case is in a court of appeals, is in a brief.\n… There’s no need to engage in motions practice, require the\nattention of additional appellate judges, and defer briefing.”).\n When HSBC submitted its response, Nora moved to strike\nportions of its brief and supplemental appendix. Nora argued\nHSBC’s citation of documents from the Wisconsin foreclosure\naction and Sondra Lisse’s bankruptcy case—some of which\n\n 9 The rule requires, in part, that a motion for a deadline extension\n“shall be filed at least seven days before the brief is due, unless it is made\nto appear in the motion that the facts which are the basis of the motion did\nnot exist earlier or were not, or with due diligence could not have been,\nknown earlier to the movant’s counsel.” 7TH CIR. R. 26 (computing and\nextending time).\n 10Nora’s second extension motion asked for three additional days,\nand before the court could rule on it, she filed a third motion asking for\ntwo more days.\n\f12 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nhad been filed by Nora as exhibits in Steven Lisse’s bank-\nruptcy appeal—made it “unreasonably difficult, if not impos-\nsible,” for her to file a timely reply. Nora also asked this court\nto stay the appeal until we ruled on her motions to strike. The\ncourt denied Nora’s motions as “frivolous,” sanctioning her\nby docking 2,000 words from the limit for her reply. Although\nour order stated—in no uncertain terms—that “no motion for\nfurther time (or additional words) will be entertained,” the\nnext day Nora filed a motion for reconsideration asking the\ncourt “to restore her full word count limitation … and to al-\nlow [Nora] sufficient time to file her Reply Brief … .” Motion\nfor Reconsideration of November 20, 2018 Procedural Order\nat 11. We denied that motion too.\n After the completion of merits briefing, HSBC moved for\ndamages and costs under FED. R. APP. P. 38, arguing Nora’s\nappeals are frivolous. We ordered Nora to respond to the mo-\ntion, and she (not to be outdone) requested sanctions against\nHSBC. Finally, failing to heed this court’s earlier directives,\nNora filed yet another request for judicial notice, which this\ncourt denied again.\n II. Discussion\n Nora appeals two separate rulings by the district court,\nalthough her briefs meld them together. First, Nora chal-\nlenges the district court’s March 22, 2018 sanctions order\nholding her and Steven Lisse jointly and severally liable to\nHSBC for $1,837.50 under FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1927. Second, Nora appeals the April 13, 2018 order sus-\npending her from practice in the Western District of\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 13\n\nWisconsin.11 Although Nora purports to identify ten issues on\nappeal, each is a variation on the central theme that she\nshould have been permitted to relitigate the authenticity of\nHSBC’s note in federal court. In addition, we must resolve\nHSBC’s appellate motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\nAPP. P. 38.\n A. March 22, 2018 Sanctions Order\n A district court may “award just damages and single or\ndouble costs” if it determines a bankruptcy appeal is frivo-\nlous. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020(a); see also Hill v. Norfolk & Western\nRy. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing power\nto sanction attorneys in addition to parties).12 An appeal is\nfrivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appellant’s\nargument is wholly without merit.” Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst.,\n732 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Spiegel v. Cont’l Ill.\nNat’l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 1986)).\n Likewise, a court may hold an attorney personally liable\nfor “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably in-\ncurred because of” her unreasonable and vexatious litigation\nconduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review a district court’s sanc-\ntions order for abuse of discretion. In re Busson-Sokolik, 635\n\n 11The district court’s April 13, 2018 order incorporates its March 20,\n2018 disciplinary order, specifying the earlier order will remain in force\nshould Nora be reinstated to practice in the Western District.\n 12 The advisory committee notes to FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 make clear\nthat district courts possess the same authority to sanction frivolous bank-\nruptcy appeals that FED. R. APP. P. 38 provides to this court. FED. R. BANKR.\nP. 8020 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“[T]his rule recog-\nnizes that the authority to award damages and costs in connection with\nfrivolous appeals is the same for district courts sitting as appellate courts,\nbankruptcy appellate panels, and courts of appeals.”).\n\f14 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nF.3d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing FED. R. BANKR. P.\n8020); Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 2018)\n(addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1927).\n Under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927,\nthe district court acted well-within its discretion in imposing\na monetary sanction on Nora.\n 1. Sanctions were appropriate under FED. R. BANKR. P.\n 8020(a) because the bankruptcy appeal was frivolous.\n The bankruptcy court found Nora filed Steven Lisse’s\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition for the improper purpose of\nthwarting the Lisses’ creditors, rather than paying them. That\nconclusion was not clearly erroneous. In re Wiese, 552 F.3d 584,\n588 (7th Cir. 2009) (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion\nwhen its decision is premised on an incorrect legal principle\nor a clearly erroneous factual finding).\n Unlike a Chapter 7 petition, which focuses on liquidating\nthe debtor’s assets to satisfy his creditors, Chapter 13 allows a\ndebtor to voluntarily propose a plan to reorganize his debts\nfor repayment out of his future income. RICHARD I. AARON,\nBANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 777 (2013 ed.) (“The central\nthesis of Chapter 13 is that an individual debtor can dedicate\nfuture income to pay accumulated debts.”); see also 8 COLLIER\nON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.02 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer\neds., 16th ed. 2018). The focus on repayment is highlighted by\nthe requirement that the debtor begin making payments to\nthe trustee within 30 days after proposing a Chapter 13 plan,\neven before the plan is confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The\nbasic premise is to facilitate the debtor’s ability to pay his\ncreditors, not to frustrate the creditors’ rights. In re Schaitz, 913\nF.2d 452, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 15\n\n428 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing Congress’s idealized Chapter\n13 case as one where “the debtor, given time and relief from\nharassment, is able to pay all or most of his debts”).\n A bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 petition for\ncause if it finds the petition was filed in bad faith. 11 U.S.C.\n§ 1307(c); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992);\n8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04[10]; see also 11 U.S.C.\n§ 1325(a)(3) (requiring a plan to have been proposed in good\nfaith as a condition of confirmation). Given bankruptcy’s his-\ntorical roots as an equitable remedy, “the good faith standard\nprevents debtors from manipulating the Code for wrongful\npurposes.” In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359. Whether a debtor filed\nhis petition in good faith is a factual finding to be reversed\nonly when the bankruptcy court’s determination, based on\nthe totality of the circumstances, is clearly erroneous. In re\nSmith, 286 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2002).\n Using a Chapter 13 petition to stave off an impending\nhome foreclosure sale is not necessarily improper. Although\nChapter 13 generally prohibits a plan from modifying mort-\ngage lenders’ underlying rights, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), it\nexpressly allows a debtor to cure defaults with respect to his\nprincipal residence “until such residence is sold at a foreclo-\nsure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable non-\nbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1); see also 8 COLLIER ON\nBANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a]; id. at § 1322.16. A debtor, thus,\nmay use a proper Chapter 13 petition to cure past defaults on\nhis mortgage through regular payments to the lender, pre-\nventing the foreclosure sale. See Nobelman v. American Savings\nBank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993).\n But this is not what Nora proposed for the Lisses. As the\nbankruptcy court recognized, the object of Nora’s plan was\n\f16 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nnot to pay the Lisses’ creditors in an orderly fashion but, in-\nstead, to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment. Nora sug-\ngested directing the Lisses’ mortgage payments to her trust\naccount (not to the Chapter 13 trustee) “during the pendency\n[of an] adversary proceeding to be commenced, in part, for\nthe determination of the identity of the real party in interest\nentitled to the payment or proceeds … .” Such an effort to\nrelitigate a creditor’s rights—already established in state-\ncourt proceedings—is an improper, bad faith use of a Chapter\n13 petition. See In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359 (“[F]iling a Chapter\n13 petition in order to thwart the payment of an otherwise\nnondischargeable income tax debt … was not one of the in-\ntended purposes of the bankruptcy provisions. … [T]he bank-\nruptcy court’s finding of lack of good faith is not clearly erro-\nneous.”).\n In the district court, Nora never presented any argument\nabout why the bankruptcy court’s good-faith determination\nwas clearly erroneous. Indeed, Nora never even filed a brief\non the merits of the appeal, despite the fact it was pending in\nthe district court for 16 months. Cf. Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d\n754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n appellate brief that does not\neven try to engage the reasons the appellant lost has no pro-\nspect of success.”).\n Nora now resurrects the argument that HSBC’s note is a\nforgery, so the appeal to the district court was not frivolous.\nThis only confirms the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that\nNora intended to use the proceedings to thwart HSBC, rather\nthan to cure the Lisses’ mortgage defaults or otherwise satisfy\nHSBC’s claim. Many court decisions have previously in-\nformed Nora that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal\ncourts are bound by state-court resolutions of debtors’\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 17\n\ndefenses to mortgage foreclosure. See, e.g., Nora v. Residential\nFunding Co., 543 Fed. App’x 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2013) (“By alleg-\ning that the fraudulent assignment to Residential Funding al-\nlowed it to succeed in foreclosing on her property in state\ncourt, Nora is impermissibly asking a federal district court to\nreview and reject the state court’s judgment of foreclosure of\nher property.”); Spencer v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 246\nF. Supp. 3d 1241, 1245 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (“As previously ex-\nplained to [Nora], the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives fed-\neral courts of jurisdiction to review a state court decision.”);\nSpencer v. PNC Bank, No. 14-cv-422-wmc, 2015 WL 1520912, at\n*4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2015) (noting Nora could challenge the\nvalidity of endorsements and notes in state court but that\n“those arguments do not undermine [the creditor’s] standing\nin the bankruptcy proceeding”); Schmid v. Bank of America, 498\nB.R. 221, 224–25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“The Rooker-Feldman\ndoctrine applies to plaintiff’s fraud claim because plaintiff’s\nalleged injury is the state court foreclosure judgment that de-\nfendant Bank of America is now asserting … Many other\ncourts have concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a\nlitigant from challenging a foreclosure judgment in a subse-\nquent case.”).\n Throughout the federal proceedings, Nora has repeatedly\nattacked HSBC’s “standing” to oppose Steven Lisse’s Chapter\n13 plan on the theory that HSBC’s note is a forgery. She simi-\nlarly contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction\nher due to this alleged Article III defect. Nora is wrong on\nboth counts. The Wisconsin foreclosure judgment established\nHSBC as the Lisses’ judgment creditor. It is the foreclosure\njudgment, not the note, that gives HSBC standing at this point\nto object to Steven Lisse’s Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1324(a)\n(providing that any “party in interest may object to\n\f18 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nconfirmation of the plan”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (defining a\n“creditor” to be a “party in interest” for purposes of Chapter\n11); In re Rimgale, 669 F.3d at 428 (explaining that Congress\nadopted § 1324 to allow “for creditors to be heard” while giv-\ning the bankruptcy judge sole authority to confirm or reject a\nplan). This makes the authenticity of HSBC’s note irrelevant\nto the analysis in federal court. Even if the note is a forgery,\nuntil the Lisses obtain a vacatur of the foreclosure judgment,\nHSBC’s standing as a judgment creditor is unassailable.\n Nora manages to flag one potentially legitimate basis to\nchallenge the bankruptcy court’s decision: that the court de-\ncided sua sponte to not only deny confirmation but to dismiss\nthe petition without leave to amend the plan. Compare In re\nTerry, 630 F.2d 634, 636 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (“As we read § 1307,\na court cannot order dismissal or conversion on its own mo-\ntion.”), with In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993)\n(holding sua sponte dismissal appropriate under 11 U.S.C.\n§ 105(a)); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04 (sug-\ngesting § 105(a) “presumably would give the court the power\nto dismiss a case sua sponte”). Yet Nora never briefed that ar-\ngument for the district court. See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones\nLang LaSalle Am., Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting\narguments not raised below are forfeited). And she fails to ad-\nequately do so here, simply quoting a transcript without cit-\ning any relevant legal authorities on the topic. See M.G.\nSkinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency v. Norman-Spencer Agency, 845\nF.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped\narguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by le-\ngal authority.”). The inclusion of one plausible argument—\namidst a plethora of frivolous arguments—will not insulate\nan appellant from sanctions. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1200 (holding\nsanctions may be imposed where most of the appellant’s\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 19\n\narguments are frivolous, even if not all of them can be classi-\nfied that way).\n Nora’s attempt to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment\nin bankruptcy court was frivolous. Nora’s repeated fraud ac-\ncusations do not change the calculus. Mains v. CitiBank, 852\nF.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding Rooker-Feldman prohibits\nfederal courts from reviewing whether a lender procured a\nstate-court foreclosure judgment through fraud). If Nora be-\nlieved she possessed new evidence of fraud, Wisconsin’s state\ncourts were the appropriate venue to raise such arguments.\nWIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(c) (authorizing motions to reopen judg-\nments due to the “[f]raud, misrepresentation, or other mis-\nconduct of an adverse party”); see also Taylor v. Federal Nat’l\nMortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming dis-\ntrict court’s decision to remand a fraud-on-the-court claim to\nstate court on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Aside from delay,\nthere was no reason for Nora to file a federal bankruptcy case\nrather than seek relief in state court. See Mains, 852 F.3d at 676\n(“The state’s courts are quite capable of protecting their own\nintegrity.”). Federal courts do not exist to provide disap-\npointed state-court losers a second bite at the apple.13\n\n\n\n\n 13 At oral argument, Nora’s counsel contended Judge Conley misun-\nderstood Chapter 13 bankruptcy law, citing his passing reference to Ste-\nven Lisse’s bankruptcy petition as an “appeal” of the Wisconsin foreclo-\nsure judgment. But, read in context, Judge Conley’s statement was noting\nthat Nora’s arguments were only appropriate in a state-court appeal (such\nthat Nora was, as a practical matter, attempting to bring an improper “ap-\npeal” in federal court). Judge Conley’s thorough and careful opinions in\nthis case dispel any concerns of the type Nora’s counsel postulates.\n\f20 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n 2. Nora’s litigation tactics warranted sanctions under 28\n U.S.C. § 1927.\n Courts may also impose sanctions against a lawyer who\n“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and\nvexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A lawyer’s subjective bad faith\nis a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for § 1927 sanc-\ntions; objective bad faith is enough. Hunt v. Moore Bros., Inc.,\n861 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2017). Attorneys demonstrate objec-\ntive bad faith when they pursue “a path that a reasonably\ncareful attorney would have known, after appropriate in-\nquiry, to be unsound.” Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Boyer v.\nBSNF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016)). Because trial\njudges are best positioned to detect bad faith litigation con-\nduct, they possess broad discretion in exercising the § 1927\npower. Id.\n Nora’s stall tactics are blatant when one looks back at how\nthis litigation unfolded. Although Nora denies intentionally\ndelaying proceedings, the record before us belies her position.\nNora herself openly acknowledged the purpose of Steven\nLisse’s bankruptcy petition was to extend the deadline to pe-\ntition the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And, as Nora now boasts\nin her brief, her strategy worked:\n The March 22, 2018 Order [by the district court]\n concludes that attorneys’ fees should be\n awarded based on “dilatory conduct” whereby\n the Lisses have maintained possession of their\n home for six (6) years. Actually, the Lisses have\n remained in possession of their home for over\n eight (8) years since the fraudulent foreclosure\n began and they are still in possession of their\n home, contrary to Judge Peterson’s conclusion\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 21\n\n that the foreclosure of the Lisses’ home is “inev-\n itable.”\nAppellant’s Response to Motion for Sanctions at 16–17,\nECF No. 24.\n Using the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as a litiga-\ntion ploy to drag out foreclosure proceedings in another juris-\ndiction constitutes objective bad faith. See Hilgeford v. The\nPeoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Our review of\nthe briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious\nlitigation. … We can think of no other reason for this [mort-\ngagor’s] appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obsti-\nnancy.”).\n The conclusion of intentional delay is supported, not only\nby the obvious motive, but also by the lack of any substantive\nmerit to the Chapter 13 proceedings. As discussed above, the\nplan Nora filed on behalf of Steven Lisse (and then again for\nSondra Lisse) improperly attempted to use an adversarial\nproceeding to relitigate the merits of a foreclosure judgment\nHSBC had already obtained in Wisconsin state court (with\nHSBC receiving no payments in the interim). Any reasonably\ncareful attorney—let alone an attorney with Nora’s familiarity\nwith bankruptcy court—would have known that this type of\nconduct would not be tolerated. Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082; cf. Carr\nv. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the suit\nis not frivolous, or at least not utterly so, it is so lacking in\nmerit … that its pursuit by the plaintiff indicates a motive to\nharass.”).\n Nora then compounded the delays caused by these merit-\nless bankruptcy petitions by filing numerous, last-minute mo-\ntions for lengthy stays or deadline extensions. For example, in\n\f22 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nSteven Lisse’s appeal in the district court, Nora filed three mo-\ntions to stay the proceedings. This strategy produced a\n16-month delay before the district court refused any further\nextensions, at which point Nora moved to voluntarily dismiss\nthe appeal without filing an opening brief. Such litigation be-\nhavior—even if one assumes pure motives—constitutes objec-\ntive bad faith warranting sanctions under § 1927. The district\ncourt did not abuse its discretion.\n B. Nora’s Suspension from Law Practice\n In addition to awarding HSBC damages and costs against\nboth Nora and Steven Lisse as a monetary sanction, two dis-\ntrict court orders imposed professional discipline on Nora.\nFirst, on March 20, 2018, the district court fined Nora $2,500\nand suspended her right to practice in the Western District for\nsix months, although it stayed the penalties until Nora com-\nmitted another violation.\n Ten days later, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court\nsuspended Nora’s law license for one year. In re Disciplinary\nProceedings against Nora, 909 N.W.2d at 167–68. As a result, on\nApril 13, 2018, the district court issued another order sus-\npending Nora’s right to practice based on W.D. Wis. LR\n83.5(E). That local rule automatically imposes reciprocal dis-\ncipline when another jurisdiction does so, although it permits\nthe attorney to apply “for modification or vacation of the [dis-\ntrict court’s] discipline.”\n Although Nora appeals the district court’s April 13, 2018\ndisciplinary order separately from its March 22, 2018 order\nawarding HSBC its damages and costs under FED. R. BANKR.\nP. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, she does not develop an inde-\npendent argument for reversing it. To be clear, Nora is\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 23\n\ncurrently prohibited from practice in the Western District as\nreciprocal discipline based on her disbarment by the Wiscon-\nsin Supreme Court, not due to her conduct in this litigation.14\nNora does not provide a reason to reverse that discipline.\n District courts are permitted to rely on state-court discipli-\nnary proceedings to suspend attorneys practicing before\nthem. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917). And this case\nshows why a local rule making reciprocal discipline auto-\nmatic (while also providing a process for attorneys to chal-\nlenge that federal discipline) makes sense. Such rules align the\nprocedure with the relevant legal presumptions. Separate fed-\neral hearings are not required. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486\n(7th Cir. 1995). Federal courts give “great weight” to state-\ncourt disciplinary findings. In re Jafree, 759 F.2d 604, 608 (7th\nCir. 1985). The attorney bears the burden to identify either a\ndue process violation, insufficient fact findings, or “some\nother grave reason” why the state-court’s ruling is not entitled\nto the federal court’s respect. Selling 243 U.S. at 51. Placing the\nonus on the attorney to raise such issues in a motion to modify\nor vacate discipline minimizes the amount of resources di-\nverted to (essentially) collateral attacks on state-court pro-\nceedings. See In re Wick, 628 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2010).15\n\n\n 14 The district court’s April 13, 2018 order, however, does state that its\n\nMarch 20, 2018 disciplinary order (holding sanctions for Nora’s conduct\nin this litigation in abeyance until further misconduct) will remain in effect\nshould Nora be reinstated.\n 15 This court’s rules take a similar procedural approach. 7TH CIR. R.\n46(d). Based on the suspension of Nora’s Wisconsin law license in 2018,\nthis court ordered Nora removed from its roll of attorneys after she failed\nto demonstrate why this court should not do so. Order, In re Nora, No.\nD-18-07 (7th Cir. May 23, 2018).\n\f24 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n Even setting aside the discipline imposed by the Wiscon-\nsin Supreme Court, Nora’s litigation activity in federal court\nwarrants a suspension itself. Federal courts’ inherent author-\nity to disbar or suspend lawyers for misconduct is longstand-\ning and well established. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985);\nsee also Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824) (Marshall, J.)\n(holding the power to suspend attorneys is “incidental to all\nCourts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and\nfor the respectability of the profession”).\n Again, Nora used tag-team Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings\nby a husband and wife—each lacking a good faith basis—to\npostpone the orderly resolution of state-court proceedings.\nNora’s behavior in this litigation unfortunately is not an aber-\nration for her. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650,\n654-55 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, this appeal is frivolous, and\nwe are troubled by Nora’s conduct in this litigation. … [W]e\nsuspect that the removal was part of a strategy designed to\ngum up the progress of the case.”); Spencer v. Federal Home\nLoan Mortg. Corp., No. 15-cv-332-wmc, 2015 WL 4509159, at *1\n(W.D. Wis. July 24, 2015) (stating that Nora’s appeals ap-\npeared “motivated by the goal to further delay a warranted\nstate court foreclosure.”). Courts have sanctioned Nora for\nthis conduct before, but apparently she has not received the\nmessage that it will not be tolerated.\n Not only are Nora’s litigation tactics inappropriate, her\ntreatment of opposing counsel and judicial officers is censura-\nble. In the district court, Nora accused HSBC’s counsel (by\nname) of committing “uncontroverted fraud on the Court,” as\nwell as multiple federal crimes, by presenting HSBC’s claim.\nShe repeats similar attacks in these appeals. See, e.g., Appel-\nlants Br. at 47. This behavior is, again, not new for Nora. PNC\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 25\n\nBank, 763 F.3d at 655 (“Nora has accused the state court judge\nand court reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts,\nthe district court judge of pursuing ‘a campaign of libel\nagainst her,’ and opposing counsel of engaging in ‘actionable\ncivil fraud and racketeering that may constitute state and fed-\neral criminal misconduct.’”); Nora v. Furay, No. 14-cv-527-jdp,\n2014 WL 4209608, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2014) (“Nora con-\ntends that Judge Furay ‘acted in reckless haste to place false\nfindings on the public record in order to support the falsely\nmade allegations against her former client … to make false\nfindings of fact concerning matters which had never been ad-\njudicated, and to damage Nora’s character and reputation.’”);\nIn re Rinaldi, No. 11-35689-svk, 2017 WL 104749, at *1 (E.D.\nWis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“The conversion of the case to Chapter 13\nclearly changed the context of HSBCʹs entitlement to relief\nfrom stay, but Attorney Nora ignored the conversion and ac-\ncused HSBCʹs attorneys of fraud on the Court.”).\n Flippant, unfounded accusations of misconduct and fraud\nby opposing counsel and court officials demean the profes-\nsion and impair the orderly operation of the judicial system.\nIn re Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487. They also violate the ethical\nstandards for lawyers practicing in this circuit. See 7TH CIR.\nSTANDARDS FOR PROF. CONDUCT, Lawyer’s Duties to Other\nCounsel at ¶4 (“We will not, absent good cause, attribute bad\nmotives or improper conduct to other counsel or bring the\nprofession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impro-\npriety.”). Such behavior warrants punishment.\n Following Nora’s repeated abuse of the judicial process\nthrough frivolous filings and dilatory tactics, her unprofes-\nsional conduct toward opposing counsel, and the suspension\nof her Wisconsin law license, “the district court certainly was\n\f26 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nentitled to say, ‘enough is enough.’” Salmeron v. Enter.\nRecovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2009). We find no\nfault with the district court’s order suspending Nora from\npractice in the Western District of Wisconsin.\n C. Further Appellate Sanctions\n We must also resolve HSBC’s appellate motion for addi-\ntional sanctions. This court may “award just damages and sin-\ngle or double costs to the appellee” when it deems an appeal\nfrivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Such sanctions are discretionary\nand appropriate where an appellant simply repeats previ-\nously rejected, frivolous arguments or pursues an appeal to\nharass their adversary. Arnold v. Villarreal, 853 F.3d 384, 389\n(7th Cir. 2017).\n Nora’s arguments almost entirely regurgitate points she\npressed before the bankruptcy court, which the district court\nconcluded were frivolous. As we have explained to Nora pre-\nviously, “Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 when a\nlitigant or attorney presents appellate arguments with no rea-\nsonable expectation of success for the purposes of delay, har-\nassment, or sheer obstinacy.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 665. That\naptly describes Nora’s present appeals.\n Not only were Nora’s arguments on the merits frivolous,\nshe also engaged in meritless and dilatory motion practice be-\nfore this court. She moved to stay these appeals pending our\nruling on a frivolous motion to strike that she filed. When we\ndenied that motion, Nora immediately filed an equally frivo-\nlous motion to reconsider. Similarly, Nora submitted four\nseparate “Requests for Judicial Notice,” needlessly clogging\nthis court’s motion docket. She continued to lodge these re-\nquests, even after this court issued an opinion detailing why\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 27\n\nthey were unnecessary and improper. In re Appeals of Nora, 905\nF.3d at 497 (7th Cir. 2018).\n We find Nora’s appeals to have been frivolous and grant\nHSBC’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. HSBC requested\n$2,150.00 for attorneys’ fees and $446.00 for costs in its motion.\nAlthough such figures appear reasonable, HSBC has not sub-\nmitted an affidavit or other evidentiary record to support\nthem. See Arnold, 853 F.3d at 389 (directing moving party to\n“submit an affidavit and supporting papers specifying the\ndamages” incurred); Flip Side Prod., Inc. v. Jam Prod., Ltd., 843\nF.2d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring party seeking sanc-\ntions to submit a “verified, itemized statement” of its dam-\nages and costs). So, we direct HSBC to provide an accounting\nof their costs and attorneys’ fees within 15 days.\n For numerous reasons, including her failure to present “a\nseparately filed motion” in compliance with FED. R. APP. P. 38,\nwe deny Nora’s request for attorneys’ fees.\n Finally, we must revisit our previous sanctions against\nNora. Due to “frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings”\nby Nora in an appeal back in 2015, we fined her $2,500 but\nsuspended the sanction “until the time, if ever, that Nora sub-\nmits further inappropriate filings.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 667.\nGiven Nora’s frivolous filings in these appeals, we lift the sus-\npension of our previous monetary sanction.\n III. Conclusion\n Lawyers must represent their clients’ interests responsi-\nbly, not only zealously. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter., Inc., 886\nF.2d 1485, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). Part of being a responsible\ncounselor to one’s client is recognizing when the legal battle\nis lost and advising the client how to best handle that\n\f28 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\noutcome. Frivolous legal arguments, intentionally dilatory\ntactics, and unprofessional antagonism toward opposing\ncounsel benefits no one and improperly burdens federal\ncourts. Nora’s conduct has crossed the boundaries of accepta-\nble conduct for attorneys in this circuit.\n For these reasons, we order as follows:\n 1) On appeal number 18-1866, the district court’s March\n22, 2018 order holding Steven Lisse and Wendy Alison Nora\njointly and severally liable for $1,837.50 is AFFIRMED;\n 2) On appeal number 18-1889, the district court’s March\n20, 2018 and April 13, 2018 orders suspending Wendy Alison\nNora’s ability to practice in the Bankruptcy and District\nCourts for the Western District of Wisconsin (and staying an\nadditional $2,500 fine) are AFFIRMED;\n 3) HSBC’s motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\nAPP. P. 38 is GRANTED, and HSBC is directed to provide an\naccounting of its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in these\nappeals within 15 days;\n 4) Nora’s “Request for Appellant’s Attorneys Fees and\nCosts of Defending against the Motion for Sanctions” is\nDENIED; and\n 5) We lift the suspension of the monetary sanction im-\nposed in appeal number 13-2676 and order Nora to tender a\ncheck payable to the clerk of this court for $2,500 within 60\ndays of the date of this opinion.\n The district court’s decisions are AFFIRMED WITH\nSANCTIONS.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\nIN THE MATTER OF:\\n STEVEN ROBERT LISSE,\\n Debtor.\\nAPPEALS OF:\\n WENDY ALISON NORA\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-617-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir-\\ncuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Attorney Wendy Alison Nora ap-\\npeals a decision requiring her and her client to pay damages\\nand costs related to this bankruptcy litigation, as well as an\\norder suspending her from the practice of law in the Western\\nDistrict of Wisconsin. These appeals, unfortunately, are not\\nNora’s first encounter with attorney discipline. See, e.g., In re\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nDisciplinary Action against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990);\\nIn re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 495 N.W.2d 99 (Wis.\\n1993); In re Rinaldi, 778 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Nora, 778\\nF.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2018). While we hope this will be\\nher last such encounter, her serial dilatory, vexatious, and un-\\nprofessional litigation practices lead us to affirm the district\\ncourt’s orders. In addition, Nora’s frivolous motion practice\\nand legal arguments in these appeals lead us to lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction against Nora.\\n I. Background\\n Proceedings in multiple venues are relevant to these ap-\\npeals, including each level of the Wisconsin state court sys-\\ntem, two Chapter 13 petitions in federal bankruptcy court,\\nand two bankruptcy appeals in the district court. Because the\\nprocedural history is pertinent to resolving Nora’s appeals,\\nwe detail it below.\\n A. Wisconsin Foreclosure Action\\n Steven and Sondra Lisse refinanced their home in 2006,\\ntaking out a new mortgage and signing a corresponding note.\\nThe Lisses fell behind on their payments, and an entity con-\\ntrolled by HSBC Bank USA, N.A. filed a foreclosure action in\\nDane County Circuit Court in 2010.1\\n Four years later, HSBC moved for summary judgment. In\\nresponse, the Lisses asked the court for additional discovery\\nthat they hoped would demonstrate HSBC could not enforce\\n\\n 1 The prolix name of the entity is HSBC Bank USA, National Associa-\\ntion for the Benefit of Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series\\n2006-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates. For simplicity, this\\nopinion refers to appellee as HSBC.\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 3\\n\\nits note. The court denied the Lisses’ request and awarded\\nHSBC summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. The Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. HSBC Bank\\nUSA v. Lisse, 877 N.W.2d 650 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016) (un-\\npublished table decision).\\n B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petitions\\n Approximately six weeks after the Wisconsin Court of Ap-\\npeals’ affirmance, Steven Lisse (by attorney Nora) filed a\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of Wis-\\nconsin. As a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended\\nthe Lisses’ deadline to petition for review of the foreclosure\\njudgment. Order, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Apr. 7, 2016).2 The practical effect was to postpone\\nHSBC’s foreclosure on the Lisses’ home as long as bankruptcy\\nproceedings remained pending in federal court.\\n Nora submitted a Chapter 13 plan for Steven Lisse that\\nproposed the Lisses would make their monthly mortgage\\npayments to Nora’s trust account while the bankruptcy court\\nconducted an adversary proceeding to identify the entity en-\\ntitled to the money. HSBC objected, noting it already litigated\\nits claim to judgment in the Wisconsin courts.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Nora acknowledged the purpose of Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy peti-\\ntion was to extend the Lisses’ deadline to appeal in state court: “Mr. Lisse’s\\nemergency Petition was necessary to preserve his right to file a Petition\\nfor Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the decision of the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals entered on March 8, 2016 which denied his Mo-\\ntion for Reconsideration.” Motion for Extension of Time to File Schedules\\nat ¶5, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-109235-cjf (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Apr.\\n3, 2016), ECF No. 9.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n After the bankruptcy court held a confirmation hearing, it\\nrejected Nora’s proposed plan and sua sponte dismissed the\\ncase without leave to amend. The bankruptcy court con-\\ncluded, “[T]his clearly is an opportunity or this plan shows all\\nthe earmarks of being an effort to continue a fight, which\\ncould be made and was made in the state foreclosure action,\\nin the Bankruptcy Court.” Transcript of Final Hearing on\\nChapter 13 Plan at 51–52, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-\\n10935 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 84. The bank-\\nruptcy judge found the plan improper, citing In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990), “because the purpose for filing the\\nplan is not to pay the creditor but to thwart paying the credi-\\ntor.” Id. at 52. Nora filed an appeal to the district court on\\nbehalf of Steven Lisse, challenging HSBC’s standing, arguing\\nHSBC’s note was a forgery, and accusing HSBC’s counsel of\\nfraud on the court.\\n Five days after the bankruptcy court dismissed Steven\\nLisse’s petition, Nora filed a separate Chapter 13 petition on\\nbehalf of his wife, Sondra Lisse. This again extended the\\nLisses’ deadline in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Order,\\nHSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 (Wis. July 28, 2016).\\nNora’s proposed Chapter 13 plan for Sondra Lisse was similar\\nto the one the bankruptcy court had just rejected in Steven\\nLisse’s case. HSBC moved to dismiss the petition for lack of\\ngood faith, arguing Nora filed it with the sole intent to delay\\nthe final disposition of the Wisconsin foreclosure action.\\nHSBC also sought relief from the automatic stay.\\n Nora responded by moving for sanctions, claiming\\nHSBC’s Rooker-Feldman and preclusion arguments were friv-\\nolous and accusing HSBC’s counsel of “completely desecrat-\\ning the integrity of these proceedings.” Motion for\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 5\\n\\nNoncompliance with Discovery at 10, No. 3:16-12556-cjf\\n(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2016), ECF No. 59. The bankruptcy\\ncourt rejected Nora’s sanctions arguments entirely. In re\\nSondra Kay Lisse, 567 B.R. 813, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017)\\n(finding “no basis” to grant the motion). It also lifted the au-\\ntomatic stay, noting the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment pre-\\ncluded Nora’s arguments that HSBC’s note was forged.\\n After these procedural rulings, Nora filed three appeals to\\nthe district court and moved to voluntarily dismiss Sondra\\nLisse’s petition pending resolution of the appeals, which the\\ndistrict court granted. With both bankruptcy cases dismissed\\n(although on appeal), the Lisses filed their petition for review\\nwith the Wisconsin Supreme Court—13 months after the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment.\\nPetition for Review, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Mar. 23, 2017).\\n C. Bankruptcy Appeals to the District Court\\n Nora began Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal by filing a\\ndocument accusing HSBC and its counsel (by name) of federal\\ncrimes, including bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157.\\nNext, she asked the district court to order HSBC to “conven-\\ntionally file” its original note with the clerk of court, as evi-\\ndence of “criminal misconduct.” Shortly thereafter, Nora\\nmoved to stay the deadline for Steven Lisse’s merits brief,\\nciting HSBC’s purportedly “ambiguous and contradictory”\\nrecord designations. Then, in a motion requesting summary\\nreversal, Nora again accused HSBC and its counsel of perpe-\\ntrating a fraud on the courts by presenting forged documents.\\n Following this initial burst of activity, Steven Lisse’s ap-\\npeal lay dormant for almost a year. Finally, on August 23,\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n2017, HSBC requested dismissal for failure to prosecute. This\\nprompted the district court to set an October 2, 2017 deadline\\nfor Nora’s opening brief on the merits.\\n Nora filed a motion to stay the appeal ten days later, citing\\nthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,\\net seq.,3 and a physician’s recommendation that Nora take a\\nleave from practicing law. Despite expressing some skepti-\\ncism as to Nora’s motives—noting her “history of frivolous\\nand dilatory tactics” and efforts to “drag[ ] out the briefing on\\nthe merits by satellite skirmishes”—the district court granted\\na three-month stay. Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2017), ECF No. 42. It did,\\nhowever, stress that “[n]o further extensions will be granted\\nto Attorney Nora absent new, extraordinary circumstances.”\\nId. Nora later testified that she continued to practice law for\\nother clients in other matters during the three-month stay.4\\n The day after the district court stayed Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the\\nLisses’ petition to review the foreclosure judgment. HSBC\\n\\n 3 Nora’s invocation of the ADA is noteworthy, given that she previ-\\nously sued a Wisconsin circuit judge in federal court for alleged ADA vi-\\nolations in depriving her of medical accommodations by not granting her\\ndeadline extensions. Complaint, Nora v. Colas, No. 10-cv-709-bbc (W.D.\\nWis. Nov. 15, 2010), ECF No. 1. In its decision suspending Nora’s Wiscon-\\nsin law license (discussed later in this opinion), the Wisconsin Supreme\\nCourt found that lawsuit “was clearly pursued in an attempt to harass or\\nmaliciously injure” the judge. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora,\\n909 N.W.2d at 164.\\n 4 Nora has previously engaged in similar inconsistent behavior. See,\\ne.g., In re Nora, 417 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (7th Cir. 2011) (“At the same time\\nthat she told the district judge that she was ‘totally disabled’ from litigat-\\ning, Nora was actively litigating in the bankruptcy court.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 7\\n\\nBank USA v. Lisse, 904 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2017) (un-\\npublished table decision). As a result, in December 2017,\\nHSBC began moving forward with a foreclosure sale in Dane\\nCounty Circuit Court.\\n With respect to Sondra Lisse’s appeal, on December 5,\\n2017, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rul-\\nings. Lisse v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2017\\nWL 6021316 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2017). It held that the preclu-\\nsive effect of the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment defeated\\nNora’s challenges to the note’s authenticity and provided\\nHSBC with standing to object to Sondra Lisse’s proposed\\nChapter 13 plan. Id. at *7. Also, the district court concluded\\nthe “appeal, like the bankruptcy litigation, plainly lacks merit\\nand was wastefully presented.” Id. at *8.5 Nora asked the dis-\\ntrict court to reconsider, but the district court declined. Lisse\\nv. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2018 WL\\n840157, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding Nora’s motion\\nprovided “no basis … to reconsider its decision”). Sondra\\nLisse did not appeal the district court’s rulings to this court.\\n After the stay expired in Steven Lisse’s appeal—and on the\\neve of Nora’s deadline to file an opening brief—the Lisses re-\\nturned to Dane County Circuit Court to file a flurry of mo-\\ntions seeking to postpone the foreclosure sale.6 The day before\\n\\n 5\\n It denied HSBC’s request for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nBANKR. P. 8020 because HSBC did not file a separate motion for such relief.\\n 6 These motions were filed by another attorney. They included a mo-\\ntion to hold HSBC and its counsel in contempt for “falsely represent[ing]”\\nthe Lisses’ note to be an original and a sanctions motion against HSBC for\\n“fraud on the court.” The state court denied the Lisses’ motions and con-\\nfirmed the foreclosure sale. The Lisses appealed, and the case remains\\npending. HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2018AP000557 (Wis. Ct. App.).\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nher opening brief was due, Nora moved for another stay\\npending resolution of her clients’ state-court motions. The\\ndistrict court denied Nora’s eleventh-hour request, finding\\n“the debtor’s sole purpose appears to be to delay an inevitable\\nforeclosure through every legal artifice available both in state\\nand federal court.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 46.\\nCharacterizing Nora’s litigation maneuvers as “plainly\\nseek[ing] to continue to postpone [the state-court foreclosure\\naction] through collateral, tag-team attacks in federal court\\nbrought separately by husband and wife,” the district court\\nstated it would “no longer be complicit in these transparent\\nefforts.” Id. at 2. It refused to stay Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy\\nappeal further.\\n The following day, instead of filing an opening brief, Nora\\nmoved to voluntarily dismiss Steven Lisse’s appeal—more\\nthan 16 months after she filed it.\\n D. Sanctions in the District Court\\n The district court dismissed Steven Lisse’s appeal, but it\\ndid not stop there. Due to her “pattern of sharp practice,” the\\ndistrict court ordered Nora to show cause “why she should\\nnot be sanctioned for her frivolous, or at best vexatious, ap-\\npeal.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc\\n(W.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 49. A week later, Nora\\nasked the district court to vacate its show cause order, alleg-\\ning that the order violated due process and that the district\\ncourt had pre-judged the merits of imposing sanctions. The\\ndistrict court scheduled an evidentiary hearing before a three-\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 9\\n\\njudge panel consisting of Chief District Judge Peterson, Dis-\\ntrict Judge Conley, and Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay.7\\n Nora, now represented by her own counsel, filed an an-\\nswer seeking to “quash” the show cause order, alleging a lack\\nof notice of the “charges” against her, objecting to Judge\\nConley’s participation at the hearing, and challenging the\\nconstitutional authority of Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay to\\nparticipate. The district court provided Nora with a 13-page\\n“supplemental notice” identifying the bases for the order to\\nshow cause. Nora’s lawyer followed up with a “rejoinder,”\\nobjecting to the lack of separate “counts” and arguing the\\ncourt could not conduct its own attorney discipline proceed-\\nings.\\n The district court held a 90-minute hearing on the show\\ncause order and issued its opinion on March 20, 2018. It\\ngrouped Nora’s misconduct into three categories: “(1) inap-\\npropriately pursuing relief in federal court; (2) dilatory litiga-\\ntion conduct, including numerous, last-minute requests for\\nlengthy extensions; and (3) filing multiple cases or appeals\\nthen failing to consolidate or join them.” Opinion and Order\\nat 8, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D.\\nWis. Mar. 20, 2018), ECF No. 88. The court decided, “Nora’s\\nadvocacy has crossed the line of professional conduct too\\nmany times to be tolerated or ignored any longer.” Id. at 11.\\nThe district court fined Nora $2,500 and suspended her from\\nappearing in new matters in the Western District for six\\n\\n 7 As the district court noted, it created the three-judge panel “in a\\ngood-faith attempt to bend over backwards to accommodate and assuage\\nNora’s concerns about a lack of impartiality.” Opinion and Order at 6 n.3,\\nLisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2018),\\nECF No. 88.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nmonths, although it stayed those sanctions if and until Nora\\nsubmitted another improper filing. Id.\\n Meanwhile, HSBC had filed a motion for $3,675 in costs\\nand attorneys’ fees under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28\\nU.S.C. § 1927. Classifying the appeal as “frivolous,” the dis-\\ntrict court held Steven Lisse and Nora “jointly and severally\\nliable for $1,837.50.” Opinion and Order at 4, 8, Lisse v. HSBC\\nBank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2018),\\nECF No. 89. This monetary sanction was in addition to the\\nsuspended fine discussed above.\\n About a week later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued\\na decision in disciplinary proceedings against Nora—for con-\\nduct not connected with this litigation—revoking her law li-\\ncense for at least one year. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d at 167. On April 13, 2018, pursuant to W.D.\\nWis. LR 83.5, the district court suspended Nora from practice\\nin the Western District until her Wisconsin law license was re-\\nstored.\\n E. Appeals in this Court\\n Nora now appeals the district court’s decisions in her in-\\ndividual capacity.8 Her opening brief was due on July 30,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8Nora, as an attorney sanctioned for professional misconduct, pos-\\nsesses standing to appeal the district court’s decisions in her own name.\\nMartinez v. City of Chicago, 823 F.3d 1050, 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 11\\n\\n2018, but on that date, in violation of Circuit Rule 26,9 Nora\\ninstead filed a motion asking for a sixty-day extension. We\\npushed the deadline back to September 14, 2018, but when\\nthat date arrived, Nora again filed a noncompliant extension\\nmotion.10 Although we again extended Nora’s deadline to\\nSeptember 19, 2018, she failed to meet it and filed her opening\\nbrief late.\\n Nora also repeatedly filed documents styled as “Requests\\nfor Judicial Notice,” asking this court to take judicial notice of\\nvarious documents filed in other cases (affidavits, deposition\\ntranscripts, court orders). After two orders denying Nora’s\\nrequests, on Nora’s third attempt Judge Easterbrook (as mo-\\ntions judge) published an opinion explaining why the\\nrequests were procedurally improper. In re Appeals of Nora,\\n905 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The right place to propose\\njudicial notice, once a case is in a court of appeals, is in a brief.\\n… There’s no need to engage in motions practice, require the\\nattention of additional appellate judges, and defer briefing.”).\\n When HSBC submitted its response, Nora moved to strike\\nportions of its brief and supplemental appendix. Nora argued\\nHSBC’s citation of documents from the Wisconsin foreclosure\\naction and Sondra Lisse’s bankruptcy case—some of which\\n\\n 9 The rule requires, in part, that a motion for a deadline extension\\n“shall be filed at least seven days before the brief is due, unless it is made\\nto appear in the motion that the facts which are the basis of the motion did\\nnot exist earlier or were not, or with due diligence could not have been,\\nknown earlier to the movant’s counsel.” 7TH CIR. R. 26 (computing and\\nextending time).\\n 10Nora’s second extension motion asked for three additional days,\\nand before the court could rule on it, she filed a third motion asking for\\ntwo more days.\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nhad been filed by Nora as exhibits in Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal—made it “unreasonably difficult, if not impos-\\nsible,” for her to file a timely reply. Nora also asked this court\\nto stay the appeal until we ruled on her motions to strike. The\\ncourt denied Nora’s motions as “frivolous,” sanctioning her\\nby docking 2,000 words from the limit for her reply. Although\\nour order stated—in no uncertain terms—that “no motion for\\nfurther time (or additional words) will be entertained,” the\\nnext day Nora filed a motion for reconsideration asking the\\ncourt “to restore her full word count limitation … and to al-\\nlow [Nora] sufficient time to file her Reply Brief … .” Motion\\nfor Reconsideration of November 20, 2018 Procedural Order\\nat 11. We denied that motion too.\\n After the completion of merits briefing, HSBC moved for\\ndamages and costs under FED. R. APP. P. 38, arguing Nora’s\\nappeals are frivolous. We ordered Nora to respond to the mo-\\ntion, and she (not to be outdone) requested sanctions against\\nHSBC. Finally, failing to heed this court’s earlier directives,\\nNora filed yet another request for judicial notice, which this\\ncourt denied again.\\n II. Discussion\\n Nora appeals two separate rulings by the district court,\\nalthough her briefs meld them together. First, Nora chal-\\nlenges the district court’s March 22, 2018 sanctions order\\nholding her and Steven Lisse jointly and severally liable to\\nHSBC for $1,837.50 under FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927. Second, Nora appeals the April 13, 2018 order sus-\\npending her from practice in the Western District of\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 13\\n\\nWisconsin.11 Although Nora purports to identify ten issues on\\nappeal, each is a variation on the central theme that she\\nshould have been permitted to relitigate the authenticity of\\nHSBC’s note in federal court. In addition, we must resolve\\nHSBC’s appellate motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38.\\n A. March 22, 2018 Sanctions Order\\n A district court may “award just damages and single or\\ndouble costs” if it determines a bankruptcy appeal is frivo-\\nlous. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020(a); see also Hill v. Norfolk & Western\\nRy. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing power\\nto sanction attorneys in addition to parties).12 An appeal is\\nfrivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appellant’s\\nargument is wholly without merit.” Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst.,\\n732 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Spiegel v. Cont’l Ill.\\nNat’l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 1986)).\\n Likewise, a court may hold an attorney personally liable\\nfor “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably in-\\ncurred because of” her unreasonable and vexatious litigation\\nconduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review a district court’s sanc-\\ntions order for abuse of discretion. In re Busson-Sokolik, 635\\n\\n 11The district court’s April 13, 2018 order incorporates its March 20,\\n2018 disciplinary order, specifying the earlier order will remain in force\\nshould Nora be reinstated to practice in the Western District.\\n 12 The advisory committee notes to FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 make clear\\nthat district courts possess the same authority to sanction frivolous bank-\\nruptcy appeals that FED. R. APP. P. 38 provides to this court. FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“[T]his rule recog-\\nnizes that the authority to award damages and costs in connection with\\nfrivolous appeals is the same for district courts sitting as appellate courts,\\nbankruptcy appellate panels, and courts of appeals.”).\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nF.3d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n8020); Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1927).\\n Under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927,\\nthe district court acted well-within its discretion in imposing\\na monetary sanction on Nora.\\n 1. Sanctions were appropriate under FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n 8020(a) because the bankruptcy appeal was frivolous.\\n The bankruptcy court found Nora filed Steven Lisse’s\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition for the improper purpose of\\nthwarting the Lisses’ creditors, rather than paying them. That\\nconclusion was not clearly erroneous. In re Wiese, 552 F.3d 584,\\n588 (7th Cir. 2009) (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion\\nwhen its decision is premised on an incorrect legal principle\\nor a clearly erroneous factual finding).\\n Unlike a Chapter 7 petition, which focuses on liquidating\\nthe debtor’s assets to satisfy his creditors, Chapter 13 allows a\\ndebtor to voluntarily propose a plan to reorganize his debts\\nfor repayment out of his future income. RICHARD I. AARON,\\nBANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 777 (2013 ed.) (“The central\\nthesis of Chapter 13 is that an individual debtor can dedicate\\nfuture income to pay accumulated debts.”); see also 8 COLLIER\\nON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.02 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer\\neds., 16th ed. 2018). The focus on repayment is highlighted by\\nthe requirement that the debtor begin making payments to\\nthe trustee within 30 days after proposing a Chapter 13 plan,\\neven before the plan is confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The\\nbasic premise is to facilitate the debtor’s ability to pay his\\ncreditors, not to frustrate the creditors’ rights. In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 15\\n\\n428 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing Congress’s idealized Chapter\\n13 case as one where “the debtor, given time and relief from\\nharassment, is able to pay all or most of his debts”).\\n A bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 petition for\\ncause if it finds the petition was filed in bad faith. 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1307(c); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992);\\n8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04[10]; see also 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1325(a)(3) (requiring a plan to have been proposed in good\\nfaith as a condition of confirmation). Given bankruptcy’s his-\\ntorical roots as an equitable remedy, “the good faith standard\\nprevents debtors from manipulating the Code for wrongful\\npurposes.” In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359. Whether a debtor filed\\nhis petition in good faith is a factual finding to be reversed\\nonly when the bankruptcy court’s determination, based on\\nthe totality of the circumstances, is clearly erroneous. In re\\nSmith, 286 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n Using a Chapter 13 petition to stave off an impending\\nhome foreclosure sale is not necessarily improper. Although\\nChapter 13 generally prohibits a plan from modifying mort-\\ngage lenders’ underlying rights, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), it\\nexpressly allows a debtor to cure defaults with respect to his\\nprincipal residence “until such residence is sold at a foreclo-\\nsure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable non-\\nbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1); see also 8 COLLIER ON\\nBANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a]; id. at § 1322.16. A debtor, thus,\\nmay use a proper Chapter 13 petition to cure past defaults on\\nhis mortgage through regular payments to the lender, pre-\\nventing the foreclosure sale. See Nobelman v. American Savings\\nBank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993).\\n But this is not what Nora proposed for the Lisses. As the\\nbankruptcy court recognized, the object of Nora’s plan was\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nnot to pay the Lisses’ creditors in an orderly fashion but, in-\\nstead, to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment. Nora sug-\\ngested directing the Lisses’ mortgage payments to her trust\\naccount (not to the Chapter 13 trustee) “during the pendency\\n[of an] adversary proceeding to be commenced, in part, for\\nthe determination of the identity of the real party in interest\\nentitled to the payment or proceeds … .” Such an effort to\\nrelitigate a creditor’s rights—already established in state-\\ncourt proceedings—is an improper, bad faith use of a Chapter\\n13 petition. See In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359 (“[F]iling a Chapter\\n13 petition in order to thwart the payment of an otherwise\\nnondischargeable income tax debt … was not one of the in-\\ntended purposes of the bankruptcy provisions. … [T]he bank-\\nruptcy court’s finding of lack of good faith is not clearly erro-\\nneous.”).\\n In the district court, Nora never presented any argument\\nabout why the bankruptcy court’s good-faith determination\\nwas clearly erroneous. Indeed, Nora never even filed a brief\\non the merits of the appeal, despite the fact it was pending in\\nthe district court for 16 months. Cf. Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d\\n754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n appellate brief that does not\\neven try to engage the reasons the appellant lost has no pro-\\nspect of success.”).\\n Nora now resurrects the argument that HSBC’s note is a\\nforgery, so the appeal to the district court was not frivolous.\\nThis only confirms the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that\\nNora intended to use the proceedings to thwart HSBC, rather\\nthan to cure the Lisses’ mortgage defaults or otherwise satisfy\\nHSBC’s claim. Many court decisions have previously in-\\nformed Nora that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal\\ncourts are bound by state-court resolutions of debtors’\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 17\\n\\ndefenses to mortgage foreclosure. See, e.g., Nora v. Residential\\nFunding Co., 543 Fed. App’x 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2013) (“By alleg-\\ning that the fraudulent assignment to Residential Funding al-\\nlowed it to succeed in foreclosing on her property in state\\ncourt, Nora is impermissibly asking a federal district court to\\nreview and reject the state court’s judgment of foreclosure of\\nher property.”); Spencer v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 246\\nF. Supp. 3d 1241, 1245 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (“As previously ex-\\nplained to [Nora], the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives fed-\\neral courts of jurisdiction to review a state court decision.”);\\nSpencer v. PNC Bank, No. 14-cv-422-wmc, 2015 WL 1520912, at\\n*4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2015) (noting Nora could challenge the\\nvalidity of endorsements and notes in state court but that\\n“those arguments do not undermine [the creditor’s] standing\\nin the bankruptcy proceeding”); Schmid v. Bank of America, 498\\nB.R. 221, 224–25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“The Rooker-Feldman\\ndoctrine applies to plaintiff’s fraud claim because plaintiff’s\\nalleged injury is the state court foreclosure judgment that de-\\nfendant Bank of America is now asserting … Many other\\ncourts have concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a\\nlitigant from challenging a foreclosure judgment in a subse-\\nquent case.”).\\n Throughout the federal proceedings, Nora has repeatedly\\nattacked HSBC’s “standing” to oppose Steven Lisse’s Chapter\\n13 plan on the theory that HSBC’s note is a forgery. She simi-\\nlarly contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction\\nher due to this alleged Article III defect. Nora is wrong on\\nboth counts. The Wisconsin foreclosure judgment established\\nHSBC as the Lisses’ judgment creditor. It is the foreclosure\\njudgment, not the note, that gives HSBC standing at this point\\nto object to Steven Lisse’s Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1324(a)\\n(providing that any “party in interest may object to\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nconfirmation of the plan”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (defining a\\n“creditor” to be a “party in interest” for purposes of Chapter\\n11); In re Rimgale, 669 F.3d at 428 (explaining that Congress\\nadopted § 1324 to allow “for creditors to be heard” while giv-\\ning the bankruptcy judge sole authority to confirm or reject a\\nplan). This makes the authenticity of HSBC’s note irrelevant\\nto the analysis in federal court. Even if the note is a forgery,\\nuntil the Lisses obtain a vacatur of the foreclosure judgment,\\nHSBC’s standing as a judgment creditor is unassailable.\\n Nora manages to flag one potentially legitimate basis to\\nchallenge the bankruptcy court’s decision: that the court de-\\ncided sua sponte to not only deny confirmation but to dismiss\\nthe petition without leave to amend the plan. Compare In re\\nTerry, 630 F.2d 634, 636 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (“As we read § 1307,\\na court cannot order dismissal or conversion on its own mo-\\ntion.”), with In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993)\\n(holding sua sponte dismissal appropriate under 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 105(a)); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04 (sug-\\ngesting § 105(a) “presumably would give the court the power\\nto dismiss a case sua sponte”). Yet Nora never briefed that ar-\\ngument for the district court. See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones\\nLang LaSalle Am., Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting\\narguments not raised below are forfeited). And she fails to ad-\\nequately do so here, simply quoting a transcript without cit-\\ning any relevant legal authorities on the topic. See M.G.\\nSkinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency v. Norman-Spencer Agency, 845\\nF.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped\\narguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by le-\\ngal authority.”). The inclusion of one plausible argument—\\namidst a plethora of frivolous arguments—will not insulate\\nan appellant from sanctions. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1200 (holding\\nsanctions may be imposed where most of the appellant’s\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 19\\n\\narguments are frivolous, even if not all of them can be classi-\\nfied that way).\\n Nora’s attempt to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment\\nin bankruptcy court was frivolous. Nora’s repeated fraud ac-\\ncusations do not change the calculus. Mains v. CitiBank, 852\\nF.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding Rooker-Feldman prohibits\\nfederal courts from reviewing whether a lender procured a\\nstate-court foreclosure judgment through fraud). If Nora be-\\nlieved she possessed new evidence of fraud, Wisconsin’s state\\ncourts were the appropriate venue to raise such arguments.\\nWIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(c) (authorizing motions to reopen judg-\\nments due to the “[f]raud, misrepresentation, or other mis-\\nconduct of an adverse party”); see also Taylor v. Federal Nat’l\\nMortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming dis-\\ntrict court’s decision to remand a fraud-on-the-court claim to\\nstate court on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Aside from delay,\\nthere was no reason for Nora to file a federal bankruptcy case\\nrather than seek relief in state court. See Mains, 852 F.3d at 676\\n(“The state’s courts are quite capable of protecting their own\\nintegrity.”). Federal courts do not exist to provide disap-\\npointed state-court losers a second bite at the apple.13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 At oral argument, Nora’s counsel contended Judge Conley misun-\\nderstood Chapter 13 bankruptcy law, citing his passing reference to Ste-\\nven Lisse’s bankruptcy petition as an “appeal” of the Wisconsin foreclo-\\nsure judgment. But, read in context, Judge Conley’s statement was noting\\nthat Nora’s arguments were only appropriate in a state-court appeal (such\\nthat Nora was, as a practical matter, attempting to bring an improper “ap-\\npeal” in federal court). Judge Conley’s thorough and careful opinions in\\nthis case dispel any concerns of the type Nora’s counsel postulates.\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n 2. Nora’s litigation tactics warranted sanctions under 28\\n U.S.C. § 1927.\\n Courts may also impose sanctions against a lawyer who\\n“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and\\nvexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A lawyer’s subjective bad faith\\nis a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for § 1927 sanc-\\ntions; objective bad faith is enough. Hunt v. Moore Bros., Inc.,\\n861 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2017). Attorneys demonstrate objec-\\ntive bad faith when they pursue “a path that a reasonably\\ncareful attorney would have known, after appropriate in-\\nquiry, to be unsound.” Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Boyer v.\\nBSNF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016)). Because trial\\njudges are best positioned to detect bad faith litigation con-\\nduct, they possess broad discretion in exercising the § 1927\\npower. Id.\\n Nora’s stall tactics are blatant when one looks back at how\\nthis litigation unfolded. Although Nora denies intentionally\\ndelaying proceedings, the record before us belies her position.\\nNora herself openly acknowledged the purpose of Steven\\nLisse’s bankruptcy petition was to extend the deadline to pe-\\ntition the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And, as Nora now boasts\\nin her brief, her strategy worked:\\n The March 22, 2018 Order [by the district court]\\n concludes that attorneys’ fees should be\\n awarded based on “dilatory conduct” whereby\\n the Lisses have maintained possession of their\\n home for six (6) years. Actually, the Lisses have\\n remained in possession of their home for over\\n eight (8) years since the fraudulent foreclosure\\n began and they are still in possession of their\\n home, contrary to Judge Peterson’s conclusion\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 21\\n\\n that the foreclosure of the Lisses’ home is “inev-\\n itable.”\\nAppellant’s Response to Motion for Sanctions at 16–17,\\nECF No. 24.\\n Using the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as a litiga-\\ntion ploy to drag out foreclosure proceedings in another juris-\\ndiction constitutes objective bad faith. See Hilgeford v. The\\nPeoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Our review of\\nthe briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious\\nlitigation. … We can think of no other reason for this [mort-\\ngagor’s] appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obsti-\\nnancy.”).\\n The conclusion of intentional delay is supported, not only\\nby the obvious motive, but also by the lack of any substantive\\nmerit to the Chapter 13 proceedings. As discussed above, the\\nplan Nora filed on behalf of Steven Lisse (and then again for\\nSondra Lisse) improperly attempted to use an adversarial\\nproceeding to relitigate the merits of a foreclosure judgment\\nHSBC had already obtained in Wisconsin state court (with\\nHSBC receiving no payments in the interim). Any reasonably\\ncareful attorney—let alone an attorney with Nora’s familiarity\\nwith bankruptcy court—would have known that this type of\\nconduct would not be tolerated. Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082; cf. Carr\\nv. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the suit\\nis not frivolous, or at least not utterly so, it is so lacking in\\nmerit … that its pursuit by the plaintiff indicates a motive to\\nharass.”).\\n Nora then compounded the delays caused by these merit-\\nless bankruptcy petitions by filing numerous, last-minute mo-\\ntions for lengthy stays or deadline extensions. For example, in\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nSteven Lisse’s appeal in the district court, Nora filed three mo-\\ntions to stay the proceedings. This strategy produced a\\n16-month delay before the district court refused any further\\nextensions, at which point Nora moved to voluntarily dismiss\\nthe appeal without filing an opening brief. Such litigation be-\\nhavior—even if one assumes pure motives—constitutes objec-\\ntive bad faith warranting sanctions under § 1927. The district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion.\\n B. Nora’s Suspension from Law Practice\\n In addition to awarding HSBC damages and costs against\\nboth Nora and Steven Lisse as a monetary sanction, two dis-\\ntrict court orders imposed professional discipline on Nora.\\nFirst, on March 20, 2018, the district court fined Nora $2,500\\nand suspended her right to practice in the Western District for\\nsix months, although it stayed the penalties until Nora com-\\nmitted another violation.\\n Ten days later, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court\\nsuspended Nora’s law license for one year. In re Disciplinary\\nProceedings against Nora, 909 N.W.2d at 167–68. As a result, on\\nApril 13, 2018, the district court issued another order sus-\\npending Nora’s right to practice based on W.D. Wis. LR\\n83.5(E). That local rule automatically imposes reciprocal dis-\\ncipline when another jurisdiction does so, although it permits\\nthe attorney to apply “for modification or vacation of the [dis-\\ntrict court’s] discipline.”\\n Although Nora appeals the district court’s April 13, 2018\\ndisciplinary order separately from its March 22, 2018 order\\nawarding HSBC its damages and costs under FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, she does not develop an inde-\\npendent argument for reversing it. To be clear, Nora is\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 23\\n\\ncurrently prohibited from practice in the Western District as\\nreciprocal discipline based on her disbarment by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, not due to her conduct in this litigation.14\\nNora does not provide a reason to reverse that discipline.\\n District courts are permitted to rely on state-court discipli-\\nnary proceedings to suspend attorneys practicing before\\nthem. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917). And this case\\nshows why a local rule making reciprocal discipline auto-\\nmatic (while also providing a process for attorneys to chal-\\nlenge that federal discipline) makes sense. Such rules align the\\nprocedure with the relevant legal presumptions. Separate fed-\\neral hearings are not required. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486\\n(7th Cir. 1995). Federal courts give “great weight” to state-\\ncourt disciplinary findings. In re Jafree, 759 F.2d 604, 608 (7th\\nCir. 1985). The attorney bears the burden to identify either a\\ndue process violation, insufficient fact findings, or “some\\nother grave reason” why the state-court’s ruling is not entitled\\nto the federal court’s respect. Selling 243 U.S. at 51. Placing the\\nonus on the attorney to raise such issues in a motion to modify\\nor vacate discipline minimizes the amount of resources di-\\nverted to (essentially) collateral attacks on state-court pro-\\nceedings. See In re Wick, 628 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2010).15\\n\\n\\n 14 The district court’s April 13, 2018 order, however, does state that its\\n\\nMarch 20, 2018 disciplinary order (holding sanctions for Nora’s conduct\\nin this litigation in abeyance until further misconduct) will remain in effect\\nshould Nora be reinstated.\\n 15 This court’s rules take a similar procedural approach. 7TH CIR. R.\\n46(d). Based on the suspension of Nora’s Wisconsin law license in 2018,\\nthis court ordered Nora removed from its roll of attorneys after she failed\\nto demonstrate why this court should not do so. Order, In re Nora, No.\\nD-18-07 (7th Cir. May 23, 2018).\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n Even setting aside the discipline imposed by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, Nora’s litigation activity in federal court\\nwarrants a suspension itself. Federal courts’ inherent author-\\nity to disbar or suspend lawyers for misconduct is longstand-\\ning and well established. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985);\\nsee also Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824) (Marshall, J.)\\n(holding the power to suspend attorneys is “incidental to all\\nCourts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and\\nfor the respectability of the profession”).\\n Again, Nora used tag-team Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings\\nby a husband and wife—each lacking a good faith basis—to\\npostpone the orderly resolution of state-court proceedings.\\nNora’s behavior in this litigation unfortunately is not an aber-\\nration for her. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650,\\n654-55 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, this appeal is frivolous, and\\nwe are troubled by Nora’s conduct in this litigation. … [W]e\\nsuspect that the removal was part of a strategy designed to\\ngum up the progress of the case.”); Spencer v. Federal Home\\nLoan Mortg. Corp., No. 15-cv-332-wmc, 2015 WL 4509159, at *1\\n(W.D. Wis. July 24, 2015) (stating that Nora’s appeals ap-\\npeared “motivated by the goal to further delay a warranted\\nstate court foreclosure.”). Courts have sanctioned Nora for\\nthis conduct before, but apparently she has not received the\\nmessage that it will not be tolerated.\\n Not only are Nora’s litigation tactics inappropriate, her\\ntreatment of opposing counsel and judicial officers is censura-\\nble. In the district court, Nora accused HSBC’s counsel (by\\nname) of committing “uncontroverted fraud on the Court,” as\\nwell as multiple federal crimes, by presenting HSBC’s claim.\\nShe repeats similar attacks in these appeals. See, e.g., Appel-\\nlants Br. at 47. This behavior is, again, not new for Nora. PNC\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 25\\n\\nBank, 763 F.3d at 655 (“Nora has accused the state court judge\\nand court reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts,\\nthe district court judge of pursuing ‘a campaign of libel\\nagainst her,’ and opposing counsel of engaging in ‘actionable\\ncivil fraud and racketeering that may constitute state and fed-\\neral criminal misconduct.’”); Nora v. Furay, No. 14-cv-527-jdp,\\n2014 WL 4209608, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2014) (“Nora con-\\ntends that Judge Furay ‘acted in reckless haste to place false\\nfindings on the public record in order to support the falsely\\nmade allegations against her former client … to make false\\nfindings of fact concerning matters which had never been ad-\\njudicated, and to damage Nora’s character and reputation.’”);\\nIn re Rinaldi, No. 11-35689-svk, 2017 WL 104749, at *1 (E.D.\\nWis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“The conversion of the case to Chapter 13\\nclearly changed the context of HSBCʹs entitlement to relief\\nfrom stay, but Attorney Nora ignored the conversion and ac-\\ncused HSBCʹs attorneys of fraud on the Court.”).\\n Flippant, unfounded accusations of misconduct and fraud\\nby opposing counsel and court officials demean the profes-\\nsion and impair the orderly operation of the judicial system.\\nIn re Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487. They also violate the ethical\\nstandards for lawyers practicing in this circuit. See 7TH CIR.\\nSTANDARDS FOR PROF. CONDUCT, Lawyer’s Duties to Other\\nCounsel at ¶4 (“We will not, absent good cause, attribute bad\\nmotives or improper conduct to other counsel or bring the\\nprofession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impro-\\npriety.”). Such behavior warrants punishment.\\n Following Nora’s repeated abuse of the judicial process\\nthrough frivolous filings and dilatory tactics, her unprofes-\\nsional conduct toward opposing counsel, and the suspension\\nof her Wisconsin law license, “the district court certainly was\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nentitled to say, ‘enough is enough.’” Salmeron v. Enter.\\nRecovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2009). We find no\\nfault with the district court’s order suspending Nora from\\npractice in the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n C. Further Appellate Sanctions\\n We must also resolve HSBC’s appellate motion for addi-\\ntional sanctions. This court may “award just damages and sin-\\ngle or double costs to the appellee” when it deems an appeal\\nfrivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Such sanctions are discretionary\\nand appropriate where an appellant simply repeats previ-\\nously rejected, frivolous arguments or pursues an appeal to\\nharass their adversary. Arnold v. Villarreal, 853 F.3d 384, 389\\n(7th Cir. 2017).\\n Nora’s arguments almost entirely regurgitate points she\\npressed before the bankruptcy court, which the district court\\nconcluded were frivolous. As we have explained to Nora pre-\\nviously, “Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 when a\\nlitigant or attorney presents appellate arguments with no rea-\\nsonable expectation of success for the purposes of delay, har-\\nassment, or sheer obstinacy.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 665. That\\naptly describes Nora’s present appeals.\\n Not only were Nora’s arguments on the merits frivolous,\\nshe also engaged in meritless and dilatory motion practice be-\\nfore this court. She moved to stay these appeals pending our\\nruling on a frivolous motion to strike that she filed. When we\\ndenied that motion, Nora immediately filed an equally frivo-\\nlous motion to reconsider. Similarly, Nora submitted four\\nseparate “Requests for Judicial Notice,” needlessly clogging\\nthis court’s motion docket. She continued to lodge these re-\\nquests, even after this court issued an opinion detailing why\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 27\\n\\nthey were unnecessary and improper. In re Appeals of Nora, 905\\nF.3d at 497 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n We find Nora’s appeals to have been frivolous and grant\\nHSBC’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. HSBC requested\\n$2,150.00 for attorneys’ fees and $446.00 for costs in its motion.\\nAlthough such figures appear reasonable, HSBC has not sub-\\nmitted an affidavit or other evidentiary record to support\\nthem. See Arnold, 853 F.3d at 389 (directing moving party to\\n“submit an affidavit and supporting papers specifying the\\ndamages” incurred); Flip Side Prod., Inc. v. Jam Prod., Ltd., 843\\nF.2d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring party seeking sanc-\\ntions to submit a “verified, itemized statement” of its dam-\\nages and costs). So, we direct HSBC to provide an accounting\\nof their costs and attorneys’ fees within 15 days.\\n For numerous reasons, including her failure to present “a\\nseparately filed motion” in compliance with FED. R. APP. P. 38,\\nwe deny Nora’s request for attorneys’ fees.\\n Finally, we must revisit our previous sanctions against\\nNora. Due to “frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings”\\nby Nora in an appeal back in 2015, we fined her $2,500 but\\nsuspended the sanction “until the time, if ever, that Nora sub-\\nmits further inappropriate filings.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 667.\\nGiven Nora’s frivolous filings in these appeals, we lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Lawyers must represent their clients’ interests responsi-\\nbly, not only zealously. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter., Inc., 886\\nF.2d 1485, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). Part of being a responsible\\ncounselor to one’s client is recognizing when the legal battle\\nis lost and advising the client how to best handle that\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\noutcome. Frivolous legal arguments, intentionally dilatory\\ntactics, and unprofessional antagonism toward opposing\\ncounsel benefits no one and improperly burdens federal\\ncourts. Nora’s conduct has crossed the boundaries of accepta-\\nble conduct for attorneys in this circuit.\\n For these reasons, we order as follows:\\n 1) On appeal number 18-1866, the district court’s March\\n22, 2018 order holding Steven Lisse and Wendy Alison Nora\\njointly and severally liable for $1,837.50 is AFFIRMED;\\n 2) On appeal number 18-1889, the district court’s March\\n20, 2018 and April 13, 2018 orders suspending Wendy Alison\\nNora’s ability to practice in the Bankruptcy and District\\nCourts for the Western District of Wisconsin (and staying an\\nadditional $2,500 fine) are AFFIRMED;\\n 3) HSBC’s motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38 is GRANTED, and HSBC is directed to provide an\\naccounting of its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in these\\nappeals within 15 days;\\n 4) Nora’s “Request for Appellant’s Attorneys Fees and\\nCosts of Defending against the Motion for Sanctions” is\\nDENIED; and\\n 5) We lift the suspension of the monetary sanction im-\\nposed in appeal number 13-2676 and order Nora to tender a\\ncheck payable to the clerk of this court for $2,500 within 60\\ndays of the date of this opinion.\\n The district court’s decisions are AFFIRMED WITH\\nSANCTIONS.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1676,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4605767,"string":"4,605,767"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1889"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir- cuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\nIN THE MATTER OF:\\n STEVEN ROBERT LISSE,\\n Debtor.\\nAPPEALS OF:\\n WENDY ALISON NORA\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-617-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir-\\ncuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Attorney Wendy Alison Nora ap-\\npeals a decision requiring her and her client to pay damages\\nand costs related to this bankruptcy litigation, as well as an\\norder suspending her from the practice of law in the Western\\nDistrict of Wisconsin. These appeals, unfortunately, are not\\nNora’s first encounter with attorney discipline. See, e.g., In re\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nDisciplinary Action against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990);\\nIn re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 495 N.W.2d 99 (Wis.\\n1993); In re Rinaldi, 778 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Nora, 778\\nF.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2018). While we hope this will be\\nher last such encounter, her serial dilatory, vexatious, and un-\\nprofessional litigation practices lead us to affirm the district\\ncourt’s orders. In addition, Nora’s frivolous motion practice\\nand legal arguments in these appeals lead us to lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction against Nora.\\n I. Background\\n Proceedings in multiple venues are relevant to these ap-\\npeals, including each level of the Wisconsin state court sys-\\ntem, two Chapter 13 petitions in federal bankruptcy court,\\nand two bankruptcy appeals in the district court. Because the\\nprocedural history is pertinent to resolving Nora’s appeals,\\nwe detail it below.\\n A. Wisconsin Foreclosure Action\\n Steven and Sondra Lisse refinanced their home in 2006,\\ntaking out a new mortgage and signing a corresponding note.\\nThe Lisses fell behind on their payments, and an entity con-\\ntrolled by HSBC Bank USA, N.A. filed a foreclosure action in\\nDane County Circuit Court in 2010.1\\n Four years later, HSBC moved for summary judgment. In\\nresponse, the Lisses asked the court for additional discovery\\nthat they hoped would demonstrate HSBC could not enforce\\n\\n 1 The prolix name of the entity is HSBC Bank USA, National Associa-\\ntion for the Benefit of Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series\\n2006-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates. For simplicity, this\\nopinion refers to appellee as HSBC.\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 3\\n\\nits note. The court denied the Lisses’ request and awarded\\nHSBC summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. The Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. HSBC Bank\\nUSA v. Lisse, 877 N.W.2d 650 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016) (un-\\npublished table decision).\\n B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petitions\\n Approximately six weeks after the Wisconsin Court of Ap-\\npeals’ affirmance, Steven Lisse (by attorney Nora) filed a\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of Wis-\\nconsin. As a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended\\nthe Lisses’ deadline to petition for review of the foreclosure\\njudgment. Order, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Apr. 7, 2016).2 The practical effect was to postpone\\nHSBC’s foreclosure on the Lisses’ home as long as bankruptcy\\nproceedings remained pending in federal court.\\n Nora submitted a Chapter 13 plan for Steven Lisse that\\nproposed the Lisses would make their monthly mortgage\\npayments to Nora’s trust account while the bankruptcy court\\nconducted an adversary proceeding to identify the entity en-\\ntitled to the money. HSBC objected, noting it already litigated\\nits claim to judgment in the Wisconsin courts.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Nora acknowledged the purpose of Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy peti-\\ntion was to extend the Lisses’ deadline to appeal in state court: “Mr. Lisse’s\\nemergency Petition was necessary to preserve his right to file a Petition\\nfor Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the decision of the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals entered on March 8, 2016 which denied his Mo-\\ntion for Reconsideration.” Motion for Extension of Time to File Schedules\\nat ¶5, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-109235-cjf (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Apr.\\n3, 2016), ECF No. 9.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n After the bankruptcy court held a confirmation hearing, it\\nrejected Nora’s proposed plan and sua sponte dismissed the\\ncase without leave to amend. The bankruptcy court con-\\ncluded, “[T]his clearly is an opportunity or this plan shows all\\nthe earmarks of being an effort to continue a fight, which\\ncould be made and was made in the state foreclosure action,\\nin the Bankruptcy Court.” Transcript of Final Hearing on\\nChapter 13 Plan at 51–52, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-\\n10935 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 84. The bank-\\nruptcy judge found the plan improper, citing In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990), “because the purpose for filing the\\nplan is not to pay the creditor but to thwart paying the credi-\\ntor.” Id. at 52. Nora filed an appeal to the district court on\\nbehalf of Steven Lisse, challenging HSBC’s standing, arguing\\nHSBC’s note was a forgery, and accusing HSBC’s counsel of\\nfraud on the court.\\n Five days after the bankruptcy court dismissed Steven\\nLisse’s petition, Nora filed a separate Chapter 13 petition on\\nbehalf of his wife, Sondra Lisse. This again extended the\\nLisses’ deadline in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Order,\\nHSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 (Wis. July 28, 2016).\\nNora’s proposed Chapter 13 plan for Sondra Lisse was similar\\nto the one the bankruptcy court had just rejected in Steven\\nLisse’s case. HSBC moved to dismiss the petition for lack of\\ngood faith, arguing Nora filed it with the sole intent to delay\\nthe final disposition of the Wisconsin foreclosure action.\\nHSBC also sought relief from the automatic stay.\\n Nora responded by moving for sanctions, claiming\\nHSBC’s Rooker-Feldman and preclusion arguments were friv-\\nolous and accusing HSBC’s counsel of “completely desecrat-\\ning the integrity of these proceedings.” Motion for\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 5\\n\\nNoncompliance with Discovery at 10, No. 3:16-12556-cjf\\n(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2016), ECF No. 59. The bankruptcy\\ncourt rejected Nora’s sanctions arguments entirely. In re\\nSondra Kay Lisse, 567 B.R. 813, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017)\\n(finding “no basis” to grant the motion). It also lifted the au-\\ntomatic stay, noting the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment pre-\\ncluded Nora’s arguments that HSBC’s note was forged.\\n After these procedural rulings, Nora filed three appeals to\\nthe district court and moved to voluntarily dismiss Sondra\\nLisse’s petition pending resolution of the appeals, which the\\ndistrict court granted. With both bankruptcy cases dismissed\\n(although on appeal), the Lisses filed their petition for review\\nwith the Wisconsin Supreme Court—13 months after the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment.\\nPetition for Review, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Mar. 23, 2017).\\n C. Bankruptcy Appeals to the District Court\\n Nora began Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal by filing a\\ndocument accusing HSBC and its counsel (by name) of federal\\ncrimes, including bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157.\\nNext, she asked the district court to order HSBC to “conven-\\ntionally file” its original note with the clerk of court, as evi-\\ndence of “criminal misconduct.” Shortly thereafter, Nora\\nmoved to stay the deadline for Steven Lisse’s merits brief,\\nciting HSBC’s purportedly “ambiguous and contradictory”\\nrecord designations. Then, in a motion requesting summary\\nreversal, Nora again accused HSBC and its counsel of perpe-\\ntrating a fraud on the courts by presenting forged documents.\\n Following this initial burst of activity, Steven Lisse’s ap-\\npeal lay dormant for almost a year. Finally, on August 23,\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n2017, HSBC requested dismissal for failure to prosecute. This\\nprompted the district court to set an October 2, 2017 deadline\\nfor Nora’s opening brief on the merits.\\n Nora filed a motion to stay the appeal ten days later, citing\\nthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,\\net seq.,3 and a physician’s recommendation that Nora take a\\nleave from practicing law. Despite expressing some skepti-\\ncism as to Nora’s motives—noting her “history of frivolous\\nand dilatory tactics” and efforts to “drag[ ] out the briefing on\\nthe merits by satellite skirmishes”—the district court granted\\na three-month stay. Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2017), ECF No. 42. It did,\\nhowever, stress that “[n]o further extensions will be granted\\nto Attorney Nora absent new, extraordinary circumstances.”\\nId. Nora later testified that she continued to practice law for\\nother clients in other matters during the three-month stay.4\\n The day after the district court stayed Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the\\nLisses’ petition to review the foreclosure judgment. HSBC\\n\\n 3 Nora’s invocation of the ADA is noteworthy, given that she previ-\\nously sued a Wisconsin circuit judge in federal court for alleged ADA vi-\\nolations in depriving her of medical accommodations by not granting her\\ndeadline extensions. Complaint, Nora v. Colas, No. 10-cv-709-bbc (W.D.\\nWis. Nov. 15, 2010), ECF No. 1. In its decision suspending Nora’s Wiscon-\\nsin law license (discussed later in this opinion), the Wisconsin Supreme\\nCourt found that lawsuit “was clearly pursued in an attempt to harass or\\nmaliciously injure” the judge. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora,\\n909 N.W.2d at 164.\\n 4 Nora has previously engaged in similar inconsistent behavior. See,\\ne.g., In re Nora, 417 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (7th Cir. 2011) (“At the same time\\nthat she told the district judge that she was ‘totally disabled’ from litigat-\\ning, Nora was actively litigating in the bankruptcy court.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 7\\n\\nBank USA v. Lisse, 904 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2017) (un-\\npublished table decision). As a result, in December 2017,\\nHSBC began moving forward with a foreclosure sale in Dane\\nCounty Circuit Court.\\n With respect to Sondra Lisse’s appeal, on December 5,\\n2017, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rul-\\nings. Lisse v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2017\\nWL 6021316 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2017). It held that the preclu-\\nsive effect of the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment defeated\\nNora’s challenges to the note’s authenticity and provided\\nHSBC with standing to object to Sondra Lisse’s proposed\\nChapter 13 plan. Id. at *7. Also, the district court concluded\\nthe “appeal, like the bankruptcy litigation, plainly lacks merit\\nand was wastefully presented.” Id. at *8.5 Nora asked the dis-\\ntrict court to reconsider, but the district court declined. Lisse\\nv. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2018 WL\\n840157, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding Nora’s motion\\nprovided “no basis … to reconsider its decision”). Sondra\\nLisse did not appeal the district court’s rulings to this court.\\n After the stay expired in Steven Lisse’s appeal—and on the\\neve of Nora’s deadline to file an opening brief—the Lisses re-\\nturned to Dane County Circuit Court to file a flurry of mo-\\ntions seeking to postpone the foreclosure sale.6 The day before\\n\\n 5\\n It denied HSBC’s request for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nBANKR. P. 8020 because HSBC did not file a separate motion for such relief.\\n 6 These motions were filed by another attorney. They included a mo-\\ntion to hold HSBC and its counsel in contempt for “falsely represent[ing]”\\nthe Lisses’ note to be an original and a sanctions motion against HSBC for\\n“fraud on the court.” The state court denied the Lisses’ motions and con-\\nfirmed the foreclosure sale. The Lisses appealed, and the case remains\\npending. HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2018AP000557 (Wis. Ct. App.).\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nher opening brief was due, Nora moved for another stay\\npending resolution of her clients’ state-court motions. The\\ndistrict court denied Nora’s eleventh-hour request, finding\\n“the debtor’s sole purpose appears to be to delay an inevitable\\nforeclosure through every legal artifice available both in state\\nand federal court.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 46.\\nCharacterizing Nora’s litigation maneuvers as “plainly\\nseek[ing] to continue to postpone [the state-court foreclosure\\naction] through collateral, tag-team attacks in federal court\\nbrought separately by husband and wife,” the district court\\nstated it would “no longer be complicit in these transparent\\nefforts.” Id. at 2. It refused to stay Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy\\nappeal further.\\n The following day, instead of filing an opening brief, Nora\\nmoved to voluntarily dismiss Steven Lisse’s appeal—more\\nthan 16 months after she filed it.\\n D. Sanctions in the District Court\\n The district court dismissed Steven Lisse’s appeal, but it\\ndid not stop there. Due to her “pattern of sharp practice,” the\\ndistrict court ordered Nora to show cause “why she should\\nnot be sanctioned for her frivolous, or at best vexatious, ap-\\npeal.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc\\n(W.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 49. A week later, Nora\\nasked the district court to vacate its show cause order, alleg-\\ning that the order violated due process and that the district\\ncourt had pre-judged the merits of imposing sanctions. The\\ndistrict court scheduled an evidentiary hearing before a three-\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 9\\n\\njudge panel consisting of Chief District Judge Peterson, Dis-\\ntrict Judge Conley, and Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay.7\\n Nora, now represented by her own counsel, filed an an-\\nswer seeking to “quash” the show cause order, alleging a lack\\nof notice of the “charges” against her, objecting to Judge\\nConley’s participation at the hearing, and challenging the\\nconstitutional authority of Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay to\\nparticipate. The district court provided Nora with a 13-page\\n“supplemental notice” identifying the bases for the order to\\nshow cause. Nora’s lawyer followed up with a “rejoinder,”\\nobjecting to the lack of separate “counts” and arguing the\\ncourt could not conduct its own attorney discipline proceed-\\nings.\\n The district court held a 90-minute hearing on the show\\ncause order and issued its opinion on March 20, 2018. It\\ngrouped Nora’s misconduct into three categories: “(1) inap-\\npropriately pursuing relief in federal court; (2) dilatory litiga-\\ntion conduct, including numerous, last-minute requests for\\nlengthy extensions; and (3) filing multiple cases or appeals\\nthen failing to consolidate or join them.” Opinion and Order\\nat 8, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D.\\nWis. Mar. 20, 2018), ECF No. 88. The court decided, “Nora’s\\nadvocacy has crossed the line of professional conduct too\\nmany times to be tolerated or ignored any longer.” Id. at 11.\\nThe district court fined Nora $2,500 and suspended her from\\nappearing in new matters in the Western District for six\\n\\n 7 As the district court noted, it created the three-judge panel “in a\\ngood-faith attempt to bend over backwards to accommodate and assuage\\nNora’s concerns about a lack of impartiality.” Opinion and Order at 6 n.3,\\nLisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2018),\\nECF No. 88.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nmonths, although it stayed those sanctions if and until Nora\\nsubmitted another improper filing. Id.\\n Meanwhile, HSBC had filed a motion for $3,675 in costs\\nand attorneys’ fees under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28\\nU.S.C. § 1927. Classifying the appeal as “frivolous,” the dis-\\ntrict court held Steven Lisse and Nora “jointly and severally\\nliable for $1,837.50.” Opinion and Order at 4, 8, Lisse v. HSBC\\nBank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2018),\\nECF No. 89. This monetary sanction was in addition to the\\nsuspended fine discussed above.\\n About a week later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued\\na decision in disciplinary proceedings against Nora—for con-\\nduct not connected with this litigation—revoking her law li-\\ncense for at least one year. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d at 167. On April 13, 2018, pursuant to W.D.\\nWis. LR 83.5, the district court suspended Nora from practice\\nin the Western District until her Wisconsin law license was re-\\nstored.\\n E. Appeals in this Court\\n Nora now appeals the district court’s decisions in her in-\\ndividual capacity.8 Her opening brief was due on July 30,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8Nora, as an attorney sanctioned for professional misconduct, pos-\\nsesses standing to appeal the district court’s decisions in her own name.\\nMartinez v. City of Chicago, 823 F.3d 1050, 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 11\\n\\n2018, but on that date, in violation of Circuit Rule 26,9 Nora\\ninstead filed a motion asking for a sixty-day extension. We\\npushed the deadline back to September 14, 2018, but when\\nthat date arrived, Nora again filed a noncompliant extension\\nmotion.10 Although we again extended Nora’s deadline to\\nSeptember 19, 2018, she failed to meet it and filed her opening\\nbrief late.\\n Nora also repeatedly filed documents styled as “Requests\\nfor Judicial Notice,” asking this court to take judicial notice of\\nvarious documents filed in other cases (affidavits, deposition\\ntranscripts, court orders). After two orders denying Nora’s\\nrequests, on Nora’s third attempt Judge Easterbrook (as mo-\\ntions judge) published an opinion explaining why the\\nrequests were procedurally improper. In re Appeals of Nora,\\n905 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The right place to propose\\njudicial notice, once a case is in a court of appeals, is in a brief.\\n… There’s no need to engage in motions practice, require the\\nattention of additional appellate judges, and defer briefing.”).\\n When HSBC submitted its response, Nora moved to strike\\nportions of its brief and supplemental appendix. Nora argued\\nHSBC’s citation of documents from the Wisconsin foreclosure\\naction and Sondra Lisse’s bankruptcy case—some of which\\n\\n 9 The rule requires, in part, that a motion for a deadline extension\\n“shall be filed at least seven days before the brief is due, unless it is made\\nto appear in the motion that the facts which are the basis of the motion did\\nnot exist earlier or were not, or with due diligence could not have been,\\nknown earlier to the movant’s counsel.” 7TH CIR. R. 26 (computing and\\nextending time).\\n 10Nora’s second extension motion asked for three additional days,\\nand before the court could rule on it, she filed a third motion asking for\\ntwo more days.\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nhad been filed by Nora as exhibits in Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal—made it “unreasonably difficult, if not impos-\\nsible,” for her to file a timely reply. Nora also asked this court\\nto stay the appeal until we ruled on her motions to strike. The\\ncourt denied Nora’s motions as “frivolous,” sanctioning her\\nby docking 2,000 words from the limit for her reply. Although\\nour order stated—in no uncertain terms—that “no motion for\\nfurther time (or additional words) will be entertained,” the\\nnext day Nora filed a motion for reconsideration asking the\\ncourt “to restore her full word count limitation … and to al-\\nlow [Nora] sufficient time to file her Reply Brief … .” Motion\\nfor Reconsideration of November 20, 2018 Procedural Order\\nat 11. We denied that motion too.\\n After the completion of merits briefing, HSBC moved for\\ndamages and costs under FED. R. APP. P. 38, arguing Nora’s\\nappeals are frivolous. We ordered Nora to respond to the mo-\\ntion, and she (not to be outdone) requested sanctions against\\nHSBC. Finally, failing to heed this court’s earlier directives,\\nNora filed yet another request for judicial notice, which this\\ncourt denied again.\\n II. Discussion\\n Nora appeals two separate rulings by the district court,\\nalthough her briefs meld them together. First, Nora chal-\\nlenges the district court’s March 22, 2018 sanctions order\\nholding her and Steven Lisse jointly and severally liable to\\nHSBC for $1,837.50 under FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927. Second, Nora appeals the April 13, 2018 order sus-\\npending her from practice in the Western District of\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 13\\n\\nWisconsin.11 Although Nora purports to identify ten issues on\\nappeal, each is a variation on the central theme that she\\nshould have been permitted to relitigate the authenticity of\\nHSBC’s note in federal court. In addition, we must resolve\\nHSBC’s appellate motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38.\\n A. March 22, 2018 Sanctions Order\\n A district court may “award just damages and single or\\ndouble costs” if it determines a bankruptcy appeal is frivo-\\nlous. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020(a); see also Hill v. Norfolk & Western\\nRy. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing power\\nto sanction attorneys in addition to parties).12 An appeal is\\nfrivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appellant’s\\nargument is wholly without merit.” Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst.,\\n732 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Spiegel v. Cont’l Ill.\\nNat’l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 1986)).\\n Likewise, a court may hold an attorney personally liable\\nfor “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably in-\\ncurred because of” her unreasonable and vexatious litigation\\nconduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review a district court’s sanc-\\ntions order for abuse of discretion. In re Busson-Sokolik, 635\\n\\n 11The district court’s April 13, 2018 order incorporates its March 20,\\n2018 disciplinary order, specifying the earlier order will remain in force\\nshould Nora be reinstated to practice in the Western District.\\n 12 The advisory committee notes to FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 make clear\\nthat district courts possess the same authority to sanction frivolous bank-\\nruptcy appeals that FED. R. APP. P. 38 provides to this court. FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“[T]his rule recog-\\nnizes that the authority to award damages and costs in connection with\\nfrivolous appeals is the same for district courts sitting as appellate courts,\\nbankruptcy appellate panels, and courts of appeals.”).\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nF.3d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n8020); Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1927).\\n Under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927,\\nthe district court acted well-within its discretion in imposing\\na monetary sanction on Nora.\\n 1. Sanctions were appropriate under FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n 8020(a) because the bankruptcy appeal was frivolous.\\n The bankruptcy court found Nora filed Steven Lisse’s\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition for the improper purpose of\\nthwarting the Lisses’ creditors, rather than paying them. That\\nconclusion was not clearly erroneous. In re Wiese, 552 F.3d 584,\\n588 (7th Cir. 2009) (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion\\nwhen its decision is premised on an incorrect legal principle\\nor a clearly erroneous factual finding).\\n Unlike a Chapter 7 petition, which focuses on liquidating\\nthe debtor’s assets to satisfy his creditors, Chapter 13 allows a\\ndebtor to voluntarily propose a plan to reorganize his debts\\nfor repayment out of his future income. RICHARD I. AARON,\\nBANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 777 (2013 ed.) (“The central\\nthesis of Chapter 13 is that an individual debtor can dedicate\\nfuture income to pay accumulated debts.”); see also 8 COLLIER\\nON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.02 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer\\neds., 16th ed. 2018). The focus on repayment is highlighted by\\nthe requirement that the debtor begin making payments to\\nthe trustee within 30 days after proposing a Chapter 13 plan,\\neven before the plan is confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The\\nbasic premise is to facilitate the debtor’s ability to pay his\\ncreditors, not to frustrate the creditors’ rights. In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 15\\n\\n428 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing Congress’s idealized Chapter\\n13 case as one where “the debtor, given time and relief from\\nharassment, is able to pay all or most of his debts”).\\n A bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 petition for\\ncause if it finds the petition was filed in bad faith. 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1307(c); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992);\\n8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04[10]; see also 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1325(a)(3) (requiring a plan to have been proposed in good\\nfaith as a condition of confirmation). Given bankruptcy’s his-\\ntorical roots as an equitable remedy, “the good faith standard\\nprevents debtors from manipulating the Code for wrongful\\npurposes.” In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359. Whether a debtor filed\\nhis petition in good faith is a factual finding to be reversed\\nonly when the bankruptcy court’s determination, based on\\nthe totality of the circumstances, is clearly erroneous. In re\\nSmith, 286 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n Using a Chapter 13 petition to stave off an impending\\nhome foreclosure sale is not necessarily improper. Although\\nChapter 13 generally prohibits a plan from modifying mort-\\ngage lenders’ underlying rights, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), it\\nexpressly allows a debtor to cure defaults with respect to his\\nprincipal residence “until such residence is sold at a foreclo-\\nsure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable non-\\nbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1); see also 8 COLLIER ON\\nBANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a]; id. at § 1322.16. A debtor, thus,\\nmay use a proper Chapter 13 petition to cure past defaults on\\nhis mortgage through regular payments to the lender, pre-\\nventing the foreclosure sale. See Nobelman v. American Savings\\nBank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993).\\n But this is not what Nora proposed for the Lisses. As the\\nbankruptcy court recognized, the object of Nora’s plan was\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nnot to pay the Lisses’ creditors in an orderly fashion but, in-\\nstead, to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment. Nora sug-\\ngested directing the Lisses’ mortgage payments to her trust\\naccount (not to the Chapter 13 trustee) “during the pendency\\n[of an] adversary proceeding to be commenced, in part, for\\nthe determination of the identity of the real party in interest\\nentitled to the payment or proceeds … .” Such an effort to\\nrelitigate a creditor’s rights—already established in state-\\ncourt proceedings—is an improper, bad faith use of a Chapter\\n13 petition. See In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359 (“[F]iling a Chapter\\n13 petition in order to thwart the payment of an otherwise\\nnondischargeable income tax debt … was not one of the in-\\ntended purposes of the bankruptcy provisions. … [T]he bank-\\nruptcy court’s finding of lack of good faith is not clearly erro-\\nneous.”).\\n In the district court, Nora never presented any argument\\nabout why the bankruptcy court’s good-faith determination\\nwas clearly erroneous. Indeed, Nora never even filed a brief\\non the merits of the appeal, despite the fact it was pending in\\nthe district court for 16 months. Cf. Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d\\n754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n appellate brief that does not\\neven try to engage the reasons the appellant lost has no pro-\\nspect of success.”).\\n Nora now resurrects the argument that HSBC’s note is a\\nforgery, so the appeal to the district court was not frivolous.\\nThis only confirms the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that\\nNora intended to use the proceedings to thwart HSBC, rather\\nthan to cure the Lisses’ mortgage defaults or otherwise satisfy\\nHSBC’s claim. Many court decisions have previously in-\\nformed Nora that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal\\ncourts are bound by state-court resolutions of debtors’\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 17\\n\\ndefenses to mortgage foreclosure. See, e.g., Nora v. Residential\\nFunding Co., 543 Fed. App’x 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2013) (“By alleg-\\ning that the fraudulent assignment to Residential Funding al-\\nlowed it to succeed in foreclosing on her property in state\\ncourt, Nora is impermissibly asking a federal district court to\\nreview and reject the state court’s judgment of foreclosure of\\nher property.”); Spencer v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 246\\nF. Supp. 3d 1241, 1245 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (“As previously ex-\\nplained to [Nora], the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives fed-\\neral courts of jurisdiction to review a state court decision.”);\\nSpencer v. PNC Bank, No. 14-cv-422-wmc, 2015 WL 1520912, at\\n*4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2015) (noting Nora could challenge the\\nvalidity of endorsements and notes in state court but that\\n“those arguments do not undermine [the creditor’s] standing\\nin the bankruptcy proceeding”); Schmid v. Bank of America, 498\\nB.R. 221, 224–25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“The Rooker-Feldman\\ndoctrine applies to plaintiff’s fraud claim because plaintiff’s\\nalleged injury is the state court foreclosure judgment that de-\\nfendant Bank of America is now asserting … Many other\\ncourts have concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a\\nlitigant from challenging a foreclosure judgment in a subse-\\nquent case.”).\\n Throughout the federal proceedings, Nora has repeatedly\\nattacked HSBC’s “standing” to oppose Steven Lisse’s Chapter\\n13 plan on the theory that HSBC’s note is a forgery. She simi-\\nlarly contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction\\nher due to this alleged Article III defect. Nora is wrong on\\nboth counts. The Wisconsin foreclosure judgment established\\nHSBC as the Lisses’ judgment creditor. It is the foreclosure\\njudgment, not the note, that gives HSBC standing at this point\\nto object to Steven Lisse’s Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1324(a)\\n(providing that any “party in interest may object to\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nconfirmation of the plan”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (defining a\\n“creditor” to be a “party in interest” for purposes of Chapter\\n11); In re Rimgale, 669 F.3d at 428 (explaining that Congress\\nadopted § 1324 to allow “for creditors to be heard” while giv-\\ning the bankruptcy judge sole authority to confirm or reject a\\nplan). This makes the authenticity of HSBC’s note irrelevant\\nto the analysis in federal court. Even if the note is a forgery,\\nuntil the Lisses obtain a vacatur of the foreclosure judgment,\\nHSBC’s standing as a judgment creditor is unassailable.\\n Nora manages to flag one potentially legitimate basis to\\nchallenge the bankruptcy court’s decision: that the court de-\\ncided sua sponte to not only deny confirmation but to dismiss\\nthe petition without leave to amend the plan. Compare In re\\nTerry, 630 F.2d 634, 636 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (“As we read § 1307,\\na court cannot order dismissal or conversion on its own mo-\\ntion.”), with In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993)\\n(holding sua sponte dismissal appropriate under 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 105(a)); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04 (sug-\\ngesting § 105(a) “presumably would give the court the power\\nto dismiss a case sua sponte”). Yet Nora never briefed that ar-\\ngument for the district court. See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones\\nLang LaSalle Am., Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting\\narguments not raised below are forfeited). And she fails to ad-\\nequately do so here, simply quoting a transcript without cit-\\ning any relevant legal authorities on the topic. See M.G.\\nSkinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency v. Norman-Spencer Agency, 845\\nF.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped\\narguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by le-\\ngal authority.”). The inclusion of one plausible argument—\\namidst a plethora of frivolous arguments—will not insulate\\nan appellant from sanctions. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1200 (holding\\nsanctions may be imposed where most of the appellant’s\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 19\\n\\narguments are frivolous, even if not all of them can be classi-\\nfied that way).\\n Nora’s attempt to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment\\nin bankruptcy court was frivolous. Nora’s repeated fraud ac-\\ncusations do not change the calculus. Mains v. CitiBank, 852\\nF.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding Rooker-Feldman prohibits\\nfederal courts from reviewing whether a lender procured a\\nstate-court foreclosure judgment through fraud). If Nora be-\\nlieved she possessed new evidence of fraud, Wisconsin’s state\\ncourts were the appropriate venue to raise such arguments.\\nWIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(c) (authorizing motions to reopen judg-\\nments due to the “[f]raud, misrepresentation, or other mis-\\nconduct of an adverse party”); see also Taylor v. Federal Nat’l\\nMortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming dis-\\ntrict court’s decision to remand a fraud-on-the-court claim to\\nstate court on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Aside from delay,\\nthere was no reason for Nora to file a federal bankruptcy case\\nrather than seek relief in state court. See Mains, 852 F.3d at 676\\n(“The state’s courts are quite capable of protecting their own\\nintegrity.”). Federal courts do not exist to provide disap-\\npointed state-court losers a second bite at the apple.13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 At oral argument, Nora’s counsel contended Judge Conley misun-\\nderstood Chapter 13 bankruptcy law, citing his passing reference to Ste-\\nven Lisse’s bankruptcy petition as an “appeal” of the Wisconsin foreclo-\\nsure judgment. But, read in context, Judge Conley’s statement was noting\\nthat Nora’s arguments were only appropriate in a state-court appeal (such\\nthat Nora was, as a practical matter, attempting to bring an improper “ap-\\npeal” in federal court). Judge Conley’s thorough and careful opinions in\\nthis case dispel any concerns of the type Nora’s counsel postulates.\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n 2. Nora’s litigation tactics warranted sanctions under 28\\n U.S.C. § 1927.\\n Courts may also impose sanctions against a lawyer who\\n“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and\\nvexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A lawyer’s subjective bad faith\\nis a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for § 1927 sanc-\\ntions; objective bad faith is enough. Hunt v. Moore Bros., Inc.,\\n861 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2017). Attorneys demonstrate objec-\\ntive bad faith when they pursue “a path that a reasonably\\ncareful attorney would have known, after appropriate in-\\nquiry, to be unsound.” Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Boyer v.\\nBSNF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016)). Because trial\\njudges are best positioned to detect bad faith litigation con-\\nduct, they possess broad discretion in exercising the § 1927\\npower. Id.\\n Nora’s stall tactics are blatant when one looks back at how\\nthis litigation unfolded. Although Nora denies intentionally\\ndelaying proceedings, the record before us belies her position.\\nNora herself openly acknowledged the purpose of Steven\\nLisse’s bankruptcy petition was to extend the deadline to pe-\\ntition the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And, as Nora now boasts\\nin her brief, her strategy worked:\\n The March 22, 2018 Order [by the district court]\\n concludes that attorneys’ fees should be\\n awarded based on “dilatory conduct” whereby\\n the Lisses have maintained possession of their\\n home for six (6) years. Actually, the Lisses have\\n remained in possession of their home for over\\n eight (8) years since the fraudulent foreclosure\\n began and they are still in possession of their\\n home, contrary to Judge Peterson’s conclusion\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 21\\n\\n that the foreclosure of the Lisses’ home is “inev-\\n itable.”\\nAppellant’s Response to Motion for Sanctions at 16–17,\\nECF No. 24.\\n Using the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as a litiga-\\ntion ploy to drag out foreclosure proceedings in another juris-\\ndiction constitutes objective bad faith. See Hilgeford v. The\\nPeoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Our review of\\nthe briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious\\nlitigation. … We can think of no other reason for this [mort-\\ngagor’s] appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obsti-\\nnancy.”).\\n The conclusion of intentional delay is supported, not only\\nby the obvious motive, but also by the lack of any substantive\\nmerit to the Chapter 13 proceedings. As discussed above, the\\nplan Nora filed on behalf of Steven Lisse (and then again for\\nSondra Lisse) improperly attempted to use an adversarial\\nproceeding to relitigate the merits of a foreclosure judgment\\nHSBC had already obtained in Wisconsin state court (with\\nHSBC receiving no payments in the interim). Any reasonably\\ncareful attorney—let alone an attorney with Nora’s familiarity\\nwith bankruptcy court—would have known that this type of\\nconduct would not be tolerated. Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082; cf. Carr\\nv. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the suit\\nis not frivolous, or at least not utterly so, it is so lacking in\\nmerit … that its pursuit by the plaintiff indicates a motive to\\nharass.”).\\n Nora then compounded the delays caused by these merit-\\nless bankruptcy petitions by filing numerous, last-minute mo-\\ntions for lengthy stays or deadline extensions. For example, in\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nSteven Lisse’s appeal in the district court, Nora filed three mo-\\ntions to stay the proceedings. This strategy produced a\\n16-month delay before the district court refused any further\\nextensions, at which point Nora moved to voluntarily dismiss\\nthe appeal without filing an opening brief. Such litigation be-\\nhavior—even if one assumes pure motives—constitutes objec-\\ntive bad faith warranting sanctions under § 1927. The district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion.\\n B. Nora’s Suspension from Law Practice\\n In addition to awarding HSBC damages and costs against\\nboth Nora and Steven Lisse as a monetary sanction, two dis-\\ntrict court orders imposed professional discipline on Nora.\\nFirst, on March 20, 2018, the district court fined Nora $2,500\\nand suspended her right to practice in the Western District for\\nsix months, although it stayed the penalties until Nora com-\\nmitted another violation.\\n Ten days later, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court\\nsuspended Nora’s law license for one year. In re Disciplinary\\nProceedings against Nora, 909 N.W.2d at 167–68. As a result, on\\nApril 13, 2018, the district court issued another order sus-\\npending Nora’s right to practice based on W.D. Wis. LR\\n83.5(E). That local rule automatically imposes reciprocal dis-\\ncipline when another jurisdiction does so, although it permits\\nthe attorney to apply “for modification or vacation of the [dis-\\ntrict court’s] discipline.”\\n Although Nora appeals the district court’s April 13, 2018\\ndisciplinary order separately from its March 22, 2018 order\\nawarding HSBC its damages and costs under FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, she does not develop an inde-\\npendent argument for reversing it. To be clear, Nora is\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 23\\n\\ncurrently prohibited from practice in the Western District as\\nreciprocal discipline based on her disbarment by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, not due to her conduct in this litigation.14\\nNora does not provide a reason to reverse that discipline.\\n District courts are permitted to rely on state-court discipli-\\nnary proceedings to suspend attorneys practicing before\\nthem. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917). And this case\\nshows why a local rule making reciprocal discipline auto-\\nmatic (while also providing a process for attorneys to chal-\\nlenge that federal discipline) makes sense. Such rules align the\\nprocedure with the relevant legal presumptions. Separate fed-\\neral hearings are not required. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486\\n(7th Cir. 1995). Federal courts give “great weight” to state-\\ncourt disciplinary findings. In re Jafree, 759 F.2d 604, 608 (7th\\nCir. 1985). The attorney bears the burden to identify either a\\ndue process violation, insufficient fact findings, or “some\\nother grave reason” why the state-court’s ruling is not entitled\\nto the federal court’s respect. Selling 243 U.S. at 51. Placing the\\nonus on the attorney to raise such issues in a motion to modify\\nor vacate discipline minimizes the amount of resources di-\\nverted to (essentially) collateral attacks on state-court pro-\\nceedings. See In re Wick, 628 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2010).15\\n\\n\\n 14 The district court’s April 13, 2018 order, however, does state that its\\n\\nMarch 20, 2018 disciplinary order (holding sanctions for Nora’s conduct\\nin this litigation in abeyance until further misconduct) will remain in effect\\nshould Nora be reinstated.\\n 15 This court’s rules take a similar procedural approach. 7TH CIR. R.\\n46(d). Based on the suspension of Nora’s Wisconsin law license in 2018,\\nthis court ordered Nora removed from its roll of attorneys after she failed\\nto demonstrate why this court should not do so. Order, In re Nora, No.\\nD-18-07 (7th Cir. May 23, 2018).\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n Even setting aside the discipline imposed by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, Nora’s litigation activity in federal court\\nwarrants a suspension itself. Federal courts’ inherent author-\\nity to disbar or suspend lawyers for misconduct is longstand-\\ning and well established. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985);\\nsee also Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824) (Marshall, J.)\\n(holding the power to suspend attorneys is “incidental to all\\nCourts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and\\nfor the respectability of the profession”).\\n Again, Nora used tag-team Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings\\nby a husband and wife—each lacking a good faith basis—to\\npostpone the orderly resolution of state-court proceedings.\\nNora’s behavior in this litigation unfortunately is not an aber-\\nration for her. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650,\\n654-55 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, this appeal is frivolous, and\\nwe are troubled by Nora’s conduct in this litigation. … [W]e\\nsuspect that the removal was part of a strategy designed to\\ngum up the progress of the case.”); Spencer v. Federal Home\\nLoan Mortg. Corp., No. 15-cv-332-wmc, 2015 WL 4509159, at *1\\n(W.D. Wis. July 24, 2015) (stating that Nora’s appeals ap-\\npeared “motivated by the goal to further delay a warranted\\nstate court foreclosure.”). Courts have sanctioned Nora for\\nthis conduct before, but apparently she has not received the\\nmessage that it will not be tolerated.\\n Not only are Nora’s litigation tactics inappropriate, her\\ntreatment of opposing counsel and judicial officers is censura-\\nble. In the district court, Nora accused HSBC’s counsel (by\\nname) of committing “uncontroverted fraud on the Court,” as\\nwell as multiple federal crimes, by presenting HSBC’s claim.\\nShe repeats similar attacks in these appeals. See, e.g., Appel-\\nlants Br. at 47. This behavior is, again, not new for Nora. PNC\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 25\\n\\nBank, 763 F.3d at 655 (“Nora has accused the state court judge\\nand court reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts,\\nthe district court judge of pursuing ‘a campaign of libel\\nagainst her,’ and opposing counsel of engaging in ‘actionable\\ncivil fraud and racketeering that may constitute state and fed-\\neral criminal misconduct.’”); Nora v. Furay, No. 14-cv-527-jdp,\\n2014 WL 4209608, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2014) (“Nora con-\\ntends that Judge Furay ‘acted in reckless haste to place false\\nfindings on the public record in order to support the falsely\\nmade allegations against her former client … to make false\\nfindings of fact concerning matters which had never been ad-\\njudicated, and to damage Nora’s character and reputation.’”);\\nIn re Rinaldi, No. 11-35689-svk, 2017 WL 104749, at *1 (E.D.\\nWis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“The conversion of the case to Chapter 13\\nclearly changed the context of HSBCʹs entitlement to relief\\nfrom stay, but Attorney Nora ignored the conversion and ac-\\ncused HSBCʹs attorneys of fraud on the Court.”).\\n Flippant, unfounded accusations of misconduct and fraud\\nby opposing counsel and court officials demean the profes-\\nsion and impair the orderly operation of the judicial system.\\nIn re Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487. They also violate the ethical\\nstandards for lawyers practicing in this circuit. See 7TH CIR.\\nSTANDARDS FOR PROF. CONDUCT, Lawyer’s Duties to Other\\nCounsel at ¶4 (“We will not, absent good cause, attribute bad\\nmotives or improper conduct to other counsel or bring the\\nprofession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impro-\\npriety.”). Such behavior warrants punishment.\\n Following Nora’s repeated abuse of the judicial process\\nthrough frivolous filings and dilatory tactics, her unprofes-\\nsional conduct toward opposing counsel, and the suspension\\nof her Wisconsin law license, “the district court certainly was\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nentitled to say, ‘enough is enough.’” Salmeron v. Enter.\\nRecovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2009). We find no\\nfault with the district court’s order suspending Nora from\\npractice in the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n C. Further Appellate Sanctions\\n We must also resolve HSBC’s appellate motion for addi-\\ntional sanctions. This court may “award just damages and sin-\\ngle or double costs to the appellee” when it deems an appeal\\nfrivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Such sanctions are discretionary\\nand appropriate where an appellant simply repeats previ-\\nously rejected, frivolous arguments or pursues an appeal to\\nharass their adversary. Arnold v. Villarreal, 853 F.3d 384, 389\\n(7th Cir. 2017).\\n Nora’s arguments almost entirely regurgitate points she\\npressed before the bankruptcy court, which the district court\\nconcluded were frivolous. As we have explained to Nora pre-\\nviously, “Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 when a\\nlitigant or attorney presents appellate arguments with no rea-\\nsonable expectation of success for the purposes of delay, har-\\nassment, or sheer obstinacy.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 665. That\\naptly describes Nora’s present appeals.\\n Not only were Nora’s arguments on the merits frivolous,\\nshe also engaged in meritless and dilatory motion practice be-\\nfore this court. She moved to stay these appeals pending our\\nruling on a frivolous motion to strike that she filed. When we\\ndenied that motion, Nora immediately filed an equally frivo-\\nlous motion to reconsider. Similarly, Nora submitted four\\nseparate “Requests for Judicial Notice,” needlessly clogging\\nthis court’s motion docket. She continued to lodge these re-\\nquests, even after this court issued an opinion detailing why\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 27\\n\\nthey were unnecessary and improper. In re Appeals of Nora, 905\\nF.3d at 497 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n We find Nora’s appeals to have been frivolous and grant\\nHSBC’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. HSBC requested\\n$2,150.00 for attorneys’ fees and $446.00 for costs in its motion.\\nAlthough such figures appear reasonable, HSBC has not sub-\\nmitted an affidavit or other evidentiary record to support\\nthem. See Arnold, 853 F.3d at 389 (directing moving party to\\n“submit an affidavit and supporting papers specifying the\\ndamages” incurred); Flip Side Prod., Inc. v. Jam Prod., Ltd., 843\\nF.2d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring party seeking sanc-\\ntions to submit a “verified, itemized statement” of its dam-\\nages and costs). So, we direct HSBC to provide an accounting\\nof their costs and attorneys’ fees within 15 days.\\n For numerous reasons, including her failure to present “a\\nseparately filed motion” in compliance with FED. R. APP. P. 38,\\nwe deny Nora’s request for attorneys’ fees.\\n Finally, we must revisit our previous sanctions against\\nNora. Due to “frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings”\\nby Nora in an appeal back in 2015, we fined her $2,500 but\\nsuspended the sanction “until the time, if ever, that Nora sub-\\nmits further inappropriate filings.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 667.\\nGiven Nora’s frivolous filings in these appeals, we lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Lawyers must represent their clients’ interests responsi-\\nbly, not only zealously. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter., Inc., 886\\nF.2d 1485, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). Part of being a responsible\\ncounselor to one’s client is recognizing when the legal battle\\nis lost and advising the client how to best handle that\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\noutcome. Frivolous legal arguments, intentionally dilatory\\ntactics, and unprofessional antagonism toward opposing\\ncounsel benefits no one and improperly burdens federal\\ncourts. Nora’s conduct has crossed the boundaries of accepta-\\nble conduct for attorneys in this circuit.\\n For these reasons, we order as follows:\\n 1) On appeal number 18-1866, the district court’s March\\n22, 2018 order holding Steven Lisse and Wendy Alison Nora\\njointly and severally liable for $1,837.50 is AFFIRMED;\\n 2) On appeal number 18-1889, the district court’s March\\n20, 2018 and April 13, 2018 orders suspending Wendy Alison\\nNora’s ability to practice in the Bankruptcy and District\\nCourts for the Western District of Wisconsin (and staying an\\nadditional $2,500 fine) are AFFIRMED;\\n 3) HSBC’s motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38 is GRANTED, and HSBC is directed to provide an\\naccounting of its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in these\\nappeals within 15 days;\\n 4) Nora’s “Request for Appellant’s Attorneys Fees and\\nCosts of Defending against the Motion for Sanctions” is\\nDENIED; and\\n 5) We lift the suspension of the monetary sanction im-\\nposed in appeal number 13-2676 and order Nora to tender a\\ncheck payable to the clerk of this court for $2,500 within 60\\ndays of the date of this opinion.\\n The district court’s decisions are AFFIRMED WITH\\nSANCTIONS.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383020/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Cir cuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Cir cuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605767/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\nIN THE MATTER OF:\n STEVEN ROBERT LISSE,\n Debtor.\nAPPEALS OF:\n WENDY ALISON NORA\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-617-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir-\ncuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Attorney Wendy Alison Nora ap-\npeals a decision requiring her and her client to pay damages\nand costs related to this bankruptcy litigation, as well as an\norder suspending her from the practice of law in the Western\nDistrict of Wisconsin. These appeals, unfortunately, are not\nNora’s first encounter with attorney discipline. See, e.g., In re\n\f2 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nDisciplinary Action against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990);\nIn re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 495 N.W.2d 99 (Wis.\n1993); In re Rinaldi, 778 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Nora, 778\nF.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\nNora, 909 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2018). While we hope this will be\nher last such encounter, her serial dilatory, vexatious, and un-\nprofessional litigation practices lead us to affirm the district\ncourt’s orders. In addition, Nora’s frivolous motion practice\nand legal arguments in these appeals lead us to lift the sus-\npension of our previous monetary sanction against Nora.\n I. Background\n Proceedings in multiple venues are relevant to these ap-\npeals, including each level of the Wisconsin state court sys-\ntem, two Chapter 13 petitions in federal bankruptcy court,\nand two bankruptcy appeals in the district court. Because the\nprocedural history is pertinent to resolving Nora’s appeals,\nwe detail it below.\n A. Wisconsin Foreclosure Action\n Steven and Sondra Lisse refinanced their home in 2006,\ntaking out a new mortgage and signing a corresponding note.\nThe Lisses fell behind on their payments, and an entity con-\ntrolled by HSBC Bank USA, N.A. filed a foreclosure action in\nDane County Circuit Court in 2010.1\n Four years later, HSBC moved for summary judgment. In\nresponse, the Lisses asked the court for additional discovery\nthat they hoped would demonstrate HSBC could not enforce\n\n 1 The prolix name of the entity is HSBC Bank USA, National Associa-\ntion for the Benefit of Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series\n2006-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates. For simplicity, this\nopinion refers to appellee as HSBC.\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 3\n\nits note. The court denied the Lisses’ request and awarded\nHSBC summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. The Wis-\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. HSBC Bank\nUSA v. Lisse, 877 N.W.2d 650 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016) (un-\npublished table decision).\n B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petitions\n Approximately six weeks after the Wisconsin Court of Ap-\npeals’ affirmance, Steven Lisse (by attorney Nora) filed a\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of Wis-\nconsin. As a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended\nthe Lisses’ deadline to petition for review of the foreclosure\njudgment. Order, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\n(Wis. Apr. 7, 2016).2 The practical effect was to postpone\nHSBC’s foreclosure on the Lisses’ home as long as bankruptcy\nproceedings remained pending in federal court.\n Nora submitted a Chapter 13 plan for Steven Lisse that\nproposed the Lisses would make their monthly mortgage\npayments to Nora’s trust account while the bankruptcy court\nconducted an adversary proceeding to identify the entity en-\ntitled to the money. HSBC objected, noting it already litigated\nits claim to judgment in the Wisconsin courts.\n\n\n\n\n 2 Nora acknowledged the purpose of Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy peti-\ntion was to extend the Lisses’ deadline to appeal in state court: “Mr. Lisse’s\nemergency Petition was necessary to preserve his right to file a Petition\nfor Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the decision of the Wis-\nconsin Court of Appeals entered on March 8, 2016 which denied his Mo-\ntion for Reconsideration.” Motion for Extension of Time to File Schedules\nat ¶5, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-109235-cjf (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Apr.\n3, 2016), ECF No. 9.\n\f4 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n After the bankruptcy court held a confirmation hearing, it\nrejected Nora’s proposed plan and sua sponte dismissed the\ncase without leave to amend. The bankruptcy court con-\ncluded, “[T]his clearly is an opportunity or this plan shows all\nthe earmarks of being an effort to continue a fight, which\ncould be made and was made in the state foreclosure action,\nin the Bankruptcy Court.” Transcript of Final Hearing on\nChapter 13 Plan at 51–52, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-\n10935 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 84. The bank-\nruptcy judge found the plan improper, citing In re Schaitz, 913\nF.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990), “because the purpose for filing the\nplan is not to pay the creditor but to thwart paying the credi-\ntor.” Id. at 52. Nora filed an appeal to the district court on\nbehalf of Steven Lisse, challenging HSBC’s standing, arguing\nHSBC’s note was a forgery, and accusing HSBC’s counsel of\nfraud on the court.\n Five days after the bankruptcy court dismissed Steven\nLisse’s petition, Nora filed a separate Chapter 13 petition on\nbehalf of his wife, Sondra Lisse. This again extended the\nLisses’ deadline in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Order,\nHSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 (Wis. July 28, 2016).\nNora’s proposed Chapter 13 plan for Sondra Lisse was similar\nto the one the bankruptcy court had just rejected in Steven\nLisse’s case. HSBC moved to dismiss the petition for lack of\ngood faith, arguing Nora filed it with the sole intent to delay\nthe final disposition of the Wisconsin foreclosure action.\nHSBC also sought relief from the automatic stay.\n Nora responded by moving for sanctions, claiming\nHSBC’s Rooker-Feldman and preclusion arguments were friv-\nolous and accusing HSBC’s counsel of “completely desecrat-\ning the integrity of these proceedings.” Motion for\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 5\n\nNoncompliance with Discovery at 10, No. 3:16-12556-cjf\n(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2016), ECF No. 59. The bankruptcy\ncourt rejected Nora’s sanctions arguments entirely. In re\nSondra Kay Lisse, 567 B.R. 813, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017)\n(finding “no basis” to grant the motion). It also lifted the au-\ntomatic stay, noting the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment pre-\ncluded Nora’s arguments that HSBC’s note was forged.\n After these procedural rulings, Nora filed three appeals to\nthe district court and moved to voluntarily dismiss Sondra\nLisse’s petition pending resolution of the appeals, which the\ndistrict court granted. With both bankruptcy cases dismissed\n(although on appeal), the Lisses filed their petition for review\nwith the Wisconsin Supreme Court—13 months after the Wis-\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment.\nPetition for Review, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\n(Wis. Mar. 23, 2017).\n C. Bankruptcy Appeals to the District Court\n Nora began Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal by filing a\ndocument accusing HSBC and its counsel (by name) of federal\ncrimes, including bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157.\nNext, she asked the district court to order HSBC to “conven-\ntionally file” its original note with the clerk of court, as evi-\ndence of “criminal misconduct.” Shortly thereafter, Nora\nmoved to stay the deadline for Steven Lisse’s merits brief,\nciting HSBC’s purportedly “ambiguous and contradictory”\nrecord designations. Then, in a motion requesting summary\nreversal, Nora again accused HSBC and its counsel of perpe-\ntrating a fraud on the courts by presenting forged documents.\n Following this initial burst of activity, Steven Lisse’s ap-\npeal lay dormant for almost a year. Finally, on August 23,\n\f6 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n2017, HSBC requested dismissal for failure to prosecute. This\nprompted the district court to set an October 2, 2017 deadline\nfor Nora’s opening brief on the merits.\n Nora filed a motion to stay the appeal ten days later, citing\nthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,\net seq.,3 and a physician’s recommendation that Nora take a\nleave from practicing law. Despite expressing some skepti-\ncism as to Nora’s motives—noting her “history of frivolous\nand dilatory tactics” and efforts to “drag[ ] out the briefing on\nthe merits by satellite skirmishes”—the district court granted\na three-month stay. Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\n3:16-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2017), ECF No. 42. It did,\nhowever, stress that “[n]o further extensions will be granted\nto Attorney Nora absent new, extraordinary circumstances.”\nId. Nora later testified that she continued to practice law for\nother clients in other matters during the three-month stay.4\n The day after the district court stayed Steven Lisse’s bank-\nruptcy appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the\nLisses’ petition to review the foreclosure judgment. HSBC\n\n 3 Nora’s invocation of the ADA is noteworthy, given that she previ-\nously sued a Wisconsin circuit judge in federal court for alleged ADA vi-\nolations in depriving her of medical accommodations by not granting her\ndeadline extensions. Complaint, Nora v. Colas, No. 10-cv-709-bbc (W.D.\nWis. Nov. 15, 2010), ECF No. 1. In its decision suspending Nora’s Wiscon-\nsin law license (discussed later in this opinion), the Wisconsin Supreme\nCourt found that lawsuit “was clearly pursued in an attempt to harass or\nmaliciously injure” the judge. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora,\n909 N.W.2d at 164.\n 4 Nora has previously engaged in similar inconsistent behavior. See,\ne.g., In re Nora, 417 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (7th Cir. 2011) (“At the same time\nthat she told the district judge that she was ‘totally disabled’ from litigat-\ning, Nora was actively litigating in the bankruptcy court.”).\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 7\n\nBank USA v. Lisse, 904 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2017) (un-\npublished table decision). As a result, in December 2017,\nHSBC began moving forward with a foreclosure sale in Dane\nCounty Circuit Court.\n With respect to Sondra Lisse’s appeal, on December 5,\n2017, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rul-\nings. Lisse v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2017\nWL 6021316 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2017). It held that the preclu-\nsive effect of the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment defeated\nNora’s challenges to the note’s authenticity and provided\nHSBC with standing to object to Sondra Lisse’s proposed\nChapter 13 plan. Id. at *7. Also, the district court concluded\nthe “appeal, like the bankruptcy litigation, plainly lacks merit\nand was wastefully presented.” Id. at *8.5 Nora asked the dis-\ntrict court to reconsider, but the district court declined. Lisse\nv. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2018 WL\n840157, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding Nora’s motion\nprovided “no basis … to reconsider its decision”). Sondra\nLisse did not appeal the district court’s rulings to this court.\n After the stay expired in Steven Lisse’s appeal—and on the\neve of Nora’s deadline to file an opening brief—the Lisses re-\nturned to Dane County Circuit Court to file a flurry of mo-\ntions seeking to postpone the foreclosure sale.6 The day before\n\n 5\n It denied HSBC’s request for damages and costs under FED. R.\nBANKR. P. 8020 because HSBC did not file a separate motion for such relief.\n 6 These motions were filed by another attorney. They included a mo-\ntion to hold HSBC and its counsel in contempt for “falsely represent[ing]”\nthe Lisses’ note to be an original and a sanctions motion against HSBC for\n“fraud on the court.” The state court denied the Lisses’ motions and con-\nfirmed the foreclosure sale. The Lisses appealed, and the case remains\npending. HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2018AP000557 (Wis. Ct. App.).\n\f8 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nher opening brief was due, Nora moved for another stay\npending resolution of her clients’ state-court motions. The\ndistrict court denied Nora’s eleventh-hour request, finding\n“the debtor’s sole purpose appears to be to delay an inevitable\nforeclosure through every legal artifice available both in state\nand federal court.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\n3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 46.\nCharacterizing Nora’s litigation maneuvers as “plainly\nseek[ing] to continue to postpone [the state-court foreclosure\naction] through collateral, tag-team attacks in federal court\nbrought separately by husband and wife,” the district court\nstated it would “no longer be complicit in these transparent\nefforts.” Id. at 2. It refused to stay Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy\nappeal further.\n The following day, instead of filing an opening brief, Nora\nmoved to voluntarily dismiss Steven Lisse’s appeal—more\nthan 16 months after she filed it.\n D. Sanctions in the District Court\n The district court dismissed Steven Lisse’s appeal, but it\ndid not stop there. Due to her “pattern of sharp practice,” the\ndistrict court ordered Nora to show cause “why she should\nnot be sanctioned for her frivolous, or at best vexatious, ap-\npeal.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc\n(W.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 49. A week later, Nora\nasked the district court to vacate its show cause order, alleg-\ning that the order violated due process and that the district\ncourt had pre-judged the merits of imposing sanctions. The\ndistrict court scheduled an evidentiary hearing before a three-\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 9\n\njudge panel consisting of Chief District Judge Peterson, Dis-\ntrict Judge Conley, and Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay.7\n Nora, now represented by her own counsel, filed an an-\nswer seeking to “quash” the show cause order, alleging a lack\nof notice of the “charges” against her, objecting to Judge\nConley’s participation at the hearing, and challenging the\nconstitutional authority of Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay to\nparticipate. The district court provided Nora with a 13-page\n“supplemental notice” identifying the bases for the order to\nshow cause. Nora’s lawyer followed up with a “rejoinder,”\nobjecting to the lack of separate “counts” and arguing the\ncourt could not conduct its own attorney discipline proceed-\nings.\n The district court held a 90-minute hearing on the show\ncause order and issued its opinion on March 20, 2018. It\ngrouped Nora’s misconduct into three categories: “(1) inap-\npropriately pursuing relief in federal court; (2) dilatory litiga-\ntion conduct, including numerous, last-minute requests for\nlengthy extensions; and (3) filing multiple cases or appeals\nthen failing to consolidate or join them.” Opinion and Order\nat 8, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D.\nWis. Mar. 20, 2018), ECF No. 88. The court decided, “Nora’s\nadvocacy has crossed the line of professional conduct too\nmany times to be tolerated or ignored any longer.” Id. at 11.\nThe district court fined Nora $2,500 and suspended her from\nappearing in new matters in the Western District for six\n\n 7 As the district court noted, it created the three-judge panel “in a\ngood-faith attempt to bend over backwards to accommodate and assuage\nNora’s concerns about a lack of impartiality.” Opinion and Order at 6 n.3,\nLisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2018),\nECF No. 88.\n\f10 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nmonths, although it stayed those sanctions if and until Nora\nsubmitted another improper filing. Id.\n Meanwhile, HSBC had filed a motion for $3,675 in costs\nand attorneys’ fees under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28\nU.S.C. § 1927. Classifying the appeal as “frivolous,” the dis-\ntrict court held Steven Lisse and Nora “jointly and severally\nliable for $1,837.50.” Opinion and Order at 4, 8, Lisse v. HSBC\nBank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2018),\nECF No. 89. This monetary sanction was in addition to the\nsuspended fine discussed above.\n About a week later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued\na decision in disciplinary proceedings against Nora—for con-\nduct not connected with this litigation—revoking her law li-\ncense for at least one year. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\nNora, 909 N.W.2d at 167. On April 13, 2018, pursuant to W.D.\nWis. LR 83.5, the district court suspended Nora from practice\nin the Western District until her Wisconsin law license was re-\nstored.\n E. Appeals in this Court\n Nora now appeals the district court’s decisions in her in-\ndividual capacity.8 Her opening brief was due on July 30,\n\n\n\n\n 8Nora, as an attorney sanctioned for professional misconduct, pos-\nsesses standing to appeal the district court’s decisions in her own name.\nMartinez v. City of Chicago, 823 F.3d 1050, 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 2016).\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 11\n\n2018, but on that date, in violation of Circuit Rule 26,9 Nora\ninstead filed a motion asking for a sixty-day extension. We\npushed the deadline back to September 14, 2018, but when\nthat date arrived, Nora again filed a noncompliant extension\nmotion.10 Although we again extended Nora’s deadline to\nSeptember 19, 2018, she failed to meet it and filed her opening\nbrief late.\n Nora also repeatedly filed documents styled as “Requests\nfor Judicial Notice,” asking this court to take judicial notice of\nvarious documents filed in other cases (affidavits, deposition\ntranscripts, court orders). After two orders denying Nora’s\nrequests, on Nora’s third attempt Judge Easterbrook (as mo-\ntions judge) published an opinion explaining why the\nrequests were procedurally improper. In re Appeals of Nora,\n905 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The right place to propose\njudicial notice, once a case is in a court of appeals, is in a brief.\n… There’s no need to engage in motions practice, require the\nattention of additional appellate judges, and defer briefing.”).\n When HSBC submitted its response, Nora moved to strike\nportions of its brief and supplemental appendix. Nora argued\nHSBC’s citation of documents from the Wisconsin foreclosure\naction and Sondra Lisse’s bankruptcy case—some of which\n\n 9 The rule requires, in part, that a motion for a deadline extension\n“shall be filed at least seven days before the brief is due, unless it is made\nto appear in the motion that the facts which are the basis of the motion did\nnot exist earlier or were not, or with due diligence could not have been,\nknown earlier to the movant’s counsel.” 7TH CIR. R. 26 (computing and\nextending time).\n 10Nora’s second extension motion asked for three additional days,\nand before the court could rule on it, she filed a third motion asking for\ntwo more days.\n\f12 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nhad been filed by Nora as exhibits in Steven Lisse’s bank-\nruptcy appeal—made it “unreasonably difficult, if not impos-\nsible,” for her to file a timely reply. Nora also asked this court\nto stay the appeal until we ruled on her motions to strike. The\ncourt denied Nora’s motions as “frivolous,” sanctioning her\nby docking 2,000 words from the limit for her reply. Although\nour order stated—in no uncertain terms—that “no motion for\nfurther time (or additional words) will be entertained,” the\nnext day Nora filed a motion for reconsideration asking the\ncourt “to restore her full word count limitation … and to al-\nlow [Nora] sufficient time to file her Reply Brief … .” Motion\nfor Reconsideration of November 20, 2018 Procedural Order\nat 11. We denied that motion too.\n After the completion of merits briefing, HSBC moved for\ndamages and costs under FED. R. APP. P. 38, arguing Nora’s\nappeals are frivolous. We ordered Nora to respond to the mo-\ntion, and she (not to be outdone) requested sanctions against\nHSBC. Finally, failing to heed this court’s earlier directives,\nNora filed yet another request for judicial notice, which this\ncourt denied again.\n II. Discussion\n Nora appeals two separate rulings by the district court,\nalthough her briefs meld them together. First, Nora chal-\nlenges the district court’s March 22, 2018 sanctions order\nholding her and Steven Lisse jointly and severally liable to\nHSBC for $1,837.50 under FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1927. Second, Nora appeals the April 13, 2018 order sus-\npending her from practice in the Western District of\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 13\n\nWisconsin.11 Although Nora purports to identify ten issues on\nappeal, each is a variation on the central theme that she\nshould have been permitted to relitigate the authenticity of\nHSBC’s note in federal court. In addition, we must resolve\nHSBC’s appellate motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\nAPP. P. 38.\n A. March 22, 2018 Sanctions Order\n A district court may “award just damages and single or\ndouble costs” if it determines a bankruptcy appeal is frivo-\nlous. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020(a); see also Hill v. Norfolk & Western\nRy. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing power\nto sanction attorneys in addition to parties).12 An appeal is\nfrivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appellant’s\nargument is wholly without merit.” Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst.,\n732 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Spiegel v. Cont’l Ill.\nNat’l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 1986)).\n Likewise, a court may hold an attorney personally liable\nfor “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably in-\ncurred because of” her unreasonable and vexatious litigation\nconduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review a district court’s sanc-\ntions order for abuse of discretion. In re Busson-Sokolik, 635\n\n 11The district court’s April 13, 2018 order incorporates its March 20,\n2018 disciplinary order, specifying the earlier order will remain in force\nshould Nora be reinstated to practice in the Western District.\n 12 The advisory committee notes to FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 make clear\nthat district courts possess the same authority to sanction frivolous bank-\nruptcy appeals that FED. R. APP. P. 38 provides to this court. FED. R. BANKR.\nP. 8020 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“[T]his rule recog-\nnizes that the authority to award damages and costs in connection with\nfrivolous appeals is the same for district courts sitting as appellate courts,\nbankruptcy appellate panels, and courts of appeals.”).\n\f14 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nF.3d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing FED. R. BANKR. P.\n8020); Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 2018)\n(addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1927).\n Under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927,\nthe district court acted well-within its discretion in imposing\na monetary sanction on Nora.\n 1. Sanctions were appropriate under FED. R. BANKR. P.\n 8020(a) because the bankruptcy appeal was frivolous.\n The bankruptcy court found Nora filed Steven Lisse’s\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition for the improper purpose of\nthwarting the Lisses’ creditors, rather than paying them. That\nconclusion was not clearly erroneous. In re Wiese, 552 F.3d 584,\n588 (7th Cir. 2009) (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion\nwhen its decision is premised on an incorrect legal principle\nor a clearly erroneous factual finding).\n Unlike a Chapter 7 petition, which focuses on liquidating\nthe debtor’s assets to satisfy his creditors, Chapter 13 allows a\ndebtor to voluntarily propose a plan to reorganize his debts\nfor repayment out of his future income. RICHARD I. AARON,\nBANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 777 (2013 ed.) (“The central\nthesis of Chapter 13 is that an individual debtor can dedicate\nfuture income to pay accumulated debts.”); see also 8 COLLIER\nON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.02 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer\neds., 16th ed. 2018). The focus on repayment is highlighted by\nthe requirement that the debtor begin making payments to\nthe trustee within 30 days after proposing a Chapter 13 plan,\neven before the plan is confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The\nbasic premise is to facilitate the debtor’s ability to pay his\ncreditors, not to frustrate the creditors’ rights. In re Schaitz, 913\nF.2d 452, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 15\n\n428 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing Congress’s idealized Chapter\n13 case as one where “the debtor, given time and relief from\nharassment, is able to pay all or most of his debts”).\n A bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 petition for\ncause if it finds the petition was filed in bad faith. 11 U.S.C.\n§ 1307(c); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992);\n8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04[10]; see also 11 U.S.C.\n§ 1325(a)(3) (requiring a plan to have been proposed in good\nfaith as a condition of confirmation). Given bankruptcy’s his-\ntorical roots as an equitable remedy, “the good faith standard\nprevents debtors from manipulating the Code for wrongful\npurposes.” In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359. Whether a debtor filed\nhis petition in good faith is a factual finding to be reversed\nonly when the bankruptcy court’s determination, based on\nthe totality of the circumstances, is clearly erroneous. In re\nSmith, 286 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2002).\n Using a Chapter 13 petition to stave off an impending\nhome foreclosure sale is not necessarily improper. Although\nChapter 13 generally prohibits a plan from modifying mort-\ngage lenders’ underlying rights, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), it\nexpressly allows a debtor to cure defaults with respect to his\nprincipal residence “until such residence is sold at a foreclo-\nsure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable non-\nbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1); see also 8 COLLIER ON\nBANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a]; id. at § 1322.16. A debtor, thus,\nmay use a proper Chapter 13 petition to cure past defaults on\nhis mortgage through regular payments to the lender, pre-\nventing the foreclosure sale. See Nobelman v. American Savings\nBank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993).\n But this is not what Nora proposed for the Lisses. As the\nbankruptcy court recognized, the object of Nora’s plan was\n\f16 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nnot to pay the Lisses’ creditors in an orderly fashion but, in-\nstead, to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment. Nora sug-\ngested directing the Lisses’ mortgage payments to her trust\naccount (not to the Chapter 13 trustee) “during the pendency\n[of an] adversary proceeding to be commenced, in part, for\nthe determination of the identity of the real party in interest\nentitled to the payment or proceeds … .” Such an effort to\nrelitigate a creditor’s rights—already established in state-\ncourt proceedings—is an improper, bad faith use of a Chapter\n13 petition. See In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359 (“[F]iling a Chapter\n13 petition in order to thwart the payment of an otherwise\nnondischargeable income tax debt … was not one of the in-\ntended purposes of the bankruptcy provisions. … [T]he bank-\nruptcy court’s finding of lack of good faith is not clearly erro-\nneous.”).\n In the district court, Nora never presented any argument\nabout why the bankruptcy court’s good-faith determination\nwas clearly erroneous. Indeed, Nora never even filed a brief\non the merits of the appeal, despite the fact it was pending in\nthe district court for 16 months. Cf. Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d\n754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n appellate brief that does not\neven try to engage the reasons the appellant lost has no pro-\nspect of success.”).\n Nora now resurrects the argument that HSBC’s note is a\nforgery, so the appeal to the district court was not frivolous.\nThis only confirms the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that\nNora intended to use the proceedings to thwart HSBC, rather\nthan to cure the Lisses’ mortgage defaults or otherwise satisfy\nHSBC’s claim. Many court decisions have previously in-\nformed Nora that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal\ncourts are bound by state-court resolutions of debtors’\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 17\n\ndefenses to mortgage foreclosure. See, e.g., Nora v. Residential\nFunding Co., 543 Fed. App’x 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2013) (“By alleg-\ning that the fraudulent assignment to Residential Funding al-\nlowed it to succeed in foreclosing on her property in state\ncourt, Nora is impermissibly asking a federal district court to\nreview and reject the state court’s judgment of foreclosure of\nher property.”); Spencer v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 246\nF. Supp. 3d 1241, 1245 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (“As previously ex-\nplained to [Nora], the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives fed-\neral courts of jurisdiction to review a state court decision.”);\nSpencer v. PNC Bank, No. 14-cv-422-wmc, 2015 WL 1520912, at\n*4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2015) (noting Nora could challenge the\nvalidity of endorsements and notes in state court but that\n“those arguments do not undermine [the creditor’s] standing\nin the bankruptcy proceeding”); Schmid v. Bank of America, 498\nB.R. 221, 224–25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“The Rooker-Feldman\ndoctrine applies to plaintiff’s fraud claim because plaintiff’s\nalleged injury is the state court foreclosure judgment that de-\nfendant Bank of America is now asserting … Many other\ncourts have concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a\nlitigant from challenging a foreclosure judgment in a subse-\nquent case.”).\n Throughout the federal proceedings, Nora has repeatedly\nattacked HSBC’s “standing” to oppose Steven Lisse’s Chapter\n13 plan on the theory that HSBC’s note is a forgery. She simi-\nlarly contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction\nher due to this alleged Article III defect. Nora is wrong on\nboth counts. The Wisconsin foreclosure judgment established\nHSBC as the Lisses’ judgment creditor. It is the foreclosure\njudgment, not the note, that gives HSBC standing at this point\nto object to Steven Lisse’s Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1324(a)\n(providing that any “party in interest may object to\n\f18 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nconfirmation of the plan”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (defining a\n“creditor” to be a “party in interest” for purposes of Chapter\n11); In re Rimgale, 669 F.3d at 428 (explaining that Congress\nadopted § 1324 to allow “for creditors to be heard” while giv-\ning the bankruptcy judge sole authority to confirm or reject a\nplan). This makes the authenticity of HSBC’s note irrelevant\nto the analysis in federal court. Even if the note is a forgery,\nuntil the Lisses obtain a vacatur of the foreclosure judgment,\nHSBC’s standing as a judgment creditor is unassailable.\n Nora manages to flag one potentially legitimate basis to\nchallenge the bankruptcy court’s decision: that the court de-\ncided sua sponte to not only deny confirmation but to dismiss\nthe petition without leave to amend the plan. Compare In re\nTerry, 630 F.2d 634, 636 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (“As we read § 1307,\na court cannot order dismissal or conversion on its own mo-\ntion.”), with In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993)\n(holding sua sponte dismissal appropriate under 11 U.S.C.\n§ 105(a)); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04 (sug-\ngesting § 105(a) “presumably would give the court the power\nto dismiss a case sua sponte”). Yet Nora never briefed that ar-\ngument for the district court. See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones\nLang LaSalle Am., Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting\narguments not raised below are forfeited). And she fails to ad-\nequately do so here, simply quoting a transcript without cit-\ning any relevant legal authorities on the topic. See M.G.\nSkinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency v. Norman-Spencer Agency, 845\nF.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped\narguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by le-\ngal authority.”). The inclusion of one plausible argument—\namidst a plethora of frivolous arguments—will not insulate\nan appellant from sanctions. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1200 (holding\nsanctions may be imposed where most of the appellant’s\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 19\n\narguments are frivolous, even if not all of them can be classi-\nfied that way).\n Nora’s attempt to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment\nin bankruptcy court was frivolous. Nora’s repeated fraud ac-\ncusations do not change the calculus. Mains v. CitiBank, 852\nF.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding Rooker-Feldman prohibits\nfederal courts from reviewing whether a lender procured a\nstate-court foreclosure judgment through fraud). If Nora be-\nlieved she possessed new evidence of fraud, Wisconsin’s state\ncourts were the appropriate venue to raise such arguments.\nWIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(c) (authorizing motions to reopen judg-\nments due to the “[f]raud, misrepresentation, or other mis-\nconduct of an adverse party”); see also Taylor v. Federal Nat’l\nMortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming dis-\ntrict court’s decision to remand a fraud-on-the-court claim to\nstate court on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Aside from delay,\nthere was no reason for Nora to file a federal bankruptcy case\nrather than seek relief in state court. See Mains, 852 F.3d at 676\n(“The state’s courts are quite capable of protecting their own\nintegrity.”). Federal courts do not exist to provide disap-\npointed state-court losers a second bite at the apple.13\n\n\n\n\n 13 At oral argument, Nora’s counsel contended Judge Conley misun-\nderstood Chapter 13 bankruptcy law, citing his passing reference to Ste-\nven Lisse’s bankruptcy petition as an “appeal” of the Wisconsin foreclo-\nsure judgment. But, read in context, Judge Conley’s statement was noting\nthat Nora’s arguments were only appropriate in a state-court appeal (such\nthat Nora was, as a practical matter, attempting to bring an improper “ap-\npeal” in federal court). Judge Conley’s thorough and careful opinions in\nthis case dispel any concerns of the type Nora’s counsel postulates.\n\f20 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n 2. Nora’s litigation tactics warranted sanctions under 28\n U.S.C. § 1927.\n Courts may also impose sanctions against a lawyer who\n“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and\nvexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A lawyer’s subjective bad faith\nis a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for § 1927 sanc-\ntions; objective bad faith is enough. Hunt v. Moore Bros., Inc.,\n861 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2017). Attorneys demonstrate objec-\ntive bad faith when they pursue “a path that a reasonably\ncareful attorney would have known, after appropriate in-\nquiry, to be unsound.” Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Boyer v.\nBSNF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016)). Because trial\njudges are best positioned to detect bad faith litigation con-\nduct, they possess broad discretion in exercising the § 1927\npower. Id.\n Nora’s stall tactics are blatant when one looks back at how\nthis litigation unfolded. Although Nora denies intentionally\ndelaying proceedings, the record before us belies her position.\nNora herself openly acknowledged the purpose of Steven\nLisse’s bankruptcy petition was to extend the deadline to pe-\ntition the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And, as Nora now boasts\nin her brief, her strategy worked:\n The March 22, 2018 Order [by the district court]\n concludes that attorneys’ fees should be\n awarded based on “dilatory conduct” whereby\n the Lisses have maintained possession of their\n home for six (6) years. Actually, the Lisses have\n remained in possession of their home for over\n eight (8) years since the fraudulent foreclosure\n began and they are still in possession of their\n home, contrary to Judge Peterson’s conclusion\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 21\n\n that the foreclosure of the Lisses’ home is “inev-\n itable.”\nAppellant’s Response to Motion for Sanctions at 16–17,\nECF No. 24.\n Using the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as a litiga-\ntion ploy to drag out foreclosure proceedings in another juris-\ndiction constitutes objective bad faith. See Hilgeford v. The\nPeoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Our review of\nthe briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious\nlitigation. … We can think of no other reason for this [mort-\ngagor’s] appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obsti-\nnancy.”).\n The conclusion of intentional delay is supported, not only\nby the obvious motive, but also by the lack of any substantive\nmerit to the Chapter 13 proceedings. As discussed above, the\nplan Nora filed on behalf of Steven Lisse (and then again for\nSondra Lisse) improperly attempted to use an adversarial\nproceeding to relitigate the merits of a foreclosure judgment\nHSBC had already obtained in Wisconsin state court (with\nHSBC receiving no payments in the interim). Any reasonably\ncareful attorney—let alone an attorney with Nora’s familiarity\nwith bankruptcy court—would have known that this type of\nconduct would not be tolerated. Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082; cf. Carr\nv. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the suit\nis not frivolous, or at least not utterly so, it is so lacking in\nmerit … that its pursuit by the plaintiff indicates a motive to\nharass.”).\n Nora then compounded the delays caused by these merit-\nless bankruptcy petitions by filing numerous, last-minute mo-\ntions for lengthy stays or deadline extensions. For example, in\n\f22 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nSteven Lisse’s appeal in the district court, Nora filed three mo-\ntions to stay the proceedings. This strategy produced a\n16-month delay before the district court refused any further\nextensions, at which point Nora moved to voluntarily dismiss\nthe appeal without filing an opening brief. Such litigation be-\nhavior—even if one assumes pure motives—constitutes objec-\ntive bad faith warranting sanctions under § 1927. The district\ncourt did not abuse its discretion.\n B. Nora’s Suspension from Law Practice\n In addition to awarding HSBC damages and costs against\nboth Nora and Steven Lisse as a monetary sanction, two dis-\ntrict court orders imposed professional discipline on Nora.\nFirst, on March 20, 2018, the district court fined Nora $2,500\nand suspended her right to practice in the Western District for\nsix months, although it stayed the penalties until Nora com-\nmitted another violation.\n Ten days later, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court\nsuspended Nora’s law license for one year. In re Disciplinary\nProceedings against Nora, 909 N.W.2d at 167–68. As a result, on\nApril 13, 2018, the district court issued another order sus-\npending Nora’s right to practice based on W.D. Wis. LR\n83.5(E). That local rule automatically imposes reciprocal dis-\ncipline when another jurisdiction does so, although it permits\nthe attorney to apply “for modification or vacation of the [dis-\ntrict court’s] discipline.”\n Although Nora appeals the district court’s April 13, 2018\ndisciplinary order separately from its March 22, 2018 order\nawarding HSBC its damages and costs under FED. R. BANKR.\nP. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, she does not develop an inde-\npendent argument for reversing it. To be clear, Nora is\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 23\n\ncurrently prohibited from practice in the Western District as\nreciprocal discipline based on her disbarment by the Wiscon-\nsin Supreme Court, not due to her conduct in this litigation.14\nNora does not provide a reason to reverse that discipline.\n District courts are permitted to rely on state-court discipli-\nnary proceedings to suspend attorneys practicing before\nthem. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917). And this case\nshows why a local rule making reciprocal discipline auto-\nmatic (while also providing a process for attorneys to chal-\nlenge that federal discipline) makes sense. Such rules align the\nprocedure with the relevant legal presumptions. Separate fed-\neral hearings are not required. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486\n(7th Cir. 1995). Federal courts give “great weight” to state-\ncourt disciplinary findings. In re Jafree, 759 F.2d 604, 608 (7th\nCir. 1985). The attorney bears the burden to identify either a\ndue process violation, insufficient fact findings, or “some\nother grave reason” why the state-court’s ruling is not entitled\nto the federal court’s respect. Selling 243 U.S. at 51. Placing the\nonus on the attorney to raise such issues in a motion to modify\nor vacate discipline minimizes the amount of resources di-\nverted to (essentially) collateral attacks on state-court pro-\nceedings. See In re Wick, 628 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2010).15\n\n\n 14 The district court’s April 13, 2018 order, however, does state that its\n\nMarch 20, 2018 disciplinary order (holding sanctions for Nora’s conduct\nin this litigation in abeyance until further misconduct) will remain in effect\nshould Nora be reinstated.\n 15 This court’s rules take a similar procedural approach. 7TH CIR. R.\n46(d). Based on the suspension of Nora’s Wisconsin law license in 2018,\nthis court ordered Nora removed from its roll of attorneys after she failed\nto demonstrate why this court should not do so. Order, In re Nora, No.\nD-18-07 (7th Cir. May 23, 2018).\n\f24 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n Even setting aside the discipline imposed by the Wiscon-\nsin Supreme Court, Nora’s litigation activity in federal court\nwarrants a suspension itself. Federal courts’ inherent author-\nity to disbar or suspend lawyers for misconduct is longstand-\ning and well established. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985);\nsee also Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824) (Marshall, J.)\n(holding the power to suspend attorneys is “incidental to all\nCourts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and\nfor the respectability of the profession”).\n Again, Nora used tag-team Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings\nby a husband and wife—each lacking a good faith basis—to\npostpone the orderly resolution of state-court proceedings.\nNora’s behavior in this litigation unfortunately is not an aber-\nration for her. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650,\n654-55 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, this appeal is frivolous, and\nwe are troubled by Nora’s conduct in this litigation. … [W]e\nsuspect that the removal was part of a strategy designed to\ngum up the progress of the case.”); Spencer v. Federal Home\nLoan Mortg. Corp., No. 15-cv-332-wmc, 2015 WL 4509159, at *1\n(W.D. Wis. July 24, 2015) (stating that Nora’s appeals ap-\npeared “motivated by the goal to further delay a warranted\nstate court foreclosure.”). Courts have sanctioned Nora for\nthis conduct before, but apparently she has not received the\nmessage that it will not be tolerated.\n Not only are Nora’s litigation tactics inappropriate, her\ntreatment of opposing counsel and judicial officers is censura-\nble. In the district court, Nora accused HSBC’s counsel (by\nname) of committing “uncontroverted fraud on the Court,” as\nwell as multiple federal crimes, by presenting HSBC’s claim.\nShe repeats similar attacks in these appeals. See, e.g., Appel-\nlants Br. at 47. This behavior is, again, not new for Nora. PNC\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 25\n\nBank, 763 F.3d at 655 (“Nora has accused the state court judge\nand court reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts,\nthe district court judge of pursuing ‘a campaign of libel\nagainst her,’ and opposing counsel of engaging in ‘actionable\ncivil fraud and racketeering that may constitute state and fed-\neral criminal misconduct.’”); Nora v. Furay, No. 14-cv-527-jdp,\n2014 WL 4209608, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2014) (“Nora con-\ntends that Judge Furay ‘acted in reckless haste to place false\nfindings on the public record in order to support the falsely\nmade allegations against her former client … to make false\nfindings of fact concerning matters which had never been ad-\njudicated, and to damage Nora’s character and reputation.’”);\nIn re Rinaldi, No. 11-35689-svk, 2017 WL 104749, at *1 (E.D.\nWis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“The conversion of the case to Chapter 13\nclearly changed the context of HSBCʹs entitlement to relief\nfrom stay, but Attorney Nora ignored the conversion and ac-\ncused HSBCʹs attorneys of fraud on the Court.”).\n Flippant, unfounded accusations of misconduct and fraud\nby opposing counsel and court officials demean the profes-\nsion and impair the orderly operation of the judicial system.\nIn re Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487. They also violate the ethical\nstandards for lawyers practicing in this circuit. See 7TH CIR.\nSTANDARDS FOR PROF. CONDUCT, Lawyer’s Duties to Other\nCounsel at ¶4 (“We will not, absent good cause, attribute bad\nmotives or improper conduct to other counsel or bring the\nprofession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impro-\npriety.”). Such behavior warrants punishment.\n Following Nora’s repeated abuse of the judicial process\nthrough frivolous filings and dilatory tactics, her unprofes-\nsional conduct toward opposing counsel, and the suspension\nof her Wisconsin law license, “the district court certainly was\n\f26 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nentitled to say, ‘enough is enough.’” Salmeron v. Enter.\nRecovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2009). We find no\nfault with the district court’s order suspending Nora from\npractice in the Western District of Wisconsin.\n C. Further Appellate Sanctions\n We must also resolve HSBC’s appellate motion for addi-\ntional sanctions. This court may “award just damages and sin-\ngle or double costs to the appellee” when it deems an appeal\nfrivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Such sanctions are discretionary\nand appropriate where an appellant simply repeats previ-\nously rejected, frivolous arguments or pursues an appeal to\nharass their adversary. Arnold v. Villarreal, 853 F.3d 384, 389\n(7th Cir. 2017).\n Nora’s arguments almost entirely regurgitate points she\npressed before the bankruptcy court, which the district court\nconcluded were frivolous. As we have explained to Nora pre-\nviously, “Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 when a\nlitigant or attorney presents appellate arguments with no rea-\nsonable expectation of success for the purposes of delay, har-\nassment, or sheer obstinacy.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 665. That\naptly describes Nora’s present appeals.\n Not only were Nora’s arguments on the merits frivolous,\nshe also engaged in meritless and dilatory motion practice be-\nfore this court. She moved to stay these appeals pending our\nruling on a frivolous motion to strike that she filed. When we\ndenied that motion, Nora immediately filed an equally frivo-\nlous motion to reconsider. Similarly, Nora submitted four\nseparate “Requests for Judicial Notice,” needlessly clogging\nthis court’s motion docket. She continued to lodge these re-\nquests, even after this court issued an opinion detailing why\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 27\n\nthey were unnecessary and improper. In re Appeals of Nora, 905\nF.3d at 497 (7th Cir. 2018).\n We find Nora’s appeals to have been frivolous and grant\nHSBC’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. HSBC requested\n$2,150.00 for attorneys’ fees and $446.00 for costs in its motion.\nAlthough such figures appear reasonable, HSBC has not sub-\nmitted an affidavit or other evidentiary record to support\nthem. See Arnold, 853 F.3d at 389 (directing moving party to\n“submit an affidavit and supporting papers specifying the\ndamages” incurred); Flip Side Prod., Inc. v. Jam Prod., Ltd., 843\nF.2d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring party seeking sanc-\ntions to submit a “verified, itemized statement” of its dam-\nages and costs). So, we direct HSBC to provide an accounting\nof their costs and attorneys’ fees within 15 days.\n For numerous reasons, including her failure to present “a\nseparately filed motion” in compliance with FED. R. APP. P. 38,\nwe deny Nora’s request for attorneys’ fees.\n Finally, we must revisit our previous sanctions against\nNora. Due to “frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings”\nby Nora in an appeal back in 2015, we fined her $2,500 but\nsuspended the sanction “until the time, if ever, that Nora sub-\nmits further inappropriate filings.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 667.\nGiven Nora’s frivolous filings in these appeals, we lift the sus-\npension of our previous monetary sanction.\n III. Conclusion\n Lawyers must represent their clients’ interests responsi-\nbly, not only zealously. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter., Inc., 886\nF.2d 1485, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). Part of being a responsible\ncounselor to one’s client is recognizing when the legal battle\nis lost and advising the client how to best handle that\n\f28 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\noutcome. Frivolous legal arguments, intentionally dilatory\ntactics, and unprofessional antagonism toward opposing\ncounsel benefits no one and improperly burdens federal\ncourts. Nora’s conduct has crossed the boundaries of accepta-\nble conduct for attorneys in this circuit.\n For these reasons, we order as follows:\n 1) On appeal number 18-1866, the district court’s March\n22, 2018 order holding Steven Lisse and Wendy Alison Nora\njointly and severally liable for $1,837.50 is AFFIRMED;\n 2) On appeal number 18-1889, the district court’s March\n20, 2018 and April 13, 2018 orders suspending Wendy Alison\nNora’s ability to practice in the Bankruptcy and District\nCourts for the Western District of Wisconsin (and staying an\nadditional $2,500 fine) are AFFIRMED;\n 3) HSBC’s motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\nAPP. P. 38 is GRANTED, and HSBC is directed to provide an\naccounting of its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in these\nappeals within 15 days;\n 4) Nora’s “Request for Appellant’s Attorneys Fees and\nCosts of Defending against the Motion for Sanctions” is\nDENIED; and\n 5) We lift the suspension of the monetary sanction im-\nposed in appeal number 13-2676 and order Nora to tender a\ncheck payable to the clerk of this court for $2,500 within 60\ndays of the date of this opinion.\n The district court’s decisions are AFFIRMED WITH\nSANCTIONS.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\nIN THE MATTER OF:\\n STEVEN ROBERT LISSE,\\n Debtor.\\nAPPEALS OF:\\n WENDY ALISON NORA\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-617-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir-\\ncuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Attorney Wendy Alison Nora ap-\\npeals a decision requiring her and her client to pay damages\\nand costs related to this bankruptcy litigation, as well as an\\norder suspending her from the practice of law in the Western\\nDistrict of Wisconsin. These appeals, unfortunately, are not\\nNora’s first encounter with attorney discipline. See, e.g., In re\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nDisciplinary Action against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990);\\nIn re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 495 N.W.2d 99 (Wis.\\n1993); In re Rinaldi, 778 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Nora, 778\\nF.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2018). While we hope this will be\\nher last such encounter, her serial dilatory, vexatious, and un-\\nprofessional litigation practices lead us to affirm the district\\ncourt’s orders. In addition, Nora’s frivolous motion practice\\nand legal arguments in these appeals lead us to lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction against Nora.\\n I. Background\\n Proceedings in multiple venues are relevant to these ap-\\npeals, including each level of the Wisconsin state court sys-\\ntem, two Chapter 13 petitions in federal bankruptcy court,\\nand two bankruptcy appeals in the district court. Because the\\nprocedural history is pertinent to resolving Nora’s appeals,\\nwe detail it below.\\n A. Wisconsin Foreclosure Action\\n Steven and Sondra Lisse refinanced their home in 2006,\\ntaking out a new mortgage and signing a corresponding note.\\nThe Lisses fell behind on their payments, and an entity con-\\ntrolled by HSBC Bank USA, N.A. filed a foreclosure action in\\nDane County Circuit Court in 2010.1\\n Four years later, HSBC moved for summary judgment. In\\nresponse, the Lisses asked the court for additional discovery\\nthat they hoped would demonstrate HSBC could not enforce\\n\\n 1 The prolix name of the entity is HSBC Bank USA, National Associa-\\ntion for the Benefit of Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series\\n2006-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates. For simplicity, this\\nopinion refers to appellee as HSBC.\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 3\\n\\nits note. The court denied the Lisses’ request and awarded\\nHSBC summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. The Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. HSBC Bank\\nUSA v. Lisse, 877 N.W.2d 650 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016) (un-\\npublished table decision).\\n B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petitions\\n Approximately six weeks after the Wisconsin Court of Ap-\\npeals’ affirmance, Steven Lisse (by attorney Nora) filed a\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of Wis-\\nconsin. As a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended\\nthe Lisses’ deadline to petition for review of the foreclosure\\njudgment. Order, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Apr. 7, 2016).2 The practical effect was to postpone\\nHSBC’s foreclosure on the Lisses’ home as long as bankruptcy\\nproceedings remained pending in federal court.\\n Nora submitted a Chapter 13 plan for Steven Lisse that\\nproposed the Lisses would make their monthly mortgage\\npayments to Nora’s trust account while the bankruptcy court\\nconducted an adversary proceeding to identify the entity en-\\ntitled to the money. HSBC objected, noting it already litigated\\nits claim to judgment in the Wisconsin courts.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Nora acknowledged the purpose of Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy peti-\\ntion was to extend the Lisses’ deadline to appeal in state court: “Mr. Lisse’s\\nemergency Petition was necessary to preserve his right to file a Petition\\nfor Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the decision of the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals entered on March 8, 2016 which denied his Mo-\\ntion for Reconsideration.” Motion for Extension of Time to File Schedules\\nat ¶5, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-109235-cjf (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Apr.\\n3, 2016), ECF No. 9.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n After the bankruptcy court held a confirmation hearing, it\\nrejected Nora’s proposed plan and sua sponte dismissed the\\ncase without leave to amend. The bankruptcy court con-\\ncluded, “[T]his clearly is an opportunity or this plan shows all\\nthe earmarks of being an effort to continue a fight, which\\ncould be made and was made in the state foreclosure action,\\nin the Bankruptcy Court.” Transcript of Final Hearing on\\nChapter 13 Plan at 51–52, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-\\n10935 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 84. The bank-\\nruptcy judge found the plan improper, citing In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990), “because the purpose for filing the\\nplan is not to pay the creditor but to thwart paying the credi-\\ntor.” Id. at 52. Nora filed an appeal to the district court on\\nbehalf of Steven Lisse, challenging HSBC’s standing, arguing\\nHSBC’s note was a forgery, and accusing HSBC’s counsel of\\nfraud on the court.\\n Five days after the bankruptcy court dismissed Steven\\nLisse’s petition, Nora filed a separate Chapter 13 petition on\\nbehalf of his wife, Sondra Lisse. This again extended the\\nLisses’ deadline in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Order,\\nHSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 (Wis. July 28, 2016).\\nNora’s proposed Chapter 13 plan for Sondra Lisse was similar\\nto the one the bankruptcy court had just rejected in Steven\\nLisse’s case. HSBC moved to dismiss the petition for lack of\\ngood faith, arguing Nora filed it with the sole intent to delay\\nthe final disposition of the Wisconsin foreclosure action.\\nHSBC also sought relief from the automatic stay.\\n Nora responded by moving for sanctions, claiming\\nHSBC’s Rooker-Feldman and preclusion arguments were friv-\\nolous and accusing HSBC’s counsel of “completely desecrat-\\ning the integrity of these proceedings.” Motion for\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 5\\n\\nNoncompliance with Discovery at 10, No. 3:16-12556-cjf\\n(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2016), ECF No. 59. The bankruptcy\\ncourt rejected Nora’s sanctions arguments entirely. In re\\nSondra Kay Lisse, 567 B.R. 813, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017)\\n(finding “no basis” to grant the motion). It also lifted the au-\\ntomatic stay, noting the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment pre-\\ncluded Nora’s arguments that HSBC’s note was forged.\\n After these procedural rulings, Nora filed three appeals to\\nthe district court and moved to voluntarily dismiss Sondra\\nLisse’s petition pending resolution of the appeals, which the\\ndistrict court granted. With both bankruptcy cases dismissed\\n(although on appeal), the Lisses filed their petition for review\\nwith the Wisconsin Supreme Court—13 months after the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment.\\nPetition for Review, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Mar. 23, 2017).\\n C. Bankruptcy Appeals to the District Court\\n Nora began Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal by filing a\\ndocument accusing HSBC and its counsel (by name) of federal\\ncrimes, including bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157.\\nNext, she asked the district court to order HSBC to “conven-\\ntionally file” its original note with the clerk of court, as evi-\\ndence of “criminal misconduct.” Shortly thereafter, Nora\\nmoved to stay the deadline for Steven Lisse’s merits brief,\\nciting HSBC’s purportedly “ambiguous and contradictory”\\nrecord designations. Then, in a motion requesting summary\\nreversal, Nora again accused HSBC and its counsel of perpe-\\ntrating a fraud on the courts by presenting forged documents.\\n Following this initial burst of activity, Steven Lisse’s ap-\\npeal lay dormant for almost a year. Finally, on August 23,\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n2017, HSBC requested dismissal for failure to prosecute. This\\nprompted the district court to set an October 2, 2017 deadline\\nfor Nora’s opening brief on the merits.\\n Nora filed a motion to stay the appeal ten days later, citing\\nthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,\\net seq.,3 and a physician’s recommendation that Nora take a\\nleave from practicing law. Despite expressing some skepti-\\ncism as to Nora’s motives—noting her “history of frivolous\\nand dilatory tactics” and efforts to “drag[ ] out the briefing on\\nthe merits by satellite skirmishes”—the district court granted\\na three-month stay. Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2017), ECF No. 42. It did,\\nhowever, stress that “[n]o further extensions will be granted\\nto Attorney Nora absent new, extraordinary circumstances.”\\nId. Nora later testified that she continued to practice law for\\nother clients in other matters during the three-month stay.4\\n The day after the district court stayed Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the\\nLisses’ petition to review the foreclosure judgment. HSBC\\n\\n 3 Nora’s invocation of the ADA is noteworthy, given that she previ-\\nously sued a Wisconsin circuit judge in federal court for alleged ADA vi-\\nolations in depriving her of medical accommodations by not granting her\\ndeadline extensions. Complaint, Nora v. Colas, No. 10-cv-709-bbc (W.D.\\nWis. Nov. 15, 2010), ECF No. 1. In its decision suspending Nora’s Wiscon-\\nsin law license (discussed later in this opinion), the Wisconsin Supreme\\nCourt found that lawsuit “was clearly pursued in an attempt to harass or\\nmaliciously injure” the judge. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora,\\n909 N.W.2d at 164.\\n 4 Nora has previously engaged in similar inconsistent behavior. See,\\ne.g., In re Nora, 417 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (7th Cir. 2011) (“At the same time\\nthat she told the district judge that she was ‘totally disabled’ from litigat-\\ning, Nora was actively litigating in the bankruptcy court.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 7\\n\\nBank USA v. Lisse, 904 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2017) (un-\\npublished table decision). As a result, in December 2017,\\nHSBC began moving forward with a foreclosure sale in Dane\\nCounty Circuit Court.\\n With respect to Sondra Lisse’s appeal, on December 5,\\n2017, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rul-\\nings. Lisse v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2017\\nWL 6021316 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2017). It held that the preclu-\\nsive effect of the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment defeated\\nNora’s challenges to the note’s authenticity and provided\\nHSBC with standing to object to Sondra Lisse’s proposed\\nChapter 13 plan. Id. at *7. Also, the district court concluded\\nthe “appeal, like the bankruptcy litigation, plainly lacks merit\\nand was wastefully presented.” Id. at *8.5 Nora asked the dis-\\ntrict court to reconsider, but the district court declined. Lisse\\nv. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2018 WL\\n840157, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding Nora’s motion\\nprovided “no basis … to reconsider its decision”). Sondra\\nLisse did not appeal the district court’s rulings to this court.\\n After the stay expired in Steven Lisse’s appeal—and on the\\neve of Nora’s deadline to file an opening brief—the Lisses re-\\nturned to Dane County Circuit Court to file a flurry of mo-\\ntions seeking to postpone the foreclosure sale.6 The day before\\n\\n 5\\n It denied HSBC’s request for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nBANKR. P. 8020 because HSBC did not file a separate motion for such relief.\\n 6 These motions were filed by another attorney. They included a mo-\\ntion to hold HSBC and its counsel in contempt for “falsely represent[ing]”\\nthe Lisses’ note to be an original and a sanctions motion against HSBC for\\n“fraud on the court.” The state court denied the Lisses’ motions and con-\\nfirmed the foreclosure sale. The Lisses appealed, and the case remains\\npending. HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2018AP000557 (Wis. Ct. App.).\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nher opening brief was due, Nora moved for another stay\\npending resolution of her clients’ state-court motions. The\\ndistrict court denied Nora’s eleventh-hour request, finding\\n“the debtor’s sole purpose appears to be to delay an inevitable\\nforeclosure through every legal artifice available both in state\\nand federal court.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 46.\\nCharacterizing Nora’s litigation maneuvers as “plainly\\nseek[ing] to continue to postpone [the state-court foreclosure\\naction] through collateral, tag-team attacks in federal court\\nbrought separately by husband and wife,” the district court\\nstated it would “no longer be complicit in these transparent\\nefforts.” Id. at 2. It refused to stay Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy\\nappeal further.\\n The following day, instead of filing an opening brief, Nora\\nmoved to voluntarily dismiss Steven Lisse’s appeal—more\\nthan 16 months after she filed it.\\n D. Sanctions in the District Court\\n The district court dismissed Steven Lisse’s appeal, but it\\ndid not stop there. Due to her “pattern of sharp practice,” the\\ndistrict court ordered Nora to show cause “why she should\\nnot be sanctioned for her frivolous, or at best vexatious, ap-\\npeal.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc\\n(W.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 49. A week later, Nora\\nasked the district court to vacate its show cause order, alleg-\\ning that the order violated due process and that the district\\ncourt had pre-judged the merits of imposing sanctions. The\\ndistrict court scheduled an evidentiary hearing before a three-\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 9\\n\\njudge panel consisting of Chief District Judge Peterson, Dis-\\ntrict Judge Conley, and Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay.7\\n Nora, now represented by her own counsel, filed an an-\\nswer seeking to “quash” the show cause order, alleging a lack\\nof notice of the “charges” against her, objecting to Judge\\nConley’s participation at the hearing, and challenging the\\nconstitutional authority of Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay to\\nparticipate. The district court provided Nora with a 13-page\\n“supplemental notice” identifying the bases for the order to\\nshow cause. Nora’s lawyer followed up with a “rejoinder,”\\nobjecting to the lack of separate “counts” and arguing the\\ncourt could not conduct its own attorney discipline proceed-\\nings.\\n The district court held a 90-minute hearing on the show\\ncause order and issued its opinion on March 20, 2018. It\\ngrouped Nora’s misconduct into three categories: “(1) inap-\\npropriately pursuing relief in federal court; (2) dilatory litiga-\\ntion conduct, including numerous, last-minute requests for\\nlengthy extensions; and (3) filing multiple cases or appeals\\nthen failing to consolidate or join them.” Opinion and Order\\nat 8, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D.\\nWis. Mar. 20, 2018), ECF No. 88. The court decided, “Nora’s\\nadvocacy has crossed the line of professional conduct too\\nmany times to be tolerated or ignored any longer.” Id. at 11.\\nThe district court fined Nora $2,500 and suspended her from\\nappearing in new matters in the Western District for six\\n\\n 7 As the district court noted, it created the three-judge panel “in a\\ngood-faith attempt to bend over backwards to accommodate and assuage\\nNora’s concerns about a lack of impartiality.” Opinion and Order at 6 n.3,\\nLisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2018),\\nECF No. 88.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nmonths, although it stayed those sanctions if and until Nora\\nsubmitted another improper filing. Id.\\n Meanwhile, HSBC had filed a motion for $3,675 in costs\\nand attorneys’ fees under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28\\nU.S.C. § 1927. Classifying the appeal as “frivolous,” the dis-\\ntrict court held Steven Lisse and Nora “jointly and severally\\nliable for $1,837.50.” Opinion and Order at 4, 8, Lisse v. HSBC\\nBank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2018),\\nECF No. 89. This monetary sanction was in addition to the\\nsuspended fine discussed above.\\n About a week later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued\\na decision in disciplinary proceedings against Nora—for con-\\nduct not connected with this litigation—revoking her law li-\\ncense for at least one year. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d at 167. On April 13, 2018, pursuant to W.D.\\nWis. LR 83.5, the district court suspended Nora from practice\\nin the Western District until her Wisconsin law license was re-\\nstored.\\n E. Appeals in this Court\\n Nora now appeals the district court’s decisions in her in-\\ndividual capacity.8 Her opening brief was due on July 30,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8Nora, as an attorney sanctioned for professional misconduct, pos-\\nsesses standing to appeal the district court’s decisions in her own name.\\nMartinez v. City of Chicago, 823 F.3d 1050, 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 11\\n\\n2018, but on that date, in violation of Circuit Rule 26,9 Nora\\ninstead filed a motion asking for a sixty-day extension. We\\npushed the deadline back to September 14, 2018, but when\\nthat date arrived, Nora again filed a noncompliant extension\\nmotion.10 Although we again extended Nora’s deadline to\\nSeptember 19, 2018, she failed to meet it and filed her opening\\nbrief late.\\n Nora also repeatedly filed documents styled as “Requests\\nfor Judicial Notice,” asking this court to take judicial notice of\\nvarious documents filed in other cases (affidavits, deposition\\ntranscripts, court orders). After two orders denying Nora’s\\nrequests, on Nora’s third attempt Judge Easterbrook (as mo-\\ntions judge) published an opinion explaining why the\\nrequests were procedurally improper. In re Appeals of Nora,\\n905 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The right place to propose\\njudicial notice, once a case is in a court of appeals, is in a brief.\\n… There’s no need to engage in motions practice, require the\\nattention of additional appellate judges, and defer briefing.”).\\n When HSBC submitted its response, Nora moved to strike\\nportions of its brief and supplemental appendix. Nora argued\\nHSBC’s citation of documents from the Wisconsin foreclosure\\naction and Sondra Lisse’s bankruptcy case—some of which\\n\\n 9 The rule requires, in part, that a motion for a deadline extension\\n“shall be filed at least seven days before the brief is due, unless it is made\\nto appear in the motion that the facts which are the basis of the motion did\\nnot exist earlier or were not, or with due diligence could not have been,\\nknown earlier to the movant’s counsel.” 7TH CIR. R. 26 (computing and\\nextending time).\\n 10Nora’s second extension motion asked for three additional days,\\nand before the court could rule on it, she filed a third motion asking for\\ntwo more days.\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nhad been filed by Nora as exhibits in Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal—made it “unreasonably difficult, if not impos-\\nsible,” for her to file a timely reply. Nora also asked this court\\nto stay the appeal until we ruled on her motions to strike. The\\ncourt denied Nora’s motions as “frivolous,” sanctioning her\\nby docking 2,000 words from the limit for her reply. Although\\nour order stated—in no uncertain terms—that “no motion for\\nfurther time (or additional words) will be entertained,” the\\nnext day Nora filed a motion for reconsideration asking the\\ncourt “to restore her full word count limitation … and to al-\\nlow [Nora] sufficient time to file her Reply Brief … .” Motion\\nfor Reconsideration of November 20, 2018 Procedural Order\\nat 11. We denied that motion too.\\n After the completion of merits briefing, HSBC moved for\\ndamages and costs under FED. R. APP. P. 38, arguing Nora’s\\nappeals are frivolous. We ordered Nora to respond to the mo-\\ntion, and she (not to be outdone) requested sanctions against\\nHSBC. Finally, failing to heed this court’s earlier directives,\\nNora filed yet another request for judicial notice, which this\\ncourt denied again.\\n II. Discussion\\n Nora appeals two separate rulings by the district court,\\nalthough her briefs meld them together. First, Nora chal-\\nlenges the district court’s March 22, 2018 sanctions order\\nholding her and Steven Lisse jointly and severally liable to\\nHSBC for $1,837.50 under FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927. Second, Nora appeals the April 13, 2018 order sus-\\npending her from practice in the Western District of\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 13\\n\\nWisconsin.11 Although Nora purports to identify ten issues on\\nappeal, each is a variation on the central theme that she\\nshould have been permitted to relitigate the authenticity of\\nHSBC’s note in federal court. In addition, we must resolve\\nHSBC’s appellate motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38.\\n A. March 22, 2018 Sanctions Order\\n A district court may “award just damages and single or\\ndouble costs” if it determines a bankruptcy appeal is frivo-\\nlous. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020(a); see also Hill v. Norfolk & Western\\nRy. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing power\\nto sanction attorneys in addition to parties).12 An appeal is\\nfrivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appellant’s\\nargument is wholly without merit.” Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst.,\\n732 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Spiegel v. Cont’l Ill.\\nNat’l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 1986)).\\n Likewise, a court may hold an attorney personally liable\\nfor “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably in-\\ncurred because of” her unreasonable and vexatious litigation\\nconduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review a district court’s sanc-\\ntions order for abuse of discretion. In re Busson-Sokolik, 635\\n\\n 11The district court’s April 13, 2018 order incorporates its March 20,\\n2018 disciplinary order, specifying the earlier order will remain in force\\nshould Nora be reinstated to practice in the Western District.\\n 12 The advisory committee notes to FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 make clear\\nthat district courts possess the same authority to sanction frivolous bank-\\nruptcy appeals that FED. R. APP. P. 38 provides to this court. FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“[T]his rule recog-\\nnizes that the authority to award damages and costs in connection with\\nfrivolous appeals is the same for district courts sitting as appellate courts,\\nbankruptcy appellate panels, and courts of appeals.”).\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nF.3d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n8020); Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1927).\\n Under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927,\\nthe district court acted well-within its discretion in imposing\\na monetary sanction on Nora.\\n 1. Sanctions were appropriate under FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n 8020(a) because the bankruptcy appeal was frivolous.\\n The bankruptcy court found Nora filed Steven Lisse’s\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition for the improper purpose of\\nthwarting the Lisses’ creditors, rather than paying them. That\\nconclusion was not clearly erroneous. In re Wiese, 552 F.3d 584,\\n588 (7th Cir. 2009) (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion\\nwhen its decision is premised on an incorrect legal principle\\nor a clearly erroneous factual finding).\\n Unlike a Chapter 7 petition, which focuses on liquidating\\nthe debtor’s assets to satisfy his creditors, Chapter 13 allows a\\ndebtor to voluntarily propose a plan to reorganize his debts\\nfor repayment out of his future income. RICHARD I. AARON,\\nBANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 777 (2013 ed.) (“The central\\nthesis of Chapter 13 is that an individual debtor can dedicate\\nfuture income to pay accumulated debts.”); see also 8 COLLIER\\nON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.02 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer\\neds., 16th ed. 2018). The focus on repayment is highlighted by\\nthe requirement that the debtor begin making payments to\\nthe trustee within 30 days after proposing a Chapter 13 plan,\\neven before the plan is confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The\\nbasic premise is to facilitate the debtor’s ability to pay his\\ncreditors, not to frustrate the creditors’ rights. In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 15\\n\\n428 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing Congress’s idealized Chapter\\n13 case as one where “the debtor, given time and relief from\\nharassment, is able to pay all or most of his debts”).\\n A bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 petition for\\ncause if it finds the petition was filed in bad faith. 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1307(c); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992);\\n8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04[10]; see also 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1325(a)(3) (requiring a plan to have been proposed in good\\nfaith as a condition of confirmation). Given bankruptcy’s his-\\ntorical roots as an equitable remedy, “the good faith standard\\nprevents debtors from manipulating the Code for wrongful\\npurposes.” In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359. Whether a debtor filed\\nhis petition in good faith is a factual finding to be reversed\\nonly when the bankruptcy court’s determination, based on\\nthe totality of the circumstances, is clearly erroneous. In re\\nSmith, 286 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n Using a Chapter 13 petition to stave off an impending\\nhome foreclosure sale is not necessarily improper. Although\\nChapter 13 generally prohibits a plan from modifying mort-\\ngage lenders’ underlying rights, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), it\\nexpressly allows a debtor to cure defaults with respect to his\\nprincipal residence “until such residence is sold at a foreclo-\\nsure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable non-\\nbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1); see also 8 COLLIER ON\\nBANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a]; id. at § 1322.16. A debtor, thus,\\nmay use a proper Chapter 13 petition to cure past defaults on\\nhis mortgage through regular payments to the lender, pre-\\nventing the foreclosure sale. See Nobelman v. American Savings\\nBank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993).\\n But this is not what Nora proposed for the Lisses. As the\\nbankruptcy court recognized, the object of Nora’s plan was\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nnot to pay the Lisses’ creditors in an orderly fashion but, in-\\nstead, to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment. Nora sug-\\ngested directing the Lisses’ mortgage payments to her trust\\naccount (not to the Chapter 13 trustee) “during the pendency\\n[of an] adversary proceeding to be commenced, in part, for\\nthe determination of the identity of the real party in interest\\nentitled to the payment or proceeds … .” Such an effort to\\nrelitigate a creditor’s rights—already established in state-\\ncourt proceedings—is an improper, bad faith use of a Chapter\\n13 petition. See In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359 (“[F]iling a Chapter\\n13 petition in order to thwart the payment of an otherwise\\nnondischargeable income tax debt … was not one of the in-\\ntended purposes of the bankruptcy provisions. … [T]he bank-\\nruptcy court’s finding of lack of good faith is not clearly erro-\\nneous.”).\\n In the district court, Nora never presented any argument\\nabout why the bankruptcy court’s good-faith determination\\nwas clearly erroneous. Indeed, Nora never even filed a brief\\non the merits of the appeal, despite the fact it was pending in\\nthe district court for 16 months. Cf. Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d\\n754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n appellate brief that does not\\neven try to engage the reasons the appellant lost has no pro-\\nspect of success.”).\\n Nora now resurrects the argument that HSBC’s note is a\\nforgery, so the appeal to the district court was not frivolous.\\nThis only confirms the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that\\nNora intended to use the proceedings to thwart HSBC, rather\\nthan to cure the Lisses’ mortgage defaults or otherwise satisfy\\nHSBC’s claim. Many court decisions have previously in-\\nformed Nora that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal\\ncourts are bound by state-court resolutions of debtors’\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 17\\n\\ndefenses to mortgage foreclosure. See, e.g., Nora v. Residential\\nFunding Co., 543 Fed. App’x 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2013) (“By alleg-\\ning that the fraudulent assignment to Residential Funding al-\\nlowed it to succeed in foreclosing on her property in state\\ncourt, Nora is impermissibly asking a federal district court to\\nreview and reject the state court’s judgment of foreclosure of\\nher property.”); Spencer v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 246\\nF. Supp. 3d 1241, 1245 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (“As previously ex-\\nplained to [Nora], the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives fed-\\neral courts of jurisdiction to review a state court decision.”);\\nSpencer v. PNC Bank, No. 14-cv-422-wmc, 2015 WL 1520912, at\\n*4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2015) (noting Nora could challenge the\\nvalidity of endorsements and notes in state court but that\\n“those arguments do not undermine [the creditor’s] standing\\nin the bankruptcy proceeding”); Schmid v. Bank of America, 498\\nB.R. 221, 224–25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“The Rooker-Feldman\\ndoctrine applies to plaintiff’s fraud claim because plaintiff’s\\nalleged injury is the state court foreclosure judgment that de-\\nfendant Bank of America is now asserting … Many other\\ncourts have concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a\\nlitigant from challenging a foreclosure judgment in a subse-\\nquent case.”).\\n Throughout the federal proceedings, Nora has repeatedly\\nattacked HSBC’s “standing” to oppose Steven Lisse’s Chapter\\n13 plan on the theory that HSBC’s note is a forgery. She simi-\\nlarly contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction\\nher due to this alleged Article III defect. Nora is wrong on\\nboth counts. The Wisconsin foreclosure judgment established\\nHSBC as the Lisses’ judgment creditor. It is the foreclosure\\njudgment, not the note, that gives HSBC standing at this point\\nto object to Steven Lisse’s Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1324(a)\\n(providing that any “party in interest may object to\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nconfirmation of the plan”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (defining a\\n“creditor” to be a “party in interest” for purposes of Chapter\\n11); In re Rimgale, 669 F.3d at 428 (explaining that Congress\\nadopted § 1324 to allow “for creditors to be heard” while giv-\\ning the bankruptcy judge sole authority to confirm or reject a\\nplan). This makes the authenticity of HSBC’s note irrelevant\\nto the analysis in federal court. Even if the note is a forgery,\\nuntil the Lisses obtain a vacatur of the foreclosure judgment,\\nHSBC’s standing as a judgment creditor is unassailable.\\n Nora manages to flag one potentially legitimate basis to\\nchallenge the bankruptcy court’s decision: that the court de-\\ncided sua sponte to not only deny confirmation but to dismiss\\nthe petition without leave to amend the plan. Compare In re\\nTerry, 630 F.2d 634, 636 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (“As we read § 1307,\\na court cannot order dismissal or conversion on its own mo-\\ntion.”), with In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993)\\n(holding sua sponte dismissal appropriate under 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 105(a)); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04 (sug-\\ngesting § 105(a) “presumably would give the court the power\\nto dismiss a case sua sponte”). Yet Nora never briefed that ar-\\ngument for the district court. See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones\\nLang LaSalle Am., Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting\\narguments not raised below are forfeited). And she fails to ad-\\nequately do so here, simply quoting a transcript without cit-\\ning any relevant legal authorities on the topic. See M.G.\\nSkinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency v. Norman-Spencer Agency, 845\\nF.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped\\narguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by le-\\ngal authority.”). The inclusion of one plausible argument—\\namidst a plethora of frivolous arguments—will not insulate\\nan appellant from sanctions. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1200 (holding\\nsanctions may be imposed where most of the appellant’s\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 19\\n\\narguments are frivolous, even if not all of them can be classi-\\nfied that way).\\n Nora’s attempt to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment\\nin bankruptcy court was frivolous. Nora’s repeated fraud ac-\\ncusations do not change the calculus. Mains v. CitiBank, 852\\nF.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding Rooker-Feldman prohibits\\nfederal courts from reviewing whether a lender procured a\\nstate-court foreclosure judgment through fraud). If Nora be-\\nlieved she possessed new evidence of fraud, Wisconsin’s state\\ncourts were the appropriate venue to raise such arguments.\\nWIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(c) (authorizing motions to reopen judg-\\nments due to the “[f]raud, misrepresentation, or other mis-\\nconduct of an adverse party”); see also Taylor v. Federal Nat’l\\nMortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming dis-\\ntrict court’s decision to remand a fraud-on-the-court claim to\\nstate court on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Aside from delay,\\nthere was no reason for Nora to file a federal bankruptcy case\\nrather than seek relief in state court. See Mains, 852 F.3d at 676\\n(“The state’s courts are quite capable of protecting their own\\nintegrity.”). Federal courts do not exist to provide disap-\\npointed state-court losers a second bite at the apple.13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 At oral argument, Nora’s counsel contended Judge Conley misun-\\nderstood Chapter 13 bankruptcy law, citing his passing reference to Ste-\\nven Lisse’s bankruptcy petition as an “appeal” of the Wisconsin foreclo-\\nsure judgment. But, read in context, Judge Conley’s statement was noting\\nthat Nora’s arguments were only appropriate in a state-court appeal (such\\nthat Nora was, as a practical matter, attempting to bring an improper “ap-\\npeal” in federal court). Judge Conley’s thorough and careful opinions in\\nthis case dispel any concerns of the type Nora’s counsel postulates.\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n 2. Nora’s litigation tactics warranted sanctions under 28\\n U.S.C. § 1927.\\n Courts may also impose sanctions against a lawyer who\\n“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and\\nvexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A lawyer’s subjective bad faith\\nis a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for § 1927 sanc-\\ntions; objective bad faith is enough. Hunt v. Moore Bros., Inc.,\\n861 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2017). Attorneys demonstrate objec-\\ntive bad faith when they pursue “a path that a reasonably\\ncareful attorney would have known, after appropriate in-\\nquiry, to be unsound.” Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Boyer v.\\nBSNF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016)). Because trial\\njudges are best positioned to detect bad faith litigation con-\\nduct, they possess broad discretion in exercising the § 1927\\npower. Id.\\n Nora’s stall tactics are blatant when one looks back at how\\nthis litigation unfolded. Although Nora denies intentionally\\ndelaying proceedings, the record before us belies her position.\\nNora herself openly acknowledged the purpose of Steven\\nLisse’s bankruptcy petition was to extend the deadline to pe-\\ntition the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And, as Nora now boasts\\nin her brief, her strategy worked:\\n The March 22, 2018 Order [by the district court]\\n concludes that attorneys’ fees should be\\n awarded based on “dilatory conduct” whereby\\n the Lisses have maintained possession of their\\n home for six (6) years. Actually, the Lisses have\\n remained in possession of their home for over\\n eight (8) years since the fraudulent foreclosure\\n began and they are still in possession of their\\n home, contrary to Judge Peterson’s conclusion\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 21\\n\\n that the foreclosure of the Lisses’ home is “inev-\\n itable.”\\nAppellant’s Response to Motion for Sanctions at 16–17,\\nECF No. 24.\\n Using the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as a litiga-\\ntion ploy to drag out foreclosure proceedings in another juris-\\ndiction constitutes objective bad faith. See Hilgeford v. The\\nPeoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Our review of\\nthe briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious\\nlitigation. … We can think of no other reason for this [mort-\\ngagor’s] appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obsti-\\nnancy.”).\\n The conclusion of intentional delay is supported, not only\\nby the obvious motive, but also by the lack of any substantive\\nmerit to the Chapter 13 proceedings. As discussed above, the\\nplan Nora filed on behalf of Steven Lisse (and then again for\\nSondra Lisse) improperly attempted to use an adversarial\\nproceeding to relitigate the merits of a foreclosure judgment\\nHSBC had already obtained in Wisconsin state court (with\\nHSBC receiving no payments in the interim). Any reasonably\\ncareful attorney—let alone an attorney with Nora’s familiarity\\nwith bankruptcy court—would have known that this type of\\nconduct would not be tolerated. Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082; cf. Carr\\nv. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the suit\\nis not frivolous, or at least not utterly so, it is so lacking in\\nmerit … that its pursuit by the plaintiff indicates a motive to\\nharass.”).\\n Nora then compounded the delays caused by these merit-\\nless bankruptcy petitions by filing numerous, last-minute mo-\\ntions for lengthy stays or deadline extensions. For example, in\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nSteven Lisse’s appeal in the district court, Nora filed three mo-\\ntions to stay the proceedings. This strategy produced a\\n16-month delay before the district court refused any further\\nextensions, at which point Nora moved to voluntarily dismiss\\nthe appeal without filing an opening brief. Such litigation be-\\nhavior—even if one assumes pure motives—constitutes objec-\\ntive bad faith warranting sanctions under § 1927. The district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion.\\n B. Nora’s Suspension from Law Practice\\n In addition to awarding HSBC damages and costs against\\nboth Nora and Steven Lisse as a monetary sanction, two dis-\\ntrict court orders imposed professional discipline on Nora.\\nFirst, on March 20, 2018, the district court fined Nora $2,500\\nand suspended her right to practice in the Western District for\\nsix months, although it stayed the penalties until Nora com-\\nmitted another violation.\\n Ten days later, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court\\nsuspended Nora’s law license for one year. In re Disciplinary\\nProceedings against Nora, 909 N.W.2d at 167–68. As a result, on\\nApril 13, 2018, the district court issued another order sus-\\npending Nora’s right to practice based on W.D. Wis. LR\\n83.5(E). That local rule automatically imposes reciprocal dis-\\ncipline when another jurisdiction does so, although it permits\\nthe attorney to apply “for modification or vacation of the [dis-\\ntrict court’s] discipline.”\\n Although Nora appeals the district court’s April 13, 2018\\ndisciplinary order separately from its March 22, 2018 order\\nawarding HSBC its damages and costs under FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, she does not develop an inde-\\npendent argument for reversing it. To be clear, Nora is\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 23\\n\\ncurrently prohibited from practice in the Western District as\\nreciprocal discipline based on her disbarment by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, not due to her conduct in this litigation.14\\nNora does not provide a reason to reverse that discipline.\\n District courts are permitted to rely on state-court discipli-\\nnary proceedings to suspend attorneys practicing before\\nthem. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917). And this case\\nshows why a local rule making reciprocal discipline auto-\\nmatic (while also providing a process for attorneys to chal-\\nlenge that federal discipline) makes sense. Such rules align the\\nprocedure with the relevant legal presumptions. Separate fed-\\neral hearings are not required. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486\\n(7th Cir. 1995). Federal courts give “great weight” to state-\\ncourt disciplinary findings. In re Jafree, 759 F.2d 604, 608 (7th\\nCir. 1985). The attorney bears the burden to identify either a\\ndue process violation, insufficient fact findings, or “some\\nother grave reason” why the state-court’s ruling is not entitled\\nto the federal court’s respect. Selling 243 U.S. at 51. Placing the\\nonus on the attorney to raise such issues in a motion to modify\\nor vacate discipline minimizes the amount of resources di-\\nverted to (essentially) collateral attacks on state-court pro-\\nceedings. See In re Wick, 628 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2010).15\\n\\n\\n 14 The district court’s April 13, 2018 order, however, does state that its\\n\\nMarch 20, 2018 disciplinary order (holding sanctions for Nora’s conduct\\nin this litigation in abeyance until further misconduct) will remain in effect\\nshould Nora be reinstated.\\n 15 This court’s rules take a similar procedural approach. 7TH CIR. R.\\n46(d). Based on the suspension of Nora’s Wisconsin law license in 2018,\\nthis court ordered Nora removed from its roll of attorneys after she failed\\nto demonstrate why this court should not do so. Order, In re Nora, No.\\nD-18-07 (7th Cir. May 23, 2018).\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n Even setting aside the discipline imposed by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, Nora’s litigation activity in federal court\\nwarrants a suspension itself. Federal courts’ inherent author-\\nity to disbar or suspend lawyers for misconduct is longstand-\\ning and well established. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985);\\nsee also Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824) (Marshall, J.)\\n(holding the power to suspend attorneys is “incidental to all\\nCourts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and\\nfor the respectability of the profession”).\\n Again, Nora used tag-team Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings\\nby a husband and wife—each lacking a good faith basis—to\\npostpone the orderly resolution of state-court proceedings.\\nNora’s behavior in this litigation unfortunately is not an aber-\\nration for her. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650,\\n654-55 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, this appeal is frivolous, and\\nwe are troubled by Nora’s conduct in this litigation. … [W]e\\nsuspect that the removal was part of a strategy designed to\\ngum up the progress of the case.”); Spencer v. Federal Home\\nLoan Mortg. Corp., No. 15-cv-332-wmc, 2015 WL 4509159, at *1\\n(W.D. Wis. July 24, 2015) (stating that Nora’s appeals ap-\\npeared “motivated by the goal to further delay a warranted\\nstate court foreclosure.”). Courts have sanctioned Nora for\\nthis conduct before, but apparently she has not received the\\nmessage that it will not be tolerated.\\n Not only are Nora’s litigation tactics inappropriate, her\\ntreatment of opposing counsel and judicial officers is censura-\\nble. In the district court, Nora accused HSBC’s counsel (by\\nname) of committing “uncontroverted fraud on the Court,” as\\nwell as multiple federal crimes, by presenting HSBC’s claim.\\nShe repeats similar attacks in these appeals. See, e.g., Appel-\\nlants Br. at 47. This behavior is, again, not new for Nora. PNC\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 25\\n\\nBank, 763 F.3d at 655 (“Nora has accused the state court judge\\nand court reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts,\\nthe district court judge of pursuing ‘a campaign of libel\\nagainst her,’ and opposing counsel of engaging in ‘actionable\\ncivil fraud and racketeering that may constitute state and fed-\\neral criminal misconduct.’”); Nora v. Furay, No. 14-cv-527-jdp,\\n2014 WL 4209608, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2014) (“Nora con-\\ntends that Judge Furay ‘acted in reckless haste to place false\\nfindings on the public record in order to support the falsely\\nmade allegations against her former client … to make false\\nfindings of fact concerning matters which had never been ad-\\njudicated, and to damage Nora’s character and reputation.’”);\\nIn re Rinaldi, No. 11-35689-svk, 2017 WL 104749, at *1 (E.D.\\nWis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“The conversion of the case to Chapter 13\\nclearly changed the context of HSBCʹs entitlement to relief\\nfrom stay, but Attorney Nora ignored the conversion and ac-\\ncused HSBCʹs attorneys of fraud on the Court.”).\\n Flippant, unfounded accusations of misconduct and fraud\\nby opposing counsel and court officials demean the profes-\\nsion and impair the orderly operation of the judicial system.\\nIn re Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487. They also violate the ethical\\nstandards for lawyers practicing in this circuit. See 7TH CIR.\\nSTANDARDS FOR PROF. CONDUCT, Lawyer’s Duties to Other\\nCounsel at ¶4 (“We will not, absent good cause, attribute bad\\nmotives or improper conduct to other counsel or bring the\\nprofession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impro-\\npriety.”). Such behavior warrants punishment.\\n Following Nora’s repeated abuse of the judicial process\\nthrough frivolous filings and dilatory tactics, her unprofes-\\nsional conduct toward opposing counsel, and the suspension\\nof her Wisconsin law license, “the district court certainly was\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nentitled to say, ‘enough is enough.’” Salmeron v. Enter.\\nRecovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2009). We find no\\nfault with the district court’s order suspending Nora from\\npractice in the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n C. Further Appellate Sanctions\\n We must also resolve HSBC’s appellate motion for addi-\\ntional sanctions. This court may “award just damages and sin-\\ngle or double costs to the appellee” when it deems an appeal\\nfrivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Such sanctions are discretionary\\nand appropriate where an appellant simply repeats previ-\\nously rejected, frivolous arguments or pursues an appeal to\\nharass their adversary. Arnold v. Villarreal, 853 F.3d 384, 389\\n(7th Cir. 2017).\\n Nora’s arguments almost entirely regurgitate points she\\npressed before the bankruptcy court, which the district court\\nconcluded were frivolous. As we have explained to Nora pre-\\nviously, “Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 when a\\nlitigant or attorney presents appellate arguments with no rea-\\nsonable expectation of success for the purposes of delay, har-\\nassment, or sheer obstinacy.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 665. That\\naptly describes Nora’s present appeals.\\n Not only were Nora’s arguments on the merits frivolous,\\nshe also engaged in meritless and dilatory motion practice be-\\nfore this court. She moved to stay these appeals pending our\\nruling on a frivolous motion to strike that she filed. When we\\ndenied that motion, Nora immediately filed an equally frivo-\\nlous motion to reconsider. Similarly, Nora submitted four\\nseparate “Requests for Judicial Notice,” needlessly clogging\\nthis court’s motion docket. She continued to lodge these re-\\nquests, even after this court issued an opinion detailing why\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 27\\n\\nthey were unnecessary and improper. In re Appeals of Nora, 905\\nF.3d at 497 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n We find Nora’s appeals to have been frivolous and grant\\nHSBC’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. HSBC requested\\n$2,150.00 for attorneys’ fees and $446.00 for costs in its motion.\\nAlthough such figures appear reasonable, HSBC has not sub-\\nmitted an affidavit or other evidentiary record to support\\nthem. See Arnold, 853 F.3d at 389 (directing moving party to\\n“submit an affidavit and supporting papers specifying the\\ndamages” incurred); Flip Side Prod., Inc. v. Jam Prod., Ltd., 843\\nF.2d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring party seeking sanc-\\ntions to submit a “verified, itemized statement” of its dam-\\nages and costs). So, we direct HSBC to provide an accounting\\nof their costs and attorneys’ fees within 15 days.\\n For numerous reasons, including her failure to present “a\\nseparately filed motion” in compliance with FED. R. APP. P. 38,\\nwe deny Nora’s request for attorneys’ fees.\\n Finally, we must revisit our previous sanctions against\\nNora. Due to “frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings”\\nby Nora in an appeal back in 2015, we fined her $2,500 but\\nsuspended the sanction “until the time, if ever, that Nora sub-\\nmits further inappropriate filings.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 667.\\nGiven Nora’s frivolous filings in these appeals, we lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Lawyers must represent their clients’ interests responsi-\\nbly, not only zealously. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter., Inc., 886\\nF.2d 1485, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). Part of being a responsible\\ncounselor to one’s client is recognizing when the legal battle\\nis lost and advising the client how to best handle that\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\noutcome. Frivolous legal arguments, intentionally dilatory\\ntactics, and unprofessional antagonism toward opposing\\ncounsel benefits no one and improperly burdens federal\\ncourts. Nora’s conduct has crossed the boundaries of accepta-\\nble conduct for attorneys in this circuit.\\n For these reasons, we order as follows:\\n 1) On appeal number 18-1866, the district court’s March\\n22, 2018 order holding Steven Lisse and Wendy Alison Nora\\njointly and severally liable for $1,837.50 is AFFIRMED;\\n 2) On appeal number 18-1889, the district court’s March\\n20, 2018 and April 13, 2018 orders suspending Wendy Alison\\nNora’s ability to practice in the Bankruptcy and District\\nCourts for the Western District of Wisconsin (and staying an\\nadditional $2,500 fine) are AFFIRMED;\\n 3) HSBC’s motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38 is GRANTED, and HSBC is directed to provide an\\naccounting of its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in these\\nappeals within 15 days;\\n 4) Nora’s “Request for Appellant’s Attorneys Fees and\\nCosts of Defending against the Motion for Sanctions” is\\nDENIED; and\\n 5) We lift the suspension of the monetary sanction im-\\nposed in appeal number 13-2676 and order Nora to tender a\\ncheck payable to the clerk of this court for $2,500 within 60\\ndays of the date of this opinion.\\n The district court’s decisions are AFFIRMED WITH\\nSANCTIONS.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1677,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4605768,"string":"4,605,768"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"CRAFTWOOD II, INC., and Craftwood III, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., and Comprehensive Marketing, Inc., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Craftwood II, Inc. v. Generac Power Systems, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2883"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Easterbrook, Kanne, Hamilton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2883\\nCRAFTWOOD II, INC., and CRAFTWOOD III, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nGENERAC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., and COMPREHENSIVE\\nMARKETING, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 4105 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Two corporations, Craftwood\\nII and Craftwood III, operate hardware businesses in Cali-\\nfornia. They contend in this suit under the Telephone Con-\\nsumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227, that defendants sent\\nthem unsolicited fax advertisements. Defendants moved to\\ndismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), con-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2883\\n\\ntending that plaintiffs lack standing to sue. The district judge\\ngranted that motion—not so much because he found the lack\\nof an injury as because he thought that defendants had sub-\\nstantially (though not technically) met the requirements of a\\ndefense in §227(b)(1)(C). On appeal defendants contend ex-\\npressly what is only implicit in the district court’s decision:\\nthat unless plaintiffs prove injury from a violation of law, the\\nsuit must be dismissed for lack of a case or controversy. That\\nproposition contradicts the holding of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.\\n678 (1946), among many other decisions showing that a\\nplaintiff’s failure on the merits does not divest a federal\\ncourt of jurisdiction.\\n The difference between a jurisdictional and a substantive\\ncharacterization of a defense magers not just because federal\\ncourts must raise jurisdiction on their own, even if the liti-\\ngants are content to have a federal judge resolve the dispute,\\nbut because different procedures apply to jurisdictional and\\nsubstantive issues. When subject-mager jurisdiction—which\\nis to say, the power to hear and decide the case at all—is at\\nstake, a district judge may resolve factual disputes and make\\nany findings necessary to determine the court’s adjudicatory\\ncompetence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Venezuela v. Helmerich &\\nPayne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1316 (2017);\\nMcNuE v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 184\\n(1936). If the court has jurisdiction, however, then it must\\ntake all plausible allegations in favor of the complainant\\nwhen handling a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or\\nfor judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Bell Atlantic\\nCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). And if the com-\\nplaint states a claim for relief, then a material factual dispute\\nwill defeat a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56\\nand entitle the plaintiff to a trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v.\\n\\fNo. 18-2883 3\\n\\nCatreE, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). By treating a defense as if it were\\nan element of subject-mager jurisdiction, the district court\\ntransgressed these allocations of authority.\\n Standing to sue is established by allegations (and, if nec-\\nessary, proof) of injury, caused by the defendant, and re-\\ndressable by a favorable judicial decision. See, e.g., Lujan v.\\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Spokeo, Inc.\\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). Plaintiffs allege that they re-\\nceived unsolicited fax ads, causing at least two kinds of inju-\\nry: printing the faxes used paper and toner, which are costly,\\nand the need to read the incoming faxes diverted the time of\\none or more employees from the businesses’ profitable en-\\ndeavors. These are concrete rather than abstract losses. The\\ninjuries may have been slight, but an “identifiable trifle”\\nsuffices. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 & n.14\\n(1973). Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by the defendants’\\nfaxed ads and may be redressed by an award of damages.\\nWe have resolved dozens of fax-ad suits on the merits with-\\nout suspecting that we were violating Article III of the Con-\\nstitution. This suit is no more constitutionally suspect than\\nthey. Whether it is good public policy to use the cumber-\\nsome and costly process of adjudication to resolve disputes\\nabout annoying fax ads is for Congress to decide.\\n We have thought about the possibility of revising the dis-\\ntrict court’s decision to be a dismissal on the merits, rather\\nthan for lack of standing, but conclude that such a step\\nwould be inappropriate, for several reasons.\\n First, it is presumptively unlawful to send any unsolicit-\\ned fax advertisement. Copies of some faxes are in the record,\\nand there’s no doubt that they are advertisements. Plaintiffs\\nallege that they were unsolicited. That makes out a plausible\\n\\f4 No. 18-2883\\n\\nclaim for relief. Defendants invoke an affirmative defense,\\nbut complaints need not anticipate or agempt to plead\\naround potential defenses. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.\\n635 (1980); United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., 350\\nF.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n Second, precisely because a complaint need not antici-\\npate defenses, it is difficult to see how the suit could be dis-\\nmissed on the pleadings. Instead the defense has factual\\ncomponents: the existence of a business relation between\\nplaintiff and defendant, the recipient’s provision of a fax\\nnumber as part of that business relation, and the inclusion in\\nthe unsolicited fax of “a notice meeting the requirements\\nunder paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defendants assert that\\nthe first two elements have been met but do not contend that\\nthe third is satisfied. So they have not so much as argued\\nthat the defense obtains as a mager of law.\\n Third, allegations must be supported by evidence. De-\\nfendants say, and the district judge found, that “plaintiffs”\\nhave an established business relation with them, and that\\n“plaintiffs” furnished their fax numbers. For their part, how-\\never, plaintiffs contend that only one of them (Craftwood II)\\nwas doing business with only one of the defendants (Com-\\nprehensive Marketing). That Craftwood II and Craftwood III\\nare under common control does not make them the same\\nthing—not, at least, unless the requirements for lateral veil\\npiercing have been satisfied. Defendants and the district\\njudge did not address that subject. Nor did defendant Gen-\\nerac show that it has an established business relation with\\neither plaintiff. Perhaps plaintiffs are wrong about who was\\ndoing business with whom, but it looks like we have the\\n\\fNo. 18-2883 5\\n\\nmakings of a material factual dispute, which a district judge\\ncould not resolve at the pleading stage.\\n Fourth, there is the problem of the “notice meeting the\\nrequirements under paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defend-\\nants’ notice, which is in the record, reads (all errors in the\\noriginal):\\n The information in this facsimile message is privileged and con-\\n fidential information, intended for the addressee If you have re-\\n ceived this message in error, or if the recipient of this communi-\\n cation does not desire to receive future communications from the\\n sender. The recipientmustnotifythe sender of the same with a re-\\n turn fax to 830-916-0736 or call Toll Free 1-877-325-2526\\n\\nBeyond the oddity of telling the recipient of an unwanted fax\\nthat it “must” do something is the omission of two bits of\\ninformation that the statute insists be included: that the re-\\ncipient has a legal right to avoid future fax ads and that the\\nsender must comply with an opt-out request “within the\\nshortest reasonable time” as determined by federal rules (30\\ndays). The district court said, essentially, “no harm no foul”:\\nplaintiffs used the number in the notice, and the ads stopped\\ncoming. That’s yet more factfinding outside the scope of the\\ncomplaint, and it amounts to a conclusion that the “identifi-\\nable trifle” of the cost and annoyance of the fax ads already\\nreceived, plus the opportunity cost of the time needed to\\nstop more faxes from arriving, just can’t support a claim.\\nPerhaps a judge or jury could decide that any award exceed-\\ning nominal damages would be inappropriate, but that’s\\nsome distance from saying that there has been neither injury\\nnor a violation of law.\\n To the extent that the district judge believed it possible to\\nresolve the suit on the merits in part (the first two compo-\\n\\f6 No. 18-2883\\n\\nnents of the affirmative defense) and then dismiss the rest\\nfor want of jurisdiction (because the third component of the\\ndefense creates a bare procedural right, of the sort discussed\\nin Spokeo), it was making a fundamental error. Jurisdiction\\nalmost always depends on the state of magers when a suit\\nbegins. See, e.g., Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc.,\\n498 U.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v.\\nLouisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Tor-\\nrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539–40 (1824). (We put the possibility of\\nmootness to one side. Whatever it is, this case is not moot.) A\\ncourt cannot resolve part of a plaintiff’s claim on the merits\\nand then say that the residue is outside federal jurisdiction.\\nJohnson v. WaEenbarger, 361 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 1994). Whether\\nor not there would be standing to complain about the precise\\nwording of the opt-out language when that was the only as-\\nserted source of injury—St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. Nomax,\\nInc., 899 F.3d 500 (8th Cir. 2018), gives a negative answer—\\nthis suit began as more than that.\\n The district court erred in dismissing the complaint for\\nlack of jurisdiction, and it would not be appropriate to dis-\\nmiss it under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) either. Perhaps, after dis-\\ncovery (which has yet to occur), the record will show the ab-\\nsence of a material factual dispute. But as things stand plain-\\ntiffs have a plausible grievance.\\n The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for\\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383021/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605768/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: CRAFTWOOD II, INC., and Craftwood III, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., and Comprehensive Marketing, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2883\nCRAFTWOOD II, INC., and CRAFTWOOD III, INC.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nGENERAC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., and COMPREHENSIVE\nMARKETING, INC.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 4105 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\nJudges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Two corporations, Craftwood\nII and Craftwood III, operate hardware businesses in Cali-\nfornia. They contend in this suit under the Telephone Con-\nsumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227, that defendants sent\nthem unsolicited fax advertisements. Defendants moved to\ndismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), con-\n\f2 No. 18-2883\n\ntending that plaintiffs lack standing to sue. The district judge\ngranted that motion—not so much because he found the lack\nof an injury as because he thought that defendants had sub-\nstantially (though not technically) met the requirements of a\ndefense in §227(b)(1)(C). On appeal defendants contend ex-\npressly what is only implicit in the district court’s decision:\nthat unless plaintiffs prove injury from a violation of law, the\nsuit must be dismissed for lack of a case or controversy. That\nproposition contradicts the holding of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.\n678 (1946), among many other decisions showing that a\nplaintiff’s failure on the merits does not divest a federal\ncourt of jurisdiction.\n The difference between a jurisdictional and a substantive\ncharacterization of a defense magers not just because federal\ncourts must raise jurisdiction on their own, even if the liti-\ngants are content to have a federal judge resolve the dispute,\nbut because different procedures apply to jurisdictional and\nsubstantive issues. When subject-mager jurisdiction—which\nis to say, the power to hear and decide the case at all—is at\nstake, a district judge may resolve factual disputes and make\nany findings necessary to determine the court’s adjudicatory\ncompetence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Venezuela v. Helmerich &\nPayne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1316 (2017);\nMcNuE v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 184\n(1936). If the court has jurisdiction, however, then it must\ntake all plausible allegations in favor of the complainant\nwhen handling a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or\nfor judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Bell Atlantic\nCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). And if the com-\nplaint states a claim for relief, then a material factual dispute\nwill defeat a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56\nand entitle the plaintiff to a trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v.\n\fNo. 18-2883 3\n\nCatreE, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). By treating a defense as if it were\nan element of subject-mager jurisdiction, the district court\ntransgressed these allocations of authority.\n Standing to sue is established by allegations (and, if nec-\nessary, proof) of injury, caused by the defendant, and re-\ndressable by a favorable judicial decision. See, e.g., Lujan v.\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Spokeo, Inc.\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). Plaintiffs allege that they re-\nceived unsolicited fax ads, causing at least two kinds of inju-\nry: printing the faxes used paper and toner, which are costly,\nand the need to read the incoming faxes diverted the time of\none or more employees from the businesses’ profitable en-\ndeavors. These are concrete rather than abstract losses. The\ninjuries may have been slight, but an “identifiable trifle”\nsuffices. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 & n.14\n(1973). Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by the defendants’\nfaxed ads and may be redressed by an award of damages.\nWe have resolved dozens of fax-ad suits on the merits with-\nout suspecting that we were violating Article III of the Con-\nstitution. This suit is no more constitutionally suspect than\nthey. Whether it is good public policy to use the cumber-\nsome and costly process of adjudication to resolve disputes\nabout annoying fax ads is for Congress to decide.\n We have thought about the possibility of revising the dis-\ntrict court’s decision to be a dismissal on the merits, rather\nthan for lack of standing, but conclude that such a step\nwould be inappropriate, for several reasons.\n First, it is presumptively unlawful to send any unsolicit-\ned fax advertisement. Copies of some faxes are in the record,\nand there’s no doubt that they are advertisements. Plaintiffs\nallege that they were unsolicited. That makes out a plausible\n\f4 No. 18-2883\n\nclaim for relief. Defendants invoke an affirmative defense,\nbut complaints need not anticipate or agempt to plead\naround potential defenses. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.\n635 (1980); United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., 350\nF.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2003).\n Second, precisely because a complaint need not antici-\npate defenses, it is difficult to see how the suit could be dis-\nmissed on the pleadings. Instead the defense has factual\ncomponents: the existence of a business relation between\nplaintiff and defendant, the recipient’s provision of a fax\nnumber as part of that business relation, and the inclusion in\nthe unsolicited fax of “a notice meeting the requirements\nunder paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defendants assert that\nthe first two elements have been met but do not contend that\nthe third is satisfied. So they have not so much as argued\nthat the defense obtains as a mager of law.\n Third, allegations must be supported by evidence. De-\nfendants say, and the district judge found, that “plaintiffs”\nhave an established business relation with them, and that\n“plaintiffs” furnished their fax numbers. For their part, how-\never, plaintiffs contend that only one of them (Craftwood II)\nwas doing business with only one of the defendants (Com-\nprehensive Marketing). That Craftwood II and Craftwood III\nare under common control does not make them the same\nthing—not, at least, unless the requirements for lateral veil\npiercing have been satisfied. Defendants and the district\njudge did not address that subject. Nor did defendant Gen-\nerac show that it has an established business relation with\neither plaintiff. Perhaps plaintiffs are wrong about who was\ndoing business with whom, but it looks like we have the\n\fNo. 18-2883 5\n\nmakings of a material factual dispute, which a district judge\ncould not resolve at the pleading stage.\n Fourth, there is the problem of the “notice meeting the\nrequirements under paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defend-\nants’ notice, which is in the record, reads (all errors in the\noriginal):\n The information in this facsimile message is privileged and con-\n fidential information, intended for the addressee If you have re-\n ceived this message in error, or if the recipient of this communi-\n cation does not desire to receive future communications from the\n sender. The recipientmustnotifythe sender of the same with a re-\n turn fax to 830-916-0736 or call Toll Free 1-877-325-2526\n\nBeyond the oddity of telling the recipient of an unwanted fax\nthat it “must” do something is the omission of two bits of\ninformation that the statute insists be included: that the re-\ncipient has a legal right to avoid future fax ads and that the\nsender must comply with an opt-out request “within the\nshortest reasonable time” as determined by federal rules (30\ndays). The district court said, essentially, “no harm no foul”:\nplaintiffs used the number in the notice, and the ads stopped\ncoming. That’s yet more factfinding outside the scope of the\ncomplaint, and it amounts to a conclusion that the “identifi-\nable trifle” of the cost and annoyance of the fax ads already\nreceived, plus the opportunity cost of the time needed to\nstop more faxes from arriving, just can’t support a claim.\nPerhaps a judge or jury could decide that any award exceed-\ning nominal damages would be inappropriate, but that’s\nsome distance from saying that there has been neither injury\nnor a violation of law.\n To the extent that the district judge believed it possible to\nresolve the suit on the merits in part (the first two compo-\n\f6 No. 18-2883\n\nnents of the affirmative defense) and then dismiss the rest\nfor want of jurisdiction (because the third component of the\ndefense creates a bare procedural right, of the sort discussed\nin Spokeo), it was making a fundamental error. Jurisdiction\nalmost always depends on the state of magers when a suit\nbegins. See, e.g., Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc.,\n498 U.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v.\nLouisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Tor-\nrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539–40 (1824). (We put the possibility of\nmootness to one side. Whatever it is, this case is not moot.) A\ncourt cannot resolve part of a plaintiff’s claim on the merits\nand then say that the residue is outside federal jurisdiction.\nJohnson v. WaEenbarger, 361 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 1994). Whether\nor not there would be standing to complain about the precise\nwording of the opt-out language when that was the only as-\nserted source of injury—St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. Nomax,\nInc., 899 F.3d 500 (8th Cir. 2018), gives a negative answer—\nthis suit began as more than that.\n The district court erred in dismissing the complaint for\nlack of jurisdiction, and it would not be appropriate to dis-\nmiss it under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) either. Perhaps, after dis-\ncovery (which has yet to occur), the record will show the ab-\nsence of a material factual dispute. But as things stand plain-\ntiffs have a plausible grievance.\n The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: CRAFTWOOD II, INC., and Craftwood III, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., and Comprehensive Marketing, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2883\\nCRAFTWOOD II, INC., and CRAFTWOOD III, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nGENERAC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., and COMPREHENSIVE\\nMARKETING, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 4105 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Two corporations, Craftwood\\nII and Craftwood III, operate hardware businesses in Cali-\\nfornia. They contend in this suit under the Telephone Con-\\nsumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227, that defendants sent\\nthem unsolicited fax advertisements. Defendants moved to\\ndismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), con-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2883\\n\\ntending that plaintiffs lack standing to sue. The district judge\\ngranted that motion—not so much because he found the lack\\nof an injury as because he thought that defendants had sub-\\nstantially (though not technically) met the requirements of a\\ndefense in §227(b)(1)(C). On appeal defendants contend ex-\\npressly what is only implicit in the district court’s decision:\\nthat unless plaintiffs prove injury from a violation of law, the\\nsuit must be dismissed for lack of a case or controversy. That\\nproposition contradicts the holding of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.\\n678 (1946), among many other decisions showing that a\\nplaintiff’s failure on the merits does not divest a federal\\ncourt of jurisdiction.\\n The difference between a jurisdictional and a substantive\\ncharacterization of a defense magers not just because federal\\ncourts must raise jurisdiction on their own, even if the liti-\\ngants are content to have a federal judge resolve the dispute,\\nbut because different procedures apply to jurisdictional and\\nsubstantive issues. When subject-mager jurisdiction—which\\nis to say, the power to hear and decide the case at all—is at\\nstake, a district judge may resolve factual disputes and make\\nany findings necessary to determine the court’s adjudicatory\\ncompetence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Venezuela v. Helmerich &\\nPayne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1316 (2017);\\nMcNuE v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 184\\n(1936). If the court has jurisdiction, however, then it must\\ntake all plausible allegations in favor of the complainant\\nwhen handling a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or\\nfor judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Bell Atlantic\\nCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). And if the com-\\nplaint states a claim for relief, then a material factual dispute\\nwill defeat a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56\\nand entitle the plaintiff to a trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v.\\n\\fNo. 18-2883 3\\n\\nCatreE, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). By treating a defense as if it were\\nan element of subject-mager jurisdiction, the district court\\ntransgressed these allocations of authority.\\n Standing to sue is established by allegations (and, if nec-\\nessary, proof) of injury, caused by the defendant, and re-\\ndressable by a favorable judicial decision. See, e.g., Lujan v.\\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Spokeo, Inc.\\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). Plaintiffs allege that they re-\\nceived unsolicited fax ads, causing at least two kinds of inju-\\nry: printing the faxes used paper and toner, which are costly,\\nand the need to read the incoming faxes diverted the time of\\none or more employees from the businesses’ profitable en-\\ndeavors. These are concrete rather than abstract losses. The\\ninjuries may have been slight, but an “identifiable trifle”\\nsuffices. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 & n.14\\n(1973). Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by the defendants’\\nfaxed ads and may be redressed by an award of damages.\\nWe have resolved dozens of fax-ad suits on the merits with-\\nout suspecting that we were violating Article III of the Con-\\nstitution. This suit is no more constitutionally suspect than\\nthey. Whether it is good public policy to use the cumber-\\nsome and costly process of adjudication to resolve disputes\\nabout annoying fax ads is for Congress to decide.\\n We have thought about the possibility of revising the dis-\\ntrict court’s decision to be a dismissal on the merits, rather\\nthan for lack of standing, but conclude that such a step\\nwould be inappropriate, for several reasons.\\n First, it is presumptively unlawful to send any unsolicit-\\ned fax advertisement. Copies of some faxes are in the record,\\nand there’s no doubt that they are advertisements. Plaintiffs\\nallege that they were unsolicited. That makes out a plausible\\n\\f4 No. 18-2883\\n\\nclaim for relief. Defendants invoke an affirmative defense,\\nbut complaints need not anticipate or agempt to plead\\naround potential defenses. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.\\n635 (1980); United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., 350\\nF.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n Second, precisely because a complaint need not antici-\\npate defenses, it is difficult to see how the suit could be dis-\\nmissed on the pleadings. Instead the defense has factual\\ncomponents: the existence of a business relation between\\nplaintiff and defendant, the recipient’s provision of a fax\\nnumber as part of that business relation, and the inclusion in\\nthe unsolicited fax of “a notice meeting the requirements\\nunder paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defendants assert that\\nthe first two elements have been met but do not contend that\\nthe third is satisfied. So they have not so much as argued\\nthat the defense obtains as a mager of law.\\n Third, allegations must be supported by evidence. De-\\nfendants say, and the district judge found, that “plaintiffs”\\nhave an established business relation with them, and that\\n“plaintiffs” furnished their fax numbers. For their part, how-\\never, plaintiffs contend that only one of them (Craftwood II)\\nwas doing business with only one of the defendants (Com-\\nprehensive Marketing). That Craftwood II and Craftwood III\\nare under common control does not make them the same\\nthing—not, at least, unless the requirements for lateral veil\\npiercing have been satisfied. Defendants and the district\\njudge did not address that subject. Nor did defendant Gen-\\nerac show that it has an established business relation with\\neither plaintiff. Perhaps plaintiffs are wrong about who was\\ndoing business with whom, but it looks like we have the\\n\\fNo. 18-2883 5\\n\\nmakings of a material factual dispute, which a district judge\\ncould not resolve at the pleading stage.\\n Fourth, there is the problem of the “notice meeting the\\nrequirements under paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defend-\\nants’ notice, which is in the record, reads (all errors in the\\noriginal):\\n The information in this facsimile message is privileged and con-\\n fidential information, intended for the addressee If you have re-\\n ceived this message in error, or if the recipient of this communi-\\n cation does not desire to receive future communications from the\\n sender. The recipientmustnotifythe sender of the same with a re-\\n turn fax to 830-916-0736 or call Toll Free 1-877-325-2526\\n\\nBeyond the oddity of telling the recipient of an unwanted fax\\nthat it “must” do something is the omission of two bits of\\ninformation that the statute insists be included: that the re-\\ncipient has a legal right to avoid future fax ads and that the\\nsender must comply with an opt-out request “within the\\nshortest reasonable time” as determined by federal rules (30\\ndays). The district court said, essentially, “no harm no foul”:\\nplaintiffs used the number in the notice, and the ads stopped\\ncoming. That’s yet more factfinding outside the scope of the\\ncomplaint, and it amounts to a conclusion that the “identifi-\\nable trifle” of the cost and annoyance of the fax ads already\\nreceived, plus the opportunity cost of the time needed to\\nstop more faxes from arriving, just can’t support a claim.\\nPerhaps a judge or jury could decide that any award exceed-\\ning nominal damages would be inappropriate, but that’s\\nsome distance from saying that there has been neither injury\\nnor a violation of law.\\n To the extent that the district judge believed it possible to\\nresolve the suit on the merits in part (the first two compo-\\n\\f6 No. 18-2883\\n\\nnents of the affirmative defense) and then dismiss the rest\\nfor want of jurisdiction (because the third component of the\\ndefense creates a bare procedural right, of the sort discussed\\nin Spokeo), it was making a fundamental error. Jurisdiction\\nalmost always depends on the state of magers when a suit\\nbegins. See, e.g., Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc.,\\n498 U.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v.\\nLouisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Tor-\\nrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539–40 (1824). (We put the possibility of\\nmootness to one side. Whatever it is, this case is not moot.) A\\ncourt cannot resolve part of a plaintiff’s claim on the merits\\nand then say that the residue is outside federal jurisdiction.\\nJohnson v. WaEenbarger, 361 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 1994). Whether\\nor not there would be standing to complain about the precise\\nwording of the opt-out language when that was the only as-\\nserted source of injury—St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. Nomax,\\nInc., 899 F.3d 500 (8th Cir. 2018), gives a negative answer—\\nthis suit began as more than that.\\n The district court erred in dismissing the complaint for\\nlack of jurisdiction, and it would not be appropriate to dis-\\nmiss it under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) either. Perhaps, after dis-\\ncovery (which has yet to occur), the record will show the ab-\\nsence of a material factual dispute. But as things stand plain-\\ntiffs have a plausible grievance.\\n The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for\\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1678,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4605817,"string":"4,605,817"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1889"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir- cuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\nIN THE MATTER OF:\\n STEVEN ROBERT LISSE,\\n Debtor.\\nAPPEALS OF:\\n WENDY ALISON NORA\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-617-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir-\\ncuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Attorney Wendy Alison Nora ap-\\npeals a decision requiring her and her client to pay damages\\nand costs related to this bankruptcy litigation, as well as an\\norder suspending her from the practice of law in the Western\\nDistrict of Wisconsin. These appeals, unfortunately, are not\\nNora’s first encounter with attorney discipline. See, e.g., In re\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nDisciplinary Action against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990);\\nIn re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 495 N.W.2d 99 (Wis.\\n1993); In re Rinaldi, 778 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Nora, 778\\nF.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2018). While we hope this will be\\nher last such encounter, her serial dilatory, vexatious, and un-\\nprofessional litigation practices lead us to affirm the district\\ncourt’s orders. In addition, Nora’s frivolous motion practice\\nand legal arguments in these appeals lead us to lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction against Nora.\\n I. Background\\n Proceedings in multiple venues are relevant to these ap-\\npeals, including each level of the Wisconsin state court sys-\\ntem, two Chapter 13 petitions in federal bankruptcy court,\\nand two bankruptcy appeals in the district court. Because the\\nprocedural history is pertinent to resolving Nora’s appeals,\\nwe detail it below.\\n A. Wisconsin Foreclosure Action\\n Steven and Sondra Lisse refinanced their home in 2006,\\ntaking out a new mortgage and signing a corresponding note.\\nThe Lisses fell behind on their payments, and an entity con-\\ntrolled by HSBC Bank USA, N.A. filed a foreclosure action in\\nDane County Circuit Court in 2010.1\\n Four years later, HSBC moved for summary judgment. In\\nresponse, the Lisses asked the court for additional discovery\\nthat they hoped would demonstrate HSBC could not enforce\\n\\n 1 The prolix name of the entity is HSBC Bank USA, National Associa-\\ntion for the Benefit of Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series\\n2006-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates. For simplicity, this\\nopinion refers to appellee as HSBC.\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 3\\n\\nits note. The court denied the Lisses’ request and awarded\\nHSBC summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. The Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. HSBC Bank\\nUSA v. Lisse, 877 N.W.2d 650 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016) (un-\\npublished table decision).\\n B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petitions\\n Approximately six weeks after the Wisconsin Court of Ap-\\npeals’ affirmance, Steven Lisse (by attorney Nora) filed a\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of Wis-\\nconsin. As a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended\\nthe Lisses’ deadline to petition for review of the foreclosure\\njudgment. Order, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Apr. 7, 2016).2 The practical effect was to postpone\\nHSBC’s foreclosure on the Lisses’ home as long as bankruptcy\\nproceedings remained pending in federal court.\\n Nora submitted a Chapter 13 plan for Steven Lisse that\\nproposed the Lisses would make their monthly mortgage\\npayments to Nora’s trust account while the bankruptcy court\\nconducted an adversary proceeding to identify the entity en-\\ntitled to the money. HSBC objected, noting it already litigated\\nits claim to judgment in the Wisconsin courts.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Nora acknowledged the purpose of Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy peti-\\ntion was to extend the Lisses’ deadline to appeal in state court: “Mr. Lisse’s\\nemergency Petition was necessary to preserve his right to file a Petition\\nfor Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the decision of the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals entered on March 8, 2016 which denied his Mo-\\ntion for Reconsideration.” Motion for Extension of Time to File Schedules\\nat ¶5, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-109235-cjf (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Apr.\\n3, 2016), ECF No. 9.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n After the bankruptcy court held a confirmation hearing, it\\nrejected Nora’s proposed plan and sua sponte dismissed the\\ncase without leave to amend. The bankruptcy court con-\\ncluded, “[T]his clearly is an opportunity or this plan shows all\\nthe earmarks of being an effort to continue a fight, which\\ncould be made and was made in the state foreclosure action,\\nin the Bankruptcy Court.” Transcript of Final Hearing on\\nChapter 13 Plan at 51–52, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-\\n10935 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 84. The bank-\\nruptcy judge found the plan improper, citing In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990), “because the purpose for filing the\\nplan is not to pay the creditor but to thwart paying the credi-\\ntor.” Id. at 52. Nora filed an appeal to the district court on\\nbehalf of Steven Lisse, challenging HSBC’s standing, arguing\\nHSBC’s note was a forgery, and accusing HSBC’s counsel of\\nfraud on the court.\\n Five days after the bankruptcy court dismissed Steven\\nLisse’s petition, Nora filed a separate Chapter 13 petition on\\nbehalf of his wife, Sondra Lisse. This again extended the\\nLisses’ deadline in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Order,\\nHSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 (Wis. July 28, 2016).\\nNora’s proposed Chapter 13 plan for Sondra Lisse was similar\\nto the one the bankruptcy court had just rejected in Steven\\nLisse’s case. HSBC moved to dismiss the petition for lack of\\ngood faith, arguing Nora filed it with the sole intent to delay\\nthe final disposition of the Wisconsin foreclosure action.\\nHSBC also sought relief from the automatic stay.\\n Nora responded by moving for sanctions, claiming\\nHSBC’s Rooker-Feldman and preclusion arguments were friv-\\nolous and accusing HSBC’s counsel of “completely desecrat-\\ning the integrity of these proceedings.” Motion for\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 5\\n\\nNoncompliance with Discovery at 10, No. 3:16-12556-cjf\\n(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2016), ECF No. 59. The bankruptcy\\ncourt rejected Nora’s sanctions arguments entirely. In re\\nSondra Kay Lisse, 567 B.R. 813, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017)\\n(finding “no basis” to grant the motion). It also lifted the au-\\ntomatic stay, noting the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment pre-\\ncluded Nora’s arguments that HSBC’s note was forged.\\n After these procedural rulings, Nora filed three appeals to\\nthe district court and moved to voluntarily dismiss Sondra\\nLisse’s petition pending resolution of the appeals, which the\\ndistrict court granted. With both bankruptcy cases dismissed\\n(although on appeal), the Lisses filed their petition for review\\nwith the Wisconsin Supreme Court—13 months after the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment.\\nPetition for Review, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Mar. 23, 2017).\\n C. Bankruptcy Appeals to the District Court\\n Nora began Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal by filing a\\ndocument accusing HSBC and its counsel (by name) of federal\\ncrimes, including bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157.\\nNext, she asked the district court to order HSBC to “conven-\\ntionally file” its original note with the clerk of court, as evi-\\ndence of “criminal misconduct.” Shortly thereafter, Nora\\nmoved to stay the deadline for Steven Lisse’s merits brief,\\nciting HSBC’s purportedly “ambiguous and contradictory”\\nrecord designations. Then, in a motion requesting summary\\nreversal, Nora again accused HSBC and its counsel of perpe-\\ntrating a fraud on the courts by presenting forged documents.\\n Following this initial burst of activity, Steven Lisse’s ap-\\npeal lay dormant for almost a year. Finally, on August 23,\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n2017, HSBC requested dismissal for failure to prosecute. This\\nprompted the district court to set an October 2, 2017 deadline\\nfor Nora’s opening brief on the merits.\\n Nora filed a motion to stay the appeal ten days later, citing\\nthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,\\net seq.,3 and a physician’s recommendation that Nora take a\\nleave from practicing law. Despite expressing some skepti-\\ncism as to Nora’s motives—noting her “history of frivolous\\nand dilatory tactics” and efforts to “drag[ ] out the briefing on\\nthe merits by satellite skirmishes”—the district court granted\\na three-month stay. Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2017), ECF No. 42. It did,\\nhowever, stress that “[n]o further extensions will be granted\\nto Attorney Nora absent new, extraordinary circumstances.”\\nId. Nora later testified that she continued to practice law for\\nother clients in other matters during the three-month stay.4\\n The day after the district court stayed Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the\\nLisses’ petition to review the foreclosure judgment. HSBC\\n\\n 3 Nora’s invocation of the ADA is noteworthy, given that she previ-\\nously sued a Wisconsin circuit judge in federal court for alleged ADA vi-\\nolations in depriving her of medical accommodations by not granting her\\ndeadline extensions. Complaint, Nora v. Colas, No. 10-cv-709-bbc (W.D.\\nWis. Nov. 15, 2010), ECF No. 1. In its decision suspending Nora’s Wiscon-\\nsin law license (discussed later in this opinion), the Wisconsin Supreme\\nCourt found that lawsuit “was clearly pursued in an attempt to harass or\\nmaliciously injure” the judge. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora,\\n909 N.W.2d at 164.\\n 4 Nora has previously engaged in similar inconsistent behavior. See,\\ne.g., In re Nora, 417 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (7th Cir. 2011) (“At the same time\\nthat she told the district judge that she was ‘totally disabled’ from litigat-\\ning, Nora was actively litigating in the bankruptcy court.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 7\\n\\nBank USA v. Lisse, 904 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2017) (un-\\npublished table decision). As a result, in December 2017,\\nHSBC began moving forward with a foreclosure sale in Dane\\nCounty Circuit Court.\\n With respect to Sondra Lisse’s appeal, on December 5,\\n2017, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rul-\\nings. Lisse v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2017\\nWL 6021316 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2017). It held that the preclu-\\nsive effect of the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment defeated\\nNora’s challenges to the note’s authenticity and provided\\nHSBC with standing to object to Sondra Lisse’s proposed\\nChapter 13 plan. Id. at *7. Also, the district court concluded\\nthe “appeal, like the bankruptcy litigation, plainly lacks merit\\nand was wastefully presented.” Id. at *8.5 Nora asked the dis-\\ntrict court to reconsider, but the district court declined. Lisse\\nv. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2018 WL\\n840157, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding Nora’s motion\\nprovided “no basis … to reconsider its decision”). Sondra\\nLisse did not appeal the district court’s rulings to this court.\\n After the stay expired in Steven Lisse’s appeal—and on the\\neve of Nora’s deadline to file an opening brief—the Lisses re-\\nturned to Dane County Circuit Court to file a flurry of mo-\\ntions seeking to postpone the foreclosure sale.6 The day before\\n\\n 5\\n It denied HSBC’s request for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nBANKR. P. 8020 because HSBC did not file a separate motion for such relief.\\n 6 These motions were filed by another attorney. They included a mo-\\ntion to hold HSBC and its counsel in contempt for “falsely represent[ing]”\\nthe Lisses’ note to be an original and a sanctions motion against HSBC for\\n“fraud on the court.” The state court denied the Lisses’ motions and con-\\nfirmed the foreclosure sale. The Lisses appealed, and the case remains\\npending. HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2018AP000557 (Wis. Ct. App.).\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nher opening brief was due, Nora moved for another stay\\npending resolution of her clients’ state-court motions. The\\ndistrict court denied Nora’s eleventh-hour request, finding\\n“the debtor’s sole purpose appears to be to delay an inevitable\\nforeclosure through every legal artifice available both in state\\nand federal court.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 46.\\nCharacterizing Nora’s litigation maneuvers as “plainly\\nseek[ing] to continue to postpone [the state-court foreclosure\\naction] through collateral, tag-team attacks in federal court\\nbrought separately by husband and wife,” the district court\\nstated it would “no longer be complicit in these transparent\\nefforts.” Id. at 2. It refused to stay Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy\\nappeal further.\\n The following day, instead of filing an opening brief, Nora\\nmoved to voluntarily dismiss Steven Lisse’s appeal—more\\nthan 16 months after she filed it.\\n D. Sanctions in the District Court\\n The district court dismissed Steven Lisse’s appeal, but it\\ndid not stop there. Due to her “pattern of sharp practice,” the\\ndistrict court ordered Nora to show cause “why she should\\nnot be sanctioned for her frivolous, or at best vexatious, ap-\\npeal.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc\\n(W.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 49. A week later, Nora\\nasked the district court to vacate its show cause order, alleg-\\ning that the order violated due process and that the district\\ncourt had pre-judged the merits of imposing sanctions. The\\ndistrict court scheduled an evidentiary hearing before a three-\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 9\\n\\njudge panel consisting of Chief District Judge Peterson, Dis-\\ntrict Judge Conley, and Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay.7\\n Nora, now represented by her own counsel, filed an an-\\nswer seeking to “quash” the show cause order, alleging a lack\\nof notice of the “charges” against her, objecting to Judge\\nConley’s participation at the hearing, and challenging the\\nconstitutional authority of Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay to\\nparticipate. The district court provided Nora with a 13-page\\n“supplemental notice” identifying the bases for the order to\\nshow cause. Nora’s lawyer followed up with a “rejoinder,”\\nobjecting to the lack of separate “counts” and arguing the\\ncourt could not conduct its own attorney discipline proceed-\\nings.\\n The district court held a 90-minute hearing on the show\\ncause order and issued its opinion on March 20, 2018. It\\ngrouped Nora’s misconduct into three categories: “(1) inap-\\npropriately pursuing relief in federal court; (2) dilatory litiga-\\ntion conduct, including numerous, last-minute requests for\\nlengthy extensions; and (3) filing multiple cases or appeals\\nthen failing to consolidate or join them.” Opinion and Order\\nat 8, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D.\\nWis. Mar. 20, 2018), ECF No. 88. The court decided, “Nora’s\\nadvocacy has crossed the line of professional conduct too\\nmany times to be tolerated or ignored any longer.” Id. at 11.\\nThe district court fined Nora $2,500 and suspended her from\\nappearing in new matters in the Western District for six\\n\\n 7 As the district court noted, it created the three-judge panel “in a\\ngood-faith attempt to bend over backwards to accommodate and assuage\\nNora’s concerns about a lack of impartiality.” Opinion and Order at 6 n.3,\\nLisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2018),\\nECF No. 88.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nmonths, although it stayed those sanctions if and until Nora\\nsubmitted another improper filing. Id.\\n Meanwhile, HSBC had filed a motion for $3,675 in costs\\nand attorneys’ fees under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28\\nU.S.C. § 1927. Classifying the appeal as “frivolous,” the dis-\\ntrict court held Steven Lisse and Nora “jointly and severally\\nliable for $1,837.50.” Opinion and Order at 4, 8, Lisse v. HSBC\\nBank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2018),\\nECF No. 89. This monetary sanction was in addition to the\\nsuspended fine discussed above.\\n About a week later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued\\na decision in disciplinary proceedings against Nora—for con-\\nduct not connected with this litigation—revoking her law li-\\ncense for at least one year. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d at 167. On April 13, 2018, pursuant to W.D.\\nWis. LR 83.5, the district court suspended Nora from practice\\nin the Western District until her Wisconsin law license was re-\\nstored.\\n E. Appeals in this Court\\n Nora now appeals the district court’s decisions in her in-\\ndividual capacity.8 Her opening brief was due on July 30,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8Nora, as an attorney sanctioned for professional misconduct, pos-\\nsesses standing to appeal the district court’s decisions in her own name.\\nMartinez v. City of Chicago, 823 F.3d 1050, 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 11\\n\\n2018, but on that date, in violation of Circuit Rule 26,9 Nora\\ninstead filed a motion asking for a sixty-day extension. We\\npushed the deadline back to September 14, 2018, but when\\nthat date arrived, Nora again filed a noncompliant extension\\nmotion.10 Although we again extended Nora’s deadline to\\nSeptember 19, 2018, she failed to meet it and filed her opening\\nbrief late.\\n Nora also repeatedly filed documents styled as “Requests\\nfor Judicial Notice,” asking this court to take judicial notice of\\nvarious documents filed in other cases (affidavits, deposition\\ntranscripts, court orders). After two orders denying Nora’s\\nrequests, on Nora’s third attempt Judge Easterbrook (as mo-\\ntions judge) published an opinion explaining why the\\nrequests were procedurally improper. In re Appeals of Nora,\\n905 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The right place to propose\\njudicial notice, once a case is in a court of appeals, is in a brief.\\n… There’s no need to engage in motions practice, require the\\nattention of additional appellate judges, and defer briefing.”).\\n When HSBC submitted its response, Nora moved to strike\\nportions of its brief and supplemental appendix. Nora argued\\nHSBC’s citation of documents from the Wisconsin foreclosure\\naction and Sondra Lisse’s bankruptcy case—some of which\\n\\n 9 The rule requires, in part, that a motion for a deadline extension\\n“shall be filed at least seven days before the brief is due, unless it is made\\nto appear in the motion that the facts which are the basis of the motion did\\nnot exist earlier or were not, or with due diligence could not have been,\\nknown earlier to the movant’s counsel.” 7TH CIR. R. 26 (computing and\\nextending time).\\n 10Nora’s second extension motion asked for three additional days,\\nand before the court could rule on it, she filed a third motion asking for\\ntwo more days.\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nhad been filed by Nora as exhibits in Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal—made it “unreasonably difficult, if not impos-\\nsible,” for her to file a timely reply. Nora also asked this court\\nto stay the appeal until we ruled on her motions to strike. The\\ncourt denied Nora’s motions as “frivolous,” sanctioning her\\nby docking 2,000 words from the limit for her reply. Although\\nour order stated—in no uncertain terms—that “no motion for\\nfurther time (or additional words) will be entertained,” the\\nnext day Nora filed a motion for reconsideration asking the\\ncourt “to restore her full word count limitation … and to al-\\nlow [Nora] sufficient time to file her Reply Brief … .” Motion\\nfor Reconsideration of November 20, 2018 Procedural Order\\nat 11. We denied that motion too.\\n After the completion of merits briefing, HSBC moved for\\ndamages and costs under FED. R. APP. P. 38, arguing Nora’s\\nappeals are frivolous. We ordered Nora to respond to the mo-\\ntion, and she (not to be outdone) requested sanctions against\\nHSBC. Finally, failing to heed this court’s earlier directives,\\nNora filed yet another request for judicial notice, which this\\ncourt denied again.\\n II. Discussion\\n Nora appeals two separate rulings by the district court,\\nalthough her briefs meld them together. First, Nora chal-\\nlenges the district court’s March 22, 2018 sanctions order\\nholding her and Steven Lisse jointly and severally liable to\\nHSBC for $1,837.50 under FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927. Second, Nora appeals the April 13, 2018 order sus-\\npending her from practice in the Western District of\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 13\\n\\nWisconsin.11 Although Nora purports to identify ten issues on\\nappeal, each is a variation on the central theme that she\\nshould have been permitted to relitigate the authenticity of\\nHSBC’s note in federal court. In addition, we must resolve\\nHSBC’s appellate motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38.\\n A. March 22, 2018 Sanctions Order\\n A district court may “award just damages and single or\\ndouble costs” if it determines a bankruptcy appeal is frivo-\\nlous. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020(a); see also Hill v. Norfolk & Western\\nRy. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing power\\nto sanction attorneys in addition to parties).12 An appeal is\\nfrivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appellant’s\\nargument is wholly without merit.” Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst.,\\n732 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Spiegel v. Cont’l Ill.\\nNat’l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 1986)).\\n Likewise, a court may hold an attorney personally liable\\nfor “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably in-\\ncurred because of” her unreasonable and vexatious litigation\\nconduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review a district court’s sanc-\\ntions order for abuse of discretion. In re Busson-Sokolik, 635\\n\\n 11The district court’s April 13, 2018 order incorporates its March 20,\\n2018 disciplinary order, specifying the earlier order will remain in force\\nshould Nora be reinstated to practice in the Western District.\\n 12 The advisory committee notes to FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 make clear\\nthat district courts possess the same authority to sanction frivolous bank-\\nruptcy appeals that FED. R. APP. P. 38 provides to this court. FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“[T]his rule recog-\\nnizes that the authority to award damages and costs in connection with\\nfrivolous appeals is the same for district courts sitting as appellate courts,\\nbankruptcy appellate panels, and courts of appeals.”).\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nF.3d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n8020); Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1927).\\n Under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927,\\nthe district court acted well-within its discretion in imposing\\na monetary sanction on Nora.\\n 1. Sanctions were appropriate under FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n 8020(a) because the bankruptcy appeal was frivolous.\\n The bankruptcy court found Nora filed Steven Lisse’s\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition for the improper purpose of\\nthwarting the Lisses’ creditors, rather than paying them. That\\nconclusion was not clearly erroneous. In re Wiese, 552 F.3d 584,\\n588 (7th Cir. 2009) (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion\\nwhen its decision is premised on an incorrect legal principle\\nor a clearly erroneous factual finding).\\n Unlike a Chapter 7 petition, which focuses on liquidating\\nthe debtor’s assets to satisfy his creditors, Chapter 13 allows a\\ndebtor to voluntarily propose a plan to reorganize his debts\\nfor repayment out of his future income. RICHARD I. AARON,\\nBANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 777 (2013 ed.) (“The central\\nthesis of Chapter 13 is that an individual debtor can dedicate\\nfuture income to pay accumulated debts.”); see also 8 COLLIER\\nON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.02 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer\\neds., 16th ed. 2018). The focus on repayment is highlighted by\\nthe requirement that the debtor begin making payments to\\nthe trustee within 30 days after proposing a Chapter 13 plan,\\neven before the plan is confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The\\nbasic premise is to facilitate the debtor’s ability to pay his\\ncreditors, not to frustrate the creditors’ rights. In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 15\\n\\n428 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing Congress’s idealized Chapter\\n13 case as one where “the debtor, given time and relief from\\nharassment, is able to pay all or most of his debts”).\\n A bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 petition for\\ncause if it finds the petition was filed in bad faith. 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1307(c); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992);\\n8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04[10]; see also 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1325(a)(3) (requiring a plan to have been proposed in good\\nfaith as a condition of confirmation). Given bankruptcy’s his-\\ntorical roots as an equitable remedy, “the good faith standard\\nprevents debtors from manipulating the Code for wrongful\\npurposes.” In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359. Whether a debtor filed\\nhis petition in good faith is a factual finding to be reversed\\nonly when the bankruptcy court’s determination, based on\\nthe totality of the circumstances, is clearly erroneous. In re\\nSmith, 286 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n Using a Chapter 13 petition to stave off an impending\\nhome foreclosure sale is not necessarily improper. Although\\nChapter 13 generally prohibits a plan from modifying mort-\\ngage lenders’ underlying rights, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), it\\nexpressly allows a debtor to cure defaults with respect to his\\nprincipal residence “until such residence is sold at a foreclo-\\nsure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable non-\\nbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1); see also 8 COLLIER ON\\nBANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a]; id. at § 1322.16. A debtor, thus,\\nmay use a proper Chapter 13 petition to cure past defaults on\\nhis mortgage through regular payments to the lender, pre-\\nventing the foreclosure sale. See Nobelman v. American Savings\\nBank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993).\\n But this is not what Nora proposed for the Lisses. As the\\nbankruptcy court recognized, the object of Nora’s plan was\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nnot to pay the Lisses’ creditors in an orderly fashion but, in-\\nstead, to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment. Nora sug-\\ngested directing the Lisses’ mortgage payments to her trust\\naccount (not to the Chapter 13 trustee) “during the pendency\\n[of an] adversary proceeding to be commenced, in part, for\\nthe determination of the identity of the real party in interest\\nentitled to the payment or proceeds … .” Such an effort to\\nrelitigate a creditor’s rights—already established in state-\\ncourt proceedings—is an improper, bad faith use of a Chapter\\n13 petition. See In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359 (“[F]iling a Chapter\\n13 petition in order to thwart the payment of an otherwise\\nnondischargeable income tax debt … was not one of the in-\\ntended purposes of the bankruptcy provisions. … [T]he bank-\\nruptcy court’s finding of lack of good faith is not clearly erro-\\nneous.”).\\n In the district court, Nora never presented any argument\\nabout why the bankruptcy court’s good-faith determination\\nwas clearly erroneous. Indeed, Nora never even filed a brief\\non the merits of the appeal, despite the fact it was pending in\\nthe district court for 16 months. Cf. Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d\\n754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n appellate brief that does not\\neven try to engage the reasons the appellant lost has no pro-\\nspect of success.”).\\n Nora now resurrects the argument that HSBC’s note is a\\nforgery, so the appeal to the district court was not frivolous.\\nThis only confirms the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that\\nNora intended to use the proceedings to thwart HSBC, rather\\nthan to cure the Lisses’ mortgage defaults or otherwise satisfy\\nHSBC’s claim. Many court decisions have previously in-\\nformed Nora that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal\\ncourts are bound by state-court resolutions of debtors’\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 17\\n\\ndefenses to mortgage foreclosure. See, e.g., Nora v. Residential\\nFunding Co., 543 Fed. App’x 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2013) (“By alleg-\\ning that the fraudulent assignment to Residential Funding al-\\nlowed it to succeed in foreclosing on her property in state\\ncourt, Nora is impermissibly asking a federal district court to\\nreview and reject the state court’s judgment of foreclosure of\\nher property.”); Spencer v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 246\\nF. Supp. 3d 1241, 1245 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (“As previously ex-\\nplained to [Nora], the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives fed-\\neral courts of jurisdiction to review a state court decision.”);\\nSpencer v. PNC Bank, No. 14-cv-422-wmc, 2015 WL 1520912, at\\n*4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2015) (noting Nora could challenge the\\nvalidity of endorsements and notes in state court but that\\n“those arguments do not undermine [the creditor’s] standing\\nin the bankruptcy proceeding”); Schmid v. Bank of America, 498\\nB.R. 221, 224–25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“The Rooker-Feldman\\ndoctrine applies to plaintiff’s fraud claim because plaintiff’s\\nalleged injury is the state court foreclosure judgment that de-\\nfendant Bank of America is now asserting … Many other\\ncourts have concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a\\nlitigant from challenging a foreclosure judgment in a subse-\\nquent case.”).\\n Throughout the federal proceedings, Nora has repeatedly\\nattacked HSBC’s “standing” to oppose Steven Lisse’s Chapter\\n13 plan on the theory that HSBC’s note is a forgery. She simi-\\nlarly contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction\\nher due to this alleged Article III defect. Nora is wrong on\\nboth counts. The Wisconsin foreclosure judgment established\\nHSBC as the Lisses’ judgment creditor. It is the foreclosure\\njudgment, not the note, that gives HSBC standing at this point\\nto object to Steven Lisse’s Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1324(a)\\n(providing that any “party in interest may object to\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nconfirmation of the plan”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (defining a\\n“creditor” to be a “party in interest” for purposes of Chapter\\n11); In re Rimgale, 669 F.3d at 428 (explaining that Congress\\nadopted § 1324 to allow “for creditors to be heard” while giv-\\ning the bankruptcy judge sole authority to confirm or reject a\\nplan). This makes the authenticity of HSBC’s note irrelevant\\nto the analysis in federal court. Even if the note is a forgery,\\nuntil the Lisses obtain a vacatur of the foreclosure judgment,\\nHSBC’s standing as a judgment creditor is unassailable.\\n Nora manages to flag one potentially legitimate basis to\\nchallenge the bankruptcy court’s decision: that the court de-\\ncided sua sponte to not only deny confirmation but to dismiss\\nthe petition without leave to amend the plan. Compare In re\\nTerry, 630 F.2d 634, 636 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (“As we read § 1307,\\na court cannot order dismissal or conversion on its own mo-\\ntion.”), with In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993)\\n(holding sua sponte dismissal appropriate under 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 105(a)); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04 (sug-\\ngesting § 105(a) “presumably would give the court the power\\nto dismiss a case sua sponte”). Yet Nora never briefed that ar-\\ngument for the district court. See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones\\nLang LaSalle Am., Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting\\narguments not raised below are forfeited). And she fails to ad-\\nequately do so here, simply quoting a transcript without cit-\\ning any relevant legal authorities on the topic. See M.G.\\nSkinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency v. Norman-Spencer Agency, 845\\nF.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped\\narguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by le-\\ngal authority.”). The inclusion of one plausible argument—\\namidst a plethora of frivolous arguments—will not insulate\\nan appellant from sanctions. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1200 (holding\\nsanctions may be imposed where most of the appellant’s\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 19\\n\\narguments are frivolous, even if not all of them can be classi-\\nfied that way).\\n Nora’s attempt to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment\\nin bankruptcy court was frivolous. Nora’s repeated fraud ac-\\ncusations do not change the calculus. Mains v. CitiBank, 852\\nF.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding Rooker-Feldman prohibits\\nfederal courts from reviewing whether a lender procured a\\nstate-court foreclosure judgment through fraud). If Nora be-\\nlieved she possessed new evidence of fraud, Wisconsin’s state\\ncourts were the appropriate venue to raise such arguments.\\nWIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(c) (authorizing motions to reopen judg-\\nments due to the “[f]raud, misrepresentation, or other mis-\\nconduct of an adverse party”); see also Taylor v. Federal Nat’l\\nMortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming dis-\\ntrict court’s decision to remand a fraud-on-the-court claim to\\nstate court on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Aside from delay,\\nthere was no reason for Nora to file a federal bankruptcy case\\nrather than seek relief in state court. See Mains, 852 F.3d at 676\\n(“The state’s courts are quite capable of protecting their own\\nintegrity.”). Federal courts do not exist to provide disap-\\npointed state-court losers a second bite at the apple.13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 At oral argument, Nora’s counsel contended Judge Conley misun-\\nderstood Chapter 13 bankruptcy law, citing his passing reference to Ste-\\nven Lisse’s bankruptcy petition as an “appeal” of the Wisconsin foreclo-\\nsure judgment. But, read in context, Judge Conley’s statement was noting\\nthat Nora’s arguments were only appropriate in a state-court appeal (such\\nthat Nora was, as a practical matter, attempting to bring an improper “ap-\\npeal” in federal court). Judge Conley’s thorough and careful opinions in\\nthis case dispel any concerns of the type Nora’s counsel postulates.\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n 2. Nora’s litigation tactics warranted sanctions under 28\\n U.S.C. § 1927.\\n Courts may also impose sanctions against a lawyer who\\n“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and\\nvexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A lawyer’s subjective bad faith\\nis a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for § 1927 sanc-\\ntions; objective bad faith is enough. Hunt v. Moore Bros., Inc.,\\n861 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2017). Attorneys demonstrate objec-\\ntive bad faith when they pursue “a path that a reasonably\\ncareful attorney would have known, after appropriate in-\\nquiry, to be unsound.” Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Boyer v.\\nBSNF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016)). Because trial\\njudges are best positioned to detect bad faith litigation con-\\nduct, they possess broad discretion in exercising the § 1927\\npower. Id.\\n Nora’s stall tactics are blatant when one looks back at how\\nthis litigation unfolded. Although Nora denies intentionally\\ndelaying proceedings, the record before us belies her position.\\nNora herself openly acknowledged the purpose of Steven\\nLisse’s bankruptcy petition was to extend the deadline to pe-\\ntition the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And, as Nora now boasts\\nin her brief, her strategy worked:\\n The March 22, 2018 Order [by the district court]\\n concludes that attorneys’ fees should be\\n awarded based on “dilatory conduct” whereby\\n the Lisses have maintained possession of their\\n home for six (6) years. Actually, the Lisses have\\n remained in possession of their home for over\\n eight (8) years since the fraudulent foreclosure\\n began and they are still in possession of their\\n home, contrary to Judge Peterson’s conclusion\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 21\\n\\n that the foreclosure of the Lisses’ home is “inev-\\n itable.”\\nAppellant’s Response to Motion for Sanctions at 16–17,\\nECF No. 24.\\n Using the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as a litiga-\\ntion ploy to drag out foreclosure proceedings in another juris-\\ndiction constitutes objective bad faith. See Hilgeford v. The\\nPeoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Our review of\\nthe briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious\\nlitigation. … We can think of no other reason for this [mort-\\ngagor’s] appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obsti-\\nnancy.”).\\n The conclusion of intentional delay is supported, not only\\nby the obvious motive, but also by the lack of any substantive\\nmerit to the Chapter 13 proceedings. As discussed above, the\\nplan Nora filed on behalf of Steven Lisse (and then again for\\nSondra Lisse) improperly attempted to use an adversarial\\nproceeding to relitigate the merits of a foreclosure judgment\\nHSBC had already obtained in Wisconsin state court (with\\nHSBC receiving no payments in the interim). Any reasonably\\ncareful attorney—let alone an attorney with Nora’s familiarity\\nwith bankruptcy court—would have known that this type of\\nconduct would not be tolerated. Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082; cf. Carr\\nv. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the suit\\nis not frivolous, or at least not utterly so, it is so lacking in\\nmerit … that its pursuit by the plaintiff indicates a motive to\\nharass.”).\\n Nora then compounded the delays caused by these merit-\\nless bankruptcy petitions by filing numerous, last-minute mo-\\ntions for lengthy stays or deadline extensions. For example, in\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nSteven Lisse’s appeal in the district court, Nora filed three mo-\\ntions to stay the proceedings. This strategy produced a\\n16-month delay before the district court refused any further\\nextensions, at which point Nora moved to voluntarily dismiss\\nthe appeal without filing an opening brief. Such litigation be-\\nhavior—even if one assumes pure motives—constitutes objec-\\ntive bad faith warranting sanctions under § 1927. The district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion.\\n B. Nora’s Suspension from Law Practice\\n In addition to awarding HSBC damages and costs against\\nboth Nora and Steven Lisse as a monetary sanction, two dis-\\ntrict court orders imposed professional discipline on Nora.\\nFirst, on March 20, 2018, the district court fined Nora $2,500\\nand suspended her right to practice in the Western District for\\nsix months, although it stayed the penalties until Nora com-\\nmitted another violation.\\n Ten days later, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court\\nsuspended Nora’s law license for one year. In re Disciplinary\\nProceedings against Nora, 909 N.W.2d at 167–68. As a result, on\\nApril 13, 2018, the district court issued another order sus-\\npending Nora’s right to practice based on W.D. Wis. LR\\n83.5(E). That local rule automatically imposes reciprocal dis-\\ncipline when another jurisdiction does so, although it permits\\nthe attorney to apply “for modification or vacation of the [dis-\\ntrict court’s] discipline.”\\n Although Nora appeals the district court’s April 13, 2018\\ndisciplinary order separately from its March 22, 2018 order\\nawarding HSBC its damages and costs under FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, she does not develop an inde-\\npendent argument for reversing it. To be clear, Nora is\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 23\\n\\ncurrently prohibited from practice in the Western District as\\nreciprocal discipline based on her disbarment by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, not due to her conduct in this litigation.14\\nNora does not provide a reason to reverse that discipline.\\n District courts are permitted to rely on state-court discipli-\\nnary proceedings to suspend attorneys practicing before\\nthem. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917). And this case\\nshows why a local rule making reciprocal discipline auto-\\nmatic (while also providing a process for attorneys to chal-\\nlenge that federal discipline) makes sense. Such rules align the\\nprocedure with the relevant legal presumptions. Separate fed-\\neral hearings are not required. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486\\n(7th Cir. 1995). Federal courts give “great weight” to state-\\ncourt disciplinary findings. In re Jafree, 759 F.2d 604, 608 (7th\\nCir. 1985). The attorney bears the burden to identify either a\\ndue process violation, insufficient fact findings, or “some\\nother grave reason” why the state-court’s ruling is not entitled\\nto the federal court’s respect. Selling 243 U.S. at 51. Placing the\\nonus on the attorney to raise such issues in a motion to modify\\nor vacate discipline minimizes the amount of resources di-\\nverted to (essentially) collateral attacks on state-court pro-\\nceedings. See In re Wick, 628 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2010).15\\n\\n\\n 14 The district court’s April 13, 2018 order, however, does state that its\\n\\nMarch 20, 2018 disciplinary order (holding sanctions for Nora’s conduct\\nin this litigation in abeyance until further misconduct) will remain in effect\\nshould Nora be reinstated.\\n 15 This court’s rules take a similar procedural approach. 7TH CIR. R.\\n46(d). Based on the suspension of Nora’s Wisconsin law license in 2018,\\nthis court ordered Nora removed from its roll of attorneys after she failed\\nto demonstrate why this court should not do so. Order, In re Nora, No.\\nD-18-07 (7th Cir. May 23, 2018).\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n Even setting aside the discipline imposed by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, Nora’s litigation activity in federal court\\nwarrants a suspension itself. Federal courts’ inherent author-\\nity to disbar or suspend lawyers for misconduct is longstand-\\ning and well established. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985);\\nsee also Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824) (Marshall, J.)\\n(holding the power to suspend attorneys is “incidental to all\\nCourts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and\\nfor the respectability of the profession”).\\n Again, Nora used tag-team Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings\\nby a husband and wife—each lacking a good faith basis—to\\npostpone the orderly resolution of state-court proceedings.\\nNora’s behavior in this litigation unfortunately is not an aber-\\nration for her. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650,\\n654-55 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, this appeal is frivolous, and\\nwe are troubled by Nora’s conduct in this litigation. … [W]e\\nsuspect that the removal was part of a strategy designed to\\ngum up the progress of the case.”); Spencer v. Federal Home\\nLoan Mortg. Corp., No. 15-cv-332-wmc, 2015 WL 4509159, at *1\\n(W.D. Wis. July 24, 2015) (stating that Nora’s appeals ap-\\npeared “motivated by the goal to further delay a warranted\\nstate court foreclosure.”). Courts have sanctioned Nora for\\nthis conduct before, but apparently she has not received the\\nmessage that it will not be tolerated.\\n Not only are Nora’s litigation tactics inappropriate, her\\ntreatment of opposing counsel and judicial officers is censura-\\nble. In the district court, Nora accused HSBC’s counsel (by\\nname) of committing “uncontroverted fraud on the Court,” as\\nwell as multiple federal crimes, by presenting HSBC’s claim.\\nShe repeats similar attacks in these appeals. See, e.g., Appel-\\nlants Br. at 47. This behavior is, again, not new for Nora. PNC\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 25\\n\\nBank, 763 F.3d at 655 (“Nora has accused the state court judge\\nand court reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts,\\nthe district court judge of pursuing ‘a campaign of libel\\nagainst her,’ and opposing counsel of engaging in ‘actionable\\ncivil fraud and racketeering that may constitute state and fed-\\neral criminal misconduct.’”); Nora v. Furay, No. 14-cv-527-jdp,\\n2014 WL 4209608, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2014) (“Nora con-\\ntends that Judge Furay ‘acted in reckless haste to place false\\nfindings on the public record in order to support the falsely\\nmade allegations against her former client … to make false\\nfindings of fact concerning matters which had never been ad-\\njudicated, and to damage Nora’s character and reputation.’”);\\nIn re Rinaldi, No. 11-35689-svk, 2017 WL 104749, at *1 (E.D.\\nWis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“The conversion of the case to Chapter 13\\nclearly changed the context of HSBCʹs entitlement to relief\\nfrom stay, but Attorney Nora ignored the conversion and ac-\\ncused HSBCʹs attorneys of fraud on the Court.”).\\n Flippant, unfounded accusations of misconduct and fraud\\nby opposing counsel and court officials demean the profes-\\nsion and impair the orderly operation of the judicial system.\\nIn re Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487. They also violate the ethical\\nstandards for lawyers practicing in this circuit. See 7TH CIR.\\nSTANDARDS FOR PROF. CONDUCT, Lawyer’s Duties to Other\\nCounsel at ¶4 (“We will not, absent good cause, attribute bad\\nmotives or improper conduct to other counsel or bring the\\nprofession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impro-\\npriety.”). Such behavior warrants punishment.\\n Following Nora’s repeated abuse of the judicial process\\nthrough frivolous filings and dilatory tactics, her unprofes-\\nsional conduct toward opposing counsel, and the suspension\\nof her Wisconsin law license, “the district court certainly was\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nentitled to say, ‘enough is enough.’” Salmeron v. Enter.\\nRecovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2009). We find no\\nfault with the district court’s order suspending Nora from\\npractice in the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n C. Further Appellate Sanctions\\n We must also resolve HSBC’s appellate motion for addi-\\ntional sanctions. This court may “award just damages and sin-\\ngle or double costs to the appellee” when it deems an appeal\\nfrivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Such sanctions are discretionary\\nand appropriate where an appellant simply repeats previ-\\nously rejected, frivolous arguments or pursues an appeal to\\nharass their adversary. Arnold v. Villarreal, 853 F.3d 384, 389\\n(7th Cir. 2017).\\n Nora’s arguments almost entirely regurgitate points she\\npressed before the bankruptcy court, which the district court\\nconcluded were frivolous. As we have explained to Nora pre-\\nviously, “Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 when a\\nlitigant or attorney presents appellate arguments with no rea-\\nsonable expectation of success for the purposes of delay, har-\\nassment, or sheer obstinacy.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 665. That\\naptly describes Nora’s present appeals.\\n Not only were Nora’s arguments on the merits frivolous,\\nshe also engaged in meritless and dilatory motion practice be-\\nfore this court. She moved to stay these appeals pending our\\nruling on a frivolous motion to strike that she filed. When we\\ndenied that motion, Nora immediately filed an equally frivo-\\nlous motion to reconsider. Similarly, Nora submitted four\\nseparate “Requests for Judicial Notice,” needlessly clogging\\nthis court’s motion docket. She continued to lodge these re-\\nquests, even after this court issued an opinion detailing why\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 27\\n\\nthey were unnecessary and improper. In re Appeals of Nora, 905\\nF.3d at 497 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n We find Nora’s appeals to have been frivolous and grant\\nHSBC’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. HSBC requested\\n$2,150.00 for attorneys’ fees and $446.00 for costs in its motion.\\nAlthough such figures appear reasonable, HSBC has not sub-\\nmitted an affidavit or other evidentiary record to support\\nthem. See Arnold, 853 F.3d at 389 (directing moving party to\\n“submit an affidavit and supporting papers specifying the\\ndamages” incurred); Flip Side Prod., Inc. v. Jam Prod., Ltd., 843\\nF.2d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring party seeking sanc-\\ntions to submit a “verified, itemized statement” of its dam-\\nages and costs). So, we direct HSBC to provide an accounting\\nof their costs and attorneys’ fees within 15 days.\\n For numerous reasons, including her failure to present “a\\nseparately filed motion” in compliance with FED. R. APP. P. 38,\\nwe deny Nora’s request for attorneys’ fees.\\n Finally, we must revisit our previous sanctions against\\nNora. Due to “frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings”\\nby Nora in an appeal back in 2015, we fined her $2,500 but\\nsuspended the sanction “until the time, if ever, that Nora sub-\\nmits further inappropriate filings.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 667.\\nGiven Nora’s frivolous filings in these appeals, we lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Lawyers must represent their clients’ interests responsi-\\nbly, not only zealously. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter., Inc., 886\\nF.2d 1485, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). Part of being a responsible\\ncounselor to one’s client is recognizing when the legal battle\\nis lost and advising the client how to best handle that\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\noutcome. Frivolous legal arguments, intentionally dilatory\\ntactics, and unprofessional antagonism toward opposing\\ncounsel benefits no one and improperly burdens federal\\ncourts. Nora’s conduct has crossed the boundaries of accepta-\\nble conduct for attorneys in this circuit.\\n For these reasons, we order as follows:\\n 1) On appeal number 18-1866, the district court’s March\\n22, 2018 order holding Steven Lisse and Wendy Alison Nora\\njointly and severally liable for $1,837.50 is AFFIRMED;\\n 2) On appeal number 18-1889, the district court’s March\\n20, 2018 and April 13, 2018 orders suspending Wendy Alison\\nNora’s ability to practice in the Bankruptcy and District\\nCourts for the Western District of Wisconsin (and staying an\\nadditional $2,500 fine) are AFFIRMED;\\n 3) HSBC’s motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38 is GRANTED, and HSBC is directed to provide an\\naccounting of its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in these\\nappeals within 15 days;\\n 4) Nora’s “Request for Appellant’s Attorneys Fees and\\nCosts of Defending against the Motion for Sanctions” is\\nDENIED; and\\n 5) We lift the suspension of the monetary sanction im-\\nposed in appeal number 13-2676 and order Nora to tender a\\ncheck payable to the clerk of this court for $2,500 within 60\\ndays of the date of this opinion.\\n The district court’s decisions are AFFIRMED WITH\\nSANCTIONS.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383070/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Cir cuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Cir cuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605817/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\nIN THE MATTER OF:\n STEVEN ROBERT LISSE,\n Debtor.\nAPPEALS OF:\n WENDY ALISON NORA\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-617-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir-\ncuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Attorney Wendy Alison Nora ap-\npeals a decision requiring her and her client to pay damages\nand costs related to this bankruptcy litigation, as well as an\norder suspending her from the practice of law in the Western\nDistrict of Wisconsin. These appeals, unfortunately, are not\nNora’s first encounter with attorney discipline. See, e.g., In re\n\f2 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nDisciplinary Action against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990);\nIn re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 495 N.W.2d 99 (Wis.\n1993); In re Rinaldi, 778 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Nora, 778\nF.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\nNora, 909 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2018). While we hope this will be\nher last such encounter, her serial dilatory, vexatious, and un-\nprofessional litigation practices lead us to affirm the district\ncourt’s orders. In addition, Nora’s frivolous motion practice\nand legal arguments in these appeals lead us to lift the sus-\npension of our previous monetary sanction against Nora.\n I. Background\n Proceedings in multiple venues are relevant to these ap-\npeals, including each level of the Wisconsin state court sys-\ntem, two Chapter 13 petitions in federal bankruptcy court,\nand two bankruptcy appeals in the district court. Because the\nprocedural history is pertinent to resolving Nora’s appeals,\nwe detail it below.\n A. Wisconsin Foreclosure Action\n Steven and Sondra Lisse refinanced their home in 2006,\ntaking out a new mortgage and signing a corresponding note.\nThe Lisses fell behind on their payments, and an entity con-\ntrolled by HSBC Bank USA, N.A. filed a foreclosure action in\nDane County Circuit Court in 2010.1\n Four years later, HSBC moved for summary judgment. In\nresponse, the Lisses asked the court for additional discovery\nthat they hoped would demonstrate HSBC could not enforce\n\n 1 The prolix name of the entity is HSBC Bank USA, National Associa-\ntion for the Benefit of Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series\n2006-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates. For simplicity, this\nopinion refers to appellee as HSBC.\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 3\n\nits note. The court denied the Lisses’ request and awarded\nHSBC summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. The Wis-\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. HSBC Bank\nUSA v. Lisse, 877 N.W.2d 650 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016) (un-\npublished table decision).\n B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petitions\n Approximately six weeks after the Wisconsin Court of Ap-\npeals’ affirmance, Steven Lisse (by attorney Nora) filed a\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of Wis-\nconsin. As a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended\nthe Lisses’ deadline to petition for review of the foreclosure\njudgment. Order, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\n(Wis. Apr. 7, 2016).2 The practical effect was to postpone\nHSBC’s foreclosure on the Lisses’ home as long as bankruptcy\nproceedings remained pending in federal court.\n Nora submitted a Chapter 13 plan for Steven Lisse that\nproposed the Lisses would make their monthly mortgage\npayments to Nora’s trust account while the bankruptcy court\nconducted an adversary proceeding to identify the entity en-\ntitled to the money. HSBC objected, noting it already litigated\nits claim to judgment in the Wisconsin courts.\n\n\n\n\n 2 Nora acknowledged the purpose of Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy peti-\ntion was to extend the Lisses’ deadline to appeal in state court: “Mr. Lisse’s\nemergency Petition was necessary to preserve his right to file a Petition\nfor Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the decision of the Wis-\nconsin Court of Appeals entered on March 8, 2016 which denied his Mo-\ntion for Reconsideration.” Motion for Extension of Time to File Schedules\nat ¶5, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-109235-cjf (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Apr.\n3, 2016), ECF No. 9.\n\f4 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n After the bankruptcy court held a confirmation hearing, it\nrejected Nora’s proposed plan and sua sponte dismissed the\ncase without leave to amend. The bankruptcy court con-\ncluded, “[T]his clearly is an opportunity or this plan shows all\nthe earmarks of being an effort to continue a fight, which\ncould be made and was made in the state foreclosure action,\nin the Bankruptcy Court.” Transcript of Final Hearing on\nChapter 13 Plan at 51–52, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-\n10935 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 84. The bank-\nruptcy judge found the plan improper, citing In re Schaitz, 913\nF.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990), “because the purpose for filing the\nplan is not to pay the creditor but to thwart paying the credi-\ntor.” Id. at 52. Nora filed an appeal to the district court on\nbehalf of Steven Lisse, challenging HSBC’s standing, arguing\nHSBC’s note was a forgery, and accusing HSBC’s counsel of\nfraud on the court.\n Five days after the bankruptcy court dismissed Steven\nLisse’s petition, Nora filed a separate Chapter 13 petition on\nbehalf of his wife, Sondra Lisse. This again extended the\nLisses’ deadline in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Order,\nHSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 (Wis. July 28, 2016).\nNora’s proposed Chapter 13 plan for Sondra Lisse was similar\nto the one the bankruptcy court had just rejected in Steven\nLisse’s case. HSBC moved to dismiss the petition for lack of\ngood faith, arguing Nora filed it with the sole intent to delay\nthe final disposition of the Wisconsin foreclosure action.\nHSBC also sought relief from the automatic stay.\n Nora responded by moving for sanctions, claiming\nHSBC’s Rooker-Feldman and preclusion arguments were friv-\nolous and accusing HSBC’s counsel of “completely desecrat-\ning the integrity of these proceedings.” Motion for\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 5\n\nNoncompliance with Discovery at 10, No. 3:16-12556-cjf\n(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2016), ECF No. 59. The bankruptcy\ncourt rejected Nora’s sanctions arguments entirely. In re\nSondra Kay Lisse, 567 B.R. 813, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017)\n(finding “no basis” to grant the motion). It also lifted the au-\ntomatic stay, noting the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment pre-\ncluded Nora’s arguments that HSBC’s note was forged.\n After these procedural rulings, Nora filed three appeals to\nthe district court and moved to voluntarily dismiss Sondra\nLisse’s petition pending resolution of the appeals, which the\ndistrict court granted. With both bankruptcy cases dismissed\n(although on appeal), the Lisses filed their petition for review\nwith the Wisconsin Supreme Court—13 months after the Wis-\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment.\nPetition for Review, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\n(Wis. Mar. 23, 2017).\n C. Bankruptcy Appeals to the District Court\n Nora began Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal by filing a\ndocument accusing HSBC and its counsel (by name) of federal\ncrimes, including bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157.\nNext, she asked the district court to order HSBC to “conven-\ntionally file” its original note with the clerk of court, as evi-\ndence of “criminal misconduct.” Shortly thereafter, Nora\nmoved to stay the deadline for Steven Lisse’s merits brief,\nciting HSBC’s purportedly “ambiguous and contradictory”\nrecord designations. Then, in a motion requesting summary\nreversal, Nora again accused HSBC and its counsel of perpe-\ntrating a fraud on the courts by presenting forged documents.\n Following this initial burst of activity, Steven Lisse’s ap-\npeal lay dormant for almost a year. Finally, on August 23,\n\f6 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n2017, HSBC requested dismissal for failure to prosecute. This\nprompted the district court to set an October 2, 2017 deadline\nfor Nora’s opening brief on the merits.\n Nora filed a motion to stay the appeal ten days later, citing\nthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,\net seq.,3 and a physician’s recommendation that Nora take a\nleave from practicing law. Despite expressing some skepti-\ncism as to Nora’s motives—noting her “history of frivolous\nand dilatory tactics” and efforts to “drag[ ] out the briefing on\nthe merits by satellite skirmishes”—the district court granted\na three-month stay. Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\n3:16-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2017), ECF No. 42. It did,\nhowever, stress that “[n]o further extensions will be granted\nto Attorney Nora absent new, extraordinary circumstances.”\nId. Nora later testified that she continued to practice law for\nother clients in other matters during the three-month stay.4\n The day after the district court stayed Steven Lisse’s bank-\nruptcy appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the\nLisses’ petition to review the foreclosure judgment. HSBC\n\n 3 Nora’s invocation of the ADA is noteworthy, given that she previ-\nously sued a Wisconsin circuit judge in federal court for alleged ADA vi-\nolations in depriving her of medical accommodations by not granting her\ndeadline extensions. Complaint, Nora v. Colas, No. 10-cv-709-bbc (W.D.\nWis. Nov. 15, 2010), ECF No. 1. In its decision suspending Nora’s Wiscon-\nsin law license (discussed later in this opinion), the Wisconsin Supreme\nCourt found that lawsuit “was clearly pursued in an attempt to harass or\nmaliciously injure” the judge. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora,\n909 N.W.2d at 164.\n 4 Nora has previously engaged in similar inconsistent behavior. See,\ne.g., In re Nora, 417 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (7th Cir. 2011) (“At the same time\nthat she told the district judge that she was ‘totally disabled’ from litigat-\ning, Nora was actively litigating in the bankruptcy court.”).\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 7\n\nBank USA v. Lisse, 904 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2017) (un-\npublished table decision). As a result, in December 2017,\nHSBC began moving forward with a foreclosure sale in Dane\nCounty Circuit Court.\n With respect to Sondra Lisse’s appeal, on December 5,\n2017, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rul-\nings. Lisse v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2017\nWL 6021316 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2017). It held that the preclu-\nsive effect of the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment defeated\nNora’s challenges to the note’s authenticity and provided\nHSBC with standing to object to Sondra Lisse’s proposed\nChapter 13 plan. Id. at *7. Also, the district court concluded\nthe “appeal, like the bankruptcy litigation, plainly lacks merit\nand was wastefully presented.” Id. at *8.5 Nora asked the dis-\ntrict court to reconsider, but the district court declined. Lisse\nv. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2018 WL\n840157, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding Nora’s motion\nprovided “no basis … to reconsider its decision”). Sondra\nLisse did not appeal the district court’s rulings to this court.\n After the stay expired in Steven Lisse’s appeal—and on the\neve of Nora’s deadline to file an opening brief—the Lisses re-\nturned to Dane County Circuit Court to file a flurry of mo-\ntions seeking to postpone the foreclosure sale.6 The day before\n\n 5\n It denied HSBC’s request for damages and costs under FED. R.\nBANKR. P. 8020 because HSBC did not file a separate motion for such relief.\n 6 These motions were filed by another attorney. They included a mo-\ntion to hold HSBC and its counsel in contempt for “falsely represent[ing]”\nthe Lisses’ note to be an original and a sanctions motion against HSBC for\n“fraud on the court.” The state court denied the Lisses’ motions and con-\nfirmed the foreclosure sale. The Lisses appealed, and the case remains\npending. HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2018AP000557 (Wis. Ct. App.).\n\f8 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nher opening brief was due, Nora moved for another stay\npending resolution of her clients’ state-court motions. The\ndistrict court denied Nora’s eleventh-hour request, finding\n“the debtor’s sole purpose appears to be to delay an inevitable\nforeclosure through every legal artifice available both in state\nand federal court.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\n3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 46.\nCharacterizing Nora’s litigation maneuvers as “plainly\nseek[ing] to continue to postpone [the state-court foreclosure\naction] through collateral, tag-team attacks in federal court\nbrought separately by husband and wife,” the district court\nstated it would “no longer be complicit in these transparent\nefforts.” Id. at 2. It refused to stay Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy\nappeal further.\n The following day, instead of filing an opening brief, Nora\nmoved to voluntarily dismiss Steven Lisse’s appeal—more\nthan 16 months after she filed it.\n D. Sanctions in the District Court\n The district court dismissed Steven Lisse’s appeal, but it\ndid not stop there. Due to her “pattern of sharp practice,” the\ndistrict court ordered Nora to show cause “why she should\nnot be sanctioned for her frivolous, or at best vexatious, ap-\npeal.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc\n(W.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 49. A week later, Nora\nasked the district court to vacate its show cause order, alleg-\ning that the order violated due process and that the district\ncourt had pre-judged the merits of imposing sanctions. The\ndistrict court scheduled an evidentiary hearing before a three-\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 9\n\njudge panel consisting of Chief District Judge Peterson, Dis-\ntrict Judge Conley, and Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay.7\n Nora, now represented by her own counsel, filed an an-\nswer seeking to “quash” the show cause order, alleging a lack\nof notice of the “charges” against her, objecting to Judge\nConley’s participation at the hearing, and challenging the\nconstitutional authority of Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay to\nparticipate. The district court provided Nora with a 13-page\n“supplemental notice” identifying the bases for the order to\nshow cause. Nora’s lawyer followed up with a “rejoinder,”\nobjecting to the lack of separate “counts” and arguing the\ncourt could not conduct its own attorney discipline proceed-\nings.\n The district court held a 90-minute hearing on the show\ncause order and issued its opinion on March 20, 2018. It\ngrouped Nora’s misconduct into three categories: “(1) inap-\npropriately pursuing relief in federal court; (2) dilatory litiga-\ntion conduct, including numerous, last-minute requests for\nlengthy extensions; and (3) filing multiple cases or appeals\nthen failing to consolidate or join them.” Opinion and Order\nat 8, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D.\nWis. Mar. 20, 2018), ECF No. 88. The court decided, “Nora’s\nadvocacy has crossed the line of professional conduct too\nmany times to be tolerated or ignored any longer.” Id. at 11.\nThe district court fined Nora $2,500 and suspended her from\nappearing in new matters in the Western District for six\n\n 7 As the district court noted, it created the three-judge panel “in a\ngood-faith attempt to bend over backwards to accommodate and assuage\nNora’s concerns about a lack of impartiality.” Opinion and Order at 6 n.3,\nLisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2018),\nECF No. 88.\n\f10 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nmonths, although it stayed those sanctions if and until Nora\nsubmitted another improper filing. Id.\n Meanwhile, HSBC had filed a motion for $3,675 in costs\nand attorneys’ fees under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28\nU.S.C. § 1927. Classifying the appeal as “frivolous,” the dis-\ntrict court held Steven Lisse and Nora “jointly and severally\nliable for $1,837.50.” Opinion and Order at 4, 8, Lisse v. HSBC\nBank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2018),\nECF No. 89. This monetary sanction was in addition to the\nsuspended fine discussed above.\n About a week later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued\na decision in disciplinary proceedings against Nora—for con-\nduct not connected with this litigation—revoking her law li-\ncense for at least one year. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\nNora, 909 N.W.2d at 167. On April 13, 2018, pursuant to W.D.\nWis. LR 83.5, the district court suspended Nora from practice\nin the Western District until her Wisconsin law license was re-\nstored.\n E. Appeals in this Court\n Nora now appeals the district court’s decisions in her in-\ndividual capacity.8 Her opening brief was due on July 30,\n\n\n\n\n 8Nora, as an attorney sanctioned for professional misconduct, pos-\nsesses standing to appeal the district court’s decisions in her own name.\nMartinez v. City of Chicago, 823 F.3d 1050, 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 2016).\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 11\n\n2018, but on that date, in violation of Circuit Rule 26,9 Nora\ninstead filed a motion asking for a sixty-day extension. We\npushed the deadline back to September 14, 2018, but when\nthat date arrived, Nora again filed a noncompliant extension\nmotion.10 Although we again extended Nora’s deadline to\nSeptember 19, 2018, she failed to meet it and filed her opening\nbrief late.\n Nora also repeatedly filed documents styled as “Requests\nfor Judicial Notice,” asking this court to take judicial notice of\nvarious documents filed in other cases (affidavits, deposition\ntranscripts, court orders). After two orders denying Nora’s\nrequests, on Nora’s third attempt Judge Easterbrook (as mo-\ntions judge) published an opinion explaining why the\nrequests were procedurally improper. In re Appeals of Nora,\n905 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The right place to propose\njudicial notice, once a case is in a court of appeals, is in a brief.\n… There’s no need to engage in motions practice, require the\nattention of additional appellate judges, and defer briefing.”).\n When HSBC submitted its response, Nora moved to strike\nportions of its brief and supplemental appendix. Nora argued\nHSBC’s citation of documents from the Wisconsin foreclosure\naction and Sondra Lisse’s bankruptcy case—some of which\n\n 9 The rule requires, in part, that a motion for a deadline extension\n“shall be filed at least seven days before the brief is due, unless it is made\nto appear in the motion that the facts which are the basis of the motion did\nnot exist earlier or were not, or with due diligence could not have been,\nknown earlier to the movant’s counsel.” 7TH CIR. R. 26 (computing and\nextending time).\n 10Nora’s second extension motion asked for three additional days,\nand before the court could rule on it, she filed a third motion asking for\ntwo more days.\n\f12 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nhad been filed by Nora as exhibits in Steven Lisse’s bank-\nruptcy appeal—made it “unreasonably difficult, if not impos-\nsible,” for her to file a timely reply. Nora also asked this court\nto stay the appeal until we ruled on her motions to strike. The\ncourt denied Nora’s motions as “frivolous,” sanctioning her\nby docking 2,000 words from the limit for her reply. Although\nour order stated—in no uncertain terms—that “no motion for\nfurther time (or additional words) will be entertained,” the\nnext day Nora filed a motion for reconsideration asking the\ncourt “to restore her full word count limitation … and to al-\nlow [Nora] sufficient time to file her Reply Brief … .” Motion\nfor Reconsideration of November 20, 2018 Procedural Order\nat 11. We denied that motion too.\n After the completion of merits briefing, HSBC moved for\ndamages and costs under FED. R. APP. P. 38, arguing Nora’s\nappeals are frivolous. We ordered Nora to respond to the mo-\ntion, and she (not to be outdone) requested sanctions against\nHSBC. Finally, failing to heed this court’s earlier directives,\nNora filed yet another request for judicial notice, which this\ncourt denied again.\n II. Discussion\n Nora appeals two separate rulings by the district court,\nalthough her briefs meld them together. First, Nora chal-\nlenges the district court’s March 22, 2018 sanctions order\nholding her and Steven Lisse jointly and severally liable to\nHSBC for $1,837.50 under FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1927. Second, Nora appeals the April 13, 2018 order sus-\npending her from practice in the Western District of\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 13\n\nWisconsin.11 Although Nora purports to identify ten issues on\nappeal, each is a variation on the central theme that she\nshould have been permitted to relitigate the authenticity of\nHSBC’s note in federal court. In addition, we must resolve\nHSBC’s appellate motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\nAPP. P. 38.\n A. March 22, 2018 Sanctions Order\n A district court may “award just damages and single or\ndouble costs” if it determines a bankruptcy appeal is frivo-\nlous. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020(a); see also Hill v. Norfolk & Western\nRy. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing power\nto sanction attorneys in addition to parties).12 An appeal is\nfrivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appellant’s\nargument is wholly without merit.” Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst.,\n732 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Spiegel v. Cont’l Ill.\nNat’l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 1986)).\n Likewise, a court may hold an attorney personally liable\nfor “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably in-\ncurred because of” her unreasonable and vexatious litigation\nconduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review a district court’s sanc-\ntions order for abuse of discretion. In re Busson-Sokolik, 635\n\n 11The district court’s April 13, 2018 order incorporates its March 20,\n2018 disciplinary order, specifying the earlier order will remain in force\nshould Nora be reinstated to practice in the Western District.\n 12 The advisory committee notes to FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 make clear\nthat district courts possess the same authority to sanction frivolous bank-\nruptcy appeals that FED. R. APP. P. 38 provides to this court. FED. R. BANKR.\nP. 8020 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“[T]his rule recog-\nnizes that the authority to award damages and costs in connection with\nfrivolous appeals is the same for district courts sitting as appellate courts,\nbankruptcy appellate panels, and courts of appeals.”).\n\f14 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nF.3d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing FED. R. BANKR. P.\n8020); Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 2018)\n(addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1927).\n Under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927,\nthe district court acted well-within its discretion in imposing\na monetary sanction on Nora.\n 1. Sanctions were appropriate under FED. R. BANKR. P.\n 8020(a) because the bankruptcy appeal was frivolous.\n The bankruptcy court found Nora filed Steven Lisse’s\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition for the improper purpose of\nthwarting the Lisses’ creditors, rather than paying them. That\nconclusion was not clearly erroneous. In re Wiese, 552 F.3d 584,\n588 (7th Cir. 2009) (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion\nwhen its decision is premised on an incorrect legal principle\nor a clearly erroneous factual finding).\n Unlike a Chapter 7 petition, which focuses on liquidating\nthe debtor’s assets to satisfy his creditors, Chapter 13 allows a\ndebtor to voluntarily propose a plan to reorganize his debts\nfor repayment out of his future income. RICHARD I. AARON,\nBANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 777 (2013 ed.) (“The central\nthesis of Chapter 13 is that an individual debtor can dedicate\nfuture income to pay accumulated debts.”); see also 8 COLLIER\nON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.02 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer\neds., 16th ed. 2018). The focus on repayment is highlighted by\nthe requirement that the debtor begin making payments to\nthe trustee within 30 days after proposing a Chapter 13 plan,\neven before the plan is confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The\nbasic premise is to facilitate the debtor’s ability to pay his\ncreditors, not to frustrate the creditors’ rights. In re Schaitz, 913\nF.2d 452, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 15\n\n428 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing Congress’s idealized Chapter\n13 case as one where “the debtor, given time and relief from\nharassment, is able to pay all or most of his debts”).\n A bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 petition for\ncause if it finds the petition was filed in bad faith. 11 U.S.C.\n§ 1307(c); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992);\n8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04[10]; see also 11 U.S.C.\n§ 1325(a)(3) (requiring a plan to have been proposed in good\nfaith as a condition of confirmation). Given bankruptcy’s his-\ntorical roots as an equitable remedy, “the good faith standard\nprevents debtors from manipulating the Code for wrongful\npurposes.” In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359. Whether a debtor filed\nhis petition in good faith is a factual finding to be reversed\nonly when the bankruptcy court’s determination, based on\nthe totality of the circumstances, is clearly erroneous. In re\nSmith, 286 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2002).\n Using a Chapter 13 petition to stave off an impending\nhome foreclosure sale is not necessarily improper. Although\nChapter 13 generally prohibits a plan from modifying mort-\ngage lenders’ underlying rights, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), it\nexpressly allows a debtor to cure defaults with respect to his\nprincipal residence “until such residence is sold at a foreclo-\nsure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable non-\nbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1); see also 8 COLLIER ON\nBANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a]; id. at § 1322.16. A debtor, thus,\nmay use a proper Chapter 13 petition to cure past defaults on\nhis mortgage through regular payments to the lender, pre-\nventing the foreclosure sale. See Nobelman v. American Savings\nBank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993).\n But this is not what Nora proposed for the Lisses. As the\nbankruptcy court recognized, the object of Nora’s plan was\n\f16 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nnot to pay the Lisses’ creditors in an orderly fashion but, in-\nstead, to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment. Nora sug-\ngested directing the Lisses’ mortgage payments to her trust\naccount (not to the Chapter 13 trustee) “during the pendency\n[of an] adversary proceeding to be commenced, in part, for\nthe determination of the identity of the real party in interest\nentitled to the payment or proceeds … .” Such an effort to\nrelitigate a creditor’s rights—already established in state-\ncourt proceedings—is an improper, bad faith use of a Chapter\n13 petition. See In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359 (“[F]iling a Chapter\n13 petition in order to thwart the payment of an otherwise\nnondischargeable income tax debt … was not one of the in-\ntended purposes of the bankruptcy provisions. … [T]he bank-\nruptcy court’s finding of lack of good faith is not clearly erro-\nneous.”).\n In the district court, Nora never presented any argument\nabout why the bankruptcy court’s good-faith determination\nwas clearly erroneous. Indeed, Nora never even filed a brief\non the merits of the appeal, despite the fact it was pending in\nthe district court for 16 months. Cf. Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d\n754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n appellate brief that does not\neven try to engage the reasons the appellant lost has no pro-\nspect of success.”).\n Nora now resurrects the argument that HSBC’s note is a\nforgery, so the appeal to the district court was not frivolous.\nThis only confirms the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that\nNora intended to use the proceedings to thwart HSBC, rather\nthan to cure the Lisses’ mortgage defaults or otherwise satisfy\nHSBC’s claim. Many court decisions have previously in-\nformed Nora that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal\ncourts are bound by state-court resolutions of debtors’\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 17\n\ndefenses to mortgage foreclosure. See, e.g., Nora v. Residential\nFunding Co., 543 Fed. App’x 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2013) (“By alleg-\ning that the fraudulent assignment to Residential Funding al-\nlowed it to succeed in foreclosing on her property in state\ncourt, Nora is impermissibly asking a federal district court to\nreview and reject the state court’s judgment of foreclosure of\nher property.”); Spencer v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 246\nF. Supp. 3d 1241, 1245 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (“As previously ex-\nplained to [Nora], the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives fed-\neral courts of jurisdiction to review a state court decision.”);\nSpencer v. PNC Bank, No. 14-cv-422-wmc, 2015 WL 1520912, at\n*4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2015) (noting Nora could challenge the\nvalidity of endorsements and notes in state court but that\n“those arguments do not undermine [the creditor’s] standing\nin the bankruptcy proceeding”); Schmid v. Bank of America, 498\nB.R. 221, 224–25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“The Rooker-Feldman\ndoctrine applies to plaintiff’s fraud claim because plaintiff’s\nalleged injury is the state court foreclosure judgment that de-\nfendant Bank of America is now asserting … Many other\ncourts have concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a\nlitigant from challenging a foreclosure judgment in a subse-\nquent case.”).\n Throughout the federal proceedings, Nora has repeatedly\nattacked HSBC’s “standing” to oppose Steven Lisse’s Chapter\n13 plan on the theory that HSBC’s note is a forgery. She simi-\nlarly contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction\nher due to this alleged Article III defect. Nora is wrong on\nboth counts. The Wisconsin foreclosure judgment established\nHSBC as the Lisses’ judgment creditor. It is the foreclosure\njudgment, not the note, that gives HSBC standing at this point\nto object to Steven Lisse’s Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1324(a)\n(providing that any “party in interest may object to\n\f18 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nconfirmation of the plan”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (defining a\n“creditor” to be a “party in interest” for purposes of Chapter\n11); In re Rimgale, 669 F.3d at 428 (explaining that Congress\nadopted § 1324 to allow “for creditors to be heard” while giv-\ning the bankruptcy judge sole authority to confirm or reject a\nplan). This makes the authenticity of HSBC’s note irrelevant\nto the analysis in federal court. Even if the note is a forgery,\nuntil the Lisses obtain a vacatur of the foreclosure judgment,\nHSBC’s standing as a judgment creditor is unassailable.\n Nora manages to flag one potentially legitimate basis to\nchallenge the bankruptcy court’s decision: that the court de-\ncided sua sponte to not only deny confirmation but to dismiss\nthe petition without leave to amend the plan. Compare In re\nTerry, 630 F.2d 634, 636 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (“As we read § 1307,\na court cannot order dismissal or conversion on its own mo-\ntion.”), with In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993)\n(holding sua sponte dismissal appropriate under 11 U.S.C.\n§ 105(a)); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04 (sug-\ngesting § 105(a) “presumably would give the court the power\nto dismiss a case sua sponte”). Yet Nora never briefed that ar-\ngument for the district court. See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones\nLang LaSalle Am., Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting\narguments not raised below are forfeited). And she fails to ad-\nequately do so here, simply quoting a transcript without cit-\ning any relevant legal authorities on the topic. See M.G.\nSkinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency v. Norman-Spencer Agency, 845\nF.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped\narguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by le-\ngal authority.”). The inclusion of one plausible argument—\namidst a plethora of frivolous arguments—will not insulate\nan appellant from sanctions. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1200 (holding\nsanctions may be imposed where most of the appellant’s\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 19\n\narguments are frivolous, even if not all of them can be classi-\nfied that way).\n Nora’s attempt to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment\nin bankruptcy court was frivolous. Nora’s repeated fraud ac-\ncusations do not change the calculus. Mains v. CitiBank, 852\nF.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding Rooker-Feldman prohibits\nfederal courts from reviewing whether a lender procured a\nstate-court foreclosure judgment through fraud). If Nora be-\nlieved she possessed new evidence of fraud, Wisconsin’s state\ncourts were the appropriate venue to raise such arguments.\nWIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(c) (authorizing motions to reopen judg-\nments due to the “[f]raud, misrepresentation, or other mis-\nconduct of an adverse party”); see also Taylor v. Federal Nat’l\nMortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming dis-\ntrict court’s decision to remand a fraud-on-the-court claim to\nstate court on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Aside from delay,\nthere was no reason for Nora to file a federal bankruptcy case\nrather than seek relief in state court. See Mains, 852 F.3d at 676\n(“The state’s courts are quite capable of protecting their own\nintegrity.”). Federal courts do not exist to provide disap-\npointed state-court losers a second bite at the apple.13\n\n\n\n\n 13 At oral argument, Nora’s counsel contended Judge Conley misun-\nderstood Chapter 13 bankruptcy law, citing his passing reference to Ste-\nven Lisse’s bankruptcy petition as an “appeal” of the Wisconsin foreclo-\nsure judgment. But, read in context, Judge Conley’s statement was noting\nthat Nora’s arguments were only appropriate in a state-court appeal (such\nthat Nora was, as a practical matter, attempting to bring an improper “ap-\npeal” in federal court). Judge Conley’s thorough and careful opinions in\nthis case dispel any concerns of the type Nora’s counsel postulates.\n\f20 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n 2. Nora’s litigation tactics warranted sanctions under 28\n U.S.C. § 1927.\n Courts may also impose sanctions against a lawyer who\n“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and\nvexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A lawyer’s subjective bad faith\nis a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for § 1927 sanc-\ntions; objective bad faith is enough. Hunt v. Moore Bros., Inc.,\n861 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2017). Attorneys demonstrate objec-\ntive bad faith when they pursue “a path that a reasonably\ncareful attorney would have known, after appropriate in-\nquiry, to be unsound.” Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Boyer v.\nBSNF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016)). Because trial\njudges are best positioned to detect bad faith litigation con-\nduct, they possess broad discretion in exercising the § 1927\npower. Id.\n Nora’s stall tactics are blatant when one looks back at how\nthis litigation unfolded. Although Nora denies intentionally\ndelaying proceedings, the record before us belies her position.\nNora herself openly acknowledged the purpose of Steven\nLisse’s bankruptcy petition was to extend the deadline to pe-\ntition the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And, as Nora now boasts\nin her brief, her strategy worked:\n The March 22, 2018 Order [by the district court]\n concludes that attorneys’ fees should be\n awarded based on “dilatory conduct” whereby\n the Lisses have maintained possession of their\n home for six (6) years. Actually, the Lisses have\n remained in possession of their home for over\n eight (8) years since the fraudulent foreclosure\n began and they are still in possession of their\n home, contrary to Judge Peterson’s conclusion\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 21\n\n that the foreclosure of the Lisses’ home is “inev-\n itable.”\nAppellant’s Response to Motion for Sanctions at 16–17,\nECF No. 24.\n Using the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as a litiga-\ntion ploy to drag out foreclosure proceedings in another juris-\ndiction constitutes objective bad faith. See Hilgeford v. The\nPeoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Our review of\nthe briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious\nlitigation. … We can think of no other reason for this [mort-\ngagor’s] appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obsti-\nnancy.”).\n The conclusion of intentional delay is supported, not only\nby the obvious motive, but also by the lack of any substantive\nmerit to the Chapter 13 proceedings. As discussed above, the\nplan Nora filed on behalf of Steven Lisse (and then again for\nSondra Lisse) improperly attempted to use an adversarial\nproceeding to relitigate the merits of a foreclosure judgment\nHSBC had already obtained in Wisconsin state court (with\nHSBC receiving no payments in the interim). Any reasonably\ncareful attorney—let alone an attorney with Nora’s familiarity\nwith bankruptcy court—would have known that this type of\nconduct would not be tolerated. Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082; cf. Carr\nv. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the suit\nis not frivolous, or at least not utterly so, it is so lacking in\nmerit … that its pursuit by the plaintiff indicates a motive to\nharass.”).\n Nora then compounded the delays caused by these merit-\nless bankruptcy petitions by filing numerous, last-minute mo-\ntions for lengthy stays or deadline extensions. For example, in\n\f22 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nSteven Lisse’s appeal in the district court, Nora filed three mo-\ntions to stay the proceedings. This strategy produced a\n16-month delay before the district court refused any further\nextensions, at which point Nora moved to voluntarily dismiss\nthe appeal without filing an opening brief. Such litigation be-\nhavior—even if one assumes pure motives—constitutes objec-\ntive bad faith warranting sanctions under § 1927. The district\ncourt did not abuse its discretion.\n B. Nora’s Suspension from Law Practice\n In addition to awarding HSBC damages and costs against\nboth Nora and Steven Lisse as a monetary sanction, two dis-\ntrict court orders imposed professional discipline on Nora.\nFirst, on March 20, 2018, the district court fined Nora $2,500\nand suspended her right to practice in the Western District for\nsix months, although it stayed the penalties until Nora com-\nmitted another violation.\n Ten days later, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court\nsuspended Nora’s law license for one year. In re Disciplinary\nProceedings against Nora, 909 N.W.2d at 167–68. As a result, on\nApril 13, 2018, the district court issued another order sus-\npending Nora’s right to practice based on W.D. Wis. LR\n83.5(E). That local rule automatically imposes reciprocal dis-\ncipline when another jurisdiction does so, although it permits\nthe attorney to apply “for modification or vacation of the [dis-\ntrict court’s] discipline.”\n Although Nora appeals the district court’s April 13, 2018\ndisciplinary order separately from its March 22, 2018 order\nawarding HSBC its damages and costs under FED. R. BANKR.\nP. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, she does not develop an inde-\npendent argument for reversing it. To be clear, Nora is\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 23\n\ncurrently prohibited from practice in the Western District as\nreciprocal discipline based on her disbarment by the Wiscon-\nsin Supreme Court, not due to her conduct in this litigation.14\nNora does not provide a reason to reverse that discipline.\n District courts are permitted to rely on state-court discipli-\nnary proceedings to suspend attorneys practicing before\nthem. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917). And this case\nshows why a local rule making reciprocal discipline auto-\nmatic (while also providing a process for attorneys to chal-\nlenge that federal discipline) makes sense. Such rules align the\nprocedure with the relevant legal presumptions. Separate fed-\neral hearings are not required. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486\n(7th Cir. 1995). Federal courts give “great weight” to state-\ncourt disciplinary findings. In re Jafree, 759 F.2d 604, 608 (7th\nCir. 1985). The attorney bears the burden to identify either a\ndue process violation, insufficient fact findings, or “some\nother grave reason” why the state-court’s ruling is not entitled\nto the federal court’s respect. Selling 243 U.S. at 51. Placing the\nonus on the attorney to raise such issues in a motion to modify\nor vacate discipline minimizes the amount of resources di-\nverted to (essentially) collateral attacks on state-court pro-\nceedings. See In re Wick, 628 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2010).15\n\n\n 14 The district court’s April 13, 2018 order, however, does state that its\n\nMarch 20, 2018 disciplinary order (holding sanctions for Nora’s conduct\nin this litigation in abeyance until further misconduct) will remain in effect\nshould Nora be reinstated.\n 15 This court’s rules take a similar procedural approach. 7TH CIR. R.\n46(d). Based on the suspension of Nora’s Wisconsin law license in 2018,\nthis court ordered Nora removed from its roll of attorneys after she failed\nto demonstrate why this court should not do so. Order, In re Nora, No.\nD-18-07 (7th Cir. May 23, 2018).\n\f24 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\n Even setting aside the discipline imposed by the Wiscon-\nsin Supreme Court, Nora’s litigation activity in federal court\nwarrants a suspension itself. Federal courts’ inherent author-\nity to disbar or suspend lawyers for misconduct is longstand-\ning and well established. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985);\nsee also Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824) (Marshall, J.)\n(holding the power to suspend attorneys is “incidental to all\nCourts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and\nfor the respectability of the profession”).\n Again, Nora used tag-team Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings\nby a husband and wife—each lacking a good faith basis—to\npostpone the orderly resolution of state-court proceedings.\nNora’s behavior in this litigation unfortunately is not an aber-\nration for her. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650,\n654-55 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, this appeal is frivolous, and\nwe are troubled by Nora’s conduct in this litigation. … [W]e\nsuspect that the removal was part of a strategy designed to\ngum up the progress of the case.”); Spencer v. Federal Home\nLoan Mortg. Corp., No. 15-cv-332-wmc, 2015 WL 4509159, at *1\n(W.D. Wis. July 24, 2015) (stating that Nora’s appeals ap-\npeared “motivated by the goal to further delay a warranted\nstate court foreclosure.”). Courts have sanctioned Nora for\nthis conduct before, but apparently she has not received the\nmessage that it will not be tolerated.\n Not only are Nora’s litigation tactics inappropriate, her\ntreatment of opposing counsel and judicial officers is censura-\nble. In the district court, Nora accused HSBC’s counsel (by\nname) of committing “uncontroverted fraud on the Court,” as\nwell as multiple federal crimes, by presenting HSBC’s claim.\nShe repeats similar attacks in these appeals. See, e.g., Appel-\nlants Br. at 47. This behavior is, again, not new for Nora. PNC\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 25\n\nBank, 763 F.3d at 655 (“Nora has accused the state court judge\nand court reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts,\nthe district court judge of pursuing ‘a campaign of libel\nagainst her,’ and opposing counsel of engaging in ‘actionable\ncivil fraud and racketeering that may constitute state and fed-\neral criminal misconduct.’”); Nora v. Furay, No. 14-cv-527-jdp,\n2014 WL 4209608, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2014) (“Nora con-\ntends that Judge Furay ‘acted in reckless haste to place false\nfindings on the public record in order to support the falsely\nmade allegations against her former client … to make false\nfindings of fact concerning matters which had never been ad-\njudicated, and to damage Nora’s character and reputation.’”);\nIn re Rinaldi, No. 11-35689-svk, 2017 WL 104749, at *1 (E.D.\nWis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“The conversion of the case to Chapter 13\nclearly changed the context of HSBCʹs entitlement to relief\nfrom stay, but Attorney Nora ignored the conversion and ac-\ncused HSBCʹs attorneys of fraud on the Court.”).\n Flippant, unfounded accusations of misconduct and fraud\nby opposing counsel and court officials demean the profes-\nsion and impair the orderly operation of the judicial system.\nIn re Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487. They also violate the ethical\nstandards for lawyers practicing in this circuit. See 7TH CIR.\nSTANDARDS FOR PROF. CONDUCT, Lawyer’s Duties to Other\nCounsel at ¶4 (“We will not, absent good cause, attribute bad\nmotives or improper conduct to other counsel or bring the\nprofession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impro-\npriety.”). Such behavior warrants punishment.\n Following Nora’s repeated abuse of the judicial process\nthrough frivolous filings and dilatory tactics, her unprofes-\nsional conduct toward opposing counsel, and the suspension\nof her Wisconsin law license, “the district court certainly was\n\f26 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\nentitled to say, ‘enough is enough.’” Salmeron v. Enter.\nRecovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2009). We find no\nfault with the district court’s order suspending Nora from\npractice in the Western District of Wisconsin.\n C. Further Appellate Sanctions\n We must also resolve HSBC’s appellate motion for addi-\ntional sanctions. This court may “award just damages and sin-\ngle or double costs to the appellee” when it deems an appeal\nfrivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Such sanctions are discretionary\nand appropriate where an appellant simply repeats previ-\nously rejected, frivolous arguments or pursues an appeal to\nharass their adversary. Arnold v. Villarreal, 853 F.3d 384, 389\n(7th Cir. 2017).\n Nora’s arguments almost entirely regurgitate points she\npressed before the bankruptcy court, which the district court\nconcluded were frivolous. As we have explained to Nora pre-\nviously, “Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 when a\nlitigant or attorney presents appellate arguments with no rea-\nsonable expectation of success for the purposes of delay, har-\nassment, or sheer obstinacy.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 665. That\naptly describes Nora’s present appeals.\n Not only were Nora’s arguments on the merits frivolous,\nshe also engaged in meritless and dilatory motion practice be-\nfore this court. She moved to stay these appeals pending our\nruling on a frivolous motion to strike that she filed. When we\ndenied that motion, Nora immediately filed an equally frivo-\nlous motion to reconsider. Similarly, Nora submitted four\nseparate “Requests for Judicial Notice,” needlessly clogging\nthis court’s motion docket. She continued to lodge these re-\nquests, even after this court issued an opinion detailing why\n\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 27\n\nthey were unnecessary and improper. In re Appeals of Nora, 905\nF.3d at 497 (7th Cir. 2018).\n We find Nora’s appeals to have been frivolous and grant\nHSBC’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. HSBC requested\n$2,150.00 for attorneys’ fees and $446.00 for costs in its motion.\nAlthough such figures appear reasonable, HSBC has not sub-\nmitted an affidavit or other evidentiary record to support\nthem. See Arnold, 853 F.3d at 389 (directing moving party to\n“submit an affidavit and supporting papers specifying the\ndamages” incurred); Flip Side Prod., Inc. v. Jam Prod., Ltd., 843\nF.2d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring party seeking sanc-\ntions to submit a “verified, itemized statement” of its dam-\nages and costs). So, we direct HSBC to provide an accounting\nof their costs and attorneys’ fees within 15 days.\n For numerous reasons, including her failure to present “a\nseparately filed motion” in compliance with FED. R. APP. P. 38,\nwe deny Nora’s request for attorneys’ fees.\n Finally, we must revisit our previous sanctions against\nNora. Due to “frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings”\nby Nora in an appeal back in 2015, we fined her $2,500 but\nsuspended the sanction “until the time, if ever, that Nora sub-\nmits further inappropriate filings.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 667.\nGiven Nora’s frivolous filings in these appeals, we lift the sus-\npension of our previous monetary sanction.\n III. Conclusion\n Lawyers must represent their clients’ interests responsi-\nbly, not only zealously. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter., Inc., 886\nF.2d 1485, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). Part of being a responsible\ncounselor to one’s client is recognizing when the legal battle\nis lost and advising the client how to best handle that\n\f28 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\n\noutcome. Frivolous legal arguments, intentionally dilatory\ntactics, and unprofessional antagonism toward opposing\ncounsel benefits no one and improperly burdens federal\ncourts. Nora’s conduct has crossed the boundaries of accepta-\nble conduct for attorneys in this circuit.\n For these reasons, we order as follows:\n 1) On appeal number 18-1866, the district court’s March\n22, 2018 order holding Steven Lisse and Wendy Alison Nora\njointly and severally liable for $1,837.50 is AFFIRMED;\n 2) On appeal number 18-1889, the district court’s March\n20, 2018 and April 13, 2018 orders suspending Wendy Alison\nNora’s ability to practice in the Bankruptcy and District\nCourts for the Western District of Wisconsin (and staying an\nadditional $2,500 fine) are AFFIRMED;\n 3) HSBC’s motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\nAPP. P. 38 is GRANTED, and HSBC is directed to provide an\naccounting of its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in these\nappeals within 15 days;\n 4) Nora’s “Request for Appellant’s Attorneys Fees and\nCosts of Defending against the Motion for Sanctions” is\nDENIED; and\n 5) We lift the suspension of the monetary sanction im-\nposed in appeal number 13-2676 and order Nora to tender a\ncheck payable to the clerk of this court for $2,500 within 60\ndays of the date of this opinion.\n The district court’s decisions are AFFIRMED WITH\nSANCTIONS.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\nIN THE MATTER OF:\\n STEVEN ROBERT LISSE,\\n Debtor.\\nAPPEALS OF:\\n WENDY ALISON NORA\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-617-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir-\\ncuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Attorney Wendy Alison Nora ap-\\npeals a decision requiring her and her client to pay damages\\nand costs related to this bankruptcy litigation, as well as an\\norder suspending her from the practice of law in the Western\\nDistrict of Wisconsin. These appeals, unfortunately, are not\\nNora’s first encounter with attorney discipline. See, e.g., In re\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nDisciplinary Action against Nora, 450 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990);\\nIn re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora, 495 N.W.2d 99 (Wis.\\n1993); In re Rinaldi, 778 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Nora, 778\\nF.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2018). While we hope this will be\\nher last such encounter, her serial dilatory, vexatious, and un-\\nprofessional litigation practices lead us to affirm the district\\ncourt’s orders. In addition, Nora’s frivolous motion practice\\nand legal arguments in these appeals lead us to lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction against Nora.\\n I. Background\\n Proceedings in multiple venues are relevant to these ap-\\npeals, including each level of the Wisconsin state court sys-\\ntem, two Chapter 13 petitions in federal bankruptcy court,\\nand two bankruptcy appeals in the district court. Because the\\nprocedural history is pertinent to resolving Nora’s appeals,\\nwe detail it below.\\n A. Wisconsin Foreclosure Action\\n Steven and Sondra Lisse refinanced their home in 2006,\\ntaking out a new mortgage and signing a corresponding note.\\nThe Lisses fell behind on their payments, and an entity con-\\ntrolled by HSBC Bank USA, N.A. filed a foreclosure action in\\nDane County Circuit Court in 2010.1\\n Four years later, HSBC moved for summary judgment. In\\nresponse, the Lisses asked the court for additional discovery\\nthat they hoped would demonstrate HSBC could not enforce\\n\\n 1 The prolix name of the entity is HSBC Bank USA, National Associa-\\ntion for the Benefit of Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series\\n2006-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates. For simplicity, this\\nopinion refers to appellee as HSBC.\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 3\\n\\nits note. The court denied the Lisses’ request and awarded\\nHSBC summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. The Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. HSBC Bank\\nUSA v. Lisse, 877 N.W.2d 650 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016) (un-\\npublished table decision).\\n B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petitions\\n Approximately six weeks after the Wisconsin Court of Ap-\\npeals’ affirmance, Steven Lisse (by attorney Nora) filed a\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of Wis-\\nconsin. As a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended\\nthe Lisses’ deadline to petition for review of the foreclosure\\njudgment. Order, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Apr. 7, 2016).2 The practical effect was to postpone\\nHSBC’s foreclosure on the Lisses’ home as long as bankruptcy\\nproceedings remained pending in federal court.\\n Nora submitted a Chapter 13 plan for Steven Lisse that\\nproposed the Lisses would make their monthly mortgage\\npayments to Nora’s trust account while the bankruptcy court\\nconducted an adversary proceeding to identify the entity en-\\ntitled to the money. HSBC objected, noting it already litigated\\nits claim to judgment in the Wisconsin courts.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Nora acknowledged the purpose of Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy peti-\\ntion was to extend the Lisses’ deadline to appeal in state court: “Mr. Lisse’s\\nemergency Petition was necessary to preserve his right to file a Petition\\nfor Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the decision of the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals entered on March 8, 2016 which denied his Mo-\\ntion for Reconsideration.” Motion for Extension of Time to File Schedules\\nat ¶5, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-109235-cjf (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Apr.\\n3, 2016), ECF No. 9.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n After the bankruptcy court held a confirmation hearing, it\\nrejected Nora’s proposed plan and sua sponte dismissed the\\ncase without leave to amend. The bankruptcy court con-\\ncluded, “[T]his clearly is an opportunity or this plan shows all\\nthe earmarks of being an effort to continue a fight, which\\ncould be made and was made in the state foreclosure action,\\nin the Bankruptcy Court.” Transcript of Final Hearing on\\nChapter 13 Plan at 51–52, In re Steven Robert Lisse, No. 3:16-\\n10935 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 84. The bank-\\nruptcy judge found the plan improper, citing In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990), “because the purpose for filing the\\nplan is not to pay the creditor but to thwart paying the credi-\\ntor.” Id. at 52. Nora filed an appeal to the district court on\\nbehalf of Steven Lisse, challenging HSBC’s standing, arguing\\nHSBC’s note was a forgery, and accusing HSBC’s counsel of\\nfraud on the court.\\n Five days after the bankruptcy court dismissed Steven\\nLisse’s petition, Nora filed a separate Chapter 13 petition on\\nbehalf of his wife, Sondra Lisse. This again extended the\\nLisses’ deadline in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Order,\\nHSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273 (Wis. July 28, 2016).\\nNora’s proposed Chapter 13 plan for Sondra Lisse was similar\\nto the one the bankruptcy court had just rejected in Steven\\nLisse’s case. HSBC moved to dismiss the petition for lack of\\ngood faith, arguing Nora filed it with the sole intent to delay\\nthe final disposition of the Wisconsin foreclosure action.\\nHSBC also sought relief from the automatic stay.\\n Nora responded by moving for sanctions, claiming\\nHSBC’s Rooker-Feldman and preclusion arguments were friv-\\nolous and accusing HSBC’s counsel of “completely desecrat-\\ning the integrity of these proceedings.” Motion for\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 5\\n\\nNoncompliance with Discovery at 10, No. 3:16-12556-cjf\\n(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2016), ECF No. 59. The bankruptcy\\ncourt rejected Nora’s sanctions arguments entirely. In re\\nSondra Kay Lisse, 567 B.R. 813, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017)\\n(finding “no basis” to grant the motion). It also lifted the au-\\ntomatic stay, noting the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment pre-\\ncluded Nora’s arguments that HSBC’s note was forged.\\n After these procedural rulings, Nora filed three appeals to\\nthe district court and moved to voluntarily dismiss Sondra\\nLisse’s petition pending resolution of the appeals, which the\\ndistrict court granted. With both bankruptcy cases dismissed\\n(although on appeal), the Lisses filed their petition for review\\nwith the Wisconsin Supreme Court—13 months after the Wis-\\nconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment.\\nPetition for Review, HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2015AP273\\n(Wis. Mar. 23, 2017).\\n C. Bankruptcy Appeals to the District Court\\n Nora began Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy appeal by filing a\\ndocument accusing HSBC and its counsel (by name) of federal\\ncrimes, including bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157.\\nNext, she asked the district court to order HSBC to “conven-\\ntionally file” its original note with the clerk of court, as evi-\\ndence of “criminal misconduct.” Shortly thereafter, Nora\\nmoved to stay the deadline for Steven Lisse’s merits brief,\\nciting HSBC’s purportedly “ambiguous and contradictory”\\nrecord designations. Then, in a motion requesting summary\\nreversal, Nora again accused HSBC and its counsel of perpe-\\ntrating a fraud on the courts by presenting forged documents.\\n Following this initial burst of activity, Steven Lisse’s ap-\\npeal lay dormant for almost a year. Finally, on August 23,\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n2017, HSBC requested dismissal for failure to prosecute. This\\nprompted the district court to set an October 2, 2017 deadline\\nfor Nora’s opening brief on the merits.\\n Nora filed a motion to stay the appeal ten days later, citing\\nthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,\\net seq.,3 and a physician’s recommendation that Nora take a\\nleave from practicing law. Despite expressing some skepti-\\ncism as to Nora’s motives—noting her “history of frivolous\\nand dilatory tactics” and efforts to “drag[ ] out the briefing on\\nthe merits by satellite skirmishes”—the district court granted\\na three-month stay. Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2017), ECF No. 42. It did,\\nhowever, stress that “[n]o further extensions will be granted\\nto Attorney Nora absent new, extraordinary circumstances.”\\nId. Nora later testified that she continued to practice law for\\nother clients in other matters during the three-month stay.4\\n The day after the district court stayed Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the\\nLisses’ petition to review the foreclosure judgment. HSBC\\n\\n 3 Nora’s invocation of the ADA is noteworthy, given that she previ-\\nously sued a Wisconsin circuit judge in federal court for alleged ADA vi-\\nolations in depriving her of medical accommodations by not granting her\\ndeadline extensions. Complaint, Nora v. Colas, No. 10-cv-709-bbc (W.D.\\nWis. Nov. 15, 2010), ECF No. 1. In its decision suspending Nora’s Wiscon-\\nsin law license (discussed later in this opinion), the Wisconsin Supreme\\nCourt found that lawsuit “was clearly pursued in an attempt to harass or\\nmaliciously injure” the judge. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Nora,\\n909 N.W.2d at 164.\\n 4 Nora has previously engaged in similar inconsistent behavior. See,\\ne.g., In re Nora, 417 Fed. App’x 573, 574 (7th Cir. 2011) (“At the same time\\nthat she told the district judge that she was ‘totally disabled’ from litigat-\\ning, Nora was actively litigating in the bankruptcy court.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 7\\n\\nBank USA v. Lisse, 904 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2017) (un-\\npublished table decision). As a result, in December 2017,\\nHSBC began moving forward with a foreclosure sale in Dane\\nCounty Circuit Court.\\n With respect to Sondra Lisse’s appeal, on December 5,\\n2017, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rul-\\nings. Lisse v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2017\\nWL 6021316 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2017). It held that the preclu-\\nsive effect of the Wisconsin foreclosure judgment defeated\\nNora’s challenges to the note’s authenticity and provided\\nHSBC with standing to object to Sondra Lisse’s proposed\\nChapter 13 plan. Id. at *7. Also, the district court concluded\\nthe “appeal, like the bankruptcy litigation, plainly lacks merit\\nand was wastefully presented.” Id. at *8.5 Nora asked the dis-\\ntrict court to reconsider, but the district court declined. Lisse\\nv. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-206-jdp, 2018 WL\\n840157, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018) (finding Nora’s motion\\nprovided “no basis … to reconsider its decision”). Sondra\\nLisse did not appeal the district court’s rulings to this court.\\n After the stay expired in Steven Lisse’s appeal—and on the\\neve of Nora’s deadline to file an opening brief—the Lisses re-\\nturned to Dane County Circuit Court to file a flurry of mo-\\ntions seeking to postpone the foreclosure sale.6 The day before\\n\\n 5\\n It denied HSBC’s request for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nBANKR. P. 8020 because HSBC did not file a separate motion for such relief.\\n 6 These motions were filed by another attorney. They included a mo-\\ntion to hold HSBC and its counsel in contempt for “falsely represent[ing]”\\nthe Lisses’ note to be an original and a sanctions motion against HSBC for\\n“fraud on the court.” The state court denied the Lisses’ motions and con-\\nfirmed the foreclosure sale. The Lisses appealed, and the case remains\\npending. HSBC Bank USA v. Lisse, No. 2018AP000557 (Wis. Ct. App.).\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nher opening brief was due, Nora moved for another stay\\npending resolution of her clients’ state-court motions. The\\ndistrict court denied Nora’s eleventh-hour request, finding\\n“the debtor’s sole purpose appears to be to delay an inevitable\\nforeclosure through every legal artifice available both in state\\nand federal court.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No.\\n3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 46.\\nCharacterizing Nora’s litigation maneuvers as “plainly\\nseek[ing] to continue to postpone [the state-court foreclosure\\naction] through collateral, tag-team attacks in federal court\\nbrought separately by husband and wife,” the district court\\nstated it would “no longer be complicit in these transparent\\nefforts.” Id. at 2. It refused to stay Steven Lisse’s bankruptcy\\nappeal further.\\n The following day, instead of filing an opening brief, Nora\\nmoved to voluntarily dismiss Steven Lisse’s appeal—more\\nthan 16 months after she filed it.\\n D. Sanctions in the District Court\\n The district court dismissed Steven Lisse’s appeal, but it\\ndid not stop there. Due to her “pattern of sharp practice,” the\\ndistrict court ordered Nora to show cause “why she should\\nnot be sanctioned for her frivolous, or at best vexatious, ap-\\npeal.” Order, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc\\n(W.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 49. A week later, Nora\\nasked the district court to vacate its show cause order, alleg-\\ning that the order violated due process and that the district\\ncourt had pre-judged the merits of imposing sanctions. The\\ndistrict court scheduled an evidentiary hearing before a three-\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 9\\n\\njudge panel consisting of Chief District Judge Peterson, Dis-\\ntrict Judge Conley, and Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay.7\\n Nora, now represented by her own counsel, filed an an-\\nswer seeking to “quash” the show cause order, alleging a lack\\nof notice of the “charges” against her, objecting to Judge\\nConley’s participation at the hearing, and challenging the\\nconstitutional authority of Chief Bankruptcy Judge Furay to\\nparticipate. The district court provided Nora with a 13-page\\n“supplemental notice” identifying the bases for the order to\\nshow cause. Nora’s lawyer followed up with a “rejoinder,”\\nobjecting to the lack of separate “counts” and arguing the\\ncourt could not conduct its own attorney discipline proceed-\\nings.\\n The district court held a 90-minute hearing on the show\\ncause order and issued its opinion on March 20, 2018. It\\ngrouped Nora’s misconduct into three categories: “(1) inap-\\npropriately pursuing relief in federal court; (2) dilatory litiga-\\ntion conduct, including numerous, last-minute requests for\\nlengthy extensions; and (3) filing multiple cases or appeals\\nthen failing to consolidate or join them.” Opinion and Order\\nat 8, Lisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D.\\nWis. Mar. 20, 2018), ECF No. 88. The court decided, “Nora’s\\nadvocacy has crossed the line of professional conduct too\\nmany times to be tolerated or ignored any longer.” Id. at 11.\\nThe district court fined Nora $2,500 and suspended her from\\nappearing in new matters in the Western District for six\\n\\n 7 As the district court noted, it created the three-judge panel “in a\\ngood-faith attempt to bend over backwards to accommodate and assuage\\nNora’s concerns about a lack of impartiality.” Opinion and Order at 6 n.3,\\nLisse v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2018),\\nECF No. 88.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nmonths, although it stayed those sanctions if and until Nora\\nsubmitted another improper filing. Id.\\n Meanwhile, HSBC had filed a motion for $3,675 in costs\\nand attorneys’ fees under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28\\nU.S.C. § 1927. Classifying the appeal as “frivolous,” the dis-\\ntrict court held Steven Lisse and Nora “jointly and severally\\nliable for $1,837.50.” Opinion and Order at 4, 8, Lisse v. HSBC\\nBank USA, No. 3:16-cv-00617-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2018),\\nECF No. 89. This monetary sanction was in addition to the\\nsuspended fine discussed above.\\n About a week later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued\\na decision in disciplinary proceedings against Nora—for con-\\nduct not connected with this litigation—revoking her law li-\\ncense for at least one year. In re Disciplinary Proceedings against\\nNora, 909 N.W.2d at 167. On April 13, 2018, pursuant to W.D.\\nWis. LR 83.5, the district court suspended Nora from practice\\nin the Western District until her Wisconsin law license was re-\\nstored.\\n E. Appeals in this Court\\n Nora now appeals the district court’s decisions in her in-\\ndividual capacity.8 Her opening brief was due on July 30,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8Nora, as an attorney sanctioned for professional misconduct, pos-\\nsesses standing to appeal the district court’s decisions in her own name.\\nMartinez v. City of Chicago, 823 F.3d 1050, 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 11\\n\\n2018, but on that date, in violation of Circuit Rule 26,9 Nora\\ninstead filed a motion asking for a sixty-day extension. We\\npushed the deadline back to September 14, 2018, but when\\nthat date arrived, Nora again filed a noncompliant extension\\nmotion.10 Although we again extended Nora’s deadline to\\nSeptember 19, 2018, she failed to meet it and filed her opening\\nbrief late.\\n Nora also repeatedly filed documents styled as “Requests\\nfor Judicial Notice,” asking this court to take judicial notice of\\nvarious documents filed in other cases (affidavits, deposition\\ntranscripts, court orders). After two orders denying Nora’s\\nrequests, on Nora’s third attempt Judge Easterbrook (as mo-\\ntions judge) published an opinion explaining why the\\nrequests were procedurally improper. In re Appeals of Nora,\\n905 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The right place to propose\\njudicial notice, once a case is in a court of appeals, is in a brief.\\n… There’s no need to engage in motions practice, require the\\nattention of additional appellate judges, and defer briefing.”).\\n When HSBC submitted its response, Nora moved to strike\\nportions of its brief and supplemental appendix. Nora argued\\nHSBC’s citation of documents from the Wisconsin foreclosure\\naction and Sondra Lisse’s bankruptcy case—some of which\\n\\n 9 The rule requires, in part, that a motion for a deadline extension\\n“shall be filed at least seven days before the brief is due, unless it is made\\nto appear in the motion that the facts which are the basis of the motion did\\nnot exist earlier or were not, or with due diligence could not have been,\\nknown earlier to the movant’s counsel.” 7TH CIR. R. 26 (computing and\\nextending time).\\n 10Nora’s second extension motion asked for three additional days,\\nand before the court could rule on it, she filed a third motion asking for\\ntwo more days.\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nhad been filed by Nora as exhibits in Steven Lisse’s bank-\\nruptcy appeal—made it “unreasonably difficult, if not impos-\\nsible,” for her to file a timely reply. Nora also asked this court\\nto stay the appeal until we ruled on her motions to strike. The\\ncourt denied Nora’s motions as “frivolous,” sanctioning her\\nby docking 2,000 words from the limit for her reply. Although\\nour order stated—in no uncertain terms—that “no motion for\\nfurther time (or additional words) will be entertained,” the\\nnext day Nora filed a motion for reconsideration asking the\\ncourt “to restore her full word count limitation … and to al-\\nlow [Nora] sufficient time to file her Reply Brief … .” Motion\\nfor Reconsideration of November 20, 2018 Procedural Order\\nat 11. We denied that motion too.\\n After the completion of merits briefing, HSBC moved for\\ndamages and costs under FED. R. APP. P. 38, arguing Nora’s\\nappeals are frivolous. We ordered Nora to respond to the mo-\\ntion, and she (not to be outdone) requested sanctions against\\nHSBC. Finally, failing to heed this court’s earlier directives,\\nNora filed yet another request for judicial notice, which this\\ncourt denied again.\\n II. Discussion\\n Nora appeals two separate rulings by the district court,\\nalthough her briefs meld them together. First, Nora chal-\\nlenges the district court’s March 22, 2018 sanctions order\\nholding her and Steven Lisse jointly and severally liable to\\nHSBC for $1,837.50 under FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927. Second, Nora appeals the April 13, 2018 order sus-\\npending her from practice in the Western District of\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 13\\n\\nWisconsin.11 Although Nora purports to identify ten issues on\\nappeal, each is a variation on the central theme that she\\nshould have been permitted to relitigate the authenticity of\\nHSBC’s note in federal court. In addition, we must resolve\\nHSBC’s appellate motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38.\\n A. March 22, 2018 Sanctions Order\\n A district court may “award just damages and single or\\ndouble costs” if it determines a bankruptcy appeal is frivo-\\nlous. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020(a); see also Hill v. Norfolk & Western\\nRy. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing power\\nto sanction attorneys in addition to parties).12 An appeal is\\nfrivolous “when the result is obvious or when the appellant’s\\nargument is wholly without merit.” Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst.,\\n732 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Spiegel v. Cont’l Ill.\\nNat’l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 1986)).\\n Likewise, a court may hold an attorney personally liable\\nfor “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably in-\\ncurred because of” her unreasonable and vexatious litigation\\nconduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review a district court’s sanc-\\ntions order for abuse of discretion. In re Busson-Sokolik, 635\\n\\n 11The district court’s April 13, 2018 order incorporates its March 20,\\n2018 disciplinary order, specifying the earlier order will remain in force\\nshould Nora be reinstated to practice in the Western District.\\n 12 The advisory committee notes to FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 make clear\\nthat district courts possess the same authority to sanction frivolous bank-\\nruptcy appeals that FED. R. APP. P. 38 provides to this court. FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment (“[T]his rule recog-\\nnizes that the authority to award damages and costs in connection with\\nfrivolous appeals is the same for district courts sitting as appellate courts,\\nbankruptcy appellate panels, and courts of appeals.”).\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nF.3d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n8020); Bell v. Vacuforce, LLC, 908 F.3d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1927).\\n Under both FED. R. BANKR. P. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927,\\nthe district court acted well-within its discretion in imposing\\na monetary sanction on Nora.\\n 1. Sanctions were appropriate under FED. R. BANKR. P.\\n 8020(a) because the bankruptcy appeal was frivolous.\\n The bankruptcy court found Nora filed Steven Lisse’s\\nChapter 13 bankruptcy petition for the improper purpose of\\nthwarting the Lisses’ creditors, rather than paying them. That\\nconclusion was not clearly erroneous. In re Wiese, 552 F.3d 584,\\n588 (7th Cir. 2009) (a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion\\nwhen its decision is premised on an incorrect legal principle\\nor a clearly erroneous factual finding).\\n Unlike a Chapter 7 petition, which focuses on liquidating\\nthe debtor’s assets to satisfy his creditors, Chapter 13 allows a\\ndebtor to voluntarily propose a plan to reorganize his debts\\nfor repayment out of his future income. RICHARD I. AARON,\\nBANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 777 (2013 ed.) (“The central\\nthesis of Chapter 13 is that an individual debtor can dedicate\\nfuture income to pay accumulated debts.”); see also 8 COLLIER\\nON BANKRUPTCY § 1300.02 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer\\neds., 16th ed. 2018). The focus on repayment is highlighted by\\nthe requirement that the debtor begin making payments to\\nthe trustee within 30 days after proposing a Chapter 13 plan,\\neven before the plan is confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The\\nbasic premise is to facilitate the debtor’s ability to pay his\\ncreditors, not to frustrate the creditors’ rights. In re Schaitz, 913\\nF.2d 452, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 15\\n\\n428 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing Congress’s idealized Chapter\\n13 case as one where “the debtor, given time and relief from\\nharassment, is able to pay all or most of his debts”).\\n A bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 petition for\\ncause if it finds the petition was filed in bad faith. 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1307(c); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992);\\n8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04[10]; see also 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 1325(a)(3) (requiring a plan to have been proposed in good\\nfaith as a condition of confirmation). Given bankruptcy’s his-\\ntorical roots as an equitable remedy, “the good faith standard\\nprevents debtors from manipulating the Code for wrongful\\npurposes.” In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359. Whether a debtor filed\\nhis petition in good faith is a factual finding to be reversed\\nonly when the bankruptcy court’s determination, based on\\nthe totality of the circumstances, is clearly erroneous. In re\\nSmith, 286 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n Using a Chapter 13 petition to stave off an impending\\nhome foreclosure sale is not necessarily improper. Although\\nChapter 13 generally prohibits a plan from modifying mort-\\ngage lenders’ underlying rights, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), it\\nexpressly allows a debtor to cure defaults with respect to his\\nprincipal residence “until such residence is sold at a foreclo-\\nsure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable non-\\nbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1); see also 8 COLLIER ON\\nBANKRUPTCY § 1322.06[1][a]; id. at § 1322.16. A debtor, thus,\\nmay use a proper Chapter 13 petition to cure past defaults on\\nhis mortgage through regular payments to the lender, pre-\\nventing the foreclosure sale. See Nobelman v. American Savings\\nBank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993).\\n But this is not what Nora proposed for the Lisses. As the\\nbankruptcy court recognized, the object of Nora’s plan was\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nnot to pay the Lisses’ creditors in an orderly fashion but, in-\\nstead, to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment. Nora sug-\\ngested directing the Lisses’ mortgage payments to her trust\\naccount (not to the Chapter 13 trustee) “during the pendency\\n[of an] adversary proceeding to be commenced, in part, for\\nthe determination of the identity of the real party in interest\\nentitled to the payment or proceeds … .” Such an effort to\\nrelitigate a creditor’s rights—already established in state-\\ncourt proceedings—is an improper, bad faith use of a Chapter\\n13 petition. See In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1359 (“[F]iling a Chapter\\n13 petition in order to thwart the payment of an otherwise\\nnondischargeable income tax debt … was not one of the in-\\ntended purposes of the bankruptcy provisions. … [T]he bank-\\nruptcy court’s finding of lack of good faith is not clearly erro-\\nneous.”).\\n In the district court, Nora never presented any argument\\nabout why the bankruptcy court’s good-faith determination\\nwas clearly erroneous. Indeed, Nora never even filed a brief\\non the merits of the appeal, despite the fact it was pending in\\nthe district court for 16 months. Cf. Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d\\n754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n appellate brief that does not\\neven try to engage the reasons the appellant lost has no pro-\\nspect of success.”).\\n Nora now resurrects the argument that HSBC’s note is a\\nforgery, so the appeal to the district court was not frivolous.\\nThis only confirms the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that\\nNora intended to use the proceedings to thwart HSBC, rather\\nthan to cure the Lisses’ mortgage defaults or otherwise satisfy\\nHSBC’s claim. Many court decisions have previously in-\\nformed Nora that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal\\ncourts are bound by state-court resolutions of debtors’\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 17\\n\\ndefenses to mortgage foreclosure. See, e.g., Nora v. Residential\\nFunding Co., 543 Fed. App’x 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2013) (“By alleg-\\ning that the fraudulent assignment to Residential Funding al-\\nlowed it to succeed in foreclosing on her property in state\\ncourt, Nora is impermissibly asking a federal district court to\\nreview and reject the state court’s judgment of foreclosure of\\nher property.”); Spencer v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 246\\nF. Supp. 3d 1241, 1245 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (“As previously ex-\\nplained to [Nora], the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives fed-\\neral courts of jurisdiction to review a state court decision.”);\\nSpencer v. PNC Bank, No. 14-cv-422-wmc, 2015 WL 1520912, at\\n*4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2015) (noting Nora could challenge the\\nvalidity of endorsements and notes in state court but that\\n“those arguments do not undermine [the creditor’s] standing\\nin the bankruptcy proceeding”); Schmid v. Bank of America, 498\\nB.R. 221, 224–25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“The Rooker-Feldman\\ndoctrine applies to plaintiff’s fraud claim because plaintiff’s\\nalleged injury is the state court foreclosure judgment that de-\\nfendant Bank of America is now asserting … Many other\\ncourts have concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a\\nlitigant from challenging a foreclosure judgment in a subse-\\nquent case.”).\\n Throughout the federal proceedings, Nora has repeatedly\\nattacked HSBC’s “standing” to oppose Steven Lisse’s Chapter\\n13 plan on the theory that HSBC’s note is a forgery. She simi-\\nlarly contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction\\nher due to this alleged Article III defect. Nora is wrong on\\nboth counts. The Wisconsin foreclosure judgment established\\nHSBC as the Lisses’ judgment creditor. It is the foreclosure\\njudgment, not the note, that gives HSBC standing at this point\\nto object to Steven Lisse’s Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1324(a)\\n(providing that any “party in interest may object to\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nconfirmation of the plan”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (defining a\\n“creditor” to be a “party in interest” for purposes of Chapter\\n11); In re Rimgale, 669 F.3d at 428 (explaining that Congress\\nadopted § 1324 to allow “for creditors to be heard” while giv-\\ning the bankruptcy judge sole authority to confirm or reject a\\nplan). This makes the authenticity of HSBC’s note irrelevant\\nto the analysis in federal court. Even if the note is a forgery,\\nuntil the Lisses obtain a vacatur of the foreclosure judgment,\\nHSBC’s standing as a judgment creditor is unassailable.\\n Nora manages to flag one potentially legitimate basis to\\nchallenge the bankruptcy court’s decision: that the court de-\\ncided sua sponte to not only deny confirmation but to dismiss\\nthe petition without leave to amend the plan. Compare In re\\nTerry, 630 F.2d 634, 636 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (“As we read § 1307,\\na court cannot order dismissal or conversion on its own mo-\\ntion.”), with In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1993)\\n(holding sua sponte dismissal appropriate under 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 105(a)); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1307.04 (sug-\\ngesting § 105(a) “presumably would give the court the power\\nto dismiss a case sua sponte”). Yet Nora never briefed that ar-\\ngument for the district court. See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones\\nLang LaSalle Am., Inc., 882 F.3d 692, 705 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting\\narguments not raised below are forfeited). And she fails to ad-\\nequately do so here, simply quoting a transcript without cit-\\ning any relevant legal authorities on the topic. See M.G.\\nSkinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency v. Norman-Spencer Agency, 845\\nF.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped\\narguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by le-\\ngal authority.”). The inclusion of one plausible argument—\\namidst a plethora of frivolous arguments—will not insulate\\nan appellant from sanctions. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1200 (holding\\nsanctions may be imposed where most of the appellant’s\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 19\\n\\narguments are frivolous, even if not all of them can be classi-\\nfied that way).\\n Nora’s attempt to relitigate HSBC’s foreclosure judgment\\nin bankruptcy court was frivolous. Nora’s repeated fraud ac-\\ncusations do not change the calculus. Mains v. CitiBank, 852\\nF.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding Rooker-Feldman prohibits\\nfederal courts from reviewing whether a lender procured a\\nstate-court foreclosure judgment through fraud). If Nora be-\\nlieved she possessed new evidence of fraud, Wisconsin’s state\\ncourts were the appropriate venue to raise such arguments.\\nWIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(c) (authorizing motions to reopen judg-\\nments due to the “[f]raud, misrepresentation, or other mis-\\nconduct of an adverse party”); see also Taylor v. Federal Nat’l\\nMortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming dis-\\ntrict court’s decision to remand a fraud-on-the-court claim to\\nstate court on Rooker-Feldman grounds). Aside from delay,\\nthere was no reason for Nora to file a federal bankruptcy case\\nrather than seek relief in state court. See Mains, 852 F.3d at 676\\n(“The state’s courts are quite capable of protecting their own\\nintegrity.”). Federal courts do not exist to provide disap-\\npointed state-court losers a second bite at the apple.13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 At oral argument, Nora’s counsel contended Judge Conley misun-\\nderstood Chapter 13 bankruptcy law, citing his passing reference to Ste-\\nven Lisse’s bankruptcy petition as an “appeal” of the Wisconsin foreclo-\\nsure judgment. But, read in context, Judge Conley’s statement was noting\\nthat Nora’s arguments were only appropriate in a state-court appeal (such\\nthat Nora was, as a practical matter, attempting to bring an improper “ap-\\npeal” in federal court). Judge Conley’s thorough and careful opinions in\\nthis case dispel any concerns of the type Nora’s counsel postulates.\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n 2. Nora’s litigation tactics warranted sanctions under 28\\n U.S.C. § 1927.\\n Courts may also impose sanctions against a lawyer who\\n“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and\\nvexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A lawyer’s subjective bad faith\\nis a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for § 1927 sanc-\\ntions; objective bad faith is enough. Hunt v. Moore Bros., Inc.,\\n861 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2017). Attorneys demonstrate objec-\\ntive bad faith when they pursue “a path that a reasonably\\ncareful attorney would have known, after appropriate in-\\nquiry, to be unsound.” Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Boyer v.\\nBSNF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016)). Because trial\\njudges are best positioned to detect bad faith litigation con-\\nduct, they possess broad discretion in exercising the § 1927\\npower. Id.\\n Nora’s stall tactics are blatant when one looks back at how\\nthis litigation unfolded. Although Nora denies intentionally\\ndelaying proceedings, the record before us belies her position.\\nNora herself openly acknowledged the purpose of Steven\\nLisse’s bankruptcy petition was to extend the deadline to pe-\\ntition the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And, as Nora now boasts\\nin her brief, her strategy worked:\\n The March 22, 2018 Order [by the district court]\\n concludes that attorneys’ fees should be\\n awarded based on “dilatory conduct” whereby\\n the Lisses have maintained possession of their\\n home for six (6) years. Actually, the Lisses have\\n remained in possession of their home for over\\n eight (8) years since the fraudulent foreclosure\\n began and they are still in possession of their\\n home, contrary to Judge Peterson’s conclusion\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 21\\n\\n that the foreclosure of the Lisses’ home is “inev-\\n itable.”\\nAppellant’s Response to Motion for Sanctions at 16–17,\\nECF No. 24.\\n Using the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as a litiga-\\ntion ploy to drag out foreclosure proceedings in another juris-\\ndiction constitutes objective bad faith. See Hilgeford v. The\\nPeoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Our review of\\nthe briefs and record persuades us that this is vexatious\\nlitigation. … We can think of no other reason for this [mort-\\ngagor’s] appeal other than delay, harassment, or sheer obsti-\\nnancy.”).\\n The conclusion of intentional delay is supported, not only\\nby the obvious motive, but also by the lack of any substantive\\nmerit to the Chapter 13 proceedings. As discussed above, the\\nplan Nora filed on behalf of Steven Lisse (and then again for\\nSondra Lisse) improperly attempted to use an adversarial\\nproceeding to relitigate the merits of a foreclosure judgment\\nHSBC had already obtained in Wisconsin state court (with\\nHSBC receiving no payments in the interim). Any reasonably\\ncareful attorney—let alone an attorney with Nora’s familiarity\\nwith bankruptcy court—would have known that this type of\\nconduct would not be tolerated. Bell, 908 F.3d at 1082; cf. Carr\\nv. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the suit\\nis not frivolous, or at least not utterly so, it is so lacking in\\nmerit … that its pursuit by the plaintiff indicates a motive to\\nharass.”).\\n Nora then compounded the delays caused by these merit-\\nless bankruptcy petitions by filing numerous, last-minute mo-\\ntions for lengthy stays or deadline extensions. For example, in\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nSteven Lisse’s appeal in the district court, Nora filed three mo-\\ntions to stay the proceedings. This strategy produced a\\n16-month delay before the district court refused any further\\nextensions, at which point Nora moved to voluntarily dismiss\\nthe appeal without filing an opening brief. Such litigation be-\\nhavior—even if one assumes pure motives—constitutes objec-\\ntive bad faith warranting sanctions under § 1927. The district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion.\\n B. Nora’s Suspension from Law Practice\\n In addition to awarding HSBC damages and costs against\\nboth Nora and Steven Lisse as a monetary sanction, two dis-\\ntrict court orders imposed professional discipline on Nora.\\nFirst, on March 20, 2018, the district court fined Nora $2,500\\nand suspended her right to practice in the Western District for\\nsix months, although it stayed the penalties until Nora com-\\nmitted another violation.\\n Ten days later, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court\\nsuspended Nora’s law license for one year. In re Disciplinary\\nProceedings against Nora, 909 N.W.2d at 167–68. As a result, on\\nApril 13, 2018, the district court issued another order sus-\\npending Nora’s right to practice based on W.D. Wis. LR\\n83.5(E). That local rule automatically imposes reciprocal dis-\\ncipline when another jurisdiction does so, although it permits\\nthe attorney to apply “for modification or vacation of the [dis-\\ntrict court’s] discipline.”\\n Although Nora appeals the district court’s April 13, 2018\\ndisciplinary order separately from its March 22, 2018 order\\nawarding HSBC its damages and costs under FED. R. BANKR.\\nP. 8020 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, she does not develop an inde-\\npendent argument for reversing it. To be clear, Nora is\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 23\\n\\ncurrently prohibited from practice in the Western District as\\nreciprocal discipline based on her disbarment by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, not due to her conduct in this litigation.14\\nNora does not provide a reason to reverse that discipline.\\n District courts are permitted to rely on state-court discipli-\\nnary proceedings to suspend attorneys practicing before\\nthem. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917). And this case\\nshows why a local rule making reciprocal discipline auto-\\nmatic (while also providing a process for attorneys to chal-\\nlenge that federal discipline) makes sense. Such rules align the\\nprocedure with the relevant legal presumptions. Separate fed-\\neral hearings are not required. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486\\n(7th Cir. 1995). Federal courts give “great weight” to state-\\ncourt disciplinary findings. In re Jafree, 759 F.2d 604, 608 (7th\\nCir. 1985). The attorney bears the burden to identify either a\\ndue process violation, insufficient fact findings, or “some\\nother grave reason” why the state-court’s ruling is not entitled\\nto the federal court’s respect. Selling 243 U.S. at 51. Placing the\\nonus on the attorney to raise such issues in a motion to modify\\nor vacate discipline minimizes the amount of resources di-\\nverted to (essentially) collateral attacks on state-court pro-\\nceedings. See In re Wick, 628 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2010).15\\n\\n\\n 14 The district court’s April 13, 2018 order, however, does state that its\\n\\nMarch 20, 2018 disciplinary order (holding sanctions for Nora’s conduct\\nin this litigation in abeyance until further misconduct) will remain in effect\\nshould Nora be reinstated.\\n 15 This court’s rules take a similar procedural approach. 7TH CIR. R.\\n46(d). Based on the suspension of Nora’s Wisconsin law license in 2018,\\nthis court ordered Nora removed from its roll of attorneys after she failed\\nto demonstrate why this court should not do so. Order, In re Nora, No.\\nD-18-07 (7th Cir. May 23, 2018).\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\n Even setting aside the discipline imposed by the Wiscon-\\nsin Supreme Court, Nora’s litigation activity in federal court\\nwarrants a suspension itself. Federal courts’ inherent author-\\nity to disbar or suspend lawyers for misconduct is longstand-\\ning and well established. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985);\\nsee also Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824) (Marshall, J.)\\n(holding the power to suspend attorneys is “incidental to all\\nCourts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and\\nfor the respectability of the profession”).\\n Again, Nora used tag-team Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings\\nby a husband and wife—each lacking a good faith basis—to\\npostpone the orderly resolution of state-court proceedings.\\nNora’s behavior in this litigation unfortunately is not an aber-\\nration for her. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650,\\n654-55 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, this appeal is frivolous, and\\nwe are troubled by Nora’s conduct in this litigation. … [W]e\\nsuspect that the removal was part of a strategy designed to\\ngum up the progress of the case.”); Spencer v. Federal Home\\nLoan Mortg. Corp., No. 15-cv-332-wmc, 2015 WL 4509159, at *1\\n(W.D. Wis. July 24, 2015) (stating that Nora’s appeals ap-\\npeared “motivated by the goal to further delay a warranted\\nstate court foreclosure.”). Courts have sanctioned Nora for\\nthis conduct before, but apparently she has not received the\\nmessage that it will not be tolerated.\\n Not only are Nora’s litigation tactics inappropriate, her\\ntreatment of opposing counsel and judicial officers is censura-\\nble. In the district court, Nora accused HSBC’s counsel (by\\nname) of committing “uncontroverted fraud on the Court,” as\\nwell as multiple federal crimes, by presenting HSBC’s claim.\\nShe repeats similar attacks in these appeals. See, e.g., Appel-\\nlants Br. at 47. This behavior is, again, not new for Nora. PNC\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 25\\n\\nBank, 763 F.3d at 655 (“Nora has accused the state court judge\\nand court reporter of fraudulently manipulating transcripts,\\nthe district court judge of pursuing ‘a campaign of libel\\nagainst her,’ and opposing counsel of engaging in ‘actionable\\ncivil fraud and racketeering that may constitute state and fed-\\neral criminal misconduct.’”); Nora v. Furay, No. 14-cv-527-jdp,\\n2014 WL 4209608, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2014) (“Nora con-\\ntends that Judge Furay ‘acted in reckless haste to place false\\nfindings on the public record in order to support the falsely\\nmade allegations against her former client … to make false\\nfindings of fact concerning matters which had never been ad-\\njudicated, and to damage Nora’s character and reputation.’”);\\nIn re Rinaldi, No. 11-35689-svk, 2017 WL 104749, at *1 (E.D.\\nWis. Jan. 10, 2017) (“The conversion of the case to Chapter 13\\nclearly changed the context of HSBCʹs entitlement to relief\\nfrom stay, but Attorney Nora ignored the conversion and ac-\\ncused HSBCʹs attorneys of fraud on the Court.”).\\n Flippant, unfounded accusations of misconduct and fraud\\nby opposing counsel and court officials demean the profes-\\nsion and impair the orderly operation of the judicial system.\\nIn re Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487. They also violate the ethical\\nstandards for lawyers practicing in this circuit. See 7TH CIR.\\nSTANDARDS FOR PROF. CONDUCT, Lawyer’s Duties to Other\\nCounsel at ¶4 (“We will not, absent good cause, attribute bad\\nmotives or improper conduct to other counsel or bring the\\nprofession into disrepute by unfounded accusations of impro-\\npriety.”). Such behavior warrants punishment.\\n Following Nora’s repeated abuse of the judicial process\\nthrough frivolous filings and dilatory tactics, her unprofes-\\nsional conduct toward opposing counsel, and the suspension\\nof her Wisconsin law license, “the district court certainly was\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\nentitled to say, ‘enough is enough.’” Salmeron v. Enter.\\nRecovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2009). We find no\\nfault with the district court’s order suspending Nora from\\npractice in the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n C. Further Appellate Sanctions\\n We must also resolve HSBC’s appellate motion for addi-\\ntional sanctions. This court may “award just damages and sin-\\ngle or double costs to the appellee” when it deems an appeal\\nfrivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Such sanctions are discretionary\\nand appropriate where an appellant simply repeats previ-\\nously rejected, frivolous arguments or pursues an appeal to\\nharass their adversary. Arnold v. Villarreal, 853 F.3d 384, 389\\n(7th Cir. 2017).\\n Nora’s arguments almost entirely regurgitate points she\\npressed before the bankruptcy court, which the district court\\nconcluded were frivolous. As we have explained to Nora pre-\\nviously, “Sanctions are warranted under Rule 38 when a\\nlitigant or attorney presents appellate arguments with no rea-\\nsonable expectation of success for the purposes of delay, har-\\nassment, or sheer obstinacy.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 665. That\\naptly describes Nora’s present appeals.\\n Not only were Nora’s arguments on the merits frivolous,\\nshe also engaged in meritless and dilatory motion practice be-\\nfore this court. She moved to stay these appeals pending our\\nruling on a frivolous motion to strike that she filed. When we\\ndenied that motion, Nora immediately filed an equally frivo-\\nlous motion to reconsider. Similarly, Nora submitted four\\nseparate “Requests for Judicial Notice,” needlessly clogging\\nthis court’s motion docket. She continued to lodge these re-\\nquests, even after this court issued an opinion detailing why\\n\\fNos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 27\\n\\nthey were unnecessary and improper. In re Appeals of Nora, 905\\nF.3d at 497 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n We find Nora’s appeals to have been frivolous and grant\\nHSBC’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. HSBC requested\\n$2,150.00 for attorneys’ fees and $446.00 for costs in its motion.\\nAlthough such figures appear reasonable, HSBC has not sub-\\nmitted an affidavit or other evidentiary record to support\\nthem. See Arnold, 853 F.3d at 389 (directing moving party to\\n“submit an affidavit and supporting papers specifying the\\ndamages” incurred); Flip Side Prod., Inc. v. Jam Prod., Ltd., 843\\nF.2d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring party seeking sanc-\\ntions to submit a “verified, itemized statement” of its dam-\\nages and costs). So, we direct HSBC to provide an accounting\\nof their costs and attorneys’ fees within 15 days.\\n For numerous reasons, including her failure to present “a\\nseparately filed motion” in compliance with FED. R. APP. P. 38,\\nwe deny Nora’s request for attorneys’ fees.\\n Finally, we must revisit our previous sanctions against\\nNora. Due to “frivolous and needlessly antagonistic filings”\\nby Nora in an appeal back in 2015, we fined her $2,500 but\\nsuspended the sanction “until the time, if ever, that Nora sub-\\nmits further inappropriate filings.” In re Nora, 778 F.3d at 667.\\nGiven Nora’s frivolous filings in these appeals, we lift the sus-\\npension of our previous monetary sanction.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Lawyers must represent their clients’ interests responsi-\\nbly, not only zealously. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter., Inc., 886\\nF.2d 1485, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). Part of being a responsible\\ncounselor to one’s client is recognizing when the legal battle\\nis lost and advising the client how to best handle that\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889\\n\\noutcome. Frivolous legal arguments, intentionally dilatory\\ntactics, and unprofessional antagonism toward opposing\\ncounsel benefits no one and improperly burdens federal\\ncourts. Nora’s conduct has crossed the boundaries of accepta-\\nble conduct for attorneys in this circuit.\\n For these reasons, we order as follows:\\n 1) On appeal number 18-1866, the district court’s March\\n22, 2018 order holding Steven Lisse and Wendy Alison Nora\\njointly and severally liable for $1,837.50 is AFFIRMED;\\n 2) On appeal number 18-1889, the district court’s March\\n20, 2018 and April 13, 2018 orders suspending Wendy Alison\\nNora’s ability to practice in the Bankruptcy and District\\nCourts for the Western District of Wisconsin (and staying an\\nadditional $2,500 fine) are AFFIRMED;\\n 3) HSBC’s motion for damages and costs under FED. R.\\nAPP. P. 38 is GRANTED, and HSBC is directed to provide an\\naccounting of its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in these\\nappeals within 15 days;\\n 4) Nora’s “Request for Appellant’s Attorneys Fees and\\nCosts of Defending against the Motion for Sanctions” is\\nDENIED; and\\n 5) We lift the suspension of the monetary sanction im-\\nposed in appeal number 13-2676 and order Nora to tender a\\ncheck payable to the clerk of this court for $2,500 within 60\\ndays of the date of this opinion.\\n The district court’s decisions are AFFIRMED WITH\\nSANCTIONS.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1679,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4605818,"string":"4,605,818"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Craftwood II, Inc. v. Generac Power Systems, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2883"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2883\\nCRAFTWOOD II, INC., and CRAFTWOOD III, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nGENERAC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., and COMPREHENSIVE\\nMARKETING, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 4105 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Two corporations, Craftwood\\nII and Craftwood III, operate hardware businesses in Cali-\\nfornia. They contend in this suit under the Telephone Con-\\nsumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227, that defendants sent\\nthem unsolicited fax advertisements. Defendants moved to\\ndismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), con-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2883\\n\\ntending that plaintiffs lack standing to sue. The district judge\\ngranted that motion—not so much because he found the lack\\nof an injury as because he thought that defendants had sub-\\nstantially (though not technically) met the requirements of a\\ndefense in §227(b)(1)(C). On appeal defendants contend ex-\\npressly what is only implicit in the district court’s decision:\\nthat unless plaintiffs prove injury from a violation of law, the\\nsuit must be dismissed for lack of a case or controversy. That\\nproposition contradicts the holding of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.\\n678 (1946), among many other decisions showing that a\\nplaintiff’s failure on the merits does not divest a federal\\ncourt of jurisdiction.\\n The difference between a jurisdictional and a substantive\\ncharacterization of a defense magers not just because federal\\ncourts must raise jurisdiction on their own, even if the liti-\\ngants are content to have a federal judge resolve the dispute,\\nbut because different procedures apply to jurisdictional and\\nsubstantive issues. When subject-mager jurisdiction—which\\nis to say, the power to hear and decide the case at all—is at\\nstake, a district judge may resolve factual disputes and make\\nany findings necessary to determine the court’s adjudicatory\\ncompetence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Venezuela v. Helmerich &\\nPayne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1316 (2017);\\nMcNuE v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 184\\n(1936). If the court has jurisdiction, however, then it must\\ntake all plausible allegations in favor of the complainant\\nwhen handling a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or\\nfor judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Bell Atlantic\\nCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). And if the com-\\nplaint states a claim for relief, then a material factual dispute\\nwill defeat a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56\\nand entitle the plaintiff to a trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v.\\n\\fNo. 18-2883 3\\n\\nCatreE, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). By treating a defense as if it were\\nan element of subject-mager jurisdiction, the district court\\ntransgressed these allocations of authority.\\n Standing to sue is established by allegations (and, if nec-\\nessary, proof) of injury, caused by the defendant, and re-\\ndressable by a favorable judicial decision. See, e.g., Lujan v.\\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Spokeo, Inc.\\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). Plaintiffs allege that they re-\\nceived unsolicited fax ads, causing at least two kinds of inju-\\nry: printing the faxes used paper and toner, which are costly,\\nand the need to read the incoming faxes diverted the time of\\none or more employees from the businesses’ profitable en-\\ndeavors. These are concrete rather than abstract losses. The\\ninjuries may have been slight, but an “identifiable trifle”\\nsuffices. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 & n.14\\n(1973). Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by the defendants’\\nfaxed ads and may be redressed by an award of damages.\\nWe have resolved dozens of fax-ad suits on the merits with-\\nout suspecting that we were violating Article III of the Con-\\nstitution. This suit is no more constitutionally suspect than\\nthey. Whether it is good public policy to use the cumber-\\nsome and costly process of adjudication to resolve disputes\\nabout annoying fax ads is for Congress to decide.\\n We have thought about the possibility of revising the dis-\\ntrict court’s decision to be a dismissal on the merits, rather\\nthan for lack of standing, but conclude that such a step\\nwould be inappropriate, for several reasons.\\n First, it is presumptively unlawful to send any unsolicit-\\ned fax advertisement. Copies of some faxes are in the record,\\nand there’s no doubt that they are advertisements. Plaintiffs\\nallege that they were unsolicited. That makes out a plausible\\n\\f4 No. 18-2883\\n\\nclaim for relief. Defendants invoke an affirmative defense,\\nbut complaints need not anticipate or agempt to plead\\naround potential defenses. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.\\n635 (1980); United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., 350\\nF.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n Second, precisely because a complaint need not antici-\\npate defenses, it is difficult to see how the suit could be dis-\\nmissed on the pleadings. Instead the defense has factual\\ncomponents: the existence of a business relation between\\nplaintiff and defendant, the recipient’s provision of a fax\\nnumber as part of that business relation, and the inclusion in\\nthe unsolicited fax of “a notice meeting the requirements\\nunder paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defendants assert that\\nthe first two elements have been met but do not contend that\\nthe third is satisfied. So they have not so much as argued\\nthat the defense obtains as a mager of law.\\n Third, allegations must be supported by evidence. De-\\nfendants say, and the district judge found, that “plaintiffs”\\nhave an established business relation with them, and that\\n“plaintiffs” furnished their fax numbers. For their part, how-\\never, plaintiffs contend that only one of them (Craftwood II)\\nwas doing business with only one of the defendants (Com-\\nprehensive Marketing). That Craftwood II and Craftwood III\\nare under common control does not make them the same\\nthing—not, at least, unless the requirements for lateral veil\\npiercing have been satisfied. Defendants and the district\\njudge did not address that subject. Nor did defendant Gen-\\nerac show that it has an established business relation with\\neither plaintiff. Perhaps plaintiffs are wrong about who was\\ndoing business with whom, but it looks like we have the\\n\\fNo. 18-2883 5\\n\\nmakings of a material factual dispute, which a district judge\\ncould not resolve at the pleading stage.\\n Fourth, there is the problem of the “notice meeting the\\nrequirements under paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defend-\\nants’ notice, which is in the record, reads (all errors in the\\noriginal):\\n The information in this facsimile message is privileged and con-\\n fidential information, intended for the addressee If you have re-\\n ceived this message in error, or if the recipient of this communi-\\n cation does not desire to receive future communications from the\\n sender. The recipientmustnotifythe sender of the same with a re-\\n turn fax to 830-916-0736 or call Toll Free 1-877-325-2526\\n\\nBeyond the oddity of telling the recipient of an unwanted fax\\nthat it “must” do something is the omission of two bits of\\ninformation that the statute insists be included: that the re-\\ncipient has a legal right to avoid future fax ads and that the\\nsender must comply with an opt-out request “within the\\nshortest reasonable time” as determined by federal rules (30\\ndays). The district court said, essentially, “no harm no foul”:\\nplaintiffs used the number in the notice, and the ads stopped\\ncoming. That’s yet more factfinding outside the scope of the\\ncomplaint, and it amounts to a conclusion that the “identifi-\\nable trifle” of the cost and annoyance of the fax ads already\\nreceived, plus the opportunity cost of the time needed to\\nstop more faxes from arriving, just can’t support a claim.\\nPerhaps a judge or jury could decide that any award exceed-\\ning nominal damages would be inappropriate, but that’s\\nsome distance from saying that there has been neither injury\\nnor a violation of law.\\n To the extent that the district judge believed it possible to\\nresolve the suit on the merits in part (the first two compo-\\n\\f6 No. 18-2883\\n\\nnents of the affirmative defense) and then dismiss the rest\\nfor want of jurisdiction (because the third component of the\\ndefense creates a bare procedural right, of the sort discussed\\nin Spokeo), it was making a fundamental error. Jurisdiction\\nalmost always depends on the state of magers when a suit\\nbegins. See, e.g., Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc.,\\n498 U.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v.\\nLouisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Tor-\\nrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539–40 (1824). (We put the possibility of\\nmootness to one side. Whatever it is, this case is not moot.) A\\ncourt cannot resolve part of a plaintiff’s claim on the merits\\nand then say that the residue is outside federal jurisdiction.\\nJohnson v. WaEenbarger, 361 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 1994). Whether\\nor not there would be standing to complain about the precise\\nwording of the opt-out language when that was the only as-\\nserted source of injury—St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. Nomax,\\nInc., 899 F.3d 500 (8th Cir. 2018), gives a negative answer—\\nthis suit began as more than that.\\n The district court erred in dismissing the complaint for\\nlack of jurisdiction, and it would not be appropriate to dis-\\nmiss it under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) either. Perhaps, after dis-\\ncovery (which has yet to occur), the record will show the ab-\\nsence of a material factual dispute. But as things stand plain-\\ntiffs have a plausible grievance.\\n The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for\\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383071/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605818/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Craftwood II, Inc. v. Generac Power Systems, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2883\nCRAFTWOOD II, INC., and CRAFTWOOD III, INC.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nGENERAC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., and COMPREHENSIVE\nMARKETING, INC.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 4105 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\nJudges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Two corporations, Craftwood\nII and Craftwood III, operate hardware businesses in Cali-\nfornia. They contend in this suit under the Telephone Con-\nsumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227, that defendants sent\nthem unsolicited fax advertisements. Defendants moved to\ndismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), con-\n\f2 No. 18-2883\n\ntending that plaintiffs lack standing to sue. The district judge\ngranted that motion—not so much because he found the lack\nof an injury as because he thought that defendants had sub-\nstantially (though not technically) met the requirements of a\ndefense in §227(b)(1)(C). On appeal defendants contend ex-\npressly what is only implicit in the district court’s decision:\nthat unless plaintiffs prove injury from a violation of law, the\nsuit must be dismissed for lack of a case or controversy. That\nproposition contradicts the holding of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.\n678 (1946), among many other decisions showing that a\nplaintiff’s failure on the merits does not divest a federal\ncourt of jurisdiction.\n The difference between a jurisdictional and a substantive\ncharacterization of a defense magers not just because federal\ncourts must raise jurisdiction on their own, even if the liti-\ngants are content to have a federal judge resolve the dispute,\nbut because different procedures apply to jurisdictional and\nsubstantive issues. When subject-mager jurisdiction—which\nis to say, the power to hear and decide the case at all—is at\nstake, a district judge may resolve factual disputes and make\nany findings necessary to determine the court’s adjudicatory\ncompetence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Venezuela v. Helmerich &\nPayne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1316 (2017);\nMcNuE v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 184\n(1936). If the court has jurisdiction, however, then it must\ntake all plausible allegations in favor of the complainant\nwhen handling a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or\nfor judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Bell Atlantic\nCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). And if the com-\nplaint states a claim for relief, then a material factual dispute\nwill defeat a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56\nand entitle the plaintiff to a trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v.\n\fNo. 18-2883 3\n\nCatreE, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). By treating a defense as if it were\nan element of subject-mager jurisdiction, the district court\ntransgressed these allocations of authority.\n Standing to sue is established by allegations (and, if nec-\nessary, proof) of injury, caused by the defendant, and re-\ndressable by a favorable judicial decision. See, e.g., Lujan v.\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Spokeo, Inc.\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). Plaintiffs allege that they re-\nceived unsolicited fax ads, causing at least two kinds of inju-\nry: printing the faxes used paper and toner, which are costly,\nand the need to read the incoming faxes diverted the time of\none or more employees from the businesses’ profitable en-\ndeavors. These are concrete rather than abstract losses. The\ninjuries may have been slight, but an “identifiable trifle”\nsuffices. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 & n.14\n(1973). Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by the defendants’\nfaxed ads and may be redressed by an award of damages.\nWe have resolved dozens of fax-ad suits on the merits with-\nout suspecting that we were violating Article III of the Con-\nstitution. This suit is no more constitutionally suspect than\nthey. Whether it is good public policy to use the cumber-\nsome and costly process of adjudication to resolve disputes\nabout annoying fax ads is for Congress to decide.\n We have thought about the possibility of revising the dis-\ntrict court’s decision to be a dismissal on the merits, rather\nthan for lack of standing, but conclude that such a step\nwould be inappropriate, for several reasons.\n First, it is presumptively unlawful to send any unsolicit-\ned fax advertisement. Copies of some faxes are in the record,\nand there’s no doubt that they are advertisements. Plaintiffs\nallege that they were unsolicited. That makes out a plausible\n\f4 No. 18-2883\n\nclaim for relief. Defendants invoke an affirmative defense,\nbut complaints need not anticipate or agempt to plead\naround potential defenses. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.\n635 (1980); United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., 350\nF.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2003).\n Second, precisely because a complaint need not antici-\npate defenses, it is difficult to see how the suit could be dis-\nmissed on the pleadings. Instead the defense has factual\ncomponents: the existence of a business relation between\nplaintiff and defendant, the recipient’s provision of a fax\nnumber as part of that business relation, and the inclusion in\nthe unsolicited fax of “a notice meeting the requirements\nunder paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defendants assert that\nthe first two elements have been met but do not contend that\nthe third is satisfied. So they have not so much as argued\nthat the defense obtains as a mager of law.\n Third, allegations must be supported by evidence. De-\nfendants say, and the district judge found, that “plaintiffs”\nhave an established business relation with them, and that\n“plaintiffs” furnished their fax numbers. For their part, how-\never, plaintiffs contend that only one of them (Craftwood II)\nwas doing business with only one of the defendants (Com-\nprehensive Marketing). That Craftwood II and Craftwood III\nare under common control does not make them the same\nthing—not, at least, unless the requirements for lateral veil\npiercing have been satisfied. Defendants and the district\njudge did not address that subject. Nor did defendant Gen-\nerac show that it has an established business relation with\neither plaintiff. Perhaps plaintiffs are wrong about who was\ndoing business with whom, but it looks like we have the\n\fNo. 18-2883 5\n\nmakings of a material factual dispute, which a district judge\ncould not resolve at the pleading stage.\n Fourth, there is the problem of the “notice meeting the\nrequirements under paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defend-\nants’ notice, which is in the record, reads (all errors in the\noriginal):\n The information in this facsimile message is privileged and con-\n fidential information, intended for the addressee If you have re-\n ceived this message in error, or if the recipient of this communi-\n cation does not desire to receive future communications from the\n sender. The recipientmustnotifythe sender of the same with a re-\n turn fax to 830-916-0736 or call Toll Free 1-877-325-2526\n\nBeyond the oddity of telling the recipient of an unwanted fax\nthat it “must” do something is the omission of two bits of\ninformation that the statute insists be included: that the re-\ncipient has a legal right to avoid future fax ads and that the\nsender must comply with an opt-out request “within the\nshortest reasonable time” as determined by federal rules (30\ndays). The district court said, essentially, “no harm no foul”:\nplaintiffs used the number in the notice, and the ads stopped\ncoming. That’s yet more factfinding outside the scope of the\ncomplaint, and it amounts to a conclusion that the “identifi-\nable trifle” of the cost and annoyance of the fax ads already\nreceived, plus the opportunity cost of the time needed to\nstop more faxes from arriving, just can’t support a claim.\nPerhaps a judge or jury could decide that any award exceed-\ning nominal damages would be inappropriate, but that’s\nsome distance from saying that there has been neither injury\nnor a violation of law.\n To the extent that the district judge believed it possible to\nresolve the suit on the merits in part (the first two compo-\n\f6 No. 18-2883\n\nnents of the affirmative defense) and then dismiss the rest\nfor want of jurisdiction (because the third component of the\ndefense creates a bare procedural right, of the sort discussed\nin Spokeo), it was making a fundamental error. Jurisdiction\nalmost always depends on the state of magers when a suit\nbegins. See, e.g., Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc.,\n498 U.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v.\nLouisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Tor-\nrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539–40 (1824). (We put the possibility of\nmootness to one side. Whatever it is, this case is not moot.) A\ncourt cannot resolve part of a plaintiff’s claim on the merits\nand then say that the residue is outside federal jurisdiction.\nJohnson v. WaEenbarger, 361 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 1994). Whether\nor not there would be standing to complain about the precise\nwording of the opt-out language when that was the only as-\nserted source of injury—St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. Nomax,\nInc., 899 F.3d 500 (8th Cir. 2018), gives a negative answer—\nthis suit began as more than that.\n The district court erred in dismissing the complaint for\nlack of jurisdiction, and it would not be appropriate to dis-\nmiss it under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) either. Perhaps, after dis-\ncovery (which has yet to occur), the record will show the ab-\nsence of a material factual dispute. But as things stand plain-\ntiffs have a plausible grievance.\n The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Craftwood II, Inc. v. Generac Power Systems, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2883\\nCRAFTWOOD II, INC., and CRAFTWOOD III, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nGENERAC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., and COMPREHENSIVE\\nMARKETING, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 4105 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Two corporations, Craftwood\\nII and Craftwood III, operate hardware businesses in Cali-\\nfornia. They contend in this suit under the Telephone Con-\\nsumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227, that defendants sent\\nthem unsolicited fax advertisements. Defendants moved to\\ndismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), con-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2883\\n\\ntending that plaintiffs lack standing to sue. The district judge\\ngranted that motion—not so much because he found the lack\\nof an injury as because he thought that defendants had sub-\\nstantially (though not technically) met the requirements of a\\ndefense in §227(b)(1)(C). On appeal defendants contend ex-\\npressly what is only implicit in the district court’s decision:\\nthat unless plaintiffs prove injury from a violation of law, the\\nsuit must be dismissed for lack of a case or controversy. That\\nproposition contradicts the holding of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.\\n678 (1946), among many other decisions showing that a\\nplaintiff’s failure on the merits does not divest a federal\\ncourt of jurisdiction.\\n The difference between a jurisdictional and a substantive\\ncharacterization of a defense magers not just because federal\\ncourts must raise jurisdiction on their own, even if the liti-\\ngants are content to have a federal judge resolve the dispute,\\nbut because different procedures apply to jurisdictional and\\nsubstantive issues. When subject-mager jurisdiction—which\\nis to say, the power to hear and decide the case at all—is at\\nstake, a district judge may resolve factual disputes and make\\nany findings necessary to determine the court’s adjudicatory\\ncompetence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Venezuela v. Helmerich &\\nPayne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1316 (2017);\\nMcNuE v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 184\\n(1936). If the court has jurisdiction, however, then it must\\ntake all plausible allegations in favor of the complainant\\nwhen handling a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or\\nfor judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Bell Atlantic\\nCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). And if the com-\\nplaint states a claim for relief, then a material factual dispute\\nwill defeat a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56\\nand entitle the plaintiff to a trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v.\\n\\fNo. 18-2883 3\\n\\nCatreE, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). By treating a defense as if it were\\nan element of subject-mager jurisdiction, the district court\\ntransgressed these allocations of authority.\\n Standing to sue is established by allegations (and, if nec-\\nessary, proof) of injury, caused by the defendant, and re-\\ndressable by a favorable judicial decision. See, e.g., Lujan v.\\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Spokeo, Inc.\\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). Plaintiffs allege that they re-\\nceived unsolicited fax ads, causing at least two kinds of inju-\\nry: printing the faxes used paper and toner, which are costly,\\nand the need to read the incoming faxes diverted the time of\\none or more employees from the businesses’ profitable en-\\ndeavors. These are concrete rather than abstract losses. The\\ninjuries may have been slight, but an “identifiable trifle”\\nsuffices. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 & n.14\\n(1973). Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by the defendants’\\nfaxed ads and may be redressed by an award of damages.\\nWe have resolved dozens of fax-ad suits on the merits with-\\nout suspecting that we were violating Article III of the Con-\\nstitution. This suit is no more constitutionally suspect than\\nthey. Whether it is good public policy to use the cumber-\\nsome and costly process of adjudication to resolve disputes\\nabout annoying fax ads is for Congress to decide.\\n We have thought about the possibility of revising the dis-\\ntrict court’s decision to be a dismissal on the merits, rather\\nthan for lack of standing, but conclude that such a step\\nwould be inappropriate, for several reasons.\\n First, it is presumptively unlawful to send any unsolicit-\\ned fax advertisement. Copies of some faxes are in the record,\\nand there’s no doubt that they are advertisements. Plaintiffs\\nallege that they were unsolicited. That makes out a plausible\\n\\f4 No. 18-2883\\n\\nclaim for relief. Defendants invoke an affirmative defense,\\nbut complaints need not anticipate or agempt to plead\\naround potential defenses. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.\\n635 (1980); United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., 350\\nF.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2003).\\n Second, precisely because a complaint need not antici-\\npate defenses, it is difficult to see how the suit could be dis-\\nmissed on the pleadings. Instead the defense has factual\\ncomponents: the existence of a business relation between\\nplaintiff and defendant, the recipient’s provision of a fax\\nnumber as part of that business relation, and the inclusion in\\nthe unsolicited fax of “a notice meeting the requirements\\nunder paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defendants assert that\\nthe first two elements have been met but do not contend that\\nthe third is satisfied. So they have not so much as argued\\nthat the defense obtains as a mager of law.\\n Third, allegations must be supported by evidence. De-\\nfendants say, and the district judge found, that “plaintiffs”\\nhave an established business relation with them, and that\\n“plaintiffs” furnished their fax numbers. For their part, how-\\never, plaintiffs contend that only one of them (Craftwood II)\\nwas doing business with only one of the defendants (Com-\\nprehensive Marketing). That Craftwood II and Craftwood III\\nare under common control does not make them the same\\nthing—not, at least, unless the requirements for lateral veil\\npiercing have been satisfied. Defendants and the district\\njudge did not address that subject. Nor did defendant Gen-\\nerac show that it has an established business relation with\\neither plaintiff. Perhaps plaintiffs are wrong about who was\\ndoing business with whom, but it looks like we have the\\n\\fNo. 18-2883 5\\n\\nmakings of a material factual dispute, which a district judge\\ncould not resolve at the pleading stage.\\n Fourth, there is the problem of the “notice meeting the\\nrequirements under paragraph (2)(D)” of §227(b). Defend-\\nants’ notice, which is in the record, reads (all errors in the\\noriginal):\\n The information in this facsimile message is privileged and con-\\n fidential information, intended for the addressee If you have re-\\n ceived this message in error, or if the recipient of this communi-\\n cation does not desire to receive future communications from the\\n sender. The recipientmustnotifythe sender of the same with a re-\\n turn fax to 830-916-0736 or call Toll Free 1-877-325-2526\\n\\nBeyond the oddity of telling the recipient of an unwanted fax\\nthat it “must” do something is the omission of two bits of\\ninformation that the statute insists be included: that the re-\\ncipient has a legal right to avoid future fax ads and that the\\nsender must comply with an opt-out request “within the\\nshortest reasonable time” as determined by federal rules (30\\ndays). The district court said, essentially, “no harm no foul”:\\nplaintiffs used the number in the notice, and the ads stopped\\ncoming. That’s yet more factfinding outside the scope of the\\ncomplaint, and it amounts to a conclusion that the “identifi-\\nable trifle” of the cost and annoyance of the fax ads already\\nreceived, plus the opportunity cost of the time needed to\\nstop more faxes from arriving, just can’t support a claim.\\nPerhaps a judge or jury could decide that any award exceed-\\ning nominal damages would be inappropriate, but that’s\\nsome distance from saying that there has been neither injury\\nnor a violation of law.\\n To the extent that the district judge believed it possible to\\nresolve the suit on the merits in part (the first two compo-\\n\\f6 No. 18-2883\\n\\nnents of the affirmative defense) and then dismiss the rest\\nfor want of jurisdiction (because the third component of the\\ndefense creates a bare procedural right, of the sort discussed\\nin Spokeo), it was making a fundamental error. Jurisdiction\\nalmost always depends on the state of magers when a suit\\nbegins. See, e.g., Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc.,\\n498 U.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v.\\nLouisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Tor-\\nrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539–40 (1824). (We put the possibility of\\nmootness to one side. Whatever it is, this case is not moot.) A\\ncourt cannot resolve part of a plaintiff’s claim on the merits\\nand then say that the residue is outside federal jurisdiction.\\nJohnson v. WaEenbarger, 361 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 1994). Whether\\nor not there would be standing to complain about the precise\\nwording of the opt-out language when that was the only as-\\nserted source of injury—St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. Nomax,\\nInc., 899 F.3d 500 (8th Cir. 2018), gives a negative answer—\\nthis suit began as more than that.\\n The district court erred in dismissing the complaint for\\nlack of jurisdiction, and it would not be appropriate to dis-\\nmiss it under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) either. Perhaps, after dis-\\ncovery (which has yet to occur), the record will show the ab-\\nsence of a material factual dispute. But as things stand plain-\\ntiffs have a plausible grievance.\\n The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for\\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1680,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443967,"string":"8,443,967"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"In the MATTER OF: Steven Robert LISSE, Debtor. Appeals of: Wendy Alison Nora"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Matter Of Lisse"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Brennan, Eve, Wood\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415401/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443967/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In the MATTER OF: Steven Robert LISSE, Debtor. Appeals of: Wendy Alison Nora\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In the MATTER OF: Steven Robert LISSE, Debtor. Appeals of: Wendy Alison Nora\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1681,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4606482,"string":"4,606,482"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2228"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge No.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Magistrate Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit \\n Chicago, Illinois 60604 \\n \\n April 3, 2019 \\n \\n Before \\n \\n DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge \\n \\n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge \\n \\n MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge \\n \\n \\nNo. 18‐2228 \\n Appeal from the \\nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., United States District Court for the \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute \\n Division. \\n v. \\n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL \\n \\n \\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \\n Mark J. Dinsmore, \\nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \\n Magistrate Judge. \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n \\n \\n \\n O R D E R \\n \\n Defendant‐appellee filed a petition for rehearing on March 25, 2019. All of the \\njudges on the panel have voted to deny rehearing and to issue an amended opinion. \\nThis court’s opinion dated February 8, 2019, is amended in a separately filed opinion \\nreleased today. \\n \\n The petition for rehearing is therefore DENIED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383735/\", \"author_raw\": \"Magistrate Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"DANIEL A MANION"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MICHAEL B BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MICHAEL Y SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"DANIEL A MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"MICHAEL B BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\", \"MICHAEL Y SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606482/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit \n Chicago, Illinois 60604 \n \n April 3, 2019 \n \n Before \n \n DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge \n \n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge \n \n MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge \n \n \nNo. 18‐2228 \n Appeal from the \nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., United States District Court for the \n Plaintiff‐Appellant, Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute \n Division. \n v. \n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL \n \n \nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \n Mark J. Dinsmore, \nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \n Magistrate Judge. \n Defendant‐Appellee. \n \n \n \n O R D E R \n \n Defendant‐appellee filed a petition for rehearing on March 25, 2019. All of the \njudges on the panel have voted to deny rehearing and to issue an amended opinion. \nThis court’s opinion dated February 8, 2019, is amended in a separately filed opinion \nreleased today. \n \n The petition for rehearing is therefore DENIED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit \\n Chicago, Illinois 60604 \\n \\n April 3, 2019 \\n \\n Before \\n \\n DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge \\n \\n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge \\n \\n MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge \\n \\n \\nNo. 18‐2228 \\n Appeal from the \\nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., United States District Court for the \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute \\n Division. \\n v. \\n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL \\n \\n \\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \\n Mark J. Dinsmore, \\nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \\n Magistrate Judge. \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n \\n \\n \\n O R D E R \\n \\n Defendant‐appellee filed a petition for rehearing on March 25, 2019. All of the \\njudges on the panel have voted to deny rehearing and to issue an amended opinion. \\nThis court’s opinion dated February 8, 2019, is amended in a separately filed opinion \\nreleased today. \\n \\n The petition for rehearing is therefore DENIED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1682,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4606483,"string":"4,606,483"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2228"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2228 \\nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \\nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. \\n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL — Mark J. Dinsmore, Magistrate Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 \\n AS AMENDED ON DENIAL OF REHEARING APRIL 3, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Ronnie Winsted applied for disa‐\\nbility insurance benefits and supplemental security income \\nclaiming disability based on numerous conditions, including \\ndegenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and anxiety. An ad‐\\nministrative law judge denied benefits, finding that Winsted \\ncould work with certain limitations. After the district court \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\nupheld this denial, Winsted appealed, arguing the ALJ did \\nnot consider his difficulties with concentration, persistence, \\nand pace. We agree—the ALJ did not adequately explain how \\nthe limitations he placed on Winsted’s residual functional ca‐\\npacity accounted for the claimant’s mental difficulties, so we \\nremand to the agency. \\n I. Background \\n Winsted was 42 years old when he applied for benefits, \\nasserting an onset date of October 2010. Although he initially \\nalleged he became disabled in 2005, two prior applications al‐\\nleging this onset date were denied and deemed administra‐\\ntively final. \\n Winsted suffers from multiple physical impairments, \\nmostly associated with his previous work in hard labor as an \\nindustrial truck driver, a highway maintenance worker, and \\nan operating engineer. MRIs taken in 2010 and 2011 showed \\nhe had focal, isolated degenerative disc disease. Other tests \\nrevealed osteoarthritis, mild carpal tunnel syndrome in his \\nhands, and cavus (high‐arched) foot that he treats with special \\nshoes. \\n Winsted complained of shortness of breath in May 2011 \\nand was diagnosed with acute bronchitis and chronic obstruc‐\\ntive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). Although he wheezed at \\ntimes, he often responded well to medication. Throughout the \\nrelevant period, Winsted sometimes complained of wheez‐\\ning, but often his lungs were clear. A pulmonary function test \\nin 2013, however, showed Winsted had moderate obstructive \\nlung disease and possibly restrictive lung disease. \\n Winsted began seeing an internist, Dr. Nedu Gopala, for \\nback pain in August 2013. The doctor prescribed medication \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 3\\n\\nfor Winsted’s breathing, chest pain, back pain, and anxiety. \\nAt appointments throughout 2013 and into March 2015, Win‐\\nsted’s range of motion in his arms and legs alternated from \\nfull, to limited. He maintained a chronic cough, mild short‐\\nness of breath, and wheezing, though a 2014 pulmonary func‐\\ntion test did not show any evidence of lung obstruction. \\n To address stress‐related heart issues, Winsted sought \\nmental‐health treatment in 2012. A therapist diagnosed him \\nwith a panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and ma‐\\njor depressive disorder. Winsted had a guarded attitude, \\n“very little insight,” “below average” intellect, and was as‐\\nsigned a Global Assessment of Function (“GAF”) of 51, indi‐\\ncating he had moderate difficulty in social and occupational \\nfunctioning.1 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND \\nSTATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 32 (4th ed. 1994). \\nIn his therapy appointments, Winsted regularly complained \\nabout altercations with neighbors. \\n Later that year, Winsted sought treatment from a psychia‐\\ntrist, who diagnosed major depressive disorder and assigned \\na GAF of 45, indicating a serious impairment in social or oc‐\\ncupational functioning. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra. The \\npsychiatrist reported that Winsted was tense, anxious, “very \\nrestless,” and moderately depressed. He prescribed medica‐\\ntion for anxiety and depression and continued to treat Win‐\\nsted. \\n\\n \\n 1 The GAF, which assesses an “individual’s overall level of func‐\\n\\ntioning,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 n.7 (7th Cir. 2008), no longer is \\nwidely used by psychiatrists and psychologists, but it was sometimes re‐\\nferred to in social security disability hearings during Winsted’s proceed‐\\nings. See Price v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2015). \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Between September 2013 and February 2015, Winsted’s \\nmental health fluctuated. In September 2013, Winsted’s psy‐\\nchiatrist reported that his affect was appropriate, his mood \\nwas not depressed, and “on the whole [he was] doing better.” \\nBut two months later, Winsted’s affect was anxious, his mood \\nwas depressed, he was “feeling more irritable, anxious, and \\nrestless,” and he suffered panic attacks. At a therapy session \\nin July 2014, a therapist reported Winsted’s “symptoms of de‐\\npression and worry impair overall functioning,” and in Au‐\\ngust and November 2014, he was “mildly depressed.” But in \\nFebruary 2015, Winsted presented with an appropriate affect \\nand a not‐depressed mood. The same was true in April 2015, \\nthough Winsted reported he sometimes felt “tense and anx‐\\nious” and stress continued to cause him to “become over‐\\nwhelmed.” \\n The disability application also triggered an examination in \\n2013 from an agency psychologist, Dr. Steven Marlow, who \\ndiagnosed Winsted with major depressive disorder, a gener‐\\nalized anxiety disorder, and a panic disorder. Specifically, he \\nreported Winsted “has a[n] avoidant, hostile, and easily dis‐\\ntracted attitude.” Dr. Marlow determined Winsted had below \\naverage levels of mental control, understanding and memory, \\nand concentration; poor levels of persistence; and he did not \\ndo well in social situations. \\n A state‐agency physician, Dr. George Siderys, also exam‐\\nined Winsted in 2013 and opined he had a mild functional im‐\\npairment. This included: “mild decrease in range of motion,” \\npain that would be “expected to cause him problems with \\nprolonged standing, walking, or heavy lifting,” and a history \\nof heart difficulties that would cause him to “wear out if he \\nparticipated in prolonged walking or lifting.” \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 5\\n\\n In connection with Winsted’s disability claim, treating \\nphysician Dr. Gopala completed a physical residual func‐\\ntional capacity (“RFC”) questionnaire in early 2015 and re‐\\nported Winsted suffered from hypertension, COPD, and back \\npain, and described Winsted’s prognosis for back pain as \\n“poor.” He determined Winsted had a “painful range of \\nmovement” and was incapable of performing even “low \\nstress” work. Dr. Gopala also wrote that Winsted’s symptoms \\nwould affect his attention and concentration frequently; he \\ncould walk only about one block; and he could sit or stand for \\nonly 15 minutes at a time. \\n One of the therapists at the center where Winsted received \\ntreatment, Jessica Nevill, filled out a mental RFC question‐\\nnaire in April 2015. She opined Winsted had marked impair‐\\nments in his abilities to: relate to other people, respond to su‐\\npervision, respond to work pressures, and respond appropri‐\\nately to changes in the work setting. She wrote Winsted \\nwould miss work three to four days per month because of his \\nimpairments. \\n After the Social Security Administration denied Winsted’s \\napplication, he had a hearing before an ALJ. Winsted testified \\nhe used an inhaler twice a day, slept with a CPAP machine, \\nused a nebulizer for breathing every three months, and con‐\\ntinued to smoke a half‐a‐pack of cigarettes per day. He said \\nhe could not grip a two‐liter bottle with his left hand. Due to \\nthe pain in his knees and feet, he said he could stand for only \\na few minutes and, even then, he could not stand still. He also \\nsaid he could walk only a few blocks before needing to stop \\nand catch his breath, and experienced chest pain three to four \\ntimes per week. He noted he has trouble getting along with \\npeople and does not like to be around groups. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n After Winsted testified, the ALJ asked the vocational ex‐\\npert (“VE”) three hypothetical questions. First, the ALJ asked \\nthe VE to consider an individual of the same age, education, \\nand work experience as Winsted. He continued: \\n This hypothetical individual would be capable \\n of light work, but four hours maximum stand‐\\n ing and walking in an eight hour day, only oc‐\\n casional climbing of ramps, and stairs, but no \\n ropes, ladders, or scaffolds, only occasional bal‐\\n ancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and \\n crawling. Frequent, but not constant handling \\n and fingering bilaterally. This individual would \\n need to avoid concentrated exposure to breath‐\\n ing irritants, such as fumes, orders, dust, and \\n gasses, as well as wet, slippery surfaces, and un‐\\n protected heights and would further be limited \\n to only simply reaching, repetitive tasks, with \\n few workplace changes, no team work, and no \\n interactions with the public. \\nThe expert determined such a person could work as a bench \\nassembler, electronics worker, or production assembler. In \\nthe second hypothetical, the ALJ asked about an individual \\nwith the same limitations as in the first hypothetical, but who \\nalso “due to impair‐related symptoms, such as the need to lay \\ndown during the day to relieve pain would be off task 20% of \\nthe work day.” The VE replied that such an individual could \\nnot sustain employment. Finally, the ALJ asked about a per‐\\nson with all the same limitations as provided in the first hy‐\\npothetical, “but due to the frequency of bad days versus good \\ndays, this individual would have two unscheduled absences \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 7\\n\\nper month.” Again, the VE answered, “there would be no \\njobs.” \\n The ALJ conducted the Administration’s 5‐step analysis, \\nsee 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a), § 416.920(a), and found Winsted \\nnot disabled. At Step 1 the ALJ determined Winsted had not \\nengaged in substantial gainful activity since October 22, 2010. \\nAt Step 2 the ALJ identified Winsted’s severe impairments as \\ndegenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, bilateral carpal \\ntunnel syndrome, osteoarthritis in his left knee, bilateral ca‐\\nvus foot, COPD, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, an affective \\ndisorder, and an anxiety disorder. At Step 3 the ALJ acknowl‐\\nedged Winsted had moderate difficulty with social function‐\\ning and concentration, persistence, and pace because of his \\nmental‐health issues, but concluded these severe impair‐\\nments did not meet a listing for presumptive disability. Be‐\\ntween Steps 3 and 4 the ALJ determined Winsted had the req‐\\nuisite RFC to perform light work with certain limitations (as \\nprovided in the first hypothetical, and including being limited \\nto “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with few workplace \\nchanges, no team work, and no interaction with the public”) \\nbut his limitations precluded him from performing his past \\nrelevant work (Step 4). At Step 5 the ALJ concluded, based on \\nWinsted’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, that he \\nwas capable of successfully changing to other work. \\n Winsted appealed to the agency’s Appeals Council, which \\ndenied review. He then sought judicial review, and the par‐\\nties agreed to have a magistrate judge adjudicate this case. \\nSee 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That judge upheld the ALJ’s decision. \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n II. Analysis \\n A. ALJ’s Evaluation of Winsted’s Limitations in Concen‐\\n tration, Persistence, and Pace \\n Winsted argues neither the ALJ’s RFC nor his first \\nhypothetical question properly accounted for the finding that \\nhe has “moderate” difficulties with concentration, \\npersistence, and pace. The ALJ’s proposed limitations—that \\nWinsted perform only “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with \\nfew workplace changes”—fails, in his view, to address his \\nconcentration‐functioning deficits because “both the \\nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ’s RFC assessment \\nmust incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations supported \\nby the medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th \\nCir. 2015). \\n Winsted’s argument here is correct. Again and again, we \\nhave said that when an ALJ finds there are documented limi‐\\ntations of concentration, persistence, and pace, the hypothet‐\\nical question presented to the VE must account for these lim‐\\nitations. Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2018); \\nVarga, 794 F.3d at 814–15; OʹConnor‐Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d \\n614, 620 (7th Cir. 2010); Stewart v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 679, 684 \\n(7th Cir. 2009); Kasarsky v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. \\n2003); see also Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1003 (7th Cir. \\n2004). We have also made clear that in most cases “employing \\nterms like ‘simple, repetitive tasks’ on their own will not nec‐\\nessarily exclude from the VE’s consideration those positions \\nthat present significant problems of concentration, persis‐\\ntence and pace,” and thus, alone, are insufficient to present \\nthe claimant’s limitations in this area. OʹConnor‐Spinner, \\n627 F.3d at 620; see Moreno, 882 F.3d at 730. Here, at Step 3 the \\nALJ found Winsted’s moderate difficulties with \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 9\\n\\nconcentration, persistence, and pace could cause problems \\nwith concentration and following written instructions, as well \\nas stress with changes in his routine. And Winsted’s psychia‐\\ntrist and therapist both remarked that stress caused Winsted \\nto “become overwhelmed” and his depression impaired his \\noverall functioning. \\n But the first hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE did not \\ndirect the expert to consider problems with concentration, \\npersistence, and pace, which is the hypothetical the ALJ relied \\non for the RFC. Though particular words need not be in‐\\ncanted, we cannot look at the absence of the phrase “moderate \\ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace” and \\nfeel confident this limitation was properly incorporated in the \\nRFC and in the hypothetical question. See OʹConnor‐Spinner, \\n627 F.3d at 619. The ALJ may have thought, as the agency pro‐\\nposes, he was addressing Winsted’s concentration difficulties \\nby including limitations that would minimize social interac‐\\ntion. But that restriction could just have likely been meant to \\naccount for Winsted’s moderate difficulty with social func‐\\ntioning—the ALJ acknowledged Winsted experiences anxi‐\\nety, panic attacks, and irritability when he is around people. \\nNothing in the hypothetical question and RFC, however, ac‐\\ncounted for the ALJ’s discussion of how Winsted’s low GAF \\nscores reflect serious mental‐health symptoms or his mention \\nthat Winsted often “appeared tense, anxious, and/or restless” \\nwithout interacting with other people. Additionally, where a \\nclaimant’s limitations are stress‐related, as Winsted’s appear \\nto be, the hypothetical question should account for the level \\nof stress a claimant can handle. See Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d \\n816, 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2007); Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, \\n285, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2002). But there was no restriction related \\nto stress in the RFC or hypothetical question. \\n\\f10 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Notably, it appears the ALJ disregarded testimony from \\nthe VE about a person with limitations in concentration, per‐\\nsistence, and pace. The ALJ asked two additional hypothetical \\nquestions to the VE about an individual who would either be \\noff task 20% of the workday or would have two unscheduled \\nabsences per month—seemingly having in mind someone \\nwith “moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence, \\nand pace.” The VE responded that neither individual could \\nsustain employment. But these responses are not reflected in \\nthe ALJ’s decision. Because the ALJ did not include Winsted’s \\ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace in the \\nhypothetical he did consider, the decision cannot stand. \\n B. ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinion Evidence \\n Winsted also challenges the evidentiary weight the ALJ \\ngave to four medical opinions, two from treating medical pro‐\\nfessionals (Dr. Gopala and Ms. Nevill) and two from state \\nagency doctors (examining psychologist Dr. Marlow and con‐\\nsultative examiner Dr. Siderys). \\n Before reaching the merits of this argument, we must ad‐\\ndress the agency’s contention that Winsted waived it. The \\nagency is not correct on this; Winsted never “knowingly and \\nintelligently relinquished” his claim, Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. \\n463, 470 n.4 (2012). That he developed the argument poorly \\nmeans at most he forfeited it. Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, \\n254 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n Forfeited or not, this argument fails. In the decision, the \\nALJ adequately articulated why he gave each opinion the \\nweight he did, entitling his decision, in this respect, to our def‐\\nerence. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413, 416 (7th Cir. \\n2008). Starting with Dr. Gopala, the ALJ appropriately \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 11\\n\\nquestioned the doctor’s conclusion—that Winsted had a pain‐\\nful range of motion that made him incapable of engaging in \\n“low‐stress” work—in light of other record evidence. This in‐\\ncluded Dr. Gopala’s own notes, which showed Winsted reg‐\\nularly had a full range of motion, no gross sensory or motor \\ndeficits, fine motor skills within normal limits, and lungs that \\n“have often been clear.” And though treating physician’s \\nopinions, like Dr. Gopala’s, are usually entitled to controlling \\nweight, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96‐2p,2 an ALJ may \\ndiscredit the opinion if it is inconsistent with the record. \\nSee Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2016); Camp‐\\nbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010); 20 C.F.R. \\n§ 404.1527(c)(2). \\n Next, Winsted argues the ALJ erred in giving little eviden‐\\ntiary weight to Ms. Nevill’s mental RFC assessment. But the \\nALJ wrote he discounted Ms. Nevill’s report because she was \\na non‐medical professional, and thus not an “acceptable med‐\\nical source” See 20 CFR § 404.1513(a), § 416.913(a). Also, her \\nfindings were “based solely on [Winsted’s] subjective com‐\\nplaints”—an appropriate reason for an ALJ to discount an \\nopinion, see Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. \\n2008). Additionally, he found Ms. Nevill’s report, like Dr. Go‐\\npala’s, was inconsistent with Winsted’s medical‐health record \\nas a whole. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012) \\n(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)‐(3)). \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 2 The treating‐physician rule, which was eliminated for claims \\n\\nfiled after March 27, 2017, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (2017), still applies to \\nWinsted’s earlier filed claim, see Gerstner v. Berryhill, 879 F.3d 257, 261 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. \\n\\f12 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Finally, Winsted claims the ALJ gave short shrift to the \\ntwo state examiners’ 2013 opinions, asserting the ALJ erred in \\ndiscussing the state psychologist’s evaluation “in one sen‐\\ntence” and the state physician’s opinion in a footnote. But as \\nthe agency points out, the ALJ discussed these opinions \\nthroughout the decision. The ALJ cited the state psycholo‐\\ngist’s findings when discussing Winsted’s mental‐health di‐\\nagnosis, and referred repeatedly to the state physician’s opin‐\\nion throughout his discussion of Winsted’s gait, grip strength, \\nand scattered wheezing. The court applies a common‐sense \\nreading to the entirety of an ALJ’s decision. Rice v. Barnhart, \\n384 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004); Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, \\n811 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the ALJ adequately articulated his \\nreasons for discounting these two opinions—both reports \\nwere based on only one evaluation and largely reflected Win‐\\nsted’s subjective reporting. See Elder, 529 F.3d at 416; Rice, 384 \\nF.3d at 371 (ALJs should rely on medical opinions “based on \\nobjective observations,” not “subjective complaints.”); \\n20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(i) (ALJs should consider “frequency of \\nexamination” in weight it assigns opinion). \\n III. Conclusion \\n Because the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational \\nexaminer and the residual function capacity did not capture \\none of Winsted’s most significant problems—his concentra‐\\ntion‐functioning deficits—we conclude further proceedings \\nare necessary on that issue only. We thus reverse the district \\ncourt judgment and remand this case to the Social Security \\nAdministration.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383736/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606483/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐2228 \nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., \n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \n v. \n\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \n Defendant‐Appellee. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. \n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL — Mark J. Dinsmore, Magistrate Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 \n AS AMENDED ON DENIAL OF REHEARING APRIL 3, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Ronnie Winsted applied for disa‐\nbility insurance benefits and supplemental security income \nclaiming disability based on numerous conditions, including \ndegenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and anxiety. An ad‐\nministrative law judge denied benefits, finding that Winsted \ncould work with certain limitations. After the district court \n\f2 No. 18‐2228 \n\nupheld this denial, Winsted appealed, arguing the ALJ did \nnot consider his difficulties with concentration, persistence, \nand pace. We agree—the ALJ did not adequately explain how \nthe limitations he placed on Winsted’s residual functional ca‐\npacity accounted for the claimant’s mental difficulties, so we \nremand to the agency. \n I. Background \n Winsted was 42 years old when he applied for benefits, \nasserting an onset date of October 2010. Although he initially \nalleged he became disabled in 2005, two prior applications al‐\nleging this onset date were denied and deemed administra‐\ntively final. \n Winsted suffers from multiple physical impairments, \nmostly associated with his previous work in hard labor as an \nindustrial truck driver, a highway maintenance worker, and \nan operating engineer. MRIs taken in 2010 and 2011 showed \nhe had focal, isolated degenerative disc disease. Other tests \nrevealed osteoarthritis, mild carpal tunnel syndrome in his \nhands, and cavus (high‐arched) foot that he treats with special \nshoes. \n Winsted complained of shortness of breath in May 2011 \nand was diagnosed with acute bronchitis and chronic obstruc‐\ntive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). Although he wheezed at \ntimes, he often responded well to medication. Throughout the \nrelevant period, Winsted sometimes complained of wheez‐\ning, but often his lungs were clear. A pulmonary function test \nin 2013, however, showed Winsted had moderate obstructive \nlung disease and possibly restrictive lung disease. \n Winsted began seeing an internist, Dr. Nedu Gopala, for \nback pain in August 2013. The doctor prescribed medication \n\fNo. 18‐2228 3\n\nfor Winsted’s breathing, chest pain, back pain, and anxiety. \nAt appointments throughout 2013 and into March 2015, Win‐\nsted’s range of motion in his arms and legs alternated from \nfull, to limited. He maintained a chronic cough, mild short‐\nness of breath, and wheezing, though a 2014 pulmonary func‐\ntion test did not show any evidence of lung obstruction. \n To address stress‐related heart issues, Winsted sought \nmental‐health treatment in 2012. A therapist diagnosed him \nwith a panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and ma‐\njor depressive disorder. Winsted had a guarded attitude, \n“very little insight,” “below average” intellect, and was as‐\nsigned a Global Assessment of Function (“GAF”) of 51, indi‐\ncating he had moderate difficulty in social and occupational \nfunctioning.1 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND \nSTATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 32 (4th ed. 1994). \nIn his therapy appointments, Winsted regularly complained \nabout altercations with neighbors. \n Later that year, Winsted sought treatment from a psychia‐\ntrist, who diagnosed major depressive disorder and assigned \na GAF of 45, indicating a serious impairment in social or oc‐\ncupational functioning. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra. The \npsychiatrist reported that Winsted was tense, anxious, “very \nrestless,” and moderately depressed. He prescribed medica‐\ntion for anxiety and depression and continued to treat Win‐\nsted. \n\n \n 1 The GAF, which assesses an “individual’s overall level of func‐\n\ntioning,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 n.7 (7th Cir. 2008), no longer is \nwidely used by psychiatrists and psychologists, but it was sometimes re‐\nferred to in social security disability hearings during Winsted’s proceed‐\nings. See Price v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2015). \n\f4 No. 18‐2228 \n\n Between September 2013 and February 2015, Winsted’s \nmental health fluctuated. In September 2013, Winsted’s psy‐\nchiatrist reported that his affect was appropriate, his mood \nwas not depressed, and “on the whole [he was] doing better.” \nBut two months later, Winsted’s affect was anxious, his mood \nwas depressed, he was “feeling more irritable, anxious, and \nrestless,” and he suffered panic attacks. At a therapy session \nin July 2014, a therapist reported Winsted’s “symptoms of de‐\npression and worry impair overall functioning,” and in Au‐\ngust and November 2014, he was “mildly depressed.” But in \nFebruary 2015, Winsted presented with an appropriate affect \nand a not‐depressed mood. The same was true in April 2015, \nthough Winsted reported he sometimes felt “tense and anx‐\nious” and stress continued to cause him to “become over‐\nwhelmed.” \n The disability application also triggered an examination in \n2013 from an agency psychologist, Dr. Steven Marlow, who \ndiagnosed Winsted with major depressive disorder, a gener‐\nalized anxiety disorder, and a panic disorder. Specifically, he \nreported Winsted “has a[n] avoidant, hostile, and easily dis‐\ntracted attitude.” Dr. Marlow determined Winsted had below \naverage levels of mental control, understanding and memory, \nand concentration; poor levels of persistence; and he did not \ndo well in social situations. \n A state‐agency physician, Dr. George Siderys, also exam‐\nined Winsted in 2013 and opined he had a mild functional im‐\npairment. This included: “mild decrease in range of motion,” \npain that would be “expected to cause him problems with \nprolonged standing, walking, or heavy lifting,” and a history \nof heart difficulties that would cause him to “wear out if he \nparticipated in prolonged walking or lifting.” \n\fNo. 18‐2228 5\n\n In connection with Winsted’s disability claim, treating \nphysician Dr. Gopala completed a physical residual func‐\ntional capacity (“RFC”) questionnaire in early 2015 and re‐\nported Winsted suffered from hypertension, COPD, and back \npain, and described Winsted’s prognosis for back pain as \n“poor.” He determined Winsted had a “painful range of \nmovement” and was incapable of performing even “low \nstress” work. Dr. Gopala also wrote that Winsted’s symptoms \nwould affect his attention and concentration frequently; he \ncould walk only about one block; and he could sit or stand for \nonly 15 minutes at a time. \n One of the therapists at the center where Winsted received \ntreatment, Jessica Nevill, filled out a mental RFC question‐\nnaire in April 2015. She opined Winsted had marked impair‐\nments in his abilities to: relate to other people, respond to su‐\npervision, respond to work pressures, and respond appropri‐\nately to changes in the work setting. She wrote Winsted \nwould miss work three to four days per month because of his \nimpairments. \n After the Social Security Administration denied Winsted’s \napplication, he had a hearing before an ALJ. Winsted testified \nhe used an inhaler twice a day, slept with a CPAP machine, \nused a nebulizer for breathing every three months, and con‐\ntinued to smoke a half‐a‐pack of cigarettes per day. He said \nhe could not grip a two‐liter bottle with his left hand. Due to \nthe pain in his knees and feet, he said he could stand for only \na few minutes and, even then, he could not stand still. He also \nsaid he could walk only a few blocks before needing to stop \nand catch his breath, and experienced chest pain three to four \ntimes per week. He noted he has trouble getting along with \npeople and does not like to be around groups. \n\f6 No. 18‐2228 \n\n After Winsted testified, the ALJ asked the vocational ex‐\npert (“VE”) three hypothetical questions. First, the ALJ asked \nthe VE to consider an individual of the same age, education, \nand work experience as Winsted. He continued: \n This hypothetical individual would be capable \n of light work, but four hours maximum stand‐\n ing and walking in an eight hour day, only oc‐\n casional climbing of ramps, and stairs, but no \n ropes, ladders, or scaffolds, only occasional bal‐\n ancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and \n crawling. Frequent, but not constant handling \n and fingering bilaterally. This individual would \n need to avoid concentrated exposure to breath‐\n ing irritants, such as fumes, orders, dust, and \n gasses, as well as wet, slippery surfaces, and un‐\n protected heights and would further be limited \n to only simply reaching, repetitive tasks, with \n few workplace changes, no team work, and no \n interactions with the public. \nThe expert determined such a person could work as a bench \nassembler, electronics worker, or production assembler. In \nthe second hypothetical, the ALJ asked about an individual \nwith the same limitations as in the first hypothetical, but who \nalso “due to impair‐related symptoms, such as the need to lay \ndown during the day to relieve pain would be off task 20% of \nthe work day.” The VE replied that such an individual could \nnot sustain employment. Finally, the ALJ asked about a per‐\nson with all the same limitations as provided in the first hy‐\npothetical, “but due to the frequency of bad days versus good \ndays, this individual would have two unscheduled absences \n\fNo. 18‐2228 7\n\nper month.” Again, the VE answered, “there would be no \njobs.” \n The ALJ conducted the Administration’s 5‐step analysis, \nsee 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a), § 416.920(a), and found Winsted \nnot disabled. At Step 1 the ALJ determined Winsted had not \nengaged in substantial gainful activity since October 22, 2010. \nAt Step 2 the ALJ identified Winsted’s severe impairments as \ndegenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, bilateral carpal \ntunnel syndrome, osteoarthritis in his left knee, bilateral ca‐\nvus foot, COPD, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, an affective \ndisorder, and an anxiety disorder. At Step 3 the ALJ acknowl‐\nedged Winsted had moderate difficulty with social function‐\ning and concentration, persistence, and pace because of his \nmental‐health issues, but concluded these severe impair‐\nments did not meet a listing for presumptive disability. Be‐\ntween Steps 3 and 4 the ALJ determined Winsted had the req‐\nuisite RFC to perform light work with certain limitations (as \nprovided in the first hypothetical, and including being limited \nto “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with few workplace \nchanges, no team work, and no interaction with the public”) \nbut his limitations precluded him from performing his past \nrelevant work (Step 4). At Step 5 the ALJ concluded, based on \nWinsted’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, that he \nwas capable of successfully changing to other work. \n Winsted appealed to the agency’s Appeals Council, which \ndenied review. He then sought judicial review, and the par‐\nties agreed to have a magistrate judge adjudicate this case. \nSee 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That judge upheld the ALJ’s decision. \n\f8 No. 18‐2228 \n\n II. Analysis \n A. ALJ’s Evaluation of Winsted’s Limitations in Concen‐\n tration, Persistence, and Pace \n Winsted argues neither the ALJ’s RFC nor his first \nhypothetical question properly accounted for the finding that \nhe has “moderate” difficulties with concentration, \npersistence, and pace. The ALJ’s proposed limitations—that \nWinsted perform only “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with \nfew workplace changes”—fails, in his view, to address his \nconcentration‐functioning deficits because “both the \nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ’s RFC assessment \nmust incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations supported \nby the medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th \nCir. 2015). \n Winsted’s argument here is correct. Again and again, we \nhave said that when an ALJ finds there are documented limi‐\ntations of concentration, persistence, and pace, the hypothet‐\nical question presented to the VE must account for these lim‐\nitations. Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2018); \nVarga, 794 F.3d at 814–15; OʹConnor‐Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d \n614, 620 (7th Cir. 2010); Stewart v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 679, 684 \n(7th Cir. 2009); Kasarsky v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. \n2003); see also Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1003 (7th Cir. \n2004). We have also made clear that in most cases “employing \nterms like ‘simple, repetitive tasks’ on their own will not nec‐\nessarily exclude from the VE’s consideration those positions \nthat present significant problems of concentration, persis‐\ntence and pace,” and thus, alone, are insufficient to present \nthe claimant’s limitations in this area. OʹConnor‐Spinner, \n627 F.3d at 620; see Moreno, 882 F.3d at 730. Here, at Step 3 the \nALJ found Winsted’s moderate difficulties with \n\fNo. 18‐2228 9\n\nconcentration, persistence, and pace could cause problems \nwith concentration and following written instructions, as well \nas stress with changes in his routine. And Winsted’s psychia‐\ntrist and therapist both remarked that stress caused Winsted \nto “become overwhelmed” and his depression impaired his \noverall functioning. \n But the first hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE did not \ndirect the expert to consider problems with concentration, \npersistence, and pace, which is the hypothetical the ALJ relied \non for the RFC. Though particular words need not be in‐\ncanted, we cannot look at the absence of the phrase “moderate \ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace” and \nfeel confident this limitation was properly incorporated in the \nRFC and in the hypothetical question. See OʹConnor‐Spinner, \n627 F.3d at 619. The ALJ may have thought, as the agency pro‐\nposes, he was addressing Winsted’s concentration difficulties \nby including limitations that would minimize social interac‐\ntion. But that restriction could just have likely been meant to \naccount for Winsted’s moderate difficulty with social func‐\ntioning—the ALJ acknowledged Winsted experiences anxi‐\nety, panic attacks, and irritability when he is around people. \nNothing in the hypothetical question and RFC, however, ac‐\ncounted for the ALJ’s discussion of how Winsted’s low GAF \nscores reflect serious mental‐health symptoms or his mention \nthat Winsted often “appeared tense, anxious, and/or restless” \nwithout interacting with other people. Additionally, where a \nclaimant’s limitations are stress‐related, as Winsted’s appear \nto be, the hypothetical question should account for the level \nof stress a claimant can handle. See Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d \n816, 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2007); Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, \n285, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2002). But there was no restriction related \nto stress in the RFC or hypothetical question. \n\f10 No. 18‐2228 \n\n Notably, it appears the ALJ disregarded testimony from \nthe VE about a person with limitations in concentration, per‐\nsistence, and pace. The ALJ asked two additional hypothetical \nquestions to the VE about an individual who would either be \noff task 20% of the workday or would have two unscheduled \nabsences per month—seemingly having in mind someone \nwith “moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence, \nand pace.” The VE responded that neither individual could \nsustain employment. But these responses are not reflected in \nthe ALJ’s decision. Because the ALJ did not include Winsted’s \ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace in the \nhypothetical he did consider, the decision cannot stand. \n B. ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinion Evidence \n Winsted also challenges the evidentiary weight the ALJ \ngave to four medical opinions, two from treating medical pro‐\nfessionals (Dr. Gopala and Ms. Nevill) and two from state \nagency doctors (examining psychologist Dr. Marlow and con‐\nsultative examiner Dr. Siderys). \n Before reaching the merits of this argument, we must ad‐\ndress the agency’s contention that Winsted waived it. The \nagency is not correct on this; Winsted never “knowingly and \nintelligently relinquished” his claim, Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. \n463, 470 n.4 (2012). That he developed the argument poorly \nmeans at most he forfeited it. Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, \n254 (7th Cir. 2016). \n Forfeited or not, this argument fails. In the decision, the \nALJ adequately articulated why he gave each opinion the \nweight he did, entitling his decision, in this respect, to our def‐\nerence. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413, 416 (7th Cir. \n2008). Starting with Dr. Gopala, the ALJ appropriately \n\fNo. 18‐2228 11\n\nquestioned the doctor’s conclusion—that Winsted had a pain‐\nful range of motion that made him incapable of engaging in \n“low‐stress” work—in light of other record evidence. This in‐\ncluded Dr. Gopala’s own notes, which showed Winsted reg‐\nularly had a full range of motion, no gross sensory or motor \ndeficits, fine motor skills within normal limits, and lungs that \n“have often been clear.” And though treating physician’s \nopinions, like Dr. Gopala’s, are usually entitled to controlling \nweight, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96‐2p,2 an ALJ may \ndiscredit the opinion if it is inconsistent with the record. \nSee Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2016); Camp‐\nbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010); 20 C.F.R. \n§ 404.1527(c)(2). \n Next, Winsted argues the ALJ erred in giving little eviden‐\ntiary weight to Ms. Nevill’s mental RFC assessment. But the \nALJ wrote he discounted Ms. Nevill’s report because she was \na non‐medical professional, and thus not an “acceptable med‐\nical source” See 20 CFR § 404.1513(a), § 416.913(a). Also, her \nfindings were “based solely on [Winsted’s] subjective com‐\nplaints”—an appropriate reason for an ALJ to discount an \nopinion, see Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. \n2008). Additionally, he found Ms. Nevill’s report, like Dr. Go‐\npala’s, was inconsistent with Winsted’s medical‐health record \nas a whole. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012) \n(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)‐(3)). \n\n\n\n \n 2 The treating‐physician rule, which was eliminated for claims \n\nfiled after March 27, 2017, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (2017), still applies to \nWinsted’s earlier filed claim, see Gerstner v. Berryhill, 879 F.3d 257, 261 \n(7th Cir. 2018); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. \n\f12 No. 18‐2228 \n\n Finally, Winsted claims the ALJ gave short shrift to the \ntwo state examiners’ 2013 opinions, asserting the ALJ erred in \ndiscussing the state psychologist’s evaluation “in one sen‐\ntence” and the state physician’s opinion in a footnote. But as \nthe agency points out, the ALJ discussed these opinions \nthroughout the decision. The ALJ cited the state psycholo‐\ngist’s findings when discussing Winsted’s mental‐health di‐\nagnosis, and referred repeatedly to the state physician’s opin‐\nion throughout his discussion of Winsted’s gait, grip strength, \nand scattered wheezing. The court applies a common‐sense \nreading to the entirety of an ALJ’s decision. Rice v. Barnhart, \n384 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004); Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, \n811 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the ALJ adequately articulated his \nreasons for discounting these two opinions—both reports \nwere based on only one evaluation and largely reflected Win‐\nsted’s subjective reporting. See Elder, 529 F.3d at 416; Rice, 384 \nF.3d at 371 (ALJs should rely on medical opinions “based on \nobjective observations,” not “subjective complaints.”); \n20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(i) (ALJs should consider “frequency of \nexamination” in weight it assigns opinion). \n III. Conclusion \n Because the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational \nexaminer and the residual function capacity did not capture \none of Winsted’s most significant problems—his concentra‐\ntion‐functioning deficits—we conclude further proceedings \nare necessary on that issue only. We thus reverse the district \ncourt judgment and remand this case to the Social Security \nAdministration.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2228 \\nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \\nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. \\n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL — Mark J. Dinsmore, Magistrate Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 \\n AS AMENDED ON DENIAL OF REHEARING APRIL 3, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Ronnie Winsted applied for disa‐\\nbility insurance benefits and supplemental security income \\nclaiming disability based on numerous conditions, including \\ndegenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and anxiety. An ad‐\\nministrative law judge denied benefits, finding that Winsted \\ncould work with certain limitations. After the district court \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\nupheld this denial, Winsted appealed, arguing the ALJ did \\nnot consider his difficulties with concentration, persistence, \\nand pace. We agree—the ALJ did not adequately explain how \\nthe limitations he placed on Winsted’s residual functional ca‐\\npacity accounted for the claimant’s mental difficulties, so we \\nremand to the agency. \\n I. Background \\n Winsted was 42 years old when he applied for benefits, \\nasserting an onset date of October 2010. Although he initially \\nalleged he became disabled in 2005, two prior applications al‐\\nleging this onset date were denied and deemed administra‐\\ntively final. \\n Winsted suffers from multiple physical impairments, \\nmostly associated with his previous work in hard labor as an \\nindustrial truck driver, a highway maintenance worker, and \\nan operating engineer. MRIs taken in 2010 and 2011 showed \\nhe had focal, isolated degenerative disc disease. Other tests \\nrevealed osteoarthritis, mild carpal tunnel syndrome in his \\nhands, and cavus (high‐arched) foot that he treats with special \\nshoes. \\n Winsted complained of shortness of breath in May 2011 \\nand was diagnosed with acute bronchitis and chronic obstruc‐\\ntive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). Although he wheezed at \\ntimes, he often responded well to medication. Throughout the \\nrelevant period, Winsted sometimes complained of wheez‐\\ning, but often his lungs were clear. A pulmonary function test \\nin 2013, however, showed Winsted had moderate obstructive \\nlung disease and possibly restrictive lung disease. \\n Winsted began seeing an internist, Dr. Nedu Gopala, for \\nback pain in August 2013. The doctor prescribed medication \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 3\\n\\nfor Winsted’s breathing, chest pain, back pain, and anxiety. \\nAt appointments throughout 2013 and into March 2015, Win‐\\nsted’s range of motion in his arms and legs alternated from \\nfull, to limited. He maintained a chronic cough, mild short‐\\nness of breath, and wheezing, though a 2014 pulmonary func‐\\ntion test did not show any evidence of lung obstruction. \\n To address stress‐related heart issues, Winsted sought \\nmental‐health treatment in 2012. A therapist diagnosed him \\nwith a panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and ma‐\\njor depressive disorder. Winsted had a guarded attitude, \\n“very little insight,” “below average” intellect, and was as‐\\nsigned a Global Assessment of Function (“GAF”) of 51, indi‐\\ncating he had moderate difficulty in social and occupational \\nfunctioning.1 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND \\nSTATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 32 (4th ed. 1994). \\nIn his therapy appointments, Winsted regularly complained \\nabout altercations with neighbors. \\n Later that year, Winsted sought treatment from a psychia‐\\ntrist, who diagnosed major depressive disorder and assigned \\na GAF of 45, indicating a serious impairment in social or oc‐\\ncupational functioning. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra. The \\npsychiatrist reported that Winsted was tense, anxious, “very \\nrestless,” and moderately depressed. He prescribed medica‐\\ntion for anxiety and depression and continued to treat Win‐\\nsted. \\n\\n \\n 1 The GAF, which assesses an “individual’s overall level of func‐\\n\\ntioning,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 n.7 (7th Cir. 2008), no longer is \\nwidely used by psychiatrists and psychologists, but it was sometimes re‐\\nferred to in social security disability hearings during Winsted’s proceed‐\\nings. See Price v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2015). \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Between September 2013 and February 2015, Winsted’s \\nmental health fluctuated. In September 2013, Winsted’s psy‐\\nchiatrist reported that his affect was appropriate, his mood \\nwas not depressed, and “on the whole [he was] doing better.” \\nBut two months later, Winsted’s affect was anxious, his mood \\nwas depressed, he was “feeling more irritable, anxious, and \\nrestless,” and he suffered panic attacks. At a therapy session \\nin July 2014, a therapist reported Winsted’s “symptoms of de‐\\npression and worry impair overall functioning,” and in Au‐\\ngust and November 2014, he was “mildly depressed.” But in \\nFebruary 2015, Winsted presented with an appropriate affect \\nand a not‐depressed mood. The same was true in April 2015, \\nthough Winsted reported he sometimes felt “tense and anx‐\\nious” and stress continued to cause him to “become over‐\\nwhelmed.” \\n The disability application also triggered an examination in \\n2013 from an agency psychologist, Dr. Steven Marlow, who \\ndiagnosed Winsted with major depressive disorder, a gener‐\\nalized anxiety disorder, and a panic disorder. Specifically, he \\nreported Winsted “has a[n] avoidant, hostile, and easily dis‐\\ntracted attitude.” Dr. Marlow determined Winsted had below \\naverage levels of mental control, understanding and memory, \\nand concentration; poor levels of persistence; and he did not \\ndo well in social situations. \\n A state‐agency physician, Dr. George Siderys, also exam‐\\nined Winsted in 2013 and opined he had a mild functional im‐\\npairment. This included: “mild decrease in range of motion,” \\npain that would be “expected to cause him problems with \\nprolonged standing, walking, or heavy lifting,” and a history \\nof heart difficulties that would cause him to “wear out if he \\nparticipated in prolonged walking or lifting.” \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 5\\n\\n In connection with Winsted’s disability claim, treating \\nphysician Dr. Gopala completed a physical residual func‐\\ntional capacity (“RFC”) questionnaire in early 2015 and re‐\\nported Winsted suffered from hypertension, COPD, and back \\npain, and described Winsted’s prognosis for back pain as \\n“poor.” He determined Winsted had a “painful range of \\nmovement” and was incapable of performing even “low \\nstress” work. Dr. Gopala also wrote that Winsted’s symptoms \\nwould affect his attention and concentration frequently; he \\ncould walk only about one block; and he could sit or stand for \\nonly 15 minutes at a time. \\n One of the therapists at the center where Winsted received \\ntreatment, Jessica Nevill, filled out a mental RFC question‐\\nnaire in April 2015. She opined Winsted had marked impair‐\\nments in his abilities to: relate to other people, respond to su‐\\npervision, respond to work pressures, and respond appropri‐\\nately to changes in the work setting. She wrote Winsted \\nwould miss work three to four days per month because of his \\nimpairments. \\n After the Social Security Administration denied Winsted’s \\napplication, he had a hearing before an ALJ. Winsted testified \\nhe used an inhaler twice a day, slept with a CPAP machine, \\nused a nebulizer for breathing every three months, and con‐\\ntinued to smoke a half‐a‐pack of cigarettes per day. He said \\nhe could not grip a two‐liter bottle with his left hand. Due to \\nthe pain in his knees and feet, he said he could stand for only \\na few minutes and, even then, he could not stand still. He also \\nsaid he could walk only a few blocks before needing to stop \\nand catch his breath, and experienced chest pain three to four \\ntimes per week. He noted he has trouble getting along with \\npeople and does not like to be around groups. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n After Winsted testified, the ALJ asked the vocational ex‐\\npert (“VE”) three hypothetical questions. First, the ALJ asked \\nthe VE to consider an individual of the same age, education, \\nand work experience as Winsted. He continued: \\n This hypothetical individual would be capable \\n of light work, but four hours maximum stand‐\\n ing and walking in an eight hour day, only oc‐\\n casional climbing of ramps, and stairs, but no \\n ropes, ladders, or scaffolds, only occasional bal‐\\n ancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and \\n crawling. Frequent, but not constant handling \\n and fingering bilaterally. This individual would \\n need to avoid concentrated exposure to breath‐\\n ing irritants, such as fumes, orders, dust, and \\n gasses, as well as wet, slippery surfaces, and un‐\\n protected heights and would further be limited \\n to only simply reaching, repetitive tasks, with \\n few workplace changes, no team work, and no \\n interactions with the public. \\nThe expert determined such a person could work as a bench \\nassembler, electronics worker, or production assembler. In \\nthe second hypothetical, the ALJ asked about an individual \\nwith the same limitations as in the first hypothetical, but who \\nalso “due to impair‐related symptoms, such as the need to lay \\ndown during the day to relieve pain would be off task 20% of \\nthe work day.” The VE replied that such an individual could \\nnot sustain employment. Finally, the ALJ asked about a per‐\\nson with all the same limitations as provided in the first hy‐\\npothetical, “but due to the frequency of bad days versus good \\ndays, this individual would have two unscheduled absences \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 7\\n\\nper month.” Again, the VE answered, “there would be no \\njobs.” \\n The ALJ conducted the Administration’s 5‐step analysis, \\nsee 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a), § 416.920(a), and found Winsted \\nnot disabled. At Step 1 the ALJ determined Winsted had not \\nengaged in substantial gainful activity since October 22, 2010. \\nAt Step 2 the ALJ identified Winsted’s severe impairments as \\ndegenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, bilateral carpal \\ntunnel syndrome, osteoarthritis in his left knee, bilateral ca‐\\nvus foot, COPD, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, an affective \\ndisorder, and an anxiety disorder. At Step 3 the ALJ acknowl‐\\nedged Winsted had moderate difficulty with social function‐\\ning and concentration, persistence, and pace because of his \\nmental‐health issues, but concluded these severe impair‐\\nments did not meet a listing for presumptive disability. Be‐\\ntween Steps 3 and 4 the ALJ determined Winsted had the req‐\\nuisite RFC to perform light work with certain limitations (as \\nprovided in the first hypothetical, and including being limited \\nto “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with few workplace \\nchanges, no team work, and no interaction with the public”) \\nbut his limitations precluded him from performing his past \\nrelevant work (Step 4). At Step 5 the ALJ concluded, based on \\nWinsted’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, that he \\nwas capable of successfully changing to other work. \\n Winsted appealed to the agency’s Appeals Council, which \\ndenied review. He then sought judicial review, and the par‐\\nties agreed to have a magistrate judge adjudicate this case. \\nSee 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That judge upheld the ALJ’s decision. \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n II. Analysis \\n A. ALJ’s Evaluation of Winsted’s Limitations in Concen‐\\n tration, Persistence, and Pace \\n Winsted argues neither the ALJ’s RFC nor his first \\nhypothetical question properly accounted for the finding that \\nhe has “moderate” difficulties with concentration, \\npersistence, and pace. The ALJ’s proposed limitations—that \\nWinsted perform only “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with \\nfew workplace changes”—fails, in his view, to address his \\nconcentration‐functioning deficits because “both the \\nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ’s RFC assessment \\nmust incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations supported \\nby the medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th \\nCir. 2015). \\n Winsted’s argument here is correct. Again and again, we \\nhave said that when an ALJ finds there are documented limi‐\\ntations of concentration, persistence, and pace, the hypothet‐\\nical question presented to the VE must account for these lim‐\\nitations. Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2018); \\nVarga, 794 F.3d at 814–15; OʹConnor‐Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d \\n614, 620 (7th Cir. 2010); Stewart v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 679, 684 \\n(7th Cir. 2009); Kasarsky v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. \\n2003); see also Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1003 (7th Cir. \\n2004). We have also made clear that in most cases “employing \\nterms like ‘simple, repetitive tasks’ on their own will not nec‐\\nessarily exclude from the VE’s consideration those positions \\nthat present significant problems of concentration, persis‐\\ntence and pace,” and thus, alone, are insufficient to present \\nthe claimant’s limitations in this area. OʹConnor‐Spinner, \\n627 F.3d at 620; see Moreno, 882 F.3d at 730. Here, at Step 3 the \\nALJ found Winsted’s moderate difficulties with \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 9\\n\\nconcentration, persistence, and pace could cause problems \\nwith concentration and following written instructions, as well \\nas stress with changes in his routine. And Winsted’s psychia‐\\ntrist and therapist both remarked that stress caused Winsted \\nto “become overwhelmed” and his depression impaired his \\noverall functioning. \\n But the first hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE did not \\ndirect the expert to consider problems with concentration, \\npersistence, and pace, which is the hypothetical the ALJ relied \\non for the RFC. Though particular words need not be in‐\\ncanted, we cannot look at the absence of the phrase “moderate \\ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace” and \\nfeel confident this limitation was properly incorporated in the \\nRFC and in the hypothetical question. See OʹConnor‐Spinner, \\n627 F.3d at 619. The ALJ may have thought, as the agency pro‐\\nposes, he was addressing Winsted’s concentration difficulties \\nby including limitations that would minimize social interac‐\\ntion. But that restriction could just have likely been meant to \\naccount for Winsted’s moderate difficulty with social func‐\\ntioning—the ALJ acknowledged Winsted experiences anxi‐\\nety, panic attacks, and irritability when he is around people. \\nNothing in the hypothetical question and RFC, however, ac‐\\ncounted for the ALJ’s discussion of how Winsted’s low GAF \\nscores reflect serious mental‐health symptoms or his mention \\nthat Winsted often “appeared tense, anxious, and/or restless” \\nwithout interacting with other people. Additionally, where a \\nclaimant’s limitations are stress‐related, as Winsted’s appear \\nto be, the hypothetical question should account for the level \\nof stress a claimant can handle. See Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d \\n816, 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2007); Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, \\n285, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2002). But there was no restriction related \\nto stress in the RFC or hypothetical question. \\n\\f10 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Notably, it appears the ALJ disregarded testimony from \\nthe VE about a person with limitations in concentration, per‐\\nsistence, and pace. The ALJ asked two additional hypothetical \\nquestions to the VE about an individual who would either be \\noff task 20% of the workday or would have two unscheduled \\nabsences per month—seemingly having in mind someone \\nwith “moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence, \\nand pace.” The VE responded that neither individual could \\nsustain employment. But these responses are not reflected in \\nthe ALJ’s decision. Because the ALJ did not include Winsted’s \\ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace in the \\nhypothetical he did consider, the decision cannot stand. \\n B. ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinion Evidence \\n Winsted also challenges the evidentiary weight the ALJ \\ngave to four medical opinions, two from treating medical pro‐\\nfessionals (Dr. Gopala and Ms. Nevill) and two from state \\nagency doctors (examining psychologist Dr. Marlow and con‐\\nsultative examiner Dr. Siderys). \\n Before reaching the merits of this argument, we must ad‐\\ndress the agency’s contention that Winsted waived it. The \\nagency is not correct on this; Winsted never “knowingly and \\nintelligently relinquished” his claim, Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. \\n463, 470 n.4 (2012). That he developed the argument poorly \\nmeans at most he forfeited it. Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, \\n254 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n Forfeited or not, this argument fails. In the decision, the \\nALJ adequately articulated why he gave each opinion the \\nweight he did, entitling his decision, in this respect, to our def‐\\nerence. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413, 416 (7th Cir. \\n2008). Starting with Dr. Gopala, the ALJ appropriately \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 11\\n\\nquestioned the doctor’s conclusion—that Winsted had a pain‐\\nful range of motion that made him incapable of engaging in \\n“low‐stress” work—in light of other record evidence. This in‐\\ncluded Dr. Gopala’s own notes, which showed Winsted reg‐\\nularly had a full range of motion, no gross sensory or motor \\ndeficits, fine motor skills within normal limits, and lungs that \\n“have often been clear.” And though treating physician’s \\nopinions, like Dr. Gopala’s, are usually entitled to controlling \\nweight, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96‐2p,2 an ALJ may \\ndiscredit the opinion if it is inconsistent with the record. \\nSee Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2016); Camp‐\\nbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010); 20 C.F.R. \\n§ 404.1527(c)(2). \\n Next, Winsted argues the ALJ erred in giving little eviden‐\\ntiary weight to Ms. Nevill’s mental RFC assessment. But the \\nALJ wrote he discounted Ms. Nevill’s report because she was \\na non‐medical professional, and thus not an “acceptable med‐\\nical source” See 20 CFR § 404.1513(a), § 416.913(a). Also, her \\nfindings were “based solely on [Winsted’s] subjective com‐\\nplaints”—an appropriate reason for an ALJ to discount an \\nopinion, see Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. \\n2008). Additionally, he found Ms. Nevill’s report, like Dr. Go‐\\npala’s, was inconsistent with Winsted’s medical‐health record \\nas a whole. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012) \\n(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)‐(3)). \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 2 The treating‐physician rule, which was eliminated for claims \\n\\nfiled after March 27, 2017, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (2017), still applies to \\nWinsted’s earlier filed claim, see Gerstner v. Berryhill, 879 F.3d 257, 261 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. \\n\\f12 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Finally, Winsted claims the ALJ gave short shrift to the \\ntwo state examiners’ 2013 opinions, asserting the ALJ erred in \\ndiscussing the state psychologist’s evaluation “in one sen‐\\ntence” and the state physician’s opinion in a footnote. But as \\nthe agency points out, the ALJ discussed these opinions \\nthroughout the decision. The ALJ cited the state psycholo‐\\ngist’s findings when discussing Winsted’s mental‐health di‐\\nagnosis, and referred repeatedly to the state physician’s opin‐\\nion throughout his discussion of Winsted’s gait, grip strength, \\nand scattered wheezing. The court applies a common‐sense \\nreading to the entirety of an ALJ’s decision. Rice v. Barnhart, \\n384 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004); Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, \\n811 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the ALJ adequately articulated his \\nreasons for discounting these two opinions—both reports \\nwere based on only one evaluation and largely reflected Win‐\\nsted’s subjective reporting. See Elder, 529 F.3d at 416; Rice, 384 \\nF.3d at 371 (ALJs should rely on medical opinions “based on \\nobjective observations,” not “subjective complaints.”); \\n20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(i) (ALJs should consider “frequency of \\nexamination” in weight it assigns opinion). \\n III. Conclusion \\n Because the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational \\nexaminer and the residual function capacity did not capture \\none of Winsted’s most significant problems—his concentra‐\\ntion‐functioning deficits—we conclude further proceedings \\nare necessary on that issue only. We thus reverse the district \\ncourt judgment and remand this case to the Social Security \\nAdministration.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1683,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4606659,"string":"4,606,659"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2228"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge No.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Magistrate Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit \\n Chicago, Illinois 60604 \\n \\n April 3, 2019 \\n \\n Before \\n \\n DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge \\n \\n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge \\n \\n MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge \\n \\n \\nNo. 18‐2228 \\n Appeal from the \\nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., United States District Court for the \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute \\n Division. \\n v. \\n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL \\n \\n \\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \\n Mark J. Dinsmore, \\nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \\n Magistrate Judge. \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n \\n \\n \\n O R D E R \\n \\n Defendant‐appellee filed a petition for rehearing on March 25, 2019. All of the \\njudges on the panel have voted to deny rehearing and to issue an amended opinion. \\nThis court’s opinion dated February 8, 2019, is amended in a separately filed opinion \\nreleased today. \\n \\n The petition for rehearing is therefore DENIED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383912/\", \"author_raw\": \"Magistrate Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"DANIEL A MANION"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MICHAEL B BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MICHAEL Y SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"DANIEL A MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"MICHAEL B BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\", \"MICHAEL Y SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606659/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit \n Chicago, Illinois 60604 \n \n April 3, 2019 \n \n Before \n \n DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge \n \n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge \n \n MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge \n \n \nNo. 18‐2228 \n Appeal from the \nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., United States District Court for the \n Plaintiff‐Appellant, Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute \n Division. \n v. \n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL \n \n \nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \n Mark J. Dinsmore, \nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \n Magistrate Judge. \n Defendant‐Appellee. \n \n \n \n O R D E R \n \n Defendant‐appellee filed a petition for rehearing on March 25, 2019. All of the \njudges on the panel have voted to deny rehearing and to issue an amended opinion. \nThis court’s opinion dated February 8, 2019, is amended in a separately filed opinion \nreleased today. \n \n The petition for rehearing is therefore DENIED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit \\n Chicago, Illinois 60604 \\n \\n April 3, 2019 \\n \\n Before \\n \\n DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge \\n \\n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge \\n \\n MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge \\n \\n \\nNo. 18‐2228 \\n Appeal from the \\nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., United States District Court for the \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute \\n Division. \\n v. \\n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL \\n \\n \\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \\n Mark J. Dinsmore, \\nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \\n Magistrate Judge. \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n \\n \\n \\n O R D E R \\n \\n Defendant‐appellee filed a petition for rehearing on March 25, 2019. All of the \\njudges on the panel have voted to deny rehearing and to issue an amended opinion. \\nThis court’s opinion dated February 8, 2019, is amended in a separately filed opinion \\nreleased today. \\n \\n The petition for rehearing is therefore DENIED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1684,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4606660,"string":"4,606,660"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2228"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2228 \\nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \\nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. \\n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL — Mark J. Dinsmore, Magistrate Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 \\n AS AMENDED ON DENIAL OF REHEARING APRIL 3, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Ronnie Winsted applied for disa‐\\nbility insurance benefits and supplemental security income \\nclaiming disability based on numerous conditions, including \\ndegenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and anxiety. An ad‐\\nministrative law judge denied benefits, finding that Winsted \\ncould work with certain limitations. After the district court \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\nupheld this denial, Winsted appealed, arguing the ALJ did \\nnot consider his difficulties with concentration, persistence, \\nand pace. We agree—the ALJ did not adequately explain how \\nthe limitations he placed on Winsted’s residual functional ca‐\\npacity accounted for the claimant’s mental difficulties, so we \\nremand to the agency. \\n I. Background \\n Winsted was 42 years old when he applied for benefits, \\nasserting an onset date of October 2010. Although he initially \\nalleged he became disabled in 2005, two prior applications al‐\\nleging this onset date were denied and deemed administra‐\\ntively final. \\n Winsted suffers from multiple physical impairments, \\nmostly associated with his previous work in hard labor as an \\nindustrial truck driver, a highway maintenance worker, and \\nan operating engineer. MRIs taken in 2010 and 2011 showed \\nhe had focal, isolated degenerative disc disease. Other tests \\nrevealed osteoarthritis, mild carpal tunnel syndrome in his \\nhands, and cavus (high‐arched) foot that he treats with special \\nshoes. \\n Winsted complained of shortness of breath in May 2011 \\nand was diagnosed with acute bronchitis and chronic obstruc‐\\ntive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). Although he wheezed at \\ntimes, he often responded well to medication. Throughout the \\nrelevant period, Winsted sometimes complained of wheez‐\\ning, but often his lungs were clear. A pulmonary function test \\nin 2013, however, showed Winsted had moderate obstructive \\nlung disease and possibly restrictive lung disease. \\n Winsted began seeing an internist, Dr. Nedu Gopala, for \\nback pain in August 2013. The doctor prescribed medication \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 3\\n\\nfor Winsted’s breathing, chest pain, back pain, and anxiety. \\nAt appointments throughout 2013 and into March 2015, Win‐\\nsted’s range of motion in his arms and legs alternated from \\nfull, to limited. He maintained a chronic cough, mild short‐\\nness of breath, and wheezing, though a 2014 pulmonary func‐\\ntion test did not show any evidence of lung obstruction. \\n To address stress‐related heart issues, Winsted sought \\nmental‐health treatment in 2012. A therapist diagnosed him \\nwith a panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and ma‐\\njor depressive disorder. Winsted had a guarded attitude, \\n“very little insight,” “below average” intellect, and was as‐\\nsigned a Global Assessment of Function (“GAF”) of 51, indi‐\\ncating he had moderate difficulty in social and occupational \\nfunctioning.1 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND \\nSTATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 32 (4th ed. 1994). \\nIn his therapy appointments, Winsted regularly complained \\nabout altercations with neighbors. \\n Later that year, Winsted sought treatment from a psychia‐\\ntrist, who diagnosed major depressive disorder and assigned \\na GAF of 45, indicating a serious impairment in social or oc‐\\ncupational functioning. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra. The \\npsychiatrist reported that Winsted was tense, anxious, “very \\nrestless,” and moderately depressed. He prescribed medica‐\\ntion for anxiety and depression and continued to treat Win‐\\nsted. \\n\\n \\n 1 The GAF, which assesses an “individual’s overall level of func‐\\n\\ntioning,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 n.7 (7th Cir. 2008), no longer is \\nwidely used by psychiatrists and psychologists, but it was sometimes re‐\\nferred to in social security disability hearings during Winsted’s proceed‐\\nings. See Price v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2015). \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Between September 2013 and February 2015, Winsted’s \\nmental health fluctuated. In September 2013, Winsted’s psy‐\\nchiatrist reported that his affect was appropriate, his mood \\nwas not depressed, and “on the whole [he was] doing better.” \\nBut two months later, Winsted’s affect was anxious, his mood \\nwas depressed, he was “feeling more irritable, anxious, and \\nrestless,” and he suffered panic attacks. At a therapy session \\nin July 2014, a therapist reported Winsted’s “symptoms of de‐\\npression and worry impair overall functioning,” and in Au‐\\ngust and November 2014, he was “mildly depressed.” But in \\nFebruary 2015, Winsted presented with an appropriate affect \\nand a not‐depressed mood. The same was true in April 2015, \\nthough Winsted reported he sometimes felt “tense and anx‐\\nious” and stress continued to cause him to “become over‐\\nwhelmed.” \\n The disability application also triggered an examination in \\n2013 from an agency psychologist, Dr. Steven Marlow, who \\ndiagnosed Winsted with major depressive disorder, a gener‐\\nalized anxiety disorder, and a panic disorder. Specifically, he \\nreported Winsted “has a[n] avoidant, hostile, and easily dis‐\\ntracted attitude.” Dr. Marlow determined Winsted had below \\naverage levels of mental control, understanding and memory, \\nand concentration; poor levels of persistence; and he did not \\ndo well in social situations. \\n A state‐agency physician, Dr. George Siderys, also exam‐\\nined Winsted in 2013 and opined he had a mild functional im‐\\npairment. This included: “mild decrease in range of motion,” \\npain that would be “expected to cause him problems with \\nprolonged standing, walking, or heavy lifting,” and a history \\nof heart difficulties that would cause him to “wear out if he \\nparticipated in prolonged walking or lifting.” \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 5\\n\\n In connection with Winsted’s disability claim, treating \\nphysician Dr. Gopala completed a physical residual func‐\\ntional capacity (“RFC”) questionnaire in early 2015 and re‐\\nported Winsted suffered from hypertension, COPD, and back \\npain, and described Winsted’s prognosis for back pain as \\n“poor.” He determined Winsted had a “painful range of \\nmovement” and was incapable of performing even “low \\nstress” work. Dr. Gopala also wrote that Winsted’s symptoms \\nwould affect his attention and concentration frequently; he \\ncould walk only about one block; and he could sit or stand for \\nonly 15 minutes at a time. \\n One of the therapists at the center where Winsted received \\ntreatment, Jessica Nevill, filled out a mental RFC question‐\\nnaire in April 2015. She opined Winsted had marked impair‐\\nments in his abilities to: relate to other people, respond to su‐\\npervision, respond to work pressures, and respond appropri‐\\nately to changes in the work setting. She wrote Winsted \\nwould miss work three to four days per month because of his \\nimpairments. \\n After the Social Security Administration denied Winsted’s \\napplication, he had a hearing before an ALJ. Winsted testified \\nhe used an inhaler twice a day, slept with a CPAP machine, \\nused a nebulizer for breathing every three months, and con‐\\ntinued to smoke a half‐a‐pack of cigarettes per day. He said \\nhe could not grip a two‐liter bottle with his left hand. Due to \\nthe pain in his knees and feet, he said he could stand for only \\na few minutes and, even then, he could not stand still. He also \\nsaid he could walk only a few blocks before needing to stop \\nand catch his breath, and experienced chest pain three to four \\ntimes per week. He noted he has trouble getting along with \\npeople and does not like to be around groups. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n After Winsted testified, the ALJ asked the vocational ex‐\\npert (“VE”) three hypothetical questions. First, the ALJ asked \\nthe VE to consider an individual of the same age, education, \\nand work experience as Winsted. He continued: \\n This hypothetical individual would be capable \\n of light work, but four hours maximum stand‐\\n ing and walking in an eight hour day, only oc‐\\n casional climbing of ramps, and stairs, but no \\n ropes, ladders, or scaffolds, only occasional bal‐\\n ancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and \\n crawling. Frequent, but not constant handling \\n and fingering bilaterally. This individual would \\n need to avoid concentrated exposure to breath‐\\n ing irritants, such as fumes, orders, dust, and \\n gasses, as well as wet, slippery surfaces, and un‐\\n protected heights and would further be limited \\n to only simply reaching, repetitive tasks, with \\n few workplace changes, no team work, and no \\n interactions with the public. \\nThe expert determined such a person could work as a bench \\nassembler, electronics worker, or production assembler. In \\nthe second hypothetical, the ALJ asked about an individual \\nwith the same limitations as in the first hypothetical, but who \\nalso “due to impair‐related symptoms, such as the need to lay \\ndown during the day to relieve pain would be off task 20% of \\nthe work day.” The VE replied that such an individual could \\nnot sustain employment. Finally, the ALJ asked about a per‐\\nson with all the same limitations as provided in the first hy‐\\npothetical, “but due to the frequency of bad days versus good \\ndays, this individual would have two unscheduled absences \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 7\\n\\nper month.” Again, the VE answered, “there would be no \\njobs.” \\n The ALJ conducted the Administration’s 5‐step analysis, \\nsee 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a), § 416.920(a), and found Winsted \\nnot disabled. At Step 1 the ALJ determined Winsted had not \\nengaged in substantial gainful activity since October 22, 2010. \\nAt Step 2 the ALJ identified Winsted’s severe impairments as \\ndegenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, bilateral carpal \\ntunnel syndrome, osteoarthritis in his left knee, bilateral ca‐\\nvus foot, COPD, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, an affective \\ndisorder, and an anxiety disorder. At Step 3 the ALJ acknowl‐\\nedged Winsted had moderate difficulty with social function‐\\ning and concentration, persistence, and pace because of his \\nmental‐health issues, but concluded these severe impair‐\\nments did not meet a listing for presumptive disability. Be‐\\ntween Steps 3 and 4 the ALJ determined Winsted had the req‐\\nuisite RFC to perform light work with certain limitations (as \\nprovided in the first hypothetical, and including being limited \\nto “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with few workplace \\nchanges, no team work, and no interaction with the public”) \\nbut his limitations precluded him from performing his past \\nrelevant work (Step 4). At Step 5 the ALJ concluded, based on \\nWinsted’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, that he \\nwas capable of successfully changing to other work. \\n Winsted appealed to the agency’s Appeals Council, which \\ndenied review. He then sought judicial review, and the par‐\\nties agreed to have a magistrate judge adjudicate this case. \\nSee 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That judge upheld the ALJ’s decision. \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n II. Analysis \\n A. ALJ’s Evaluation of Winsted’s Limitations in Concen‐\\n tration, Persistence, and Pace \\n Winsted argues neither the ALJ’s RFC nor his first \\nhypothetical question properly accounted for the finding that \\nhe has “moderate” difficulties with concentration, \\npersistence, and pace. The ALJ’s proposed limitations—that \\nWinsted perform only “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with \\nfew workplace changes”—fails, in his view, to address his \\nconcentration‐functioning deficits because “both the \\nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ’s RFC assessment \\nmust incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations supported \\nby the medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th \\nCir. 2015). \\n Winsted’s argument here is correct. Again and again, we \\nhave said that when an ALJ finds there are documented limi‐\\ntations of concentration, persistence, and pace, the hypothet‐\\nical question presented to the VE must account for these lim‐\\nitations. Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2018); \\nVarga, 794 F.3d at 814–15; OʹConnor‐Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d \\n614, 620 (7th Cir. 2010); Stewart v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 679, 684 \\n(7th Cir. 2009); Kasarsky v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. \\n2003); see also Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1003 (7th Cir. \\n2004). We have also made clear that in most cases “employing \\nterms like ‘simple, repetitive tasks’ on their own will not nec‐\\nessarily exclude from the VE’s consideration those positions \\nthat present significant problems of concentration, persis‐\\ntence and pace,” and thus, alone, are insufficient to present \\nthe claimant’s limitations in this area. OʹConnor‐Spinner, \\n627 F.3d at 620; see Moreno, 882 F.3d at 730. Here, at Step 3 the \\nALJ found Winsted’s moderate difficulties with \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 9\\n\\nconcentration, persistence, and pace could cause problems \\nwith concentration and following written instructions, as well \\nas stress with changes in his routine. And Winsted’s psychia‐\\ntrist and therapist both remarked that stress caused Winsted \\nto “become overwhelmed” and his depression impaired his \\noverall functioning. \\n But the first hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE did not \\ndirect the expert to consider problems with concentration, \\npersistence, and pace, which is the hypothetical the ALJ relied \\non for the RFC. Though particular words need not be in‐\\ncanted, we cannot look at the absence of the phrase “moderate \\ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace” and \\nfeel confident this limitation was properly incorporated in the \\nRFC and in the hypothetical question. See OʹConnor‐Spinner, \\n627 F.3d at 619. The ALJ may have thought, as the agency pro‐\\nposes, he was addressing Winsted’s concentration difficulties \\nby including limitations that would minimize social interac‐\\ntion. But that restriction could just have likely been meant to \\naccount for Winsted’s moderate difficulty with social func‐\\ntioning—the ALJ acknowledged Winsted experiences anxi‐\\nety, panic attacks, and irritability when he is around people. \\nNothing in the hypothetical question and RFC, however, ac‐\\ncounted for the ALJ’s discussion of how Winsted’s low GAF \\nscores reflect serious mental‐health symptoms or his mention \\nthat Winsted often “appeared tense, anxious, and/or restless” \\nwithout interacting with other people. Additionally, where a \\nclaimant’s limitations are stress‐related, as Winsted’s appear \\nto be, the hypothetical question should account for the level \\nof stress a claimant can handle. See Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d \\n816, 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2007); Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, \\n285, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2002). But there was no restriction related \\nto stress in the RFC or hypothetical question. \\n\\f10 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Notably, it appears the ALJ disregarded testimony from \\nthe VE about a person with limitations in concentration, per‐\\nsistence, and pace. The ALJ asked two additional hypothetical \\nquestions to the VE about an individual who would either be \\noff task 20% of the workday or would have two unscheduled \\nabsences per month—seemingly having in mind someone \\nwith “moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence, \\nand pace.” The VE responded that neither individual could \\nsustain employment. But these responses are not reflected in \\nthe ALJ’s decision. Because the ALJ did not include Winsted’s \\ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace in the \\nhypothetical he did consider, the decision cannot stand. \\n B. ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinion Evidence \\n Winsted also challenges the evidentiary weight the ALJ \\ngave to four medical opinions, two from treating medical pro‐\\nfessionals (Dr. Gopala and Ms. Nevill) and two from state \\nagency doctors (examining psychologist Dr. Marlow and con‐\\nsultative examiner Dr. Siderys). \\n Before reaching the merits of this argument, we must ad‐\\ndress the agency’s contention that Winsted waived it. The \\nagency is not correct on this; Winsted never “knowingly and \\nintelligently relinquished” his claim, Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. \\n463, 470 n.4 (2012). That he developed the argument poorly \\nmeans at most he forfeited it. Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, \\n254 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n Forfeited or not, this argument fails. In the decision, the \\nALJ adequately articulated why he gave each opinion the \\nweight he did, entitling his decision, in this respect, to our def‐\\nerence. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413, 416 (7th Cir. \\n2008). Starting with Dr. Gopala, the ALJ appropriately \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 11\\n\\nquestioned the doctor’s conclusion—that Winsted had a pain‐\\nful range of motion that made him incapable of engaging in \\n“low‐stress” work—in light of other record evidence. This in‐\\ncluded Dr. Gopala’s own notes, which showed Winsted reg‐\\nularly had a full range of motion, no gross sensory or motor \\ndeficits, fine motor skills within normal limits, and lungs that \\n“have often been clear.” And though treating physician’s \\nopinions, like Dr. Gopala’s, are usually entitled to controlling \\nweight, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96‐2p,2 an ALJ may \\ndiscredit the opinion if it is inconsistent with the record. \\nSee Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2016); Camp‐\\nbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010); 20 C.F.R. \\n§ 404.1527(c)(2). \\n Next, Winsted argues the ALJ erred in giving little eviden‐\\ntiary weight to Ms. Nevill’s mental RFC assessment. But the \\nALJ wrote he discounted Ms. Nevill’s report because she was \\na non‐medical professional, and thus not an “acceptable med‐\\nical source” See 20 CFR § 404.1513(a), § 416.913(a). Also, her \\nfindings were “based solely on [Winsted’s] subjective com‐\\nplaints”—an appropriate reason for an ALJ to discount an \\nopinion, see Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. \\n2008). Additionally, he found Ms. Nevill’s report, like Dr. Go‐\\npala’s, was inconsistent with Winsted’s medical‐health record \\nas a whole. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012) \\n(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)‐(3)). \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 2 The treating‐physician rule, which was eliminated for claims \\n\\nfiled after March 27, 2017, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (2017), still applies to \\nWinsted’s earlier filed claim, see Gerstner v. Berryhill, 879 F.3d 257, 261 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. \\n\\f12 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Finally, Winsted claims the ALJ gave short shrift to the \\ntwo state examiners’ 2013 opinions, asserting the ALJ erred in \\ndiscussing the state psychologist’s evaluation “in one sen‐\\ntence” and the state physician’s opinion in a footnote. But as \\nthe agency points out, the ALJ discussed these opinions \\nthroughout the decision. The ALJ cited the state psycholo‐\\ngist’s findings when discussing Winsted’s mental‐health di‐\\nagnosis, and referred repeatedly to the state physician’s opin‐\\nion throughout his discussion of Winsted’s gait, grip strength, \\nand scattered wheezing. The court applies a common‐sense \\nreading to the entirety of an ALJ’s decision. Rice v. Barnhart, \\n384 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004); Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, \\n811 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the ALJ adequately articulated his \\nreasons for discounting these two opinions—both reports \\nwere based on only one evaluation and largely reflected Win‐\\nsted’s subjective reporting. See Elder, 529 F.3d at 416; Rice, 384 \\nF.3d at 371 (ALJs should rely on medical opinions “based on \\nobjective observations,” not “subjective complaints.”); \\n20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(i) (ALJs should consider “frequency of \\nexamination” in weight it assigns opinion). \\n III. Conclusion \\n Because the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational \\nexaminer and the residual function capacity did not capture \\none of Winsted’s most significant problems—his concentra‐\\ntion‐functioning deficits—we conclude further proceedings \\nare necessary on that issue only. We thus reverse the district \\ncourt judgment and remand this case to the Social Security \\nAdministration.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383913/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606660/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐2228 \nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., \n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \n v. \n\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \n Defendant‐Appellee. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. \n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL — Mark J. Dinsmore, Magistrate Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 \n AS AMENDED ON DENIAL OF REHEARING APRIL 3, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Ronnie Winsted applied for disa‐\nbility insurance benefits and supplemental security income \nclaiming disability based on numerous conditions, including \ndegenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and anxiety. An ad‐\nministrative law judge denied benefits, finding that Winsted \ncould work with certain limitations. After the district court \n\f2 No. 18‐2228 \n\nupheld this denial, Winsted appealed, arguing the ALJ did \nnot consider his difficulties with concentration, persistence, \nand pace. We agree—the ALJ did not adequately explain how \nthe limitations he placed on Winsted’s residual functional ca‐\npacity accounted for the claimant’s mental difficulties, so we \nremand to the agency. \n I. Background \n Winsted was 42 years old when he applied for benefits, \nasserting an onset date of October 2010. Although he initially \nalleged he became disabled in 2005, two prior applications al‐\nleging this onset date were denied and deemed administra‐\ntively final. \n Winsted suffers from multiple physical impairments, \nmostly associated with his previous work in hard labor as an \nindustrial truck driver, a highway maintenance worker, and \nan operating engineer. MRIs taken in 2010 and 2011 showed \nhe had focal, isolated degenerative disc disease. Other tests \nrevealed osteoarthritis, mild carpal tunnel syndrome in his \nhands, and cavus (high‐arched) foot that he treats with special \nshoes. \n Winsted complained of shortness of breath in May 2011 \nand was diagnosed with acute bronchitis and chronic obstruc‐\ntive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). Although he wheezed at \ntimes, he often responded well to medication. Throughout the \nrelevant period, Winsted sometimes complained of wheez‐\ning, but often his lungs were clear. A pulmonary function test \nin 2013, however, showed Winsted had moderate obstructive \nlung disease and possibly restrictive lung disease. \n Winsted began seeing an internist, Dr. Nedu Gopala, for \nback pain in August 2013. The doctor prescribed medication \n\fNo. 18‐2228 3\n\nfor Winsted’s breathing, chest pain, back pain, and anxiety. \nAt appointments throughout 2013 and into March 2015, Win‐\nsted’s range of motion in his arms and legs alternated from \nfull, to limited. He maintained a chronic cough, mild short‐\nness of breath, and wheezing, though a 2014 pulmonary func‐\ntion test did not show any evidence of lung obstruction. \n To address stress‐related heart issues, Winsted sought \nmental‐health treatment in 2012. A therapist diagnosed him \nwith a panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and ma‐\njor depressive disorder. Winsted had a guarded attitude, \n“very little insight,” “below average” intellect, and was as‐\nsigned a Global Assessment of Function (“GAF”) of 51, indi‐\ncating he had moderate difficulty in social and occupational \nfunctioning.1 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND \nSTATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 32 (4th ed. 1994). \nIn his therapy appointments, Winsted regularly complained \nabout altercations with neighbors. \n Later that year, Winsted sought treatment from a psychia‐\ntrist, who diagnosed major depressive disorder and assigned \na GAF of 45, indicating a serious impairment in social or oc‐\ncupational functioning. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra. The \npsychiatrist reported that Winsted was tense, anxious, “very \nrestless,” and moderately depressed. He prescribed medica‐\ntion for anxiety and depression and continued to treat Win‐\nsted. \n\n \n 1 The GAF, which assesses an “individual’s overall level of func‐\n\ntioning,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 n.7 (7th Cir. 2008), no longer is \nwidely used by psychiatrists and psychologists, but it was sometimes re‐\nferred to in social security disability hearings during Winsted’s proceed‐\nings. See Price v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2015). \n\f4 No. 18‐2228 \n\n Between September 2013 and February 2015, Winsted’s \nmental health fluctuated. In September 2013, Winsted’s psy‐\nchiatrist reported that his affect was appropriate, his mood \nwas not depressed, and “on the whole [he was] doing better.” \nBut two months later, Winsted’s affect was anxious, his mood \nwas depressed, he was “feeling more irritable, anxious, and \nrestless,” and he suffered panic attacks. At a therapy session \nin July 2014, a therapist reported Winsted’s “symptoms of de‐\npression and worry impair overall functioning,” and in Au‐\ngust and November 2014, he was “mildly depressed.” But in \nFebruary 2015, Winsted presented with an appropriate affect \nand a not‐depressed mood. The same was true in April 2015, \nthough Winsted reported he sometimes felt “tense and anx‐\nious” and stress continued to cause him to “become over‐\nwhelmed.” \n The disability application also triggered an examination in \n2013 from an agency psychologist, Dr. Steven Marlow, who \ndiagnosed Winsted with major depressive disorder, a gener‐\nalized anxiety disorder, and a panic disorder. Specifically, he \nreported Winsted “has a[n] avoidant, hostile, and easily dis‐\ntracted attitude.” Dr. Marlow determined Winsted had below \naverage levels of mental control, understanding and memory, \nand concentration; poor levels of persistence; and he did not \ndo well in social situations. \n A state‐agency physician, Dr. George Siderys, also exam‐\nined Winsted in 2013 and opined he had a mild functional im‐\npairment. This included: “mild decrease in range of motion,” \npain that would be “expected to cause him problems with \nprolonged standing, walking, or heavy lifting,” and a history \nof heart difficulties that would cause him to “wear out if he \nparticipated in prolonged walking or lifting.” \n\fNo. 18‐2228 5\n\n In connection with Winsted’s disability claim, treating \nphysician Dr. Gopala completed a physical residual func‐\ntional capacity (“RFC”) questionnaire in early 2015 and re‐\nported Winsted suffered from hypertension, COPD, and back \npain, and described Winsted’s prognosis for back pain as \n“poor.” He determined Winsted had a “painful range of \nmovement” and was incapable of performing even “low \nstress” work. Dr. Gopala also wrote that Winsted’s symptoms \nwould affect his attention and concentration frequently; he \ncould walk only about one block; and he could sit or stand for \nonly 15 minutes at a time. \n One of the therapists at the center where Winsted received \ntreatment, Jessica Nevill, filled out a mental RFC question‐\nnaire in April 2015. She opined Winsted had marked impair‐\nments in his abilities to: relate to other people, respond to su‐\npervision, respond to work pressures, and respond appropri‐\nately to changes in the work setting. She wrote Winsted \nwould miss work three to four days per month because of his \nimpairments. \n After the Social Security Administration denied Winsted’s \napplication, he had a hearing before an ALJ. Winsted testified \nhe used an inhaler twice a day, slept with a CPAP machine, \nused a nebulizer for breathing every three months, and con‐\ntinued to smoke a half‐a‐pack of cigarettes per day. He said \nhe could not grip a two‐liter bottle with his left hand. Due to \nthe pain in his knees and feet, he said he could stand for only \na few minutes and, even then, he could not stand still. He also \nsaid he could walk only a few blocks before needing to stop \nand catch his breath, and experienced chest pain three to four \ntimes per week. He noted he has trouble getting along with \npeople and does not like to be around groups. \n\f6 No. 18‐2228 \n\n After Winsted testified, the ALJ asked the vocational ex‐\npert (“VE”) three hypothetical questions. First, the ALJ asked \nthe VE to consider an individual of the same age, education, \nand work experience as Winsted. He continued: \n This hypothetical individual would be capable \n of light work, but four hours maximum stand‐\n ing and walking in an eight hour day, only oc‐\n casional climbing of ramps, and stairs, but no \n ropes, ladders, or scaffolds, only occasional bal‐\n ancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and \n crawling. Frequent, but not constant handling \n and fingering bilaterally. This individual would \n need to avoid concentrated exposure to breath‐\n ing irritants, such as fumes, orders, dust, and \n gasses, as well as wet, slippery surfaces, and un‐\n protected heights and would further be limited \n to only simply reaching, repetitive tasks, with \n few workplace changes, no team work, and no \n interactions with the public. \nThe expert determined such a person could work as a bench \nassembler, electronics worker, or production assembler. In \nthe second hypothetical, the ALJ asked about an individual \nwith the same limitations as in the first hypothetical, but who \nalso “due to impair‐related symptoms, such as the need to lay \ndown during the day to relieve pain would be off task 20% of \nthe work day.” The VE replied that such an individual could \nnot sustain employment. Finally, the ALJ asked about a per‐\nson with all the same limitations as provided in the first hy‐\npothetical, “but due to the frequency of bad days versus good \ndays, this individual would have two unscheduled absences \n\fNo. 18‐2228 7\n\nper month.” Again, the VE answered, “there would be no \njobs.” \n The ALJ conducted the Administration’s 5‐step analysis, \nsee 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a), § 416.920(a), and found Winsted \nnot disabled. At Step 1 the ALJ determined Winsted had not \nengaged in substantial gainful activity since October 22, 2010. \nAt Step 2 the ALJ identified Winsted’s severe impairments as \ndegenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, bilateral carpal \ntunnel syndrome, osteoarthritis in his left knee, bilateral ca‐\nvus foot, COPD, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, an affective \ndisorder, and an anxiety disorder. At Step 3 the ALJ acknowl‐\nedged Winsted had moderate difficulty with social function‐\ning and concentration, persistence, and pace because of his \nmental‐health issues, but concluded these severe impair‐\nments did not meet a listing for presumptive disability. Be‐\ntween Steps 3 and 4 the ALJ determined Winsted had the req‐\nuisite RFC to perform light work with certain limitations (as \nprovided in the first hypothetical, and including being limited \nto “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with few workplace \nchanges, no team work, and no interaction with the public”) \nbut his limitations precluded him from performing his past \nrelevant work (Step 4). At Step 5 the ALJ concluded, based on \nWinsted’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, that he \nwas capable of successfully changing to other work. \n Winsted appealed to the agency’s Appeals Council, which \ndenied review. He then sought judicial review, and the par‐\nties agreed to have a magistrate judge adjudicate this case. \nSee 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That judge upheld the ALJ’s decision. \n\f8 No. 18‐2228 \n\n II. Analysis \n A. ALJ’s Evaluation of Winsted’s Limitations in Concen‐\n tration, Persistence, and Pace \n Winsted argues neither the ALJ’s RFC nor his first \nhypothetical question properly accounted for the finding that \nhe has “moderate” difficulties with concentration, \npersistence, and pace. The ALJ’s proposed limitations—that \nWinsted perform only “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with \nfew workplace changes”—fails, in his view, to address his \nconcentration‐functioning deficits because “both the \nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ’s RFC assessment \nmust incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations supported \nby the medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th \nCir. 2015). \n Winsted’s argument here is correct. Again and again, we \nhave said that when an ALJ finds there are documented limi‐\ntations of concentration, persistence, and pace, the hypothet‐\nical question presented to the VE must account for these lim‐\nitations. Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2018); \nVarga, 794 F.3d at 814–15; OʹConnor‐Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d \n614, 620 (7th Cir. 2010); Stewart v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 679, 684 \n(7th Cir. 2009); Kasarsky v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. \n2003); see also Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1003 (7th Cir. \n2004). We have also made clear that in most cases “employing \nterms like ‘simple, repetitive tasks’ on their own will not nec‐\nessarily exclude from the VE’s consideration those positions \nthat present significant problems of concentration, persis‐\ntence and pace,” and thus, alone, are insufficient to present \nthe claimant’s limitations in this area. OʹConnor‐Spinner, \n627 F.3d at 620; see Moreno, 882 F.3d at 730. Here, at Step 3 the \nALJ found Winsted’s moderate difficulties with \n\fNo. 18‐2228 9\n\nconcentration, persistence, and pace could cause problems \nwith concentration and following written instructions, as well \nas stress with changes in his routine. And Winsted’s psychia‐\ntrist and therapist both remarked that stress caused Winsted \nto “become overwhelmed” and his depression impaired his \noverall functioning. \n But the first hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE did not \ndirect the expert to consider problems with concentration, \npersistence, and pace, which is the hypothetical the ALJ relied \non for the RFC. Though particular words need not be in‐\ncanted, we cannot look at the absence of the phrase “moderate \ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace” and \nfeel confident this limitation was properly incorporated in the \nRFC and in the hypothetical question. See OʹConnor‐Spinner, \n627 F.3d at 619. The ALJ may have thought, as the agency pro‐\nposes, he was addressing Winsted’s concentration difficulties \nby including limitations that would minimize social interac‐\ntion. But that restriction could just have likely been meant to \naccount for Winsted’s moderate difficulty with social func‐\ntioning—the ALJ acknowledged Winsted experiences anxi‐\nety, panic attacks, and irritability when he is around people. \nNothing in the hypothetical question and RFC, however, ac‐\ncounted for the ALJ’s discussion of how Winsted’s low GAF \nscores reflect serious mental‐health symptoms or his mention \nthat Winsted often “appeared tense, anxious, and/or restless” \nwithout interacting with other people. Additionally, where a \nclaimant’s limitations are stress‐related, as Winsted’s appear \nto be, the hypothetical question should account for the level \nof stress a claimant can handle. See Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d \n816, 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2007); Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, \n285, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2002). But there was no restriction related \nto stress in the RFC or hypothetical question. \n\f10 No. 18‐2228 \n\n Notably, it appears the ALJ disregarded testimony from \nthe VE about a person with limitations in concentration, per‐\nsistence, and pace. The ALJ asked two additional hypothetical \nquestions to the VE about an individual who would either be \noff task 20% of the workday or would have two unscheduled \nabsences per month—seemingly having in mind someone \nwith “moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence, \nand pace.” The VE responded that neither individual could \nsustain employment. But these responses are not reflected in \nthe ALJ’s decision. Because the ALJ did not include Winsted’s \ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace in the \nhypothetical he did consider, the decision cannot stand. \n B. ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinion Evidence \n Winsted also challenges the evidentiary weight the ALJ \ngave to four medical opinions, two from treating medical pro‐\nfessionals (Dr. Gopala and Ms. Nevill) and two from state \nagency doctors (examining psychologist Dr. Marlow and con‐\nsultative examiner Dr. Siderys). \n Before reaching the merits of this argument, we must ad‐\ndress the agency’s contention that Winsted waived it. The \nagency is not correct on this; Winsted never “knowingly and \nintelligently relinquished” his claim, Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. \n463, 470 n.4 (2012). That he developed the argument poorly \nmeans at most he forfeited it. Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, \n254 (7th Cir. 2016). \n Forfeited or not, this argument fails. In the decision, the \nALJ adequately articulated why he gave each opinion the \nweight he did, entitling his decision, in this respect, to our def‐\nerence. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413, 416 (7th Cir. \n2008). Starting with Dr. Gopala, the ALJ appropriately \n\fNo. 18‐2228 11\n\nquestioned the doctor’s conclusion—that Winsted had a pain‐\nful range of motion that made him incapable of engaging in \n“low‐stress” work—in light of other record evidence. This in‐\ncluded Dr. Gopala’s own notes, which showed Winsted reg‐\nularly had a full range of motion, no gross sensory or motor \ndeficits, fine motor skills within normal limits, and lungs that \n“have often been clear.” And though treating physician’s \nopinions, like Dr. Gopala’s, are usually entitled to controlling \nweight, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96‐2p,2 an ALJ may \ndiscredit the opinion if it is inconsistent with the record. \nSee Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2016); Camp‐\nbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010); 20 C.F.R. \n§ 404.1527(c)(2). \n Next, Winsted argues the ALJ erred in giving little eviden‐\ntiary weight to Ms. Nevill’s mental RFC assessment. But the \nALJ wrote he discounted Ms. Nevill’s report because she was \na non‐medical professional, and thus not an “acceptable med‐\nical source” See 20 CFR § 404.1513(a), § 416.913(a). Also, her \nfindings were “based solely on [Winsted’s] subjective com‐\nplaints”—an appropriate reason for an ALJ to discount an \nopinion, see Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. \n2008). Additionally, he found Ms. Nevill’s report, like Dr. Go‐\npala’s, was inconsistent with Winsted’s medical‐health record \nas a whole. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012) \n(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)‐(3)). \n\n\n\n \n 2 The treating‐physician rule, which was eliminated for claims \n\nfiled after March 27, 2017, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (2017), still applies to \nWinsted’s earlier filed claim, see Gerstner v. Berryhill, 879 F.3d 257, 261 \n(7th Cir. 2018); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. \n\f12 No. 18‐2228 \n\n Finally, Winsted claims the ALJ gave short shrift to the \ntwo state examiners’ 2013 opinions, asserting the ALJ erred in \ndiscussing the state psychologist’s evaluation “in one sen‐\ntence” and the state physician’s opinion in a footnote. But as \nthe agency points out, the ALJ discussed these opinions \nthroughout the decision. The ALJ cited the state psycholo‐\ngist’s findings when discussing Winsted’s mental‐health di‐\nagnosis, and referred repeatedly to the state physician’s opin‐\nion throughout his discussion of Winsted’s gait, grip strength, \nand scattered wheezing. The court applies a common‐sense \nreading to the entirety of an ALJ’s decision. Rice v. Barnhart, \n384 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004); Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, \n811 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the ALJ adequately articulated his \nreasons for discounting these two opinions—both reports \nwere based on only one evaluation and largely reflected Win‐\nsted’s subjective reporting. See Elder, 529 F.3d at 416; Rice, 384 \nF.3d at 371 (ALJs should rely on medical opinions “based on \nobjective observations,” not “subjective complaints.”); \n20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(i) (ALJs should consider “frequency of \nexamination” in weight it assigns opinion). \n III. Conclusion \n Because the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational \nexaminer and the residual function capacity did not capture \none of Winsted’s most significant problems—his concentra‐\ntion‐functioning deficits—we conclude further proceedings \nare necessary on that issue only. We thus reverse the district \ncourt judgment and remand this case to the Social Security \nAdministration.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2228 \\nRONNIE L. WINSTED, JR., \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, \\nActing Commissioner of Social Security, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. \\n No. 2:17‐cv‐00137‐MJD‐WTL — Mark J. Dinsmore, Magistrate Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 \\n AS AMENDED ON DENIAL OF REHEARING APRIL 3, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Ronnie Winsted applied for disa‐\\nbility insurance benefits and supplemental security income \\nclaiming disability based on numerous conditions, including \\ndegenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and anxiety. An ad‐\\nministrative law judge denied benefits, finding that Winsted \\ncould work with certain limitations. After the district court \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\nupheld this denial, Winsted appealed, arguing the ALJ did \\nnot consider his difficulties with concentration, persistence, \\nand pace. We agree—the ALJ did not adequately explain how \\nthe limitations he placed on Winsted’s residual functional ca‐\\npacity accounted for the claimant’s mental difficulties, so we \\nremand to the agency. \\n I. Background \\n Winsted was 42 years old when he applied for benefits, \\nasserting an onset date of October 2010. Although he initially \\nalleged he became disabled in 2005, two prior applications al‐\\nleging this onset date were denied and deemed administra‐\\ntively final. \\n Winsted suffers from multiple physical impairments, \\nmostly associated with his previous work in hard labor as an \\nindustrial truck driver, a highway maintenance worker, and \\nan operating engineer. MRIs taken in 2010 and 2011 showed \\nhe had focal, isolated degenerative disc disease. Other tests \\nrevealed osteoarthritis, mild carpal tunnel syndrome in his \\nhands, and cavus (high‐arched) foot that he treats with special \\nshoes. \\n Winsted complained of shortness of breath in May 2011 \\nand was diagnosed with acute bronchitis and chronic obstruc‐\\ntive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). Although he wheezed at \\ntimes, he often responded well to medication. Throughout the \\nrelevant period, Winsted sometimes complained of wheez‐\\ning, but often his lungs were clear. A pulmonary function test \\nin 2013, however, showed Winsted had moderate obstructive \\nlung disease and possibly restrictive lung disease. \\n Winsted began seeing an internist, Dr. Nedu Gopala, for \\nback pain in August 2013. The doctor prescribed medication \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 3\\n\\nfor Winsted’s breathing, chest pain, back pain, and anxiety. \\nAt appointments throughout 2013 and into March 2015, Win‐\\nsted’s range of motion in his arms and legs alternated from \\nfull, to limited. He maintained a chronic cough, mild short‐\\nness of breath, and wheezing, though a 2014 pulmonary func‐\\ntion test did not show any evidence of lung obstruction. \\n To address stress‐related heart issues, Winsted sought \\nmental‐health treatment in 2012. A therapist diagnosed him \\nwith a panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and ma‐\\njor depressive disorder. Winsted had a guarded attitude, \\n“very little insight,” “below average” intellect, and was as‐\\nsigned a Global Assessment of Function (“GAF”) of 51, indi‐\\ncating he had moderate difficulty in social and occupational \\nfunctioning.1 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND \\nSTATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 32 (4th ed. 1994). \\nIn his therapy appointments, Winsted regularly complained \\nabout altercations with neighbors. \\n Later that year, Winsted sought treatment from a psychia‐\\ntrist, who diagnosed major depressive disorder and assigned \\na GAF of 45, indicating a serious impairment in social or oc‐\\ncupational functioning. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra. The \\npsychiatrist reported that Winsted was tense, anxious, “very \\nrestless,” and moderately depressed. He prescribed medica‐\\ntion for anxiety and depression and continued to treat Win‐\\nsted. \\n\\n \\n 1 The GAF, which assesses an “individual’s overall level of func‐\\n\\ntioning,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 n.7 (7th Cir. 2008), no longer is \\nwidely used by psychiatrists and psychologists, but it was sometimes re‐\\nferred to in social security disability hearings during Winsted’s proceed‐\\nings. See Price v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2015). \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Between September 2013 and February 2015, Winsted’s \\nmental health fluctuated. In September 2013, Winsted’s psy‐\\nchiatrist reported that his affect was appropriate, his mood \\nwas not depressed, and “on the whole [he was] doing better.” \\nBut two months later, Winsted’s affect was anxious, his mood \\nwas depressed, he was “feeling more irritable, anxious, and \\nrestless,” and he suffered panic attacks. At a therapy session \\nin July 2014, a therapist reported Winsted’s “symptoms of de‐\\npression and worry impair overall functioning,” and in Au‐\\ngust and November 2014, he was “mildly depressed.” But in \\nFebruary 2015, Winsted presented with an appropriate affect \\nand a not‐depressed mood. The same was true in April 2015, \\nthough Winsted reported he sometimes felt “tense and anx‐\\nious” and stress continued to cause him to “become over‐\\nwhelmed.” \\n The disability application also triggered an examination in \\n2013 from an agency psychologist, Dr. Steven Marlow, who \\ndiagnosed Winsted with major depressive disorder, a gener‐\\nalized anxiety disorder, and a panic disorder. Specifically, he \\nreported Winsted “has a[n] avoidant, hostile, and easily dis‐\\ntracted attitude.” Dr. Marlow determined Winsted had below \\naverage levels of mental control, understanding and memory, \\nand concentration; poor levels of persistence; and he did not \\ndo well in social situations. \\n A state‐agency physician, Dr. George Siderys, also exam‐\\nined Winsted in 2013 and opined he had a mild functional im‐\\npairment. This included: “mild decrease in range of motion,” \\npain that would be “expected to cause him problems with \\nprolonged standing, walking, or heavy lifting,” and a history \\nof heart difficulties that would cause him to “wear out if he \\nparticipated in prolonged walking or lifting.” \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 5\\n\\n In connection with Winsted’s disability claim, treating \\nphysician Dr. Gopala completed a physical residual func‐\\ntional capacity (“RFC”) questionnaire in early 2015 and re‐\\nported Winsted suffered from hypertension, COPD, and back \\npain, and described Winsted’s prognosis for back pain as \\n“poor.” He determined Winsted had a “painful range of \\nmovement” and was incapable of performing even “low \\nstress” work. Dr. Gopala also wrote that Winsted’s symptoms \\nwould affect his attention and concentration frequently; he \\ncould walk only about one block; and he could sit or stand for \\nonly 15 minutes at a time. \\n One of the therapists at the center where Winsted received \\ntreatment, Jessica Nevill, filled out a mental RFC question‐\\nnaire in April 2015. She opined Winsted had marked impair‐\\nments in his abilities to: relate to other people, respond to su‐\\npervision, respond to work pressures, and respond appropri‐\\nately to changes in the work setting. She wrote Winsted \\nwould miss work three to four days per month because of his \\nimpairments. \\n After the Social Security Administration denied Winsted’s \\napplication, he had a hearing before an ALJ. Winsted testified \\nhe used an inhaler twice a day, slept with a CPAP machine, \\nused a nebulizer for breathing every three months, and con‐\\ntinued to smoke a half‐a‐pack of cigarettes per day. He said \\nhe could not grip a two‐liter bottle with his left hand. Due to \\nthe pain in his knees and feet, he said he could stand for only \\na few minutes and, even then, he could not stand still. He also \\nsaid he could walk only a few blocks before needing to stop \\nand catch his breath, and experienced chest pain three to four \\ntimes per week. He noted he has trouble getting along with \\npeople and does not like to be around groups. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n After Winsted testified, the ALJ asked the vocational ex‐\\npert (“VE”) three hypothetical questions. First, the ALJ asked \\nthe VE to consider an individual of the same age, education, \\nand work experience as Winsted. He continued: \\n This hypothetical individual would be capable \\n of light work, but four hours maximum stand‐\\n ing and walking in an eight hour day, only oc‐\\n casional climbing of ramps, and stairs, but no \\n ropes, ladders, or scaffolds, only occasional bal‐\\n ancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and \\n crawling. Frequent, but not constant handling \\n and fingering bilaterally. This individual would \\n need to avoid concentrated exposure to breath‐\\n ing irritants, such as fumes, orders, dust, and \\n gasses, as well as wet, slippery surfaces, and un‐\\n protected heights and would further be limited \\n to only simply reaching, repetitive tasks, with \\n few workplace changes, no team work, and no \\n interactions with the public. \\nThe expert determined such a person could work as a bench \\nassembler, electronics worker, or production assembler. In \\nthe second hypothetical, the ALJ asked about an individual \\nwith the same limitations as in the first hypothetical, but who \\nalso “due to impair‐related symptoms, such as the need to lay \\ndown during the day to relieve pain would be off task 20% of \\nthe work day.” The VE replied that such an individual could \\nnot sustain employment. Finally, the ALJ asked about a per‐\\nson with all the same limitations as provided in the first hy‐\\npothetical, “but due to the frequency of bad days versus good \\ndays, this individual would have two unscheduled absences \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 7\\n\\nper month.” Again, the VE answered, “there would be no \\njobs.” \\n The ALJ conducted the Administration’s 5‐step analysis, \\nsee 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a), § 416.920(a), and found Winsted \\nnot disabled. At Step 1 the ALJ determined Winsted had not \\nengaged in substantial gainful activity since October 22, 2010. \\nAt Step 2 the ALJ identified Winsted’s severe impairments as \\ndegenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, bilateral carpal \\ntunnel syndrome, osteoarthritis in his left knee, bilateral ca‐\\nvus foot, COPD, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, an affective \\ndisorder, and an anxiety disorder. At Step 3 the ALJ acknowl‐\\nedged Winsted had moderate difficulty with social function‐\\ning and concentration, persistence, and pace because of his \\nmental‐health issues, but concluded these severe impair‐\\nments did not meet a listing for presumptive disability. Be‐\\ntween Steps 3 and 4 the ALJ determined Winsted had the req‐\\nuisite RFC to perform light work with certain limitations (as \\nprovided in the first hypothetical, and including being limited \\nto “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with few workplace \\nchanges, no team work, and no interaction with the public”) \\nbut his limitations precluded him from performing his past \\nrelevant work (Step 4). At Step 5 the ALJ concluded, based on \\nWinsted’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, that he \\nwas capable of successfully changing to other work. \\n Winsted appealed to the agency’s Appeals Council, which \\ndenied review. He then sought judicial review, and the par‐\\nties agreed to have a magistrate judge adjudicate this case. \\nSee 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That judge upheld the ALJ’s decision. \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n II. Analysis \\n A. ALJ’s Evaluation of Winsted’s Limitations in Concen‐\\n tration, Persistence, and Pace \\n Winsted argues neither the ALJ’s RFC nor his first \\nhypothetical question properly accounted for the finding that \\nhe has “moderate” difficulties with concentration, \\npersistence, and pace. The ALJ’s proposed limitations—that \\nWinsted perform only “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with \\nfew workplace changes”—fails, in his view, to address his \\nconcentration‐functioning deficits because “both the \\nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ’s RFC assessment \\nmust incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations supported \\nby the medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th \\nCir. 2015). \\n Winsted’s argument here is correct. Again and again, we \\nhave said that when an ALJ finds there are documented limi‐\\ntations of concentration, persistence, and pace, the hypothet‐\\nical question presented to the VE must account for these lim‐\\nitations. Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2018); \\nVarga, 794 F.3d at 814–15; OʹConnor‐Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d \\n614, 620 (7th Cir. 2010); Stewart v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 679, 684 \\n(7th Cir. 2009); Kasarsky v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. \\n2003); see also Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1003 (7th Cir. \\n2004). We have also made clear that in most cases “employing \\nterms like ‘simple, repetitive tasks’ on their own will not nec‐\\nessarily exclude from the VE’s consideration those positions \\nthat present significant problems of concentration, persis‐\\ntence and pace,” and thus, alone, are insufficient to present \\nthe claimant’s limitations in this area. OʹConnor‐Spinner, \\n627 F.3d at 620; see Moreno, 882 F.3d at 730. Here, at Step 3 the \\nALJ found Winsted’s moderate difficulties with \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 9\\n\\nconcentration, persistence, and pace could cause problems \\nwith concentration and following written instructions, as well \\nas stress with changes in his routine. And Winsted’s psychia‐\\ntrist and therapist both remarked that stress caused Winsted \\nto “become overwhelmed” and his depression impaired his \\noverall functioning. \\n But the first hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE did not \\ndirect the expert to consider problems with concentration, \\npersistence, and pace, which is the hypothetical the ALJ relied \\non for the RFC. Though particular words need not be in‐\\ncanted, we cannot look at the absence of the phrase “moderate \\ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace” and \\nfeel confident this limitation was properly incorporated in the \\nRFC and in the hypothetical question. See OʹConnor‐Spinner, \\n627 F.3d at 619. The ALJ may have thought, as the agency pro‐\\nposes, he was addressing Winsted’s concentration difficulties \\nby including limitations that would minimize social interac‐\\ntion. But that restriction could just have likely been meant to \\naccount for Winsted’s moderate difficulty with social func‐\\ntioning—the ALJ acknowledged Winsted experiences anxi‐\\nety, panic attacks, and irritability when he is around people. \\nNothing in the hypothetical question and RFC, however, ac‐\\ncounted for the ALJ’s discussion of how Winsted’s low GAF \\nscores reflect serious mental‐health symptoms or his mention \\nthat Winsted often “appeared tense, anxious, and/or restless” \\nwithout interacting with other people. Additionally, where a \\nclaimant’s limitations are stress‐related, as Winsted’s appear \\nto be, the hypothetical question should account for the level \\nof stress a claimant can handle. See Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d \\n816, 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2007); Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, \\n285, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2002). But there was no restriction related \\nto stress in the RFC or hypothetical question. \\n\\f10 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Notably, it appears the ALJ disregarded testimony from \\nthe VE about a person with limitations in concentration, per‐\\nsistence, and pace. The ALJ asked two additional hypothetical \\nquestions to the VE about an individual who would either be \\noff task 20% of the workday or would have two unscheduled \\nabsences per month—seemingly having in mind someone \\nwith “moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence, \\nand pace.” The VE responded that neither individual could \\nsustain employment. But these responses are not reflected in \\nthe ALJ’s decision. Because the ALJ did not include Winsted’s \\ndifficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace in the \\nhypothetical he did consider, the decision cannot stand. \\n B. ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinion Evidence \\n Winsted also challenges the evidentiary weight the ALJ \\ngave to four medical opinions, two from treating medical pro‐\\nfessionals (Dr. Gopala and Ms. Nevill) and two from state \\nagency doctors (examining psychologist Dr. Marlow and con‐\\nsultative examiner Dr. Siderys). \\n Before reaching the merits of this argument, we must ad‐\\ndress the agency’s contention that Winsted waived it. The \\nagency is not correct on this; Winsted never “knowingly and \\nintelligently relinquished” his claim, Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. \\n463, 470 n.4 (2012). That he developed the argument poorly \\nmeans at most he forfeited it. Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, \\n254 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n Forfeited or not, this argument fails. In the decision, the \\nALJ adequately articulated why he gave each opinion the \\nweight he did, entitling his decision, in this respect, to our def‐\\nerence. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413, 416 (7th Cir. \\n2008). Starting with Dr. Gopala, the ALJ appropriately \\n\\fNo. 18‐2228 11\\n\\nquestioned the doctor’s conclusion—that Winsted had a pain‐\\nful range of motion that made him incapable of engaging in \\n“low‐stress” work—in light of other record evidence. This in‐\\ncluded Dr. Gopala’s own notes, which showed Winsted reg‐\\nularly had a full range of motion, no gross sensory or motor \\ndeficits, fine motor skills within normal limits, and lungs that \\n“have often been clear.” And though treating physician’s \\nopinions, like Dr. Gopala’s, are usually entitled to controlling \\nweight, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96‐2p,2 an ALJ may \\ndiscredit the opinion if it is inconsistent with the record. \\nSee Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2016); Camp‐\\nbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010); 20 C.F.R. \\n§ 404.1527(c)(2). \\n Next, Winsted argues the ALJ erred in giving little eviden‐\\ntiary weight to Ms. Nevill’s mental RFC assessment. But the \\nALJ wrote he discounted Ms. Nevill’s report because she was \\na non‐medical professional, and thus not an “acceptable med‐\\nical source” See 20 CFR § 404.1513(a), § 416.913(a). Also, her \\nfindings were “based solely on [Winsted’s] subjective com‐\\nplaints”—an appropriate reason for an ALJ to discount an \\nopinion, see Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. \\n2008). Additionally, he found Ms. Nevill’s report, like Dr. Go‐\\npala’s, was inconsistent with Winsted’s medical‐health record \\nas a whole. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012) \\n(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)‐(3)). \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 2 The treating‐physician rule, which was eliminated for claims \\n\\nfiled after March 27, 2017, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (2017), still applies to \\nWinsted’s earlier filed claim, see Gerstner v. Berryhill, 879 F.3d 257, 261 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. \\n\\f12 No. 18‐2228 \\n\\n Finally, Winsted claims the ALJ gave short shrift to the \\ntwo state examiners’ 2013 opinions, asserting the ALJ erred in \\ndiscussing the state psychologist’s evaluation “in one sen‐\\ntence” and the state physician’s opinion in a footnote. But as \\nthe agency points out, the ALJ discussed these opinions \\nthroughout the decision. The ALJ cited the state psycholo‐\\ngist’s findings when discussing Winsted’s mental‐health di‐\\nagnosis, and referred repeatedly to the state physician’s opin‐\\nion throughout his discussion of Winsted’s gait, grip strength, \\nand scattered wheezing. The court applies a common‐sense \\nreading to the entirety of an ALJ’s decision. Rice v. Barnhart, \\n384 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004); Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, \\n811 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the ALJ adequately articulated his \\nreasons for discounting these two opinions—both reports \\nwere based on only one evaluation and largely reflected Win‐\\nsted’s subjective reporting. See Elder, 529 F.3d at 416; Rice, 384 \\nF.3d at 371 (ALJs should rely on medical opinions “based on \\nobjective observations,” not “subjective complaints.”); \\n20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(i) (ALJs should consider “frequency of \\nexamination” in weight it assigns opinion). \\n III. Conclusion \\n Because the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational \\nexaminer and the residual function capacity did not capture \\none of Winsted’s most significant problems—his concentra‐\\ntion‐functioning deficits—we conclude further proceedings \\nare necessary on that issue only. We thus reverse the district \\ncourt judgment and remand this case to the Social Security \\nAdministration.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1685,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4606662,"string":"4,606,662"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"James GASTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Parthasarathi GHOSH, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"James Gaston v. Parthasarathi Ghosh"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3618; 18-1281"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Easterbrook, Kanne, Hamilton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888310/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"030concurrence\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888311/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\nJAMES GASTON,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nPARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 11-cv-6612 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Iskander v. Forest Park, 690\\nF.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1982), holds that private corporations,\\nwhen deemed to be state actors in suits under 42 U.S.C.\\n§1983, must be treated the same as municipal corporations.\\nThis means that they are not subject to vicarious liability.\\nSee, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009); Monell\\nv. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,\\n\\n2 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\n691–94 (1978). Iqbal, Monell, and other decisions hold that\\nmunicipalities and public employees may be held liable for\\ntheir own decisions and policies but are not liable under the\\ndoctrine of respondeat superior for the acts, decisions, and pol-\\nicies of other persons, including subordinate public officials.\\nIskander held that the same approach applies to private cor-\\nporations and their agents, to the extent that they are treated\\nas state actors for the purpose of §1983. James Gaston asks us\\nto overrule Iskander and hold that in litigation under §1983 a\\nprivate corporation may be liable vicariously to the same ex-\\ntent as a private corporation in the law of torts.\\n That argument has been made before but left unresolved,\\nbecause the appeals could be decided on other grounds. See,\\ne.g., Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2017); Glis-\\nson v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (en banc); Shields v. Illinois Department of Correc-\\ntions, 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014). That is equally true today,\\nand for the same reason as in Collins: the employee “is not\\nliable, so—even if the theory of respondeat superior were\\navailable—neither is his employer.”\\n Gaston, a prisoner of Illinois, suffered injuries that led to\\nsurgery on both of his knees. (He had other medical prob-\\nlems, but treatment for them is no longer in dispute.) He first\\ncomplained about pain in his left knee in May 2009. Drugs\\ndid not solve the pain, and the knee did not heal on its own.\\nLiping Zhang, a physician employed by Wexford Health\\nSources, which Illinois uses to provide medical care in the\\nstate’s prisons, eventually alerted Parthasarathi Ghosh, who\\nreferred Gaston to an orthopedic surgeon. Delay in imple-\\nmenting that decision followed; the consultation occurred in\\nSeptember 2010. Dr. Ghosh, the head of medical services at\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 3\\n\\nthe prison, approved a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)\\nexam, which the specialist had recommended, but it was not\\nconducted until February 2011. It revealed a lingering injury.\\nIn August 2011 Samuel Chmell performed arthroscopic sur-\\ngery on Gaston’s left knee, a step approved by Imhotep\\nCarter, who replaced Dr. Ghosh after his retirement. (Dr.\\nChmell is an orthopedic surgeon on the staff of the Universi-\\nty of Illinois hospital system, which handled all of the spe-\\ncialist work, MRI exams, and surgeries we mention.)\\n While Gaston’s left knee was healing, a consultative body\\nwithin Wexford delayed approving an MRI image of his\\nright knee, stating that one knee had to be sound before\\ntreatment of the other could proceed. In May 2012 the pris-\\non’s interim medical director (Dr. Carter having left) re-\\nferred Gaston for an MRI exam on the right knee. It showed\\nserious problems, and Dr. Chmell recommended another ar-\\nthroscopic surgery. In August 2012 Saleh Obaisi, the prison’s\\nnew medical director, approved Dr. Chmell’s recommenda-\\ntion, and surgery occurred in October 2012. This did not\\nbring the hoped-for relief, and Dr. Chmell recommended ar-\\nthroplasty (i.e., knee replacement). That surgery, a much\\nmore substantial medical intervention, was delayed while\\nspecialists determined whether Gaston’s pulmonary and\\ncardiology systems would handle the strain. More delay\\nmay have been caused by inamention to the case. The arthro-\\nplasty took place in February 2015 and was successful.\\n Gaston acknowledges that he has received a great deal of\\nmedical care. He does not contend that the diagnosis or the\\nselected interventions can lead to §1983 liability under the\\napproach of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v.\\nBrennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); and PeIies v. Carter, 836 F.3d\\n\\n4 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\n722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Instead he contends that the de-\\nlays while waiting for surgeries reflect deliberate indiffer-\\nence to his pain, so that the pain became a form of unauthor-\\nized punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (ap-\\nplied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the\\nFourteenth Amendment). After the district court dismissed\\nGaston’s complaint, we remanded, holding that a complaint\\nbased on unwarranted pain during extended delay in treat-\\nment states a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 498 F.\\nApp’x 629 (7th Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential disposition).\\n Back in the district court Gaston, although represented\\nby counsel, proceeded premy much as if anyone whose com-\\nplaint states a legal claim prevails without needing to prove\\nthe complaint’s allegations. Defendants conducted discov-\\nery; Gaston not so much. In particular, Gaston did not try to\\nfind out either who was responsible for the delays (the four\\nphysicians named as defendants? back-office staff? someone\\nelse?) or why those delays occurred (a desire that Gaston’s\\npain continue? indifference to his pain? simple negligence?\\nmedical judgment?). For their part, defendants offered some\\nevidence that would tend to support a conclusion that the\\ndelays could be chalked up to medical judgment—a prefer-\\nence for conservative treatment before surgery—plus occa-\\nsional oversight, but never to any desire to injure Gaston or\\nindifference to his pain. Dr. Chmell testified in a deposition\\nthat the treatment afforded to Gaston was within the stand-\\nard of care in the medical profession—in other words, not\\neven negligence, let alone punishment inflicted with the sub-\\njective standard required for constitutional liability.\\n Gaston contended that Wexford should be held liable\\neven if none of the four physicians is culpable. In making\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 5\\n\\nthis contention, he assumed that, if Iskander should be over-\\nruled, then Wexford and other private corporations would\\nbecome liable under §1983 for their employees’ negligence,\\nno mamer what standard applies to the personal liability of\\nthose employees.\\n The district court granted summary judgment to the four\\nindividual defendants, ruling that the record does not show\\nthat any of them acted (or delayed acting) with the state of\\nmind required for culpability. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195234\\n(N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2017). The court recognized that it lacks\\nthe authority to depart from Iskander. Wexford could be lia-\\nble for its own unconstitutional policies, but the court con-\\ncluded that the policies to which Gaston pointed, such as\\ntreating one condition at a time, reflected medical judgment\\nrather than a constitutional problem.\\n It is not as if Wexford has a policy of ignoring life-\\nthreatening conditions while a prisoner heals from surgery.\\nNor did Wexford ignore the pain from one knee while Gas-\\nton recovered from surgery on the other. He received pain-\\nalleviating drugs. The district court’s decision is addressed\\nto a policy providing time between surgeries, a policy that\\nDr. Chmell testified is medically appropriate. The district\\njudge was confident that, if a prisoner being treated for the\\nflu broke his leg, Wexford would immediately provide the\\ncare needed to deal with a broken leg. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\\n195234 at *43. (The district court added that Gaston has not\\nestablished that “treat one condition at a time” is Wexford’s\\npolicy, as opposed to a medical decision made about his sit-\\nuation, in particular.)\\n In this court, Gaston scarcely engages with the district\\ncourt’s reasoning or the consequences of his failure to intro-\\n\\n6 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\nduce evidence. Instead he asks us to overrule Iskander in the\\nbelief that this will eliminate the need to show that any of\\nWexford’s employees violated the Eighth Amendment. That\\nnot only contradicts Collins, which Gaston does not mention,\\nbut also misunderstands the nature of vicarious liability. It\\nis—well, there’s no bemer word than vicarious.\\n With vicarious liability, one person is liable for another’s\\nwrong. In an employment relation, that means an employee\\nor other agent. The wrongdoer need not be a defendant, but\\nthere must be an actionable wrong, by a person whose con-\\nduct is imputed to the employer. Medical negligence by one\\nof Wexford’s employees could support liability under state\\ntort law but not the Eighth Amendment. If only intentional\\nwrongdoing by an employee leads to personal liability, then\\nan employee’s negligence does not justify holding the em-\\nployer liable. There’s nothing to be vicariously liable for.\\n These are fundamental principles of tort and agency law,\\nwhere vicarious liability has long been common. “Vicarious\\nliability is not based upon the defendant’s own fault. Rather,\\nit is based upon the principle that he must bear legal respon-\\nsibility for another’s wrong. From the employer-defendant’s\\npoint of view, vicarious liability is strict liability, since he is\\nliable without personal fault. That is not quite the case from\\nthe plaintiff’s point of view. The plaintiff must prove that the\\nemployee commimed a tort and was acting within the scope\\nof employment when he did so.” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T.\\nHayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts 782 (2d ed. 2011\\n& update 2018). See also, e.g., Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802\\nF.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986); National Union Fire Insurance Co.\\nv. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St. 3d 594, 599 (2009) (“a principal is vi-\\ncariously liable only when an agent could be held directly\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 7\\n\\nliable”); Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 481 (1991) (“The\\nliability of the principal arises simply by the operation of law\\nand is only derivative of the wrongful act of the agent”); Re-\\nstatement (Second) of Agency §217B (1958). This also implies\\nthat vicarious responsibility does not change the substantive\\nstandard. “Vicarious liability is not an independent cause of\\naction, but rather is a legal concept used to transfer liability\\nfrom an agent to a principal”. Crawford v. Signet Bank, 179\\nF.3d 926, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1999).\\n Vicarious liability makes a person responsible for some-\\none else’s wrong but does not change the proof required to\\nshow that a legal wrong has occurred. So even if we were to\\noverrule Iskander, Gaston would need to show that someone\\nwhose acts are imputed to Wexford violated the Eighth\\nAmendment, as understood in Gamble, Farmer, and PeIies.\\nHe did not seriously try to do so. This makes it unnecessary\\nto decide whether Iskander was correctly decided.\\n One final observation. Gaston and other plaintiffs have\\ncontended that Iskander leads Wexford and similar organiza-\\ntions to skimp on medical care in order to enrich themselves.\\nWexford responds that, because it does not pay for the cost\\nof MRI exams, surgeries, and other hospital treatment out-\\nside the prisons, it has no financial reason to withhold ap-\\npropriate medical treatment. That may be true, but so far\\nWexford has not supplied evidence that it is true. Perhaps\\nWexford has contracts with hospitals providing that they\\nwill not bill it, but it has not produced them. Perhaps Illinois\\npays for out-of-prison treatment under the Medicaid pro-\\ngram, but again the record lacks proof. Dr. Chmell testified\\nthat Wexford did not pay him, but the record does not reveal\\nwhether Wexford paid the University of Illinois. Gaston has\\n\\n8 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\nlost this case for want of evidence, but the need to back up\\none’s contentions with evidence applies as much to Wexford\\nas it does to any prisoner.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 9\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383915/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}, {\"author\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the court’s\\njudgment and opinion. For reasons explained in Shields v. Illi-\\nnois Dep’t of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014), whether\\nwe should continue to apply the Monell standard to private\\ncorporations when they act under color of state law presents\\na substantial question. These appeals, however, are not the oc-\\ncasion to decide that larger question. Dr. Chmell’s testimony\\nabout the defendants’ care of plaintiff Gaston helps show that\\nplaintiff cannot prove that one or more agents of Wexford\\nacted with deliberate indifference toward his serious medical\\nneeds. Also, plaintiff has given up trying to prove that Wex-\\nford had a policy of deliberate indifference that would satisfy\\nthe Monell standard. Cf. Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections,\\n849 F.3d 372, 379–82 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (reversing sum-\\nmary judgment for private healthcare provider where evi-\\ndence would support finding that provider deliberately chose\\nnot to provide for coordination of medical care in complex\\ncases, and that absence of such coordination caused prisoner’s\\ndeath).\\n I write separately to highlight a set of subtler but im-\\nportant issues that parties, lawyers, and judges need to con-\\nfront in exploring the path suggested in Shields. Proving a vi-\\nolation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and\\nunusual punishment requires proof of an intentional or crim-\\ninally reckless tort. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839–40\\n(1994); Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en\\nbanc). The question is how to prove that a corporation acted\\nwith the required state of mind.\\n The legally simplest case would prove that a specific, iden-\\ntified employee acted with the required deliberate indiffer-\\nence. The employer would then be vicariously liable for its\\n\\n10 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\nemployee’s tort committed within the scope of employment.\\nThe net result in such a case, however, would not differ much\\nfrom the widespread practice of employers indemnifying\\ntheir employees.\\n The next simplest case would be one in which one em-\\nployee acted with deliberate indifference, but it is not possible\\nto identify that employee. I expect that as long as the wrong-\\ndoer is identified reliably as an employee acting within the\\nscope of employment, ordinary principles of respondeat su-\\nperior liability would apply.\\n The more challenging cases, and the problems that con-\\ntribute to the need to reexamine the application of Monell to\\nprivate corporations, are cases where the plaintiff cannot\\nshow that a single employee acted with deliberate indiffer-\\nence, but where the evidence allows an inference that a group\\nof employees acted with a collective indifference to a pris-\\noner’s health or safety. Experience with many prisoners’\\nhealth care suits suggests this pattern may be common, espe-\\ncially within corporate structures that diffuse responsibility\\namong different people. Consider, for example, the possibility\\nof a scheduling team who do not try to schedule promptly\\nsurgeries that prisoners need to treat serious pain.\\n General tort law does not seem to provide a consensus on\\nthe problems of collective intent posed by claims for inten-\\ntional torts against corporations. See Burlington Industries, Inc.\\nv. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998) (discussing vicarious liabil-\\nity for intentional torts); Restatement (Second) Agency §§ 219\\n& 228 (1958) (addressing when master will be liable for inten-\\ntional torts by servant); Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts\\n§ 70, at 505–06 (1984) (master will be liable for fraud or defa-\\nmation by sales representative); see also Restatement (Third)\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 11\\n\\nof Agency § 7.03, comment (e) (2006) (discussing different ap-\\nproaches to corporate intent for purposes of punitive dam-\\nages).\\n The problem of corporate intent can also be thorny under\\nfederal statutes, such as those providing civil remedies for se-\\ncurities fraud. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513\\nF.3d 702, 707–09 (7th Cir. 2008) (focusing on state of mind of\\ncorporate management for corporate liability in securities\\nfraud cases and discussing Southland Securities Corp. v. INSpire\\nIns. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004)); Patricia S.\\nAbril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter,\\n2006 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 81, 114 (2006) (“The perceived weak-\\nnesses in the respondeat superior approach have led to the\\ndevelopment of a corollary to the agency principle that allows\\nfor aggregation of the knowledge of several corporate em-\\nployees in order to find the corporation liable: the collective\\nknowledge doctrine.”); Ashley S. Kircher, Corporate Criminal\\nLiability versus Corporate Securities Fraud Liability, Analyzing the\\nDivergence in Standards of Culpability, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 157,\\n161 (2009) (“Courts in the United States are in notable disarray\\nwhen analyzing the intent of corporations sued under the se-\\ncurities laws. Some courts have rejected the application of the\\ndoctrine of collective scienter, while others have embraced the\\ndoctrine with varying degrees of strength.”).\\n I do not propose to answer those questions here, but I hope\\nthat parties pursuing the larger Monell issue will pay attention\\nto them as they make their records and write their briefs.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383915/\", \"author_raw\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606662/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: James GASTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Parthasarathi GHOSH, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\nJAMES GASTON,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nPARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 11-cv-6612 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\nJudges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Iskander v. Forest Park, 690\nF.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1982), holds that private corporations,\nwhen deemed to be state actors in suits under 42 U.S.C.\n§1983, must be treated the same as municipal corporations.\nThis means that they are not subject to vicarious liability.\nSee, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009); Monell\nv. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,\n\n2 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\n\n691–94 (1978). Iqbal, Monell, and other decisions hold that\nmunicipalities and public employees may be held liable for\ntheir own decisions and policies but are not liable under the\ndoctrine of respondeat superior for the acts, decisions, and pol-\nicies of other persons, including subordinate public officials.\nIskander held that the same approach applies to private cor-\nporations and their agents, to the extent that they are treated\nas state actors for the purpose of §1983. James Gaston asks us\nto overrule Iskander and hold that in litigation under §1983 a\nprivate corporation may be liable vicariously to the same ex-\ntent as a private corporation in the law of torts.\n That argument has been made before but left unresolved,\nbecause the appeals could be decided on other grounds. See,\ne.g., Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2017); Glis-\nson v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th\nCir. 2017) (en banc); Shields v. Illinois Department of Correc-\ntions, 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014). That is equally true today,\nand for the same reason as in Collins: the employee “is not\nliable, so—even if the theory of respondeat superior were\navailable—neither is his employer.”\n Gaston, a prisoner of Illinois, suffered injuries that led to\nsurgery on both of his knees. (He had other medical prob-\nlems, but treatment for them is no longer in dispute.) He first\ncomplained about pain in his left knee in May 2009. Drugs\ndid not solve the pain, and the knee did not heal on its own.\nLiping Zhang, a physician employed by Wexford Health\nSources, which Illinois uses to provide medical care in the\nstate’s prisons, eventually alerted Parthasarathi Ghosh, who\nreferred Gaston to an orthopedic surgeon. Delay in imple-\nmenting that decision followed; the consultation occurred in\nSeptember 2010. Dr. Ghosh, the head of medical services at\n\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 3\n\nthe prison, approved a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)\nexam, which the specialist had recommended, but it was not\nconducted until February 2011. It revealed a lingering injury.\nIn August 2011 Samuel Chmell performed arthroscopic sur-\ngery on Gaston’s left knee, a step approved by Imhotep\nCarter, who replaced Dr. Ghosh after his retirement. (Dr.\nChmell is an orthopedic surgeon on the staff of the Universi-\nty of Illinois hospital system, which handled all of the spe-\ncialist work, MRI exams, and surgeries we mention.)\n While Gaston’s left knee was healing, a consultative body\nwithin Wexford delayed approving an MRI image of his\nright knee, stating that one knee had to be sound before\ntreatment of the other could proceed. In May 2012 the pris-\non’s interim medical director (Dr. Carter having left) re-\nferred Gaston for an MRI exam on the right knee. It showed\nserious problems, and Dr. Chmell recommended another ar-\nthroscopic surgery. In August 2012 Saleh Obaisi, the prison’s\nnew medical director, approved Dr. Chmell’s recommenda-\ntion, and surgery occurred in October 2012. This did not\nbring the hoped-for relief, and Dr. Chmell recommended ar-\nthroplasty (i.e., knee replacement). That surgery, a much\nmore substantial medical intervention, was delayed while\nspecialists determined whether Gaston’s pulmonary and\ncardiology systems would handle the strain. More delay\nmay have been caused by inamention to the case. The arthro-\nplasty took place in February 2015 and was successful.\n Gaston acknowledges that he has received a great deal of\nmedical care. He does not contend that the diagnosis or the\nselected interventions can lead to §1983 liability under the\napproach of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v.\nBrennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); and PeIies v. Carter, 836 F.3d\n\n4 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\n\n722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Instead he contends that the de-\nlays while waiting for surgeries reflect deliberate indiffer-\nence to his pain, so that the pain became a form of unauthor-\nized punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (ap-\nplied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the\nFourteenth Amendment). After the district court dismissed\nGaston’s complaint, we remanded, holding that a complaint\nbased on unwarranted pain during extended delay in treat-\nment states a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 498 F.\nApp’x 629 (7th Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential disposition).\n Back in the district court Gaston, although represented\nby counsel, proceeded premy much as if anyone whose com-\nplaint states a legal claim prevails without needing to prove\nthe complaint’s allegations. Defendants conducted discov-\nery; Gaston not so much. In particular, Gaston did not try to\nfind out either who was responsible for the delays (the four\nphysicians named as defendants? back-office staff? someone\nelse?) or why those delays occurred (a desire that Gaston’s\npain continue? indifference to his pain? simple negligence?\nmedical judgment?). For their part, defendants offered some\nevidence that would tend to support a conclusion that the\ndelays could be chalked up to medical judgment—a prefer-\nence for conservative treatment before surgery—plus occa-\nsional oversight, but never to any desire to injure Gaston or\nindifference to his pain. Dr. Chmell testified in a deposition\nthat the treatment afforded to Gaston was within the stand-\nard of care in the medical profession—in other words, not\neven negligence, let alone punishment inflicted with the sub-\njective standard required for constitutional liability.\n Gaston contended that Wexford should be held liable\neven if none of the four physicians is culpable. In making\n\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 5\n\nthis contention, he assumed that, if Iskander should be over-\nruled, then Wexford and other private corporations would\nbecome liable under §1983 for their employees’ negligence,\nno mamer what standard applies to the personal liability of\nthose employees.\n The district court granted summary judgment to the four\nindividual defendants, ruling that the record does not show\nthat any of them acted (or delayed acting) with the state of\nmind required for culpability. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195234\n(N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2017). The court recognized that it lacks\nthe authority to depart from Iskander. Wexford could be lia-\nble for its own unconstitutional policies, but the court con-\ncluded that the policies to which Gaston pointed, such as\ntreating one condition at a time, reflected medical judgment\nrather than a constitutional problem.\n It is not as if Wexford has a policy of ignoring life-\nthreatening conditions while a prisoner heals from surgery.\nNor did Wexford ignore the pain from one knee while Gas-\nton recovered from surgery on the other. He received pain-\nalleviating drugs. The district court’s decision is addressed\nto a policy providing time between surgeries, a policy that\nDr. Chmell testified is medically appropriate. The district\njudge was confident that, if a prisoner being treated for the\nflu broke his leg, Wexford would immediately provide the\ncare needed to deal with a broken leg. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n195234 at *43. (The district court added that Gaston has not\nestablished that “treat one condition at a time” is Wexford’s\npolicy, as opposed to a medical decision made about his sit-\nuation, in particular.)\n In this court, Gaston scarcely engages with the district\ncourt’s reasoning or the consequences of his failure to intro-\n\n6 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\n\nduce evidence. Instead he asks us to overrule Iskander in the\nbelief that this will eliminate the need to show that any of\nWexford’s employees violated the Eighth Amendment. That\nnot only contradicts Collins, which Gaston does not mention,\nbut also misunderstands the nature of vicarious liability. It\nis—well, there’s no bemer word than vicarious.\n With vicarious liability, one person is liable for another’s\nwrong. In an employment relation, that means an employee\nor other agent. The wrongdoer need not be a defendant, but\nthere must be an actionable wrong, by a person whose con-\nduct is imputed to the employer. Medical negligence by one\nof Wexford’s employees could support liability under state\ntort law but not the Eighth Amendment. If only intentional\nwrongdoing by an employee leads to personal liability, then\nan employee’s negligence does not justify holding the em-\nployer liable. There’s nothing to be vicariously liable for.\n These are fundamental principles of tort and agency law,\nwhere vicarious liability has long been common. “Vicarious\nliability is not based upon the defendant’s own fault. Rather,\nit is based upon the principle that he must bear legal respon-\nsibility for another’s wrong. From the employer-defendant’s\npoint of view, vicarious liability is strict liability, since he is\nliable without personal fault. That is not quite the case from\nthe plaintiff’s point of view. The plaintiff must prove that the\nemployee commimed a tort and was acting within the scope\nof employment when he did so.” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T.\nHayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts 782 (2d ed. 2011\n& update 2018). See also, e.g., Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802\nF.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986); National Union Fire Insurance Co.\nv. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St. 3d 594, 599 (2009) (“a principal is vi-\ncariously liable only when an agent could be held directly\n\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 7\n\nliable”); Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 481 (1991) (“The\nliability of the principal arises simply by the operation of law\nand is only derivative of the wrongful act of the agent”); Re-\nstatement (Second) of Agency §217B (1958). This also implies\nthat vicarious responsibility does not change the substantive\nstandard. “Vicarious liability is not an independent cause of\naction, but rather is a legal concept used to transfer liability\nfrom an agent to a principal”. Crawford v. Signet Bank, 179\nF.3d 926, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1999).\n Vicarious liability makes a person responsible for some-\none else’s wrong but does not change the proof required to\nshow that a legal wrong has occurred. So even if we were to\noverrule Iskander, Gaston would need to show that someone\nwhose acts are imputed to Wexford violated the Eighth\nAmendment, as understood in Gamble, Farmer, and PeIies.\nHe did not seriously try to do so. This makes it unnecessary\nto decide whether Iskander was correctly decided.\n One final observation. Gaston and other plaintiffs have\ncontended that Iskander leads Wexford and similar organiza-\ntions to skimp on medical care in order to enrich themselves.\nWexford responds that, because it does not pay for the cost\nof MRI exams, surgeries, and other hospital treatment out-\nside the prisons, it has no financial reason to withhold ap-\npropriate medical treatment. That may be true, but so far\nWexford has not supplied evidence that it is true. Perhaps\nWexford has contracts with hospitals providing that they\nwill not bill it, but it has not produced them. Perhaps Illinois\npays for out-of-prison treatment under the Medicaid pro-\ngram, but again the record lacks proof. Dr. Chmell testified\nthat Wexford did not pay him, but the record does not reveal\nwhether Wexford paid the University of Illinois. Gaston has\n\n8 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\n\nlost this case for want of evidence, but the need to back up\none’s contentions with evidence applies as much to Wexford\nas it does to any prisoner.\n AFFIRMED\n\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 9\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: James GASTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Parthasarathi GHOSH, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\nJAMES GASTON,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nPARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 11-cv-6612 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Iskander v. Forest Park, 690\\nF.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1982), holds that private corporations,\\nwhen deemed to be state actors in suits under 42 U.S.C.\\n§1983, must be treated the same as municipal corporations.\\nThis means that they are not subject to vicarious liability.\\nSee, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009); Monell\\nv. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,\\n\\n2 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\n691–94 (1978). Iqbal, Monell, and other decisions hold that\\nmunicipalities and public employees may be held liable for\\ntheir own decisions and policies but are not liable under the\\ndoctrine of respondeat superior for the acts, decisions, and pol-\\nicies of other persons, including subordinate public officials.\\nIskander held that the same approach applies to private cor-\\nporations and their agents, to the extent that they are treated\\nas state actors for the purpose of §1983. James Gaston asks us\\nto overrule Iskander and hold that in litigation under §1983 a\\nprivate corporation may be liable vicariously to the same ex-\\ntent as a private corporation in the law of torts.\\n That argument has been made before but left unresolved,\\nbecause the appeals could be decided on other grounds. See,\\ne.g., Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2017); Glis-\\nson v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (en banc); Shields v. Illinois Department of Correc-\\ntions, 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014). That is equally true today,\\nand for the same reason as in Collins: the employee “is not\\nliable, so—even if the theory of respondeat superior were\\navailable—neither is his employer.”\\n Gaston, a prisoner of Illinois, suffered injuries that led to\\nsurgery on both of his knees. (He had other medical prob-\\nlems, but treatment for them is no longer in dispute.) He first\\ncomplained about pain in his left knee in May 2009. Drugs\\ndid not solve the pain, and the knee did not heal on its own.\\nLiping Zhang, a physician employed by Wexford Health\\nSources, which Illinois uses to provide medical care in the\\nstate’s prisons, eventually alerted Parthasarathi Ghosh, who\\nreferred Gaston to an orthopedic surgeon. Delay in imple-\\nmenting that decision followed; the consultation occurred in\\nSeptember 2010. Dr. Ghosh, the head of medical services at\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 3\\n\\nthe prison, approved a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)\\nexam, which the specialist had recommended, but it was not\\nconducted until February 2011. It revealed a lingering injury.\\nIn August 2011 Samuel Chmell performed arthroscopic sur-\\ngery on Gaston’s left knee, a step approved by Imhotep\\nCarter, who replaced Dr. Ghosh after his retirement. (Dr.\\nChmell is an orthopedic surgeon on the staff of the Universi-\\nty of Illinois hospital system, which handled all of the spe-\\ncialist work, MRI exams, and surgeries we mention.)\\n While Gaston’s left knee was healing, a consultative body\\nwithin Wexford delayed approving an MRI image of his\\nright knee, stating that one knee had to be sound before\\ntreatment of the other could proceed. In May 2012 the pris-\\non’s interim medical director (Dr. Carter having left) re-\\nferred Gaston for an MRI exam on the right knee. It showed\\nserious problems, and Dr. Chmell recommended another ar-\\nthroscopic surgery. In August 2012 Saleh Obaisi, the prison’s\\nnew medical director, approved Dr. Chmell’s recommenda-\\ntion, and surgery occurred in October 2012. This did not\\nbring the hoped-for relief, and Dr. Chmell recommended ar-\\nthroplasty (i.e., knee replacement). That surgery, a much\\nmore substantial medical intervention, was delayed while\\nspecialists determined whether Gaston’s pulmonary and\\ncardiology systems would handle the strain. More delay\\nmay have been caused by inamention to the case. The arthro-\\nplasty took place in February 2015 and was successful.\\n Gaston acknowledges that he has received a great deal of\\nmedical care. He does not contend that the diagnosis or the\\nselected interventions can lead to §1983 liability under the\\napproach of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v.\\nBrennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); and PeIies v. Carter, 836 F.3d\\n\\n4 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\n722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Instead he contends that the de-\\nlays while waiting for surgeries reflect deliberate indiffer-\\nence to his pain, so that the pain became a form of unauthor-\\nized punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (ap-\\nplied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the\\nFourteenth Amendment). After the district court dismissed\\nGaston’s complaint, we remanded, holding that a complaint\\nbased on unwarranted pain during extended delay in treat-\\nment states a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 498 F.\\nApp’x 629 (7th Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential disposition).\\n Back in the district court Gaston, although represented\\nby counsel, proceeded premy much as if anyone whose com-\\nplaint states a legal claim prevails without needing to prove\\nthe complaint’s allegations. Defendants conducted discov-\\nery; Gaston not so much. In particular, Gaston did not try to\\nfind out either who was responsible for the delays (the four\\nphysicians named as defendants? back-office staff? someone\\nelse?) or why those delays occurred (a desire that Gaston’s\\npain continue? indifference to his pain? simple negligence?\\nmedical judgment?). For their part, defendants offered some\\nevidence that would tend to support a conclusion that the\\ndelays could be chalked up to medical judgment—a prefer-\\nence for conservative treatment before surgery—plus occa-\\nsional oversight, but never to any desire to injure Gaston or\\nindifference to his pain. Dr. Chmell testified in a deposition\\nthat the treatment afforded to Gaston was within the stand-\\nard of care in the medical profession—in other words, not\\neven negligence, let alone punishment inflicted with the sub-\\njective standard required for constitutional liability.\\n Gaston contended that Wexford should be held liable\\neven if none of the four physicians is culpable. In making\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 5\\n\\nthis contention, he assumed that, if Iskander should be over-\\nruled, then Wexford and other private corporations would\\nbecome liable under §1983 for their employees’ negligence,\\nno mamer what standard applies to the personal liability of\\nthose employees.\\n The district court granted summary judgment to the four\\nindividual defendants, ruling that the record does not show\\nthat any of them acted (or delayed acting) with the state of\\nmind required for culpability. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195234\\n(N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2017). The court recognized that it lacks\\nthe authority to depart from Iskander. Wexford could be lia-\\nble for its own unconstitutional policies, but the court con-\\ncluded that the policies to which Gaston pointed, such as\\ntreating one condition at a time, reflected medical judgment\\nrather than a constitutional problem.\\n It is not as if Wexford has a policy of ignoring life-\\nthreatening conditions while a prisoner heals from surgery.\\nNor did Wexford ignore the pain from one knee while Gas-\\nton recovered from surgery on the other. He received pain-\\nalleviating drugs. The district court’s decision is addressed\\nto a policy providing time between surgeries, a policy that\\nDr. Chmell testified is medically appropriate. The district\\njudge was confident that, if a prisoner being treated for the\\nflu broke his leg, Wexford would immediately provide the\\ncare needed to deal with a broken leg. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\\n195234 at *43. (The district court added that Gaston has not\\nestablished that “treat one condition at a time” is Wexford’s\\npolicy, as opposed to a medical decision made about his sit-\\nuation, in particular.)\\n In this court, Gaston scarcely engages with the district\\ncourt’s reasoning or the consequences of his failure to intro-\\n\\n6 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\nduce evidence. Instead he asks us to overrule Iskander in the\\nbelief that this will eliminate the need to show that any of\\nWexford’s employees violated the Eighth Amendment. That\\nnot only contradicts Collins, which Gaston does not mention,\\nbut also misunderstands the nature of vicarious liability. It\\nis—well, there’s no bemer word than vicarious.\\n With vicarious liability, one person is liable for another’s\\nwrong. In an employment relation, that means an employee\\nor other agent. The wrongdoer need not be a defendant, but\\nthere must be an actionable wrong, by a person whose con-\\nduct is imputed to the employer. Medical negligence by one\\nof Wexford’s employees could support liability under state\\ntort law but not the Eighth Amendment. If only intentional\\nwrongdoing by an employee leads to personal liability, then\\nan employee’s negligence does not justify holding the em-\\nployer liable. There’s nothing to be vicariously liable for.\\n These are fundamental principles of tort and agency law,\\nwhere vicarious liability has long been common. “Vicarious\\nliability is not based upon the defendant’s own fault. Rather,\\nit is based upon the principle that he must bear legal respon-\\nsibility for another’s wrong. From the employer-defendant’s\\npoint of view, vicarious liability is strict liability, since he is\\nliable without personal fault. That is not quite the case from\\nthe plaintiff’s point of view. The plaintiff must prove that the\\nemployee commimed a tort and was acting within the scope\\nof employment when he did so.” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T.\\nHayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts 782 (2d ed. 2011\\n& update 2018). See also, e.g., Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802\\nF.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986); National Union Fire Insurance Co.\\nv. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St. 3d 594, 599 (2009) (“a principal is vi-\\ncariously liable only when an agent could be held directly\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 7\\n\\nliable”); Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 481 (1991) (“The\\nliability of the principal arises simply by the operation of law\\nand is only derivative of the wrongful act of the agent”); Re-\\nstatement (Second) of Agency §217B (1958). This also implies\\nthat vicarious responsibility does not change the substantive\\nstandard. “Vicarious liability is not an independent cause of\\naction, but rather is a legal concept used to transfer liability\\nfrom an agent to a principal”. Crawford v. Signet Bank, 179\\nF.3d 926, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1999).\\n Vicarious liability makes a person responsible for some-\\none else’s wrong but does not change the proof required to\\nshow that a legal wrong has occurred. So even if we were to\\noverrule Iskander, Gaston would need to show that someone\\nwhose acts are imputed to Wexford violated the Eighth\\nAmendment, as understood in Gamble, Farmer, and PeIies.\\nHe did not seriously try to do so. This makes it unnecessary\\nto decide whether Iskander was correctly decided.\\n One final observation. Gaston and other plaintiffs have\\ncontended that Iskander leads Wexford and similar organiza-\\ntions to skimp on medical care in order to enrich themselves.\\nWexford responds that, because it does not pay for the cost\\nof MRI exams, surgeries, and other hospital treatment out-\\nside the prisons, it has no financial reason to withhold ap-\\npropriate medical treatment. That may be true, but so far\\nWexford has not supplied evidence that it is true. Perhaps\\nWexford has contracts with hospitals providing that they\\nwill not bill it, but it has not produced them. Perhaps Illinois\\npays for out-of-prison treatment under the Medicaid pro-\\ngram, but again the record lacks proof. Dr. Chmell testified\\nthat Wexford did not pay him, but the record does not reveal\\nwhether Wexford paid the University of Illinois. Gaston has\\n\\n8 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\nlost this case for want of evidence, but the need to back up\\none’s contentions with evidence applies as much to Wexford\\nas it does to any prisoner.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 9\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1686,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4606672,"string":"4,606,672"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Arriba Lewis"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3592"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3592 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nARRIBA W. LEWIS, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Central District of Illinois. \\n No. 1:17‐cr‐10004‐JES‐JEH‐1 — James E. Shadid, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges. \\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Officer Sweeney pulled Arriba \\nLewis over for following too closely. Sweeney processed a \\nwarning while Lewis, who seemed unusually nervous, sat in \\nthe squad car. After learning Lewis was on federal supervised \\nrelease for a cocaine conviction, Sweeney requested a drug‐\\nsniffing dog roughly 5 minutes into the stop. \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n About 10 minutes and 50 seconds after Lewis pulled over, \\nSweeney handed him a warning. About 10 seconds later, a \\ndrug‐sniffing dog and its handler approached Lewis’s car. \\nThe dog alerted. Sweeney searched Lewis’s car and found \\nheroin. Lewis was charged with possession with intent to dis‐\\ntribute heroin. The district court denied his motion to sup‐\\npress. He appeals, arguing the officer lacked lawful grounds \\nto initiate the traffic stop and arguing the officer prolonged \\nthe stop without independent reasonable suspicion for the \\ndog to sniff. But we disagree on both fronts, and affirm. \\n I. Facts \\n Officer Sweeney sat in an unmarked Ford SUV with an ex‐\\nterior spotlight in the median of Interstate 55 in McLean \\nCounty, Illinois, watching traffic. He saw a man later identi‐\\nfied as Arriba Lewis driving a Dodge Charger southbound in \\n“a pack of vehicles traveling in close proximity to each other.” \\nHe “was traveling right behind another vehicle in very close \\nproximity,” gripping the wheel at 10:00 and 2:00, and appear‐\\ning to push himself behind the side pillar in a rigid posture. \\n Sweeney pursued Lewis. Sweeney testified he wanted “to \\nsee if I can observe a traffic violation and confirm [Lewis’s] \\nfollowing distance which I initially saw.” But first he passed \\nLewis to assist another officer. Sweeney’s dashboard camera \\nbegan recording after he passed Lewis because Sweeney trig‐\\ngered his emergency lights as he approached the other officer. \\nTriggering these lights activated the dashcam, which was pro‐\\ngramed to capture footage beginning 1 minute earlier. After \\npassing Lewis, Sweeney pulled over to the right shoulder be‐\\nhind the other officer. Video recorded by Sweeney’s dashcam \\nshows a truck followed by Lewis pass to the left of Sweeney. \\nThe other officer declined assistance, so Sweeney pulled out \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 3\\n\\nand accelerated. Several vehicles moved to the right lane to let \\nhim pass. He saw Lewis ahead in the left lane “at the prelim‐\\ninary stages of passing” a truck in the right lane. Then Lewis \\nchanged to the right lane behind the truck. As Lewis followed \\nthe truck, Sweeney calculated the time‐distance. He activated \\na stopwatch function to record the time between the truck’s \\nrear passing a milepost and the Charger’s front passing the \\nsame object. He clocked this at 1.2 seconds, meaning Lewis \\nfollowed 1.2 seconds behind the truck according to this calcu‐\\nlation. Lewis stayed close behind the truck for about 45 sec‐\\nonds despite the lack of traffic immediately behind him. \\n Sweeney pulled into the right lane. He testified he acti‐\\nvated his emergency lights.1 He pulled Lewis over. Lewis \\nstopped on the right shoulder, and Sweeney pulled behind \\nhim, at about 3 minutes, 41 seconds into the video. The video \\nshows Lewis made a movement to his right inside his car sec‐\\nonds later. Sweeney walked to the Charger’s passenger side \\nand saw Lewis’s hands trembling. At about 4 minutes into the \\nvideo, Sweeney reached the front window.2 He made contact \\nwith Lewis and asked for his license. Sweeney said: \\n\\n \\n1 The parties dispute the timing of Sweeney’s activation of his emergency \\n\\nlights. Sweeney testified he activated his lights sometime after clocking \\nthe following‐distance at 1.2 seconds. But Lewis argues Sweeney activated \\nhis lights when he pulled over to offer assistance to the other officer, well \\nbefore clocking the following‐distance, and nothing in the record shows \\nhe turned the lights off. This issue’s potential relevance concerns the rea‐\\nson Lewis pulled into the right lane behind the truck. \\n2 The dashcam video (presented at the suppression hearing and submitted \\n\\nto us) begins at 0 minutes, 0 seconds. The video runs for about 3 minutes, \\n41 seconds before showing Lewis stop on the shoulder. It then shows \\nSweeney reach the front passenger‐side window of the Charger at about 4 \\nminutes into the video. Sweeney said “Here you go. Here’s your warning, \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n The reason I stopped you was your following‐\\n distance. You need to leave at least 3 seconds \\n here in Illinois. You were less than 2 behind that \\n semi. Ok. And that’s why I originally pulled out \\n on you back, way back there, too. You had an‐\\n other car you were following.3 \\n Sweeney testified Lewis’s hands trembled and his breath‐\\ning seemed heavy and labored. Sweeney told Lewis he would \\njust get a warning, not a ticket, and told him to sit in the squad \\ncar during preparation of the warning. After “hem‐haw[ing]” \\nand failing to exit his car expeditiously, when he finally began \\nto exit he reached back in his car. Then he put his hands up as \\nhe walked. Sweeney said, “You’re fine man. Relax.” \\n In the squad car, Sweeney typed information into a com‐\\nputer and talked with Lewis. The first step of completing the \\nwarning was ensuring, via computer, he had a valid license. \\nUpon this check, the computer automatically showed he was \\non federal probation4 for a cocaine conviction. Sweeney \\n\\n \\nok,” and handed it to Lewis at about 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the video. \\nThus, the total time from Lewis pulling over to Sweeney handing him the \\nwarning is about 10 minutes, 50 seconds. The dog sniff began about 10 \\nseconds later and took about 1 minute, 8 seconds. References to the video’s \\ntime during the stop include about 4 minutes before Sweeney reached \\nLewis’s window. The video’s length does not equal the duration of the \\nstop. As we show below, Lewis sometimes conflates the video’s length \\nwith the duration of the stop. But they are not the same. \\n3 We base our quotations of Sweeney and Lewis during the stop on the \\n\\nvideo. Any deviations are immaterial. \\n4 Sweeney used the word “probation,” apparently because his computer \\n\\ndid not distinguish between this and supervised release. Actually, Lewis \\nwas on the latter. But the distinction is immaterial here. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 5\\n\\ntestified the computer returned information based on the li‐\\ncense within 1 minute of sitting in the squad car. \\n About 2 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \\nwhere he was headed. Lewis said he was going to pick his son \\nup. Sweeney asked where. Lewis said, “School … St. Louis.” \\nSweeney asked how old the son was. Lewis said, “26.” He ex‐\\nplained his son wanted to return to Chicago. Sweeney asked \\nwhere the son went to school. Lewis replied his son worked \\nin a warehouse. Lewis added his son “got into it” with his \\ngirlfriend. This exchange lasted slightly less than a minute. \\nSweeney thought the story seemed suspiciously inconsistent. \\n About 3.5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, he asked about \\nthe 3‐second guideline Sweeney mentioned: \\n Lewis: So you got to be how many feet back? \\n Sweeney: It’s not feet. It’s seconds. You need to \\n be at least 3 seconds. \\n Lewis: Oh. Ok. \\n Sweeney: Ok. You were 1.2. \\n Lewis: How you measure that? \\n Sweeney: It’s just a stopwatch function on here. \\n So when the, with the semi, when it goes by a \\n stationary object which was the milepost back \\n there is what I used. When the back of that goes \\n past that stationary object I start it. When the \\n front of your vehicle goes past that same object \\n I stop it. \\n About 5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \\nhim what he does for work, and he said he drove a truck. \\nRoughly 5 minutes after first making contact with Lewis at his \\nwindow, Sweeney requested a drug‐sniffing dog via a \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nmessaging system. Lewis concedes Sweeney requested the \\ndog after hearing Lewis’s answers regarding his travel plans \\nand after learning via computer he had a prior drug convic‐\\ntion for which he was on supervised release. \\n About 6 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said \\nsomething was taking a minute to update. Then he asked \\nLewis how long his son had been in St. Louis, how often \\nLewis visited, and whether Lewis drove a truck “over the \\nroad.” Sweeney testified Lewis’s breathing continued to ap‐\\npear labored in the squad car, even after hearing he would \\nonly get a warning. Nearly 8 minutes after Lewis pulled over, \\nSweeney said Illinois barred the air freshener hanging from \\nLewis’s mirror because it obstructed the view. Sweeney asked \\nLewis what part of St. Louis he was going to. Sweeney testi‐\\nfied Lewis never asked if he was free to go. \\n Sweeney then said, “in correlation with our safety detail \\ntoday … we do have a canine dog working with us.” Sweeney \\nasked if Lewis was responsible for everything in the car. \\nAbout 10 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said, “I’m \\ngonna print this off. I’m gonna have the dog walk around the \\nexterior of the vehicle, ok.” About 20 seconds later, the dash‐\\ncam records the sound of the warning printing. Then Sweeney \\nasked if Lewis was on probation. He responded in the affirm‐\\native. Nearly 11 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney \\nsaid, “Here you go. Here’s your warning, ok.”5 Sweeney gave \\nthe warning to Lewis, explained it, and said, “So you’re going \\nto St. Louis though.” At the word “though,” at about 14 \\nminutes, 41 seconds into the video (about 10 seconds after \\n\\n \\n5 This comports with his testimony that he completed the “warning pa‐\\n\\nperwork” roughly 10 minutes, 40 seconds after initiating the stop. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 7\\n\\ngiving the written warning) a dog appeared on the video and \\napproached the rear passenger side of Lewis’s car. Lewis con‐\\nfirmed he was going to St. Louis. Sweeney said that was out‐\\nside Illinois. They talked about Lewis’s probation and prior \\nincarceration while the dog circled his car. \\n About 12 minutes after Lewis pulled over (about 1 minute, \\n18 seconds after Sweeney gave the written warning to Lewis, \\nand about 1 minute, 8 seconds after the dog sniff began) the \\nhandler told Sweeney the sniff was positive. Sweeney \\nsearched Lewis’s car and quickly found 208 grams of heroin. \\n II. Procedural posture \\n Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distrib‐\\nute heroin. The district court denied his motion to suppress. \\nHe entered a conditional guilty plea. A career offender at \\ncriminal history category VI, he received a sentence of 20 \\nyears incarceration. He appeals the denial of suppression, \\nraising two main issues. First, he challenges the traffic stop’s \\ninitiation. Second, he challenges the sniff’s initiation. “We em‐\\nploy a mixed standard of review on motions to suppress, re‐\\nviewing the district court’s factual determinations for clear er‐\\nror and de novo its ultimate determination about whether the \\npolice had sufficient grounds to stop or search the individ‐\\nual.” United States v. Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th \\nCir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). \\n III. Discussion \\nA. Traffic stop \\n1. Law \\n Lewis argues Sweeney did not have legal grounds to start \\nthe traffic stop. If Lewis is right, then the court should have \\n\\f8 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nsuppressed the heroin as fruit of the poisonous tree. The \\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches \\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a \\nvehicle, the stop must meet the Fourth Amendment’s reason‐\\nableness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 \\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, \\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States \\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015). \\n The district court determined probable cause justified ini‐\\ntiating the stop.6 Generally, “the decision to stop an automo‐\\nbile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to be‐\\nlieve that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United \\nStates, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). “Probable cause exists when \\n‘the circumstances confronting a police officer support the \\nreasonable belief that a driver has committed even a minor \\ntraffic offense.’” United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th \\nCir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586 \\n(7th Cir. 2000)). Probable cause is an objective standard, based \\non the totality of the circumstances. If an officer reasonably \\nthinks he sees a driver commit a traffic violation, that is suffi‐\\ncient grounds to pull him over without offending the Consti‐\\ntution. Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724. The officer is not the judge. \\nWhether the driver actually committed a traffic infraction is \\nirrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes so long as there \\nwas an objective basis for a reasonable belief he did. Cashman, \\n216 F.3d at 587. \\n\\n \\n6 The lower standard of reasonable suspicion is enough to justify some \\n\\ntraffic stops. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014); Prouse, 440 U.S. \\nat 663; Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d at 667–68. But we need not apply this \\nstandard here because the district court did not err in finding probable \\ncause. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 9\\n\\n2. Analysis \\n Here, Sweeney had more than ample grounds to pull \\nLewis over. As Sweeney sat in the median, he thought he saw \\nLewis following another vehicle too closely. That initial ob‐\\nservation alone probably satisfied the Constitution, but we \\nneed not decide that because Sweeney pursued Lewis and \\nconducted a time‐distance calculation to confirm he followed \\na vehicle too closely. Sweeney calculated Lewis’s following‐\\ntime‐distance at 1.2 seconds. Whether Lewis actually fol‐\\nlowed by 1.2 seconds exactly is irrelevant for purposes of the \\nFourth Amendment. It is enough that this calculation sup‐\\nported a reasonable belief Lewis was breaking the law. \\n Lewis mainly argues the 3‐second rule mentioned by \\nSweeney during the traffic stop is merely the Illinois Secretary \\nof State’s recommendation, not the actual law. But this is a red \\nherring because the standard for probable cause is objective. \\nSee Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s con‐\\ncern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken \\nin certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”); \\nScott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“[T]hat the of‐\\nficer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated \\nby the reasons which provide the legal justification for the of‐\\nficer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as \\nthe circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”). \\nThe objective circumstances support probable cause to pull \\nLewis over based on the two observations of him following \\ntoo closely, in violation of the law: \\n The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow \\n another vehicle more closely than is reasonable \\n and prudent, having due regard for the speed of \\n\\f10 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n such vehicles and the traffic upon and the con‐\\n dition of the highway. \\n625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a). Here, it does not matter whether the Sec‐\\nretary’s recommendation comports with the statute. Nor does \\nit matter that Sweeney referenced the recommendation dur‐\\ning the stop. Regardless, Sweeney objectively had grounds for \\na reasonable belief Lewis was following too closely based on \\nthe two observations (and based on the clocked observation \\nalone).7 \\n And this brings us to Lewis’s next argument. He faults the \\ncourt for not giving effect to the statutory language requiring \\na driver to act based on the “condition of the highway.” He \\nargues the major highway condition was Sweeney’s squad car \\napproaching Lewis from behind. Lewis argues Illinois law re‐\\nquired him to pull immediately into the right lane when he \\nsaw the squad car approaching. He argues he had a legal duty \\nnot to obstruct it. He argues he chose the least of the available \\nevils when he pulled from the left lane into the right lane be‐\\nhind the truck to yield to Sweeney. Lewis goes so far as to \\n \\n7 Lewis argues: “For the Government to have met its burden of establish‐\\n\\ning probable cause for a 625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a) violation, it had to prove Mr. \\nLewis was driving in a way that was not ‘reasonable or prudent’ given the \\n‘speed of [other] vehicles’ and the ‘condition of the highway.’” (Appel‐\\nlant’s Reply at 9–10.) That is wrong. To show the constitutionality of the \\ntraffic stop’s start, the government merely needed to show an objective \\nbasis for a reasonable belief Lewis followed too closely, not that he actu‐\\nally followed too closely. Whether Lewis actually followed at 1.2 seconds \\nand whether 1.2 seconds was actually too close, given all the conditions of \\nthe highway, are irrelevant to whether there was probable cause sufficient \\nto initiate the stop, and ultimately would have been for a traffic court to \\ndecide (if Sweeney issued a ticket instead of a warning). \\n \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 11\\n\\nargue Sweeney “impermissibly created the grounds for the \\nstop,” manufacturing a “police‐created exigency.” \\n The main problem with this argument is that it does noth‐\\ning to justify or explain why Lewis stayed in the right lane in \\nclose proximity behind the truck for about 45 seconds after \\npulling into the right lane behind the truck. As the video \\ndemonstrates, no vehicles at this stage forced Lewis to tailgate \\nthe truck. Regardless of the status of Sweeney’s emergency \\nlights, Lewis offers no reason why he could not have eased \\nback from the truck. Moreover, Lewis’s argument does noth‐\\ning to undermine Sweeney’s observation from the median. \\n The court properly relied on Muriel, where an officer’s “es‐\\ntimation of the following distance amounted to probable \\ncause to believe that [the suspect’s] vehicle was ‘more close[ ] \\nthan is reasonable and prudent.’” Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724 \\n(quoting Ind. Code 9‐21‐8‐14). The court did not err in con‐\\ncluding probable cause supported initiating the stop. \\nB. Dog sniff \\n1. Law \\n An officer who reasonably starts a traffic stop, however, \\nmight violate the Constitution if he exceeds the scope or un‐\\nreasonably prolongs the stop. A traffic stop “‘can become un‐\\nlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required \\nto complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodri‐\\nguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting \\nIllinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). It is well‐estab‐\\nlished a dog sniff of a vehicle’s exterior only for illegal drugs \\nduring a lawful stop for a traffic violation does not infringe \\nFourth Amendment rights, even absent reasonable suspicion \\nof drugs. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But it is also well‐\\n\\f12 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nestablished a stop justified only by a traffic violation becomes \\nunlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably re‐\\nquired to complete the stop’s original mission. Rodriguez, 135 \\nS. Ct. at 1612. An officer may conduct “certain unrelated \\nchecks”—including a dog sniff—during a lawful traffic stop, \\nbut “he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent \\nthe reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify de‐\\ntaining an individual.” Id. at 1615. Absent independent rea‐\\nsonable suspicion to justify the sniff, the critical question is \\nnot whether the sniff occurs before or after the officer issues \\nthe warning, “but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—\\ni.e., adds time to—‘the stop’ … .” Id. at 1616. But with inde‐\\npendent reasonable suspicion, the officer may detain the sus‐\\npect for the sniff even if the sniff adds time to the total stop. \\n Here, the district court concluded the stop (from its start \\nto the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the warning) was not \\nprolonged past the time reasonably required to complete the \\nmission of issuing a warning. And the district court deter‐\\nmined independent reasonable suspicion justified extending \\nthe stop by about 1 minute for a canine unit to arrive. \\n2. Analysis \\n Lewis argues even if the stop started lawfully, the heroin \\nshould be suppressed because the dog sniffed after a pro‐\\nlonged detention without reasonable suspicion. But he leads \\nwith a patent mistake. He claims Sweeney was completely fin‐\\nished with the warning at 10 minutes, 40 seconds into the \\nvideo but did not print it until 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the \\nvideo, a claimed unjustified delay of nearly 4 minutes. But the \\nvideo and Sweeney’s testimony flatly contradict this. Lewis \\nmistakenly treats Sweeney’s testimony about the time on the \\nvideo’s clock when he printed the warning as testimony about \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 13\\n\\nthe duration of the stop up to the point he printed it. Sweeney \\ntestified he calculated the time it took him to complete the \\nwarning paperwork after he initiated the traffic stop (not after \\nthe video began) to be 10 minutes and 40 seconds. He testified \\nthat at 14 minutes, 26 seconds into the video (not into the stop) \\nhe said “Here you go” as he gave the warning to Lewis. The \\nbottom line is the video and testimony show there was no un‐\\nreasonable delay between finishing the warning and handing \\nit to Lewis. The claimed delay of about 4 minutes merely mir‐\\nrors the difference between the video’s clock and the duration \\nof the stop, because the stop begins about 4 minutes into the \\nvideo. The simple fact, shown by the video and testimony, is \\nSweeney printed the warning between 10 and 11 minutes into \\nthe stop and promptly gave it to Lewis. His false equivocation \\ninfects some of his remaining arguments. \\n Lewis next argues Sweeney unlawfully prolonged the de‐\\ntention by taking time to impermissibly confine and question \\nhim about issues unrelated to the warning, and he raises sev‐\\neral detailed points. But each point fails. \\n Lewis argues switching cars took 1 minute. But he does \\nnot explain why this delay was unlawful or why sitting in the \\nsquad car was impermissible. We already determined the \\ncourt did not err in concluding the initiation of the traffic stop \\nwas permissible. Lewis does not explain why moving him to \\nthe squad car was not reasonably incidental. See United States \\nv. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996) (During a valid traf‐\\nfic stop, an officer may “legitimately ask [a driver] to step out \\nof his car, even without any particularized suspicion,” and \\nmay ask the driver “to sit in his patrol car … .”). Nor does he \\nexplain why, during the minute between Sweeney asking \\n\\f14 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nLewis to exit his car and Lewis entering the squad car, he \\nspent about 40 seconds in his car after being asked to exit. \\n Lewis next argues Sweeney spent 6 minutes and 15 sec‐\\nonds asking about irrelevant travel matters and explaining \\nhow a canine unit will arrive. Lewis cites two parts of the \\nvideo in support. There are several problems with Lewis’s ar‐\\ngument here. The first challenged part of the video begins \\nwith Sweeney asking, “Where are we headed to today, sir?” \\nOfficers across the country would be surprised if we counte‐\\nnanced the characterization of this basic, routine question as \\nirrelevant to a traffic stop. Lewis’s initial response to this ques‐\\ntion was not entirely forthcoming: “Pick my son up.” That re‐\\nsponse naturally led to Sweeney’s next question: “Where’s \\nthat at?” Again, Lewis’s response was not entirely forthcom‐\\ning: “School … St. Louis.” So Sweeney asked how old the son \\nwas and where he went to school. Lewis gave the age, brought \\nup returning to Chicago, never answered about school, \\nbrought up his son’s work in “some warehouse,” and brought \\nup a situation between his son and his son’s girlfriend. \\n The Constitution allows an officer to ask these questions \\nduring a traffic stop, especially when the answers objectively \\nseem suspicious. See Muriel, 418 F.3d at 726 (Although ques‐\\ntions prolonging custody might affect the detention’s reason‐\\nableness, police “may ask questions that do not concern the \\npurpose of the stop and that are not supported by any other \\nsuspicion.”); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. \\n2002) (“What the Constitution requires is that the entire pro‐\\ncess remain reasonable. Questions that hold potential for de‐\\ntecting crime, yet create little or no inconvenience, do not turn \\nreasonable detention into unreasonable detention.”) And \\nLewis could have refused to answer at some point. But the \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 15\\n\\nbiggest problem with Lewis’s argument here is he does not \\nshow any reason these exchanges prolonged the process of is‐\\nsuing the warning. The video and testimony both document \\nSweeney worked on the warning while talking with Lewis. \\n The court did not err in determining the duration of the \\nstop (from its start to the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the \\nwarning) was not prolonged past the time reasonably re‐\\nquired to complete the mission of issuing a warning. \\n The court turned to the issue of whether Sweeney ob‐\\ntained enough information during the stop before issuing the \\nwarning to have independent reasonable suspicion of crimi‐\\nnal activity to justify detaining Lewis further. Sweeney \\nhanded Lewis the warning about 10 minutes, 50 seconds after \\nLewis pulled over. The dog alerted roughly 1 minute later. \\nEven if the period between handing the warning and the dog \\nalerting could be called a delay of about 1 minute8 it was jus‐\\ntified by independent reasonable suspicion, as the court held. \\n Reasonable suspicion requires “‘specific and articulable \\nfacts which, taken together with rational inferences from \\nthose facts,’ suggest criminal activity.” United States v. Ruiz, \\n785 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 \\nU.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is an objective stand‐\\nard, considering the totality of the circumstances. By the time \\n \\n8 We question whether even this minute can be characterized as a delay to \\n\\nwait for a dog, because immediately after handing Lewis the warning and \\nexplaining in a quick and routine manner what it is, Sweeney brings up \\nthe apt point that Lewis said he was going to St. Louis, but his terms likely \\nrestrict his freedom to leave Illinois. But we need not explore this further \\nbecause we agree with the district court that Sweeney had independent \\nreasonable suspicion to detain Lewis after handing him the warning to \\nallow the dog time to sniff. \\n\\f16 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nSweeney issued the warning, this is what he objectively had \\nreason to know. One, Lewis seemed unusually nervous even \\nafter hearing he would only get a warning. His hands trem‐\\nbled. His breathing was heavy and labored. Nervousness can \\nraise reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, \\n124 (2000). Two, he was on supervised release for a drug of‐\\nfense. Criminal histories can support reasonable suspicion. \\nUnited States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n(Sweeney had these objective grounds for reasonable suspi‐\\ncion even without asking any questions Lewis now chal‐\\nlenges.) Three, his travel explanations seemed suspiciously \\ninconsistent, which can raise reasonable suspicion. Muriel, 418 \\nF.3d at 726. These factors legitimately gave rise to objective \\nreasonable suspicion. \\n This is true even if Lewis always breathes heavily, with \\nconstantly trembling hands. Even if he were actually innocent \\nof the prior drug charge and a judge planned to exonerate him \\nnext morning. Even if his son actually studied and worked in \\nSt. Louis, quarreled, and wanted to return to Chicago. Re‐\\ngardless, objective reasonable suspicion of criminal activity \\nsupported detaining Lewis to allow a dog to sniff. Perhaps we \\ncould add his rigid posture, furtive movements, “hem‐haw‐\\ning,” and I‐55’s drug‐trafficking reputation. But we need not. \\n We conclude the district court did not err in determining \\nany delay beyond the routine traffic stop to allow the dog to \\nsniff was justified by independent reasonable suspicion. \\n IV. Conclusion \\n We considered all Lewis’s arguments and found none \\navailing. We AFFIRM the denial of suppression.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383925/\", \"author_raw\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606672/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Arriba Lewis\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐3592 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nARRIBA W. LEWIS, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Central District of Illinois. \n No. 1:17‐cr‐10004‐JES‐JEH‐1 — James E. Shadid, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges. \n MANION, Circuit Judge. Officer Sweeney pulled Arriba \nLewis over for following too closely. Sweeney processed a \nwarning while Lewis, who seemed unusually nervous, sat in \nthe squad car. After learning Lewis was on federal supervised \nrelease for a cocaine conviction, Sweeney requested a drug‐\nsniffing dog roughly 5 minutes into the stop. \n\f2 No. 17‐3592 \n\n About 10 minutes and 50 seconds after Lewis pulled over, \nSweeney handed him a warning. About 10 seconds later, a \ndrug‐sniffing dog and its handler approached Lewis’s car. \nThe dog alerted. Sweeney searched Lewis’s car and found \nheroin. Lewis was charged with possession with intent to dis‐\ntribute heroin. The district court denied his motion to sup‐\npress. He appeals, arguing the officer lacked lawful grounds \nto initiate the traffic stop and arguing the officer prolonged \nthe stop without independent reasonable suspicion for the \ndog to sniff. But we disagree on both fronts, and affirm. \n I. Facts \n Officer Sweeney sat in an unmarked Ford SUV with an ex‐\nterior spotlight in the median of Interstate 55 in McLean \nCounty, Illinois, watching traffic. He saw a man later identi‐\nfied as Arriba Lewis driving a Dodge Charger southbound in \n“a pack of vehicles traveling in close proximity to each other.” \nHe “was traveling right behind another vehicle in very close \nproximity,” gripping the wheel at 10:00 and 2:00, and appear‐\ning to push himself behind the side pillar in a rigid posture. \n Sweeney pursued Lewis. Sweeney testified he wanted “to \nsee if I can observe a traffic violation and confirm [Lewis’s] \nfollowing distance which I initially saw.” But first he passed \nLewis to assist another officer. Sweeney’s dashboard camera \nbegan recording after he passed Lewis because Sweeney trig‐\ngered his emergency lights as he approached the other officer. \nTriggering these lights activated the dashcam, which was pro‐\ngramed to capture footage beginning 1 minute earlier. After \npassing Lewis, Sweeney pulled over to the right shoulder be‐\nhind the other officer. Video recorded by Sweeney’s dashcam \nshows a truck followed by Lewis pass to the left of Sweeney. \nThe other officer declined assistance, so Sweeney pulled out \n\fNo. 17‐3592 3\n\nand accelerated. Several vehicles moved to the right lane to let \nhim pass. He saw Lewis ahead in the left lane “at the prelim‐\ninary stages of passing” a truck in the right lane. Then Lewis \nchanged to the right lane behind the truck. As Lewis followed \nthe truck, Sweeney calculated the time‐distance. He activated \na stopwatch function to record the time between the truck’s \nrear passing a milepost and the Charger’s front passing the \nsame object. He clocked this at 1.2 seconds, meaning Lewis \nfollowed 1.2 seconds behind the truck according to this calcu‐\nlation. Lewis stayed close behind the truck for about 45 sec‐\nonds despite the lack of traffic immediately behind him. \n Sweeney pulled into the right lane. He testified he acti‐\nvated his emergency lights.1 He pulled Lewis over. Lewis \nstopped on the right shoulder, and Sweeney pulled behind \nhim, at about 3 minutes, 41 seconds into the video. The video \nshows Lewis made a movement to his right inside his car sec‐\nonds later. Sweeney walked to the Charger’s passenger side \nand saw Lewis’s hands trembling. At about 4 minutes into the \nvideo, Sweeney reached the front window.2 He made contact \nwith Lewis and asked for his license. Sweeney said: \n\n \n1 The parties dispute the timing of Sweeney’s activation of his emergency \n\nlights. Sweeney testified he activated his lights sometime after clocking \nthe following‐distance at 1.2 seconds. But Lewis argues Sweeney activated \nhis lights when he pulled over to offer assistance to the other officer, well \nbefore clocking the following‐distance, and nothing in the record shows \nhe turned the lights off. This issue’s potential relevance concerns the rea‐\nson Lewis pulled into the right lane behind the truck. \n2 The dashcam video (presented at the suppression hearing and submitted \n\nto us) begins at 0 minutes, 0 seconds. The video runs for about 3 minutes, \n41 seconds before showing Lewis stop on the shoulder. It then shows \nSweeney reach the front passenger‐side window of the Charger at about 4 \nminutes into the video. Sweeney said “Here you go. Here’s your warning, \n\f4 No. 17‐3592 \n\n The reason I stopped you was your following‐\n distance. You need to leave at least 3 seconds \n here in Illinois. You were less than 2 behind that \n semi. Ok. And that’s why I originally pulled out \n on you back, way back there, too. You had an‐\n other car you were following.3 \n Sweeney testified Lewis’s hands trembled and his breath‐\ning seemed heavy and labored. Sweeney told Lewis he would \njust get a warning, not a ticket, and told him to sit in the squad \ncar during preparation of the warning. After “hem‐haw[ing]” \nand failing to exit his car expeditiously, when he finally began \nto exit he reached back in his car. Then he put his hands up as \nhe walked. Sweeney said, “You’re fine man. Relax.” \n In the squad car, Sweeney typed information into a com‐\nputer and talked with Lewis. The first step of completing the \nwarning was ensuring, via computer, he had a valid license. \nUpon this check, the computer automatically showed he was \non federal probation4 for a cocaine conviction. Sweeney \n\n \nok,” and handed it to Lewis at about 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the video. \nThus, the total time from Lewis pulling over to Sweeney handing him the \nwarning is about 10 minutes, 50 seconds. The dog sniff began about 10 \nseconds later and took about 1 minute, 8 seconds. References to the video’s \ntime during the stop include about 4 minutes before Sweeney reached \nLewis’s window. The video’s length does not equal the duration of the \nstop. As we show below, Lewis sometimes conflates the video’s length \nwith the duration of the stop. But they are not the same. \n3 We base our quotations of Sweeney and Lewis during the stop on the \n\nvideo. Any deviations are immaterial. \n4 Sweeney used the word “probation,” apparently because his computer \n\ndid not distinguish between this and supervised release. Actually, Lewis \nwas on the latter. But the distinction is immaterial here. \n\fNo. 17‐3592 5\n\ntestified the computer returned information based on the li‐\ncense within 1 minute of sitting in the squad car. \n About 2 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \nwhere he was headed. Lewis said he was going to pick his son \nup. Sweeney asked where. Lewis said, “School … St. Louis.” \nSweeney asked how old the son was. Lewis said, “26.” He ex‐\nplained his son wanted to return to Chicago. Sweeney asked \nwhere the son went to school. Lewis replied his son worked \nin a warehouse. Lewis added his son “got into it” with his \ngirlfriend. This exchange lasted slightly less than a minute. \nSweeney thought the story seemed suspiciously inconsistent. \n About 3.5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, he asked about \nthe 3‐second guideline Sweeney mentioned: \n Lewis: So you got to be how many feet back? \n Sweeney: It’s not feet. It’s seconds. You need to \n be at least 3 seconds. \n Lewis: Oh. Ok. \n Sweeney: Ok. You were 1.2. \n Lewis: How you measure that? \n Sweeney: It’s just a stopwatch function on here. \n So when the, with the semi, when it goes by a \n stationary object which was the milepost back \n there is what I used. When the back of that goes \n past that stationary object I start it. When the \n front of your vehicle goes past that same object \n I stop it. \n About 5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \nhim what he does for work, and he said he drove a truck. \nRoughly 5 minutes after first making contact with Lewis at his \nwindow, Sweeney requested a drug‐sniffing dog via a \n\f6 No. 17‐3592 \n\nmessaging system. Lewis concedes Sweeney requested the \ndog after hearing Lewis’s answers regarding his travel plans \nand after learning via computer he had a prior drug convic‐\ntion for which he was on supervised release. \n About 6 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said \nsomething was taking a minute to update. Then he asked \nLewis how long his son had been in St. Louis, how often \nLewis visited, and whether Lewis drove a truck “over the \nroad.” Sweeney testified Lewis’s breathing continued to ap‐\npear labored in the squad car, even after hearing he would \nonly get a warning. Nearly 8 minutes after Lewis pulled over, \nSweeney said Illinois barred the air freshener hanging from \nLewis’s mirror because it obstructed the view. Sweeney asked \nLewis what part of St. Louis he was going to. Sweeney testi‐\nfied Lewis never asked if he was free to go. \n Sweeney then said, “in correlation with our safety detail \ntoday … we do have a canine dog working with us.” Sweeney \nasked if Lewis was responsible for everything in the car. \nAbout 10 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said, “I’m \ngonna print this off. I’m gonna have the dog walk around the \nexterior of the vehicle, ok.” About 20 seconds later, the dash‐\ncam records the sound of the warning printing. Then Sweeney \nasked if Lewis was on probation. He responded in the affirm‐\native. Nearly 11 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney \nsaid, “Here you go. Here’s your warning, ok.”5 Sweeney gave \nthe warning to Lewis, explained it, and said, “So you’re going \nto St. Louis though.” At the word “though,” at about 14 \nminutes, 41 seconds into the video (about 10 seconds after \n\n \n5 This comports with his testimony that he completed the “warning pa‐\n\nperwork” roughly 10 minutes, 40 seconds after initiating the stop. \n\fNo. 17‐3592 7\n\ngiving the written warning) a dog appeared on the video and \napproached the rear passenger side of Lewis’s car. Lewis con‐\nfirmed he was going to St. Louis. Sweeney said that was out‐\nside Illinois. They talked about Lewis’s probation and prior \nincarceration while the dog circled his car. \n About 12 minutes after Lewis pulled over (about 1 minute, \n18 seconds after Sweeney gave the written warning to Lewis, \nand about 1 minute, 8 seconds after the dog sniff began) the \nhandler told Sweeney the sniff was positive. Sweeney \nsearched Lewis’s car and quickly found 208 grams of heroin. \n II. Procedural posture \n Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distrib‐\nute heroin. The district court denied his motion to suppress. \nHe entered a conditional guilty plea. A career offender at \ncriminal history category VI, he received a sentence of 20 \nyears incarceration. He appeals the denial of suppression, \nraising two main issues. First, he challenges the traffic stop’s \ninitiation. Second, he challenges the sniff’s initiation. “We em‐\nploy a mixed standard of review on motions to suppress, re‐\nviewing the district court’s factual determinations for clear er‐\nror and de novo its ultimate determination about whether the \npolice had sufficient grounds to stop or search the individ‐\nual.” United States v. Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th \nCir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). \n III. Discussion \nA. Traffic stop \n1. Law \n Lewis argues Sweeney did not have legal grounds to start \nthe traffic stop. If Lewis is right, then the court should have \n\f8 No. 17‐3592 \n\nsuppressed the heroin as fruit of the poisonous tree. The \nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches \nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a \nvehicle, the stop must meet the Fourth Amendment’s reason‐\nableness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 \n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, \na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States \nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015). \n The district court determined probable cause justified ini‐\ntiating the stop.6 Generally, “the decision to stop an automo‐\nbile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to be‐\nlieve that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United \nStates, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). “Probable cause exists when \n‘the circumstances confronting a police officer support the \nreasonable belief that a driver has committed even a minor \ntraffic offense.’” United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th \nCir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586 \n(7th Cir. 2000)). Probable cause is an objective standard, based \non the totality of the circumstances. If an officer reasonably \nthinks he sees a driver commit a traffic violation, that is suffi‐\ncient grounds to pull him over without offending the Consti‐\ntution. Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724. The officer is not the judge. \nWhether the driver actually committed a traffic infraction is \nirrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes so long as there \nwas an objective basis for a reasonable belief he did. Cashman, \n216 F.3d at 587. \n\n \n6 The lower standard of reasonable suspicion is enough to justify some \n\ntraffic stops. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014); Prouse, 440 U.S. \nat 663; Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d at 667–68. But we need not apply this \nstandard here because the district court did not err in finding probable \ncause. \n\fNo. 17‐3592 9\n\n2. Analysis \n Here, Sweeney had more than ample grounds to pull \nLewis over. As Sweeney sat in the median, he thought he saw \nLewis following another vehicle too closely. That initial ob‐\nservation alone probably satisfied the Constitution, but we \nneed not decide that because Sweeney pursued Lewis and \nconducted a time‐distance calculation to confirm he followed \na vehicle too closely. Sweeney calculated Lewis’s following‐\ntime‐distance at 1.2 seconds. Whether Lewis actually fol‐\nlowed by 1.2 seconds exactly is irrelevant for purposes of the \nFourth Amendment. It is enough that this calculation sup‐\nported a reasonable belief Lewis was breaking the law. \n Lewis mainly argues the 3‐second rule mentioned by \nSweeney during the traffic stop is merely the Illinois Secretary \nof State’s recommendation, not the actual law. But this is a red \nherring because the standard for probable cause is objective. \nSee Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s con‐\ncern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken \nin certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”); \nScott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“[T]hat the of‐\nficer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated \nby the reasons which provide the legal justification for the of‐\nficer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as \nthe circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”). \nThe objective circumstances support probable cause to pull \nLewis over based on the two observations of him following \ntoo closely, in violation of the law: \n The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow \n another vehicle more closely than is reasonable \n and prudent, having due regard for the speed of \n\f10 No. 17‐3592 \n\n such vehicles and the traffic upon and the con‐\n dition of the highway. \n625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a). Here, it does not matter whether the Sec‐\nretary’s recommendation comports with the statute. Nor does \nit matter that Sweeney referenced the recommendation dur‐\ning the stop. Regardless, Sweeney objectively had grounds for \na reasonable belief Lewis was following too closely based on \nthe two observations (and based on the clocked observation \nalone).7 \n And this brings us to Lewis’s next argument. He faults the \ncourt for not giving effect to the statutory language requiring \na driver to act based on the “condition of the highway.” He \nargues the major highway condition was Sweeney’s squad car \napproaching Lewis from behind. Lewis argues Illinois law re‐\nquired him to pull immediately into the right lane when he \nsaw the squad car approaching. He argues he had a legal duty \nnot to obstruct it. He argues he chose the least of the available \nevils when he pulled from the left lane into the right lane be‐\nhind the truck to yield to Sweeney. Lewis goes so far as to \n \n7 Lewis argues: “For the Government to have met its burden of establish‐\n\ning probable cause for a 625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a) violation, it had to prove Mr. \nLewis was driving in a way that was not ‘reasonable or prudent’ given the \n‘speed of [other] vehicles’ and the ‘condition of the highway.’” (Appel‐\nlant’s Reply at 9–10.) That is wrong. To show the constitutionality of the \ntraffic stop’s start, the government merely needed to show an objective \nbasis for a reasonable belief Lewis followed too closely, not that he actu‐\nally followed too closely. Whether Lewis actually followed at 1.2 seconds \nand whether 1.2 seconds was actually too close, given all the conditions of \nthe highway, are irrelevant to whether there was probable cause sufficient \nto initiate the stop, and ultimately would have been for a traffic court to \ndecide (if Sweeney issued a ticket instead of a warning). \n \n\fNo. 17‐3592 11\n\nargue Sweeney “impermissibly created the grounds for the \nstop,” manufacturing a “police‐created exigency.” \n The main problem with this argument is that it does noth‐\ning to justify or explain why Lewis stayed in the right lane in \nclose proximity behind the truck for about 45 seconds after \npulling into the right lane behind the truck. As the video \ndemonstrates, no vehicles at this stage forced Lewis to tailgate \nthe truck. Regardless of the status of Sweeney’s emergency \nlights, Lewis offers no reason why he could not have eased \nback from the truck. Moreover, Lewis’s argument does noth‐\ning to undermine Sweeney’s observation from the median. \n The court properly relied on Muriel, where an officer’s “es‐\ntimation of the following distance amounted to probable \ncause to believe that [the suspect’s] vehicle was ‘more close[ ] \nthan is reasonable and prudent.’” Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724 \n(quoting Ind. Code 9‐21‐8‐14). The court did not err in con‐\ncluding probable cause supported initiating the stop. \nB. Dog sniff \n1. Law \n An officer who reasonably starts a traffic stop, however, \nmight violate the Constitution if he exceeds the scope or un‐\nreasonably prolongs the stop. A traffic stop “‘can become un‐\nlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required \nto complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodri‐\nguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting \nIllinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). It is well‐estab‐\nlished a dog sniff of a vehicle’s exterior only for illegal drugs \nduring a lawful stop for a traffic violation does not infringe \nFourth Amendment rights, even absent reasonable suspicion \nof drugs. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But it is also well‐\n\f12 No. 17‐3592 \n\nestablished a stop justified only by a traffic violation becomes \nunlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably re‐\nquired to complete the stop’s original mission. Rodriguez, 135 \nS. Ct. at 1612. An officer may conduct “certain unrelated \nchecks”—including a dog sniff—during a lawful traffic stop, \nbut “he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent \nthe reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify de‐\ntaining an individual.” Id. at 1615. Absent independent rea‐\nsonable suspicion to justify the sniff, the critical question is \nnot whether the sniff occurs before or after the officer issues \nthe warning, “but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—\ni.e., adds time to—‘the stop’ … .” Id. at 1616. But with inde‐\npendent reasonable suspicion, the officer may detain the sus‐\npect for the sniff even if the sniff adds time to the total stop. \n Here, the district court concluded the stop (from its start \nto the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the warning) was not \nprolonged past the time reasonably required to complete the \nmission of issuing a warning. And the district court deter‐\nmined independent reasonable suspicion justified extending \nthe stop by about 1 minute for a canine unit to arrive. \n2. Analysis \n Lewis argues even if the stop started lawfully, the heroin \nshould be suppressed because the dog sniffed after a pro‐\nlonged detention without reasonable suspicion. But he leads \nwith a patent mistake. He claims Sweeney was completely fin‐\nished with the warning at 10 minutes, 40 seconds into the \nvideo but did not print it until 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the \nvideo, a claimed unjustified delay of nearly 4 minutes. But the \nvideo and Sweeney’s testimony flatly contradict this. Lewis \nmistakenly treats Sweeney’s testimony about the time on the \nvideo’s clock when he printed the warning as testimony about \n\fNo. 17‐3592 13\n\nthe duration of the stop up to the point he printed it. Sweeney \ntestified he calculated the time it took him to complete the \nwarning paperwork after he initiated the traffic stop (not after \nthe video began) to be 10 minutes and 40 seconds. He testified \nthat at 14 minutes, 26 seconds into the video (not into the stop) \nhe said “Here you go” as he gave the warning to Lewis. The \nbottom line is the video and testimony show there was no un‐\nreasonable delay between finishing the warning and handing \nit to Lewis. The claimed delay of about 4 minutes merely mir‐\nrors the difference between the video’s clock and the duration \nof the stop, because the stop begins about 4 minutes into the \nvideo. The simple fact, shown by the video and testimony, is \nSweeney printed the warning between 10 and 11 minutes into \nthe stop and promptly gave it to Lewis. His false equivocation \ninfects some of his remaining arguments. \n Lewis next argues Sweeney unlawfully prolonged the de‐\ntention by taking time to impermissibly confine and question \nhim about issues unrelated to the warning, and he raises sev‐\neral detailed points. But each point fails. \n Lewis argues switching cars took 1 minute. But he does \nnot explain why this delay was unlawful or why sitting in the \nsquad car was impermissible. We already determined the \ncourt did not err in concluding the initiation of the traffic stop \nwas permissible. Lewis does not explain why moving him to \nthe squad car was not reasonably incidental. See United States \nv. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996) (During a valid traf‐\nfic stop, an officer may “legitimately ask [a driver] to step out \nof his car, even without any particularized suspicion,” and \nmay ask the driver “to sit in his patrol car … .”). Nor does he \nexplain why, during the minute between Sweeney asking \n\f14 No. 17‐3592 \n\nLewis to exit his car and Lewis entering the squad car, he \nspent about 40 seconds in his car after being asked to exit. \n Lewis next argues Sweeney spent 6 minutes and 15 sec‐\nonds asking about irrelevant travel matters and explaining \nhow a canine unit will arrive. Lewis cites two parts of the \nvideo in support. There are several problems with Lewis’s ar‐\ngument here. The first challenged part of the video begins \nwith Sweeney asking, “Where are we headed to today, sir?” \nOfficers across the country would be surprised if we counte‐\nnanced the characterization of this basic, routine question as \nirrelevant to a traffic stop. Lewis’s initial response to this ques‐\ntion was not entirely forthcoming: “Pick my son up.” That re‐\nsponse naturally led to Sweeney’s next question: “Where’s \nthat at?” Again, Lewis’s response was not entirely forthcom‐\ning: “School … St. Louis.” So Sweeney asked how old the son \nwas and where he went to school. Lewis gave the age, brought \nup returning to Chicago, never answered about school, \nbrought up his son’s work in “some warehouse,” and brought \nup a situation between his son and his son’s girlfriend. \n The Constitution allows an officer to ask these questions \nduring a traffic stop, especially when the answers objectively \nseem suspicious. See Muriel, 418 F.3d at 726 (Although ques‐\ntions prolonging custody might affect the detention’s reason‐\nableness, police “may ask questions that do not concern the \npurpose of the stop and that are not supported by any other \nsuspicion.”); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. \n2002) (“What the Constitution requires is that the entire pro‐\ncess remain reasonable. Questions that hold potential for de‐\ntecting crime, yet create little or no inconvenience, do not turn \nreasonable detention into unreasonable detention.”) And \nLewis could have refused to answer at some point. But the \n\fNo. 17‐3592 15\n\nbiggest problem with Lewis’s argument here is he does not \nshow any reason these exchanges prolonged the process of is‐\nsuing the warning. The video and testimony both document \nSweeney worked on the warning while talking with Lewis. \n The court did not err in determining the duration of the \nstop (from its start to the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the \nwarning) was not prolonged past the time reasonably re‐\nquired to complete the mission of issuing a warning. \n The court turned to the issue of whether Sweeney ob‐\ntained enough information during the stop before issuing the \nwarning to have independent reasonable suspicion of crimi‐\nnal activity to justify detaining Lewis further. Sweeney \nhanded Lewis the warning about 10 minutes, 50 seconds after \nLewis pulled over. The dog alerted roughly 1 minute later. \nEven if the period between handing the warning and the dog \nalerting could be called a delay of about 1 minute8 it was jus‐\ntified by independent reasonable suspicion, as the court held. \n Reasonable suspicion requires “‘specific and articulable \nfacts which, taken together with rational inferences from \nthose facts,’ suggest criminal activity.” United States v. Ruiz, \n785 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 \nU.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is an objective stand‐\nard, considering the totality of the circumstances. By the time \n \n8 We question whether even this minute can be characterized as a delay to \n\nwait for a dog, because immediately after handing Lewis the warning and \nexplaining in a quick and routine manner what it is, Sweeney brings up \nthe apt point that Lewis said he was going to St. Louis, but his terms likely \nrestrict his freedom to leave Illinois. But we need not explore this further \nbecause we agree with the district court that Sweeney had independent \nreasonable suspicion to detain Lewis after handing him the warning to \nallow the dog time to sniff. \n\f16 No. 17‐3592 \n\nSweeney issued the warning, this is what he objectively had \nreason to know. One, Lewis seemed unusually nervous even \nafter hearing he would only get a warning. His hands trem‐\nbled. His breathing was heavy and labored. Nervousness can \nraise reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, \n124 (2000). Two, he was on supervised release for a drug of‐\nfense. Criminal histories can support reasonable suspicion. \nUnited States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 2016). \n(Sweeney had these objective grounds for reasonable suspi‐\ncion even without asking any questions Lewis now chal‐\nlenges.) Three, his travel explanations seemed suspiciously \ninconsistent, which can raise reasonable suspicion. Muriel, 418 \nF.3d at 726. These factors legitimately gave rise to objective \nreasonable suspicion. \n This is true even if Lewis always breathes heavily, with \nconstantly trembling hands. Even if he were actually innocent \nof the prior drug charge and a judge planned to exonerate him \nnext morning. Even if his son actually studied and worked in \nSt. Louis, quarreled, and wanted to return to Chicago. Re‐\ngardless, objective reasonable suspicion of criminal activity \nsupported detaining Lewis to allow a dog to sniff. Perhaps we \ncould add his rigid posture, furtive movements, “hem‐haw‐\ning,” and I‐55’s drug‐trafficking reputation. But we need not. \n We conclude the district court did not err in determining \nany delay beyond the routine traffic stop to allow the dog to \nsniff was justified by independent reasonable suspicion. \n IV. Conclusion \n We considered all Lewis’s arguments and found none \navailing. We AFFIRM the denial of suppression.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Arriba Lewis\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3592 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nARRIBA W. LEWIS, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Central District of Illinois. \\n No. 1:17‐cr‐10004‐JES‐JEH‐1 — James E. Shadid, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges. \\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Officer Sweeney pulled Arriba \\nLewis over for following too closely. Sweeney processed a \\nwarning while Lewis, who seemed unusually nervous, sat in \\nthe squad car. After learning Lewis was on federal supervised \\nrelease for a cocaine conviction, Sweeney requested a drug‐\\nsniffing dog roughly 5 minutes into the stop. \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n About 10 minutes and 50 seconds after Lewis pulled over, \\nSweeney handed him a warning. About 10 seconds later, a \\ndrug‐sniffing dog and its handler approached Lewis’s car. \\nThe dog alerted. Sweeney searched Lewis’s car and found \\nheroin. Lewis was charged with possession with intent to dis‐\\ntribute heroin. The district court denied his motion to sup‐\\npress. He appeals, arguing the officer lacked lawful grounds \\nto initiate the traffic stop and arguing the officer prolonged \\nthe stop without independent reasonable suspicion for the \\ndog to sniff. But we disagree on both fronts, and affirm. \\n I. Facts \\n Officer Sweeney sat in an unmarked Ford SUV with an ex‐\\nterior spotlight in the median of Interstate 55 in McLean \\nCounty, Illinois, watching traffic. He saw a man later identi‐\\nfied as Arriba Lewis driving a Dodge Charger southbound in \\n“a pack of vehicles traveling in close proximity to each other.” \\nHe “was traveling right behind another vehicle in very close \\nproximity,” gripping the wheel at 10:00 and 2:00, and appear‐\\ning to push himself behind the side pillar in a rigid posture. \\n Sweeney pursued Lewis. Sweeney testified he wanted “to \\nsee if I can observe a traffic violation and confirm [Lewis’s] \\nfollowing distance which I initially saw.” But first he passed \\nLewis to assist another officer. Sweeney’s dashboard camera \\nbegan recording after he passed Lewis because Sweeney trig‐\\ngered his emergency lights as he approached the other officer. \\nTriggering these lights activated the dashcam, which was pro‐\\ngramed to capture footage beginning 1 minute earlier. After \\npassing Lewis, Sweeney pulled over to the right shoulder be‐\\nhind the other officer. Video recorded by Sweeney’s dashcam \\nshows a truck followed by Lewis pass to the left of Sweeney. \\nThe other officer declined assistance, so Sweeney pulled out \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 3\\n\\nand accelerated. Several vehicles moved to the right lane to let \\nhim pass. He saw Lewis ahead in the left lane “at the prelim‐\\ninary stages of passing” a truck in the right lane. Then Lewis \\nchanged to the right lane behind the truck. As Lewis followed \\nthe truck, Sweeney calculated the time‐distance. He activated \\na stopwatch function to record the time between the truck’s \\nrear passing a milepost and the Charger’s front passing the \\nsame object. He clocked this at 1.2 seconds, meaning Lewis \\nfollowed 1.2 seconds behind the truck according to this calcu‐\\nlation. Lewis stayed close behind the truck for about 45 sec‐\\nonds despite the lack of traffic immediately behind him. \\n Sweeney pulled into the right lane. He testified he acti‐\\nvated his emergency lights.1 He pulled Lewis over. Lewis \\nstopped on the right shoulder, and Sweeney pulled behind \\nhim, at about 3 minutes, 41 seconds into the video. The video \\nshows Lewis made a movement to his right inside his car sec‐\\nonds later. Sweeney walked to the Charger’s passenger side \\nand saw Lewis’s hands trembling. At about 4 minutes into the \\nvideo, Sweeney reached the front window.2 He made contact \\nwith Lewis and asked for his license. Sweeney said: \\n\\n \\n1 The parties dispute the timing of Sweeney’s activation of his emergency \\n\\nlights. Sweeney testified he activated his lights sometime after clocking \\nthe following‐distance at 1.2 seconds. But Lewis argues Sweeney activated \\nhis lights when he pulled over to offer assistance to the other officer, well \\nbefore clocking the following‐distance, and nothing in the record shows \\nhe turned the lights off. This issue’s potential relevance concerns the rea‐\\nson Lewis pulled into the right lane behind the truck. \\n2 The dashcam video (presented at the suppression hearing and submitted \\n\\nto us) begins at 0 minutes, 0 seconds. The video runs for about 3 minutes, \\n41 seconds before showing Lewis stop on the shoulder. It then shows \\nSweeney reach the front passenger‐side window of the Charger at about 4 \\nminutes into the video. Sweeney said “Here you go. Here’s your warning, \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n The reason I stopped you was your following‐\\n distance. You need to leave at least 3 seconds \\n here in Illinois. You were less than 2 behind that \\n semi. Ok. And that’s why I originally pulled out \\n on you back, way back there, too. You had an‐\\n other car you were following.3 \\n Sweeney testified Lewis’s hands trembled and his breath‐\\ning seemed heavy and labored. Sweeney told Lewis he would \\njust get a warning, not a ticket, and told him to sit in the squad \\ncar during preparation of the warning. After “hem‐haw[ing]” \\nand failing to exit his car expeditiously, when he finally began \\nto exit he reached back in his car. Then he put his hands up as \\nhe walked. Sweeney said, “You’re fine man. Relax.” \\n In the squad car, Sweeney typed information into a com‐\\nputer and talked with Lewis. The first step of completing the \\nwarning was ensuring, via computer, he had a valid license. \\nUpon this check, the computer automatically showed he was \\non federal probation4 for a cocaine conviction. Sweeney \\n\\n \\nok,” and handed it to Lewis at about 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the video. \\nThus, the total time from Lewis pulling over to Sweeney handing him the \\nwarning is about 10 minutes, 50 seconds. The dog sniff began about 10 \\nseconds later and took about 1 minute, 8 seconds. References to the video’s \\ntime during the stop include about 4 minutes before Sweeney reached \\nLewis’s window. The video’s length does not equal the duration of the \\nstop. As we show below, Lewis sometimes conflates the video’s length \\nwith the duration of the stop. But they are not the same. \\n3 We base our quotations of Sweeney and Lewis during the stop on the \\n\\nvideo. Any deviations are immaterial. \\n4 Sweeney used the word “probation,” apparently because his computer \\n\\ndid not distinguish between this and supervised release. Actually, Lewis \\nwas on the latter. But the distinction is immaterial here. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 5\\n\\ntestified the computer returned information based on the li‐\\ncense within 1 minute of sitting in the squad car. \\n About 2 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \\nwhere he was headed. Lewis said he was going to pick his son \\nup. Sweeney asked where. Lewis said, “School … St. Louis.” \\nSweeney asked how old the son was. Lewis said, “26.” He ex‐\\nplained his son wanted to return to Chicago. Sweeney asked \\nwhere the son went to school. Lewis replied his son worked \\nin a warehouse. Lewis added his son “got into it” with his \\ngirlfriend. This exchange lasted slightly less than a minute. \\nSweeney thought the story seemed suspiciously inconsistent. \\n About 3.5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, he asked about \\nthe 3‐second guideline Sweeney mentioned: \\n Lewis: So you got to be how many feet back? \\n Sweeney: It’s not feet. It’s seconds. You need to \\n be at least 3 seconds. \\n Lewis: Oh. Ok. \\n Sweeney: Ok. You were 1.2. \\n Lewis: How you measure that? \\n Sweeney: It’s just a stopwatch function on here. \\n So when the, with the semi, when it goes by a \\n stationary object which was the milepost back \\n there is what I used. When the back of that goes \\n past that stationary object I start it. When the \\n front of your vehicle goes past that same object \\n I stop it. \\n About 5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \\nhim what he does for work, and he said he drove a truck. \\nRoughly 5 minutes after first making contact with Lewis at his \\nwindow, Sweeney requested a drug‐sniffing dog via a \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nmessaging system. Lewis concedes Sweeney requested the \\ndog after hearing Lewis’s answers regarding his travel plans \\nand after learning via computer he had a prior drug convic‐\\ntion for which he was on supervised release. \\n About 6 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said \\nsomething was taking a minute to update. Then he asked \\nLewis how long his son had been in St. Louis, how often \\nLewis visited, and whether Lewis drove a truck “over the \\nroad.” Sweeney testified Lewis’s breathing continued to ap‐\\npear labored in the squad car, even after hearing he would \\nonly get a warning. Nearly 8 minutes after Lewis pulled over, \\nSweeney said Illinois barred the air freshener hanging from \\nLewis’s mirror because it obstructed the view. Sweeney asked \\nLewis what part of St. Louis he was going to. Sweeney testi‐\\nfied Lewis never asked if he was free to go. \\n Sweeney then said, “in correlation with our safety detail \\ntoday … we do have a canine dog working with us.” Sweeney \\nasked if Lewis was responsible for everything in the car. \\nAbout 10 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said, “I’m \\ngonna print this off. I’m gonna have the dog walk around the \\nexterior of the vehicle, ok.” About 20 seconds later, the dash‐\\ncam records the sound of the warning printing. Then Sweeney \\nasked if Lewis was on probation. He responded in the affirm‐\\native. Nearly 11 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney \\nsaid, “Here you go. Here’s your warning, ok.”5 Sweeney gave \\nthe warning to Lewis, explained it, and said, “So you’re going \\nto St. Louis though.” At the word “though,” at about 14 \\nminutes, 41 seconds into the video (about 10 seconds after \\n\\n \\n5 This comports with his testimony that he completed the “warning pa‐\\n\\nperwork” roughly 10 minutes, 40 seconds after initiating the stop. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 7\\n\\ngiving the written warning) a dog appeared on the video and \\napproached the rear passenger side of Lewis’s car. Lewis con‐\\nfirmed he was going to St. Louis. Sweeney said that was out‐\\nside Illinois. They talked about Lewis’s probation and prior \\nincarceration while the dog circled his car. \\n About 12 minutes after Lewis pulled over (about 1 minute, \\n18 seconds after Sweeney gave the written warning to Lewis, \\nand about 1 minute, 8 seconds after the dog sniff began) the \\nhandler told Sweeney the sniff was positive. Sweeney \\nsearched Lewis’s car and quickly found 208 grams of heroin. \\n II. Procedural posture \\n Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distrib‐\\nute heroin. The district court denied his motion to suppress. \\nHe entered a conditional guilty plea. A career offender at \\ncriminal history category VI, he received a sentence of 20 \\nyears incarceration. He appeals the denial of suppression, \\nraising two main issues. First, he challenges the traffic stop’s \\ninitiation. Second, he challenges the sniff’s initiation. “We em‐\\nploy a mixed standard of review on motions to suppress, re‐\\nviewing the district court’s factual determinations for clear er‐\\nror and de novo its ultimate determination about whether the \\npolice had sufficient grounds to stop or search the individ‐\\nual.” United States v. Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th \\nCir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). \\n III. Discussion \\nA. Traffic stop \\n1. Law \\n Lewis argues Sweeney did not have legal grounds to start \\nthe traffic stop. If Lewis is right, then the court should have \\n\\f8 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nsuppressed the heroin as fruit of the poisonous tree. The \\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches \\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a \\nvehicle, the stop must meet the Fourth Amendment’s reason‐\\nableness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 \\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, \\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States \\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015). \\n The district court determined probable cause justified ini‐\\ntiating the stop.6 Generally, “the decision to stop an automo‐\\nbile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to be‐\\nlieve that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United \\nStates, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). “Probable cause exists when \\n‘the circumstances confronting a police officer support the \\nreasonable belief that a driver has committed even a minor \\ntraffic offense.’” United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th \\nCir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586 \\n(7th Cir. 2000)). Probable cause is an objective standard, based \\non the totality of the circumstances. If an officer reasonably \\nthinks he sees a driver commit a traffic violation, that is suffi‐\\ncient grounds to pull him over without offending the Consti‐\\ntution. Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724. The officer is not the judge. \\nWhether the driver actually committed a traffic infraction is \\nirrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes so long as there \\nwas an objective basis for a reasonable belief he did. Cashman, \\n216 F.3d at 587. \\n\\n \\n6 The lower standard of reasonable suspicion is enough to justify some \\n\\ntraffic stops. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014); Prouse, 440 U.S. \\nat 663; Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d at 667–68. But we need not apply this \\nstandard here because the district court did not err in finding probable \\ncause. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 9\\n\\n2. Analysis \\n Here, Sweeney had more than ample grounds to pull \\nLewis over. As Sweeney sat in the median, he thought he saw \\nLewis following another vehicle too closely. That initial ob‐\\nservation alone probably satisfied the Constitution, but we \\nneed not decide that because Sweeney pursued Lewis and \\nconducted a time‐distance calculation to confirm he followed \\na vehicle too closely. Sweeney calculated Lewis’s following‐\\ntime‐distance at 1.2 seconds. Whether Lewis actually fol‐\\nlowed by 1.2 seconds exactly is irrelevant for purposes of the \\nFourth Amendment. It is enough that this calculation sup‐\\nported a reasonable belief Lewis was breaking the law. \\n Lewis mainly argues the 3‐second rule mentioned by \\nSweeney during the traffic stop is merely the Illinois Secretary \\nof State’s recommendation, not the actual law. But this is a red \\nherring because the standard for probable cause is objective. \\nSee Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s con‐\\ncern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken \\nin certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”); \\nScott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“[T]hat the of‐\\nficer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated \\nby the reasons which provide the legal justification for the of‐\\nficer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as \\nthe circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”). \\nThe objective circumstances support probable cause to pull \\nLewis over based on the two observations of him following \\ntoo closely, in violation of the law: \\n The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow \\n another vehicle more closely than is reasonable \\n and prudent, having due regard for the speed of \\n\\f10 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n such vehicles and the traffic upon and the con‐\\n dition of the highway. \\n625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a). Here, it does not matter whether the Sec‐\\nretary’s recommendation comports with the statute. Nor does \\nit matter that Sweeney referenced the recommendation dur‐\\ning the stop. Regardless, Sweeney objectively had grounds for \\na reasonable belief Lewis was following too closely based on \\nthe two observations (and based on the clocked observation \\nalone).7 \\n And this brings us to Lewis’s next argument. He faults the \\ncourt for not giving effect to the statutory language requiring \\na driver to act based on the “condition of the highway.” He \\nargues the major highway condition was Sweeney’s squad car \\napproaching Lewis from behind. Lewis argues Illinois law re‐\\nquired him to pull immediately into the right lane when he \\nsaw the squad car approaching. He argues he had a legal duty \\nnot to obstruct it. He argues he chose the least of the available \\nevils when he pulled from the left lane into the right lane be‐\\nhind the truck to yield to Sweeney. Lewis goes so far as to \\n \\n7 Lewis argues: “For the Government to have met its burden of establish‐\\n\\ning probable cause for a 625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a) violation, it had to prove Mr. \\nLewis was driving in a way that was not ‘reasonable or prudent’ given the \\n‘speed of [other] vehicles’ and the ‘condition of the highway.’” (Appel‐\\nlant’s Reply at 9–10.) That is wrong. To show the constitutionality of the \\ntraffic stop’s start, the government merely needed to show an objective \\nbasis for a reasonable belief Lewis followed too closely, not that he actu‐\\nally followed too closely. Whether Lewis actually followed at 1.2 seconds \\nand whether 1.2 seconds was actually too close, given all the conditions of \\nthe highway, are irrelevant to whether there was probable cause sufficient \\nto initiate the stop, and ultimately would have been for a traffic court to \\ndecide (if Sweeney issued a ticket instead of a warning). \\n \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 11\\n\\nargue Sweeney “impermissibly created the grounds for the \\nstop,” manufacturing a “police‐created exigency.” \\n The main problem with this argument is that it does noth‐\\ning to justify or explain why Lewis stayed in the right lane in \\nclose proximity behind the truck for about 45 seconds after \\npulling into the right lane behind the truck. As the video \\ndemonstrates, no vehicles at this stage forced Lewis to tailgate \\nthe truck. Regardless of the status of Sweeney’s emergency \\nlights, Lewis offers no reason why he could not have eased \\nback from the truck. Moreover, Lewis’s argument does noth‐\\ning to undermine Sweeney’s observation from the median. \\n The court properly relied on Muriel, where an officer’s “es‐\\ntimation of the following distance amounted to probable \\ncause to believe that [the suspect’s] vehicle was ‘more close[ ] \\nthan is reasonable and prudent.’” Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724 \\n(quoting Ind. Code 9‐21‐8‐14). The court did not err in con‐\\ncluding probable cause supported initiating the stop. \\nB. Dog sniff \\n1. Law \\n An officer who reasonably starts a traffic stop, however, \\nmight violate the Constitution if he exceeds the scope or un‐\\nreasonably prolongs the stop. A traffic stop “‘can become un‐\\nlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required \\nto complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodri‐\\nguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting \\nIllinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). It is well‐estab‐\\nlished a dog sniff of a vehicle’s exterior only for illegal drugs \\nduring a lawful stop for a traffic violation does not infringe \\nFourth Amendment rights, even absent reasonable suspicion \\nof drugs. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But it is also well‐\\n\\f12 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nestablished a stop justified only by a traffic violation becomes \\nunlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably re‐\\nquired to complete the stop’s original mission. Rodriguez, 135 \\nS. Ct. at 1612. An officer may conduct “certain unrelated \\nchecks”—including a dog sniff—during a lawful traffic stop, \\nbut “he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent \\nthe reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify de‐\\ntaining an individual.” Id. at 1615. Absent independent rea‐\\nsonable suspicion to justify the sniff, the critical question is \\nnot whether the sniff occurs before or after the officer issues \\nthe warning, “but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—\\ni.e., adds time to—‘the stop’ … .” Id. at 1616. But with inde‐\\npendent reasonable suspicion, the officer may detain the sus‐\\npect for the sniff even if the sniff adds time to the total stop. \\n Here, the district court concluded the stop (from its start \\nto the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the warning) was not \\nprolonged past the time reasonably required to complete the \\nmission of issuing a warning. And the district court deter‐\\nmined independent reasonable suspicion justified extending \\nthe stop by about 1 minute for a canine unit to arrive. \\n2. Analysis \\n Lewis argues even if the stop started lawfully, the heroin \\nshould be suppressed because the dog sniffed after a pro‐\\nlonged detention without reasonable suspicion. But he leads \\nwith a patent mistake. He claims Sweeney was completely fin‐\\nished with the warning at 10 minutes, 40 seconds into the \\nvideo but did not print it until 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the \\nvideo, a claimed unjustified delay of nearly 4 minutes. But the \\nvideo and Sweeney’s testimony flatly contradict this. Lewis \\nmistakenly treats Sweeney’s testimony about the time on the \\nvideo’s clock when he printed the warning as testimony about \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 13\\n\\nthe duration of the stop up to the point he printed it. Sweeney \\ntestified he calculated the time it took him to complete the \\nwarning paperwork after he initiated the traffic stop (not after \\nthe video began) to be 10 minutes and 40 seconds. He testified \\nthat at 14 minutes, 26 seconds into the video (not into the stop) \\nhe said “Here you go” as he gave the warning to Lewis. The \\nbottom line is the video and testimony show there was no un‐\\nreasonable delay between finishing the warning and handing \\nit to Lewis. The claimed delay of about 4 minutes merely mir‐\\nrors the difference between the video’s clock and the duration \\nof the stop, because the stop begins about 4 minutes into the \\nvideo. The simple fact, shown by the video and testimony, is \\nSweeney printed the warning between 10 and 11 minutes into \\nthe stop and promptly gave it to Lewis. His false equivocation \\ninfects some of his remaining arguments. \\n Lewis next argues Sweeney unlawfully prolonged the de‐\\ntention by taking time to impermissibly confine and question \\nhim about issues unrelated to the warning, and he raises sev‐\\neral detailed points. But each point fails. \\n Lewis argues switching cars took 1 minute. But he does \\nnot explain why this delay was unlawful or why sitting in the \\nsquad car was impermissible. We already determined the \\ncourt did not err in concluding the initiation of the traffic stop \\nwas permissible. Lewis does not explain why moving him to \\nthe squad car was not reasonably incidental. See United States \\nv. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996) (During a valid traf‐\\nfic stop, an officer may “legitimately ask [a driver] to step out \\nof his car, even without any particularized suspicion,” and \\nmay ask the driver “to sit in his patrol car … .”). Nor does he \\nexplain why, during the minute between Sweeney asking \\n\\f14 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nLewis to exit his car and Lewis entering the squad car, he \\nspent about 40 seconds in his car after being asked to exit. \\n Lewis next argues Sweeney spent 6 minutes and 15 sec‐\\nonds asking about irrelevant travel matters and explaining \\nhow a canine unit will arrive. Lewis cites two parts of the \\nvideo in support. There are several problems with Lewis’s ar‐\\ngument here. The first challenged part of the video begins \\nwith Sweeney asking, “Where are we headed to today, sir?” \\nOfficers across the country would be surprised if we counte‐\\nnanced the characterization of this basic, routine question as \\nirrelevant to a traffic stop. Lewis’s initial response to this ques‐\\ntion was not entirely forthcoming: “Pick my son up.” That re‐\\nsponse naturally led to Sweeney’s next question: “Where’s \\nthat at?” Again, Lewis’s response was not entirely forthcom‐\\ning: “School … St. Louis.” So Sweeney asked how old the son \\nwas and where he went to school. Lewis gave the age, brought \\nup returning to Chicago, never answered about school, \\nbrought up his son’s work in “some warehouse,” and brought \\nup a situation between his son and his son’s girlfriend. \\n The Constitution allows an officer to ask these questions \\nduring a traffic stop, especially when the answers objectively \\nseem suspicious. See Muriel, 418 F.3d at 726 (Although ques‐\\ntions prolonging custody might affect the detention’s reason‐\\nableness, police “may ask questions that do not concern the \\npurpose of the stop and that are not supported by any other \\nsuspicion.”); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. \\n2002) (“What the Constitution requires is that the entire pro‐\\ncess remain reasonable. Questions that hold potential for de‐\\ntecting crime, yet create little or no inconvenience, do not turn \\nreasonable detention into unreasonable detention.”) And \\nLewis could have refused to answer at some point. But the \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 15\\n\\nbiggest problem with Lewis’s argument here is he does not \\nshow any reason these exchanges prolonged the process of is‐\\nsuing the warning. The video and testimony both document \\nSweeney worked on the warning while talking with Lewis. \\n The court did not err in determining the duration of the \\nstop (from its start to the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the \\nwarning) was not prolonged past the time reasonably re‐\\nquired to complete the mission of issuing a warning. \\n The court turned to the issue of whether Sweeney ob‐\\ntained enough information during the stop before issuing the \\nwarning to have independent reasonable suspicion of crimi‐\\nnal activity to justify detaining Lewis further. Sweeney \\nhanded Lewis the warning about 10 minutes, 50 seconds after \\nLewis pulled over. The dog alerted roughly 1 minute later. \\nEven if the period between handing the warning and the dog \\nalerting could be called a delay of about 1 minute8 it was jus‐\\ntified by independent reasonable suspicion, as the court held. \\n Reasonable suspicion requires “‘specific and articulable \\nfacts which, taken together with rational inferences from \\nthose facts,’ suggest criminal activity.” United States v. Ruiz, \\n785 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 \\nU.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is an objective stand‐\\nard, considering the totality of the circumstances. By the time \\n \\n8 We question whether even this minute can be characterized as a delay to \\n\\nwait for a dog, because immediately after handing Lewis the warning and \\nexplaining in a quick and routine manner what it is, Sweeney brings up \\nthe apt point that Lewis said he was going to St. Louis, but his terms likely \\nrestrict his freedom to leave Illinois. But we need not explore this further \\nbecause we agree with the district court that Sweeney had independent \\nreasonable suspicion to detain Lewis after handing him the warning to \\nallow the dog time to sniff. \\n\\f16 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nSweeney issued the warning, this is what he objectively had \\nreason to know. One, Lewis seemed unusually nervous even \\nafter hearing he would only get a warning. His hands trem‐\\nbled. His breathing was heavy and labored. Nervousness can \\nraise reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, \\n124 (2000). Two, he was on supervised release for a drug of‐\\nfense. Criminal histories can support reasonable suspicion. \\nUnited States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n(Sweeney had these objective grounds for reasonable suspi‐\\ncion even without asking any questions Lewis now chal‐\\nlenges.) Three, his travel explanations seemed suspiciously \\ninconsistent, which can raise reasonable suspicion. Muriel, 418 \\nF.3d at 726. These factors legitimately gave rise to objective \\nreasonable suspicion. \\n This is true even if Lewis always breathes heavily, with \\nconstantly trembling hands. Even if he were actually innocent \\nof the prior drug charge and a judge planned to exonerate him \\nnext morning. Even if his son actually studied and worked in \\nSt. Louis, quarreled, and wanted to return to Chicago. Re‐\\ngardless, objective reasonable suspicion of criminal activity \\nsupported detaining Lewis to allow a dog to sniff. Perhaps we \\ncould add his rigid posture, furtive movements, “hem‐haw‐\\ning,” and I‐55’s drug‐trafficking reputation. But we need not. \\n We conclude the district court did not err in determining \\nany delay beyond the routine traffic stop to allow the dog to \\nsniff was justified by independent reasonable suspicion. \\n IV. Conclusion \\n We considered all Lewis’s arguments and found none \\navailing. We AFFIRM the denial of suppression.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1687,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4606678,"string":"4,606,678"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"James Gaston v. Parthasarathi Ghosh"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1281"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\nJAMES GASTON,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nPARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 11-cv-6612 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Iskander v. Forest Park, 690\\nF.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1982), holds that private corporations,\\nwhen deemed to be state actors in suits under 42 U.S.C.\\n§1983, must be treated the same as municipal corporations.\\nThis means that they are not subject to vicarious liability.\\nSee, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009); Monell\\nv. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,\\n\\n2 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\n691–94 (1978). Iqbal, Monell, and other decisions hold that\\nmunicipalities and public employees may be held liable for\\ntheir own decisions and policies but are not liable under the\\ndoctrine of respondeat superior for the acts, decisions, and pol-\\nicies of other persons, including subordinate public officials.\\nIskander held that the same approach applies to private cor-\\nporations and their agents, to the extent that they are treated\\nas state actors for the purpose of §1983. James Gaston asks us\\nto overrule Iskander and hold that in litigation under §1983 a\\nprivate corporation may be liable vicariously to the same ex-\\ntent as a private corporation in the law of torts.\\n That argument has been made before but left unresolved,\\nbecause the appeals could be decided on other grounds. See,\\ne.g., Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2017); Glis-\\nson v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (en banc); Shields v. Illinois Department of Correc-\\ntions, 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014). That is equally true today,\\nand for the same reason as in Collins: the employee “is not\\nliable, so—even if the theory of respondeat superior were\\navailable—neither is his employer.”\\n Gaston, a prisoner of Illinois, suffered injuries that led to\\nsurgery on both of his knees. (He had other medical prob-\\nlems, but treatment for them is no longer in dispute.) He first\\ncomplained about pain in his left knee in May 2009. Drugs\\ndid not solve the pain, and the knee did not heal on its own.\\nLiping Zhang, a physician employed by Wexford Health\\nSources, which Illinois uses to provide medical care in the\\nstate’s prisons, eventually alerted Parthasarathi Ghosh, who\\nreferred Gaston to an orthopedic surgeon. Delay in imple-\\nmenting that decision followed; the consultation occurred in\\nSeptember 2010. Dr. Ghosh, the head of medical services at\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 3\\n\\nthe prison, approved a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)\\nexam, which the specialist had recommended, but it was not\\nconducted until February 2011. It revealed a lingering injury.\\nIn August 2011 Samuel Chmell performed arthroscopic sur-\\ngery on Gaston’s left knee, a step approved by Imhotep\\nCarter, who replaced Dr. Ghosh after his retirement. (Dr.\\nChmell is an orthopedic surgeon on the staff of the Universi-\\nty of Illinois hospital system, which handled all of the spe-\\ncialist work, MRI exams, and surgeries we mention.)\\n While Gaston’s left knee was healing, a consultative body\\nwithin Wexford delayed approving an MRI image of his\\nright knee, stating that one knee had to be sound before\\ntreatment of the other could proceed. In May 2012 the pris-\\non’s interim medical director (Dr. Carter having left) re-\\nferred Gaston for an MRI exam on the right knee. It showed\\nserious problems, and Dr. Chmell recommended another ar-\\nthroscopic surgery. In August 2012 Saleh Obaisi, the prison’s\\nnew medical director, approved Dr. Chmell’s recommenda-\\ntion, and surgery occurred in October 2012. This did not\\nbring the hoped-for relief, and Dr. Chmell recommended ar-\\nthroplasty (i.e., knee replacement). That surgery, a much\\nmore substantial medical intervention, was delayed while\\nspecialists determined whether Gaston’s pulmonary and\\ncardiology systems would handle the strain. More delay\\nmay have been caused by inamention to the case. The arthro-\\nplasty took place in February 2015 and was successful.\\n Gaston acknowledges that he has received a great deal of\\nmedical care. He does not contend that the diagnosis or the\\nselected interventions can lead to §1983 liability under the\\napproach of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v.\\nBrennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); and PeIies v. Carter, 836 F.3d\\n\\n4 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\n722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Instead he contends that the de-\\nlays while waiting for surgeries reflect deliberate indiffer-\\nence to his pain, so that the pain became a form of unauthor-\\nized punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (ap-\\nplied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the\\nFourteenth Amendment). After the district court dismissed\\nGaston’s complaint, we remanded, holding that a complaint\\nbased on unwarranted pain during extended delay in treat-\\nment states a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 498 F.\\nApp’x 629 (7th Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential disposition).\\n Back in the district court Gaston, although represented\\nby counsel, proceeded premy much as if anyone whose com-\\nplaint states a legal claim prevails without needing to prove\\nthe complaint’s allegations. Defendants conducted discov-\\nery; Gaston not so much. In particular, Gaston did not try to\\nfind out either who was responsible for the delays (the four\\nphysicians named as defendants? back-office staff? someone\\nelse?) or why those delays occurred (a desire that Gaston’s\\npain continue? indifference to his pain? simple negligence?\\nmedical judgment?). For their part, defendants offered some\\nevidence that would tend to support a conclusion that the\\ndelays could be chalked up to medical judgment—a prefer-\\nence for conservative treatment before surgery—plus occa-\\nsional oversight, but never to any desire to injure Gaston or\\nindifference to his pain. Dr. Chmell testified in a deposition\\nthat the treatment afforded to Gaston was within the stand-\\nard of care in the medical profession—in other words, not\\neven negligence, let alone punishment inflicted with the sub-\\njective standard required for constitutional liability.\\n Gaston contended that Wexford should be held liable\\neven if none of the four physicians is culpable. In making\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 5\\n\\nthis contention, he assumed that, if Iskander should be over-\\nruled, then Wexford and other private corporations would\\nbecome liable under §1983 for their employees’ negligence,\\nno mamer what standard applies to the personal liability of\\nthose employees.\\n The district court granted summary judgment to the four\\nindividual defendants, ruling that the record does not show\\nthat any of them acted (or delayed acting) with the state of\\nmind required for culpability. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195234\\n(N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2017). The court recognized that it lacks\\nthe authority to depart from Iskander. Wexford could be lia-\\nble for its own unconstitutional policies, but the court con-\\ncluded that the policies to which Gaston pointed, such as\\ntreating one condition at a time, reflected medical judgment\\nrather than a constitutional problem.\\n It is not as if Wexford has a policy of ignoring life-\\nthreatening conditions while a prisoner heals from surgery.\\nNor did Wexford ignore the pain from one knee while Gas-\\nton recovered from surgery on the other. He received pain-\\nalleviating drugs. The district court’s decision is addressed\\nto a policy providing time between surgeries, a policy that\\nDr. Chmell testified is medically appropriate. The district\\njudge was confident that, if a prisoner being treated for the\\nflu broke his leg, Wexford would immediately provide the\\ncare needed to deal with a broken leg. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\\n195234 at *43. (The district court added that Gaston has not\\nestablished that “treat one condition at a time” is Wexford’s\\npolicy, as opposed to a medical decision made about his sit-\\nuation, in particular.)\\n In this court, Gaston scarcely engages with the district\\ncourt’s reasoning or the consequences of his failure to intro-\\n\\n6 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\nduce evidence. Instead he asks us to overrule Iskander in the\\nbelief that this will eliminate the need to show that any of\\nWexford’s employees violated the Eighth Amendment. That\\nnot only contradicts Collins, which Gaston does not mention,\\nbut also misunderstands the nature of vicarious liability. It\\nis—well, there’s no bemer word than vicarious.\\n With vicarious liability, one person is liable for another’s\\nwrong. In an employment relation, that means an employee\\nor other agent. The wrongdoer need not be a defendant, but\\nthere must be an actionable wrong, by a person whose con-\\nduct is imputed to the employer. Medical negligence by one\\nof Wexford’s employees could support liability under state\\ntort law but not the Eighth Amendment. If only intentional\\nwrongdoing by an employee leads to personal liability, then\\nan employee’s negligence does not justify holding the em-\\nployer liable. There’s nothing to be vicariously liable for.\\n These are fundamental principles of tort and agency law,\\nwhere vicarious liability has long been common. “Vicarious\\nliability is not based upon the defendant’s own fault. Rather,\\nit is based upon the principle that he must bear legal respon-\\nsibility for another’s wrong. From the employer-defendant’s\\npoint of view, vicarious liability is strict liability, since he is\\nliable without personal fault. That is not quite the case from\\nthe plaintiff’s point of view. The plaintiff must prove that the\\nemployee commimed a tort and was acting within the scope\\nof employment when he did so.” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T.\\nHayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts 782 (2d ed. 2011\\n& update 2018). See also, e.g., Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802\\nF.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986); National Union Fire Insurance Co.\\nv. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St. 3d 594, 599 (2009) (“a principal is vi-\\ncariously liable only when an agent could be held directly\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 7\\n\\nliable”); Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 481 (1991) (“The\\nliability of the principal arises simply by the operation of law\\nand is only derivative of the wrongful act of the agent”); Re-\\nstatement (Second) of Agency §217B (1958). This also implies\\nthat vicarious responsibility does not change the substantive\\nstandard. “Vicarious liability is not an independent cause of\\naction, but rather is a legal concept used to transfer liability\\nfrom an agent to a principal”. Crawford v. Signet Bank, 179\\nF.3d 926, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1999).\\n Vicarious liability makes a person responsible for some-\\none else’s wrong but does not change the proof required to\\nshow that a legal wrong has occurred. So even if we were to\\noverrule Iskander, Gaston would need to show that someone\\nwhose acts are imputed to Wexford violated the Eighth\\nAmendment, as understood in Gamble, Farmer, and PeIies.\\nHe did not seriously try to do so. This makes it unnecessary\\nto decide whether Iskander was correctly decided.\\n One final observation. Gaston and other plaintiffs have\\ncontended that Iskander leads Wexford and similar organiza-\\ntions to skimp on medical care in order to enrich themselves.\\nWexford responds that, because it does not pay for the cost\\nof MRI exams, surgeries, and other hospital treatment out-\\nside the prisons, it has no financial reason to withhold ap-\\npropriate medical treatment. That may be true, but so far\\nWexford has not supplied evidence that it is true. Perhaps\\nWexford has contracts with hospitals providing that they\\nwill not bill it, but it has not produced them. Perhaps Illinois\\npays for out-of-prison treatment under the Medicaid pro-\\ngram, but again the record lacks proof. Dr. Chmell testified\\nthat Wexford did not pay him, but the record does not reveal\\nwhether Wexford paid the University of Illinois. Gaston has\\n\\n8 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\nlost this case for want of evidence, but the need to back up\\none’s contentions with evidence applies as much to Wexford\\nas it does to any prisoner.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 9\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383931/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}, {\"author\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the court’s\\njudgment and opinion. For reasons explained in Shields v. Illi-\\nnois Dep’t of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014), whether\\nwe should continue to apply the Monell standard to private\\ncorporations when they act under color of state law presents\\na substantial question. These appeals, however, are not the oc-\\ncasion to decide that larger question. Dr. Chmell’s testimony\\nabout the defendants’ care of plaintiff Gaston helps show that\\nplaintiff cannot prove that one or more agents of Wexford\\nacted with deliberate indifference toward his serious medical\\nneeds. Also, plaintiff has given up trying to prove that Wex-\\nford had a policy of deliberate indifference that would satisfy\\nthe Monell standard. Cf. Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections,\\n849 F.3d 372, 379–82 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (reversing sum-\\nmary judgment for private healthcare provider where evi-\\ndence would support finding that provider deliberately chose\\nnot to provide for coordination of medical care in complex\\ncases, and that absence of such coordination caused prisoner’s\\ndeath).\\n I write separately to highlight a set of subtler but im-\\nportant issues that parties, lawyers, and judges need to con-\\nfront in exploring the path suggested in Shields. Proving a vi-\\nolation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and\\nunusual punishment requires proof of an intentional or crim-\\ninally reckless tort. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839–40\\n(1994); Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en\\nbanc). The question is how to prove that a corporation acted\\nwith the required state of mind.\\n The legally simplest case would prove that a specific, iden-\\ntified employee acted with the required deliberate indiffer-\\nence. The employer would then be vicariously liable for its\\n\\n10 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\nemployee’s tort committed within the scope of employment.\\nThe net result in such a case, however, would not differ much\\nfrom the widespread practice of employers indemnifying\\ntheir employees.\\n The next simplest case would be one in which one em-\\nployee acted with deliberate indifference, but it is not possible\\nto identify that employee. I expect that as long as the wrong-\\ndoer is identified reliably as an employee acting within the\\nscope of employment, ordinary principles of respondeat su-\\nperior liability would apply.\\n The more challenging cases, and the problems that con-\\ntribute to the need to reexamine the application of Monell to\\nprivate corporations, are cases where the plaintiff cannot\\nshow that a single employee acted with deliberate indiffer-\\nence, but where the evidence allows an inference that a group\\nof employees acted with a collective indifference to a pris-\\noner’s health or safety. Experience with many prisoners’\\nhealth care suits suggests this pattern may be common, espe-\\ncially within corporate structures that diffuse responsibility\\namong different people. Consider, for example, the possibility\\nof a scheduling team who do not try to schedule promptly\\nsurgeries that prisoners need to treat serious pain.\\n General tort law does not seem to provide a consensus on\\nthe problems of collective intent posed by claims for inten-\\ntional torts against corporations. See Burlington Industries, Inc.\\nv. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998) (discussing vicarious liabil-\\nity for intentional torts); Restatement (Second) Agency §§ 219\\n& 228 (1958) (addressing when master will be liable for inten-\\ntional torts by servant); Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts\\n§ 70, at 505–06 (1984) (master will be liable for fraud or defa-\\nmation by sales representative); see also Restatement (Third)\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 11\\n\\nof Agency § 7.03, comment (e) (2006) (discussing different ap-\\nproaches to corporate intent for purposes of punitive dam-\\nages).\\n The problem of corporate intent can also be thorny under\\nfederal statutes, such as those providing civil remedies for se-\\ncurities fraud. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513\\nF.3d 702, 707–09 (7th Cir. 2008) (focusing on state of mind of\\ncorporate management for corporate liability in securities\\nfraud cases and discussing Southland Securities Corp. v. INSpire\\nIns. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004)); Patricia S.\\nAbril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter,\\n2006 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 81, 114 (2006) (“The perceived weak-\\nnesses in the respondeat superior approach have led to the\\ndevelopment of a corollary to the agency principle that allows\\nfor aggregation of the knowledge of several corporate em-\\nployees in order to find the corporation liable: the collective\\nknowledge doctrine.”); Ashley S. Kircher, Corporate Criminal\\nLiability versus Corporate Securities Fraud Liability, Analyzing the\\nDivergence in Standards of Culpability, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 157,\\n161 (2009) (“Courts in the United States are in notable disarray\\nwhen analyzing the intent of corporations sued under the se-\\ncurities laws. Some courts have rejected the application of the\\ndoctrine of collective scienter, while others have embraced the\\ndoctrine with varying degrees of strength.”).\\n I do not propose to answer those questions here, but I hope\\nthat parties pursuing the larger Monell issue will pay attention\\nto them as they make their records and write their briefs.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383931/\", \"author_raw\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606678/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: James Gaston v. Parthasarathi Ghosh\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\nJAMES GASTON,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nPARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 11-cv-6612 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\nJudges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Iskander v. Forest Park, 690\nF.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1982), holds that private corporations,\nwhen deemed to be state actors in suits under 42 U.S.C.\n§1983, must be treated the same as municipal corporations.\nThis means that they are not subject to vicarious liability.\nSee, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009); Monell\nv. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,\n\n2 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\n\n691–94 (1978). Iqbal, Monell, and other decisions hold that\nmunicipalities and public employees may be held liable for\ntheir own decisions and policies but are not liable under the\ndoctrine of respondeat superior for the acts, decisions, and pol-\nicies of other persons, including subordinate public officials.\nIskander held that the same approach applies to private cor-\nporations and their agents, to the extent that they are treated\nas state actors for the purpose of §1983. James Gaston asks us\nto overrule Iskander and hold that in litigation under §1983 a\nprivate corporation may be liable vicariously to the same ex-\ntent as a private corporation in the law of torts.\n That argument has been made before but left unresolved,\nbecause the appeals could be decided on other grounds. See,\ne.g., Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2017); Glis-\nson v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th\nCir. 2017) (en banc); Shields v. Illinois Department of Correc-\ntions, 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014). That is equally true today,\nand for the same reason as in Collins: the employee “is not\nliable, so—even if the theory of respondeat superior were\navailable—neither is his employer.”\n Gaston, a prisoner of Illinois, suffered injuries that led to\nsurgery on both of his knees. (He had other medical prob-\nlems, but treatment for them is no longer in dispute.) He first\ncomplained about pain in his left knee in May 2009. Drugs\ndid not solve the pain, and the knee did not heal on its own.\nLiping Zhang, a physician employed by Wexford Health\nSources, which Illinois uses to provide medical care in the\nstate’s prisons, eventually alerted Parthasarathi Ghosh, who\nreferred Gaston to an orthopedic surgeon. Delay in imple-\nmenting that decision followed; the consultation occurred in\nSeptember 2010. Dr. Ghosh, the head of medical services at\n\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 3\n\nthe prison, approved a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)\nexam, which the specialist had recommended, but it was not\nconducted until February 2011. It revealed a lingering injury.\nIn August 2011 Samuel Chmell performed arthroscopic sur-\ngery on Gaston’s left knee, a step approved by Imhotep\nCarter, who replaced Dr. Ghosh after his retirement. (Dr.\nChmell is an orthopedic surgeon on the staff of the Universi-\nty of Illinois hospital system, which handled all of the spe-\ncialist work, MRI exams, and surgeries we mention.)\n While Gaston’s left knee was healing, a consultative body\nwithin Wexford delayed approving an MRI image of his\nright knee, stating that one knee had to be sound before\ntreatment of the other could proceed. In May 2012 the pris-\non’s interim medical director (Dr. Carter having left) re-\nferred Gaston for an MRI exam on the right knee. It showed\nserious problems, and Dr. Chmell recommended another ar-\nthroscopic surgery. In August 2012 Saleh Obaisi, the prison’s\nnew medical director, approved Dr. Chmell’s recommenda-\ntion, and surgery occurred in October 2012. This did not\nbring the hoped-for relief, and Dr. Chmell recommended ar-\nthroplasty (i.e., knee replacement). That surgery, a much\nmore substantial medical intervention, was delayed while\nspecialists determined whether Gaston’s pulmonary and\ncardiology systems would handle the strain. More delay\nmay have been caused by inamention to the case. The arthro-\nplasty took place in February 2015 and was successful.\n Gaston acknowledges that he has received a great deal of\nmedical care. He does not contend that the diagnosis or the\nselected interventions can lead to §1983 liability under the\napproach of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v.\nBrennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); and PeIies v. Carter, 836 F.3d\n\n4 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\n\n722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Instead he contends that the de-\nlays while waiting for surgeries reflect deliberate indiffer-\nence to his pain, so that the pain became a form of unauthor-\nized punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (ap-\nplied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the\nFourteenth Amendment). After the district court dismissed\nGaston’s complaint, we remanded, holding that a complaint\nbased on unwarranted pain during extended delay in treat-\nment states a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 498 F.\nApp’x 629 (7th Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential disposition).\n Back in the district court Gaston, although represented\nby counsel, proceeded premy much as if anyone whose com-\nplaint states a legal claim prevails without needing to prove\nthe complaint’s allegations. Defendants conducted discov-\nery; Gaston not so much. In particular, Gaston did not try to\nfind out either who was responsible for the delays (the four\nphysicians named as defendants? back-office staff? someone\nelse?) or why those delays occurred (a desire that Gaston’s\npain continue? indifference to his pain? simple negligence?\nmedical judgment?). For their part, defendants offered some\nevidence that would tend to support a conclusion that the\ndelays could be chalked up to medical judgment—a prefer-\nence for conservative treatment before surgery—plus occa-\nsional oversight, but never to any desire to injure Gaston or\nindifference to his pain. Dr. Chmell testified in a deposition\nthat the treatment afforded to Gaston was within the stand-\nard of care in the medical profession—in other words, not\neven negligence, let alone punishment inflicted with the sub-\njective standard required for constitutional liability.\n Gaston contended that Wexford should be held liable\neven if none of the four physicians is culpable. In making\n\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 5\n\nthis contention, he assumed that, if Iskander should be over-\nruled, then Wexford and other private corporations would\nbecome liable under §1983 for their employees’ negligence,\nno mamer what standard applies to the personal liability of\nthose employees.\n The district court granted summary judgment to the four\nindividual defendants, ruling that the record does not show\nthat any of them acted (or delayed acting) with the state of\nmind required for culpability. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195234\n(N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2017). The court recognized that it lacks\nthe authority to depart from Iskander. Wexford could be lia-\nble for its own unconstitutional policies, but the court con-\ncluded that the policies to which Gaston pointed, such as\ntreating one condition at a time, reflected medical judgment\nrather than a constitutional problem.\n It is not as if Wexford has a policy of ignoring life-\nthreatening conditions while a prisoner heals from surgery.\nNor did Wexford ignore the pain from one knee while Gas-\nton recovered from surgery on the other. He received pain-\nalleviating drugs. The district court’s decision is addressed\nto a policy providing time between surgeries, a policy that\nDr. Chmell testified is medically appropriate. The district\njudge was confident that, if a prisoner being treated for the\nflu broke his leg, Wexford would immediately provide the\ncare needed to deal with a broken leg. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n195234 at *43. (The district court added that Gaston has not\nestablished that “treat one condition at a time” is Wexford’s\npolicy, as opposed to a medical decision made about his sit-\nuation, in particular.)\n In this court, Gaston scarcely engages with the district\ncourt’s reasoning or the consequences of his failure to intro-\n\n6 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\n\nduce evidence. Instead he asks us to overrule Iskander in the\nbelief that this will eliminate the need to show that any of\nWexford’s employees violated the Eighth Amendment. That\nnot only contradicts Collins, which Gaston does not mention,\nbut also misunderstands the nature of vicarious liability. It\nis—well, there’s no bemer word than vicarious.\n With vicarious liability, one person is liable for another’s\nwrong. In an employment relation, that means an employee\nor other agent. The wrongdoer need not be a defendant, but\nthere must be an actionable wrong, by a person whose con-\nduct is imputed to the employer. Medical negligence by one\nof Wexford’s employees could support liability under state\ntort law but not the Eighth Amendment. If only intentional\nwrongdoing by an employee leads to personal liability, then\nan employee’s negligence does not justify holding the em-\nployer liable. There’s nothing to be vicariously liable for.\n These are fundamental principles of tort and agency law,\nwhere vicarious liability has long been common. “Vicarious\nliability is not based upon the defendant’s own fault. Rather,\nit is based upon the principle that he must bear legal respon-\nsibility for another’s wrong. From the employer-defendant’s\npoint of view, vicarious liability is strict liability, since he is\nliable without personal fault. That is not quite the case from\nthe plaintiff’s point of view. The plaintiff must prove that the\nemployee commimed a tort and was acting within the scope\nof employment when he did so.” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T.\nHayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts 782 (2d ed. 2011\n& update 2018). See also, e.g., Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802\nF.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986); National Union Fire Insurance Co.\nv. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St. 3d 594, 599 (2009) (“a principal is vi-\ncariously liable only when an agent could be held directly\n\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 7\n\nliable”); Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 481 (1991) (“The\nliability of the principal arises simply by the operation of law\nand is only derivative of the wrongful act of the agent”); Re-\nstatement (Second) of Agency §217B (1958). This also implies\nthat vicarious responsibility does not change the substantive\nstandard. “Vicarious liability is not an independent cause of\naction, but rather is a legal concept used to transfer liability\nfrom an agent to a principal”. Crawford v. Signet Bank, 179\nF.3d 926, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1999).\n Vicarious liability makes a person responsible for some-\none else’s wrong but does not change the proof required to\nshow that a legal wrong has occurred. So even if we were to\noverrule Iskander, Gaston would need to show that someone\nwhose acts are imputed to Wexford violated the Eighth\nAmendment, as understood in Gamble, Farmer, and PeIies.\nHe did not seriously try to do so. This makes it unnecessary\nto decide whether Iskander was correctly decided.\n One final observation. Gaston and other plaintiffs have\ncontended that Iskander leads Wexford and similar organiza-\ntions to skimp on medical care in order to enrich themselves.\nWexford responds that, because it does not pay for the cost\nof MRI exams, surgeries, and other hospital treatment out-\nside the prisons, it has no financial reason to withhold ap-\npropriate medical treatment. That may be true, but so far\nWexford has not supplied evidence that it is true. Perhaps\nWexford has contracts with hospitals providing that they\nwill not bill it, but it has not produced them. Perhaps Illinois\npays for out-of-prison treatment under the Medicaid pro-\ngram, but again the record lacks proof. Dr. Chmell testified\nthat Wexford did not pay him, but the record does not reveal\nwhether Wexford paid the University of Illinois. Gaston has\n\n8 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\n\nlost this case for want of evidence, but the need to back up\none’s contentions with evidence applies as much to Wexford\nas it does to any prisoner.\n AFFIRMED\n\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 9\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: James Gaston v. Parthasarathi Ghosh\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\nJAMES GASTON,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nPARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 11-cv-6612 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Iskander v. Forest Park, 690\\nF.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1982), holds that private corporations,\\nwhen deemed to be state actors in suits under 42 U.S.C.\\n§1983, must be treated the same as municipal corporations.\\nThis means that they are not subject to vicarious liability.\\nSee, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009); Monell\\nv. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,\\n\\n2 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\n691–94 (1978). Iqbal, Monell, and other decisions hold that\\nmunicipalities and public employees may be held liable for\\ntheir own decisions and policies but are not liable under the\\ndoctrine of respondeat superior for the acts, decisions, and pol-\\nicies of other persons, including subordinate public officials.\\nIskander held that the same approach applies to private cor-\\nporations and their agents, to the extent that they are treated\\nas state actors for the purpose of §1983. James Gaston asks us\\nto overrule Iskander and hold that in litigation under §1983 a\\nprivate corporation may be liable vicariously to the same ex-\\ntent as a private corporation in the law of torts.\\n That argument has been made before but left unresolved,\\nbecause the appeals could be decided on other grounds. See,\\ne.g., Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2017); Glis-\\nson v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (en banc); Shields v. Illinois Department of Correc-\\ntions, 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014). That is equally true today,\\nand for the same reason as in Collins: the employee “is not\\nliable, so—even if the theory of respondeat superior were\\navailable—neither is his employer.”\\n Gaston, a prisoner of Illinois, suffered injuries that led to\\nsurgery on both of his knees. (He had other medical prob-\\nlems, but treatment for them is no longer in dispute.) He first\\ncomplained about pain in his left knee in May 2009. Drugs\\ndid not solve the pain, and the knee did not heal on its own.\\nLiping Zhang, a physician employed by Wexford Health\\nSources, which Illinois uses to provide medical care in the\\nstate’s prisons, eventually alerted Parthasarathi Ghosh, who\\nreferred Gaston to an orthopedic surgeon. Delay in imple-\\nmenting that decision followed; the consultation occurred in\\nSeptember 2010. Dr. Ghosh, the head of medical services at\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 3\\n\\nthe prison, approved a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)\\nexam, which the specialist had recommended, but it was not\\nconducted until February 2011. It revealed a lingering injury.\\nIn August 2011 Samuel Chmell performed arthroscopic sur-\\ngery on Gaston’s left knee, a step approved by Imhotep\\nCarter, who replaced Dr. Ghosh after his retirement. (Dr.\\nChmell is an orthopedic surgeon on the staff of the Universi-\\nty of Illinois hospital system, which handled all of the spe-\\ncialist work, MRI exams, and surgeries we mention.)\\n While Gaston’s left knee was healing, a consultative body\\nwithin Wexford delayed approving an MRI image of his\\nright knee, stating that one knee had to be sound before\\ntreatment of the other could proceed. In May 2012 the pris-\\non’s interim medical director (Dr. Carter having left) re-\\nferred Gaston for an MRI exam on the right knee. It showed\\nserious problems, and Dr. Chmell recommended another ar-\\nthroscopic surgery. In August 2012 Saleh Obaisi, the prison’s\\nnew medical director, approved Dr. Chmell’s recommenda-\\ntion, and surgery occurred in October 2012. This did not\\nbring the hoped-for relief, and Dr. Chmell recommended ar-\\nthroplasty (i.e., knee replacement). That surgery, a much\\nmore substantial medical intervention, was delayed while\\nspecialists determined whether Gaston’s pulmonary and\\ncardiology systems would handle the strain. More delay\\nmay have been caused by inamention to the case. The arthro-\\nplasty took place in February 2015 and was successful.\\n Gaston acknowledges that he has received a great deal of\\nmedical care. He does not contend that the diagnosis or the\\nselected interventions can lead to §1983 liability under the\\napproach of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v.\\nBrennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); and PeIies v. Carter, 836 F.3d\\n\\n4 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\n722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Instead he contends that the de-\\nlays while waiting for surgeries reflect deliberate indiffer-\\nence to his pain, so that the pain became a form of unauthor-\\nized punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (ap-\\nplied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the\\nFourteenth Amendment). After the district court dismissed\\nGaston’s complaint, we remanded, holding that a complaint\\nbased on unwarranted pain during extended delay in treat-\\nment states a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 498 F.\\nApp’x 629 (7th Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential disposition).\\n Back in the district court Gaston, although represented\\nby counsel, proceeded premy much as if anyone whose com-\\nplaint states a legal claim prevails without needing to prove\\nthe complaint’s allegations. Defendants conducted discov-\\nery; Gaston not so much. In particular, Gaston did not try to\\nfind out either who was responsible for the delays (the four\\nphysicians named as defendants? back-office staff? someone\\nelse?) or why those delays occurred (a desire that Gaston’s\\npain continue? indifference to his pain? simple negligence?\\nmedical judgment?). For their part, defendants offered some\\nevidence that would tend to support a conclusion that the\\ndelays could be chalked up to medical judgment—a prefer-\\nence for conservative treatment before surgery—plus occa-\\nsional oversight, but never to any desire to injure Gaston or\\nindifference to his pain. Dr. Chmell testified in a deposition\\nthat the treatment afforded to Gaston was within the stand-\\nard of care in the medical profession—in other words, not\\neven negligence, let alone punishment inflicted with the sub-\\njective standard required for constitutional liability.\\n Gaston contended that Wexford should be held liable\\neven if none of the four physicians is culpable. In making\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 5\\n\\nthis contention, he assumed that, if Iskander should be over-\\nruled, then Wexford and other private corporations would\\nbecome liable under §1983 for their employees’ negligence,\\nno mamer what standard applies to the personal liability of\\nthose employees.\\n The district court granted summary judgment to the four\\nindividual defendants, ruling that the record does not show\\nthat any of them acted (or delayed acting) with the state of\\nmind required for culpability. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195234\\n(N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2017). The court recognized that it lacks\\nthe authority to depart from Iskander. Wexford could be lia-\\nble for its own unconstitutional policies, but the court con-\\ncluded that the policies to which Gaston pointed, such as\\ntreating one condition at a time, reflected medical judgment\\nrather than a constitutional problem.\\n It is not as if Wexford has a policy of ignoring life-\\nthreatening conditions while a prisoner heals from surgery.\\nNor did Wexford ignore the pain from one knee while Gas-\\nton recovered from surgery on the other. He received pain-\\nalleviating drugs. The district court’s decision is addressed\\nto a policy providing time between surgeries, a policy that\\nDr. Chmell testified is medically appropriate. The district\\njudge was confident that, if a prisoner being treated for the\\nflu broke his leg, Wexford would immediately provide the\\ncare needed to deal with a broken leg. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\\n195234 at *43. (The district court added that Gaston has not\\nestablished that “treat one condition at a time” is Wexford’s\\npolicy, as opposed to a medical decision made about his sit-\\nuation, in particular.)\\n In this court, Gaston scarcely engages with the district\\ncourt’s reasoning or the consequences of his failure to intro-\\n\\n6 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\nduce evidence. Instead he asks us to overrule Iskander in the\\nbelief that this will eliminate the need to show that any of\\nWexford’s employees violated the Eighth Amendment. That\\nnot only contradicts Collins, which Gaston does not mention,\\nbut also misunderstands the nature of vicarious liability. It\\nis—well, there’s no bemer word than vicarious.\\n With vicarious liability, one person is liable for another’s\\nwrong. In an employment relation, that means an employee\\nor other agent. The wrongdoer need not be a defendant, but\\nthere must be an actionable wrong, by a person whose con-\\nduct is imputed to the employer. Medical negligence by one\\nof Wexford’s employees could support liability under state\\ntort law but not the Eighth Amendment. If only intentional\\nwrongdoing by an employee leads to personal liability, then\\nan employee’s negligence does not justify holding the em-\\nployer liable. There’s nothing to be vicariously liable for.\\n These are fundamental principles of tort and agency law,\\nwhere vicarious liability has long been common. “Vicarious\\nliability is not based upon the defendant’s own fault. Rather,\\nit is based upon the principle that he must bear legal respon-\\nsibility for another’s wrong. From the employer-defendant’s\\npoint of view, vicarious liability is strict liability, since he is\\nliable without personal fault. That is not quite the case from\\nthe plaintiff’s point of view. The plaintiff must prove that the\\nemployee commimed a tort and was acting within the scope\\nof employment when he did so.” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T.\\nHayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts 782 (2d ed. 2011\\n& update 2018). See also, e.g., Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802\\nF.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986); National Union Fire Insurance Co.\\nv. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St. 3d 594, 599 (2009) (“a principal is vi-\\ncariously liable only when an agent could be held directly\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 7\\n\\nliable”); Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 481 (1991) (“The\\nliability of the principal arises simply by the operation of law\\nand is only derivative of the wrongful act of the agent”); Re-\\nstatement (Second) of Agency §217B (1958). This also implies\\nthat vicarious responsibility does not change the substantive\\nstandard. “Vicarious liability is not an independent cause of\\naction, but rather is a legal concept used to transfer liability\\nfrom an agent to a principal”. Crawford v. Signet Bank, 179\\nF.3d 926, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1999).\\n Vicarious liability makes a person responsible for some-\\none else’s wrong but does not change the proof required to\\nshow that a legal wrong has occurred. So even if we were to\\noverrule Iskander, Gaston would need to show that someone\\nwhose acts are imputed to Wexford violated the Eighth\\nAmendment, as understood in Gamble, Farmer, and PeIies.\\nHe did not seriously try to do so. This makes it unnecessary\\nto decide whether Iskander was correctly decided.\\n One final observation. Gaston and other plaintiffs have\\ncontended that Iskander leads Wexford and similar organiza-\\ntions to skimp on medical care in order to enrich themselves.\\nWexford responds that, because it does not pay for the cost\\nof MRI exams, surgeries, and other hospital treatment out-\\nside the prisons, it has no financial reason to withhold ap-\\npropriate medical treatment. That may be true, but so far\\nWexford has not supplied evidence that it is true. Perhaps\\nWexford has contracts with hospitals providing that they\\nwill not bill it, but it has not produced them. Perhaps Illinois\\npays for out-of-prison treatment under the Medicaid pro-\\ngram, but again the record lacks proof. Dr. Chmell testified\\nthat Wexford did not pay him, but the record does not reveal\\nwhether Wexford paid the University of Illinois. Gaston has\\n\\n8 Nos. 17-3618 & 18-1281\\n\\nlost this case for want of evidence, but the need to back up\\none’s contentions with evidence applies as much to Wexford\\nas it does to any prisoner.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-1281 9\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1688,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4606731,"string":"4,606,731"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Arriba Lewis"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3592"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3592 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nARRIBA W. LEWIS, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Central District of Illinois. \\n No. 1:17‐cr‐10004‐JES‐JEH‐1 — James E. Shadid, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges. \\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Officer Sweeney pulled Arriba \\nLewis over for following too closely. Sweeney processed a \\nwarning while Lewis, who seemed unusually nervous, sat in \\nthe squad car. After learning Lewis was on federal supervised \\nrelease for a cocaine conviction, Sweeney requested a drug‐\\nsniffing dog roughly 5 minutes into the stop. \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n About 10 minutes and 50 seconds after Lewis pulled over, \\nSweeney handed him a warning. About 10 seconds later, a \\ndrug‐sniffing dog and its handler approached Lewis’s car. \\nThe dog alerted. Sweeney searched Lewis’s car and found \\nheroin. Lewis was charged with possession with intent to dis‐\\ntribute heroin. The district court denied his motion to sup‐\\npress. He appeals, arguing the officer lacked lawful grounds \\nto initiate the traffic stop and arguing the officer prolonged \\nthe stop without independent reasonable suspicion for the \\ndog to sniff. But we disagree on both fronts, and affirm. \\n I. Facts \\n Officer Sweeney sat in an unmarked Ford SUV with an ex‐\\nterior spotlight in the median of Interstate 55 in McLean \\nCounty, Illinois, watching traffic. He saw a man later identi‐\\nfied as Arriba Lewis driving a Dodge Charger southbound in \\n“a pack of vehicles traveling in close proximity to each other.” \\nHe “was traveling right behind another vehicle in very close \\nproximity,” gripping the wheel at 10:00 and 2:00, and appear‐\\ning to push himself behind the side pillar in a rigid posture. \\n Sweeney pursued Lewis. Sweeney testified he wanted “to \\nsee if I can observe a traffic violation and confirm [Lewis’s] \\nfollowing distance which I initially saw.” But first he passed \\nLewis to assist another officer. Sweeney’s dashboard camera \\nbegan recording after he passed Lewis because Sweeney trig‐\\ngered his emergency lights as he approached the other officer. \\nTriggering these lights activated the dashcam, which was pro‐\\ngramed to capture footage beginning 1 minute earlier. After \\npassing Lewis, Sweeney pulled over to the right shoulder be‐\\nhind the other officer. Video recorded by Sweeney’s dashcam \\nshows a truck followed by Lewis pass to the left of Sweeney. \\nThe other officer declined assistance, so Sweeney pulled out \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 3\\n\\nand accelerated. Several vehicles moved to the right lane to let \\nhim pass. He saw Lewis ahead in the left lane “at the prelim‐\\ninary stages of passing” a truck in the right lane. Then Lewis \\nchanged to the right lane behind the truck. As Lewis followed \\nthe truck, Sweeney calculated the time‐distance. He activated \\na stopwatch function to record the time between the truck’s \\nrear passing a milepost and the Charger’s front passing the \\nsame object. He clocked this at 1.2 seconds, meaning Lewis \\nfollowed 1.2 seconds behind the truck according to this calcu‐\\nlation. Lewis stayed close behind the truck for about 45 sec‐\\nonds despite the lack of traffic immediately behind him. \\n Sweeney pulled into the right lane. He testified he acti‐\\nvated his emergency lights.1 He pulled Lewis over. Lewis \\nstopped on the right shoulder, and Sweeney pulled behind \\nhim, at about 3 minutes, 41 seconds into the video. The video \\nshows Lewis made a movement to his right inside his car sec‐\\nonds later. Sweeney walked to the Charger’s passenger side \\nand saw Lewis’s hands trembling. At about 4 minutes into the \\nvideo, Sweeney reached the front window.2 He made contact \\nwith Lewis and asked for his license. Sweeney said: \\n\\n \\n1 The parties dispute the timing of Sweeney’s activation of his emergency \\n\\nlights. Sweeney testified he activated his lights sometime after clocking \\nthe following‐distance at 1.2 seconds. But Lewis argues Sweeney activated \\nhis lights when he pulled over to offer assistance to the other officer, well \\nbefore clocking the following‐distance, and nothing in the record shows \\nhe turned the lights off. This issue’s potential relevance concerns the rea‐\\nson Lewis pulled into the right lane behind the truck. \\n2 The dashcam video (presented at the suppression hearing and submitted \\n\\nto us) begins at 0 minutes, 0 seconds. The video runs for about 3 minutes, \\n41 seconds before showing Lewis stop on the shoulder. It then shows \\nSweeney reach the front passenger‐side window of the Charger at about 4 \\nminutes into the video. Sweeney said “Here you go. Here’s your warning, \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n The reason I stopped you was your following‐\\n distance. You need to leave at least 3 seconds \\n here in Illinois. You were less than 2 behind that \\n semi. Ok. And that’s why I originally pulled out \\n on you back, way back there, too. You had an‐\\n other car you were following.3 \\n Sweeney testified Lewis’s hands trembled and his breath‐\\ning seemed heavy and labored. Sweeney told Lewis he would \\njust get a warning, not a ticket, and told him to sit in the squad \\ncar during preparation of the warning. After “hem‐haw[ing]” \\nand failing to exit his car expeditiously, when he finally began \\nto exit he reached back in his car. Then he put his hands up as \\nhe walked. Sweeney said, “You’re fine man. Relax.” \\n In the squad car, Sweeney typed information into a com‐\\nputer and talked with Lewis. The first step of completing the \\nwarning was ensuring, via computer, he had a valid license. \\nUpon this check, the computer automatically showed he was \\non federal probation4 for a cocaine conviction. Sweeney \\n\\n \\nok,” and handed it to Lewis at about 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the video. \\nThus, the total time from Lewis pulling over to Sweeney handing him the \\nwarning is about 10 minutes, 50 seconds. The dog sniff began about 10 \\nseconds later and took about 1 minute, 8 seconds. References to the video’s \\ntime during the stop include about 4 minutes before Sweeney reached \\nLewis’s window. The video’s length does not equal the duration of the \\nstop. As we show below, Lewis sometimes conflates the video’s length \\nwith the duration of the stop. But they are not the same. \\n3 We base our quotations of Sweeney and Lewis during the stop on the \\n\\nvideo. Any deviations are immaterial. \\n4 Sweeney used the word “probation,” apparently because his computer \\n\\ndid not distinguish between this and supervised release. Actually, Lewis \\nwas on the latter. But the distinction is immaterial here. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 5\\n\\ntestified the computer returned information based on the li‐\\ncense within 1 minute of sitting in the squad car. \\n About 2 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \\nwhere he was headed. Lewis said he was going to pick his son \\nup. Sweeney asked where. Lewis said, “School … St. Louis.” \\nSweeney asked how old the son was. Lewis said, “26.” He ex‐\\nplained his son wanted to return to Chicago. Sweeney asked \\nwhere the son went to school. Lewis replied his son worked \\nin a warehouse. Lewis added his son “got into it” with his \\ngirlfriend. This exchange lasted slightly less than a minute. \\nSweeney thought the story seemed suspiciously inconsistent. \\n About 3.5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, he asked about \\nthe 3‐second guideline Sweeney mentioned: \\n Lewis: So you got to be how many feet back? \\n Sweeney: It’s not feet. It’s seconds. You need to \\n be at least 3 seconds. \\n Lewis: Oh. Ok. \\n Sweeney: Ok. You were 1.2. \\n Lewis: How you measure that? \\n Sweeney: It’s just a stopwatch function on here. \\n So when the, with the semi, when it goes by a \\n stationary object which was the milepost back \\n there is what I used. When the back of that goes \\n past that stationary object I start it. When the \\n front of your vehicle goes past that same object \\n I stop it. \\n About 5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \\nhim what he does for work, and he said he drove a truck. \\nRoughly 5 minutes after first making contact with Lewis at his \\nwindow, Sweeney requested a drug‐sniffing dog via a \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nmessaging system. Lewis concedes Sweeney requested the \\ndog after hearing Lewis’s answers regarding his travel plans \\nand after learning via computer he had a prior drug convic‐\\ntion for which he was on supervised release. \\n About 6 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said \\nsomething was taking a minute to update. Then he asked \\nLewis how long his son had been in St. Louis, how often \\nLewis visited, and whether Lewis drove a truck “over the \\nroad.” Sweeney testified Lewis’s breathing continued to ap‐\\npear labored in the squad car, even after hearing he would \\nonly get a warning. Nearly 8 minutes after Lewis pulled over, \\nSweeney said Illinois barred the air freshener hanging from \\nLewis’s mirror because it obstructed the view. Sweeney asked \\nLewis what part of St. Louis he was going to. Sweeney testi‐\\nfied Lewis never asked if he was free to go. \\n Sweeney then said, “in correlation with our safety detail \\ntoday … we do have a canine dog working with us.” Sweeney \\nasked if Lewis was responsible for everything in the car. \\nAbout 10 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said, “I’m \\ngonna print this off. I’m gonna have the dog walk around the \\nexterior of the vehicle, ok.” About 20 seconds later, the dash‐\\ncam records the sound of the warning printing. Then Sweeney \\nasked if Lewis was on probation. He responded in the affirm‐\\native. Nearly 11 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney \\nsaid, “Here you go. Here’s your warning, ok.”5 Sweeney gave \\nthe warning to Lewis, explained it, and said, “So you’re going \\nto St. Louis though.” At the word “though,” at about 14 \\nminutes, 41 seconds into the video (about 10 seconds after \\n\\n \\n5 This comports with his testimony that he completed the “warning pa‐\\n\\nperwork” roughly 10 minutes, 40 seconds after initiating the stop. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 7\\n\\ngiving the written warning) a dog appeared on the video and \\napproached the rear passenger side of Lewis’s car. Lewis con‐\\nfirmed he was going to St. Louis. Sweeney said that was out‐\\nside Illinois. They talked about Lewis’s probation and prior \\nincarceration while the dog circled his car. \\n About 12 minutes after Lewis pulled over (about 1 minute, \\n18 seconds after Sweeney gave the written warning to Lewis, \\nand about 1 minute, 8 seconds after the dog sniff began) the \\nhandler told Sweeney the sniff was positive. Sweeney \\nsearched Lewis’s car and quickly found 208 grams of heroin. \\n II. Procedural posture \\n Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distrib‐\\nute heroin. The district court denied his motion to suppress. \\nHe entered a conditional guilty plea. A career offender at \\ncriminal history category VI, he received a sentence of 20 \\nyears incarceration. He appeals the denial of suppression, \\nraising two main issues. First, he challenges the traffic stop’s \\ninitiation. Second, he challenges the sniff’s initiation. “We em‐\\nploy a mixed standard of review on motions to suppress, re‐\\nviewing the district court’s factual determinations for clear er‐\\nror and de novo its ultimate determination about whether the \\npolice had sufficient grounds to stop or search the individ‐\\nual.” United States v. Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th \\nCir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). \\n III. Discussion \\nA. Traffic stop \\n1. Law \\n Lewis argues Sweeney did not have legal grounds to start \\nthe traffic stop. If Lewis is right, then the court should have \\n\\f8 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nsuppressed the heroin as fruit of the poisonous tree. The \\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches \\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a \\nvehicle, the stop must meet the Fourth Amendment’s reason‐\\nableness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 \\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, \\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States \\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015). \\n The district court determined probable cause justified ini‐\\ntiating the stop.6 Generally, “the decision to stop an automo‐\\nbile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to be‐\\nlieve that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United \\nStates, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). “Probable cause exists when \\n‘the circumstances confronting a police officer support the \\nreasonable belief that a driver has committed even a minor \\ntraffic offense.’” United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th \\nCir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586 \\n(7th Cir. 2000)). Probable cause is an objective standard, based \\non the totality of the circumstances. If an officer reasonably \\nthinks he sees a driver commit a traffic violation, that is suffi‐\\ncient grounds to pull him over without offending the Consti‐\\ntution. Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724. The officer is not the judge. \\nWhether the driver actually committed a traffic infraction is \\nirrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes so long as there \\nwas an objective basis for a reasonable belief he did. Cashman, \\n216 F.3d at 587. \\n\\n \\n6 The lower standard of reasonable suspicion is enough to justify some \\n\\ntraffic stops. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014); Prouse, 440 U.S. \\nat 663; Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d at 667–68. But we need not apply this \\nstandard here because the district court did not err in finding probable \\ncause. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 9\\n\\n2. Analysis \\n Here, Sweeney had more than ample grounds to pull \\nLewis over. As Sweeney sat in the median, he thought he saw \\nLewis following another vehicle too closely. That initial ob‐\\nservation alone probably satisfied the Constitution, but we \\nneed not decide that because Sweeney pursued Lewis and \\nconducted a time‐distance calculation to confirm he followed \\na vehicle too closely. Sweeney calculated Lewis’s following‐\\ntime‐distance at 1.2 seconds. Whether Lewis actually fol‐\\nlowed by 1.2 seconds exactly is irrelevant for purposes of the \\nFourth Amendment. It is enough that this calculation sup‐\\nported a reasonable belief Lewis was breaking the law. \\n Lewis mainly argues the 3‐second rule mentioned by \\nSweeney during the traffic stop is merely the Illinois Secretary \\nof State’s recommendation, not the actual law. But this is a red \\nherring because the standard for probable cause is objective. \\nSee Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s con‐\\ncern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken \\nin certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”); \\nScott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“[T]hat the of‐\\nficer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated \\nby the reasons which provide the legal justification for the of‐\\nficer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as \\nthe circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”). \\nThe objective circumstances support probable cause to pull \\nLewis over based on the two observations of him following \\ntoo closely, in violation of the law: \\n The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow \\n another vehicle more closely than is reasonable \\n and prudent, having due regard for the speed of \\n\\f10 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n such vehicles and the traffic upon and the con‐\\n dition of the highway. \\n625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a). Here, it does not matter whether the Sec‐\\nretary’s recommendation comports with the statute. Nor does \\nit matter that Sweeney referenced the recommendation dur‐\\ning the stop. Regardless, Sweeney objectively had grounds for \\na reasonable belief Lewis was following too closely based on \\nthe two observations (and based on the clocked observation \\nalone).7 \\n And this brings us to Lewis’s next argument. He faults the \\ncourt for not giving effect to the statutory language requiring \\na driver to act based on the “condition of the highway.” He \\nargues the major highway condition was Sweeney’s squad car \\napproaching Lewis from behind. Lewis argues Illinois law re‐\\nquired him to pull immediately into the right lane when he \\nsaw the squad car approaching. He argues he had a legal duty \\nnot to obstruct it. He argues he chose the least of the available \\nevils when he pulled from the left lane into the right lane be‐\\nhind the truck to yield to Sweeney. Lewis goes so far as to \\n \\n7 Lewis argues: “For the Government to have met its burden of establish‐\\n\\ning probable cause for a 625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a) violation, it had to prove Mr. \\nLewis was driving in a way that was not ‘reasonable or prudent’ given the \\n‘speed of [other] vehicles’ and the ‘condition of the highway.’” (Appel‐\\nlant’s Reply at 9–10.) That is wrong. To show the constitutionality of the \\ntraffic stop’s start, the government merely needed to show an objective \\nbasis for a reasonable belief Lewis followed too closely, not that he actu‐\\nally followed too closely. Whether Lewis actually followed at 1.2 seconds \\nand whether 1.2 seconds was actually too close, given all the conditions of \\nthe highway, are irrelevant to whether there was probable cause sufficient \\nto initiate the stop, and ultimately would have been for a traffic court to \\ndecide (if Sweeney issued a ticket instead of a warning). \\n \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 11\\n\\nargue Sweeney “impermissibly created the grounds for the \\nstop,” manufacturing a “police‐created exigency.” \\n The main problem with this argument is that it does noth‐\\ning to justify or explain why Lewis stayed in the right lane in \\nclose proximity behind the truck for about 45 seconds after \\npulling into the right lane behind the truck. As the video \\ndemonstrates, no vehicles at this stage forced Lewis to tailgate \\nthe truck. Regardless of the status of Sweeney’s emergency \\nlights, Lewis offers no reason why he could not have eased \\nback from the truck. Moreover, Lewis’s argument does noth‐\\ning to undermine Sweeney’s observation from the median. \\n The court properly relied on Muriel, where an officer’s “es‐\\ntimation of the following distance amounted to probable \\ncause to believe that [the suspect’s] vehicle was ‘more close[ ] \\nthan is reasonable and prudent.’” Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724 \\n(quoting Ind. Code 9‐21‐8‐14). The court did not err in con‐\\ncluding probable cause supported initiating the stop. \\nB. Dog sniff \\n1. Law \\n An officer who reasonably starts a traffic stop, however, \\nmight violate the Constitution if he exceeds the scope or un‐\\nreasonably prolongs the stop. A traffic stop “‘can become un‐\\nlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required \\nto complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodri‐\\nguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting \\nIllinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). It is well‐estab‐\\nlished a dog sniff of a vehicle’s exterior only for illegal drugs \\nduring a lawful stop for a traffic violation does not infringe \\nFourth Amendment rights, even absent reasonable suspicion \\nof drugs. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But it is also well‐\\n\\f12 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nestablished a stop justified only by a traffic violation becomes \\nunlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably re‐\\nquired to complete the stop’s original mission. Rodriguez, 135 \\nS. Ct. at 1612. An officer may conduct “certain unrelated \\nchecks”—including a dog sniff—during a lawful traffic stop, \\nbut “he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent \\nthe reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify de‐\\ntaining an individual.” Id. at 1615. Absent independent rea‐\\nsonable suspicion to justify the sniff, the critical question is \\nnot whether the sniff occurs before or after the officer issues \\nthe warning, “but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—\\ni.e., adds time to—‘the stop’ … .” Id. at 1616. But with inde‐\\npendent reasonable suspicion, the officer may detain the sus‐\\npect for the sniff even if the sniff adds time to the total stop. \\n Here, the district court concluded the stop (from its start \\nto the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the warning) was not \\nprolonged past the time reasonably required to complete the \\nmission of issuing a warning. And the district court deter‐\\nmined independent reasonable suspicion justified extending \\nthe stop by about 1 minute for a canine unit to arrive. \\n2. Analysis \\n Lewis argues even if the stop started lawfully, the heroin \\nshould be suppressed because the dog sniffed after a pro‐\\nlonged detention without reasonable suspicion. But he leads \\nwith a patent mistake. He claims Sweeney was completely fin‐\\nished with the warning at 10 minutes, 40 seconds into the \\nvideo but did not print it until 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the \\nvideo, a claimed unjustified delay of nearly 4 minutes. But the \\nvideo and Sweeney’s testimony flatly contradict this. Lewis \\nmistakenly treats Sweeney’s testimony about the time on the \\nvideo’s clock when he printed the warning as testimony about \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 13\\n\\nthe duration of the stop up to the point he printed it. Sweeney \\ntestified he calculated the time it took him to complete the \\nwarning paperwork after he initiated the traffic stop (not after \\nthe video began) to be 10 minutes and 40 seconds. He testified \\nthat at 14 minutes, 26 seconds into the video (not into the stop) \\nhe said “Here you go” as he gave the warning to Lewis. The \\nbottom line is the video and testimony show there was no un‐\\nreasonable delay between finishing the warning and handing \\nit to Lewis. The claimed delay of about 4 minutes merely mir‐\\nrors the difference between the video’s clock and the duration \\nof the stop, because the stop begins about 4 minutes into the \\nvideo. The simple fact, shown by the video and testimony, is \\nSweeney printed the warning between 10 and 11 minutes into \\nthe stop and promptly gave it to Lewis. His false equivocation \\ninfects some of his remaining arguments. \\n Lewis next argues Sweeney unlawfully prolonged the de‐\\ntention by taking time to impermissibly confine and question \\nhim about issues unrelated to the warning, and he raises sev‐\\neral detailed points. But each point fails. \\n Lewis argues switching cars took 1 minute. But he does \\nnot explain why this delay was unlawful or why sitting in the \\nsquad car was impermissible. We already determined the \\ncourt did not err in concluding the initiation of the traffic stop \\nwas permissible. Lewis does not explain why moving him to \\nthe squad car was not reasonably incidental. See United States \\nv. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996) (During a valid traf‐\\nfic stop, an officer may “legitimately ask [a driver] to step out \\nof his car, even without any particularized suspicion,” and \\nmay ask the driver “to sit in his patrol car … .”). Nor does he \\nexplain why, during the minute between Sweeney asking \\n\\f14 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nLewis to exit his car and Lewis entering the squad car, he \\nspent about 40 seconds in his car after being asked to exit. \\n Lewis next argues Sweeney spent 6 minutes and 15 sec‐\\nonds asking about irrelevant travel matters and explaining \\nhow a canine unit will arrive. Lewis cites two parts of the \\nvideo in support. There are several problems with Lewis’s ar‐\\ngument here. The first challenged part of the video begins \\nwith Sweeney asking, “Where are we headed to today, sir?” \\nOfficers across the country would be surprised if we counte‐\\nnanced the characterization of this basic, routine question as \\nirrelevant to a traffic stop. Lewis’s initial response to this ques‐\\ntion was not entirely forthcoming: “Pick my son up.” That re‐\\nsponse naturally led to Sweeney’s next question: “Where’s \\nthat at?” Again, Lewis’s response was not entirely forthcom‐\\ning: “School … St. Louis.” So Sweeney asked how old the son \\nwas and where he went to school. Lewis gave the age, brought \\nup returning to Chicago, never answered about school, \\nbrought up his son’s work in “some warehouse,” and brought \\nup a situation between his son and his son’s girlfriend. \\n The Constitution allows an officer to ask these questions \\nduring a traffic stop, especially when the answers objectively \\nseem suspicious. See Muriel, 418 F.3d at 726 (Although ques‐\\ntions prolonging custody might affect the detention’s reason‐\\nableness, police “may ask questions that do not concern the \\npurpose of the stop and that are not supported by any other \\nsuspicion.”); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. \\n2002) (“What the Constitution requires is that the entire pro‐\\ncess remain reasonable. Questions that hold potential for de‐\\ntecting crime, yet create little or no inconvenience, do not turn \\nreasonable detention into unreasonable detention.”) And \\nLewis could have refused to answer at some point. But the \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 15\\n\\nbiggest problem with Lewis’s argument here is he does not \\nshow any reason these exchanges prolonged the process of is‐\\nsuing the warning. The video and testimony both document \\nSweeney worked on the warning while talking with Lewis. \\n The court did not err in determining the duration of the \\nstop (from its start to the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the \\nwarning) was not prolonged past the time reasonably re‐\\nquired to complete the mission of issuing a warning. \\n The court turned to the issue of whether Sweeney ob‐\\ntained enough information during the stop before issuing the \\nwarning to have independent reasonable suspicion of crimi‐\\nnal activity to justify detaining Lewis further. Sweeney \\nhanded Lewis the warning about 10 minutes, 50 seconds after \\nLewis pulled over. The dog alerted roughly 1 minute later. \\nEven if the period between handing the warning and the dog \\nalerting could be called a delay of about 1 minute8 it was jus‐\\ntified by independent reasonable suspicion, as the court held. \\n Reasonable suspicion requires “‘specific and articulable \\nfacts which, taken together with rational inferences from \\nthose facts,’ suggest criminal activity.” United States v. Ruiz, \\n785 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 \\nU.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is an objective stand‐\\nard, considering the totality of the circumstances. By the time \\n \\n8 We question whether even this minute can be characterized as a delay to \\n\\nwait for a dog, because immediately after handing Lewis the warning and \\nexplaining in a quick and routine manner what it is, Sweeney brings up \\nthe apt point that Lewis said he was going to St. Louis, but his terms likely \\nrestrict his freedom to leave Illinois. But we need not explore this further \\nbecause we agree with the district court that Sweeney had independent \\nreasonable suspicion to detain Lewis after handing him the warning to \\nallow the dog time to sniff. \\n\\f16 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nSweeney issued the warning, this is what he objectively had \\nreason to know. One, Lewis seemed unusually nervous even \\nafter hearing he would only get a warning. His hands trem‐\\nbled. His breathing was heavy and labored. Nervousness can \\nraise reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, \\n124 (2000). Two, he was on supervised release for a drug of‐\\nfense. Criminal histories can support reasonable suspicion. \\nUnited States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n(Sweeney had these objective grounds for reasonable suspi‐\\ncion even without asking any questions Lewis now chal‐\\nlenges.) Three, his travel explanations seemed suspiciously \\ninconsistent, which can raise reasonable suspicion. Muriel, 418 \\nF.3d at 726. These factors legitimately gave rise to objective \\nreasonable suspicion. \\n This is true even if Lewis always breathes heavily, with \\nconstantly trembling hands. Even if he were actually innocent \\nof the prior drug charge and a judge planned to exonerate him \\nnext morning. Even if his son actually studied and worked in \\nSt. Louis, quarreled, and wanted to return to Chicago. Re‐\\ngardless, objective reasonable suspicion of criminal activity \\nsupported detaining Lewis to allow a dog to sniff. Perhaps we \\ncould add his rigid posture, furtive movements, “hem‐haw‐\\ning,” and I‐55’s drug‐trafficking reputation. But we need not. \\n We conclude the district court did not err in determining \\nany delay beyond the routine traffic stop to allow the dog to \\nsniff was justified by independent reasonable suspicion. \\n IV. Conclusion \\n We considered all Lewis’s arguments and found none \\navailing. We AFFIRM the denial of suppression.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4383984/\", \"author_raw\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606731/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Arriba Lewis\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐3592 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nARRIBA W. LEWIS, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Central District of Illinois. \n No. 1:17‐cr‐10004‐JES‐JEH‐1 — James E. Shadid, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges. \n MANION, Circuit Judge. Officer Sweeney pulled Arriba \nLewis over for following too closely. Sweeney processed a \nwarning while Lewis, who seemed unusually nervous, sat in \nthe squad car. After learning Lewis was on federal supervised \nrelease for a cocaine conviction, Sweeney requested a drug‐\nsniffing dog roughly 5 minutes into the stop. \n\f2 No. 17‐3592 \n\n About 10 minutes and 50 seconds after Lewis pulled over, \nSweeney handed him a warning. About 10 seconds later, a \ndrug‐sniffing dog and its handler approached Lewis’s car. \nThe dog alerted. Sweeney searched Lewis’s car and found \nheroin. Lewis was charged with possession with intent to dis‐\ntribute heroin. The district court denied his motion to sup‐\npress. He appeals, arguing the officer lacked lawful grounds \nto initiate the traffic stop and arguing the officer prolonged \nthe stop without independent reasonable suspicion for the \ndog to sniff. But we disagree on both fronts, and affirm. \n I. Facts \n Officer Sweeney sat in an unmarked Ford SUV with an ex‐\nterior spotlight in the median of Interstate 55 in McLean \nCounty, Illinois, watching traffic. He saw a man later identi‐\nfied as Arriba Lewis driving a Dodge Charger southbound in \n“a pack of vehicles traveling in close proximity to each other.” \nHe “was traveling right behind another vehicle in very close \nproximity,” gripping the wheel at 10:00 and 2:00, and appear‐\ning to push himself behind the side pillar in a rigid posture. \n Sweeney pursued Lewis. Sweeney testified he wanted “to \nsee if I can observe a traffic violation and confirm [Lewis’s] \nfollowing distance which I initially saw.” But first he passed \nLewis to assist another officer. Sweeney’s dashboard camera \nbegan recording after he passed Lewis because Sweeney trig‐\ngered his emergency lights as he approached the other officer. \nTriggering these lights activated the dashcam, which was pro‐\ngramed to capture footage beginning 1 minute earlier. After \npassing Lewis, Sweeney pulled over to the right shoulder be‐\nhind the other officer. Video recorded by Sweeney’s dashcam \nshows a truck followed by Lewis pass to the left of Sweeney. \nThe other officer declined assistance, so Sweeney pulled out \n\fNo. 17‐3592 3\n\nand accelerated. Several vehicles moved to the right lane to let \nhim pass. He saw Lewis ahead in the left lane “at the prelim‐\ninary stages of passing” a truck in the right lane. Then Lewis \nchanged to the right lane behind the truck. As Lewis followed \nthe truck, Sweeney calculated the time‐distance. He activated \na stopwatch function to record the time between the truck’s \nrear passing a milepost and the Charger’s front passing the \nsame object. He clocked this at 1.2 seconds, meaning Lewis \nfollowed 1.2 seconds behind the truck according to this calcu‐\nlation. Lewis stayed close behind the truck for about 45 sec‐\nonds despite the lack of traffic immediately behind him. \n Sweeney pulled into the right lane. He testified he acti‐\nvated his emergency lights.1 He pulled Lewis over. Lewis \nstopped on the right shoulder, and Sweeney pulled behind \nhim, at about 3 minutes, 41 seconds into the video. The video \nshows Lewis made a movement to his right inside his car sec‐\nonds later. Sweeney walked to the Charger’s passenger side \nand saw Lewis’s hands trembling. At about 4 minutes into the \nvideo, Sweeney reached the front window.2 He made contact \nwith Lewis and asked for his license. Sweeney said: \n\n \n1 The parties dispute the timing of Sweeney’s activation of his emergency \n\nlights. Sweeney testified he activated his lights sometime after clocking \nthe following‐distance at 1.2 seconds. But Lewis argues Sweeney activated \nhis lights when he pulled over to offer assistance to the other officer, well \nbefore clocking the following‐distance, and nothing in the record shows \nhe turned the lights off. This issue’s potential relevance concerns the rea‐\nson Lewis pulled into the right lane behind the truck. \n2 The dashcam video (presented at the suppression hearing and submitted \n\nto us) begins at 0 minutes, 0 seconds. The video runs for about 3 minutes, \n41 seconds before showing Lewis stop on the shoulder. It then shows \nSweeney reach the front passenger‐side window of the Charger at about 4 \nminutes into the video. Sweeney said “Here you go. Here’s your warning, \n\f4 No. 17‐3592 \n\n The reason I stopped you was your following‐\n distance. You need to leave at least 3 seconds \n here in Illinois. You were less than 2 behind that \n semi. Ok. And that’s why I originally pulled out \n on you back, way back there, too. You had an‐\n other car you were following.3 \n Sweeney testified Lewis’s hands trembled and his breath‐\ning seemed heavy and labored. Sweeney told Lewis he would \njust get a warning, not a ticket, and told him to sit in the squad \ncar during preparation of the warning. After “hem‐haw[ing]” \nand failing to exit his car expeditiously, when he finally began \nto exit he reached back in his car. Then he put his hands up as \nhe walked. Sweeney said, “You’re fine man. Relax.” \n In the squad car, Sweeney typed information into a com‐\nputer and talked with Lewis. The first step of completing the \nwarning was ensuring, via computer, he had a valid license. \nUpon this check, the computer automatically showed he was \non federal probation4 for a cocaine conviction. Sweeney \n\n \nok,” and handed it to Lewis at about 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the video. \nThus, the total time from Lewis pulling over to Sweeney handing him the \nwarning is about 10 minutes, 50 seconds. The dog sniff began about 10 \nseconds later and took about 1 minute, 8 seconds. References to the video’s \ntime during the stop include about 4 minutes before Sweeney reached \nLewis’s window. The video’s length does not equal the duration of the \nstop. As we show below, Lewis sometimes conflates the video’s length \nwith the duration of the stop. But they are not the same. \n3 We base our quotations of Sweeney and Lewis during the stop on the \n\nvideo. Any deviations are immaterial. \n4 Sweeney used the word “probation,” apparently because his computer \n\ndid not distinguish between this and supervised release. Actually, Lewis \nwas on the latter. But the distinction is immaterial here. \n\fNo. 17‐3592 5\n\ntestified the computer returned information based on the li‐\ncense within 1 minute of sitting in the squad car. \n About 2 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \nwhere he was headed. Lewis said he was going to pick his son \nup. Sweeney asked where. Lewis said, “School … St. Louis.” \nSweeney asked how old the son was. Lewis said, “26.” He ex‐\nplained his son wanted to return to Chicago. Sweeney asked \nwhere the son went to school. Lewis replied his son worked \nin a warehouse. Lewis added his son “got into it” with his \ngirlfriend. This exchange lasted slightly less than a minute. \nSweeney thought the story seemed suspiciously inconsistent. \n About 3.5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, he asked about \nthe 3‐second guideline Sweeney mentioned: \n Lewis: So you got to be how many feet back? \n Sweeney: It’s not feet. It’s seconds. You need to \n be at least 3 seconds. \n Lewis: Oh. Ok. \n Sweeney: Ok. You were 1.2. \n Lewis: How you measure that? \n Sweeney: It’s just a stopwatch function on here. \n So when the, with the semi, when it goes by a \n stationary object which was the milepost back \n there is what I used. When the back of that goes \n past that stationary object I start it. When the \n front of your vehicle goes past that same object \n I stop it. \n About 5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \nhim what he does for work, and he said he drove a truck. \nRoughly 5 minutes after first making contact with Lewis at his \nwindow, Sweeney requested a drug‐sniffing dog via a \n\f6 No. 17‐3592 \n\nmessaging system. Lewis concedes Sweeney requested the \ndog after hearing Lewis’s answers regarding his travel plans \nand after learning via computer he had a prior drug convic‐\ntion for which he was on supervised release. \n About 6 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said \nsomething was taking a minute to update. Then he asked \nLewis how long his son had been in St. Louis, how often \nLewis visited, and whether Lewis drove a truck “over the \nroad.” Sweeney testified Lewis’s breathing continued to ap‐\npear labored in the squad car, even after hearing he would \nonly get a warning. Nearly 8 minutes after Lewis pulled over, \nSweeney said Illinois barred the air freshener hanging from \nLewis’s mirror because it obstructed the view. Sweeney asked \nLewis what part of St. Louis he was going to. Sweeney testi‐\nfied Lewis never asked if he was free to go. \n Sweeney then said, “in correlation with our safety detail \ntoday … we do have a canine dog working with us.” Sweeney \nasked if Lewis was responsible for everything in the car. \nAbout 10 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said, “I’m \ngonna print this off. I’m gonna have the dog walk around the \nexterior of the vehicle, ok.” About 20 seconds later, the dash‐\ncam records the sound of the warning printing. Then Sweeney \nasked if Lewis was on probation. He responded in the affirm‐\native. Nearly 11 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney \nsaid, “Here you go. Here’s your warning, ok.”5 Sweeney gave \nthe warning to Lewis, explained it, and said, “So you’re going \nto St. Louis though.” At the word “though,” at about 14 \nminutes, 41 seconds into the video (about 10 seconds after \n\n \n5 This comports with his testimony that he completed the “warning pa‐\n\nperwork” roughly 10 minutes, 40 seconds after initiating the stop. \n\fNo. 17‐3592 7\n\ngiving the written warning) a dog appeared on the video and \napproached the rear passenger side of Lewis’s car. Lewis con‐\nfirmed he was going to St. Louis. Sweeney said that was out‐\nside Illinois. They talked about Lewis’s probation and prior \nincarceration while the dog circled his car. \n About 12 minutes after Lewis pulled over (about 1 minute, \n18 seconds after Sweeney gave the written warning to Lewis, \nand about 1 minute, 8 seconds after the dog sniff began) the \nhandler told Sweeney the sniff was positive. Sweeney \nsearched Lewis’s car and quickly found 208 grams of heroin. \n II. Procedural posture \n Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distrib‐\nute heroin. The district court denied his motion to suppress. \nHe entered a conditional guilty plea. A career offender at \ncriminal history category VI, he received a sentence of 20 \nyears incarceration. He appeals the denial of suppression, \nraising two main issues. First, he challenges the traffic stop’s \ninitiation. Second, he challenges the sniff’s initiation. “We em‐\nploy a mixed standard of review on motions to suppress, re‐\nviewing the district court’s factual determinations for clear er‐\nror and de novo its ultimate determination about whether the \npolice had sufficient grounds to stop or search the individ‐\nual.” United States v. Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th \nCir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). \n III. Discussion \nA. Traffic stop \n1. Law \n Lewis argues Sweeney did not have legal grounds to start \nthe traffic stop. If Lewis is right, then the court should have \n\f8 No. 17‐3592 \n\nsuppressed the heroin as fruit of the poisonous tree. The \nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches \nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a \nvehicle, the stop must meet the Fourth Amendment’s reason‐\nableness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 \n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, \na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States \nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015). \n The district court determined probable cause justified ini‐\ntiating the stop.6 Generally, “the decision to stop an automo‐\nbile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to be‐\nlieve that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United \nStates, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). “Probable cause exists when \n‘the circumstances confronting a police officer support the \nreasonable belief that a driver has committed even a minor \ntraffic offense.’” United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th \nCir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586 \n(7th Cir. 2000)). Probable cause is an objective standard, based \non the totality of the circumstances. If an officer reasonably \nthinks he sees a driver commit a traffic violation, that is suffi‐\ncient grounds to pull him over without offending the Consti‐\ntution. Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724. The officer is not the judge. \nWhether the driver actually committed a traffic infraction is \nirrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes so long as there \nwas an objective basis for a reasonable belief he did. Cashman, \n216 F.3d at 587. \n\n \n6 The lower standard of reasonable suspicion is enough to justify some \n\ntraffic stops. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014); Prouse, 440 U.S. \nat 663; Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d at 667–68. But we need not apply this \nstandard here because the district court did not err in finding probable \ncause. \n\fNo. 17‐3592 9\n\n2. Analysis \n Here, Sweeney had more than ample grounds to pull \nLewis over. As Sweeney sat in the median, he thought he saw \nLewis following another vehicle too closely. That initial ob‐\nservation alone probably satisfied the Constitution, but we \nneed not decide that because Sweeney pursued Lewis and \nconducted a time‐distance calculation to confirm he followed \na vehicle too closely. Sweeney calculated Lewis’s following‐\ntime‐distance at 1.2 seconds. Whether Lewis actually fol‐\nlowed by 1.2 seconds exactly is irrelevant for purposes of the \nFourth Amendment. It is enough that this calculation sup‐\nported a reasonable belief Lewis was breaking the law. \n Lewis mainly argues the 3‐second rule mentioned by \nSweeney during the traffic stop is merely the Illinois Secretary \nof State’s recommendation, not the actual law. But this is a red \nherring because the standard for probable cause is objective. \nSee Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s con‐\ncern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken \nin certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”); \nScott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“[T]hat the of‐\nficer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated \nby the reasons which provide the legal justification for the of‐\nficer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as \nthe circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”). \nThe objective circumstances support probable cause to pull \nLewis over based on the two observations of him following \ntoo closely, in violation of the law: \n The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow \n another vehicle more closely than is reasonable \n and prudent, having due regard for the speed of \n\f10 No. 17‐3592 \n\n such vehicles and the traffic upon and the con‐\n dition of the highway. \n625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a). Here, it does not matter whether the Sec‐\nretary’s recommendation comports with the statute. Nor does \nit matter that Sweeney referenced the recommendation dur‐\ning the stop. Regardless, Sweeney objectively had grounds for \na reasonable belief Lewis was following too closely based on \nthe two observations (and based on the clocked observation \nalone).7 \n And this brings us to Lewis’s next argument. He faults the \ncourt for not giving effect to the statutory language requiring \na driver to act based on the “condition of the highway.” He \nargues the major highway condition was Sweeney’s squad car \napproaching Lewis from behind. Lewis argues Illinois law re‐\nquired him to pull immediately into the right lane when he \nsaw the squad car approaching. He argues he had a legal duty \nnot to obstruct it. He argues he chose the least of the available \nevils when he pulled from the left lane into the right lane be‐\nhind the truck to yield to Sweeney. Lewis goes so far as to \n \n7 Lewis argues: “For the Government to have met its burden of establish‐\n\ning probable cause for a 625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a) violation, it had to prove Mr. \nLewis was driving in a way that was not ‘reasonable or prudent’ given the \n‘speed of [other] vehicles’ and the ‘condition of the highway.’” (Appel‐\nlant’s Reply at 9–10.) That is wrong. To show the constitutionality of the \ntraffic stop’s start, the government merely needed to show an objective \nbasis for a reasonable belief Lewis followed too closely, not that he actu‐\nally followed too closely. Whether Lewis actually followed at 1.2 seconds \nand whether 1.2 seconds was actually too close, given all the conditions of \nthe highway, are irrelevant to whether there was probable cause sufficient \nto initiate the stop, and ultimately would have been for a traffic court to \ndecide (if Sweeney issued a ticket instead of a warning). \n \n\fNo. 17‐3592 11\n\nargue Sweeney “impermissibly created the grounds for the \nstop,” manufacturing a “police‐created exigency.” \n The main problem with this argument is that it does noth‐\ning to justify or explain why Lewis stayed in the right lane in \nclose proximity behind the truck for about 45 seconds after \npulling into the right lane behind the truck. As the video \ndemonstrates, no vehicles at this stage forced Lewis to tailgate \nthe truck. Regardless of the status of Sweeney’s emergency \nlights, Lewis offers no reason why he could not have eased \nback from the truck. Moreover, Lewis’s argument does noth‐\ning to undermine Sweeney’s observation from the median. \n The court properly relied on Muriel, where an officer’s “es‐\ntimation of the following distance amounted to probable \ncause to believe that [the suspect’s] vehicle was ‘more close[ ] \nthan is reasonable and prudent.’” Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724 \n(quoting Ind. Code 9‐21‐8‐14). The court did not err in con‐\ncluding probable cause supported initiating the stop. \nB. Dog sniff \n1. Law \n An officer who reasonably starts a traffic stop, however, \nmight violate the Constitution if he exceeds the scope or un‐\nreasonably prolongs the stop. A traffic stop “‘can become un‐\nlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required \nto complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodri‐\nguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting \nIllinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). It is well‐estab‐\nlished a dog sniff of a vehicle’s exterior only for illegal drugs \nduring a lawful stop for a traffic violation does not infringe \nFourth Amendment rights, even absent reasonable suspicion \nof drugs. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But it is also well‐\n\f12 No. 17‐3592 \n\nestablished a stop justified only by a traffic violation becomes \nunlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably re‐\nquired to complete the stop’s original mission. Rodriguez, 135 \nS. Ct. at 1612. An officer may conduct “certain unrelated \nchecks”—including a dog sniff—during a lawful traffic stop, \nbut “he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent \nthe reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify de‐\ntaining an individual.” Id. at 1615. Absent independent rea‐\nsonable suspicion to justify the sniff, the critical question is \nnot whether the sniff occurs before or after the officer issues \nthe warning, “but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—\ni.e., adds time to—‘the stop’ … .” Id. at 1616. But with inde‐\npendent reasonable suspicion, the officer may detain the sus‐\npect for the sniff even if the sniff adds time to the total stop. \n Here, the district court concluded the stop (from its start \nto the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the warning) was not \nprolonged past the time reasonably required to complete the \nmission of issuing a warning. And the district court deter‐\nmined independent reasonable suspicion justified extending \nthe stop by about 1 minute for a canine unit to arrive. \n2. Analysis \n Lewis argues even if the stop started lawfully, the heroin \nshould be suppressed because the dog sniffed after a pro‐\nlonged detention without reasonable suspicion. But he leads \nwith a patent mistake. He claims Sweeney was completely fin‐\nished with the warning at 10 minutes, 40 seconds into the \nvideo but did not print it until 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the \nvideo, a claimed unjustified delay of nearly 4 minutes. But the \nvideo and Sweeney’s testimony flatly contradict this. Lewis \nmistakenly treats Sweeney’s testimony about the time on the \nvideo’s clock when he printed the warning as testimony about \n\fNo. 17‐3592 13\n\nthe duration of the stop up to the point he printed it. Sweeney \ntestified he calculated the time it took him to complete the \nwarning paperwork after he initiated the traffic stop (not after \nthe video began) to be 10 minutes and 40 seconds. He testified \nthat at 14 minutes, 26 seconds into the video (not into the stop) \nhe said “Here you go” as he gave the warning to Lewis. The \nbottom line is the video and testimony show there was no un‐\nreasonable delay between finishing the warning and handing \nit to Lewis. The claimed delay of about 4 minutes merely mir‐\nrors the difference between the video’s clock and the duration \nof the stop, because the stop begins about 4 minutes into the \nvideo. The simple fact, shown by the video and testimony, is \nSweeney printed the warning between 10 and 11 minutes into \nthe stop and promptly gave it to Lewis. His false equivocation \ninfects some of his remaining arguments. \n Lewis next argues Sweeney unlawfully prolonged the de‐\ntention by taking time to impermissibly confine and question \nhim about issues unrelated to the warning, and he raises sev‐\neral detailed points. But each point fails. \n Lewis argues switching cars took 1 minute. But he does \nnot explain why this delay was unlawful or why sitting in the \nsquad car was impermissible. We already determined the \ncourt did not err in concluding the initiation of the traffic stop \nwas permissible. Lewis does not explain why moving him to \nthe squad car was not reasonably incidental. See United States \nv. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996) (During a valid traf‐\nfic stop, an officer may “legitimately ask [a driver] to step out \nof his car, even without any particularized suspicion,” and \nmay ask the driver “to sit in his patrol car … .”). Nor does he \nexplain why, during the minute between Sweeney asking \n\f14 No. 17‐3592 \n\nLewis to exit his car and Lewis entering the squad car, he \nspent about 40 seconds in his car after being asked to exit. \n Lewis next argues Sweeney spent 6 minutes and 15 sec‐\nonds asking about irrelevant travel matters and explaining \nhow a canine unit will arrive. Lewis cites two parts of the \nvideo in support. There are several problems with Lewis’s ar‐\ngument here. The first challenged part of the video begins \nwith Sweeney asking, “Where are we headed to today, sir?” \nOfficers across the country would be surprised if we counte‐\nnanced the characterization of this basic, routine question as \nirrelevant to a traffic stop. Lewis’s initial response to this ques‐\ntion was not entirely forthcoming: “Pick my son up.” That re‐\nsponse naturally led to Sweeney’s next question: “Where’s \nthat at?” Again, Lewis’s response was not entirely forthcom‐\ning: “School … St. Louis.” So Sweeney asked how old the son \nwas and where he went to school. Lewis gave the age, brought \nup returning to Chicago, never answered about school, \nbrought up his son’s work in “some warehouse,” and brought \nup a situation between his son and his son’s girlfriend. \n The Constitution allows an officer to ask these questions \nduring a traffic stop, especially when the answers objectively \nseem suspicious. See Muriel, 418 F.3d at 726 (Although ques‐\ntions prolonging custody might affect the detention’s reason‐\nableness, police “may ask questions that do not concern the \npurpose of the stop and that are not supported by any other \nsuspicion.”); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. \n2002) (“What the Constitution requires is that the entire pro‐\ncess remain reasonable. Questions that hold potential for de‐\ntecting crime, yet create little or no inconvenience, do not turn \nreasonable detention into unreasonable detention.”) And \nLewis could have refused to answer at some point. But the \n\fNo. 17‐3592 15\n\nbiggest problem with Lewis’s argument here is he does not \nshow any reason these exchanges prolonged the process of is‐\nsuing the warning. The video and testimony both document \nSweeney worked on the warning while talking with Lewis. \n The court did not err in determining the duration of the \nstop (from its start to the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the \nwarning) was not prolonged past the time reasonably re‐\nquired to complete the mission of issuing a warning. \n The court turned to the issue of whether Sweeney ob‐\ntained enough information during the stop before issuing the \nwarning to have independent reasonable suspicion of crimi‐\nnal activity to justify detaining Lewis further. Sweeney \nhanded Lewis the warning about 10 minutes, 50 seconds after \nLewis pulled over. The dog alerted roughly 1 minute later. \nEven if the period between handing the warning and the dog \nalerting could be called a delay of about 1 minute8 it was jus‐\ntified by independent reasonable suspicion, as the court held. \n Reasonable suspicion requires “‘specific and articulable \nfacts which, taken together with rational inferences from \nthose facts,’ suggest criminal activity.” United States v. Ruiz, \n785 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 \nU.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is an objective stand‐\nard, considering the totality of the circumstances. By the time \n \n8 We question whether even this minute can be characterized as a delay to \n\nwait for a dog, because immediately after handing Lewis the warning and \nexplaining in a quick and routine manner what it is, Sweeney brings up \nthe apt point that Lewis said he was going to St. Louis, but his terms likely \nrestrict his freedom to leave Illinois. But we need not explore this further \nbecause we agree with the district court that Sweeney had independent \nreasonable suspicion to detain Lewis after handing him the warning to \nallow the dog time to sniff. \n\f16 No. 17‐3592 \n\nSweeney issued the warning, this is what he objectively had \nreason to know. One, Lewis seemed unusually nervous even \nafter hearing he would only get a warning. His hands trem‐\nbled. His breathing was heavy and labored. Nervousness can \nraise reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, \n124 (2000). Two, he was on supervised release for a drug of‐\nfense. Criminal histories can support reasonable suspicion. \nUnited States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 2016). \n(Sweeney had these objective grounds for reasonable suspi‐\ncion even without asking any questions Lewis now chal‐\nlenges.) Three, his travel explanations seemed suspiciously \ninconsistent, which can raise reasonable suspicion. Muriel, 418 \nF.3d at 726. These factors legitimately gave rise to objective \nreasonable suspicion. \n This is true even if Lewis always breathes heavily, with \nconstantly trembling hands. Even if he were actually innocent \nof the prior drug charge and a judge planned to exonerate him \nnext morning. Even if his son actually studied and worked in \nSt. Louis, quarreled, and wanted to return to Chicago. Re‐\ngardless, objective reasonable suspicion of criminal activity \nsupported detaining Lewis to allow a dog to sniff. Perhaps we \ncould add his rigid posture, furtive movements, “hem‐haw‐\ning,” and I‐55’s drug‐trafficking reputation. But we need not. \n We conclude the district court did not err in determining \nany delay beyond the routine traffic stop to allow the dog to \nsniff was justified by independent reasonable suspicion. \n IV. Conclusion \n We considered all Lewis’s arguments and found none \navailing. We AFFIRM the denial of suppression.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Arriba Lewis\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3592 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nARRIBA W. LEWIS, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Central District of Illinois. \\n No. 1:17‐cr‐10004‐JES‐JEH‐1 — James E. Shadid, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 3, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges. \\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Officer Sweeney pulled Arriba \\nLewis over for following too closely. Sweeney processed a \\nwarning while Lewis, who seemed unusually nervous, sat in \\nthe squad car. After learning Lewis was on federal supervised \\nrelease for a cocaine conviction, Sweeney requested a drug‐\\nsniffing dog roughly 5 minutes into the stop. \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n About 10 minutes and 50 seconds after Lewis pulled over, \\nSweeney handed him a warning. About 10 seconds later, a \\ndrug‐sniffing dog and its handler approached Lewis’s car. \\nThe dog alerted. Sweeney searched Lewis’s car and found \\nheroin. Lewis was charged with possession with intent to dis‐\\ntribute heroin. The district court denied his motion to sup‐\\npress. He appeals, arguing the officer lacked lawful grounds \\nto initiate the traffic stop and arguing the officer prolonged \\nthe stop without independent reasonable suspicion for the \\ndog to sniff. But we disagree on both fronts, and affirm. \\n I. Facts \\n Officer Sweeney sat in an unmarked Ford SUV with an ex‐\\nterior spotlight in the median of Interstate 55 in McLean \\nCounty, Illinois, watching traffic. He saw a man later identi‐\\nfied as Arriba Lewis driving a Dodge Charger southbound in \\n“a pack of vehicles traveling in close proximity to each other.” \\nHe “was traveling right behind another vehicle in very close \\nproximity,” gripping the wheel at 10:00 and 2:00, and appear‐\\ning to push himself behind the side pillar in a rigid posture. \\n Sweeney pursued Lewis. Sweeney testified he wanted “to \\nsee if I can observe a traffic violation and confirm [Lewis’s] \\nfollowing distance which I initially saw.” But first he passed \\nLewis to assist another officer. Sweeney’s dashboard camera \\nbegan recording after he passed Lewis because Sweeney trig‐\\ngered his emergency lights as he approached the other officer. \\nTriggering these lights activated the dashcam, which was pro‐\\ngramed to capture footage beginning 1 minute earlier. After \\npassing Lewis, Sweeney pulled over to the right shoulder be‐\\nhind the other officer. Video recorded by Sweeney’s dashcam \\nshows a truck followed by Lewis pass to the left of Sweeney. \\nThe other officer declined assistance, so Sweeney pulled out \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 3\\n\\nand accelerated. Several vehicles moved to the right lane to let \\nhim pass. He saw Lewis ahead in the left lane “at the prelim‐\\ninary stages of passing” a truck in the right lane. Then Lewis \\nchanged to the right lane behind the truck. As Lewis followed \\nthe truck, Sweeney calculated the time‐distance. He activated \\na stopwatch function to record the time between the truck’s \\nrear passing a milepost and the Charger’s front passing the \\nsame object. He clocked this at 1.2 seconds, meaning Lewis \\nfollowed 1.2 seconds behind the truck according to this calcu‐\\nlation. Lewis stayed close behind the truck for about 45 sec‐\\nonds despite the lack of traffic immediately behind him. \\n Sweeney pulled into the right lane. He testified he acti‐\\nvated his emergency lights.1 He pulled Lewis over. Lewis \\nstopped on the right shoulder, and Sweeney pulled behind \\nhim, at about 3 minutes, 41 seconds into the video. The video \\nshows Lewis made a movement to his right inside his car sec‐\\nonds later. Sweeney walked to the Charger’s passenger side \\nand saw Lewis’s hands trembling. At about 4 minutes into the \\nvideo, Sweeney reached the front window.2 He made contact \\nwith Lewis and asked for his license. Sweeney said: \\n\\n \\n1 The parties dispute the timing of Sweeney’s activation of his emergency \\n\\nlights. Sweeney testified he activated his lights sometime after clocking \\nthe following‐distance at 1.2 seconds. But Lewis argues Sweeney activated \\nhis lights when he pulled over to offer assistance to the other officer, well \\nbefore clocking the following‐distance, and nothing in the record shows \\nhe turned the lights off. This issue’s potential relevance concerns the rea‐\\nson Lewis pulled into the right lane behind the truck. \\n2 The dashcam video (presented at the suppression hearing and submitted \\n\\nto us) begins at 0 minutes, 0 seconds. The video runs for about 3 minutes, \\n41 seconds before showing Lewis stop on the shoulder. It then shows \\nSweeney reach the front passenger‐side window of the Charger at about 4 \\nminutes into the video. Sweeney said “Here you go. Here’s your warning, \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n The reason I stopped you was your following‐\\n distance. You need to leave at least 3 seconds \\n here in Illinois. You were less than 2 behind that \\n semi. Ok. And that’s why I originally pulled out \\n on you back, way back there, too. You had an‐\\n other car you were following.3 \\n Sweeney testified Lewis’s hands trembled and his breath‐\\ning seemed heavy and labored. Sweeney told Lewis he would \\njust get a warning, not a ticket, and told him to sit in the squad \\ncar during preparation of the warning. After “hem‐haw[ing]” \\nand failing to exit his car expeditiously, when he finally began \\nto exit he reached back in his car. Then he put his hands up as \\nhe walked. Sweeney said, “You’re fine man. Relax.” \\n In the squad car, Sweeney typed information into a com‐\\nputer and talked with Lewis. The first step of completing the \\nwarning was ensuring, via computer, he had a valid license. \\nUpon this check, the computer automatically showed he was \\non federal probation4 for a cocaine conviction. Sweeney \\n\\n \\nok,” and handed it to Lewis at about 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the video. \\nThus, the total time from Lewis pulling over to Sweeney handing him the \\nwarning is about 10 minutes, 50 seconds. The dog sniff began about 10 \\nseconds later and took about 1 minute, 8 seconds. References to the video’s \\ntime during the stop include about 4 minutes before Sweeney reached \\nLewis’s window. The video’s length does not equal the duration of the \\nstop. As we show below, Lewis sometimes conflates the video’s length \\nwith the duration of the stop. But they are not the same. \\n3 We base our quotations of Sweeney and Lewis during the stop on the \\n\\nvideo. Any deviations are immaterial. \\n4 Sweeney used the word “probation,” apparently because his computer \\n\\ndid not distinguish between this and supervised release. Actually, Lewis \\nwas on the latter. But the distinction is immaterial here. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 5\\n\\ntestified the computer returned information based on the li‐\\ncense within 1 minute of sitting in the squad car. \\n About 2 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \\nwhere he was headed. Lewis said he was going to pick his son \\nup. Sweeney asked where. Lewis said, “School … St. Louis.” \\nSweeney asked how old the son was. Lewis said, “26.” He ex‐\\nplained his son wanted to return to Chicago. Sweeney asked \\nwhere the son went to school. Lewis replied his son worked \\nin a warehouse. Lewis added his son “got into it” with his \\ngirlfriend. This exchange lasted slightly less than a minute. \\nSweeney thought the story seemed suspiciously inconsistent. \\n About 3.5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, he asked about \\nthe 3‐second guideline Sweeney mentioned: \\n Lewis: So you got to be how many feet back? \\n Sweeney: It’s not feet. It’s seconds. You need to \\n be at least 3 seconds. \\n Lewis: Oh. Ok. \\n Sweeney: Ok. You were 1.2. \\n Lewis: How you measure that? \\n Sweeney: It’s just a stopwatch function on here. \\n So when the, with the semi, when it goes by a \\n stationary object which was the milepost back \\n there is what I used. When the back of that goes \\n past that stationary object I start it. When the \\n front of your vehicle goes past that same object \\n I stop it. \\n About 5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked \\nhim what he does for work, and he said he drove a truck. \\nRoughly 5 minutes after first making contact with Lewis at his \\nwindow, Sweeney requested a drug‐sniffing dog via a \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nmessaging system. Lewis concedes Sweeney requested the \\ndog after hearing Lewis’s answers regarding his travel plans \\nand after learning via computer he had a prior drug convic‐\\ntion for which he was on supervised release. \\n About 6 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said \\nsomething was taking a minute to update. Then he asked \\nLewis how long his son had been in St. Louis, how often \\nLewis visited, and whether Lewis drove a truck “over the \\nroad.” Sweeney testified Lewis’s breathing continued to ap‐\\npear labored in the squad car, even after hearing he would \\nonly get a warning. Nearly 8 minutes after Lewis pulled over, \\nSweeney said Illinois barred the air freshener hanging from \\nLewis’s mirror because it obstructed the view. Sweeney asked \\nLewis what part of St. Louis he was going to. Sweeney testi‐\\nfied Lewis never asked if he was free to go. \\n Sweeney then said, “in correlation with our safety detail \\ntoday … we do have a canine dog working with us.” Sweeney \\nasked if Lewis was responsible for everything in the car. \\nAbout 10 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said, “I’m \\ngonna print this off. I’m gonna have the dog walk around the \\nexterior of the vehicle, ok.” About 20 seconds later, the dash‐\\ncam records the sound of the warning printing. Then Sweeney \\nasked if Lewis was on probation. He responded in the affirm‐\\native. Nearly 11 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney \\nsaid, “Here you go. Here’s your warning, ok.”5 Sweeney gave \\nthe warning to Lewis, explained it, and said, “So you’re going \\nto St. Louis though.” At the word “though,” at about 14 \\nminutes, 41 seconds into the video (about 10 seconds after \\n\\n \\n5 This comports with his testimony that he completed the “warning pa‐\\n\\nperwork” roughly 10 minutes, 40 seconds after initiating the stop. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 7\\n\\ngiving the written warning) a dog appeared on the video and \\napproached the rear passenger side of Lewis’s car. Lewis con‐\\nfirmed he was going to St. Louis. Sweeney said that was out‐\\nside Illinois. They talked about Lewis’s probation and prior \\nincarceration while the dog circled his car. \\n About 12 minutes after Lewis pulled over (about 1 minute, \\n18 seconds after Sweeney gave the written warning to Lewis, \\nand about 1 minute, 8 seconds after the dog sniff began) the \\nhandler told Sweeney the sniff was positive. Sweeney \\nsearched Lewis’s car and quickly found 208 grams of heroin. \\n II. Procedural posture \\n Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distrib‐\\nute heroin. The district court denied his motion to suppress. \\nHe entered a conditional guilty plea. A career offender at \\ncriminal history category VI, he received a sentence of 20 \\nyears incarceration. He appeals the denial of suppression, \\nraising two main issues. First, he challenges the traffic stop’s \\ninitiation. Second, he challenges the sniff’s initiation. “We em‐\\nploy a mixed standard of review on motions to suppress, re‐\\nviewing the district court’s factual determinations for clear er‐\\nror and de novo its ultimate determination about whether the \\npolice had sufficient grounds to stop or search the individ‐\\nual.” United States v. Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th \\nCir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). \\n III. Discussion \\nA. Traffic stop \\n1. Law \\n Lewis argues Sweeney did not have legal grounds to start \\nthe traffic stop. If Lewis is right, then the court should have \\n\\f8 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nsuppressed the heroin as fruit of the poisonous tree. The \\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches \\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a \\nvehicle, the stop must meet the Fourth Amendment’s reason‐\\nableness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 \\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, \\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States \\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015). \\n The district court determined probable cause justified ini‐\\ntiating the stop.6 Generally, “the decision to stop an automo‐\\nbile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to be‐\\nlieve that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United \\nStates, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). “Probable cause exists when \\n‘the circumstances confronting a police officer support the \\nreasonable belief that a driver has committed even a minor \\ntraffic offense.’” United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th \\nCir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586 \\n(7th Cir. 2000)). Probable cause is an objective standard, based \\non the totality of the circumstances. If an officer reasonably \\nthinks he sees a driver commit a traffic violation, that is suffi‐\\ncient grounds to pull him over without offending the Consti‐\\ntution. Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724. The officer is not the judge. \\nWhether the driver actually committed a traffic infraction is \\nirrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes so long as there \\nwas an objective basis for a reasonable belief he did. Cashman, \\n216 F.3d at 587. \\n\\n \\n6 The lower standard of reasonable suspicion is enough to justify some \\n\\ntraffic stops. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014); Prouse, 440 U.S. \\nat 663; Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d at 667–68. But we need not apply this \\nstandard here because the district court did not err in finding probable \\ncause. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 9\\n\\n2. Analysis \\n Here, Sweeney had more than ample grounds to pull \\nLewis over. As Sweeney sat in the median, he thought he saw \\nLewis following another vehicle too closely. That initial ob‐\\nservation alone probably satisfied the Constitution, but we \\nneed not decide that because Sweeney pursued Lewis and \\nconducted a time‐distance calculation to confirm he followed \\na vehicle too closely. Sweeney calculated Lewis’s following‐\\ntime‐distance at 1.2 seconds. Whether Lewis actually fol‐\\nlowed by 1.2 seconds exactly is irrelevant for purposes of the \\nFourth Amendment. It is enough that this calculation sup‐\\nported a reasonable belief Lewis was breaking the law. \\n Lewis mainly argues the 3‐second rule mentioned by \\nSweeney during the traffic stop is merely the Illinois Secretary \\nof State’s recommendation, not the actual law. But this is a red \\nherring because the standard for probable cause is objective. \\nSee Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s con‐\\ncern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken \\nin certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”); \\nScott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“[T]hat the of‐\\nficer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated \\nby the reasons which provide the legal justification for the of‐\\nficer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as \\nthe circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”). \\nThe objective circumstances support probable cause to pull \\nLewis over based on the two observations of him following \\ntoo closely, in violation of the law: \\n The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow \\n another vehicle more closely than is reasonable \\n and prudent, having due regard for the speed of \\n\\f10 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\n such vehicles and the traffic upon and the con‐\\n dition of the highway. \\n625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a). Here, it does not matter whether the Sec‐\\nretary’s recommendation comports with the statute. Nor does \\nit matter that Sweeney referenced the recommendation dur‐\\ning the stop. Regardless, Sweeney objectively had grounds for \\na reasonable belief Lewis was following too closely based on \\nthe two observations (and based on the clocked observation \\nalone).7 \\n And this brings us to Lewis’s next argument. He faults the \\ncourt for not giving effect to the statutory language requiring \\na driver to act based on the “condition of the highway.” He \\nargues the major highway condition was Sweeney’s squad car \\napproaching Lewis from behind. Lewis argues Illinois law re‐\\nquired him to pull immediately into the right lane when he \\nsaw the squad car approaching. He argues he had a legal duty \\nnot to obstruct it. He argues he chose the least of the available \\nevils when he pulled from the left lane into the right lane be‐\\nhind the truck to yield to Sweeney. Lewis goes so far as to \\n \\n7 Lewis argues: “For the Government to have met its burden of establish‐\\n\\ning probable cause for a 625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a) violation, it had to prove Mr. \\nLewis was driving in a way that was not ‘reasonable or prudent’ given the \\n‘speed of [other] vehicles’ and the ‘condition of the highway.’” (Appel‐\\nlant’s Reply at 9–10.) That is wrong. To show the constitutionality of the \\ntraffic stop’s start, the government merely needed to show an objective \\nbasis for a reasonable belief Lewis followed too closely, not that he actu‐\\nally followed too closely. Whether Lewis actually followed at 1.2 seconds \\nand whether 1.2 seconds was actually too close, given all the conditions of \\nthe highway, are irrelevant to whether there was probable cause sufficient \\nto initiate the stop, and ultimately would have been for a traffic court to \\ndecide (if Sweeney issued a ticket instead of a warning). \\n \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 11\\n\\nargue Sweeney “impermissibly created the grounds for the \\nstop,” manufacturing a “police‐created exigency.” \\n The main problem with this argument is that it does noth‐\\ning to justify or explain why Lewis stayed in the right lane in \\nclose proximity behind the truck for about 45 seconds after \\npulling into the right lane behind the truck. As the video \\ndemonstrates, no vehicles at this stage forced Lewis to tailgate \\nthe truck. Regardless of the status of Sweeney’s emergency \\nlights, Lewis offers no reason why he could not have eased \\nback from the truck. Moreover, Lewis’s argument does noth‐\\ning to undermine Sweeney’s observation from the median. \\n The court properly relied on Muriel, where an officer’s “es‐\\ntimation of the following distance amounted to probable \\ncause to believe that [the suspect’s] vehicle was ‘more close[ ] \\nthan is reasonable and prudent.’” Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724 \\n(quoting Ind. Code 9‐21‐8‐14). The court did not err in con‐\\ncluding probable cause supported initiating the stop. \\nB. Dog sniff \\n1. Law \\n An officer who reasonably starts a traffic stop, however, \\nmight violate the Constitution if he exceeds the scope or un‐\\nreasonably prolongs the stop. A traffic stop “‘can become un‐\\nlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required \\nto complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodri‐\\nguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting \\nIllinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). It is well‐estab‐\\nlished a dog sniff of a vehicle’s exterior only for illegal drugs \\nduring a lawful stop for a traffic violation does not infringe \\nFourth Amendment rights, even absent reasonable suspicion \\nof drugs. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But it is also well‐\\n\\f12 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nestablished a stop justified only by a traffic violation becomes \\nunlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably re‐\\nquired to complete the stop’s original mission. Rodriguez, 135 \\nS. Ct. at 1612. An officer may conduct “certain unrelated \\nchecks”—including a dog sniff—during a lawful traffic stop, \\nbut “he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent \\nthe reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify de‐\\ntaining an individual.” Id. at 1615. Absent independent rea‐\\nsonable suspicion to justify the sniff, the critical question is \\nnot whether the sniff occurs before or after the officer issues \\nthe warning, “but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—\\ni.e., adds time to—‘the stop’ … .” Id. at 1616. But with inde‐\\npendent reasonable suspicion, the officer may detain the sus‐\\npect for the sniff even if the sniff adds time to the total stop. \\n Here, the district court concluded the stop (from its start \\nto the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the warning) was not \\nprolonged past the time reasonably required to complete the \\nmission of issuing a warning. And the district court deter‐\\nmined independent reasonable suspicion justified extending \\nthe stop by about 1 minute for a canine unit to arrive. \\n2. Analysis \\n Lewis argues even if the stop started lawfully, the heroin \\nshould be suppressed because the dog sniffed after a pro‐\\nlonged detention without reasonable suspicion. But he leads \\nwith a patent mistake. He claims Sweeney was completely fin‐\\nished with the warning at 10 minutes, 40 seconds into the \\nvideo but did not print it until 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the \\nvideo, a claimed unjustified delay of nearly 4 minutes. But the \\nvideo and Sweeney’s testimony flatly contradict this. Lewis \\nmistakenly treats Sweeney’s testimony about the time on the \\nvideo’s clock when he printed the warning as testimony about \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 13\\n\\nthe duration of the stop up to the point he printed it. Sweeney \\ntestified he calculated the time it took him to complete the \\nwarning paperwork after he initiated the traffic stop (not after \\nthe video began) to be 10 minutes and 40 seconds. He testified \\nthat at 14 minutes, 26 seconds into the video (not into the stop) \\nhe said “Here you go” as he gave the warning to Lewis. The \\nbottom line is the video and testimony show there was no un‐\\nreasonable delay between finishing the warning and handing \\nit to Lewis. The claimed delay of about 4 minutes merely mir‐\\nrors the difference between the video’s clock and the duration \\nof the stop, because the stop begins about 4 minutes into the \\nvideo. The simple fact, shown by the video and testimony, is \\nSweeney printed the warning between 10 and 11 minutes into \\nthe stop and promptly gave it to Lewis. His false equivocation \\ninfects some of his remaining arguments. \\n Lewis next argues Sweeney unlawfully prolonged the de‐\\ntention by taking time to impermissibly confine and question \\nhim about issues unrelated to the warning, and he raises sev‐\\neral detailed points. But each point fails. \\n Lewis argues switching cars took 1 minute. But he does \\nnot explain why this delay was unlawful or why sitting in the \\nsquad car was impermissible. We already determined the \\ncourt did not err in concluding the initiation of the traffic stop \\nwas permissible. Lewis does not explain why moving him to \\nthe squad car was not reasonably incidental. See United States \\nv. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996) (During a valid traf‐\\nfic stop, an officer may “legitimately ask [a driver] to step out \\nof his car, even without any particularized suspicion,” and \\nmay ask the driver “to sit in his patrol car … .”). Nor does he \\nexplain why, during the minute between Sweeney asking \\n\\f14 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nLewis to exit his car and Lewis entering the squad car, he \\nspent about 40 seconds in his car after being asked to exit. \\n Lewis next argues Sweeney spent 6 minutes and 15 sec‐\\nonds asking about irrelevant travel matters and explaining \\nhow a canine unit will arrive. Lewis cites two parts of the \\nvideo in support. There are several problems with Lewis’s ar‐\\ngument here. The first challenged part of the video begins \\nwith Sweeney asking, “Where are we headed to today, sir?” \\nOfficers across the country would be surprised if we counte‐\\nnanced the characterization of this basic, routine question as \\nirrelevant to a traffic stop. Lewis’s initial response to this ques‐\\ntion was not entirely forthcoming: “Pick my son up.” That re‐\\nsponse naturally led to Sweeney’s next question: “Where’s \\nthat at?” Again, Lewis’s response was not entirely forthcom‐\\ning: “School … St. Louis.” So Sweeney asked how old the son \\nwas and where he went to school. Lewis gave the age, brought \\nup returning to Chicago, never answered about school, \\nbrought up his son’s work in “some warehouse,” and brought \\nup a situation between his son and his son’s girlfriend. \\n The Constitution allows an officer to ask these questions \\nduring a traffic stop, especially when the answers objectively \\nseem suspicious. See Muriel, 418 F.3d at 726 (Although ques‐\\ntions prolonging custody might affect the detention’s reason‐\\nableness, police “may ask questions that do not concern the \\npurpose of the stop and that are not supported by any other \\nsuspicion.”); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. \\n2002) (“What the Constitution requires is that the entire pro‐\\ncess remain reasonable. Questions that hold potential for de‐\\ntecting crime, yet create little or no inconvenience, do not turn \\nreasonable detention into unreasonable detention.”) And \\nLewis could have refused to answer at some point. But the \\n\\fNo. 17‐3592 15\\n\\nbiggest problem with Lewis’s argument here is he does not \\nshow any reason these exchanges prolonged the process of is‐\\nsuing the warning. The video and testimony both document \\nSweeney worked on the warning while talking with Lewis. \\n The court did not err in determining the duration of the \\nstop (from its start to the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the \\nwarning) was not prolonged past the time reasonably re‐\\nquired to complete the mission of issuing a warning. \\n The court turned to the issue of whether Sweeney ob‐\\ntained enough information during the stop before issuing the \\nwarning to have independent reasonable suspicion of crimi‐\\nnal activity to justify detaining Lewis further. Sweeney \\nhanded Lewis the warning about 10 minutes, 50 seconds after \\nLewis pulled over. The dog alerted roughly 1 minute later. \\nEven if the period between handing the warning and the dog \\nalerting could be called a delay of about 1 minute8 it was jus‐\\ntified by independent reasonable suspicion, as the court held. \\n Reasonable suspicion requires “‘specific and articulable \\nfacts which, taken together with rational inferences from \\nthose facts,’ suggest criminal activity.” United States v. Ruiz, \\n785 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 \\nU.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is an objective stand‐\\nard, considering the totality of the circumstances. By the time \\n \\n8 We question whether even this minute can be characterized as a delay to \\n\\nwait for a dog, because immediately after handing Lewis the warning and \\nexplaining in a quick and routine manner what it is, Sweeney brings up \\nthe apt point that Lewis said he was going to St. Louis, but his terms likely \\nrestrict his freedom to leave Illinois. But we need not explore this further \\nbecause we agree with the district court that Sweeney had independent \\nreasonable suspicion to detain Lewis after handing him the warning to \\nallow the dog time to sniff. \\n\\f16 No. 17‐3592 \\n\\nSweeney issued the warning, this is what he objectively had \\nreason to know. One, Lewis seemed unusually nervous even \\nafter hearing he would only get a warning. His hands trem‐\\nbled. His breathing was heavy and labored. Nervousness can \\nraise reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, \\n124 (2000). Two, he was on supervised release for a drug of‐\\nfense. Criminal histories can support reasonable suspicion. \\nUnited States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n(Sweeney had these objective grounds for reasonable suspi‐\\ncion even without asking any questions Lewis now chal‐\\nlenges.) Three, his travel explanations seemed suspiciously \\ninconsistent, which can raise reasonable suspicion. Muriel, 418 \\nF.3d at 726. These factors legitimately gave rise to objective \\nreasonable suspicion. \\n This is true even if Lewis always breathes heavily, with \\nconstantly trembling hands. Even if he were actually innocent \\nof the prior drug charge and a judge planned to exonerate him \\nnext morning. Even if his son actually studied and worked in \\nSt. Louis, quarreled, and wanted to return to Chicago. Re‐\\ngardless, objective reasonable suspicion of criminal activity \\nsupported detaining Lewis to allow a dog to sniff. Perhaps we \\ncould add his rigid posture, furtive movements, “hem‐haw‐\\ning,” and I‐55’s drug‐trafficking reputation. But we need not. \\n We conclude the district court did not err in determining \\nany delay beyond the routine traffic stop to allow the dog to \\nsniff was justified by independent reasonable suspicion. \\n IV. Conclusion \\n We considered all Lewis’s arguments and found none \\navailing. We AFFIRM the denial of suppression.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1689,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443950,"string":"8,443,950"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Arriba W. LEWIS"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Lewis"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 17-3592"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Flaum, Manion, Ripple\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415381/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443950/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Arriba W. LEWIS\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Arriba W. LEWIS\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1690,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607080,"string":"4,607,080"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Stephen R. WEST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant, and Charter Communications, Inc., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Stephen West v. Charter Communications, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1906"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Brennan, Hamilton, Rovner\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-1906\\n\\nSTEPHEN R. WEST,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nLOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC\\nCOMPANY,\\n Defendant,\\n\\n\\nand\\n\\n\\n\\nCHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,\\nINC., et al.,\\n\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\\n No. 4:16-cv-00145-RLY-DML — Richard L. Young, Judge.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1906\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 28, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 4, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. In this diversity action, plaintiff\\nStephen West contends that the addition of a fiber optic\\ncommunications wire to a utilities transmission tower on his\\nproperty exceeds the scope of the utilities easement that\\nauthorized the tower. West sued both Charter Communica-\\ntions, Inc. (“Charter”), whose subsidiary installed the wire, and\\nLouisville Gas and Electric Company (“Louisville”), which\\nowns the tower and is a party to the easement. The district\\ncourt dismissed the claims against Charter, concluding that the\\naddition of Charter’s communications wire to the tower is\\ncompatible with the scope and purpose of the easement and\\nconsequently does not violate the terms of the easement\\nagreement nor does it amount to an unconstitutional taking of\\nWest’s property. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018 WL\\n321686 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). Wishing to appeal that ruling,\\nWest entered into an agreement with Louisville providing that\\nhe would voluntarily dismiss his claims against Louisville,\\nwhile reserving the right to revive them in the event we\\nreversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against\\nCharter. West then filed a notice of appeal pursuant to\\n28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the conditional dismissal of West’s\\nclaims against Louisville renders the judgment non-final, we\\ndismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 3\\n\\n I.\\n West inherited a small plot of land from his parents in\\nJeffersonville, Indiana that abuts the Ohio River, which\\ndemarcates the border between Indiana and Kentucky.1 A\\nmassive utility transmission tower some 248 feet tall sits on the\\nproperty, carrying LG&E power lines that run between the two\\nstates. The tower and the power lines are authorized by a 1938\\nutility easement entered into by the predecessors of West (and\\nhis parents) and LG&E, as amended by a supplemental\\nagreement in 1976. Broadly speaking, the easement grants to\\nLG&E the perpetual right to install and maintain towers and\\nwires “for the transmission, distribution and delivery of\\nelectrical energy to the Grantee [LG&E] and other persons and\\nconcerns and to the public in general for light, heat, power,\\ntelephone and/or other purposes in, upon, along and over the\\nreal estate of the Grantor [West] … .” R. 33-1 at 2. West’s\\nparents rejected a further amendment to the deed of easement\\nproposed by LG&E in 1990 which would have authorized\\nLG&E to “upgrade and remove communications and tele-\\nphone systems… .” R. 33-4 at 2.\\n In 2000, LG&E entered into a contract with Insight Ken-\\ntucky Partners II, LP (“Insight”), a subsidiary of Time Warner\\nCable, Inc. (“Time Warner”), granting Insight permission to\\nrun fiber optic cables across LG&E’s existing infrastructure.\\nInsight proceeded to run a fiber optic cable carrying television\\nand internet content and services across West’s property via\\n\\n\\n1\\n Jeffersonville is situated directly across the Ohio River from Louisville,\\nKentucky.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1906\\n\\nthe LG&E tower; Insight’s cable replaced an existing static wire\\non that tower. Time Warner, Insight’s parent corporation, was\\nlater acquired by Charter. We shall refer to Charter and its\\npredecessors collectively as the Charter defendants.\\n In 2016, West filed suit against LG&E in state court, seeking\\na declaratory judgment that the easement did not authorize\\nInsight’s fiber optic cable. West also asserted claims for breach\\nof contract, trespass, and unjust enrichment. LG&E removed\\nthe case to federal court. After the district court denied LG&E’s\\nmotion to dismiss West’s claims, reasoning that there were\\nfactual questions as to the scope of LG&E’s rights under the\\neasement, West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2016 WL 6395918,\\nat *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 28, 2016), West amended his complaint to\\nname Insight, Time Warner, and Charter as additional defen-\\ndants and also to add new claims to the suit. The amended\\ncomplaint asserted claims against both LG&E and the Charter\\ndefendants for declaratory judgment, trespass, unjust enrich-\\nment, as well as claims for (tortious) conversion and criminal\\ntrespass. LG&E alone was also named in a new claim for\\nnuisance. LG&E filed a second, partial motion to dismiss\\naimed at the conversion and criminal trespass claims, but the\\ndistrict court denied that motion, concluding in view of the\\nfacts alleged that the complaint stated plausible claims for\\nrelief in these respects. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018\\nWL 321685, at *2–*4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). LG&E subsequently\\nfiled a cross-claim for indemnification against the Charter\\ndefendants.\\n Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the\\nCharter defendants moved to dismiss all of West’s claims\\nagainst them, arguing principally that because the easement\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 5\\n\\nover West’s property had already been dedicated for a utility\\nuse that is compatible with cable television transmission, the\\naddition of Insight’s fiber optic wire was statutorily authorized\\nby section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of\\n1984, 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (the “Cable Act”).\\n The district court agreed with the Charter defendants and\\ngranted their motion to dismiss. 2018 WL 321686. The court\\ndetermined that the easement across West’s property had been\\ndedicated for utility use, id. at *5, and that the running of fiber\\noptic cables across that easement for the purpose of providing\\npaid television, internet, and communications services amount-\\ned to a permissible compatible use under the Cable Act, id. The\\ncourt went on to conclude that the Cable Act did not\\nimpermissibly burden West’s property rights retroactively, nor\\ndid it constitute a constitutionally prohibited taking of his\\nproperty. Id. at *5–*6. Because it found that Insight’s use of the\\neasement over West’s property to be authorized, the court\\ndismissed all claims against the Charter defendants. Id. at *6\\nThat decision left LG&E as the sole remaining defendant on\\nWest’s claims.\\n West and LG&E subsequently filed a joint stipulation\\nasking the court to dismiss the claims against LG&E and close\\nthe case, R. 88, but the district court denied that request, R. 91.\\nAlthough the stipulation posited that West’s claims against\\nLG&E were “moot” in view of the district court’s decision\\ndismissing the claims against the Charter defendants, R. 88 at\\n2 ¶3, the district court rejected that assertion. The court\\nreasoned that there was still a live controversy as to whether\\nthe easement itself permitted LG&E to install and maintain\\nInsight’s fiber optic cable on LG&E’s infrastructure. R. 91 at\\n\\f6 No. 18-1906\\n\\n2–3. The court also noted that the stipulation was unclear as to\\nwhether the proposed dismissal of the claims against LG&E\\nwas to be with or without prejudice; but the court construed\\nthe stipulated dismissal to be without prejudice, which would\\npermit West to revive these claims in the event the dismissal of\\nthe claims against the Charter defendants was reversed on\\nappeal. R. 91 at 3. That, in turn, led the court to conclude that,\\nnotwithstanding the proposed dismissal of the claims against\\nLG&E, a final judgment was not yet at hand. R. 91 at 3. The\\ncourt indicated that the parties had three options open to them:\\n(1) continue litigating the merits of West’s claims against LG&E\\nto a final judgment; (2) stipulate to the dismissal of these claims\\nwith prejudice; or (3) seek a certification of a final judgment as\\nto fewer than all parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 54(b). R. 91 at 3–4.\\n Rather than pursuing any of these options, West and LG&E\\npursued a fourth option in the hope of creating a final judg-\\nment that would open the door to this appeal. The two parties\\nentered into a tolling and standstill agreement which provided\\nfor the voluntary dismissal of West’s claims against LG& E for\\nthe duration of, and conditioned upon the outcome of, his\\nappeal of the dismissal of the claims against the Charter\\ndefendants. App. R. 7-3 Ex. B. West and LG&E agreed that the\\nstatute of limitations as to any claims between them would be\\ntolled for the duration of the agreement and that, in the event\\nWest prevailed in his appeal, LG&E would not object to the re-\\nfiling of his claims against LG&E nor assert any timeliness\\ndefenses to the claims. If, on the other hand, West did not\\nprevail in the appeal, West agreed he would not re-file his\\npending claims against LG&E nor any other claims arising out\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 7\\n\\nof the same facts. By its terms, the agreement was to remain in\\neffect until such time as the appeal was decided or West\\nterminated the agreement on 14 days’ notice, at which point an\\naction filed by either party would be deemed filed as of the\\ndate West’s suit was originally filed in 2016. App. R. 7-3.\\nPursuant to this agreement, West voluntarily dismissed all of\\nhis claims against LG&E by stipulation (signed by attorneys for\\nWest and LG&E) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\\n41(a)(1)(A)(ii). R. 98.2 LG&E in turn voluntarily dismissed its\\ncross-claim against the Charter defendants without prejudice\\npursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)((a)(i). R. 95.\\n West then appealed to this court pursuant to section 1291.\\nAfter a preliminary round of memoranda as to whether there\\nwas a final judgment establishing our appellate jurisdiction, we\\nallowed the case to proceed to briefing and argument, while\\nreserving judgment on the jurisdictional question.\\n II.\\n As in every case, the first question we must resolve is our\\njurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a\\nBetter Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012\\n(1998); In re Morse Elec. Co., 805 F.2d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 1986)\\n(citing In re Boomgarden, 780 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1985)).\\n\\n\\n2\\n None of the Charter defendants (who had been dismissed from the suit)\\nsigned the stipulated dismissal of West’s claims, which presents an\\ninteresting question of whether the stipulation was signed by “all defen-\\ndants” as Rule 41(a)(1)(A) requires. The Charter defendants contest the\\nvalidity of the dismissal on this basis, but in view of our conclusion below\\nthat West’s provisional dismissal of his claims against LG&E renders the\\njudgment non-final, we need not reach this issue.\\n\\f8 No. 18-1906\\n\\n Section 1291, which West invoked in filing this appeal,\\nrequires that a final judgment have been issued by the district\\ncourt. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“[t]he courts of appeals … shall\\nhave jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the\\ndistrict courts of the United States …”). A final judgment is one\\nthat ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the\\ndistrict court to do but execute the judgment. See Coopers &\\nLybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 2457 (1978)\\n(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631,\\n633 (1945)); Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Kagan, 724 F.3d 843, 847 (7th\\nCir. 2013); Kimbrell v. Brown, 651 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2011);\\nUnion Oil Co. of Cal. v. John Brown E&C, 121 F.3d 305, 309 (7th\\nCir. 1997).\\n The requirement of a final judgment is more than a mere\\nformality. Section 1291 reflects a strong preference for resolv-\\ning all disputed issues as to all parties in one appeal, to the\\nextent possible. See Arrow Gear Co. v. Downers Grove Sanitary\\nDist., 629 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 2010). Underlying that prefer-\\nence lies a legislative judgment that permitting multiple,\\npiecemeal appeals from a single action in the district court will\\nhave a “debilitating effect” on the efficient administration of\\njustice. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 471, 98 S. Ct. at 2459\\n(quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S. Ct.\\n2140, 2149 (1974)); see also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.\\n323, 325, 60 S. Ct. 540, 541 (1940).\\n The district court’s decision disposing of West’s claims\\nagainst the Charter defendants—which is what West is\\nappealing—was manifestly not a final decision. LG&E re-\\nmained as a defendant, and the district court had already\\ndenied LG&E’s two motions to dismiss the claims against it,\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 9\\n\\nreasoning that resolution of those claims would have to await\\nthe development of the facts. 2016 WL 6395918, at *3; 2018 WL\\n321685, at *3–*4. Certainly there was a substantial degree of\\noverlap in theory and in fact with the claims against the\\nCharter defendants. But at no time following the court’s\\ndismissal of West’s claims against the Charter defendants did\\nLG&E and/or West ask the court to enter a final, binding\\njudgment resolving the claims against LG&E based on the\\nrationale of the decision dismissing the Charter defendants.\\nInstead, the parties presented the court with a stipulation of\\ndismissal (without prejudice) which posited, with no substan-\\ntive analysis, that West’s claims against LG&E had been\\nrendered “moot” by the dismissal of the claims against the\\nCharter defendants. The district court’s decision rejecting the\\nstipulation of dismissal explained why, in its view, the decision\\nas to the Charter defendants did not (wholly) resolve the\\nviability of the claims against LG&E, and West has given us no\\nreason to doubt that the district court’s assessment was correct.\\nThere is no dispute, for example, that there is a nuisance claim\\nnaming LG&E alone that does not turn on the scope of the\\neasement between West and LG&E.3\\n Instead, intent on appealing the Charter dismissal without\\na final judgment as to LG&E, West and LG&E engineered a\\nprovisional dismissal of the claims against LG&E so as to bring\\nthe proceedings in the district court to a close, but without the\\n\\n\\n3\\n The nuisance claim, in fact, is based on the installation in 2013 of flashing\\nred (aviation warning) lights on the LG&E tower located on West’s\\nproperty, which has nothing whatever to do with Insight’s fiber optic cable.\\nSee R. 33 at 15.\\n\\f10 No. 18-1906\\n\\nbinding effects of a truly final judgment. By the terms of the\\ntolling and standstill agreement between these two parties, the\\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E is conditional: In the\\nevent this court were to affirm the dismissal of the claims\\nagainst the Charter defendants, West has agreed not to pursue\\nthe claims against LG&E. If, on the other hand, this court were\\nto reverse the dismissal of the Charter defendants, West has\\nreserved the right to reinstate the claims against LG&E; and, in\\nthe event of such reinstatement, both parties have agreed to\\nwaive any time-based defenses to claims they might have\\nagainst one another. In short, in the event West were to prevail\\nin this appeal, West and LG&E may pick up where they left off\\nin the district court. The dismissal appears to be conditional in\\na second respect as well. West has reserved the right to\\nterminate the tolling and standstill agreement on 14 days’\\nnotice to LG&E, at which point he would likewise be free to\\nreinstate the claims against LG&E and pursue them as if they\\nhad never been dismissed. Apart from the notice requirement,\\nthe agreement does not impose any condition upon West’s\\nright to exercise this right. So, for example, had West con-\\ncluded after oral arguments in this case that we were likely to\\naffirm the dismissal of the claims against the Charter defen-\\ndants, West would have been free to terminate the agreement\\nand resurrect the claims against LG&E without waiting for us\\nto rule on his appeal.\\n This conditional dismissal of the claims against LG&E\\nrepresents the very sort of attempt to manufacture appellate\\njurisdiction of which our precedents have consistently disap-\\nproved. As we stated in Union Oil, “[L]itigants and courts\\ncannot avoid the finality requirement of § 1291 by agreement.\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 11\\n\\nTo hold otherwise would allow litigants to circumvent the\\nrules that Congress has instructed as to the timing of appellate\\nproceedings.” 121 F.3d at 310 (citation omitted). We have thus\\nrepeatedly cited the absence of a final judgment when, after a\\ndispositive ruling as to some but not all claims or parties, the\\nparties have entered to a conditional dismissal of the remain-\\ning claims on terms that permit those claims to be revived at a\\nlater date. See Arrow Gear, 629 F.3d at 636–37 (following res\\njudicata dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for contribution against\\nsome but not all defendants, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its\\nclaims against two remaining defendants without prejudice);\\nUnion Oil, 121 F.3d at 309–11 (following dismissal and judg-\\nment on the pleadings as to some claims and partial summary\\njudgment limiting plaintiff’s damages as to remaining breach\\nof contract claim, parties stipulated to termination of proceed-\\nings in district court and agreed to release one another from\\nliability in event appeals court affirmed district court’s rulings\\nas to contract claim, but reserved right to pursue their respec-\\ntive rights under the contract and resume litigation in the\\ndistrict court in the event of reversal on appeal); see also Kagan,\\n724 F.3d at 846–47 (following judgment in favor of (deceased)\\ninsured’s wife and against his children in life insurer’s inter-\\npleader suit, wife filed Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to amend\\njudgment disputing amount of interest insurer had paid on\\npolicy proceeds, indicating that an active dispute between wife\\nand insurer remained in district court); Kimbrell, 651 F.3d at\\n757–58 (personal injury claims against truck driver’s employer\\ndismissed for want of diligence in serving process; but claim\\nagainst truck driver himself, which initially had been stayed\\ndue to driver’s pending bankruptcy, remained unresolved, as\\n\\f12 No. 18-1906\\n\\nevidenced by plaintiff’s re-filing of claim in new suit after stay\\nlifted); Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852,\\n856 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Claims dismissed without prejudice have\\nnot been disposed of, and any resulting judgment is not final\\nunless there is a clear legal bar to the claims’ revival.”); First\\nHealth Grp. Corp. v. BCE Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 801 (7th\\nCir. 2001) (collecting cases holding “that the dismissal of one\\nclaim or theory without prejudice, with a right to reactivate\\nthat claim after an appeal on the remaining theories, makes the\\njudgment non-final”).\\n As these cases make clear, the conditional nature of the\\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E negates the requisite\\nfinality of the judgment. Although West has nominally\\ndismissed his claims against LG&E, he retains the right,\\ndepending on the outcome of this appeal, to reinstate those\\nclaims and proceed as if the claims had never been dismissed\\nand no time had passed. In the words of Arrow Gear, “[t]his is\\na ‘start-over’ case.” 629 F.3d at 637.\\n Arrow could re-file the identical claim in the\\n same court against the two parties that it has\\n dropped, and, if it did, an appeal from the final\\n judgment in the new case would bring up to us\\n many of the same issues as an appeal from a\\n final judgment in this case would have done had\\n the two parties not been dropped.\\nId. What was true of the appellant in Arrow Gear is just as true\\nof West here. West and LG&E have attempted to construct a\\nnominally final judgment and open the door to an immediate\\nappeal by bringing the proceedings in the district court as to\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 13\\n\\nthe remaining defendant, LG&E, to a close, but on terms that\\nleave West’s options open as to LG&E depending on how he\\nfares against the Charter defendants in this appeal. The\\nresulting judgment is not, in practical effect, a final one, and\\nthat deprives us of appellate jurisdiction.\\n West’s desire to resolve the viability of its claims against the\\nCharter defendants on appeal now is understandable, and\\nperhaps even “noble” to the extent it is consistent with an\\nexpeditious resolution of the case. Union Oil, 121 F.3d at 309.\\nPutting aside the nuisance claim, the degree of substantive\\noverlap between the claims against the Charter defendants and\\nthe claims against LG&E appears to be substantial. West and\\nLG&E certainly agree that our interpretation of the Cable Act\\nand its application to LG&E’s easement across West’s property\\nwill effectively dictate the resolution of his claims against\\nLG&E (save perhaps for the nuisance claim) as well as his\\nclaims against the Charter defendants.\\n But, short of litigating the claims against LG&E to final\\njudgment, there were options open to West to pursue an\\nimmediate appeal as to the Charter defendants. As Judge\\nYoung pointed out, West could have asked the court to enter\\na final judgment as to the claims against the Charter defen-\\ndants pursuant to Rule 54(b), although that likely would have\\nbeen a stretch given the overlap with the claims against LG&E.\\nSee First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 801. Alternatively, West could\\nhave sought permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal\\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), on the theory that the decision\\nas to the Charter defendants “involves a controlling question\\nof law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of\\nopinion and that an immediate appeal from the [otherwise\\n\\f14 No. 18-1906\\n\\nnon-appealable] order may materially advance the ultimate\\ntermination of the litigation.” See First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at\\n801–02; see generally Sterk v. Redbox Auto. Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d\\n535, 536 (7th Cir. 2012); Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of\\nIll., 219 F.3d 674, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n West pursued neither of these options. He instead opted to\\npursue the same type of effort to fabricate a final judgment that\\nwe have rejected as a transparent effort to circumvent section\\n1291.\\n Even so, West might also have chosen to rectify the prob-\\nlem once we flagged the potential lack of a final judgment in\\nsoliciting jurisdictional memoranda from the parties and again\\nat oral argument. In other cases, we have deemed it sufficient\\nwhen a party has disavowed any right to pursue claims or\\nparties that have been dismissed without prejudice. See Chessie\\nLogistics, 867 F.3d at 856 (at oral argument, appellee unequivo-\\ncally agreed that its counterclaims, which had been dismissed\\nwithout prejudice in the district court, should be dismissed\\nwith prejudice); Kagan, 724 F.3d at 847 (appellee’s jurisdictional\\nmemorandum disclaimed any intent to seek further amend-\\nment of judgment as to dismissed defendant); Arrow Gear, 629\\nF.3d at 637 (appellant’s lawyer committed at oral argument not\\nto re-file suit against two defendants that had been voluntarily\\ndismissed without prejudice); First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 802\\n(at oral argument, appellant’s lawyer elected to dismiss\\nremaining trademark claims unconditionally, so that they\\ncould not be reinstated regardless of outcome of appeal).\\n But West has never disclaimed the right to resurrect his\\nclaims against LG&E that his agreement with LG&E expressly\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 15\\n\\nreserves to him. To the contrary, at oral argument, after the\\nCharter defendants’ counsel construed the initial remarks of\\nWest’s counsel to constitute such a disclaimer and abandoned\\n(to our surprise) their contention that we lack jurisdiction,\\nWest’s counsel reiterated in rebuttal that the dismissal of\\nLG&E was conditional, as the terms of the tolling agreement\\nmake clear it is. Certainly it is West’s right to preserve his\\nclaims against LG&E. But his refusal to surrender them\\nunequivocally at this juncture makes clear that the judgment\\nin this case is non-final.\\n There is, consequently, no final judgment as required by\\nsection 1291. The parties did not litigate West’s claims against\\nLG&E to a final judgment, and their agreed-upon dismissal of\\nthose claims allows West to reinstate them in the district court\\ndepending upon the outcome of this appeal (were it permitted\\nto proceed). Our precedents foreclose this attempt to manufac-\\nture appellate jurisdiction by producing a judgment which has\\nthe appearance but not the binding quality of finality.\\n III.\\n For the reasons we have discussed above, we DISMISS the\\nappeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384333/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607080/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Stephen R. WEST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant, and Charter Communications, Inc., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1906\n\nSTEPHEN R. WEST,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n\nLOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC\nCOMPANY,\n Defendant,\n\n\nand\n\n\n\nCHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,\nINC., et al.,\n\n Defendants-Appellees.\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\n No. 4:16-cv-00145-RLY-DML — Richard L. Young, Judge.\n\f2 No. 18-1906\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 28, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 4, 2019\n\n\n Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. In this diversity action, plaintiff\nStephen West contends that the addition of a fiber optic\ncommunications wire to a utilities transmission tower on his\nproperty exceeds the scope of the utilities easement that\nauthorized the tower. West sued both Charter Communica-\ntions, Inc. (“Charter”), whose subsidiary installed the wire, and\nLouisville Gas and Electric Company (“Louisville”), which\nowns the tower and is a party to the easement. The district\ncourt dismissed the claims against Charter, concluding that the\naddition of Charter’s communications wire to the tower is\ncompatible with the scope and purpose of the easement and\nconsequently does not violate the terms of the easement\nagreement nor does it amount to an unconstitutional taking of\nWest’s property. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018 WL\n321686 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). Wishing to appeal that ruling,\nWest entered into an agreement with Louisville providing that\nhe would voluntarily dismiss his claims against Louisville,\nwhile reserving the right to revive them in the event we\nreversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against\nCharter. West then filed a notice of appeal pursuant to\n28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the conditional dismissal of West’s\nclaims against Louisville renders the judgment non-final, we\ndismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.\n\fNo. 18-1906 3\n\n I.\n West inherited a small plot of land from his parents in\nJeffersonville, Indiana that abuts the Ohio River, which\ndemarcates the border between Indiana and Kentucky.1 A\nmassive utility transmission tower some 248 feet tall sits on the\nproperty, carrying LG&E power lines that run between the two\nstates. The tower and the power lines are authorized by a 1938\nutility easement entered into by the predecessors of West (and\nhis parents) and LG&E, as amended by a supplemental\nagreement in 1976. Broadly speaking, the easement grants to\nLG&E the perpetual right to install and maintain towers and\nwires “for the transmission, distribution and delivery of\nelectrical energy to the Grantee [LG&E] and other persons and\nconcerns and to the public in general for light, heat, power,\ntelephone and/or other purposes in, upon, along and over the\nreal estate of the Grantor [West] … .” R. 33-1 at 2. West’s\nparents rejected a further amendment to the deed of easement\nproposed by LG&E in 1990 which would have authorized\nLG&E to “upgrade and remove communications and tele-\nphone systems… .” R. 33-4 at 2.\n In 2000, LG&E entered into a contract with Insight Ken-\ntucky Partners II, LP (“Insight”), a subsidiary of Time Warner\nCable, Inc. (“Time Warner”), granting Insight permission to\nrun fiber optic cables across LG&E’s existing infrastructure.\nInsight proceeded to run a fiber optic cable carrying television\nand internet content and services across West’s property via\n\n\n1\n Jeffersonville is situated directly across the Ohio River from Louisville,\nKentucky.\n\f4 No. 18-1906\n\nthe LG&E tower; Insight’s cable replaced an existing static wire\non that tower. Time Warner, Insight’s parent corporation, was\nlater acquired by Charter. We shall refer to Charter and its\npredecessors collectively as the Charter defendants.\n In 2016, West filed suit against LG&E in state court, seeking\na declaratory judgment that the easement did not authorize\nInsight’s fiber optic cable. West also asserted claims for breach\nof contract, trespass, and unjust enrichment. LG&E removed\nthe case to federal court. After the district court denied LG&E’s\nmotion to dismiss West’s claims, reasoning that there were\nfactual questions as to the scope of LG&E’s rights under the\neasement, West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2016 WL 6395918,\nat *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 28, 2016), West amended his complaint to\nname Insight, Time Warner, and Charter as additional defen-\ndants and also to add new claims to the suit. The amended\ncomplaint asserted claims against both LG&E and the Charter\ndefendants for declaratory judgment, trespass, unjust enrich-\nment, as well as claims for (tortious) conversion and criminal\ntrespass. LG&E alone was also named in a new claim for\nnuisance. LG&E filed a second, partial motion to dismiss\naimed at the conversion and criminal trespass claims, but the\ndistrict court denied that motion, concluding in view of the\nfacts alleged that the complaint stated plausible claims for\nrelief in these respects. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018\nWL 321685, at *2–*4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). LG&E subsequently\nfiled a cross-claim for indemnification against the Charter\ndefendants.\n Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the\nCharter defendants moved to dismiss all of West’s claims\nagainst them, arguing principally that because the easement\n\fNo. 18-1906 5\n\nover West’s property had already been dedicated for a utility\nuse that is compatible with cable television transmission, the\naddition of Insight’s fiber optic wire was statutorily authorized\nby section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of\n1984, 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (the “Cable Act”).\n The district court agreed with the Charter defendants and\ngranted their motion to dismiss. 2018 WL 321686. The court\ndetermined that the easement across West’s property had been\ndedicated for utility use, id. at *5, and that the running of fiber\noptic cables across that easement for the purpose of providing\npaid television, internet, and communications services amount-\ned to a permissible compatible use under the Cable Act, id. The\ncourt went on to conclude that the Cable Act did not\nimpermissibly burden West’s property rights retroactively, nor\ndid it constitute a constitutionally prohibited taking of his\nproperty. Id. at *5–*6. Because it found that Insight’s use of the\neasement over West’s property to be authorized, the court\ndismissed all claims against the Charter defendants. Id. at *6\nThat decision left LG&E as the sole remaining defendant on\nWest’s claims.\n West and LG&E subsequently filed a joint stipulation\nasking the court to dismiss the claims against LG&E and close\nthe case, R. 88, but the district court denied that request, R. 91.\nAlthough the stipulation posited that West’s claims against\nLG&E were “moot” in view of the district court’s decision\ndismissing the claims against the Charter defendants, R. 88 at\n2 ¶3, the district court rejected that assertion. The court\nreasoned that there was still a live controversy as to whether\nthe easement itself permitted LG&E to install and maintain\nInsight’s fiber optic cable on LG&E’s infrastructure. R. 91 at\n\f6 No. 18-1906\n\n2–3. The court also noted that the stipulation was unclear as to\nwhether the proposed dismissal of the claims against LG&E\nwas to be with or without prejudice; but the court construed\nthe stipulated dismissal to be without prejudice, which would\npermit West to revive these claims in the event the dismissal of\nthe claims against the Charter defendants was reversed on\nappeal. R. 91 at 3. That, in turn, led the court to conclude that,\nnotwithstanding the proposed dismissal of the claims against\nLG&E, a final judgment was not yet at hand. R. 91 at 3. The\ncourt indicated that the parties had three options open to them:\n(1) continue litigating the merits of West’s claims against LG&E\nto a final judgment; (2) stipulate to the dismissal of these claims\nwith prejudice; or (3) seek a certification of a final judgment as\nto fewer than all parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil\nProcedure 54(b). R. 91 at 3–4.\n Rather than pursuing any of these options, West and LG&E\npursued a fourth option in the hope of creating a final judg-\nment that would open the door to this appeal. The two parties\nentered into a tolling and standstill agreement which provided\nfor the voluntary dismissal of West’s claims against LG& E for\nthe duration of, and conditioned upon the outcome of, his\nappeal of the dismissal of the claims against the Charter\ndefendants. App. R. 7-3 Ex. B. West and LG&E agreed that the\nstatute of limitations as to any claims between them would be\ntolled for the duration of the agreement and that, in the event\nWest prevailed in his appeal, LG&E would not object to the re-\nfiling of his claims against LG&E nor assert any timeliness\ndefenses to the claims. If, on the other hand, West did not\nprevail in the appeal, West agreed he would not re-file his\npending claims against LG&E nor any other claims arising out\n\fNo. 18-1906 7\n\nof the same facts. By its terms, the agreement was to remain in\neffect until such time as the appeal was decided or West\nterminated the agreement on 14 days’ notice, at which point an\naction filed by either party would be deemed filed as of the\ndate West’s suit was originally filed in 2016. App. R. 7-3.\nPursuant to this agreement, West voluntarily dismissed all of\nhis claims against LG&E by stipulation (signed by attorneys for\nWest and LG&E) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\n41(a)(1)(A)(ii). R. 98.2 LG&E in turn voluntarily dismissed its\ncross-claim against the Charter defendants without prejudice\npursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)((a)(i). R. 95.\n West then appealed to this court pursuant to section 1291.\nAfter a preliminary round of memoranda as to whether there\nwas a final judgment establishing our appellate jurisdiction, we\nallowed the case to proceed to briefing and argument, while\nreserving judgment on the jurisdictional question.\n II.\n As in every case, the first question we must resolve is our\njurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a\nBetter Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012\n(1998); In re Morse Elec. Co., 805 F.2d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 1986)\n(citing In re Boomgarden, 780 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1985)).\n\n\n2\n None of the Charter defendants (who had been dismissed from the suit)\nsigned the stipulated dismissal of West’s claims, which presents an\ninteresting question of whether the stipulation was signed by “all defen-\ndants” as Rule 41(a)(1)(A) requires. The Charter defendants contest the\nvalidity of the dismissal on this basis, but in view of our conclusion below\nthat West’s provisional dismissal of his claims against LG&E renders the\njudgment non-final, we need not reach this issue.\n\f8 No. 18-1906\n\n Section 1291, which West invoked in filing this appeal,\nrequires that a final judgment have been issued by the district\ncourt. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“[t]he courts of appeals … shall\nhave jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the\ndistrict courts of the United States …”). A final judgment is one\nthat ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the\ndistrict court to do but execute the judgment. See Coopers &\nLybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 2457 (1978)\n(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631,\n633 (1945)); Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Kagan, 724 F.3d 843, 847 (7th\nCir. 2013); Kimbrell v. Brown, 651 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2011);\nUnion Oil Co. of Cal. v. John Brown E&C, 121 F.3d 305, 309 (7th\nCir. 1997).\n The requirement of a final judgment is more than a mere\nformality. Section 1291 reflects a strong preference for resolv-\ning all disputed issues as to all parties in one appeal, to the\nextent possible. See Arrow Gear Co. v. Downers Grove Sanitary\nDist., 629 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 2010). Underlying that prefer-\nence lies a legislative judgment that permitting multiple,\npiecemeal appeals from a single action in the district court will\nhave a “debilitating effect” on the efficient administration of\njustice. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 471, 98 S. Ct. at 2459\n(quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S. Ct.\n2140, 2149 (1974)); see also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.\n323, 325, 60 S. Ct. 540, 541 (1940).\n The district court’s decision disposing of West’s claims\nagainst the Charter defendants—which is what West is\nappealing—was manifestly not a final decision. LG&E re-\nmained as a defendant, and the district court had already\ndenied LG&E’s two motions to dismiss the claims against it,\n\fNo. 18-1906 9\n\nreasoning that resolution of those claims would have to await\nthe development of the facts. 2016 WL 6395918, at *3; 2018 WL\n321685, at *3–*4. Certainly there was a substantial degree of\noverlap in theory and in fact with the claims against the\nCharter defendants. But at no time following the court’s\ndismissal of West’s claims against the Charter defendants did\nLG&E and/or West ask the court to enter a final, binding\njudgment resolving the claims against LG&E based on the\nrationale of the decision dismissing the Charter defendants.\nInstead, the parties presented the court with a stipulation of\ndismissal (without prejudice) which posited, with no substan-\ntive analysis, that West’s claims against LG&E had been\nrendered “moot” by the dismissal of the claims against the\nCharter defendants. The district court’s decision rejecting the\nstipulation of dismissal explained why, in its view, the decision\nas to the Charter defendants did not (wholly) resolve the\nviability of the claims against LG&E, and West has given us no\nreason to doubt that the district court’s assessment was correct.\nThere is no dispute, for example, that there is a nuisance claim\nnaming LG&E alone that does not turn on the scope of the\neasement between West and LG&E.3\n Instead, intent on appealing the Charter dismissal without\na final judgment as to LG&E, West and LG&E engineered a\nprovisional dismissal of the claims against LG&E so as to bring\nthe proceedings in the district court to a close, but without the\n\n\n3\n The nuisance claim, in fact, is based on the installation in 2013 of flashing\nred (aviation warning) lights on the LG&E tower located on West’s\nproperty, which has nothing whatever to do with Insight’s fiber optic cable.\nSee R. 33 at 15.\n\f10 No. 18-1906\n\nbinding effects of a truly final judgment. By the terms of the\ntolling and standstill agreement between these two parties, the\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E is conditional: In the\nevent this court were to affirm the dismissal of the claims\nagainst the Charter defendants, West has agreed not to pursue\nthe claims against LG&E. If, on the other hand, this court were\nto reverse the dismissal of the Charter defendants, West has\nreserved the right to reinstate the claims against LG&E; and, in\nthe event of such reinstatement, both parties have agreed to\nwaive any time-based defenses to claims they might have\nagainst one another. In short, in the event West were to prevail\nin this appeal, West and LG&E may pick up where they left off\nin the district court. The dismissal appears to be conditional in\na second respect as well. West has reserved the right to\nterminate the tolling and standstill agreement on 14 days’\nnotice to LG&E, at which point he would likewise be free to\nreinstate the claims against LG&E and pursue them as if they\nhad never been dismissed. Apart from the notice requirement,\nthe agreement does not impose any condition upon West’s\nright to exercise this right. So, for example, had West con-\ncluded after oral arguments in this case that we were likely to\naffirm the dismissal of the claims against the Charter defen-\ndants, West would have been free to terminate the agreement\nand resurrect the claims against LG&E without waiting for us\nto rule on his appeal.\n This conditional dismissal of the claims against LG&E\nrepresents the very sort of attempt to manufacture appellate\njurisdiction of which our precedents have consistently disap-\nproved. As we stated in Union Oil, “[L]itigants and courts\ncannot avoid the finality requirement of § 1291 by agreement.\n\fNo. 18-1906 11\n\nTo hold otherwise would allow litigants to circumvent the\nrules that Congress has instructed as to the timing of appellate\nproceedings.” 121 F.3d at 310 (citation omitted). We have thus\nrepeatedly cited the absence of a final judgment when, after a\ndispositive ruling as to some but not all claims or parties, the\nparties have entered to a conditional dismissal of the remain-\ning claims on terms that permit those claims to be revived at a\nlater date. See Arrow Gear, 629 F.3d at 636–37 (following res\njudicata dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for contribution against\nsome but not all defendants, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its\nclaims against two remaining defendants without prejudice);\nUnion Oil, 121 F.3d at 309–11 (following dismissal and judg-\nment on the pleadings as to some claims and partial summary\njudgment limiting plaintiff’s damages as to remaining breach\nof contract claim, parties stipulated to termination of proceed-\nings in district court and agreed to release one another from\nliability in event appeals court affirmed district court’s rulings\nas to contract claim, but reserved right to pursue their respec-\ntive rights under the contract and resume litigation in the\ndistrict court in the event of reversal on appeal); see also Kagan,\n724 F.3d at 846–47 (following judgment in favor of (deceased)\ninsured’s wife and against his children in life insurer’s inter-\npleader suit, wife filed Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to amend\njudgment disputing amount of interest insurer had paid on\npolicy proceeds, indicating that an active dispute between wife\nand insurer remained in district court); Kimbrell, 651 F.3d at\n757–58 (personal injury claims against truck driver’s employer\ndismissed for want of diligence in serving process; but claim\nagainst truck driver himself, which initially had been stayed\ndue to driver’s pending bankruptcy, remained unresolved, as\n\f12 No. 18-1906\n\nevidenced by plaintiff’s re-filing of claim in new suit after stay\nlifted); Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852,\n856 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Claims dismissed without prejudice have\nnot been disposed of, and any resulting judgment is not final\nunless there is a clear legal bar to the claims’ revival.”); First\nHealth Grp. Corp. v. BCE Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 801 (7th\nCir. 2001) (collecting cases holding “that the dismissal of one\nclaim or theory without prejudice, with a right to reactivate\nthat claim after an appeal on the remaining theories, makes the\njudgment non-final”).\n As these cases make clear, the conditional nature of the\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E negates the requisite\nfinality of the judgment. Although West has nominally\ndismissed his claims against LG&E, he retains the right,\ndepending on the outcome of this appeal, to reinstate those\nclaims and proceed as if the claims had never been dismissed\nand no time had passed. In the words of Arrow Gear, “[t]his is\na ‘start-over’ case.” 629 F.3d at 637.\n Arrow could re-file the identical claim in the\n same court against the two parties that it has\n dropped, and, if it did, an appeal from the final\n judgment in the new case would bring up to us\n many of the same issues as an appeal from a\n final judgment in this case would have done had\n the two parties not been dropped.\nId. What was true of the appellant in Arrow Gear is just as true\nof West here. West and LG&E have attempted to construct a\nnominally final judgment and open the door to an immediate\nappeal by bringing the proceedings in the district court as to\n\fNo. 18-1906 13\n\nthe remaining defendant, LG&E, to a close, but on terms that\nleave West’s options open as to LG&E depending on how he\nfares against the Charter defendants in this appeal. The\nresulting judgment is not, in practical effect, a final one, and\nthat deprives us of appellate jurisdiction.\n West’s desire to resolve the viability of its claims against the\nCharter defendants on appeal now is understandable, and\nperhaps even “noble” to the extent it is consistent with an\nexpeditious resolution of the case. Union Oil, 121 F.3d at 309.\nPutting aside the nuisance claim, the degree of substantive\noverlap between the claims against the Charter defendants and\nthe claims against LG&E appears to be substantial. West and\nLG&E certainly agree that our interpretation of the Cable Act\nand its application to LG&E’s easement across West’s property\nwill effectively dictate the resolution of his claims against\nLG&E (save perhaps for the nuisance claim) as well as his\nclaims against the Charter defendants.\n But, short of litigating the claims against LG&E to final\njudgment, there were options open to West to pursue an\nimmediate appeal as to the Charter defendants. As Judge\nYoung pointed out, West could have asked the court to enter\na final judgment as to the claims against the Charter defen-\ndants pursuant to Rule 54(b), although that likely would have\nbeen a stretch given the overlap with the claims against LG&E.\nSee First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 801. Alternatively, West could\nhave sought permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), on the theory that the decision\nas to the Charter defendants “involves a controlling question\nof law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of\nopinion and that an immediate appeal from the [otherwise\n\f14 No. 18-1906\n\nnon-appealable] order may materially advance the ultimate\ntermination of the litigation.” See First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at\n801–02; see generally Sterk v. Redbox Auto. Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d\n535, 536 (7th Cir. 2012); Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of\nIll., 219 F.3d 674, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2000).\n West pursued neither of these options. He instead opted to\npursue the same type of effort to fabricate a final judgment that\nwe have rejected as a transparent effort to circumvent section\n1291.\n Even so, West might also have chosen to rectify the prob-\nlem once we flagged the potential lack of a final judgment in\nsoliciting jurisdictional memoranda from the parties and again\nat oral argument. In other cases, we have deemed it sufficient\nwhen a party has disavowed any right to pursue claims or\nparties that have been dismissed without prejudice. See Chessie\nLogistics, 867 F.3d at 856 (at oral argument, appellee unequivo-\ncally agreed that its counterclaims, which had been dismissed\nwithout prejudice in the district court, should be dismissed\nwith prejudice); Kagan, 724 F.3d at 847 (appellee’s jurisdictional\nmemorandum disclaimed any intent to seek further amend-\nment of judgment as to dismissed defendant); Arrow Gear, 629\nF.3d at 637 (appellant’s lawyer committed at oral argument not\nto re-file suit against two defendants that had been voluntarily\ndismissed without prejudice); First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 802\n(at oral argument, appellant’s lawyer elected to dismiss\nremaining trademark claims unconditionally, so that they\ncould not be reinstated regardless of outcome of appeal).\n But West has never disclaimed the right to resurrect his\nclaims against LG&E that his agreement with LG&E expressly\n\fNo. 18-1906 15\n\nreserves to him. To the contrary, at oral argument, after the\nCharter defendants’ counsel construed the initial remarks of\nWest’s counsel to constitute such a disclaimer and abandoned\n(to our surprise) their contention that we lack jurisdiction,\nWest’s counsel reiterated in rebuttal that the dismissal of\nLG&E was conditional, as the terms of the tolling agreement\nmake clear it is. Certainly it is West’s right to preserve his\nclaims against LG&E. But his refusal to surrender them\nunequivocally at this juncture makes clear that the judgment\nin this case is non-final.\n There is, consequently, no final judgment as required by\nsection 1291. The parties did not litigate West’s claims against\nLG&E to a final judgment, and their agreed-upon dismissal of\nthose claims allows West to reinstate them in the district court\ndepending upon the outcome of this appeal (were it permitted\nto proceed). Our precedents foreclose this attempt to manufac-\nture appellate jurisdiction by producing a judgment which has\nthe appearance but not the binding quality of finality.\n III.\n For the reasons we have discussed above, we DISMISS the\nappeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Stephen R. WEST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant, and Charter Communications, Inc., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-1906\\n\\nSTEPHEN R. WEST,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nLOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC\\nCOMPANY,\\n Defendant,\\n\\n\\nand\\n\\n\\n\\nCHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,\\nINC., et al.,\\n\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\\n No. 4:16-cv-00145-RLY-DML — Richard L. Young, Judge.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1906\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 28, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 4, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. In this diversity action, plaintiff\\nStephen West contends that the addition of a fiber optic\\ncommunications wire to a utilities transmission tower on his\\nproperty exceeds the scope of the utilities easement that\\nauthorized the tower. West sued both Charter Communica-\\ntions, Inc. (“Charter”), whose subsidiary installed the wire, and\\nLouisville Gas and Electric Company (“Louisville”), which\\nowns the tower and is a party to the easement. The district\\ncourt dismissed the claims against Charter, concluding that the\\naddition of Charter’s communications wire to the tower is\\ncompatible with the scope and purpose of the easement and\\nconsequently does not violate the terms of the easement\\nagreement nor does it amount to an unconstitutional taking of\\nWest’s property. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018 WL\\n321686 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). Wishing to appeal that ruling,\\nWest entered into an agreement with Louisville providing that\\nhe would voluntarily dismiss his claims against Louisville,\\nwhile reserving the right to revive them in the event we\\nreversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against\\nCharter. West then filed a notice of appeal pursuant to\\n28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the conditional dismissal of West’s\\nclaims against Louisville renders the judgment non-final, we\\ndismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 3\\n\\n I.\\n West inherited a small plot of land from his parents in\\nJeffersonville, Indiana that abuts the Ohio River, which\\ndemarcates the border between Indiana and Kentucky.1 A\\nmassive utility transmission tower some 248 feet tall sits on the\\nproperty, carrying LG&E power lines that run between the two\\nstates. The tower and the power lines are authorized by a 1938\\nutility easement entered into by the predecessors of West (and\\nhis parents) and LG&E, as amended by a supplemental\\nagreement in 1976. Broadly speaking, the easement grants to\\nLG&E the perpetual right to install and maintain towers and\\nwires “for the transmission, distribution and delivery of\\nelectrical energy to the Grantee [LG&E] and other persons and\\nconcerns and to the public in general for light, heat, power,\\ntelephone and/or other purposes in, upon, along and over the\\nreal estate of the Grantor [West] … .” R. 33-1 at 2. West’s\\nparents rejected a further amendment to the deed of easement\\nproposed by LG&E in 1990 which would have authorized\\nLG&E to “upgrade and remove communications and tele-\\nphone systems… .” R. 33-4 at 2.\\n In 2000, LG&E entered into a contract with Insight Ken-\\ntucky Partners II, LP (“Insight”), a subsidiary of Time Warner\\nCable, Inc. (“Time Warner”), granting Insight permission to\\nrun fiber optic cables across LG&E’s existing infrastructure.\\nInsight proceeded to run a fiber optic cable carrying television\\nand internet content and services across West’s property via\\n\\n\\n1\\n Jeffersonville is situated directly across the Ohio River from Louisville,\\nKentucky.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1906\\n\\nthe LG&E tower; Insight’s cable replaced an existing static wire\\non that tower. Time Warner, Insight’s parent corporation, was\\nlater acquired by Charter. We shall refer to Charter and its\\npredecessors collectively as the Charter defendants.\\n In 2016, West filed suit against LG&E in state court, seeking\\na declaratory judgment that the easement did not authorize\\nInsight’s fiber optic cable. West also asserted claims for breach\\nof contract, trespass, and unjust enrichment. LG&E removed\\nthe case to federal court. After the district court denied LG&E’s\\nmotion to dismiss West’s claims, reasoning that there were\\nfactual questions as to the scope of LG&E’s rights under the\\neasement, West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2016 WL 6395918,\\nat *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 28, 2016), West amended his complaint to\\nname Insight, Time Warner, and Charter as additional defen-\\ndants and also to add new claims to the suit. The amended\\ncomplaint asserted claims against both LG&E and the Charter\\ndefendants for declaratory judgment, trespass, unjust enrich-\\nment, as well as claims for (tortious) conversion and criminal\\ntrespass. LG&E alone was also named in a new claim for\\nnuisance. LG&E filed a second, partial motion to dismiss\\naimed at the conversion and criminal trespass claims, but the\\ndistrict court denied that motion, concluding in view of the\\nfacts alleged that the complaint stated plausible claims for\\nrelief in these respects. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018\\nWL 321685, at *2–*4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). LG&E subsequently\\nfiled a cross-claim for indemnification against the Charter\\ndefendants.\\n Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the\\nCharter defendants moved to dismiss all of West’s claims\\nagainst them, arguing principally that because the easement\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 5\\n\\nover West’s property had already been dedicated for a utility\\nuse that is compatible with cable television transmission, the\\naddition of Insight’s fiber optic wire was statutorily authorized\\nby section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of\\n1984, 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (the “Cable Act”).\\n The district court agreed with the Charter defendants and\\ngranted their motion to dismiss. 2018 WL 321686. The court\\ndetermined that the easement across West’s property had been\\ndedicated for utility use, id. at *5, and that the running of fiber\\noptic cables across that easement for the purpose of providing\\npaid television, internet, and communications services amount-\\ned to a permissible compatible use under the Cable Act, id. The\\ncourt went on to conclude that the Cable Act did not\\nimpermissibly burden West’s property rights retroactively, nor\\ndid it constitute a constitutionally prohibited taking of his\\nproperty. Id. at *5–*6. Because it found that Insight’s use of the\\neasement over West’s property to be authorized, the court\\ndismissed all claims against the Charter defendants. Id. at *6\\nThat decision left LG&E as the sole remaining defendant on\\nWest’s claims.\\n West and LG&E subsequently filed a joint stipulation\\nasking the court to dismiss the claims against LG&E and close\\nthe case, R. 88, but the district court denied that request, R. 91.\\nAlthough the stipulation posited that West’s claims against\\nLG&E were “moot” in view of the district court’s decision\\ndismissing the claims against the Charter defendants, R. 88 at\\n2 ¶3, the district court rejected that assertion. The court\\nreasoned that there was still a live controversy as to whether\\nthe easement itself permitted LG&E to install and maintain\\nInsight’s fiber optic cable on LG&E’s infrastructure. R. 91 at\\n\\f6 No. 18-1906\\n\\n2–3. The court also noted that the stipulation was unclear as to\\nwhether the proposed dismissal of the claims against LG&E\\nwas to be with or without prejudice; but the court construed\\nthe stipulated dismissal to be without prejudice, which would\\npermit West to revive these claims in the event the dismissal of\\nthe claims against the Charter defendants was reversed on\\nappeal. R. 91 at 3. That, in turn, led the court to conclude that,\\nnotwithstanding the proposed dismissal of the claims against\\nLG&E, a final judgment was not yet at hand. R. 91 at 3. The\\ncourt indicated that the parties had three options open to them:\\n(1) continue litigating the merits of West’s claims against LG&E\\nto a final judgment; (2) stipulate to the dismissal of these claims\\nwith prejudice; or (3) seek a certification of a final judgment as\\nto fewer than all parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 54(b). R. 91 at 3–4.\\n Rather than pursuing any of these options, West and LG&E\\npursued a fourth option in the hope of creating a final judg-\\nment that would open the door to this appeal. The two parties\\nentered into a tolling and standstill agreement which provided\\nfor the voluntary dismissal of West’s claims against LG& E for\\nthe duration of, and conditioned upon the outcome of, his\\nappeal of the dismissal of the claims against the Charter\\ndefendants. App. R. 7-3 Ex. B. West and LG&E agreed that the\\nstatute of limitations as to any claims between them would be\\ntolled for the duration of the agreement and that, in the event\\nWest prevailed in his appeal, LG&E would not object to the re-\\nfiling of his claims against LG&E nor assert any timeliness\\ndefenses to the claims. If, on the other hand, West did not\\nprevail in the appeal, West agreed he would not re-file his\\npending claims against LG&E nor any other claims arising out\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 7\\n\\nof the same facts. By its terms, the agreement was to remain in\\neffect until such time as the appeal was decided or West\\nterminated the agreement on 14 days’ notice, at which point an\\naction filed by either party would be deemed filed as of the\\ndate West’s suit was originally filed in 2016. App. R. 7-3.\\nPursuant to this agreement, West voluntarily dismissed all of\\nhis claims against LG&E by stipulation (signed by attorneys for\\nWest and LG&E) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\\n41(a)(1)(A)(ii). R. 98.2 LG&E in turn voluntarily dismissed its\\ncross-claim against the Charter defendants without prejudice\\npursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)((a)(i). R. 95.\\n West then appealed to this court pursuant to section 1291.\\nAfter a preliminary round of memoranda as to whether there\\nwas a final judgment establishing our appellate jurisdiction, we\\nallowed the case to proceed to briefing and argument, while\\nreserving judgment on the jurisdictional question.\\n II.\\n As in every case, the first question we must resolve is our\\njurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a\\nBetter Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012\\n(1998); In re Morse Elec. Co., 805 F.2d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 1986)\\n(citing In re Boomgarden, 780 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1985)).\\n\\n\\n2\\n None of the Charter defendants (who had been dismissed from the suit)\\nsigned the stipulated dismissal of West’s claims, which presents an\\ninteresting question of whether the stipulation was signed by “all defen-\\ndants” as Rule 41(a)(1)(A) requires. The Charter defendants contest the\\nvalidity of the dismissal on this basis, but in view of our conclusion below\\nthat West’s provisional dismissal of his claims against LG&E renders the\\njudgment non-final, we need not reach this issue.\\n\\f8 No. 18-1906\\n\\n Section 1291, which West invoked in filing this appeal,\\nrequires that a final judgment have been issued by the district\\ncourt. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“[t]he courts of appeals … shall\\nhave jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the\\ndistrict courts of the United States …”). A final judgment is one\\nthat ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the\\ndistrict court to do but execute the judgment. See Coopers &\\nLybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 2457 (1978)\\n(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631,\\n633 (1945)); Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Kagan, 724 F.3d 843, 847 (7th\\nCir. 2013); Kimbrell v. Brown, 651 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2011);\\nUnion Oil Co. of Cal. v. John Brown E&C, 121 F.3d 305, 309 (7th\\nCir. 1997).\\n The requirement of a final judgment is more than a mere\\nformality. Section 1291 reflects a strong preference for resolv-\\ning all disputed issues as to all parties in one appeal, to the\\nextent possible. See Arrow Gear Co. v. Downers Grove Sanitary\\nDist., 629 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 2010). Underlying that prefer-\\nence lies a legislative judgment that permitting multiple,\\npiecemeal appeals from a single action in the district court will\\nhave a “debilitating effect” on the efficient administration of\\njustice. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 471, 98 S. Ct. at 2459\\n(quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S. Ct.\\n2140, 2149 (1974)); see also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.\\n323, 325, 60 S. Ct. 540, 541 (1940).\\n The district court’s decision disposing of West’s claims\\nagainst the Charter defendants—which is what West is\\nappealing—was manifestly not a final decision. LG&E re-\\nmained as a defendant, and the district court had already\\ndenied LG&E’s two motions to dismiss the claims against it,\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 9\\n\\nreasoning that resolution of those claims would have to await\\nthe development of the facts. 2016 WL 6395918, at *3; 2018 WL\\n321685, at *3–*4. Certainly there was a substantial degree of\\noverlap in theory and in fact with the claims against the\\nCharter defendants. But at no time following the court’s\\ndismissal of West’s claims against the Charter defendants did\\nLG&E and/or West ask the court to enter a final, binding\\njudgment resolving the claims against LG&E based on the\\nrationale of the decision dismissing the Charter defendants.\\nInstead, the parties presented the court with a stipulation of\\ndismissal (without prejudice) which posited, with no substan-\\ntive analysis, that West’s claims against LG&E had been\\nrendered “moot” by the dismissal of the claims against the\\nCharter defendants. The district court’s decision rejecting the\\nstipulation of dismissal explained why, in its view, the decision\\nas to the Charter defendants did not (wholly) resolve the\\nviability of the claims against LG&E, and West has given us no\\nreason to doubt that the district court’s assessment was correct.\\nThere is no dispute, for example, that there is a nuisance claim\\nnaming LG&E alone that does not turn on the scope of the\\neasement between West and LG&E.3\\n Instead, intent on appealing the Charter dismissal without\\na final judgment as to LG&E, West and LG&E engineered a\\nprovisional dismissal of the claims against LG&E so as to bring\\nthe proceedings in the district court to a close, but without the\\n\\n\\n3\\n The nuisance claim, in fact, is based on the installation in 2013 of flashing\\nred (aviation warning) lights on the LG&E tower located on West’s\\nproperty, which has nothing whatever to do with Insight’s fiber optic cable.\\nSee R. 33 at 15.\\n\\f10 No. 18-1906\\n\\nbinding effects of a truly final judgment. By the terms of the\\ntolling and standstill agreement between these two parties, the\\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E is conditional: In the\\nevent this court were to affirm the dismissal of the claims\\nagainst the Charter defendants, West has agreed not to pursue\\nthe claims against LG&E. If, on the other hand, this court were\\nto reverse the dismissal of the Charter defendants, West has\\nreserved the right to reinstate the claims against LG&E; and, in\\nthe event of such reinstatement, both parties have agreed to\\nwaive any time-based defenses to claims they might have\\nagainst one another. In short, in the event West were to prevail\\nin this appeal, West and LG&E may pick up where they left off\\nin the district court. The dismissal appears to be conditional in\\na second respect as well. West has reserved the right to\\nterminate the tolling and standstill agreement on 14 days’\\nnotice to LG&E, at which point he would likewise be free to\\nreinstate the claims against LG&E and pursue them as if they\\nhad never been dismissed. Apart from the notice requirement,\\nthe agreement does not impose any condition upon West’s\\nright to exercise this right. So, for example, had West con-\\ncluded after oral arguments in this case that we were likely to\\naffirm the dismissal of the claims against the Charter defen-\\ndants, West would have been free to terminate the agreement\\nand resurrect the claims against LG&E without waiting for us\\nto rule on his appeal.\\n This conditional dismissal of the claims against LG&E\\nrepresents the very sort of attempt to manufacture appellate\\njurisdiction of which our precedents have consistently disap-\\nproved. As we stated in Union Oil, “[L]itigants and courts\\ncannot avoid the finality requirement of § 1291 by agreement.\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 11\\n\\nTo hold otherwise would allow litigants to circumvent the\\nrules that Congress has instructed as to the timing of appellate\\nproceedings.” 121 F.3d at 310 (citation omitted). We have thus\\nrepeatedly cited the absence of a final judgment when, after a\\ndispositive ruling as to some but not all claims or parties, the\\nparties have entered to a conditional dismissal of the remain-\\ning claims on terms that permit those claims to be revived at a\\nlater date. See Arrow Gear, 629 F.3d at 636–37 (following res\\njudicata dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for contribution against\\nsome but not all defendants, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its\\nclaims against two remaining defendants without prejudice);\\nUnion Oil, 121 F.3d at 309–11 (following dismissal and judg-\\nment on the pleadings as to some claims and partial summary\\njudgment limiting plaintiff’s damages as to remaining breach\\nof contract claim, parties stipulated to termination of proceed-\\nings in district court and agreed to release one another from\\nliability in event appeals court affirmed district court’s rulings\\nas to contract claim, but reserved right to pursue their respec-\\ntive rights under the contract and resume litigation in the\\ndistrict court in the event of reversal on appeal); see also Kagan,\\n724 F.3d at 846–47 (following judgment in favor of (deceased)\\ninsured’s wife and against his children in life insurer’s inter-\\npleader suit, wife filed Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to amend\\njudgment disputing amount of interest insurer had paid on\\npolicy proceeds, indicating that an active dispute between wife\\nand insurer remained in district court); Kimbrell, 651 F.3d at\\n757–58 (personal injury claims against truck driver’s employer\\ndismissed for want of diligence in serving process; but claim\\nagainst truck driver himself, which initially had been stayed\\ndue to driver’s pending bankruptcy, remained unresolved, as\\n\\f12 No. 18-1906\\n\\nevidenced by plaintiff’s re-filing of claim in new suit after stay\\nlifted); Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852,\\n856 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Claims dismissed without prejudice have\\nnot been disposed of, and any resulting judgment is not final\\nunless there is a clear legal bar to the claims’ revival.”); First\\nHealth Grp. Corp. v. BCE Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 801 (7th\\nCir. 2001) (collecting cases holding “that the dismissal of one\\nclaim or theory without prejudice, with a right to reactivate\\nthat claim after an appeal on the remaining theories, makes the\\njudgment non-final”).\\n As these cases make clear, the conditional nature of the\\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E negates the requisite\\nfinality of the judgment. Although West has nominally\\ndismissed his claims against LG&E, he retains the right,\\ndepending on the outcome of this appeal, to reinstate those\\nclaims and proceed as if the claims had never been dismissed\\nand no time had passed. In the words of Arrow Gear, “[t]his is\\na ‘start-over’ case.” 629 F.3d at 637.\\n Arrow could re-file the identical claim in the\\n same court against the two parties that it has\\n dropped, and, if it did, an appeal from the final\\n judgment in the new case would bring up to us\\n many of the same issues as an appeal from a\\n final judgment in this case would have done had\\n the two parties not been dropped.\\nId. What was true of the appellant in Arrow Gear is just as true\\nof West here. West and LG&E have attempted to construct a\\nnominally final judgment and open the door to an immediate\\nappeal by bringing the proceedings in the district court as to\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 13\\n\\nthe remaining defendant, LG&E, to a close, but on terms that\\nleave West’s options open as to LG&E depending on how he\\nfares against the Charter defendants in this appeal. The\\nresulting judgment is not, in practical effect, a final one, and\\nthat deprives us of appellate jurisdiction.\\n West’s desire to resolve the viability of its claims against the\\nCharter defendants on appeal now is understandable, and\\nperhaps even “noble” to the extent it is consistent with an\\nexpeditious resolution of the case. Union Oil, 121 F.3d at 309.\\nPutting aside the nuisance claim, the degree of substantive\\noverlap between the claims against the Charter defendants and\\nthe claims against LG&E appears to be substantial. West and\\nLG&E certainly agree that our interpretation of the Cable Act\\nand its application to LG&E’s easement across West’s property\\nwill effectively dictate the resolution of his claims against\\nLG&E (save perhaps for the nuisance claim) as well as his\\nclaims against the Charter defendants.\\n But, short of litigating the claims against LG&E to final\\njudgment, there were options open to West to pursue an\\nimmediate appeal as to the Charter defendants. As Judge\\nYoung pointed out, West could have asked the court to enter\\na final judgment as to the claims against the Charter defen-\\ndants pursuant to Rule 54(b), although that likely would have\\nbeen a stretch given the overlap with the claims against LG&E.\\nSee First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 801. Alternatively, West could\\nhave sought permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal\\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), on the theory that the decision\\nas to the Charter defendants “involves a controlling question\\nof law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of\\nopinion and that an immediate appeal from the [otherwise\\n\\f14 No. 18-1906\\n\\nnon-appealable] order may materially advance the ultimate\\ntermination of the litigation.” See First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at\\n801–02; see generally Sterk v. Redbox Auto. Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d\\n535, 536 (7th Cir. 2012); Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of\\nIll., 219 F.3d 674, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n West pursued neither of these options. He instead opted to\\npursue the same type of effort to fabricate a final judgment that\\nwe have rejected as a transparent effort to circumvent section\\n1291.\\n Even so, West might also have chosen to rectify the prob-\\nlem once we flagged the potential lack of a final judgment in\\nsoliciting jurisdictional memoranda from the parties and again\\nat oral argument. In other cases, we have deemed it sufficient\\nwhen a party has disavowed any right to pursue claims or\\nparties that have been dismissed without prejudice. See Chessie\\nLogistics, 867 F.3d at 856 (at oral argument, appellee unequivo-\\ncally agreed that its counterclaims, which had been dismissed\\nwithout prejudice in the district court, should be dismissed\\nwith prejudice); Kagan, 724 F.3d at 847 (appellee’s jurisdictional\\nmemorandum disclaimed any intent to seek further amend-\\nment of judgment as to dismissed defendant); Arrow Gear, 629\\nF.3d at 637 (appellant’s lawyer committed at oral argument not\\nto re-file suit against two defendants that had been voluntarily\\ndismissed without prejudice); First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 802\\n(at oral argument, appellant’s lawyer elected to dismiss\\nremaining trademark claims unconditionally, so that they\\ncould not be reinstated regardless of outcome of appeal).\\n But West has never disclaimed the right to resurrect his\\nclaims against LG&E that his agreement with LG&E expressly\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 15\\n\\nreserves to him. To the contrary, at oral argument, after the\\nCharter defendants’ counsel construed the initial remarks of\\nWest’s counsel to constitute such a disclaimer and abandoned\\n(to our surprise) their contention that we lack jurisdiction,\\nWest’s counsel reiterated in rebuttal that the dismissal of\\nLG&E was conditional, as the terms of the tolling agreement\\nmake clear it is. Certainly it is West’s right to preserve his\\nclaims against LG&E. But his refusal to surrender them\\nunequivocally at this juncture makes clear that the judgment\\nin this case is non-final.\\n There is, consequently, no final judgment as required by\\nsection 1291. The parties did not litigate West’s claims against\\nLG&E to a final judgment, and their agreed-upon dismissal of\\nthose claims allows West to reinstate them in the district court\\ndepending upon the outcome of this appeal (were it permitted\\nto proceed). Our precedents foreclose this attempt to manufac-\\nture appellate jurisdiction by producing a judgment which has\\nthe appearance but not the binding quality of finality.\\n III.\\n For the reasons we have discussed above, we DISMISS the\\nappeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1691,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607196,"string":"4,607,196"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Stephen West v. Charter Communications, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1906"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-1906\\n\\nSTEPHEN R. WEST,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nLOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC\\nCOMPANY,\\n Defendant,\\n\\n\\nand\\n\\n\\n\\nCHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,\\nINC., et al.,\\n\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\\n No. 4:16-cv-00145-RLY-DML — Richard L. Young, Judge.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1906\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 28, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 4, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. In this diversity action, plaintiff\\nStephen West contends that the addition of a fiber optic\\ncommunications wire to a utilities transmission tower on his\\nproperty exceeds the scope of the utilities easement that\\nauthorized the tower. West sued both Charter Communica-\\ntions, Inc. (“Charter”), whose subsidiary installed the wire, and\\nLouisville Gas and Electric Company (“Louisville”), which\\nowns the tower and is a party to the easement. The district\\ncourt dismissed the claims against Charter, concluding that the\\naddition of Charter’s communications wire to the tower is\\ncompatible with the scope and purpose of the easement and\\nconsequently does not violate the terms of the easement\\nagreement nor does it amount to an unconstitutional taking of\\nWest’s property. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018 WL\\n321686 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). Wishing to appeal that ruling,\\nWest entered into an agreement with Louisville providing that\\nhe would voluntarily dismiss his claims against Louisville,\\nwhile reserving the right to revive them in the event we\\nreversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against\\nCharter. West then filed a notice of appeal pursuant to\\n28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the conditional dismissal of West’s\\nclaims against Louisville renders the judgment non-final, we\\ndismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 3\\n\\n I.\\n West inherited a small plot of land from his parents in\\nJeffersonville, Indiana that abuts the Ohio River, which\\ndemarcates the border between Indiana and Kentucky.1 A\\nmassive utility transmission tower some 248 feet tall sits on the\\nproperty, carrying LG&E power lines that run between the two\\nstates. The tower and the power lines are authorized by a 1938\\nutility easement entered into by the predecessors of West (and\\nhis parents) and LG&E, as amended by a supplemental\\nagreement in 1976. Broadly speaking, the easement grants to\\nLG&E the perpetual right to install and maintain towers and\\nwires “for the transmission, distribution and delivery of\\nelectrical energy to the Grantee [LG&E] and other persons and\\nconcerns and to the public in general for light, heat, power,\\ntelephone and/or other purposes in, upon, along and over the\\nreal estate of the Grantor [West] … .” R. 33-1 at 2. West’s\\nparents rejected a further amendment to the deed of easement\\nproposed by LG&E in 1990 which would have authorized\\nLG&E to “upgrade and remove communications and tele-\\nphone systems… .” R. 33-4 at 2.\\n In 2000, LG&E entered into a contract with Insight Ken-\\ntucky Partners II, LP (“Insight”), a subsidiary of Time Warner\\nCable, Inc. (“Time Warner”), granting Insight permission to\\nrun fiber optic cables across LG&E’s existing infrastructure.\\nInsight proceeded to run a fiber optic cable carrying television\\nand internet content and services across West’s property via\\n\\n\\n1\\n Jeffersonville is situated directly across the Ohio River from Louisville,\\nKentucky.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1906\\n\\nthe LG&E tower; Insight’s cable replaced an existing static wire\\non that tower. Time Warner, Insight’s parent corporation, was\\nlater acquired by Charter. We shall refer to Charter and its\\npredecessors collectively as the Charter defendants.\\n In 2016, West filed suit against LG&E in state court, seeking\\na declaratory judgment that the easement did not authorize\\nInsight’s fiber optic cable. West also asserted claims for breach\\nof contract, trespass, and unjust enrichment. LG&E removed\\nthe case to federal court. After the district court denied LG&E’s\\nmotion to dismiss West’s claims, reasoning that there were\\nfactual questions as to the scope of LG&E’s rights under the\\neasement, West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2016 WL 6395918,\\nat *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 28, 2016), West amended his complaint to\\nname Insight, Time Warner, and Charter as additional defen-\\ndants and also to add new claims to the suit. The amended\\ncomplaint asserted claims against both LG&E and the Charter\\ndefendants for declaratory judgment, trespass, unjust enrich-\\nment, as well as claims for (tortious) conversion and criminal\\ntrespass. LG&E alone was also named in a new claim for\\nnuisance. LG&E filed a second, partial motion to dismiss\\naimed at the conversion and criminal trespass claims, but the\\ndistrict court denied that motion, concluding in view of the\\nfacts alleged that the complaint stated plausible claims for\\nrelief in these respects. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018\\nWL 321685, at *2–*4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). LG&E subsequently\\nfiled a cross-claim for indemnification against the Charter\\ndefendants.\\n Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the\\nCharter defendants moved to dismiss all of West’s claims\\nagainst them, arguing principally that because the easement\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 5\\n\\nover West’s property had already been dedicated for a utility\\nuse that is compatible with cable television transmission, the\\naddition of Insight’s fiber optic wire was statutorily authorized\\nby section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of\\n1984, 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (the “Cable Act”).\\n The district court agreed with the Charter defendants and\\ngranted their motion to dismiss. 2018 WL 321686. The court\\ndetermined that the easement across West’s property had been\\ndedicated for utility use, id. at *5, and that the running of fiber\\noptic cables across that easement for the purpose of providing\\npaid television, internet, and communications services amount-\\ned to a permissible compatible use under the Cable Act, id. The\\ncourt went on to conclude that the Cable Act did not\\nimpermissibly burden West’s property rights retroactively, nor\\ndid it constitute a constitutionally prohibited taking of his\\nproperty. Id. at *5–*6. Because it found that Insight’s use of the\\neasement over West’s property to be authorized, the court\\ndismissed all claims against the Charter defendants. Id. at *6\\nThat decision left LG&E as the sole remaining defendant on\\nWest’s claims.\\n West and LG&E subsequently filed a joint stipulation\\nasking the court to dismiss the claims against LG&E and close\\nthe case, R. 88, but the district court denied that request, R. 91.\\nAlthough the stipulation posited that West’s claims against\\nLG&E were “moot” in view of the district court’s decision\\ndismissing the claims against the Charter defendants, R. 88 at\\n2 ¶3, the district court rejected that assertion. The court\\nreasoned that there was still a live controversy as to whether\\nthe easement itself permitted LG&E to install and maintain\\nInsight’s fiber optic cable on LG&E’s infrastructure. R. 91 at\\n\\f6 No. 18-1906\\n\\n2–3. The court also noted that the stipulation was unclear as to\\nwhether the proposed dismissal of the claims against LG&E\\nwas to be with or without prejudice; but the court construed\\nthe stipulated dismissal to be without prejudice, which would\\npermit West to revive these claims in the event the dismissal of\\nthe claims against the Charter defendants was reversed on\\nappeal. R. 91 at 3. That, in turn, led the court to conclude that,\\nnotwithstanding the proposed dismissal of the claims against\\nLG&E, a final judgment was not yet at hand. R. 91 at 3. The\\ncourt indicated that the parties had three options open to them:\\n(1) continue litigating the merits of West’s claims against LG&E\\nto a final judgment; (2) stipulate to the dismissal of these claims\\nwith prejudice; or (3) seek a certification of a final judgment as\\nto fewer than all parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 54(b). R. 91 at 3–4.\\n Rather than pursuing any of these options, West and LG&E\\npursued a fourth option in the hope of creating a final judg-\\nment that would open the door to this appeal. The two parties\\nentered into a tolling and standstill agreement which provided\\nfor the voluntary dismissal of West’s claims against LG& E for\\nthe duration of, and conditioned upon the outcome of, his\\nappeal of the dismissal of the claims against the Charter\\ndefendants. App. R. 7-3 Ex. B. West and LG&E agreed that the\\nstatute of limitations as to any claims between them would be\\ntolled for the duration of the agreement and that, in the event\\nWest prevailed in his appeal, LG&E would not object to the re-\\nfiling of his claims against LG&E nor assert any timeliness\\ndefenses to the claims. If, on the other hand, West did not\\nprevail in the appeal, West agreed he would not re-file his\\npending claims against LG&E nor any other claims arising out\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 7\\n\\nof the same facts. By its terms, the agreement was to remain in\\neffect until such time as the appeal was decided or West\\nterminated the agreement on 14 days’ notice, at which point an\\naction filed by either party would be deemed filed as of the\\ndate West’s suit was originally filed in 2016. App. R. 7-3.\\nPursuant to this agreement, West voluntarily dismissed all of\\nhis claims against LG&E by stipulation (signed by attorneys for\\nWest and LG&E) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\\n41(a)(1)(A)(ii). R. 98.2 LG&E in turn voluntarily dismissed its\\ncross-claim against the Charter defendants without prejudice\\npursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)((a)(i). R. 95.\\n West then appealed to this court pursuant to section 1291.\\nAfter a preliminary round of memoranda as to whether there\\nwas a final judgment establishing our appellate jurisdiction, we\\nallowed the case to proceed to briefing and argument, while\\nreserving judgment on the jurisdictional question.\\n II.\\n As in every case, the first question we must resolve is our\\njurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a\\nBetter Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012\\n(1998); In re Morse Elec. Co., 805 F.2d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 1986)\\n(citing In re Boomgarden, 780 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1985)).\\n\\n\\n2\\n None of the Charter defendants (who had been dismissed from the suit)\\nsigned the stipulated dismissal of West’s claims, which presents an\\ninteresting question of whether the stipulation was signed by “all defen-\\ndants” as Rule 41(a)(1)(A) requires. The Charter defendants contest the\\nvalidity of the dismissal on this basis, but in view of our conclusion below\\nthat West’s provisional dismissal of his claims against LG&E renders the\\njudgment non-final, we need not reach this issue.\\n\\f8 No. 18-1906\\n\\n Section 1291, which West invoked in filing this appeal,\\nrequires that a final judgment have been issued by the district\\ncourt. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“[t]he courts of appeals … shall\\nhave jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the\\ndistrict courts of the United States …”). A final judgment is one\\nthat ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the\\ndistrict court to do but execute the judgment. See Coopers &\\nLybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 2457 (1978)\\n(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631,\\n633 (1945)); Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Kagan, 724 F.3d 843, 847 (7th\\nCir. 2013); Kimbrell v. Brown, 651 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2011);\\nUnion Oil Co. of Cal. v. John Brown E&C, 121 F.3d 305, 309 (7th\\nCir. 1997).\\n The requirement of a final judgment is more than a mere\\nformality. Section 1291 reflects a strong preference for resolv-\\ning all disputed issues as to all parties in one appeal, to the\\nextent possible. See Arrow Gear Co. v. Downers Grove Sanitary\\nDist., 629 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 2010). Underlying that prefer-\\nence lies a legislative judgment that permitting multiple,\\npiecemeal appeals from a single action in the district court will\\nhave a “debilitating effect” on the efficient administration of\\njustice. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 471, 98 S. Ct. at 2459\\n(quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S. Ct.\\n2140, 2149 (1974)); see also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.\\n323, 325, 60 S. Ct. 540, 541 (1940).\\n The district court’s decision disposing of West’s claims\\nagainst the Charter defendants—which is what West is\\nappealing—was manifestly not a final decision. LG&E re-\\nmained as a defendant, and the district court had already\\ndenied LG&E’s two motions to dismiss the claims against it,\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 9\\n\\nreasoning that resolution of those claims would have to await\\nthe development of the facts. 2016 WL 6395918, at *3; 2018 WL\\n321685, at *3–*4. Certainly there was a substantial degree of\\noverlap in theory and in fact with the claims against the\\nCharter defendants. But at no time following the court’s\\ndismissal of West’s claims against the Charter defendants did\\nLG&E and/or West ask the court to enter a final, binding\\njudgment resolving the claims against LG&E based on the\\nrationale of the decision dismissing the Charter defendants.\\nInstead, the parties presented the court with a stipulation of\\ndismissal (without prejudice) which posited, with no substan-\\ntive analysis, that West’s claims against LG&E had been\\nrendered “moot” by the dismissal of the claims against the\\nCharter defendants. The district court’s decision rejecting the\\nstipulation of dismissal explained why, in its view, the decision\\nas to the Charter defendants did not (wholly) resolve the\\nviability of the claims against LG&E, and West has given us no\\nreason to doubt that the district court’s assessment was correct.\\nThere is no dispute, for example, that there is a nuisance claim\\nnaming LG&E alone that does not turn on the scope of the\\neasement between West and LG&E.3\\n Instead, intent on appealing the Charter dismissal without\\na final judgment as to LG&E, West and LG&E engineered a\\nprovisional dismissal of the claims against LG&E so as to bring\\nthe proceedings in the district court to a close, but without the\\n\\n\\n3\\n The nuisance claim, in fact, is based on the installation in 2013 of flashing\\nred (aviation warning) lights on the LG&E tower located on West’s\\nproperty, which has nothing whatever to do with Insight’s fiber optic cable.\\nSee R. 33 at 15.\\n\\f10 No. 18-1906\\n\\nbinding effects of a truly final judgment. By the terms of the\\ntolling and standstill agreement between these two parties, the\\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E is conditional: In the\\nevent this court were to affirm the dismissal of the claims\\nagainst the Charter defendants, West has agreed not to pursue\\nthe claims against LG&E. If, on the other hand, this court were\\nto reverse the dismissal of the Charter defendants, West has\\nreserved the right to reinstate the claims against LG&E; and, in\\nthe event of such reinstatement, both parties have agreed to\\nwaive any time-based defenses to claims they might have\\nagainst one another. In short, in the event West were to prevail\\nin this appeal, West and LG&E may pick up where they left off\\nin the district court. The dismissal appears to be conditional in\\na second respect as well. West has reserved the right to\\nterminate the tolling and standstill agreement on 14 days’\\nnotice to LG&E, at which point he would likewise be free to\\nreinstate the claims against LG&E and pursue them as if they\\nhad never been dismissed. Apart from the notice requirement,\\nthe agreement does not impose any condition upon West’s\\nright to exercise this right. So, for example, had West con-\\ncluded after oral arguments in this case that we were likely to\\naffirm the dismissal of the claims against the Charter defen-\\ndants, West would have been free to terminate the agreement\\nand resurrect the claims against LG&E without waiting for us\\nto rule on his appeal.\\n This conditional dismissal of the claims against LG&E\\nrepresents the very sort of attempt to manufacture appellate\\njurisdiction of which our precedents have consistently disap-\\nproved. As we stated in Union Oil, “[L]itigants and courts\\ncannot avoid the finality requirement of § 1291 by agreement.\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 11\\n\\nTo hold otherwise would allow litigants to circumvent the\\nrules that Congress has instructed as to the timing of appellate\\nproceedings.” 121 F.3d at 310 (citation omitted). We have thus\\nrepeatedly cited the absence of a final judgment when, after a\\ndispositive ruling as to some but not all claims or parties, the\\nparties have entered to a conditional dismissal of the remain-\\ning claims on terms that permit those claims to be revived at a\\nlater date. See Arrow Gear, 629 F.3d at 636–37 (following res\\njudicata dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for contribution against\\nsome but not all defendants, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its\\nclaims against two remaining defendants without prejudice);\\nUnion Oil, 121 F.3d at 309–11 (following dismissal and judg-\\nment on the pleadings as to some claims and partial summary\\njudgment limiting plaintiff’s damages as to remaining breach\\nof contract claim, parties stipulated to termination of proceed-\\nings in district court and agreed to release one another from\\nliability in event appeals court affirmed district court’s rulings\\nas to contract claim, but reserved right to pursue their respec-\\ntive rights under the contract and resume litigation in the\\ndistrict court in the event of reversal on appeal); see also Kagan,\\n724 F.3d at 846–47 (following judgment in favor of (deceased)\\ninsured’s wife and against his children in life insurer’s inter-\\npleader suit, wife filed Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to amend\\njudgment disputing amount of interest insurer had paid on\\npolicy proceeds, indicating that an active dispute between wife\\nand insurer remained in district court); Kimbrell, 651 F.3d at\\n757–58 (personal injury claims against truck driver’s employer\\ndismissed for want of diligence in serving process; but claim\\nagainst truck driver himself, which initially had been stayed\\ndue to driver’s pending bankruptcy, remained unresolved, as\\n\\f12 No. 18-1906\\n\\nevidenced by plaintiff’s re-filing of claim in new suit after stay\\nlifted); Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852,\\n856 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Claims dismissed without prejudice have\\nnot been disposed of, and any resulting judgment is not final\\nunless there is a clear legal bar to the claims’ revival.”); First\\nHealth Grp. Corp. v. BCE Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 801 (7th\\nCir. 2001) (collecting cases holding “that the dismissal of one\\nclaim or theory without prejudice, with a right to reactivate\\nthat claim after an appeal on the remaining theories, makes the\\njudgment non-final”).\\n As these cases make clear, the conditional nature of the\\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E negates the requisite\\nfinality of the judgment. Although West has nominally\\ndismissed his claims against LG&E, he retains the right,\\ndepending on the outcome of this appeal, to reinstate those\\nclaims and proceed as if the claims had never been dismissed\\nand no time had passed. In the words of Arrow Gear, “[t]his is\\na ‘start-over’ case.” 629 F.3d at 637.\\n Arrow could re-file the identical claim in the\\n same court against the two parties that it has\\n dropped, and, if it did, an appeal from the final\\n judgment in the new case would bring up to us\\n many of the same issues as an appeal from a\\n final judgment in this case would have done had\\n the two parties not been dropped.\\nId. What was true of the appellant in Arrow Gear is just as true\\nof West here. West and LG&E have attempted to construct a\\nnominally final judgment and open the door to an immediate\\nappeal by bringing the proceedings in the district court as to\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 13\\n\\nthe remaining defendant, LG&E, to a close, but on terms that\\nleave West’s options open as to LG&E depending on how he\\nfares against the Charter defendants in this appeal. The\\nresulting judgment is not, in practical effect, a final one, and\\nthat deprives us of appellate jurisdiction.\\n West’s desire to resolve the viability of its claims against the\\nCharter defendants on appeal now is understandable, and\\nperhaps even “noble” to the extent it is consistent with an\\nexpeditious resolution of the case. Union Oil, 121 F.3d at 309.\\nPutting aside the nuisance claim, the degree of substantive\\noverlap between the claims against the Charter defendants and\\nthe claims against LG&E appears to be substantial. West and\\nLG&E certainly agree that our interpretation of the Cable Act\\nand its application to LG&E’s easement across West’s property\\nwill effectively dictate the resolution of his claims against\\nLG&E (save perhaps for the nuisance claim) as well as his\\nclaims against the Charter defendants.\\n But, short of litigating the claims against LG&E to final\\njudgment, there were options open to West to pursue an\\nimmediate appeal as to the Charter defendants. As Judge\\nYoung pointed out, West could have asked the court to enter\\na final judgment as to the claims against the Charter defen-\\ndants pursuant to Rule 54(b), although that likely would have\\nbeen a stretch given the overlap with the claims against LG&E.\\nSee First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 801. Alternatively, West could\\nhave sought permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal\\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), on the theory that the decision\\nas to the Charter defendants “involves a controlling question\\nof law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of\\nopinion and that an immediate appeal from the [otherwise\\n\\f14 No. 18-1906\\n\\nnon-appealable] order may materially advance the ultimate\\ntermination of the litigation.” See First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at\\n801–02; see generally Sterk v. Redbox Auto. Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d\\n535, 536 (7th Cir. 2012); Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of\\nIll., 219 F.3d 674, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n West pursued neither of these options. He instead opted to\\npursue the same type of effort to fabricate a final judgment that\\nwe have rejected as a transparent effort to circumvent section\\n1291.\\n Even so, West might also have chosen to rectify the prob-\\nlem once we flagged the potential lack of a final judgment in\\nsoliciting jurisdictional memoranda from the parties and again\\nat oral argument. In other cases, we have deemed it sufficient\\nwhen a party has disavowed any right to pursue claims or\\nparties that have been dismissed without prejudice. See Chessie\\nLogistics, 867 F.3d at 856 (at oral argument, appellee unequivo-\\ncally agreed that its counterclaims, which had been dismissed\\nwithout prejudice in the district court, should be dismissed\\nwith prejudice); Kagan, 724 F.3d at 847 (appellee’s jurisdictional\\nmemorandum disclaimed any intent to seek further amend-\\nment of judgment as to dismissed defendant); Arrow Gear, 629\\nF.3d at 637 (appellant’s lawyer committed at oral argument not\\nto re-file suit against two defendants that had been voluntarily\\ndismissed without prejudice); First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 802\\n(at oral argument, appellant’s lawyer elected to dismiss\\nremaining trademark claims unconditionally, so that they\\ncould not be reinstated regardless of outcome of appeal).\\n But West has never disclaimed the right to resurrect his\\nclaims against LG&E that his agreement with LG&E expressly\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 15\\n\\nreserves to him. To the contrary, at oral argument, after the\\nCharter defendants’ counsel construed the initial remarks of\\nWest’s counsel to constitute such a disclaimer and abandoned\\n(to our surprise) their contention that we lack jurisdiction,\\nWest’s counsel reiterated in rebuttal that the dismissal of\\nLG&E was conditional, as the terms of the tolling agreement\\nmake clear it is. Certainly it is West’s right to preserve his\\nclaims against LG&E. But his refusal to surrender them\\nunequivocally at this juncture makes clear that the judgment\\nin this case is non-final.\\n There is, consequently, no final judgment as required by\\nsection 1291. The parties did not litigate West’s claims against\\nLG&E to a final judgment, and their agreed-upon dismissal of\\nthose claims allows West to reinstate them in the district court\\ndepending upon the outcome of this appeal (were it permitted\\nto proceed). Our precedents foreclose this attempt to manufac-\\nture appellate jurisdiction by producing a judgment which has\\nthe appearance but not the binding quality of finality.\\n III.\\n For the reasons we have discussed above, we DISMISS the\\nappeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384449/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607196/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Stephen West v. Charter Communications, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1906\n\nSTEPHEN R. WEST,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n\nLOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC\nCOMPANY,\n Defendant,\n\n\nand\n\n\n\nCHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,\nINC., et al.,\n\n Defendants-Appellees.\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\n No. 4:16-cv-00145-RLY-DML — Richard L. Young, Judge.\n\f2 No. 18-1906\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 28, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 4, 2019\n\n\n Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. In this diversity action, plaintiff\nStephen West contends that the addition of a fiber optic\ncommunications wire to a utilities transmission tower on his\nproperty exceeds the scope of the utilities easement that\nauthorized the tower. West sued both Charter Communica-\ntions, Inc. (“Charter”), whose subsidiary installed the wire, and\nLouisville Gas and Electric Company (“Louisville”), which\nowns the tower and is a party to the easement. The district\ncourt dismissed the claims against Charter, concluding that the\naddition of Charter’s communications wire to the tower is\ncompatible with the scope and purpose of the easement and\nconsequently does not violate the terms of the easement\nagreement nor does it amount to an unconstitutional taking of\nWest’s property. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018 WL\n321686 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). Wishing to appeal that ruling,\nWest entered into an agreement with Louisville providing that\nhe would voluntarily dismiss his claims against Louisville,\nwhile reserving the right to revive them in the event we\nreversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against\nCharter. West then filed a notice of appeal pursuant to\n28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the conditional dismissal of West’s\nclaims against Louisville renders the judgment non-final, we\ndismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.\n\fNo. 18-1906 3\n\n I.\n West inherited a small plot of land from his parents in\nJeffersonville, Indiana that abuts the Ohio River, which\ndemarcates the border between Indiana and Kentucky.1 A\nmassive utility transmission tower some 248 feet tall sits on the\nproperty, carrying LG&E power lines that run between the two\nstates. The tower and the power lines are authorized by a 1938\nutility easement entered into by the predecessors of West (and\nhis parents) and LG&E, as amended by a supplemental\nagreement in 1976. Broadly speaking, the easement grants to\nLG&E the perpetual right to install and maintain towers and\nwires “for the transmission, distribution and delivery of\nelectrical energy to the Grantee [LG&E] and other persons and\nconcerns and to the public in general for light, heat, power,\ntelephone and/or other purposes in, upon, along and over the\nreal estate of the Grantor [West] … .” R. 33-1 at 2. West’s\nparents rejected a further amendment to the deed of easement\nproposed by LG&E in 1990 which would have authorized\nLG&E to “upgrade and remove communications and tele-\nphone systems… .” R. 33-4 at 2.\n In 2000, LG&E entered into a contract with Insight Ken-\ntucky Partners II, LP (“Insight”), a subsidiary of Time Warner\nCable, Inc. (“Time Warner”), granting Insight permission to\nrun fiber optic cables across LG&E’s existing infrastructure.\nInsight proceeded to run a fiber optic cable carrying television\nand internet content and services across West’s property via\n\n\n1\n Jeffersonville is situated directly across the Ohio River from Louisville,\nKentucky.\n\f4 No. 18-1906\n\nthe LG&E tower; Insight’s cable replaced an existing static wire\non that tower. Time Warner, Insight’s parent corporation, was\nlater acquired by Charter. We shall refer to Charter and its\npredecessors collectively as the Charter defendants.\n In 2016, West filed suit against LG&E in state court, seeking\na declaratory judgment that the easement did not authorize\nInsight’s fiber optic cable. West also asserted claims for breach\nof contract, trespass, and unjust enrichment. LG&E removed\nthe case to federal court. After the district court denied LG&E’s\nmotion to dismiss West’s claims, reasoning that there were\nfactual questions as to the scope of LG&E’s rights under the\neasement, West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2016 WL 6395918,\nat *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 28, 2016), West amended his complaint to\nname Insight, Time Warner, and Charter as additional defen-\ndants and also to add new claims to the suit. The amended\ncomplaint asserted claims against both LG&E and the Charter\ndefendants for declaratory judgment, trespass, unjust enrich-\nment, as well as claims for (tortious) conversion and criminal\ntrespass. LG&E alone was also named in a new claim for\nnuisance. LG&E filed a second, partial motion to dismiss\naimed at the conversion and criminal trespass claims, but the\ndistrict court denied that motion, concluding in view of the\nfacts alleged that the complaint stated plausible claims for\nrelief in these respects. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018\nWL 321685, at *2–*4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). LG&E subsequently\nfiled a cross-claim for indemnification against the Charter\ndefendants.\n Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the\nCharter defendants moved to dismiss all of West’s claims\nagainst them, arguing principally that because the easement\n\fNo. 18-1906 5\n\nover West’s property had already been dedicated for a utility\nuse that is compatible with cable television transmission, the\naddition of Insight’s fiber optic wire was statutorily authorized\nby section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of\n1984, 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (the “Cable Act”).\n The district court agreed with the Charter defendants and\ngranted their motion to dismiss. 2018 WL 321686. The court\ndetermined that the easement across West’s property had been\ndedicated for utility use, id. at *5, and that the running of fiber\noptic cables across that easement for the purpose of providing\npaid television, internet, and communications services amount-\ned to a permissible compatible use under the Cable Act, id. The\ncourt went on to conclude that the Cable Act did not\nimpermissibly burden West’s property rights retroactively, nor\ndid it constitute a constitutionally prohibited taking of his\nproperty. Id. at *5–*6. Because it found that Insight’s use of the\neasement over West’s property to be authorized, the court\ndismissed all claims against the Charter defendants. Id. at *6\nThat decision left LG&E as the sole remaining defendant on\nWest’s claims.\n West and LG&E subsequently filed a joint stipulation\nasking the court to dismiss the claims against LG&E and close\nthe case, R. 88, but the district court denied that request, R. 91.\nAlthough the stipulation posited that West’s claims against\nLG&E were “moot” in view of the district court’s decision\ndismissing the claims against the Charter defendants, R. 88 at\n2 ¶3, the district court rejected that assertion. The court\nreasoned that there was still a live controversy as to whether\nthe easement itself permitted LG&E to install and maintain\nInsight’s fiber optic cable on LG&E’s infrastructure. R. 91 at\n\f6 No. 18-1906\n\n2–3. The court also noted that the stipulation was unclear as to\nwhether the proposed dismissal of the claims against LG&E\nwas to be with or without prejudice; but the court construed\nthe stipulated dismissal to be without prejudice, which would\npermit West to revive these claims in the event the dismissal of\nthe claims against the Charter defendants was reversed on\nappeal. R. 91 at 3. That, in turn, led the court to conclude that,\nnotwithstanding the proposed dismissal of the claims against\nLG&E, a final judgment was not yet at hand. R. 91 at 3. The\ncourt indicated that the parties had three options open to them:\n(1) continue litigating the merits of West’s claims against LG&E\nto a final judgment; (2) stipulate to the dismissal of these claims\nwith prejudice; or (3) seek a certification of a final judgment as\nto fewer than all parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil\nProcedure 54(b). R. 91 at 3–4.\n Rather than pursuing any of these options, West and LG&E\npursued a fourth option in the hope of creating a final judg-\nment that would open the door to this appeal. The two parties\nentered into a tolling and standstill agreement which provided\nfor the voluntary dismissal of West’s claims against LG& E for\nthe duration of, and conditioned upon the outcome of, his\nappeal of the dismissal of the claims against the Charter\ndefendants. App. R. 7-3 Ex. B. West and LG&E agreed that the\nstatute of limitations as to any claims between them would be\ntolled for the duration of the agreement and that, in the event\nWest prevailed in his appeal, LG&E would not object to the re-\nfiling of his claims against LG&E nor assert any timeliness\ndefenses to the claims. If, on the other hand, West did not\nprevail in the appeal, West agreed he would not re-file his\npending claims against LG&E nor any other claims arising out\n\fNo. 18-1906 7\n\nof the same facts. By its terms, the agreement was to remain in\neffect until such time as the appeal was decided or West\nterminated the agreement on 14 days’ notice, at which point an\naction filed by either party would be deemed filed as of the\ndate West’s suit was originally filed in 2016. App. R. 7-3.\nPursuant to this agreement, West voluntarily dismissed all of\nhis claims against LG&E by stipulation (signed by attorneys for\nWest and LG&E) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\n41(a)(1)(A)(ii). R. 98.2 LG&E in turn voluntarily dismissed its\ncross-claim against the Charter defendants without prejudice\npursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)((a)(i). R. 95.\n West then appealed to this court pursuant to section 1291.\nAfter a preliminary round of memoranda as to whether there\nwas a final judgment establishing our appellate jurisdiction, we\nallowed the case to proceed to briefing and argument, while\nreserving judgment on the jurisdictional question.\n II.\n As in every case, the first question we must resolve is our\njurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a\nBetter Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012\n(1998); In re Morse Elec. Co., 805 F.2d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 1986)\n(citing In re Boomgarden, 780 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1985)).\n\n\n2\n None of the Charter defendants (who had been dismissed from the suit)\nsigned the stipulated dismissal of West’s claims, which presents an\ninteresting question of whether the stipulation was signed by “all defen-\ndants” as Rule 41(a)(1)(A) requires. The Charter defendants contest the\nvalidity of the dismissal on this basis, but in view of our conclusion below\nthat West’s provisional dismissal of his claims against LG&E renders the\njudgment non-final, we need not reach this issue.\n\f8 No. 18-1906\n\n Section 1291, which West invoked in filing this appeal,\nrequires that a final judgment have been issued by the district\ncourt. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“[t]he courts of appeals … shall\nhave jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the\ndistrict courts of the United States …”). A final judgment is one\nthat ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the\ndistrict court to do but execute the judgment. See Coopers &\nLybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 2457 (1978)\n(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631,\n633 (1945)); Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Kagan, 724 F.3d 843, 847 (7th\nCir. 2013); Kimbrell v. Brown, 651 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2011);\nUnion Oil Co. of Cal. v. John Brown E&C, 121 F.3d 305, 309 (7th\nCir. 1997).\n The requirement of a final judgment is more than a mere\nformality. Section 1291 reflects a strong preference for resolv-\ning all disputed issues as to all parties in one appeal, to the\nextent possible. See Arrow Gear Co. v. Downers Grove Sanitary\nDist., 629 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 2010). Underlying that prefer-\nence lies a legislative judgment that permitting multiple,\npiecemeal appeals from a single action in the district court will\nhave a “debilitating effect” on the efficient administration of\njustice. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 471, 98 S. Ct. at 2459\n(quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S. Ct.\n2140, 2149 (1974)); see also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.\n323, 325, 60 S. Ct. 540, 541 (1940).\n The district court’s decision disposing of West’s claims\nagainst the Charter defendants—which is what West is\nappealing—was manifestly not a final decision. LG&E re-\nmained as a defendant, and the district court had already\ndenied LG&E’s two motions to dismiss the claims against it,\n\fNo. 18-1906 9\n\nreasoning that resolution of those claims would have to await\nthe development of the facts. 2016 WL 6395918, at *3; 2018 WL\n321685, at *3–*4. Certainly there was a substantial degree of\noverlap in theory and in fact with the claims against the\nCharter defendants. But at no time following the court’s\ndismissal of West’s claims against the Charter defendants did\nLG&E and/or West ask the court to enter a final, binding\njudgment resolving the claims against LG&E based on the\nrationale of the decision dismissing the Charter defendants.\nInstead, the parties presented the court with a stipulation of\ndismissal (without prejudice) which posited, with no substan-\ntive analysis, that West’s claims against LG&E had been\nrendered “moot” by the dismissal of the claims against the\nCharter defendants. The district court’s decision rejecting the\nstipulation of dismissal explained why, in its view, the decision\nas to the Charter defendants did not (wholly) resolve the\nviability of the claims against LG&E, and West has given us no\nreason to doubt that the district court’s assessment was correct.\nThere is no dispute, for example, that there is a nuisance claim\nnaming LG&E alone that does not turn on the scope of the\neasement between West and LG&E.3\n Instead, intent on appealing the Charter dismissal without\na final judgment as to LG&E, West and LG&E engineered a\nprovisional dismissal of the claims against LG&E so as to bring\nthe proceedings in the district court to a close, but without the\n\n\n3\n The nuisance claim, in fact, is based on the installation in 2013 of flashing\nred (aviation warning) lights on the LG&E tower located on West’s\nproperty, which has nothing whatever to do with Insight’s fiber optic cable.\nSee R. 33 at 15.\n\f10 No. 18-1906\n\nbinding effects of a truly final judgment. By the terms of the\ntolling and standstill agreement between these two parties, the\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E is conditional: In the\nevent this court were to affirm the dismissal of the claims\nagainst the Charter defendants, West has agreed not to pursue\nthe claims against LG&E. If, on the other hand, this court were\nto reverse the dismissal of the Charter defendants, West has\nreserved the right to reinstate the claims against LG&E; and, in\nthe event of such reinstatement, both parties have agreed to\nwaive any time-based defenses to claims they might have\nagainst one another. In short, in the event West were to prevail\nin this appeal, West and LG&E may pick up where they left off\nin the district court. The dismissal appears to be conditional in\na second respect as well. West has reserved the right to\nterminate the tolling and standstill agreement on 14 days’\nnotice to LG&E, at which point he would likewise be free to\nreinstate the claims against LG&E and pursue them as if they\nhad never been dismissed. Apart from the notice requirement,\nthe agreement does not impose any condition upon West’s\nright to exercise this right. So, for example, had West con-\ncluded after oral arguments in this case that we were likely to\naffirm the dismissal of the claims against the Charter defen-\ndants, West would have been free to terminate the agreement\nand resurrect the claims against LG&E without waiting for us\nto rule on his appeal.\n This conditional dismissal of the claims against LG&E\nrepresents the very sort of attempt to manufacture appellate\njurisdiction of which our precedents have consistently disap-\nproved. As we stated in Union Oil, “[L]itigants and courts\ncannot avoid the finality requirement of § 1291 by agreement.\n\fNo. 18-1906 11\n\nTo hold otherwise would allow litigants to circumvent the\nrules that Congress has instructed as to the timing of appellate\nproceedings.” 121 F.3d at 310 (citation omitted). We have thus\nrepeatedly cited the absence of a final judgment when, after a\ndispositive ruling as to some but not all claims or parties, the\nparties have entered to a conditional dismissal of the remain-\ning claims on terms that permit those claims to be revived at a\nlater date. See Arrow Gear, 629 F.3d at 636–37 (following res\njudicata dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for contribution against\nsome but not all defendants, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its\nclaims against two remaining defendants without prejudice);\nUnion Oil, 121 F.3d at 309–11 (following dismissal and judg-\nment on the pleadings as to some claims and partial summary\njudgment limiting plaintiff’s damages as to remaining breach\nof contract claim, parties stipulated to termination of proceed-\nings in district court and agreed to release one another from\nliability in event appeals court affirmed district court’s rulings\nas to contract claim, but reserved right to pursue their respec-\ntive rights under the contract and resume litigation in the\ndistrict court in the event of reversal on appeal); see also Kagan,\n724 F.3d at 846–47 (following judgment in favor of (deceased)\ninsured’s wife and against his children in life insurer’s inter-\npleader suit, wife filed Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to amend\njudgment disputing amount of interest insurer had paid on\npolicy proceeds, indicating that an active dispute between wife\nand insurer remained in district court); Kimbrell, 651 F.3d at\n757–58 (personal injury claims against truck driver’s employer\ndismissed for want of diligence in serving process; but claim\nagainst truck driver himself, which initially had been stayed\ndue to driver’s pending bankruptcy, remained unresolved, as\n\f12 No. 18-1906\n\nevidenced by plaintiff’s re-filing of claim in new suit after stay\nlifted); Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852,\n856 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Claims dismissed without prejudice have\nnot been disposed of, and any resulting judgment is not final\nunless there is a clear legal bar to the claims’ revival.”); First\nHealth Grp. Corp. v. BCE Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 801 (7th\nCir. 2001) (collecting cases holding “that the dismissal of one\nclaim or theory without prejudice, with a right to reactivate\nthat claim after an appeal on the remaining theories, makes the\njudgment non-final”).\n As these cases make clear, the conditional nature of the\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E negates the requisite\nfinality of the judgment. Although West has nominally\ndismissed his claims against LG&E, he retains the right,\ndepending on the outcome of this appeal, to reinstate those\nclaims and proceed as if the claims had never been dismissed\nand no time had passed. In the words of Arrow Gear, “[t]his is\na ‘start-over’ case.” 629 F.3d at 637.\n Arrow could re-file the identical claim in the\n same court against the two parties that it has\n dropped, and, if it did, an appeal from the final\n judgment in the new case would bring up to us\n many of the same issues as an appeal from a\n final judgment in this case would have done had\n the two parties not been dropped.\nId. What was true of the appellant in Arrow Gear is just as true\nof West here. West and LG&E have attempted to construct a\nnominally final judgment and open the door to an immediate\nappeal by bringing the proceedings in the district court as to\n\fNo. 18-1906 13\n\nthe remaining defendant, LG&E, to a close, but on terms that\nleave West’s options open as to LG&E depending on how he\nfares against the Charter defendants in this appeal. The\nresulting judgment is not, in practical effect, a final one, and\nthat deprives us of appellate jurisdiction.\n West’s desire to resolve the viability of its claims against the\nCharter defendants on appeal now is understandable, and\nperhaps even “noble” to the extent it is consistent with an\nexpeditious resolution of the case. Union Oil, 121 F.3d at 309.\nPutting aside the nuisance claim, the degree of substantive\noverlap between the claims against the Charter defendants and\nthe claims against LG&E appears to be substantial. West and\nLG&E certainly agree that our interpretation of the Cable Act\nand its application to LG&E’s easement across West’s property\nwill effectively dictate the resolution of his claims against\nLG&E (save perhaps for the nuisance claim) as well as his\nclaims against the Charter defendants.\n But, short of litigating the claims against LG&E to final\njudgment, there were options open to West to pursue an\nimmediate appeal as to the Charter defendants. As Judge\nYoung pointed out, West could have asked the court to enter\na final judgment as to the claims against the Charter defen-\ndants pursuant to Rule 54(b), although that likely would have\nbeen a stretch given the overlap with the claims against LG&E.\nSee First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 801. Alternatively, West could\nhave sought permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), on the theory that the decision\nas to the Charter defendants “involves a controlling question\nof law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of\nopinion and that an immediate appeal from the [otherwise\n\f14 No. 18-1906\n\nnon-appealable] order may materially advance the ultimate\ntermination of the litigation.” See First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at\n801–02; see generally Sterk v. Redbox Auto. Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d\n535, 536 (7th Cir. 2012); Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of\nIll., 219 F.3d 674, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2000).\n West pursued neither of these options. He instead opted to\npursue the same type of effort to fabricate a final judgment that\nwe have rejected as a transparent effort to circumvent section\n1291.\n Even so, West might also have chosen to rectify the prob-\nlem once we flagged the potential lack of a final judgment in\nsoliciting jurisdictional memoranda from the parties and again\nat oral argument. In other cases, we have deemed it sufficient\nwhen a party has disavowed any right to pursue claims or\nparties that have been dismissed without prejudice. See Chessie\nLogistics, 867 F.3d at 856 (at oral argument, appellee unequivo-\ncally agreed that its counterclaims, which had been dismissed\nwithout prejudice in the district court, should be dismissed\nwith prejudice); Kagan, 724 F.3d at 847 (appellee’s jurisdictional\nmemorandum disclaimed any intent to seek further amend-\nment of judgment as to dismissed defendant); Arrow Gear, 629\nF.3d at 637 (appellant’s lawyer committed at oral argument not\nto re-file suit against two defendants that had been voluntarily\ndismissed without prejudice); First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 802\n(at oral argument, appellant’s lawyer elected to dismiss\nremaining trademark claims unconditionally, so that they\ncould not be reinstated regardless of outcome of appeal).\n But West has never disclaimed the right to resurrect his\nclaims against LG&E that his agreement with LG&E expressly\n\fNo. 18-1906 15\n\nreserves to him. To the contrary, at oral argument, after the\nCharter defendants’ counsel construed the initial remarks of\nWest’s counsel to constitute such a disclaimer and abandoned\n(to our surprise) their contention that we lack jurisdiction,\nWest’s counsel reiterated in rebuttal that the dismissal of\nLG&E was conditional, as the terms of the tolling agreement\nmake clear it is. Certainly it is West’s right to preserve his\nclaims against LG&E. But his refusal to surrender them\nunequivocally at this juncture makes clear that the judgment\nin this case is non-final.\n There is, consequently, no final judgment as required by\nsection 1291. The parties did not litigate West’s claims against\nLG&E to a final judgment, and their agreed-upon dismissal of\nthose claims allows West to reinstate them in the district court\ndepending upon the outcome of this appeal (were it permitted\nto proceed). Our precedents foreclose this attempt to manufac-\nture appellate jurisdiction by producing a judgment which has\nthe appearance but not the binding quality of finality.\n III.\n For the reasons we have discussed above, we DISMISS the\nappeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Stephen West v. Charter Communications, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-1906\\n\\nSTEPHEN R. WEST,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nLOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC\\nCOMPANY,\\n Defendant,\\n\\n\\nand\\n\\n\\n\\nCHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,\\nINC., et al.,\\n\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\\n No. 4:16-cv-00145-RLY-DML — Richard L. Young, Judge.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1906\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 28, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 4, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. In this diversity action, plaintiff\\nStephen West contends that the addition of a fiber optic\\ncommunications wire to a utilities transmission tower on his\\nproperty exceeds the scope of the utilities easement that\\nauthorized the tower. West sued both Charter Communica-\\ntions, Inc. (“Charter”), whose subsidiary installed the wire, and\\nLouisville Gas and Electric Company (“Louisville”), which\\nowns the tower and is a party to the easement. The district\\ncourt dismissed the claims against Charter, concluding that the\\naddition of Charter’s communications wire to the tower is\\ncompatible with the scope and purpose of the easement and\\nconsequently does not violate the terms of the easement\\nagreement nor does it amount to an unconstitutional taking of\\nWest’s property. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018 WL\\n321686 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). Wishing to appeal that ruling,\\nWest entered into an agreement with Louisville providing that\\nhe would voluntarily dismiss his claims against Louisville,\\nwhile reserving the right to revive them in the event we\\nreversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against\\nCharter. West then filed a notice of appeal pursuant to\\n28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the conditional dismissal of West’s\\nclaims against Louisville renders the judgment non-final, we\\ndismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 3\\n\\n I.\\n West inherited a small plot of land from his parents in\\nJeffersonville, Indiana that abuts the Ohio River, which\\ndemarcates the border between Indiana and Kentucky.1 A\\nmassive utility transmission tower some 248 feet tall sits on the\\nproperty, carrying LG&E power lines that run between the two\\nstates. The tower and the power lines are authorized by a 1938\\nutility easement entered into by the predecessors of West (and\\nhis parents) and LG&E, as amended by a supplemental\\nagreement in 1976. Broadly speaking, the easement grants to\\nLG&E the perpetual right to install and maintain towers and\\nwires “for the transmission, distribution and delivery of\\nelectrical energy to the Grantee [LG&E] and other persons and\\nconcerns and to the public in general for light, heat, power,\\ntelephone and/or other purposes in, upon, along and over the\\nreal estate of the Grantor [West] … .” R. 33-1 at 2. West’s\\nparents rejected a further amendment to the deed of easement\\nproposed by LG&E in 1990 which would have authorized\\nLG&E to “upgrade and remove communications and tele-\\nphone systems… .” R. 33-4 at 2.\\n In 2000, LG&E entered into a contract with Insight Ken-\\ntucky Partners II, LP (“Insight”), a subsidiary of Time Warner\\nCable, Inc. (“Time Warner”), granting Insight permission to\\nrun fiber optic cables across LG&E’s existing infrastructure.\\nInsight proceeded to run a fiber optic cable carrying television\\nand internet content and services across West’s property via\\n\\n\\n1\\n Jeffersonville is situated directly across the Ohio River from Louisville,\\nKentucky.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1906\\n\\nthe LG&E tower; Insight’s cable replaced an existing static wire\\non that tower. Time Warner, Insight’s parent corporation, was\\nlater acquired by Charter. We shall refer to Charter and its\\npredecessors collectively as the Charter defendants.\\n In 2016, West filed suit against LG&E in state court, seeking\\na declaratory judgment that the easement did not authorize\\nInsight’s fiber optic cable. West also asserted claims for breach\\nof contract, trespass, and unjust enrichment. LG&E removed\\nthe case to federal court. After the district court denied LG&E’s\\nmotion to dismiss West’s claims, reasoning that there were\\nfactual questions as to the scope of LG&E’s rights under the\\neasement, West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2016 WL 6395918,\\nat *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 28, 2016), West amended his complaint to\\nname Insight, Time Warner, and Charter as additional defen-\\ndants and also to add new claims to the suit. The amended\\ncomplaint asserted claims against both LG&E and the Charter\\ndefendants for declaratory judgment, trespass, unjust enrich-\\nment, as well as claims for (tortious) conversion and criminal\\ntrespass. LG&E alone was also named in a new claim for\\nnuisance. LG&E filed a second, partial motion to dismiss\\naimed at the conversion and criminal trespass claims, but the\\ndistrict court denied that motion, concluding in view of the\\nfacts alleged that the complaint stated plausible claims for\\nrelief in these respects. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 2018\\nWL 321685, at *2–*4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). LG&E subsequently\\nfiled a cross-claim for indemnification against the Charter\\ndefendants.\\n Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the\\nCharter defendants moved to dismiss all of West’s claims\\nagainst them, arguing principally that because the easement\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 5\\n\\nover West’s property had already been dedicated for a utility\\nuse that is compatible with cable television transmission, the\\naddition of Insight’s fiber optic wire was statutorily authorized\\nby section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of\\n1984, 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (the “Cable Act”).\\n The district court agreed with the Charter defendants and\\ngranted their motion to dismiss. 2018 WL 321686. The court\\ndetermined that the easement across West’s property had been\\ndedicated for utility use, id. at *5, and that the running of fiber\\noptic cables across that easement for the purpose of providing\\npaid television, internet, and communications services amount-\\ned to a permissible compatible use under the Cable Act, id. The\\ncourt went on to conclude that the Cable Act did not\\nimpermissibly burden West’s property rights retroactively, nor\\ndid it constitute a constitutionally prohibited taking of his\\nproperty. Id. at *5–*6. Because it found that Insight’s use of the\\neasement over West’s property to be authorized, the court\\ndismissed all claims against the Charter defendants. Id. at *6\\nThat decision left LG&E as the sole remaining defendant on\\nWest’s claims.\\n West and LG&E subsequently filed a joint stipulation\\nasking the court to dismiss the claims against LG&E and close\\nthe case, R. 88, but the district court denied that request, R. 91.\\nAlthough the stipulation posited that West’s claims against\\nLG&E were “moot” in view of the district court’s decision\\ndismissing the claims against the Charter defendants, R. 88 at\\n2 ¶3, the district court rejected that assertion. The court\\nreasoned that there was still a live controversy as to whether\\nthe easement itself permitted LG&E to install and maintain\\nInsight’s fiber optic cable on LG&E’s infrastructure. R. 91 at\\n\\f6 No. 18-1906\\n\\n2–3. The court also noted that the stipulation was unclear as to\\nwhether the proposed dismissal of the claims against LG&E\\nwas to be with or without prejudice; but the court construed\\nthe stipulated dismissal to be without prejudice, which would\\npermit West to revive these claims in the event the dismissal of\\nthe claims against the Charter defendants was reversed on\\nappeal. R. 91 at 3. That, in turn, led the court to conclude that,\\nnotwithstanding the proposed dismissal of the claims against\\nLG&E, a final judgment was not yet at hand. R. 91 at 3. The\\ncourt indicated that the parties had three options open to them:\\n(1) continue litigating the merits of West’s claims against LG&E\\nto a final judgment; (2) stipulate to the dismissal of these claims\\nwith prejudice; or (3) seek a certification of a final judgment as\\nto fewer than all parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil\\nProcedure 54(b). R. 91 at 3–4.\\n Rather than pursuing any of these options, West and LG&E\\npursued a fourth option in the hope of creating a final judg-\\nment that would open the door to this appeal. The two parties\\nentered into a tolling and standstill agreement which provided\\nfor the voluntary dismissal of West’s claims against LG& E for\\nthe duration of, and conditioned upon the outcome of, his\\nappeal of the dismissal of the claims against the Charter\\ndefendants. App. R. 7-3 Ex. B. West and LG&E agreed that the\\nstatute of limitations as to any claims between them would be\\ntolled for the duration of the agreement and that, in the event\\nWest prevailed in his appeal, LG&E would not object to the re-\\nfiling of his claims against LG&E nor assert any timeliness\\ndefenses to the claims. If, on the other hand, West did not\\nprevail in the appeal, West agreed he would not re-file his\\npending claims against LG&E nor any other claims arising out\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 7\\n\\nof the same facts. By its terms, the agreement was to remain in\\neffect until such time as the appeal was decided or West\\nterminated the agreement on 14 days’ notice, at which point an\\naction filed by either party would be deemed filed as of the\\ndate West’s suit was originally filed in 2016. App. R. 7-3.\\nPursuant to this agreement, West voluntarily dismissed all of\\nhis claims against LG&E by stipulation (signed by attorneys for\\nWest and LG&E) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\\n41(a)(1)(A)(ii). R. 98.2 LG&E in turn voluntarily dismissed its\\ncross-claim against the Charter defendants without prejudice\\npursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)((a)(i). R. 95.\\n West then appealed to this court pursuant to section 1291.\\nAfter a preliminary round of memoranda as to whether there\\nwas a final judgment establishing our appellate jurisdiction, we\\nallowed the case to proceed to briefing and argument, while\\nreserving judgment on the jurisdictional question.\\n II.\\n As in every case, the first question we must resolve is our\\njurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a\\nBetter Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012\\n(1998); In re Morse Elec. Co., 805 F.2d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 1986)\\n(citing In re Boomgarden, 780 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1985)).\\n\\n\\n2\\n None of the Charter defendants (who had been dismissed from the suit)\\nsigned the stipulated dismissal of West’s claims, which presents an\\ninteresting question of whether the stipulation was signed by “all defen-\\ndants” as Rule 41(a)(1)(A) requires. The Charter defendants contest the\\nvalidity of the dismissal on this basis, but in view of our conclusion below\\nthat West’s provisional dismissal of his claims against LG&E renders the\\njudgment non-final, we need not reach this issue.\\n\\f8 No. 18-1906\\n\\n Section 1291, which West invoked in filing this appeal,\\nrequires that a final judgment have been issued by the district\\ncourt. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“[t]he courts of appeals … shall\\nhave jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the\\ndistrict courts of the United States …”). A final judgment is one\\nthat ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the\\ndistrict court to do but execute the judgment. See Coopers &\\nLybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 2457 (1978)\\n(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631,\\n633 (1945)); Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Kagan, 724 F.3d 843, 847 (7th\\nCir. 2013); Kimbrell v. Brown, 651 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2011);\\nUnion Oil Co. of Cal. v. John Brown E&C, 121 F.3d 305, 309 (7th\\nCir. 1997).\\n The requirement of a final judgment is more than a mere\\nformality. Section 1291 reflects a strong preference for resolv-\\ning all disputed issues as to all parties in one appeal, to the\\nextent possible. See Arrow Gear Co. v. Downers Grove Sanitary\\nDist., 629 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 2010). Underlying that prefer-\\nence lies a legislative judgment that permitting multiple,\\npiecemeal appeals from a single action in the district court will\\nhave a “debilitating effect” on the efficient administration of\\njustice. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 471, 98 S. Ct. at 2459\\n(quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S. Ct.\\n2140, 2149 (1974)); see also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.\\n323, 325, 60 S. Ct. 540, 541 (1940).\\n The district court’s decision disposing of West’s claims\\nagainst the Charter defendants—which is what West is\\nappealing—was manifestly not a final decision. LG&E re-\\nmained as a defendant, and the district court had already\\ndenied LG&E’s two motions to dismiss the claims against it,\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 9\\n\\nreasoning that resolution of those claims would have to await\\nthe development of the facts. 2016 WL 6395918, at *3; 2018 WL\\n321685, at *3–*4. Certainly there was a substantial degree of\\noverlap in theory and in fact with the claims against the\\nCharter defendants. But at no time following the court’s\\ndismissal of West’s claims against the Charter defendants did\\nLG&E and/or West ask the court to enter a final, binding\\njudgment resolving the claims against LG&E based on the\\nrationale of the decision dismissing the Charter defendants.\\nInstead, the parties presented the court with a stipulation of\\ndismissal (without prejudice) which posited, with no substan-\\ntive analysis, that West’s claims against LG&E had been\\nrendered “moot” by the dismissal of the claims against the\\nCharter defendants. The district court’s decision rejecting the\\nstipulation of dismissal explained why, in its view, the decision\\nas to the Charter defendants did not (wholly) resolve the\\nviability of the claims against LG&E, and West has given us no\\nreason to doubt that the district court’s assessment was correct.\\nThere is no dispute, for example, that there is a nuisance claim\\nnaming LG&E alone that does not turn on the scope of the\\neasement between West and LG&E.3\\n Instead, intent on appealing the Charter dismissal without\\na final judgment as to LG&E, West and LG&E engineered a\\nprovisional dismissal of the claims against LG&E so as to bring\\nthe proceedings in the district court to a close, but without the\\n\\n\\n3\\n The nuisance claim, in fact, is based on the installation in 2013 of flashing\\nred (aviation warning) lights on the LG&E tower located on West’s\\nproperty, which has nothing whatever to do with Insight’s fiber optic cable.\\nSee R. 33 at 15.\\n\\f10 No. 18-1906\\n\\nbinding effects of a truly final judgment. By the terms of the\\ntolling and standstill agreement between these two parties, the\\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E is conditional: In the\\nevent this court were to affirm the dismissal of the claims\\nagainst the Charter defendants, West has agreed not to pursue\\nthe claims against LG&E. If, on the other hand, this court were\\nto reverse the dismissal of the Charter defendants, West has\\nreserved the right to reinstate the claims against LG&E; and, in\\nthe event of such reinstatement, both parties have agreed to\\nwaive any time-based defenses to claims they might have\\nagainst one another. In short, in the event West were to prevail\\nin this appeal, West and LG&E may pick up where they left off\\nin the district court. The dismissal appears to be conditional in\\na second respect as well. West has reserved the right to\\nterminate the tolling and standstill agreement on 14 days’\\nnotice to LG&E, at which point he would likewise be free to\\nreinstate the claims against LG&E and pursue them as if they\\nhad never been dismissed. Apart from the notice requirement,\\nthe agreement does not impose any condition upon West’s\\nright to exercise this right. So, for example, had West con-\\ncluded after oral arguments in this case that we were likely to\\naffirm the dismissal of the claims against the Charter defen-\\ndants, West would have been free to terminate the agreement\\nand resurrect the claims against LG&E without waiting for us\\nto rule on his appeal.\\n This conditional dismissal of the claims against LG&E\\nrepresents the very sort of attempt to manufacture appellate\\njurisdiction of which our precedents have consistently disap-\\nproved. As we stated in Union Oil, “[L]itigants and courts\\ncannot avoid the finality requirement of § 1291 by agreement.\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 11\\n\\nTo hold otherwise would allow litigants to circumvent the\\nrules that Congress has instructed as to the timing of appellate\\nproceedings.” 121 F.3d at 310 (citation omitted). We have thus\\nrepeatedly cited the absence of a final judgment when, after a\\ndispositive ruling as to some but not all claims or parties, the\\nparties have entered to a conditional dismissal of the remain-\\ning claims on terms that permit those claims to be revived at a\\nlater date. See Arrow Gear, 629 F.3d at 636–37 (following res\\njudicata dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for contribution against\\nsome but not all defendants, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its\\nclaims against two remaining defendants without prejudice);\\nUnion Oil, 121 F.3d at 309–11 (following dismissal and judg-\\nment on the pleadings as to some claims and partial summary\\njudgment limiting plaintiff’s damages as to remaining breach\\nof contract claim, parties stipulated to termination of proceed-\\nings in district court and agreed to release one another from\\nliability in event appeals court affirmed district court’s rulings\\nas to contract claim, but reserved right to pursue their respec-\\ntive rights under the contract and resume litigation in the\\ndistrict court in the event of reversal on appeal); see also Kagan,\\n724 F.3d at 846–47 (following judgment in favor of (deceased)\\ninsured’s wife and against his children in life insurer’s inter-\\npleader suit, wife filed Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to amend\\njudgment disputing amount of interest insurer had paid on\\npolicy proceeds, indicating that an active dispute between wife\\nand insurer remained in district court); Kimbrell, 651 F.3d at\\n757–58 (personal injury claims against truck driver’s employer\\ndismissed for want of diligence in serving process; but claim\\nagainst truck driver himself, which initially had been stayed\\ndue to driver’s pending bankruptcy, remained unresolved, as\\n\\f12 No. 18-1906\\n\\nevidenced by plaintiff’s re-filing of claim in new suit after stay\\nlifted); Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852,\\n856 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Claims dismissed without prejudice have\\nnot been disposed of, and any resulting judgment is not final\\nunless there is a clear legal bar to the claims’ revival.”); First\\nHealth Grp. Corp. v. BCE Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 801 (7th\\nCir. 2001) (collecting cases holding “that the dismissal of one\\nclaim or theory without prejudice, with a right to reactivate\\nthat claim after an appeal on the remaining theories, makes the\\njudgment non-final”).\\n As these cases make clear, the conditional nature of the\\ndismissal of the claims against LG&E negates the requisite\\nfinality of the judgment. Although West has nominally\\ndismissed his claims against LG&E, he retains the right,\\ndepending on the outcome of this appeal, to reinstate those\\nclaims and proceed as if the claims had never been dismissed\\nand no time had passed. In the words of Arrow Gear, “[t]his is\\na ‘start-over’ case.” 629 F.3d at 637.\\n Arrow could re-file the identical claim in the\\n same court against the two parties that it has\\n dropped, and, if it did, an appeal from the final\\n judgment in the new case would bring up to us\\n many of the same issues as an appeal from a\\n final judgment in this case would have done had\\n the two parties not been dropped.\\nId. What was true of the appellant in Arrow Gear is just as true\\nof West here. West and LG&E have attempted to construct a\\nnominally final judgment and open the door to an immediate\\nappeal by bringing the proceedings in the district court as to\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 13\\n\\nthe remaining defendant, LG&E, to a close, but on terms that\\nleave West’s options open as to LG&E depending on how he\\nfares against the Charter defendants in this appeal. The\\nresulting judgment is not, in practical effect, a final one, and\\nthat deprives us of appellate jurisdiction.\\n West’s desire to resolve the viability of its claims against the\\nCharter defendants on appeal now is understandable, and\\nperhaps even “noble” to the extent it is consistent with an\\nexpeditious resolution of the case. Union Oil, 121 F.3d at 309.\\nPutting aside the nuisance claim, the degree of substantive\\noverlap between the claims against the Charter defendants and\\nthe claims against LG&E appears to be substantial. West and\\nLG&E certainly agree that our interpretation of the Cable Act\\nand its application to LG&E’s easement across West’s property\\nwill effectively dictate the resolution of his claims against\\nLG&E (save perhaps for the nuisance claim) as well as his\\nclaims against the Charter defendants.\\n But, short of litigating the claims against LG&E to final\\njudgment, there were options open to West to pursue an\\nimmediate appeal as to the Charter defendants. As Judge\\nYoung pointed out, West could have asked the court to enter\\na final judgment as to the claims against the Charter defen-\\ndants pursuant to Rule 54(b), although that likely would have\\nbeen a stretch given the overlap with the claims against LG&E.\\nSee First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 801. Alternatively, West could\\nhave sought permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal\\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), on the theory that the decision\\nas to the Charter defendants “involves a controlling question\\nof law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of\\nopinion and that an immediate appeal from the [otherwise\\n\\f14 No. 18-1906\\n\\nnon-appealable] order may materially advance the ultimate\\ntermination of the litigation.” See First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at\\n801–02; see generally Sterk v. Redbox Auto. Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d\\n535, 536 (7th Cir. 2012); Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of\\nIll., 219 F.3d 674, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n West pursued neither of these options. He instead opted to\\npursue the same type of effort to fabricate a final judgment that\\nwe have rejected as a transparent effort to circumvent section\\n1291.\\n Even so, West might also have chosen to rectify the prob-\\nlem once we flagged the potential lack of a final judgment in\\nsoliciting jurisdictional memoranda from the parties and again\\nat oral argument. In other cases, we have deemed it sufficient\\nwhen a party has disavowed any right to pursue claims or\\nparties that have been dismissed without prejudice. See Chessie\\nLogistics, 867 F.3d at 856 (at oral argument, appellee unequivo-\\ncally agreed that its counterclaims, which had been dismissed\\nwithout prejudice in the district court, should be dismissed\\nwith prejudice); Kagan, 724 F.3d at 847 (appellee’s jurisdictional\\nmemorandum disclaimed any intent to seek further amend-\\nment of judgment as to dismissed defendant); Arrow Gear, 629\\nF.3d at 637 (appellant’s lawyer committed at oral argument not\\nto re-file suit against two defendants that had been voluntarily\\ndismissed without prejudice); First Health Grp., 269 F.3d at 802\\n(at oral argument, appellant’s lawyer elected to dismiss\\nremaining trademark claims unconditionally, so that they\\ncould not be reinstated regardless of outcome of appeal).\\n But West has never disclaimed the right to resurrect his\\nclaims against LG&E that his agreement with LG&E expressly\\n\\fNo. 18-1906 15\\n\\nreserves to him. To the contrary, at oral argument, after the\\nCharter defendants’ counsel construed the initial remarks of\\nWest’s counsel to constitute such a disclaimer and abandoned\\n(to our surprise) their contention that we lack jurisdiction,\\nWest’s counsel reiterated in rebuttal that the dismissal of\\nLG&E was conditional, as the terms of the tolling agreement\\nmake clear it is. Certainly it is West’s right to preserve his\\nclaims against LG&E. But his refusal to surrender them\\nunequivocally at this juncture makes clear that the judgment\\nin this case is non-final.\\n There is, consequently, no final judgment as required by\\nsection 1291. The parties did not litigate West’s claims against\\nLG&E to a final judgment, and their agreed-upon dismissal of\\nthose claims allows West to reinstate them in the district court\\ndepending upon the outcome of this appeal (were it permitted\\nto proceed). Our precedents foreclose this attempt to manufac-\\nture appellate jurisdiction by producing a judgment which has\\nthe appearance but not the binding quality of finality.\\n III.\\n For the reasons we have discussed above, we DISMISS the\\nappeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1692,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607495,"string":"4,607,495"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Bettie BURMESTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Bettie Burmester v. Nancy Berryhill"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2106"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Kanne, Brennan\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"William Joseph Bauer\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-2106\\n\\nBETTIE BURMESTER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting\\nCommissioner of Social Security,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:15-cv-01393-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 5, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Bettie Burmester applied for disability\\ninsurance benefits claiming she was unable to work due to\\nphysical impairments affecting her joints, chronic pain, and\\npoor mental health. The Social Security Administration\\n(“SSA”) denied her application. Burmester appeals the decision\\n\\f2 No. 18-2106\\n\\nof the ALJ that held she was not disabled and the district court\\nopinion affirming the ALJ’s denial of benefits. For the follow-\\ning reasons, we agree with the district court and affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n On December 20, 2010, Burmester applied for disability\\nbenefits alleging a June 26, 2008, onset of her disability. She\\nclaimed her ability to work was limited by degenerative disc\\ndisease, pseudo-gout in her left knee, osteoarthritis in both\\nknees and left thumb, a heart condition, and depression. The\\napplication was denied on May 11, 2011, and on October 3,\\n2011. Burmester requested a hearing.\\n On December 10, 2012, ALJ Patrick Morrison conducted a\\nhearing. Burmester testified that she lived in a townhouse with\\nher husband, and had completed high school and one year of\\ntechnical college. She worked as a hand packager for the\\nmanufacturing company Briggs & Stratton for many years. She\\nwas employed as a part-time attendant at the Bradley Center,\\nan arena located in Milwaukee. Her job duties included\\nchecking the validity of tickets and directing event goers to\\ntheir seats.\\n Burmester amended the onset date of her disability to\\nSeptember 1, 2009. When asked to rank her impairments by\\nseverity, she listed back spasms, rheumatoid arthritis in her\\nhands and feet, knee pain, and fibromyalgia as her most\\nlimiting conditions. The ALJ also noted that Burmester had\\nchondromalacia (also known as “runner’s knee”), gout, and\\nright shoulder issues. Burmester testified that her hypertension\\nwas under control, that she gets about three migraine head-\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 3\\n\\naches a year, and that she had been diagnosed with anxiety\\nand depression.\\n For her daily activities, Burmester testified that her husband\\nhelped her out of bed but she was otherwise independent in\\nher own self care. Her husband did the cooking, cleaning, paid\\nthe bills, and went grocery shopping and a friend helped with\\ncleaning once a week. Burmester was able to go to church once\\na week; out to dinner once a month; use the computer to check\\nher email and social media accounts; and walk her dog half a\\nblock twice a day. Her treating physician prescribed the use of\\na cane.\\n On January 17, 2013, in a written decision, the ALJ deter-\\nmined that Burmester was not disabled. Burmester successfully\\nappealed that decision to the Appeals Council, and her case\\nwas remanded to the ALJ for further hearings.\\n The second hearing was held on June 3, 2014. Burmester\\nagain amended her disability onset date to September 6, 2009.\\nShe testified that she suffered from degenerative disc and joint\\ndisease in her lumbar spine, right shoulder impingement\\nsyndrome, chondromalacia in the left patella, rheumatoid\\narthritis in her feet and hands, neck pain, gout, high blood\\npressure, trochanteric bursitis in her hips, and Type II diabetes.\\nShe took Percocet and morphine for pain management, and\\nreceived Remicade infusions every six weeks to treat her\\nrheumatoid arthritis. Burmester stated again that she had been\\ndiagnosed with anxiety and depression, and reported having\\npanic attacks every three months.\\n At the time of the hearing, she lived with her husband and\\nadult son who cooked her meals and did the grocery shopping.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2106\\n\\nShe would do some cleaning, but her son or husband would\\nfinish it when she inevitably became too sore to continue. She\\nreported attending church twice a month, and going out to eat\\nonce a month. She also let her dog outside and walked around\\nthe backyard with him for twenty minutes at a time.\\n On July 16, 2014, the ALJ found that Burmester was not\\ndisabled; he concluded that “based upon the overall objective\\ndiagnostic imaging, physical examination, and mental status\\nfindings, the claimant’s admitted high level of daily function-\\ning contradicting her hearing testimony, as well as her multiple\\ninconsistent statements (such as regarding drug use, short and\\nlong-term memory, and ability to concentrate), the under-\\nsigned finds that her allegations of disability are not fully\\nsubstantiated in the record.” The ALJ found that she had the\\nresidual function capacity (RFC) to perform light work,\\n except with no more than frequent reaching\\n overhead with the right upper extremity and no\\n work on ladders, ropes, scaffolding, or at unpro-\\n tected heights. She also is mentally limited to\\n simple, routine, repetitive tasks requiring only\\n simple work-related decisions with few changes\\n in the routine work setting and no more than\\n occasional interaction with supervisors, cowork-\\n ers, and the general public.\\nBased on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found\\nthat Burmester could not continue her past relevant work as a\\nhand packager, but that a significant number of jobs existed in\\nthe national economy that Burmester could perform—such as\\nrouter, price marker, or routing clerk. The Appeals Council\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 5\\n\\ndenied Burmester’s request for a review and the ALJ’s decision\\nbecame final. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision.\\n II. LEGAL STANDARD\\n We will uphold an ALJ’s final decision if the correct legal\\nstandards were applied and supported with substantial\\nevidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811\\n(7th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence\\nas a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a\\nconclusion.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nThe court is not to “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide\\nquestions of credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for that of\\nthe Commissioner.” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,\\n539 (7th Cir. 2003). Where substantial evidence supports the\\nALJ’s disability determination, we must affirm the decision\\neven if “reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the\\nclaimant] is disabled.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th\\nCir. 2008.)\\n III. ANALYSIS\\n Burmester argues that the ALJ improperly relied on\\nboilerplate language in discussing Burmester’s credibility\\nwithout giving a proper explanation for his decision. She\\ncontends the ALJ failed to consider the entire time period at\\nissue and unduly relied on Burmester’s daily activities as\\nevidence that Burmester could work.\\n The fact that the “ALJ used boilerplate language does not\\nautomatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate\\nconclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies\\nhis credibility determination.\\\" Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351,\\n\\f6 No. 18-2106\\n\\n367–68 (7th Cir. 2013). While the ALJ used boilerplate language\\nhere, he went further and included information that supported\\nthe decision. The fourteen-page opinion contains a detailed\\nrecitation of the medical evidence in this case. The ALJ deter-\\nmined Burmester was unable to perform her past relevant\\nwork but found she was capable of light work, subject to\\nlimitations which included no work on ladders or scaffolds,\\nbeing limited to simple routine tasks requiring simple deci-\\nsions, and having to face limited interactions with the general\\npublic. This finding was more limiting than that of any state\\nagency doctor or psychologist, illustrating reasoned consider-\\nation given to the evidence Burmester presented.\\n The ALJ did not equate Burmester's ability to perform\\ncertain activities of daily living with an ability to work full\\ntime. Instead, he used her reported activities to assess the\\ncredibility of her statements concerning the intensity, persis-\\ntence, or limiting effects of her symptoms consistent with the\\napplicable rules at the time the ALJ made his decision in 2014.\\nSee SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996)\\n(superseded prospectively by SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4,\\n2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016)).1 We may disturb the ALJ's\\ncredibility finding only if it is “patently wrong.” See Curvin v.\\nColvin, 778 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the ALJ’s\\n\\n1\\n Burmester cited several cases in which this court applied SSR 16-3p\\nretroactively, including Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2016). Subse-\\nquent to Colvin, the Social Security Administration gave additional\\nguidance that reviewing courts should apply the regulation that was in\\nforce when the ALJ made his decision. See Evaluation of Symptoms in\\nDisability Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. 49463, 49463-4 (Oct. 25, 2017). We follow that\\nguidance here and apply SSR 96-7p.\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 7\\n\\ndetermination was not patently wrong because of the many\\nspecific reasons the ALJ cited from the record. See Hall v.\\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2018) (Symptom analysis\\nnot “patently wrong” because the ALJ had “many specific\\nreasons supported by the evidence.”). These include: diagnos-\\ntic imaging documenting only mild to moderate findings in\\nBurmester’s back, hips and feet; normal findings of strength\\nand range of motion; and having intact memory and good\\ncommunication skills. The ALJ also noted that Burmester’s\\ndaily life demonstrated a high level of daily functioning,\\n“suggesting she is not as limited as her allegations of disabling\\nsymptoms would indicate.”\\n Next, Burmester argues that the ALJ erred in finding she\\nhad moderate difficulties in her ability to sustain concentration,\\npersistence or pace (“CPP”), while failing to include those\\nlimitations in the residual capacity evaluation or questions to\\nthe vocation expert. It is well-established that “both the\\nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ's RFC assessment\\nmust incorporate all of the claimant's limitations supported by\\nthe medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (quoting Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 2014)).\\nHowever, an ALJ may reasonably rely upon the opinion of a\\nmedical expert who translates these findings into an RFC\\ndetermination. See Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 289 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (citing Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir.\\n1987) (“All that is required is that the hypothetical question [to\\nthe VE] be supported by the medical evidence in the record.”)).\\n Here, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of\\nDr. Jeremy Meyers, who stated in the “Statement of Work\\n\\f8 No. 18-2106\\n\\nCapacity” portion of his assessment that Burmester had the\\n“ability to understand, remember and carry out simple\\ninstructions subject to physical limitations,” that “maintaining\\nconcentration and attention should be manageable” and that\\nshe “should be able to withstand routine work stress and adapt\\nto typical job site changes.” These limitations were given to the\\nvocational expert. The ALJ gave the VE the hypothetical of a\\nperson “limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks which\\nwould require only simple work-related decision making and\\nwould require few changes in the routine work setting with no\\nmore than occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,\\nand the general public.”\\n Earlier in his report, Dr. Meyers also stated that “[i]t is the\\nopinion of the examiner that Ms. Burmester is able to devote an\\nhour to an enjoyed activity such as reading before feeling a\\nneed to go on to something else.” Burmester argues that the\\nALJ improperly ignored this limitation on CPP in his hypothet-\\nical to the vocational expert. If Dr. Meyers intended for this\\nstatement to be a conclusion that Burmester was unable to\\nconcentrate for more than an hour at work, Dr. Meyers would\\nhave included that limitation in his “Statement of Work\\nCapacity.” Instead Dr. Meyers states that maintaining concen-\\ntration for Burmester should be “manageable.” The ALJ\\nsummarized Dr. Meyers’ report as concluding that Burmester\\nwas able to maintain concentration and attention. The ALJ\\nappropriately relied on the narrative statement in crafting the\\nhypothetical to the vocation expert and the RFC. See Baldwin v.\\nBerryhill, 746 F. App'x 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2018) (ALJ did not err\\nin ignoring a finding that plaintiff was moderately limited in\\nconcentration and pace where the psychologist's narrative in\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 9\\n\\nthe same report indicated plaintiff had the concentration and\\npace “necessary to fulfill a normal workday” and where\\nsubsequent medication improved plaintiff’s mental health and\\nmood).\\n There was no other finding in the report that Burmester\\nwas unable to concentrate on work, unlike in DeCamp v.\\nBerryhill, 916 F.3d 671, 675–6 (7th Cir. 2019). In DeCamp, the\\nplaintiff’s doctors listed moderate difficulties in concentration\\nin a checkbox section of their reports, but did not include such\\nlimitations in their narrative conclusions. Id. The ALJ presented\\na hypothetical to the vocational expert based solely on the\\nnarratives, omitting any reference to limitations on concentra-\\ntion at work, instead limiting plaintiff to “unskilled work” with\\nno “fast-paced production line or tandem tasks.” Id. at 675. We\\nnoted that we have “repeatedly rejected the notion that a\\nhypothetical … confining the claimant to simple, routine tasks\\nand limited interactions with others adequately captures\\ntemperamental deficiencies and limitations in concentration,\\npersistence, and pace.” Id. at 676. Here, there was no such\\ncheckbox indicating a moderate limitation, there was only the\\nStatement of Work Capacity indicating that concentrating at\\nwork would be manageable for Burmester. The report did not\\nconclude that work must be limited to one hour increments to\\nbe manageable for Burmester.\\n The ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Meyers’ report is also\\nconsistent with the rest of the record. Dr. Rattan, who reviewed\\nDr. Meyers opinion, also concluded there was no limitation on\\nBurmester’s concentration. Her mental health treatment notes\\nshowed mostly normal findings. Burmester herself stated she\\ncould finish what she started and follow instructions.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2106\\n\\n Burmester also argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh\\nmedical opinions when he rejected the opinion of her treating\\nphysicians. The ALJ was required to give “controlling weight”\\nto a treating physician's medical opinion on the nature and\\nseverity of an impairment if it is (1) “well-supported by\\nmedically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic\\ntechniques” and (2) “not inconsistent with other substantial\\nevidence.” Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 2010); 20\\nC.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96-2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 9. The\\nexclusion of the treating physicians was not unsupported in the\\nALJ opinion. Instead, the ALJ provided detailed reasons for his\\nfinding that the opinions of Dr. Bustos and Dr. Centena were\\nnot supported by the record.\\n Dr. Bustos’ July 2011 assessment of Burmester was the most\\nphysically limiting of any of the reports given to the ALJ.\\nDr. Bustos indicated that Burmester could rarely lift ten\\npounds, required a cane, was unable to bend or stoop, and that\\nher pain was enough to constantly interfere with her concen-\\ntration. The assessment, consisting of a series of checked boxes,\\nwas internally inconsistent. Dr. Bustos stated that Burmester\\ncould sit and stand for more than two hours, but also found\\nshe was unable to sit and stand for more than two hours in an\\neight-hour workday. Dr. Bustos’ own notes also contradicted\\nthe assessment, stating that Burmester exhibited a normal gait\\nand had no difficulties with heel and toe walking. Dr. Bustos\\nwas also contradicted by other medical evidence. The state\\nagency medical consultants found Burmester capable of light\\nwork and she was observed carrying ten pound weights up\\nand down stairs. Further, Burmester admitted that she spent\\nthree or four hours a day reading, contradicting Dr. Bustos’\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 11\\n\\nfinding that her pain constantly interfered with her concentra-\\ntion.\\n Dr. Centena provided the most mentally limiting opinion,\\ndescribing Burmester as having no useful ability to regularly\\nattend work or complete a normal workday. This opinion was\\ninconsistent with the record and Dr. Centena’s own notes\\nwhich showed Burmester had logical thought processes,\\nfunctioning memory, and intact judgment. The state psycholo-\\ngists found Burmester was doing well and stable on her\\nmedications for depression and anxiety. Additionally,\\nBurmester admitted that she could follow simple instructions,\\nand that she cooked, cleaned, shopped and managed money.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n The ALJ did not improperly evaluate Burmester’s credibil-\\nity, nor did he erroneously reject the opinions of medical\\nexperts. The ALJ’s opinion that Burmester was not disabled\\nwas supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s decision,\\nand the district court opinion, are AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384748/\", \"author_raw\": \"William Joseph Bauer\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607495/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Bettie BURMESTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-2106\n\nBETTIE BURMESTER,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting\nCommissioner of Social Security,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 2:15-cv-01393-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 5, 2019\n\n\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Bettie Burmester applied for disability\ninsurance benefits claiming she was unable to work due to\nphysical impairments affecting her joints, chronic pain, and\npoor mental health. The Social Security Administration\n(“SSA”) denied her application. Burmester appeals the decision\n\f2 No. 18-2106\n\nof the ALJ that held she was not disabled and the district court\nopinion affirming the ALJ’s denial of benefits. For the follow-\ning reasons, we agree with the district court and affirm.\n I. BACKGROUND\n On December 20, 2010, Burmester applied for disability\nbenefits alleging a June 26, 2008, onset of her disability. She\nclaimed her ability to work was limited by degenerative disc\ndisease, pseudo-gout in her left knee, osteoarthritis in both\nknees and left thumb, a heart condition, and depression. The\napplication was denied on May 11, 2011, and on October 3,\n2011. Burmester requested a hearing.\n On December 10, 2012, ALJ Patrick Morrison conducted a\nhearing. Burmester testified that she lived in a townhouse with\nher husband, and had completed high school and one year of\ntechnical college. She worked as a hand packager for the\nmanufacturing company Briggs & Stratton for many years. She\nwas employed as a part-time attendant at the Bradley Center,\nan arena located in Milwaukee. Her job duties included\nchecking the validity of tickets and directing event goers to\ntheir seats.\n Burmester amended the onset date of her disability to\nSeptember 1, 2009. When asked to rank her impairments by\nseverity, she listed back spasms, rheumatoid arthritis in her\nhands and feet, knee pain, and fibromyalgia as her most\nlimiting conditions. The ALJ also noted that Burmester had\nchondromalacia (also known as “runner’s knee”), gout, and\nright shoulder issues. Burmester testified that her hypertension\nwas under control, that she gets about three migraine head-\n\fNo. 18-2106 3\n\naches a year, and that she had been diagnosed with anxiety\nand depression.\n For her daily activities, Burmester testified that her husband\nhelped her out of bed but she was otherwise independent in\nher own self care. Her husband did the cooking, cleaning, paid\nthe bills, and went grocery shopping and a friend helped with\ncleaning once a week. Burmester was able to go to church once\na week; out to dinner once a month; use the computer to check\nher email and social media accounts; and walk her dog half a\nblock twice a day. Her treating physician prescribed the use of\na cane.\n On January 17, 2013, in a written decision, the ALJ deter-\nmined that Burmester was not disabled. Burmester successfully\nappealed that decision to the Appeals Council, and her case\nwas remanded to the ALJ for further hearings.\n The second hearing was held on June 3, 2014. Burmester\nagain amended her disability onset date to September 6, 2009.\nShe testified that she suffered from degenerative disc and joint\ndisease in her lumbar spine, right shoulder impingement\nsyndrome, chondromalacia in the left patella, rheumatoid\narthritis in her feet and hands, neck pain, gout, high blood\npressure, trochanteric bursitis in her hips, and Type II diabetes.\nShe took Percocet and morphine for pain management, and\nreceived Remicade infusions every six weeks to treat her\nrheumatoid arthritis. Burmester stated again that she had been\ndiagnosed with anxiety and depression, and reported having\npanic attacks every three months.\n At the time of the hearing, she lived with her husband and\nadult son who cooked her meals and did the grocery shopping.\n\f4 No. 18-2106\n\nShe would do some cleaning, but her son or husband would\nfinish it when she inevitably became too sore to continue. She\nreported attending church twice a month, and going out to eat\nonce a month. She also let her dog outside and walked around\nthe backyard with him for twenty minutes at a time.\n On July 16, 2014, the ALJ found that Burmester was not\ndisabled; he concluded that “based upon the overall objective\ndiagnostic imaging, physical examination, and mental status\nfindings, the claimant’s admitted high level of daily function-\ning contradicting her hearing testimony, as well as her multiple\ninconsistent statements (such as regarding drug use, short and\nlong-term memory, and ability to concentrate), the under-\nsigned finds that her allegations of disability are not fully\nsubstantiated in the record.” The ALJ found that she had the\nresidual function capacity (RFC) to perform light work,\n except with no more than frequent reaching\n overhead with the right upper extremity and no\n work on ladders, ropes, scaffolding, or at unpro-\n tected heights. She also is mentally limited to\n simple, routine, repetitive tasks requiring only\n simple work-related decisions with few changes\n in the routine work setting and no more than\n occasional interaction with supervisors, cowork-\n ers, and the general public.\nBased on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found\nthat Burmester could not continue her past relevant work as a\nhand packager, but that a significant number of jobs existed in\nthe national economy that Burmester could perform—such as\nrouter, price marker, or routing clerk. The Appeals Council\n\fNo. 18-2106 5\n\ndenied Burmester’s request for a review and the ALJ’s decision\nbecame final. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision.\n II. LEGAL STANDARD\n We will uphold an ALJ’s final decision if the correct legal\nstandards were applied and supported with substantial\nevidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811\n(7th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence\nas a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a\nconclusion.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2010).\nThe court is not to “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide\nquestions of credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for that of\nthe Commissioner.” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,\n539 (7th Cir. 2003). Where substantial evidence supports the\nALJ’s disability determination, we must affirm the decision\neven if “reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the\nclaimant] is disabled.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th\nCir. 2008.)\n III. ANALYSIS\n Burmester argues that the ALJ improperly relied on\nboilerplate language in discussing Burmester’s credibility\nwithout giving a proper explanation for his decision. She\ncontends the ALJ failed to consider the entire time period at\nissue and unduly relied on Burmester’s daily activities as\nevidence that Burmester could work.\n The fact that the “ALJ used boilerplate language does not\nautomatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate\nconclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies\nhis credibility determination.\" Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351,\n\f6 No. 18-2106\n\n367–68 (7th Cir. 2013). While the ALJ used boilerplate language\nhere, he went further and included information that supported\nthe decision. The fourteen-page opinion contains a detailed\nrecitation of the medical evidence in this case. The ALJ deter-\nmined Burmester was unable to perform her past relevant\nwork but found she was capable of light work, subject to\nlimitations which included no work on ladders or scaffolds,\nbeing limited to simple routine tasks requiring simple deci-\nsions, and having to face limited interactions with the general\npublic. This finding was more limiting than that of any state\nagency doctor or psychologist, illustrating reasoned consider-\nation given to the evidence Burmester presented.\n The ALJ did not equate Burmester's ability to perform\ncertain activities of daily living with an ability to work full\ntime. Instead, he used her reported activities to assess the\ncredibility of her statements concerning the intensity, persis-\ntence, or limiting effects of her symptoms consistent with the\napplicable rules at the time the ALJ made his decision in 2014.\nSee SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996)\n(superseded prospectively by SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4,\n2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016)).1 We may disturb the ALJ's\ncredibility finding only if it is “patently wrong.” See Curvin v.\nColvin, 778 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the ALJ’s\n\n1\n Burmester cited several cases in which this court applied SSR 16-3p\nretroactively, including Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2016). Subse-\nquent to Colvin, the Social Security Administration gave additional\nguidance that reviewing courts should apply the regulation that was in\nforce when the ALJ made his decision. See Evaluation of Symptoms in\nDisability Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. 49463, 49463-4 (Oct. 25, 2017). We follow that\nguidance here and apply SSR 96-7p.\n\fNo. 18-2106 7\n\ndetermination was not patently wrong because of the many\nspecific reasons the ALJ cited from the record. See Hall v.\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2018) (Symptom analysis\nnot “patently wrong” because the ALJ had “many specific\nreasons supported by the evidence.”). These include: diagnos-\ntic imaging documenting only mild to moderate findings in\nBurmester’s back, hips and feet; normal findings of strength\nand range of motion; and having intact memory and good\ncommunication skills. The ALJ also noted that Burmester’s\ndaily life demonstrated a high level of daily functioning,\n“suggesting she is not as limited as her allegations of disabling\nsymptoms would indicate.”\n Next, Burmester argues that the ALJ erred in finding she\nhad moderate difficulties in her ability to sustain concentration,\npersistence or pace (“CPP”), while failing to include those\nlimitations in the residual capacity evaluation or questions to\nthe vocation expert. It is well-established that “both the\nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ's RFC assessment\nmust incorporate all of the claimant's limitations supported by\nthe medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.\n2015) (quoting Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 2014)).\nHowever, an ALJ may reasonably rely upon the opinion of a\nmedical expert who translates these findings into an RFC\ndetermination. See Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 289 (7th\nCir. 2002) (citing Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir.\n1987) (“All that is required is that the hypothetical question [to\nthe VE] be supported by the medical evidence in the record.”)).\n Here, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of\nDr. Jeremy Meyers, who stated in the “Statement of Work\n\f8 No. 18-2106\n\nCapacity” portion of his assessment that Burmester had the\n“ability to understand, remember and carry out simple\ninstructions subject to physical limitations,” that “maintaining\nconcentration and attention should be manageable” and that\nshe “should be able to withstand routine work stress and adapt\nto typical job site changes.” These limitations were given to the\nvocational expert. The ALJ gave the VE the hypothetical of a\nperson “limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks which\nwould require only simple work-related decision making and\nwould require few changes in the routine work setting with no\nmore than occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,\nand the general public.”\n Earlier in his report, Dr. Meyers also stated that “[i]t is the\nopinion of the examiner that Ms. Burmester is able to devote an\nhour to an enjoyed activity such as reading before feeling a\nneed to go on to something else.” Burmester argues that the\nALJ improperly ignored this limitation on CPP in his hypothet-\nical to the vocational expert. If Dr. Meyers intended for this\nstatement to be a conclusion that Burmester was unable to\nconcentrate for more than an hour at work, Dr. Meyers would\nhave included that limitation in his “Statement of Work\nCapacity.” Instead Dr. Meyers states that maintaining concen-\ntration for Burmester should be “manageable.” The ALJ\nsummarized Dr. Meyers’ report as concluding that Burmester\nwas able to maintain concentration and attention. The ALJ\nappropriately relied on the narrative statement in crafting the\nhypothetical to the vocation expert and the RFC. See Baldwin v.\nBerryhill, 746 F. App'x 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2018) (ALJ did not err\nin ignoring a finding that plaintiff was moderately limited in\nconcentration and pace where the psychologist's narrative in\n\fNo. 18-2106 9\n\nthe same report indicated plaintiff had the concentration and\npace “necessary to fulfill a normal workday” and where\nsubsequent medication improved plaintiff’s mental health and\nmood).\n There was no other finding in the report that Burmester\nwas unable to concentrate on work, unlike in DeCamp v.\nBerryhill, 916 F.3d 671, 675–6 (7th Cir. 2019). In DeCamp, the\nplaintiff’s doctors listed moderate difficulties in concentration\nin a checkbox section of their reports, but did not include such\nlimitations in their narrative conclusions. Id. The ALJ presented\na hypothetical to the vocational expert based solely on the\nnarratives, omitting any reference to limitations on concentra-\ntion at work, instead limiting plaintiff to “unskilled work” with\nno “fast-paced production line or tandem tasks.” Id. at 675. We\nnoted that we have “repeatedly rejected the notion that a\nhypothetical … confining the claimant to simple, routine tasks\nand limited interactions with others adequately captures\ntemperamental deficiencies and limitations in concentration,\npersistence, and pace.” Id. at 676. Here, there was no such\ncheckbox indicating a moderate limitation, there was only the\nStatement of Work Capacity indicating that concentrating at\nwork would be manageable for Burmester. The report did not\nconclude that work must be limited to one hour increments to\nbe manageable for Burmester.\n The ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Meyers’ report is also\nconsistent with the rest of the record. Dr. Rattan, who reviewed\nDr. Meyers opinion, also concluded there was no limitation on\nBurmester’s concentration. Her mental health treatment notes\nshowed mostly normal findings. Burmester herself stated she\ncould finish what she started and follow instructions.\n\f10 No. 18-2106\n\n Burmester also argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh\nmedical opinions when he rejected the opinion of her treating\nphysicians. The ALJ was required to give “controlling weight”\nto a treating physician's medical opinion on the nature and\nseverity of an impairment if it is (1) “well-supported by\nmedically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic\ntechniques” and (2) “not inconsistent with other substantial\nevidence.” Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 2010); 20\nC.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96-2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 9. The\nexclusion of the treating physicians was not unsupported in the\nALJ opinion. Instead, the ALJ provided detailed reasons for his\nfinding that the opinions of Dr. Bustos and Dr. Centena were\nnot supported by the record.\n Dr. Bustos’ July 2011 assessment of Burmester was the most\nphysically limiting of any of the reports given to the ALJ.\nDr. Bustos indicated that Burmester could rarely lift ten\npounds, required a cane, was unable to bend or stoop, and that\nher pain was enough to constantly interfere with her concen-\ntration. The assessment, consisting of a series of checked boxes,\nwas internally inconsistent. Dr. Bustos stated that Burmester\ncould sit and stand for more than two hours, but also found\nshe was unable to sit and stand for more than two hours in an\neight-hour workday. Dr. Bustos’ own notes also contradicted\nthe assessment, stating that Burmester exhibited a normal gait\nand had no difficulties with heel and toe walking. Dr. Bustos\nwas also contradicted by other medical evidence. The state\nagency medical consultants found Burmester capable of light\nwork and she was observed carrying ten pound weights up\nand down stairs. Further, Burmester admitted that she spent\nthree or four hours a day reading, contradicting Dr. Bustos’\n\fNo. 18-2106 11\n\nfinding that her pain constantly interfered with her concentra-\ntion.\n Dr. Centena provided the most mentally limiting opinion,\ndescribing Burmester as having no useful ability to regularly\nattend work or complete a normal workday. This opinion was\ninconsistent with the record and Dr. Centena’s own notes\nwhich showed Burmester had logical thought processes,\nfunctioning memory, and intact judgment. The state psycholo-\ngists found Burmester was doing well and stable on her\nmedications for depression and anxiety. Additionally,\nBurmester admitted that she could follow simple instructions,\nand that she cooked, cleaned, shopped and managed money.\n IV. CONCLUSION\n The ALJ did not improperly evaluate Burmester’s credibil-\nity, nor did he erroneously reject the opinions of medical\nexperts. The ALJ’s opinion that Burmester was not disabled\nwas supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s decision,\nand the district court opinion, are AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Bettie BURMESTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-2106\\n\\nBETTIE BURMESTER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting\\nCommissioner of Social Security,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:15-cv-01393-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 5, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Bettie Burmester applied for disability\\ninsurance benefits claiming she was unable to work due to\\nphysical impairments affecting her joints, chronic pain, and\\npoor mental health. The Social Security Administration\\n(“SSA”) denied her application. Burmester appeals the decision\\n\\f2 No. 18-2106\\n\\nof the ALJ that held she was not disabled and the district court\\nopinion affirming the ALJ’s denial of benefits. For the follow-\\ning reasons, we agree with the district court and affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n On December 20, 2010, Burmester applied for disability\\nbenefits alleging a June 26, 2008, onset of her disability. She\\nclaimed her ability to work was limited by degenerative disc\\ndisease, pseudo-gout in her left knee, osteoarthritis in both\\nknees and left thumb, a heart condition, and depression. The\\napplication was denied on May 11, 2011, and on October 3,\\n2011. Burmester requested a hearing.\\n On December 10, 2012, ALJ Patrick Morrison conducted a\\nhearing. Burmester testified that she lived in a townhouse with\\nher husband, and had completed high school and one year of\\ntechnical college. She worked as a hand packager for the\\nmanufacturing company Briggs & Stratton for many years. She\\nwas employed as a part-time attendant at the Bradley Center,\\nan arena located in Milwaukee. Her job duties included\\nchecking the validity of tickets and directing event goers to\\ntheir seats.\\n Burmester amended the onset date of her disability to\\nSeptember 1, 2009. When asked to rank her impairments by\\nseverity, she listed back spasms, rheumatoid arthritis in her\\nhands and feet, knee pain, and fibromyalgia as her most\\nlimiting conditions. The ALJ also noted that Burmester had\\nchondromalacia (also known as “runner’s knee”), gout, and\\nright shoulder issues. Burmester testified that her hypertension\\nwas under control, that she gets about three migraine head-\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 3\\n\\naches a year, and that she had been diagnosed with anxiety\\nand depression.\\n For her daily activities, Burmester testified that her husband\\nhelped her out of bed but she was otherwise independent in\\nher own self care. Her husband did the cooking, cleaning, paid\\nthe bills, and went grocery shopping and a friend helped with\\ncleaning once a week. Burmester was able to go to church once\\na week; out to dinner once a month; use the computer to check\\nher email and social media accounts; and walk her dog half a\\nblock twice a day. Her treating physician prescribed the use of\\na cane.\\n On January 17, 2013, in a written decision, the ALJ deter-\\nmined that Burmester was not disabled. Burmester successfully\\nappealed that decision to the Appeals Council, and her case\\nwas remanded to the ALJ for further hearings.\\n The second hearing was held on June 3, 2014. Burmester\\nagain amended her disability onset date to September 6, 2009.\\nShe testified that she suffered from degenerative disc and joint\\ndisease in her lumbar spine, right shoulder impingement\\nsyndrome, chondromalacia in the left patella, rheumatoid\\narthritis in her feet and hands, neck pain, gout, high blood\\npressure, trochanteric bursitis in her hips, and Type II diabetes.\\nShe took Percocet and morphine for pain management, and\\nreceived Remicade infusions every six weeks to treat her\\nrheumatoid arthritis. Burmester stated again that she had been\\ndiagnosed with anxiety and depression, and reported having\\npanic attacks every three months.\\n At the time of the hearing, she lived with her husband and\\nadult son who cooked her meals and did the grocery shopping.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2106\\n\\nShe would do some cleaning, but her son or husband would\\nfinish it when she inevitably became too sore to continue. She\\nreported attending church twice a month, and going out to eat\\nonce a month. She also let her dog outside and walked around\\nthe backyard with him for twenty minutes at a time.\\n On July 16, 2014, the ALJ found that Burmester was not\\ndisabled; he concluded that “based upon the overall objective\\ndiagnostic imaging, physical examination, and mental status\\nfindings, the claimant’s admitted high level of daily function-\\ning contradicting her hearing testimony, as well as her multiple\\ninconsistent statements (such as regarding drug use, short and\\nlong-term memory, and ability to concentrate), the under-\\nsigned finds that her allegations of disability are not fully\\nsubstantiated in the record.” The ALJ found that she had the\\nresidual function capacity (RFC) to perform light work,\\n except with no more than frequent reaching\\n overhead with the right upper extremity and no\\n work on ladders, ropes, scaffolding, or at unpro-\\n tected heights. She also is mentally limited to\\n simple, routine, repetitive tasks requiring only\\n simple work-related decisions with few changes\\n in the routine work setting and no more than\\n occasional interaction with supervisors, cowork-\\n ers, and the general public.\\nBased on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found\\nthat Burmester could not continue her past relevant work as a\\nhand packager, but that a significant number of jobs existed in\\nthe national economy that Burmester could perform—such as\\nrouter, price marker, or routing clerk. The Appeals Council\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 5\\n\\ndenied Burmester’s request for a review and the ALJ’s decision\\nbecame final. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision.\\n II. LEGAL STANDARD\\n We will uphold an ALJ’s final decision if the correct legal\\nstandards were applied and supported with substantial\\nevidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811\\n(7th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence\\nas a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a\\nconclusion.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nThe court is not to “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide\\nquestions of credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for that of\\nthe Commissioner.” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,\\n539 (7th Cir. 2003). Where substantial evidence supports the\\nALJ’s disability determination, we must affirm the decision\\neven if “reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the\\nclaimant] is disabled.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th\\nCir. 2008.)\\n III. ANALYSIS\\n Burmester argues that the ALJ improperly relied on\\nboilerplate language in discussing Burmester’s credibility\\nwithout giving a proper explanation for his decision. She\\ncontends the ALJ failed to consider the entire time period at\\nissue and unduly relied on Burmester’s daily activities as\\nevidence that Burmester could work.\\n The fact that the “ALJ used boilerplate language does not\\nautomatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate\\nconclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies\\nhis credibility determination.\\\" Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351,\\n\\f6 No. 18-2106\\n\\n367–68 (7th Cir. 2013). While the ALJ used boilerplate language\\nhere, he went further and included information that supported\\nthe decision. The fourteen-page opinion contains a detailed\\nrecitation of the medical evidence in this case. The ALJ deter-\\nmined Burmester was unable to perform her past relevant\\nwork but found she was capable of light work, subject to\\nlimitations which included no work on ladders or scaffolds,\\nbeing limited to simple routine tasks requiring simple deci-\\nsions, and having to face limited interactions with the general\\npublic. This finding was more limiting than that of any state\\nagency doctor or psychologist, illustrating reasoned consider-\\nation given to the evidence Burmester presented.\\n The ALJ did not equate Burmester's ability to perform\\ncertain activities of daily living with an ability to work full\\ntime. Instead, he used her reported activities to assess the\\ncredibility of her statements concerning the intensity, persis-\\ntence, or limiting effects of her symptoms consistent with the\\napplicable rules at the time the ALJ made his decision in 2014.\\nSee SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996)\\n(superseded prospectively by SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4,\\n2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016)).1 We may disturb the ALJ's\\ncredibility finding only if it is “patently wrong.” See Curvin v.\\nColvin, 778 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the ALJ’s\\n\\n1\\n Burmester cited several cases in which this court applied SSR 16-3p\\nretroactively, including Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2016). Subse-\\nquent to Colvin, the Social Security Administration gave additional\\nguidance that reviewing courts should apply the regulation that was in\\nforce when the ALJ made his decision. See Evaluation of Symptoms in\\nDisability Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. 49463, 49463-4 (Oct. 25, 2017). We follow that\\nguidance here and apply SSR 96-7p.\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 7\\n\\ndetermination was not patently wrong because of the many\\nspecific reasons the ALJ cited from the record. See Hall v.\\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2018) (Symptom analysis\\nnot “patently wrong” because the ALJ had “many specific\\nreasons supported by the evidence.”). These include: diagnos-\\ntic imaging documenting only mild to moderate findings in\\nBurmester’s back, hips and feet; normal findings of strength\\nand range of motion; and having intact memory and good\\ncommunication skills. The ALJ also noted that Burmester’s\\ndaily life demonstrated a high level of daily functioning,\\n“suggesting she is not as limited as her allegations of disabling\\nsymptoms would indicate.”\\n Next, Burmester argues that the ALJ erred in finding she\\nhad moderate difficulties in her ability to sustain concentration,\\npersistence or pace (“CPP”), while failing to include those\\nlimitations in the residual capacity evaluation or questions to\\nthe vocation expert. It is well-established that “both the\\nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ's RFC assessment\\nmust incorporate all of the claimant's limitations supported by\\nthe medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (quoting Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 2014)).\\nHowever, an ALJ may reasonably rely upon the opinion of a\\nmedical expert who translates these findings into an RFC\\ndetermination. See Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 289 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (citing Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir.\\n1987) (“All that is required is that the hypothetical question [to\\nthe VE] be supported by the medical evidence in the record.”)).\\n Here, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of\\nDr. Jeremy Meyers, who stated in the “Statement of Work\\n\\f8 No. 18-2106\\n\\nCapacity” portion of his assessment that Burmester had the\\n“ability to understand, remember and carry out simple\\ninstructions subject to physical limitations,” that “maintaining\\nconcentration and attention should be manageable” and that\\nshe “should be able to withstand routine work stress and adapt\\nto typical job site changes.” These limitations were given to the\\nvocational expert. The ALJ gave the VE the hypothetical of a\\nperson “limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks which\\nwould require only simple work-related decision making and\\nwould require few changes in the routine work setting with no\\nmore than occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,\\nand the general public.”\\n Earlier in his report, Dr. Meyers also stated that “[i]t is the\\nopinion of the examiner that Ms. Burmester is able to devote an\\nhour to an enjoyed activity such as reading before feeling a\\nneed to go on to something else.” Burmester argues that the\\nALJ improperly ignored this limitation on CPP in his hypothet-\\nical to the vocational expert. If Dr. Meyers intended for this\\nstatement to be a conclusion that Burmester was unable to\\nconcentrate for more than an hour at work, Dr. Meyers would\\nhave included that limitation in his “Statement of Work\\nCapacity.” Instead Dr. Meyers states that maintaining concen-\\ntration for Burmester should be “manageable.” The ALJ\\nsummarized Dr. Meyers’ report as concluding that Burmester\\nwas able to maintain concentration and attention. The ALJ\\nappropriately relied on the narrative statement in crafting the\\nhypothetical to the vocation expert and the RFC. See Baldwin v.\\nBerryhill, 746 F. App'x 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2018) (ALJ did not err\\nin ignoring a finding that plaintiff was moderately limited in\\nconcentration and pace where the psychologist's narrative in\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 9\\n\\nthe same report indicated plaintiff had the concentration and\\npace “necessary to fulfill a normal workday” and where\\nsubsequent medication improved plaintiff’s mental health and\\nmood).\\n There was no other finding in the report that Burmester\\nwas unable to concentrate on work, unlike in DeCamp v.\\nBerryhill, 916 F.3d 671, 675–6 (7th Cir. 2019). In DeCamp, the\\nplaintiff’s doctors listed moderate difficulties in concentration\\nin a checkbox section of their reports, but did not include such\\nlimitations in their narrative conclusions. Id. The ALJ presented\\na hypothetical to the vocational expert based solely on the\\nnarratives, omitting any reference to limitations on concentra-\\ntion at work, instead limiting plaintiff to “unskilled work” with\\nno “fast-paced production line or tandem tasks.” Id. at 675. We\\nnoted that we have “repeatedly rejected the notion that a\\nhypothetical … confining the claimant to simple, routine tasks\\nand limited interactions with others adequately captures\\ntemperamental deficiencies and limitations in concentration,\\npersistence, and pace.” Id. at 676. Here, there was no such\\ncheckbox indicating a moderate limitation, there was only the\\nStatement of Work Capacity indicating that concentrating at\\nwork would be manageable for Burmester. The report did not\\nconclude that work must be limited to one hour increments to\\nbe manageable for Burmester.\\n The ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Meyers’ report is also\\nconsistent with the rest of the record. Dr. Rattan, who reviewed\\nDr. Meyers opinion, also concluded there was no limitation on\\nBurmester’s concentration. Her mental health treatment notes\\nshowed mostly normal findings. Burmester herself stated she\\ncould finish what she started and follow instructions.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2106\\n\\n Burmester also argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh\\nmedical opinions when he rejected the opinion of her treating\\nphysicians. The ALJ was required to give “controlling weight”\\nto a treating physician's medical opinion on the nature and\\nseverity of an impairment if it is (1) “well-supported by\\nmedically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic\\ntechniques” and (2) “not inconsistent with other substantial\\nevidence.” Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 2010); 20\\nC.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96-2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 9. The\\nexclusion of the treating physicians was not unsupported in the\\nALJ opinion. Instead, the ALJ provided detailed reasons for his\\nfinding that the opinions of Dr. Bustos and Dr. Centena were\\nnot supported by the record.\\n Dr. Bustos’ July 2011 assessment of Burmester was the most\\nphysically limiting of any of the reports given to the ALJ.\\nDr. Bustos indicated that Burmester could rarely lift ten\\npounds, required a cane, was unable to bend or stoop, and that\\nher pain was enough to constantly interfere with her concen-\\ntration. The assessment, consisting of a series of checked boxes,\\nwas internally inconsistent. Dr. Bustos stated that Burmester\\ncould sit and stand for more than two hours, but also found\\nshe was unable to sit and stand for more than two hours in an\\neight-hour workday. Dr. Bustos’ own notes also contradicted\\nthe assessment, stating that Burmester exhibited a normal gait\\nand had no difficulties with heel and toe walking. Dr. Bustos\\nwas also contradicted by other medical evidence. The state\\nagency medical consultants found Burmester capable of light\\nwork and she was observed carrying ten pound weights up\\nand down stairs. Further, Burmester admitted that she spent\\nthree or four hours a day reading, contradicting Dr. Bustos’\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 11\\n\\nfinding that her pain constantly interfered with her concentra-\\ntion.\\n Dr. Centena provided the most mentally limiting opinion,\\ndescribing Burmester as having no useful ability to regularly\\nattend work or complete a normal workday. This opinion was\\ninconsistent with the record and Dr. Centena’s own notes\\nwhich showed Burmester had logical thought processes,\\nfunctioning memory, and intact judgment. The state psycholo-\\ngists found Burmester was doing well and stable on her\\nmedications for depression and anxiety. Additionally,\\nBurmester admitted that she could follow simple instructions,\\nand that she cooked, cleaned, shopped and managed money.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n The ALJ did not improperly evaluate Burmester’s credibil-\\nity, nor did he erroneously reject the opinions of medical\\nexperts. The ALJ’s opinion that Burmester was not disabled\\nwas supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s decision,\\nand the district court opinion, are AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1693,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607573,"string":"4,607,573"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Bettie Burmester v. Nancy Berryhill"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2106"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"William Joseph Bauer\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-2106\\n\\nBETTIE BURMESTER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting\\nCommissioner of Social Security,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:15-cv-01393-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 5, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Bettie Burmester applied for disability\\ninsurance benefits claiming she was unable to work due to\\nphysical impairments affecting her joints, chronic pain, and\\npoor mental health. The Social Security Administration\\n(“SSA”) denied her application. Burmester appeals the decision\\n\\f2 No. 18-2106\\n\\nof the ALJ that held she was not disabled and the district court\\nopinion affirming the ALJ’s denial of benefits. For the follow-\\ning reasons, we agree with the district court and affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n On December 20, 2010, Burmester applied for disability\\nbenefits alleging a June 26, 2008, onset of her disability. She\\nclaimed her ability to work was limited by degenerative disc\\ndisease, pseudo-gout in her left knee, osteoarthritis in both\\nknees and left thumb, a heart condition, and depression. The\\napplication was denied on May 11, 2011, and on October 3,\\n2011. Burmester requested a hearing.\\n On December 10, 2012, ALJ Patrick Morrison conducted a\\nhearing. Burmester testified that she lived in a townhouse with\\nher husband, and had completed high school and one year of\\ntechnical college. She worked as a hand packager for the\\nmanufacturing company Briggs & Stratton for many years. She\\nwas employed as a part-time attendant at the Bradley Center,\\nan arena located in Milwaukee. Her job duties included\\nchecking the validity of tickets and directing event goers to\\ntheir seats.\\n Burmester amended the onset date of her disability to\\nSeptember 1, 2009. When asked to rank her impairments by\\nseverity, she listed back spasms, rheumatoid arthritis in her\\nhands and feet, knee pain, and fibromyalgia as her most\\nlimiting conditions. The ALJ also noted that Burmester had\\nchondromalacia (also known as “runner’s knee”), gout, and\\nright shoulder issues. Burmester testified that her hypertension\\nwas under control, that she gets about three migraine head-\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 3\\n\\naches a year, and that she had been diagnosed with anxiety\\nand depression.\\n For her daily activities, Burmester testified that her husband\\nhelped her out of bed but she was otherwise independent in\\nher own self care. Her husband did the cooking, cleaning, paid\\nthe bills, and went grocery shopping and a friend helped with\\ncleaning once a week. Burmester was able to go to church once\\na week; out to dinner once a month; use the computer to check\\nher email and social media accounts; and walk her dog half a\\nblock twice a day. Her treating physician prescribed the use of\\na cane.\\n On January 17, 2013, in a written decision, the ALJ deter-\\nmined that Burmester was not disabled. Burmester successfully\\nappealed that decision to the Appeals Council, and her case\\nwas remanded to the ALJ for further hearings.\\n The second hearing was held on June 3, 2014. Burmester\\nagain amended her disability onset date to September 6, 2009.\\nShe testified that she suffered from degenerative disc and joint\\ndisease in her lumbar spine, right shoulder impingement\\nsyndrome, chondromalacia in the left patella, rheumatoid\\narthritis in her feet and hands, neck pain, gout, high blood\\npressure, trochanteric bursitis in her hips, and Type II diabetes.\\nShe took Percocet and morphine for pain management, and\\nreceived Remicade infusions every six weeks to treat her\\nrheumatoid arthritis. Burmester stated again that she had been\\ndiagnosed with anxiety and depression, and reported having\\npanic attacks every three months.\\n At the time of the hearing, she lived with her husband and\\nadult son who cooked her meals and did the grocery shopping.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2106\\n\\nShe would do some cleaning, but her son or husband would\\nfinish it when she inevitably became too sore to continue. She\\nreported attending church twice a month, and going out to eat\\nonce a month. She also let her dog outside and walked around\\nthe backyard with him for twenty minutes at a time.\\n On July 16, 2014, the ALJ found that Burmester was not\\ndisabled; he concluded that “based upon the overall objective\\ndiagnostic imaging, physical examination, and mental status\\nfindings, the claimant’s admitted high level of daily function-\\ning contradicting her hearing testimony, as well as her multiple\\ninconsistent statements (such as regarding drug use, short and\\nlong-term memory, and ability to concentrate), the under-\\nsigned finds that her allegations of disability are not fully\\nsubstantiated in the record.” The ALJ found that she had the\\nresidual function capacity (RFC) to perform light work,\\n except with no more than frequent reaching\\n overhead with the right upper extremity and no\\n work on ladders, ropes, scaffolding, or at unpro-\\n tected heights. She also is mentally limited to\\n simple, routine, repetitive tasks requiring only\\n simple work-related decisions with few changes\\n in the routine work setting and no more than\\n occasional interaction with supervisors, cowork-\\n ers, and the general public.\\nBased on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found\\nthat Burmester could not continue her past relevant work as a\\nhand packager, but that a significant number of jobs existed in\\nthe national economy that Burmester could perform—such as\\nrouter, price marker, or routing clerk. The Appeals Council\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 5\\n\\ndenied Burmester’s request for a review and the ALJ’s decision\\nbecame final. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision.\\n II. LEGAL STANDARD\\n We will uphold an ALJ’s final decision if the correct legal\\nstandards were applied and supported with substantial\\nevidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811\\n(7th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence\\nas a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a\\nconclusion.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nThe court is not to “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide\\nquestions of credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for that of\\nthe Commissioner.” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,\\n539 (7th Cir. 2003). Where substantial evidence supports the\\nALJ’s disability determination, we must affirm the decision\\neven if “reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the\\nclaimant] is disabled.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th\\nCir. 2008.)\\n III. ANALYSIS\\n Burmester argues that the ALJ improperly relied on\\nboilerplate language in discussing Burmester’s credibility\\nwithout giving a proper explanation for his decision. She\\ncontends the ALJ failed to consider the entire time period at\\nissue and unduly relied on Burmester’s daily activities as\\nevidence that Burmester could work.\\n The fact that the “ALJ used boilerplate language does not\\nautomatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate\\nconclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies\\nhis credibility determination.\\\" Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351,\\n\\f6 No. 18-2106\\n\\n367–68 (7th Cir. 2013). While the ALJ used boilerplate language\\nhere, he went further and included information that supported\\nthe decision. The fourteen-page opinion contains a detailed\\nrecitation of the medical evidence in this case. The ALJ deter-\\nmined Burmester was unable to perform her past relevant\\nwork but found she was capable of light work, subject to\\nlimitations which included no work on ladders or scaffolds,\\nbeing limited to simple routine tasks requiring simple deci-\\nsions, and having to face limited interactions with the general\\npublic. This finding was more limiting than that of any state\\nagency doctor or psychologist, illustrating reasoned consider-\\nation given to the evidence Burmester presented.\\n The ALJ did not equate Burmester's ability to perform\\ncertain activities of daily living with an ability to work full\\ntime. Instead, he used her reported activities to assess the\\ncredibility of her statements concerning the intensity, persis-\\ntence, or limiting effects of her symptoms consistent with the\\napplicable rules at the time the ALJ made his decision in 2014.\\nSee SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996)\\n(superseded prospectively by SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4,\\n2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016)).1 We may disturb the ALJ's\\ncredibility finding only if it is “patently wrong.” See Curvin v.\\nColvin, 778 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the ALJ’s\\n\\n1\\n Burmester cited several cases in which this court applied SSR 16-3p\\nretroactively, including Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2016). Subse-\\nquent to Colvin, the Social Security Administration gave additional\\nguidance that reviewing courts should apply the regulation that was in\\nforce when the ALJ made his decision. See Evaluation of Symptoms in\\nDisability Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. 49463, 49463-4 (Oct. 25, 2017). We follow that\\nguidance here and apply SSR 96-7p.\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 7\\n\\ndetermination was not patently wrong because of the many\\nspecific reasons the ALJ cited from the record. See Hall v.\\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2018) (Symptom analysis\\nnot “patently wrong” because the ALJ had “many specific\\nreasons supported by the evidence.”). These include: diagnos-\\ntic imaging documenting only mild to moderate findings in\\nBurmester’s back, hips and feet; normal findings of strength\\nand range of motion; and having intact memory and good\\ncommunication skills. The ALJ also noted that Burmester’s\\ndaily life demonstrated a high level of daily functioning,\\n“suggesting she is not as limited as her allegations of disabling\\nsymptoms would indicate.”\\n Next, Burmester argues that the ALJ erred in finding she\\nhad moderate difficulties in her ability to sustain concentration,\\npersistence or pace (“CPP”), while failing to include those\\nlimitations in the residual capacity evaluation or questions to\\nthe vocation expert. It is well-established that “both the\\nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ's RFC assessment\\nmust incorporate all of the claimant's limitations supported by\\nthe medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (quoting Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 2014)).\\nHowever, an ALJ may reasonably rely upon the opinion of a\\nmedical expert who translates these findings into an RFC\\ndetermination. See Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 289 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (citing Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir.\\n1987) (“All that is required is that the hypothetical question [to\\nthe VE] be supported by the medical evidence in the record.”)).\\n Here, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of\\nDr. Jeremy Meyers, who stated in the “Statement of Work\\n\\f8 No. 18-2106\\n\\nCapacity” portion of his assessment that Burmester had the\\n“ability to understand, remember and carry out simple\\ninstructions subject to physical limitations,” that “maintaining\\nconcentration and attention should be manageable” and that\\nshe “should be able to withstand routine work stress and adapt\\nto typical job site changes.” These limitations were given to the\\nvocational expert. The ALJ gave the VE the hypothetical of a\\nperson “limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks which\\nwould require only simple work-related decision making and\\nwould require few changes in the routine work setting with no\\nmore than occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,\\nand the general public.”\\n Earlier in his report, Dr. Meyers also stated that “[i]t is the\\nopinion of the examiner that Ms. Burmester is able to devote an\\nhour to an enjoyed activity such as reading before feeling a\\nneed to go on to something else.” Burmester argues that the\\nALJ improperly ignored this limitation on CPP in his hypothet-\\nical to the vocational expert. If Dr. Meyers intended for this\\nstatement to be a conclusion that Burmester was unable to\\nconcentrate for more than an hour at work, Dr. Meyers would\\nhave included that limitation in his “Statement of Work\\nCapacity.” Instead Dr. Meyers states that maintaining concen-\\ntration for Burmester should be “manageable.” The ALJ\\nsummarized Dr. Meyers’ report as concluding that Burmester\\nwas able to maintain concentration and attention. The ALJ\\nappropriately relied on the narrative statement in crafting the\\nhypothetical to the vocation expert and the RFC. See Baldwin v.\\nBerryhill, 746 F. App'x 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2018) (ALJ did not err\\nin ignoring a finding that plaintiff was moderately limited in\\nconcentration and pace where the psychologist's narrative in\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 9\\n\\nthe same report indicated plaintiff had the concentration and\\npace “necessary to fulfill a normal workday” and where\\nsubsequent medication improved plaintiff’s mental health and\\nmood).\\n There was no other finding in the report that Burmester\\nwas unable to concentrate on work, unlike in DeCamp v.\\nBerryhill, 916 F.3d 671, 675–6 (7th Cir. 2019). In DeCamp, the\\nplaintiff’s doctors listed moderate difficulties in concentration\\nin a checkbox section of their reports, but did not include such\\nlimitations in their narrative conclusions. Id. The ALJ presented\\na hypothetical to the vocational expert based solely on the\\nnarratives, omitting any reference to limitations on concentra-\\ntion at work, instead limiting plaintiff to “unskilled work” with\\nno “fast-paced production line or tandem tasks.” Id. at 675. We\\nnoted that we have “repeatedly rejected the notion that a\\nhypothetical … confining the claimant to simple, routine tasks\\nand limited interactions with others adequately captures\\ntemperamental deficiencies and limitations in concentration,\\npersistence, and pace.” Id. at 676. Here, there was no such\\ncheckbox indicating a moderate limitation, there was only the\\nStatement of Work Capacity indicating that concentrating at\\nwork would be manageable for Burmester. The report did not\\nconclude that work must be limited to one hour increments to\\nbe manageable for Burmester.\\n The ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Meyers’ report is also\\nconsistent with the rest of the record. Dr. Rattan, who reviewed\\nDr. Meyers opinion, also concluded there was no limitation on\\nBurmester’s concentration. Her mental health treatment notes\\nshowed mostly normal findings. Burmester herself stated she\\ncould finish what she started and follow instructions.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2106\\n\\n Burmester also argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh\\nmedical opinions when he rejected the opinion of her treating\\nphysicians. The ALJ was required to give “controlling weight”\\nto a treating physician's medical opinion on the nature and\\nseverity of an impairment if it is (1) “well-supported by\\nmedically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic\\ntechniques” and (2) “not inconsistent with other substantial\\nevidence.” Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 2010); 20\\nC.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96-2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 9. The\\nexclusion of the treating physicians was not unsupported in the\\nALJ opinion. Instead, the ALJ provided detailed reasons for his\\nfinding that the opinions of Dr. Bustos and Dr. Centena were\\nnot supported by the record.\\n Dr. Bustos’ July 2011 assessment of Burmester was the most\\nphysically limiting of any of the reports given to the ALJ.\\nDr. Bustos indicated that Burmester could rarely lift ten\\npounds, required a cane, was unable to bend or stoop, and that\\nher pain was enough to constantly interfere with her concen-\\ntration. The assessment, consisting of a series of checked boxes,\\nwas internally inconsistent. Dr. Bustos stated that Burmester\\ncould sit and stand for more than two hours, but also found\\nshe was unable to sit and stand for more than two hours in an\\neight-hour workday. Dr. Bustos’ own notes also contradicted\\nthe assessment, stating that Burmester exhibited a normal gait\\nand had no difficulties with heel and toe walking. Dr. Bustos\\nwas also contradicted by other medical evidence. The state\\nagency medical consultants found Burmester capable of light\\nwork and she was observed carrying ten pound weights up\\nand down stairs. Further, Burmester admitted that she spent\\nthree or four hours a day reading, contradicting Dr. Bustos’\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 11\\n\\nfinding that her pain constantly interfered with her concentra-\\ntion.\\n Dr. Centena provided the most mentally limiting opinion,\\ndescribing Burmester as having no useful ability to regularly\\nattend work or complete a normal workday. This opinion was\\ninconsistent with the record and Dr. Centena’s own notes\\nwhich showed Burmester had logical thought processes,\\nfunctioning memory, and intact judgment. The state psycholo-\\ngists found Burmester was doing well and stable on her\\nmedications for depression and anxiety. Additionally,\\nBurmester admitted that she could follow simple instructions,\\nand that she cooked, cleaned, shopped and managed money.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n The ALJ did not improperly evaluate Burmester’s credibil-\\nity, nor did he erroneously reject the opinions of medical\\nexperts. The ALJ’s opinion that Burmester was not disabled\\nwas supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s decision,\\nand the district court opinion, are AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4384826/\", \"author_raw\": \"William Joseph Bauer\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607573/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Bettie Burmester v. Nancy Berryhill\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-2106\n\nBETTIE BURMESTER,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting\nCommissioner of Social Security,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 2:15-cv-01393-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 5, 2019\n\n\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Bettie Burmester applied for disability\ninsurance benefits claiming she was unable to work due to\nphysical impairments affecting her joints, chronic pain, and\npoor mental health. The Social Security Administration\n(“SSA”) denied her application. Burmester appeals the decision\n\f2 No. 18-2106\n\nof the ALJ that held she was not disabled and the district court\nopinion affirming the ALJ’s denial of benefits. For the follow-\ning reasons, we agree with the district court and affirm.\n I. BACKGROUND\n On December 20, 2010, Burmester applied for disability\nbenefits alleging a June 26, 2008, onset of her disability. She\nclaimed her ability to work was limited by degenerative disc\ndisease, pseudo-gout in her left knee, osteoarthritis in both\nknees and left thumb, a heart condition, and depression. The\napplication was denied on May 11, 2011, and on October 3,\n2011. Burmester requested a hearing.\n On December 10, 2012, ALJ Patrick Morrison conducted a\nhearing. Burmester testified that she lived in a townhouse with\nher husband, and had completed high school and one year of\ntechnical college. She worked as a hand packager for the\nmanufacturing company Briggs & Stratton for many years. She\nwas employed as a part-time attendant at the Bradley Center,\nan arena located in Milwaukee. Her job duties included\nchecking the validity of tickets and directing event goers to\ntheir seats.\n Burmester amended the onset date of her disability to\nSeptember 1, 2009. When asked to rank her impairments by\nseverity, she listed back spasms, rheumatoid arthritis in her\nhands and feet, knee pain, and fibromyalgia as her most\nlimiting conditions. The ALJ also noted that Burmester had\nchondromalacia (also known as “runner’s knee”), gout, and\nright shoulder issues. Burmester testified that her hypertension\nwas under control, that she gets about three migraine head-\n\fNo. 18-2106 3\n\naches a year, and that she had been diagnosed with anxiety\nand depression.\n For her daily activities, Burmester testified that her husband\nhelped her out of bed but she was otherwise independent in\nher own self care. Her husband did the cooking, cleaning, paid\nthe bills, and went grocery shopping and a friend helped with\ncleaning once a week. Burmester was able to go to church once\na week; out to dinner once a month; use the computer to check\nher email and social media accounts; and walk her dog half a\nblock twice a day. Her treating physician prescribed the use of\na cane.\n On January 17, 2013, in a written decision, the ALJ deter-\nmined that Burmester was not disabled. Burmester successfully\nappealed that decision to the Appeals Council, and her case\nwas remanded to the ALJ for further hearings.\n The second hearing was held on June 3, 2014. Burmester\nagain amended her disability onset date to September 6, 2009.\nShe testified that she suffered from degenerative disc and joint\ndisease in her lumbar spine, right shoulder impingement\nsyndrome, chondromalacia in the left patella, rheumatoid\narthritis in her feet and hands, neck pain, gout, high blood\npressure, trochanteric bursitis in her hips, and Type II diabetes.\nShe took Percocet and morphine for pain management, and\nreceived Remicade infusions every six weeks to treat her\nrheumatoid arthritis. Burmester stated again that she had been\ndiagnosed with anxiety and depression, and reported having\npanic attacks every three months.\n At the time of the hearing, she lived with her husband and\nadult son who cooked her meals and did the grocery shopping.\n\f4 No. 18-2106\n\nShe would do some cleaning, but her son or husband would\nfinish it when she inevitably became too sore to continue. She\nreported attending church twice a month, and going out to eat\nonce a month. She also let her dog outside and walked around\nthe backyard with him for twenty minutes at a time.\n On July 16, 2014, the ALJ found that Burmester was not\ndisabled; he concluded that “based upon the overall objective\ndiagnostic imaging, physical examination, and mental status\nfindings, the claimant’s admitted high level of daily function-\ning contradicting her hearing testimony, as well as her multiple\ninconsistent statements (such as regarding drug use, short and\nlong-term memory, and ability to concentrate), the under-\nsigned finds that her allegations of disability are not fully\nsubstantiated in the record.” The ALJ found that she had the\nresidual function capacity (RFC) to perform light work,\n except with no more than frequent reaching\n overhead with the right upper extremity and no\n work on ladders, ropes, scaffolding, or at unpro-\n tected heights. She also is mentally limited to\n simple, routine, repetitive tasks requiring only\n simple work-related decisions with few changes\n in the routine work setting and no more than\n occasional interaction with supervisors, cowork-\n ers, and the general public.\nBased on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found\nthat Burmester could not continue her past relevant work as a\nhand packager, but that a significant number of jobs existed in\nthe national economy that Burmester could perform—such as\nrouter, price marker, or routing clerk. The Appeals Council\n\fNo. 18-2106 5\n\ndenied Burmester’s request for a review and the ALJ’s decision\nbecame final. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision.\n II. LEGAL STANDARD\n We will uphold an ALJ’s final decision if the correct legal\nstandards were applied and supported with substantial\nevidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811\n(7th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence\nas a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a\nconclusion.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2010).\nThe court is not to “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide\nquestions of credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for that of\nthe Commissioner.” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,\n539 (7th Cir. 2003). Where substantial evidence supports the\nALJ’s disability determination, we must affirm the decision\neven if “reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the\nclaimant] is disabled.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th\nCir. 2008.)\n III. ANALYSIS\n Burmester argues that the ALJ improperly relied on\nboilerplate language in discussing Burmester’s credibility\nwithout giving a proper explanation for his decision. She\ncontends the ALJ failed to consider the entire time period at\nissue and unduly relied on Burmester’s daily activities as\nevidence that Burmester could work.\n The fact that the “ALJ used boilerplate language does not\nautomatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate\nconclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies\nhis credibility determination.\" Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351,\n\f6 No. 18-2106\n\n367–68 (7th Cir. 2013). While the ALJ used boilerplate language\nhere, he went further and included information that supported\nthe decision. The fourteen-page opinion contains a detailed\nrecitation of the medical evidence in this case. The ALJ deter-\nmined Burmester was unable to perform her past relevant\nwork but found she was capable of light work, subject to\nlimitations which included no work on ladders or scaffolds,\nbeing limited to simple routine tasks requiring simple deci-\nsions, and having to face limited interactions with the general\npublic. This finding was more limiting than that of any state\nagency doctor or psychologist, illustrating reasoned consider-\nation given to the evidence Burmester presented.\n The ALJ did not equate Burmester's ability to perform\ncertain activities of daily living with an ability to work full\ntime. Instead, he used her reported activities to assess the\ncredibility of her statements concerning the intensity, persis-\ntence, or limiting effects of her symptoms consistent with the\napplicable rules at the time the ALJ made his decision in 2014.\nSee SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996)\n(superseded prospectively by SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4,\n2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016)).1 We may disturb the ALJ's\ncredibility finding only if it is “patently wrong.” See Curvin v.\nColvin, 778 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the ALJ’s\n\n1\n Burmester cited several cases in which this court applied SSR 16-3p\nretroactively, including Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2016). Subse-\nquent to Colvin, the Social Security Administration gave additional\nguidance that reviewing courts should apply the regulation that was in\nforce when the ALJ made his decision. See Evaluation of Symptoms in\nDisability Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. 49463, 49463-4 (Oct. 25, 2017). We follow that\nguidance here and apply SSR 96-7p.\n\fNo. 18-2106 7\n\ndetermination was not patently wrong because of the many\nspecific reasons the ALJ cited from the record. See Hall v.\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2018) (Symptom analysis\nnot “patently wrong” because the ALJ had “many specific\nreasons supported by the evidence.”). These include: diagnos-\ntic imaging documenting only mild to moderate findings in\nBurmester’s back, hips and feet; normal findings of strength\nand range of motion; and having intact memory and good\ncommunication skills. The ALJ also noted that Burmester’s\ndaily life demonstrated a high level of daily functioning,\n“suggesting she is not as limited as her allegations of disabling\nsymptoms would indicate.”\n Next, Burmester argues that the ALJ erred in finding she\nhad moderate difficulties in her ability to sustain concentration,\npersistence or pace (“CPP”), while failing to include those\nlimitations in the residual capacity evaluation or questions to\nthe vocation expert. It is well-established that “both the\nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ's RFC assessment\nmust incorporate all of the claimant's limitations supported by\nthe medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.\n2015) (quoting Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 2014)).\nHowever, an ALJ may reasonably rely upon the opinion of a\nmedical expert who translates these findings into an RFC\ndetermination. See Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 289 (7th\nCir. 2002) (citing Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir.\n1987) (“All that is required is that the hypothetical question [to\nthe VE] be supported by the medical evidence in the record.”)).\n Here, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of\nDr. Jeremy Meyers, who stated in the “Statement of Work\n\f8 No. 18-2106\n\nCapacity” portion of his assessment that Burmester had the\n“ability to understand, remember and carry out simple\ninstructions subject to physical limitations,” that “maintaining\nconcentration and attention should be manageable” and that\nshe “should be able to withstand routine work stress and adapt\nto typical job site changes.” These limitations were given to the\nvocational expert. The ALJ gave the VE the hypothetical of a\nperson “limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks which\nwould require only simple work-related decision making and\nwould require few changes in the routine work setting with no\nmore than occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,\nand the general public.”\n Earlier in his report, Dr. Meyers also stated that “[i]t is the\nopinion of the examiner that Ms. Burmester is able to devote an\nhour to an enjoyed activity such as reading before feeling a\nneed to go on to something else.” Burmester argues that the\nALJ improperly ignored this limitation on CPP in his hypothet-\nical to the vocational expert. If Dr. Meyers intended for this\nstatement to be a conclusion that Burmester was unable to\nconcentrate for more than an hour at work, Dr. Meyers would\nhave included that limitation in his “Statement of Work\nCapacity.” Instead Dr. Meyers states that maintaining concen-\ntration for Burmester should be “manageable.” The ALJ\nsummarized Dr. Meyers’ report as concluding that Burmester\nwas able to maintain concentration and attention. The ALJ\nappropriately relied on the narrative statement in crafting the\nhypothetical to the vocation expert and the RFC. See Baldwin v.\nBerryhill, 746 F. App'x 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2018) (ALJ did not err\nin ignoring a finding that plaintiff was moderately limited in\nconcentration and pace where the psychologist's narrative in\n\fNo. 18-2106 9\n\nthe same report indicated plaintiff had the concentration and\npace “necessary to fulfill a normal workday” and where\nsubsequent medication improved plaintiff’s mental health and\nmood).\n There was no other finding in the report that Burmester\nwas unable to concentrate on work, unlike in DeCamp v.\nBerryhill, 916 F.3d 671, 675–6 (7th Cir. 2019). In DeCamp, the\nplaintiff’s doctors listed moderate difficulties in concentration\nin a checkbox section of their reports, but did not include such\nlimitations in their narrative conclusions. Id. The ALJ presented\na hypothetical to the vocational expert based solely on the\nnarratives, omitting any reference to limitations on concentra-\ntion at work, instead limiting plaintiff to “unskilled work” with\nno “fast-paced production line or tandem tasks.” Id. at 675. We\nnoted that we have “repeatedly rejected the notion that a\nhypothetical … confining the claimant to simple, routine tasks\nand limited interactions with others adequately captures\ntemperamental deficiencies and limitations in concentration,\npersistence, and pace.” Id. at 676. Here, there was no such\ncheckbox indicating a moderate limitation, there was only the\nStatement of Work Capacity indicating that concentrating at\nwork would be manageable for Burmester. The report did not\nconclude that work must be limited to one hour increments to\nbe manageable for Burmester.\n The ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Meyers’ report is also\nconsistent with the rest of the record. Dr. Rattan, who reviewed\nDr. Meyers opinion, also concluded there was no limitation on\nBurmester’s concentration. Her mental health treatment notes\nshowed mostly normal findings. Burmester herself stated she\ncould finish what she started and follow instructions.\n\f10 No. 18-2106\n\n Burmester also argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh\nmedical opinions when he rejected the opinion of her treating\nphysicians. The ALJ was required to give “controlling weight”\nto a treating physician's medical opinion on the nature and\nseverity of an impairment if it is (1) “well-supported by\nmedically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic\ntechniques” and (2) “not inconsistent with other substantial\nevidence.” Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 2010); 20\nC.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96-2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 9. The\nexclusion of the treating physicians was not unsupported in the\nALJ opinion. Instead, the ALJ provided detailed reasons for his\nfinding that the opinions of Dr. Bustos and Dr. Centena were\nnot supported by the record.\n Dr. Bustos’ July 2011 assessment of Burmester was the most\nphysically limiting of any of the reports given to the ALJ.\nDr. Bustos indicated that Burmester could rarely lift ten\npounds, required a cane, was unable to bend or stoop, and that\nher pain was enough to constantly interfere with her concen-\ntration. The assessment, consisting of a series of checked boxes,\nwas internally inconsistent. Dr. Bustos stated that Burmester\ncould sit and stand for more than two hours, but also found\nshe was unable to sit and stand for more than two hours in an\neight-hour workday. Dr. Bustos’ own notes also contradicted\nthe assessment, stating that Burmester exhibited a normal gait\nand had no difficulties with heel and toe walking. Dr. Bustos\nwas also contradicted by other medical evidence. The state\nagency medical consultants found Burmester capable of light\nwork and she was observed carrying ten pound weights up\nand down stairs. Further, Burmester admitted that she spent\nthree or four hours a day reading, contradicting Dr. Bustos’\n\fNo. 18-2106 11\n\nfinding that her pain constantly interfered with her concentra-\ntion.\n Dr. Centena provided the most mentally limiting opinion,\ndescribing Burmester as having no useful ability to regularly\nattend work or complete a normal workday. This opinion was\ninconsistent with the record and Dr. Centena’s own notes\nwhich showed Burmester had logical thought processes,\nfunctioning memory, and intact judgment. The state psycholo-\ngists found Burmester was doing well and stable on her\nmedications for depression and anxiety. Additionally,\nBurmester admitted that she could follow simple instructions,\nand that she cooked, cleaned, shopped and managed money.\n IV. CONCLUSION\n The ALJ did not improperly evaluate Burmester’s credibil-\nity, nor did he erroneously reject the opinions of medical\nexperts. The ALJ’s opinion that Burmester was not disabled\nwas supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s decision,\nand the district court opinion, are AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Bettie Burmester v. Nancy Berryhill\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-2106\\n\\nBETTIE BURMESTER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting\\nCommissioner of Social Security,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:15-cv-01393-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 5, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Bettie Burmester applied for disability\\ninsurance benefits claiming she was unable to work due to\\nphysical impairments affecting her joints, chronic pain, and\\npoor mental health. The Social Security Administration\\n(“SSA”) denied her application. Burmester appeals the decision\\n\\f2 No. 18-2106\\n\\nof the ALJ that held she was not disabled and the district court\\nopinion affirming the ALJ’s denial of benefits. For the follow-\\ning reasons, we agree with the district court and affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n On December 20, 2010, Burmester applied for disability\\nbenefits alleging a June 26, 2008, onset of her disability. She\\nclaimed her ability to work was limited by degenerative disc\\ndisease, pseudo-gout in her left knee, osteoarthritis in both\\nknees and left thumb, a heart condition, and depression. The\\napplication was denied on May 11, 2011, and on October 3,\\n2011. Burmester requested a hearing.\\n On December 10, 2012, ALJ Patrick Morrison conducted a\\nhearing. Burmester testified that she lived in a townhouse with\\nher husband, and had completed high school and one year of\\ntechnical college. She worked as a hand packager for the\\nmanufacturing company Briggs & Stratton for many years. She\\nwas employed as a part-time attendant at the Bradley Center,\\nan arena located in Milwaukee. Her job duties included\\nchecking the validity of tickets and directing event goers to\\ntheir seats.\\n Burmester amended the onset date of her disability to\\nSeptember 1, 2009. When asked to rank her impairments by\\nseverity, she listed back spasms, rheumatoid arthritis in her\\nhands and feet, knee pain, and fibromyalgia as her most\\nlimiting conditions. The ALJ also noted that Burmester had\\nchondromalacia (also known as “runner’s knee”), gout, and\\nright shoulder issues. Burmester testified that her hypertension\\nwas under control, that she gets about three migraine head-\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 3\\n\\naches a year, and that she had been diagnosed with anxiety\\nand depression.\\n For her daily activities, Burmester testified that her husband\\nhelped her out of bed but she was otherwise independent in\\nher own self care. Her husband did the cooking, cleaning, paid\\nthe bills, and went grocery shopping and a friend helped with\\ncleaning once a week. Burmester was able to go to church once\\na week; out to dinner once a month; use the computer to check\\nher email and social media accounts; and walk her dog half a\\nblock twice a day. Her treating physician prescribed the use of\\na cane.\\n On January 17, 2013, in a written decision, the ALJ deter-\\nmined that Burmester was not disabled. Burmester successfully\\nappealed that decision to the Appeals Council, and her case\\nwas remanded to the ALJ for further hearings.\\n The second hearing was held on June 3, 2014. Burmester\\nagain amended her disability onset date to September 6, 2009.\\nShe testified that she suffered from degenerative disc and joint\\ndisease in her lumbar spine, right shoulder impingement\\nsyndrome, chondromalacia in the left patella, rheumatoid\\narthritis in her feet and hands, neck pain, gout, high blood\\npressure, trochanteric bursitis in her hips, and Type II diabetes.\\nShe took Percocet and morphine for pain management, and\\nreceived Remicade infusions every six weeks to treat her\\nrheumatoid arthritis. Burmester stated again that she had been\\ndiagnosed with anxiety and depression, and reported having\\npanic attacks every three months.\\n At the time of the hearing, she lived with her husband and\\nadult son who cooked her meals and did the grocery shopping.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2106\\n\\nShe would do some cleaning, but her son or husband would\\nfinish it when she inevitably became too sore to continue. She\\nreported attending church twice a month, and going out to eat\\nonce a month. She also let her dog outside and walked around\\nthe backyard with him for twenty minutes at a time.\\n On July 16, 2014, the ALJ found that Burmester was not\\ndisabled; he concluded that “based upon the overall objective\\ndiagnostic imaging, physical examination, and mental status\\nfindings, the claimant’s admitted high level of daily function-\\ning contradicting her hearing testimony, as well as her multiple\\ninconsistent statements (such as regarding drug use, short and\\nlong-term memory, and ability to concentrate), the under-\\nsigned finds that her allegations of disability are not fully\\nsubstantiated in the record.” The ALJ found that she had the\\nresidual function capacity (RFC) to perform light work,\\n except with no more than frequent reaching\\n overhead with the right upper extremity and no\\n work on ladders, ropes, scaffolding, or at unpro-\\n tected heights. She also is mentally limited to\\n simple, routine, repetitive tasks requiring only\\n simple work-related decisions with few changes\\n in the routine work setting and no more than\\n occasional interaction with supervisors, cowork-\\n ers, and the general public.\\nBased on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found\\nthat Burmester could not continue her past relevant work as a\\nhand packager, but that a significant number of jobs existed in\\nthe national economy that Burmester could perform—such as\\nrouter, price marker, or routing clerk. The Appeals Council\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 5\\n\\ndenied Burmester’s request for a review and the ALJ’s decision\\nbecame final. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision.\\n II. LEGAL STANDARD\\n We will uphold an ALJ’s final decision if the correct legal\\nstandards were applied and supported with substantial\\nevidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811\\n(7th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence\\nas a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a\\nconclusion.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nThe court is not to “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide\\nquestions of credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for that of\\nthe Commissioner.” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,\\n539 (7th Cir. 2003). Where substantial evidence supports the\\nALJ’s disability determination, we must affirm the decision\\neven if “reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the\\nclaimant] is disabled.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th\\nCir. 2008.)\\n III. ANALYSIS\\n Burmester argues that the ALJ improperly relied on\\nboilerplate language in discussing Burmester’s credibility\\nwithout giving a proper explanation for his decision. She\\ncontends the ALJ failed to consider the entire time period at\\nissue and unduly relied on Burmester’s daily activities as\\nevidence that Burmester could work.\\n The fact that the “ALJ used boilerplate language does not\\nautomatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate\\nconclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies\\nhis credibility determination.\\\" Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351,\\n\\f6 No. 18-2106\\n\\n367–68 (7th Cir. 2013). While the ALJ used boilerplate language\\nhere, he went further and included information that supported\\nthe decision. The fourteen-page opinion contains a detailed\\nrecitation of the medical evidence in this case. The ALJ deter-\\nmined Burmester was unable to perform her past relevant\\nwork but found she was capable of light work, subject to\\nlimitations which included no work on ladders or scaffolds,\\nbeing limited to simple routine tasks requiring simple deci-\\nsions, and having to face limited interactions with the general\\npublic. This finding was more limiting than that of any state\\nagency doctor or psychologist, illustrating reasoned consider-\\nation given to the evidence Burmester presented.\\n The ALJ did not equate Burmester's ability to perform\\ncertain activities of daily living with an ability to work full\\ntime. Instead, he used her reported activities to assess the\\ncredibility of her statements concerning the intensity, persis-\\ntence, or limiting effects of her symptoms consistent with the\\napplicable rules at the time the ALJ made his decision in 2014.\\nSee SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996)\\n(superseded prospectively by SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4,\\n2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016)).1 We may disturb the ALJ's\\ncredibility finding only if it is “patently wrong.” See Curvin v.\\nColvin, 778 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the ALJ’s\\n\\n1\\n Burmester cited several cases in which this court applied SSR 16-3p\\nretroactively, including Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2016). Subse-\\nquent to Colvin, the Social Security Administration gave additional\\nguidance that reviewing courts should apply the regulation that was in\\nforce when the ALJ made his decision. See Evaluation of Symptoms in\\nDisability Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. 49463, 49463-4 (Oct. 25, 2017). We follow that\\nguidance here and apply SSR 96-7p.\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 7\\n\\ndetermination was not patently wrong because of the many\\nspecific reasons the ALJ cited from the record. See Hall v.\\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2018) (Symptom analysis\\nnot “patently wrong” because the ALJ had “many specific\\nreasons supported by the evidence.”). These include: diagnos-\\ntic imaging documenting only mild to moderate findings in\\nBurmester’s back, hips and feet; normal findings of strength\\nand range of motion; and having intact memory and good\\ncommunication skills. The ALJ also noted that Burmester’s\\ndaily life demonstrated a high level of daily functioning,\\n“suggesting she is not as limited as her allegations of disabling\\nsymptoms would indicate.”\\n Next, Burmester argues that the ALJ erred in finding she\\nhad moderate difficulties in her ability to sustain concentration,\\npersistence or pace (“CPP”), while failing to include those\\nlimitations in the residual capacity evaluation or questions to\\nthe vocation expert. It is well-established that “both the\\nhypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ's RFC assessment\\nmust incorporate all of the claimant's limitations supported by\\nthe medical record.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (quoting Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 2014)).\\nHowever, an ALJ may reasonably rely upon the opinion of a\\nmedical expert who translates these findings into an RFC\\ndetermination. See Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 289 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (citing Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir.\\n1987) (“All that is required is that the hypothetical question [to\\nthe VE] be supported by the medical evidence in the record.”)).\\n Here, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of\\nDr. Jeremy Meyers, who stated in the “Statement of Work\\n\\f8 No. 18-2106\\n\\nCapacity” portion of his assessment that Burmester had the\\n“ability to understand, remember and carry out simple\\ninstructions subject to physical limitations,” that “maintaining\\nconcentration and attention should be manageable” and that\\nshe “should be able to withstand routine work stress and adapt\\nto typical job site changes.” These limitations were given to the\\nvocational expert. The ALJ gave the VE the hypothetical of a\\nperson “limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks which\\nwould require only simple work-related decision making and\\nwould require few changes in the routine work setting with no\\nmore than occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,\\nand the general public.”\\n Earlier in his report, Dr. Meyers also stated that “[i]t is the\\nopinion of the examiner that Ms. Burmester is able to devote an\\nhour to an enjoyed activity such as reading before feeling a\\nneed to go on to something else.” Burmester argues that the\\nALJ improperly ignored this limitation on CPP in his hypothet-\\nical to the vocational expert. If Dr. Meyers intended for this\\nstatement to be a conclusion that Burmester was unable to\\nconcentrate for more than an hour at work, Dr. Meyers would\\nhave included that limitation in his “Statement of Work\\nCapacity.” Instead Dr. Meyers states that maintaining concen-\\ntration for Burmester should be “manageable.” The ALJ\\nsummarized Dr. Meyers’ report as concluding that Burmester\\nwas able to maintain concentration and attention. The ALJ\\nappropriately relied on the narrative statement in crafting the\\nhypothetical to the vocation expert and the RFC. See Baldwin v.\\nBerryhill, 746 F. App'x 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2018) (ALJ did not err\\nin ignoring a finding that plaintiff was moderately limited in\\nconcentration and pace where the psychologist's narrative in\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 9\\n\\nthe same report indicated plaintiff had the concentration and\\npace “necessary to fulfill a normal workday” and where\\nsubsequent medication improved plaintiff’s mental health and\\nmood).\\n There was no other finding in the report that Burmester\\nwas unable to concentrate on work, unlike in DeCamp v.\\nBerryhill, 916 F.3d 671, 675–6 (7th Cir. 2019). In DeCamp, the\\nplaintiff’s doctors listed moderate difficulties in concentration\\nin a checkbox section of their reports, but did not include such\\nlimitations in their narrative conclusions. Id. The ALJ presented\\na hypothetical to the vocational expert based solely on the\\nnarratives, omitting any reference to limitations on concentra-\\ntion at work, instead limiting plaintiff to “unskilled work” with\\nno “fast-paced production line or tandem tasks.” Id. at 675. We\\nnoted that we have “repeatedly rejected the notion that a\\nhypothetical … confining the claimant to simple, routine tasks\\nand limited interactions with others adequately captures\\ntemperamental deficiencies and limitations in concentration,\\npersistence, and pace.” Id. at 676. Here, there was no such\\ncheckbox indicating a moderate limitation, there was only the\\nStatement of Work Capacity indicating that concentrating at\\nwork would be manageable for Burmester. The report did not\\nconclude that work must be limited to one hour increments to\\nbe manageable for Burmester.\\n The ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Meyers’ report is also\\nconsistent with the rest of the record. Dr. Rattan, who reviewed\\nDr. Meyers opinion, also concluded there was no limitation on\\nBurmester’s concentration. Her mental health treatment notes\\nshowed mostly normal findings. Burmester herself stated she\\ncould finish what she started and follow instructions.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2106\\n\\n Burmester also argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh\\nmedical opinions when he rejected the opinion of her treating\\nphysicians. The ALJ was required to give “controlling weight”\\nto a treating physician's medical opinion on the nature and\\nseverity of an impairment if it is (1) “well-supported by\\nmedically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic\\ntechniques” and (2) “not inconsistent with other substantial\\nevidence.” Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 2010); 20\\nC.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96-2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 9. The\\nexclusion of the treating physicians was not unsupported in the\\nALJ opinion. Instead, the ALJ provided detailed reasons for his\\nfinding that the opinions of Dr. Bustos and Dr. Centena were\\nnot supported by the record.\\n Dr. Bustos’ July 2011 assessment of Burmester was the most\\nphysically limiting of any of the reports given to the ALJ.\\nDr. Bustos indicated that Burmester could rarely lift ten\\npounds, required a cane, was unable to bend or stoop, and that\\nher pain was enough to constantly interfere with her concen-\\ntration. The assessment, consisting of a series of checked boxes,\\nwas internally inconsistent. Dr. Bustos stated that Burmester\\ncould sit and stand for more than two hours, but also found\\nshe was unable to sit and stand for more than two hours in an\\neight-hour workday. Dr. Bustos’ own notes also contradicted\\nthe assessment, stating that Burmester exhibited a normal gait\\nand had no difficulties with heel and toe walking. Dr. Bustos\\nwas also contradicted by other medical evidence. The state\\nagency medical consultants found Burmester capable of light\\nwork and she was observed carrying ten pound weights up\\nand down stairs. Further, Burmester admitted that she spent\\nthree or four hours a day reading, contradicting Dr. Bustos’\\n\\fNo. 18-2106 11\\n\\nfinding that her pain constantly interfered with her concentra-\\ntion.\\n Dr. Centena provided the most mentally limiting opinion,\\ndescribing Burmester as having no useful ability to regularly\\nattend work or complete a normal workday. This opinion was\\ninconsistent with the record and Dr. Centena’s own notes\\nwhich showed Burmester had logical thought processes,\\nfunctioning memory, and intact judgment. The state psycholo-\\ngists found Burmester was doing well and stable on her\\nmedications for depression and anxiety. Additionally,\\nBurmester admitted that she could follow simple instructions,\\nand that she cooked, cleaned, shopped and managed money.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n The ALJ did not improperly evaluate Burmester’s credibil-\\nity, nor did he erroneously reject the opinions of medical\\nexperts. The ALJ’s opinion that Burmester was not disabled\\nwas supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s decision,\\nand the district court opinion, are AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1694,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607774,"string":"4,607,774"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deandre CHERRY, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Deandre Cherry"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3018"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Flaum, Rovner, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3018 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nDEANDRE CHERRY, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:12‐cr‐00415‐1 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Deandre Cherry’s heroin customers \\nhad been complaining about the poor quality of his supply, \\nso on a rainy night in May 2012, he drove into a parking lot in \\nMarkham, Illinois hoping to exchange his inventory of low‐\\nquality heroin for a better supply of cocaine that his supplier \\nhad just picked up at O’Hare airport. Unbeknownst to \\nCherry, however, his supplier had just been arrested picking \\nup the cocaine and, since his hopes were for a better deal for \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nhimself, decided to cooperate and help the Drug Enforcement \\nAgency (DEA) agents ensnare another dealer down the line. \\nInstead of the exchange, Cherry was arrested mid‐deal and \\neventually sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. Cherry \\nappeals, claiming the agents lacked probable cause to arrest \\nhim and search his vehicle. He also claims they failed to pre‐\\nserve exculpatory evidence. We affirm the holding of the dis‐\\ntrict court in all respects. \\n I. \\n In the course of an investigation into cocaine importation \\nfrom Mexico to Chicago, DEA agents arrested a man who was \\nattempting to take possession of twenty‐six kilograms of co‐\\ncaine near Chicago’s O’Hare airport. During an interview af‐\\nter that arrest, the man told Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) \\nagents that he was scheduled to deliver thirteen kilograms of \\ncocaine to a man he called “Mo” that night. “Mo” was later \\nidentified as Cherry. According to the arrested man, Cherry \\nwas a high‐ranking member of the Black P Stone street gang \\nin Chicago who distributed many kilograms of cocaine each \\nmonth. The arrested man agreed to become a confidential in‐\\nformant for the DEA and help the agents execute a sting op‐\\neration. \\n The confidential informant told the agents that, through \\nprior conversations, he and Cherry had agreed that the in‐\\nformant would drive the cocaine to a residence in Harvey, Il‐\\nlinois, that Cherry would meet him there, take custody of the \\ncocaine, and then a few hours later another member of \\nCherry’s organization would pay the informant for the co‐\\ncaine. The confidential informant provided agents with \\nCherry’s cell phone number and a physical description: an \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 3\\n\\naverage height black man, weighing about 200 pounds, and \\ndriving a white Mercedes SUV. \\n The agents formulated a plan for a sting operation in \\nwhich the confidential informant would drive his own car to \\nmeet Cherry with sham cocaine concealed in the car’s drug‐\\nhiding trap compartment. Under the plan, the informant \\nwould signal the agents by stepping out of the car once he and \\nCherry had engaged in a conversation about the exchange of \\nthe cocaine. For their own safety, the agents had the confiden‐\\ntial informant change the meeting spot to a parking lot further \\naway from gang activity. They then outfitted the informant \\nwith hidden audio and video recording equipment, and \\nsearched and inventoried the informant’s vehicle (as is the \\nprotocol for such operations). \\n At around 7:50 p.m. on May 31, 2012, the confidential in‐\\nformant placed a recorded call to Cherry. The informant told \\nCherry that he was approximately ten minutes away from the \\nagreed upon meeting place in Harvey, and Cherry responded \\nthat he would meet him there. A few minutes later the confi‐\\ndential informant, under direction of the agents, called \\nCherry and changed the rendezvous spot to a parking lot in \\nnearby Markham, Illinois. Shortly thereafter, a 2012 white \\nMercedes SUV (later determined to be registered to Cherry) \\nentered the nearly empty parking lot, circled the lot, and then \\nparked next to the confidential informant.1 \\n In a conversation that was recorded, but not monitored in \\nreal time by agents, the confidential informant told Cherry \\n \\n1 The testimony of the agents was inconsistent as to whether Cherry \\n\\nparked directly next to the informant’s car, one parking spot away, or one‐\\nand‐a‐half parking spots away. We find this discrepancy to be immaterial. \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nthat “it” (meaning the thirteen kilograms of cocaine) was in \\nthe “spot”—the hidden compartment in the back of the car. \\nOnce Cherry responded affirmatively that he wanted to see \\nthe drugs, the informant opened the compartment and then \\nexited the car—the pre‐arranged signal to law enforcement. \\nCherry did not handle nor take physical possession of the \\ndrugs. \\n The district court credited the testimony of the DEA \\nagents at the scene who testified that as they approached the \\ncar and Cherry saw them, he dashed the short distance be‐\\ntween the informant’s car and his SUV, opened the front door \\nof the SUV, and attempted to get in. One agent testified that \\nCherry opened the door and “tried to get into the vehicle as \\nwe jumped on him so— … [h]e had his hand and his arm got \\ninto it, but we pulled him back out.” Tr. 11/27/12 at 77 (R. 58). \\n As one agent subdued Cherry and placed him under ar‐\\nrest, a second agent quickly looked into the Mercedes to make \\nsure no one else was hiding in the vehicle. A third agent went \\nthrough the motions of arresting the confidential informant to \\nprotect him as an informant, and after doing so returned to \\nthe Mercedes where, along with two other agents, he saw, \\nthrough the open door, a black messenger‐type satchel with \\nthe flap open and clear plastic bags containing what looked to \\nbe heroin or cocaine. Cherry testified at the suppression hear‐\\ning that the drugs were not, in fact, in plain sight, but that they \\nwere in a black plastic bag contained within the closed and \\nlocked satchel, and the cash was also concealed in a black \\nplastic bag stuffed under the driver’s seat. Later testing con‐\\nfirmed that the satchel held baggies containing 348.1 grams of \\nheroin and 13.7 grams of cocaine base (crack). Agents also \\nfound $19,495 in cash in the SUV. Eventually Chicago Police \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 5\\n\\nOfficer and DEA task force officer Jose Castaneda photo‐\\ngraphed the car and the satchel, taking photographs of the \\nsatchel both open and closed, the cash, and other items in the \\ncar. All of the photographs had the same time stamp—8:48 \\np.m. Officer Castanada testified that he could not recall the \\norder in which he took the photographs and could not say \\nwhether the satchel was open or closed when Cherry was ar‐\\nrested.2 \\n After agents read Cherry his Miranda rights, Cherry \\nagreed to talk to one of the agents and told him that three \\nweeks earlier the confidential informant, who he knew as “Fat \\nMan” fronted him half of a kilogram of heroin for $31,500, but \\nthe heroin was not of good quality and his customers were \\ncomplaining. On the night he was arrested, Cherry was bring‐\\ning approximately 300 grams of heroin back to the confiden‐\\ntial informant to exchange for an equivalent amount of co‐\\ncaine. The government charged Cherry with possession with \\nintent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, in viola‐\\ntion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). \\n Cherry filed two motions to suppress the evidence before \\ntrial. In the first motion he claimed that the agents lacked \\nprobable cause to arrest him. In the second motion he argued \\nthat the agents had no authority to search his bag within the \\nvehicle as the drugs were not in plain view. Following a No‐\\nvember 27, 2012 suppression hearing in which the court heard \\nfrom Cherry and from four DEA agents, the district court \\n\\n \\n2 From this point forward we will refer to all law enforcement officers col‐\\n\\nlectively as “agents” unless specifically noted otherwise. Technically, Of‐\\nficer Castaneda was employed as a City of Chicago police officer and as‐\\nsigned to the DEA as a task force officer. \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nfound that the agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry and \\nthat the subsequent search of the vehicle was lawful as the \\ndrugs were in plain sight. In the alternative, the district court \\nheld that the narcotics inevitably would have been discovered \\nafter Cherry’s arrest, subsequent to an inventory search of his \\nvehicle. \\n Cherry twice moved to reconsider the district court deci‐\\nsion, arguing, on September 8, 2014, that a new Seventh Cir‐\\ncuit decision indicated that a court must have more corrobo‐\\nration from an informant’s tip and that an enhanced version \\nof the recording from the confidential informant’s body cam‐\\nera did not support an agreement by Cherry to accept the co‐\\ncaine. The district court rejected both arguments. \\n Almost two years after the suppression hearing, on \\nSeptember 8, 2014, Cherry filed another motion—this time \\nseeking to inspect the camera used to photograph the satchel \\nand the metadata associated with the photographs in order to \\ndetermine in what order the photographs were taken. \\nBecause Castaneda took all of the photographs of the satchel, \\nboth open and closed, within the same minute (and the time \\nstamp did not reveal seconds), the court and parties could not \\ndetermine in what order the agent took the photographs. \\nCherry’s counsel argued that the data sought would reveal \\nthe order in which the pictures were taken, and thus would \\nuncover the truth about whether the drugs had been in plain \\nsight in an open bag, or not visible in a closed bag when the \\nagents arrived at the vehicle. After a search, however, the \\ngovernment determined that neither the camera nor any \\nmetadata was available because Agent Castaneda took the \\nphotographs with a personal camera which he subsequently \\nsold at a yard sale in the summer of 2013. Cherry filed a \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 7\\n\\nrenewed motion to reconsider, arguing that because the \\ngovernment failed to retain the metadata from the camera, the \\ncourt should be precluded from relying on the photographs \\nin making its probable cause determination. After the trial, \\nCherry also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the \\nbasis of an alleged Brady violation—that is, that the \\ngovernment failed to preserve the exculpatory evidence of the \\nphotographic metadata from the camera. The district court \\nrejected this argument as well, noting that Cherry had failed \\nto demonstrate any bad faith on the government’s part, that \\nthe court had already found that the heroin was in plain view, \\nand inevitably the drugs would have been discovered during \\nan inventory search. \\n The case proceeded to trial where the jury convicted \\nCherry of the single count of the superseding indictment. Af‐\\nter trial, Cherry filed another motion in which he repeated his \\npre‐trial arguments. The district court found no reason to alter \\nits rulings. Cherry was sentenced to 240 months’ imprison‐\\nment, and now appeals. In this court he again argues that his \\narrest was not supported by probable cause and that the dis‐\\ntrict court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained \\nduring the warrantless search of his vehicle. He also argues \\nthat the district court erred by determining that the govern‐\\nment did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) \\nwhen it failed to preserve the potentially exculpatory \\nmetadata associated with the photographs of the evidence. \\n II. \\n1. Probable cause to arrest \\n The main crux of Cherry’s defense is that the DEA agents \\nhad so little reliable information either from the confidential \\n\\f8 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\ninformant or from their own investigations that they could \\nnot have had probable cause either to arrest him or to search \\nhis vehicle. In pursuit of this defense, shortly after his original \\nindictment, Cherry filed a motion to suppress the evidence \\nobtained from his allegedly illegal arrest and the subsequent \\nsearch of his SUV. The district court, however, denied his mo‐\\ntion to suppress. When considering a district court’s denial of \\na motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error \\nand questions of law de novo. United States v. Velazquez, 906 \\nF.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2018). We will not overturn a district \\ncourt’s credibility finding unless we find clear error. United \\nStates v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018). Cherry also \\nfiled post‐trial motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce‐\\ndure 29(a) and (c), repeating these arguments and challenging \\nthe sufficiency of the evidence that the government relied \\nupon to establish probable cause. R. 177, 196. When a defend‐\\nant challenges the sufficiency of the government’s evidence in \\na Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, as Cherry did \\nbelow, we review de novo, viewing the evidence in the light \\nmost favorable to the government. United States v. Cruse, 805 \\nF.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2015). We must affirm if any rational \\ntrier of fact could have found the elements of the crime be‐\\nyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We have often said that “after a \\nguilty verdict, a defendant seeking a judgment of acquittal \\nfaces a ‘nearly insurmountable hurdle.’” United States v. Jones, \\n713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Moore, \\n115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir. 1997)). Yet even under the rela‐\\ntively easier standard of review of the motion to dismiss, we \\nfind the DEA agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry. \\n Cherry’s claims require us to go back to the core of the \\nFourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitu‐\\ntion prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, including \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 9\\n\\narrests made without either a warrant or probable cause. U.S. \\nConst. Amend. IV. A police officer has probable cause to \\nmake an arrest if a reasonable person, knowing all of the facts \\nand circumstances known to this officer, would believe that \\nthe individual in question has committed or is committing a \\ncrime. Seiser v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2014). \\nThere is no checklist that can determine probable cause, par‐\\nticularly when evaluating probable cause based on an inform‐\\nant’s tip. \\n [P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on \\n the assessment of probabilities in particular fac‐\\n tual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, re‐\\n duced to a neat set of legal rules. Informants’ \\n tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes \\n from many different types of persons. … In‐\\n formants’ tips, like all other clues and evidence \\n coming to a policeman on the scene may vary \\n greatly in their value and reliability. Rigid legal \\n rules are ill‐suited to an area of such diversity. \\n One simple rule will not cover every situation. \\nIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (internal citations \\nomitted). And, as the general standards of review remind us, \\nwhen we look at the value and reliability of any particular tip, \\nwe give deference to the district court’s determinations of the \\nfacts (and inferences therefrom) that feed into the finding of \\nprobable cause and review the legal determination of proba‐\\nble cause de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 \\n(1996). When reviewing probable cause in the case where an \\ninformant has provided a tip, therefore, we look at the totality \\nof the circumstances, noting that “a deficiency in one may be \\ncompensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, \\n\\f10 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nby a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia \\nof reliability.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. For this reason, direct \\ncomparisons of indicia of probable cause from one informant \\ncase to the next can be difficult. \\n Despite the inability to reduce the analysis to a neat set of \\nrules, the Supreme Court has mentioned factors that might go \\ninto the decision‐making hopper, while warning against any \\ntemptation to be confined to a rigid test. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234–\\n35. Those factors include an informant’s past reliability, her \\nreputation for honesty, the basis of her knowledge, and her \\npotential motive. Id. In United States v. Searcy, a case which \\ninvolved a warrant application to a magistrate judge, our \\ncourt, like the Supreme Court, stressed the importance of con‐\\nsidering the totality of the circumstances, but noted that a \\nmagistrate might consider: “first, the degree to which the in‐\\nformant acquired knowledge of the events through firsthand \\nobservation; second, the detail and specificity of the infor‐\\nmation provided by the informant; third, the interval between \\nthe date of the events and a police officer’s application for the \\nsearch warrant; and fourth, the extent to which law enforce‐\\nment corroborated the informant’s statements.” United States \\nv. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). \\n Anonymous tips, of course, require more corroboration \\nthen those where the honesty, motivation, and reliability of \\nthe informant can be assessed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244–46; Ad‐\\nams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (“Some tips, com‐\\npletely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant \\nno police response or require further investigation before a \\nforcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.”). The ability \\nof an informant to predict future actions of others with speci‐\\nficity is one indicator of reliability. Gates, 462 U.S. at 245–46. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 11\\n\\nWhen a suspect engages in the behaviors and actions that an \\ninformant has predicted, “[t]hat is exactly the type of corrob‐\\noration that counts.” United States v. Oliva, 385 F.3d 1111, 1114 \\n(7th Cir. 2004). See also, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 \\n(1990) (“What was important was the caller’s ability to predict \\nrespondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated inside \\ninformation.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. Navarro, \\n90 F.3d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1996) (“because the surveillance \\npreceding the stop corroborated the information from the in‐\\nformant, the law enforcement officers had probable cause for \\nboth the arrest and search.”). But see United States v. Lopez, 907 \\nF.3d 472, 483 (7th Cir. 2018) (informant who later disappeared \\nwas not reliable and “[t]he officers’ observations that day [of \\nthe arrest] did not corroborate, even roughly, the informant’s \\nstory.”) Moreover, because the “Fourth Amendment, bal‐\\nances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal se‐\\ncurity against the importance of the governmental interests \\nalleged to justify the intrusion … [a] stop to investigate an al‐\\nready completed crime does not necessarily promote the in‐\\nterest of crime prevention as directly as a stop to investigate \\nsuspected ongoing criminal activity.” United States v. Hensley, \\n469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985). \\n In this case, the informant did not have a long (or any) his‐\\ntory of cooperating with law enforcement, and had not been \\nknown to them for long, but he was not an anonymous tipster. \\nHe had agreed to cooperate with law enforcement after being \\narrested earlier that day picking up a very large quantity of \\ncocaine at the airport—more cocaine than anyone could use \\nfor personal consumption. The confidential informant pro‐\\nvided significant incriminating information including that he \\nhad a pre‐arranged plan to deliver thirteen kilograms of co‐\\ncaine to Cherry. The informant also told the agents that \\n\\f12 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nCherry was a member of the Black P Stone gang in Chicago \\nand regularly trafficked in drugs. The informant then pre‐\\ndicted to the DEA agents that Cherry, an African‐American \\nman, who he knew as “Mo” and who was of average height \\nand weighed about 200 pounds would be arriving at a partic‐\\nular parking lot in Markham, Illinois at a particular time, and \\nwas known to drive a white Mercedes SUV. The phone calls \\nbetween Cherry and the informant corroborated some of this \\ninformation—Cherry appeared to agree to follow the inform‐\\nant’s instructions given in the phone calls. The agents were \\nable to corroborate more of this information when a man, \\nmeeting the informant’s description, arrived in the predicted \\nplace at the predicted time, driving the make, model, and \\ncolor of vehicle that the informant said he would be driving. \\nCherry’s own behavior added to their confidence when he ar‐\\nrived at the agreed‐upon parking lot, circled the parking lot \\nas though assessing the safety and privacy of the situation, \\nand then parked next to the confidential informant’s car. He \\nexited his own car and got into the front passenger seat of the \\ninformant’s car. Law enforcement agents instructed the in‐\\nformant to signal them after having a certain conversation \\nwith Cherry and showing him the sham cocaine in the hidden \\ncompartment. The informant subsequently gave the agents \\nthe signal indicating that he had completed the prerequisite \\ntasks. As the agents announced themselves, Cherry made in‐\\nitial moves to flee either by running toward or taking steps \\ntoward his vehicle. \\n The confidential informant was not an anonymous tipster \\nand continued to cooperate with the agents after his arrest \\nand throughout the sting operation—following all of the \\nagents’ commands and instructions. His earlier arrest meant \\nthat he had motivation to help the agents in order to receive \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 13\\n\\nleniency in his own case. We recognize that this can be a dou‐\\nble edge sword—it gives informants motivation to assist law \\nenforcement officers, but perhaps also gives them motivation \\nto assist law enforcement without regard to the accuracy of \\nthe information. In any event, we have noted that the fact that \\na desire for leniency motivates an informant does not make \\nthe information he provides inherently unreliable. United \\nStates v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2010). And in fact, \\nour court has noted that informant tips that involve inculpa‐\\ntory statements add great weight to an assessment of proba‐\\nble cause to arrest. United States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456, 459 \\n(7th Cir. 2004) (also noting that “several circuits have held that \\nsuch statements are so presumptively reliable that they may \\nsupport a probable cause determination even if uncorrobo‐\\nrated.”). It is true that there is always a risk that an informant \\nis setting up an innocent rival or enemy, but this is less of a \\nrisk when the informant is known and trying to lessen his \\nown sentence. Surely the informant knew that he would not \\nhave engendered the good will of the agents had Cherry ar‐\\nrived and stated on the recorded wire that he had just come \\nto meet the informant for pizza. See United States v. Olson, 408 \\nF.3d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A motive to curry favor, how‐\\never, does not necessarily render an informant unreliable. In‐\\ndeed, even informants ‘attempting to strike a bargain with the \\npolice have a strong incentive to provide accurate and specific \\ninformation rather than false information about a defendant’s \\nillegal activity.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 870 \\n(2002)) (cleaned up). \\n As we have just noted, there is no formula for determining \\nthe requisite degree of reliability of an informant’s tip that \\nwill provide probable cause to arrest. Other cases can give us \\nguide posts. And so, for example, we might look to United \\n\\f14 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nStates v. Freeman, 691 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2012), where the police \\nhad analogous facts from an informant about a similar pre‐\\narranged drug deal. In Freeman, an arrested drug dealer \\nagreed to assist the police in a sting. He telephoned a raspy‐\\nvoiced man who agreed to meet him and sell him crack at a \\nSav‐A‐Lot parking lot. At the agreed upon time, a minivan \\npulled into the nearly empty parking lot and waited by the \\ndoor of the store. The informant called the defendant who re‐\\nsponded that he was waiting by that same door. The van, \\nhowever, suddenly pulled out of the lot. After the van failed \\nto engage a turn signal, police officers initiated a traffic stop \\nand encountered a raspy‐voiced man. A dog alerted to the \\nscent of drugs, giving the police probable cause to search the \\nvan, but when they did, they found no drugs. The officers \\nasked the informant to redial the number he had just used to \\nset up the drug deal, and when he did, the call came through \\non a cell phone located in the armrest on the passenger‐side \\ndoor of the van. The men were arrested and, during a strip \\nsearch at the jail, officers found crack cocaine hidden in the \\nman’s buttocks. The district court found that “[t]he police had \\ncredible information about Freeman’s drug‐trafficking habits \\nfrom the cooperating informants, and his activities just prior \\nto his arrest coincided perfectly with the details of the under‐\\ncover operation, thus supplying probable cause to arrest de‐\\nspite the fact that no drugs were found in the search during \\nthe stop.” Id. at 896. The police watched the silver van pull \\ninto the parking lot, the van matched the description given by \\nan earlier informant, it arrived at the time that the drug dealer \\non the phone said it would, and then the drug dealer on the \\nphone stated that he was parked just outside a Sav‐A‐Lot \\nstore, right where the van was parked. Id. at 899–900. When \\npulled over, the passenger met physical descriptions given by \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 15\\n\\nprevious informants and the phone number used to arrange \\nthe transaction rang a phone located within the silver van. \\nJust as in this case, the police had little independent corrobo‐\\nration other than the informants’ accurate descriptions and \\nhis ability to predict the defendant’s actions. This, the court \\nheld, was sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 896. \\n Cherry argues that this case is not like Freeman, because in \\nFreeman the police were monitoring the calls in real‐time and \\nknew that the defendant had agreed to sell crack to an \\ninformant at the precise location where he then appeared. But \\nthe agents in this case likewise knew that Cherry planned to \\nmeet the informant in the parking lot to participate in a drug \\ndeal. It is true that they did not listen to the phone calls in real \\ntime, but during the first call the officers were present with \\nthe informant. Tr. 11/26/12 at 23 (R. 58 at 23). In Freeman, our \\ncourt noted that “the police on the scene had plenty of \\ninformation to give them probable cause to believe that [the \\ndefendant] had committed the crime,” including the fact that \\nthe events unfolded just as the informant had said they \\nwould—a raspy‐voiced man arrived at a pre‐arranged \\nlocation at the pre‐arranged time in a vehicle he was known \\nto drive.” Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900. Sometimes having a \\ndrug buyer appear on the scene precisely when expected is \\nsufficient to supply probable cause for an arrest. See United \\nStates v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2008). In Colon the \\ncourt upheld the finding of probable cause where one drug \\ndealer telephoned another to tell him that a man would be \\narriving at a particular house in fifteen minutes to purchase \\ndrugs, and the police arrested that man as he left the house. \\nId. In this case the agents had far more: they had a man who \\nmatched the predicted description, arriving in a vehicle that \\nmatched descriptions of the drug dealer’s vehicle, at the \\n\\f16 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\npredicted place and time. They had the informant’s \\nconfirmatory signal, and the defendant’s preliminary attempt \\nto flee.3 \\n It is true that the facts in this case are not the same as they \\nwere in Freeman. No two cases ever are. But Freeman empha‐\\nsizes the value to law enforcement of an informant’s \\nknowledge when the events the informant predicted come to \\nlight in the manner the informant forecasted, particularly \\nwhen those events would not have been known to the general \\npublic. See Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900; White, 496 U.S. at 332 \\n(noting that an informant’s predictions gain some degree of \\nreliability when the police see the events unfold as the inform‐\\nant predicted, particularly when it demonstrates inside infor‐\\nmation of which the general public would not be aware). Of \\ncourse, there is always a risk that a confidential informant has \\nulterior motives and is leading law enforcement astray. Prob‐\\nable cause, however, does not require certainty in an inform‐\\nant’s tip, just sufficient probability. Seiser, 762 F.3d at 654. In \\nBrown, 366 F.3d at 460–61, for example, our court found suffi‐\\ncient probable cause to arrest despite a small risk that the in‐\\nformant “had simply spotted [the defendant] while fleeing \\nfrom the bank and then falsely implicated him in the bank \\nrobbery.” Id. at 460–61. In that case a bank robber caught in \\nthe act described the getaway car awaiting him, the exact \\n \\n3 Although flight cannot, on its own, provide probable cause to arrest, the \\n\\ndetermination of probable cause depends on a totality of circumstances \\nthat may take into account “commonsense judgments and inferences \\nabout human behavior,” including unprovoked flight. Illinois v. Wardlow, \\n528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (explaining that a “refusal to cooperate, without \\nmore, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed \\nfor a detention or seizure,” but unprovoked flight could factor into rea‐\\nsonable suspicion) (internal citations omitted). \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 17\\n\\nlocation where it would be waiting, the color and make of the \\ncar, the first letter of the license plate, and a name and descrip‐\\ntion of the driver. Id. at 457. When the police were able to ver‐\\nify these details, “the entirety of [the informant’s] story, in‐\\ncluding his statements about Mr. Brown’s role in the rob‐\\nberies, assumed a high degree of reliability.” Id. at 460. It is \\ntrue that the informant in Brown, like the informant here, \\ncould have been setting up an innocent person. As we noted, \\nhowever, probable cause does not require “hard certainties,” \\nonly probabilities. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (citing United States v. \\nCortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). Cherry argues that the in‐\\nformant’s information in Brown was far more detailed and the \\npolice were able to corroborate more of it. We do not think the \\nlevel of detail in these two cases is materially different in a \\nmanner that affects probable cause. \\n Undoubtedly more certainty is better where a defendant’s \\nliberty is at stake, but we do not require incontrovertible evi‐\\ndence for probable cause. Of course, it would have been better \\nhad the agents done more independent corroboration; had \\nthey been monitoring the conversations in real time (and cer‐\\ntainly the technology was so readily available, even in 2012, \\nthat one wonders why it was not used); and if they had seen \\nCherry take possession of the drugs. Because probable cause \\nis fact specific, it might happen that, in another case, a court \\nwould require this sort of corroboration before finding prob‐\\nable cause. We cannot conclude, however, that in this case \\nthese deficiencies eviscerated probable cause. The DEA \\nagents had multiple pieces of detailed information from an \\ninformant who was implicating himself in a drug deal—infor‐\\nmation corroborated as the predictions came true. This was \\nsufficient probable cause to support the arrest of Cherry. \\n\\f18 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\n2. Probable cause to search the vehicle \\n We also conclude that the DEA agents lawfully searched \\nCherry’s vehicle, including the satchel, and lawfully seized \\nthe narcotics. Like a warrantless arrest, a warrantless search \\nand seizure violates the Fourth Amendment unless it falls \\nwithin certain exceptions to the warrant requirement. Katz v. \\nUnited States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “The ‘plain‐view’ doc‐\\ntrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that \\nwarrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but \\nthis characterization overlooks the important difference be‐\\ntween searches and seizures. If an article is already in plain \\nview, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve \\nany invasion of privacy.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 \\n(1990). Under this plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure \\nis justified if first, the law enforcement officer did not violate \\nthe Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which \\nthe evidence could be plainly viewed; second, the item was in \\nplain view; and third, its incriminating character was imme‐\\ndiately apparent. United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 262 \\n(7th Cir. 2016). \\n After hearing testimony from the agents and Cherry, the \\ncourt concluded that the drugs were in plain view after \\nCherry opened the driver’s side door to his car while trying \\nto flee. We see no reason not to give deference to this credibil‐\\nity and factual finding. As the district court concluded, the \\nagents’ testimony was substantially consistent: they arrested \\nthe defendant after he opened the door to his SUV, and \\nthrough that open door they were able to see the messenger \\nbag with a plastic bag containing a substance the agents rea‐\\nsonably suspected was illegal drugs. The district court con‐\\ncluded that the agents’ version of events, was more likely true \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 19\\n\\nthan Cherry’s, and that any minor discrepancies were imma‐\\nterial. R. 60 at 4–6. The district court did not believe Cherry’s \\ntestimony that he hid the drugs at the bottom of the satchel, \\nbelow several car titles and then placed the satchel on the \\nfloor of the front passenger side of the car. The district court \\nreasoned that a drug dealer coming to exchange drugs would \\nwant to minimize his vulnerability and thus the time for the \\nexchange, and therefore would place the drugs where they \\nwould be readily accessible. As we have noted, “we must ac‐\\ncept the district court’s credibility determination unless the \\nfacts, as testified to by the police officers, were so unbelievable \\nthat no reasonable factfinder could credit them.” Contreras, \\n820 F.3d at 263. \\n Cherry does not seem to dispute the prerequisites to the \\nplain view doctrine—that the agents were lawfully in the \\nparking lot and that the incriminating nature of the evidence \\nwould have been readily apparent. Cherry argues instead that \\nhis version of events is the one to be believed—the drugs were \\nhidden inside the satchel on the floor of the Mercedes where \\nthe agents could not have seen them and the agents’ reports \\nto the contrary were inconsistent and thus unbelievable. We \\ncan make short shrift of this argument. “A district court’s \\ncredibility assessment based on live testimony will not be dis‐\\nturbed unless it is completely without foundation.” Freeman, \\n691 F.3d at 900 (internal citations omitted). \\n Even if we were to perseverate on the inconsistencies in \\nthe agents’ testimony, none makes it impossible that the \\ndrugs were in plain view. At the suppression hearing, Agent \\nO’Reilly testified that Cherry “ran across the parking spot to \\nhis vehicle” and opened the drivers’ side door, and had his \\nhand and arm inside the car when he was arrested. 11/27/12 \\n\\f20 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nTr. at 76–77, 95 (R. 58). Agent Brazao testified that although \\nhe did not see who opened the door to the SUV, after he se‐\\ncured the informant, he walked back to the SUV one minute \\nafter the agents moved in to arrest Cherry, noticed the doors \\nwere open, and saw a black satchel and drugs through the \\nopen door. Id. at 14, 35–36, 48–49. Agent Crawford testified \\nthat he did not see who initially opened the door, but when \\nhe arrived at the SUV, the other agents had already arrested \\nCherry and he was on the ground and the door was open. Id. \\nat 53–54, 56–61, 65–66. Crawford looked into the SUV to make \\ncertain there were no other people in the SUV who might be \\na threat to the agents and saw the satchel and drugs in plain \\nview. Id. Those agents testified consistently at trial. Tr. 6/28/16 \\na.m. at 193–202, 242–43 (R. 184); Tr. 6/28/16 p.m. at 296, 307–\\n08, 310–11 (R. 179). Cherry points accusatorily to Chicago po‐\\nlice officer Gamboa’s testimony. Officer Gamboa did not tes‐\\ntify at the suppression hearing, but he did testify at trial and \\nhis testimony was less clear about the door. He testified that \\nCherry “very quickly tried to get into his vehicle,” Tr. 6/28/16 \\nat 390, 391 (R. 179) and that he was handcuffed outside of the \\nvehicle. Id. at 391. His testimony about whether the door to \\nthe SUV was open or closed, however, was a bit equivocal. \\nCherry hangs his hat on the fact that Officer Gamboa testified \\nat trial that the agents grabbed Cherry before he could open \\nhis car. Gamboa’s testimony, however, was not as clear as \\nCherry presents it to be: \\n Gamboa: He tried to go in the car. I tried not to \\n let him go in the car. \\n Q. And you grabbed him? \\n A. From the shoulders and his arm, yeah. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 21\\n\\n Q. So he wasn’t in the car at the time that you \\n grabbed him? \\n A. No. He was trying to get into the car. \\n Q. Door was open? \\n A. Trying to open it, yeah. \\n Q. Oh, so the door—he hadn’t been able to—he \\n wasn’t successful in opening the door? \\n A. He didn’t get in. If he did open it, I wasn’t pay‐\\n ing attention. I was just trying to make sure he \\n didn’t get in. \\n Q. So you don’t recall whether it was open or \\n closed? \\n A. It wasnʹt open— he didnʹt get in. Letʹs put it that \\n way. He couldn’t get his foot in, so it wasn’t. \\n Q. Okay. So you donʹt think it was open? \\n A. No. \\nId. at 391–92 (emphasis ours). \\n None of the testimony gives rise to an irreconcilable dif‐\\nference. In fact, none of it is inherently inconsistent. Testi‐\\nmony is not incredible as a matter of law \\n “only because the witness may have been im‐\\n peached by certain discrepancies in [her] story, \\n by prior inconsistent statements, or by the exist‐\\n ence of a motive to provide evidence favorable \\n to the government.” To find a witness’s testi‐\\n mony to be incredible as a matter of law, it must \\n have been “physically impossible for the wit‐\\n ness to have observed that which he claims \\n\\f22 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\n occurred, or impossible under the laws of na‐\\n ture for the occurrence to have taken place at \\n all.” \\nContreras, 820 F.3d at 264 (citing Freeman, 691 F.3d at 900 and \\nUnited States v. Taylor, 701 F.3d 1166, 1174 (7th Cir.2012)). \\n The district court certainly did not err by accepting the tes‐\\ntimony of the three agents who were clear on the matter that \\nthe door was open allowing the agents to view the drugs in \\nplain view on the seat. This was particularly true after the \\nsuppression hearing when the district court had only the tes‐\\ntimony of Agents Brazao, Crawford and O’Reilly to consider. \\nBut this was also true even when the court reviewed the post‐\\ntrial motion for acquittal. We cannot say that no reasonable \\njury could have concluded that the door was open and the \\ndrugs in plain view. We see no reason to disturb the credibil‐\\nity and factual findings of the district court on the motion to \\nsuppress and certainly no reason to upset the jury’s conclu‐\\nsion. \\n In any event, even if the door to the Mercedes was closed, \\nthere were two other avenues to admit the evidence. First, the \\nagents were entitled to open the door to conduct a limited \\nprotective sweep in case there were other occupants who \\nwere not visible through the tinted windows or hiding in the \\nrear seat. Traffic stops are dangerous for officers and the “le‐\\ngitimate and weighty” interest in officer safety allows officers \\nto perform protective searches and frisks of other passengers. \\nArizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331 (2009). \\n And finally, the district court was correct to hold, in the \\nalternative, that the drugs were admissible under the inevita‐\\nble discovery doctrine. As the Supreme Court has held, “[i]f \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 23\\n\\nthe prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evi‐\\ndence that the information ultimately or inevitably would \\nhave been discovered by lawful means … then the deterrence \\nrationale has so little basis that the evidence should be re‐\\nceived.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Cherry \\nhad been arrested, the agents would have removed his car \\nfrom the parking lot and it would have been subject to an in‐\\nventory search, as is the usual protocol. As we noted before, \\nonce a defendant is in custody, “the arresting officers would \\nnot have allowed the truck to just sit on the street after” a de‐\\nfendant has been taken away. United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d \\n935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010). Agent Brazao confirmed this in his \\ntestimony at the suppression hearing: “it was determined by \\nthe case agents that we were not going to seize the vehicle, \\nand we didn’t want to leave it there in an open parking lot so \\nthat someone would steal it or damage it. So we wanted to \\nsecure it. So we asked Markham police can we secure it in \\ntheir parking lot until someone can come pick it up.” \\nTr. 11/27/12 at 66 (R. 58). Although Cherry was arrested in a \\nprivate parking lot, it seems unlikely that a police department \\nwould have allowed a car, potentially filled with drugs, to sit \\nin a parking lot indefinitely. The drugs, therefore, inevitably \\nwould have been discovered during an inventory search. \\n3. Photographic metadata. \\n Finally, Cherry’s motion to dismiss the superseding in‐\\ndictment and the motion for judgment of acquittal argued \\nthat the government violated its affirmative duty to disclose \\nevidence favorable to him as required by the Supreme Court \\nin Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady requires that the \\ngovernment disclose evidence materially favorable to the ac‐\\ncused, whether that evidence is impeachment evidence or \\n\\f24 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nexculpatory. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 \\n(2006). Upon review of a motion to dismiss which alleges a \\nBrady violation, we look only to see if the district court abused \\nits discretion. United States v. King, 910 F.3d 320, 326 (7th Cir. \\n2018). \\n When a defendant alleges that the government failed to \\npreserve potentially exculpatory evidence, as Cherry has \\ndone here, we apply the standard articulated in Arizona v. \\nYoungblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), which states that there is no \\ndenial of due process “unless a criminal defendant can show \\nbad faith on the part of the police.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. \\nSee also United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 407 (7th Cir. \\n2011), as amended (Feb. 23, 2011). In short, our precedent de‐\\nmands that Cherry demonstrate: “(1) bad faith by the govern‐\\nment, (2) that the exculpatory nature of the evidence was ap‐\\nparent before its destruction, and (3) that he could not obtain \\nthe same evidence anywhere else.” Fletcher, 634 F.3d at 407 \\n(citing United States v. Kimoto, 588 F.3d 464, 475 (7th Cir. \\n2009)). Bad faith, in turn, requires proof of an “‘official ani‐\\nmus’ or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evi‐\\ndence,’” and necessarily turns on an official’s subjective \\nknowledge that the evidence in question had exculpatory \\nvalue at the time it was lost or destroyed.” United States v. Bell, \\n819 F.3d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones v. \\nMcCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1992)). \\n In this case, the first two factors overlap. The district court \\ndid not abuse its discretion in determining that the camera \\nwas not sold in bad faith, in part because the exculpatory na‐\\nture would not have been obvious to the officer at the time the \\ncamera was sold. Agent Castaneda sold the camera, which \\nwas his personal property, at a garage sale in the summer of \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 25\\n\\n2013, months after the suppression hearing. During the sup‐\\npression hearing, the defense counsel asked Castaneda about \\nthe order of the photographs but never sought to inspect the \\ncamera or its metadata until almost two years after that hear‐\\ning. Cherry’s counsel was well aware of the existence of this \\ndata, but at no point before or during the suppression hearing \\ndid Cherry ask for the camera or the metadata. Nor did \\nCherry ask the government to preserve the data. The district \\ncourt concluded that “[n]o evidence supports Defendant’s po‐\\nsition (nor is it likely) that after the motion to suppress, during \\nwhich metadata was not even mentioned, law enforcement \\nofficers anticipated that such information would someday be \\nrequested and intentionally destroyed it in order to deprive \\nDefendant of the evidence.” R. 106 at 4. \\n Moreover, as we noted above, the contents of the vehicle, \\nincluding the satchel and the drugs within it, would have \\nbeen discovered in a lawful inventory search once the agents \\ntook custody of the vehicle. This makes any debate about the \\norder in which the photographs were taken and whether the \\nbag was opened or closed irrelevant. \\n III. \\n For all the reasons asserted above, we AFFIRM the opinion \\nof the district court in all respects.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385027/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607774/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deandre CHERRY, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐3018 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nDEANDRE CHERRY, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 1:12‐cr‐00415‐1 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Deandre Cherry’s heroin customers \nhad been complaining about the poor quality of his supply, \nso on a rainy night in May 2012, he drove into a parking lot in \nMarkham, Illinois hoping to exchange his inventory of low‐\nquality heroin for a better supply of cocaine that his supplier \nhad just picked up at O’Hare airport. Unbeknownst to \nCherry, however, his supplier had just been arrested picking \nup the cocaine and, since his hopes were for a better deal for \n\f2 No. 17‐3018 \n\nhimself, decided to cooperate and help the Drug Enforcement \nAgency (DEA) agents ensnare another dealer down the line. \nInstead of the exchange, Cherry was arrested mid‐deal and \neventually sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. Cherry \nappeals, claiming the agents lacked probable cause to arrest \nhim and search his vehicle. He also claims they failed to pre‐\nserve exculpatory evidence. We affirm the holding of the dis‐\ntrict court in all respects. \n I. \n In the course of an investigation into cocaine importation \nfrom Mexico to Chicago, DEA agents arrested a man who was \nattempting to take possession of twenty‐six kilograms of co‐\ncaine near Chicago’s O’Hare airport. During an interview af‐\nter that arrest, the man told Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) \nagents that he was scheduled to deliver thirteen kilograms of \ncocaine to a man he called “Mo” that night. “Mo” was later \nidentified as Cherry. According to the arrested man, Cherry \nwas a high‐ranking member of the Black P Stone street gang \nin Chicago who distributed many kilograms of cocaine each \nmonth. The arrested man agreed to become a confidential in‐\nformant for the DEA and help the agents execute a sting op‐\neration. \n The confidential informant told the agents that, through \nprior conversations, he and Cherry had agreed that the in‐\nformant would drive the cocaine to a residence in Harvey, Il‐\nlinois, that Cherry would meet him there, take custody of the \ncocaine, and then a few hours later another member of \nCherry’s organization would pay the informant for the co‐\ncaine. The confidential informant provided agents with \nCherry’s cell phone number and a physical description: an \n\fNo. 17‐3018 3\n\naverage height black man, weighing about 200 pounds, and \ndriving a white Mercedes SUV. \n The agents formulated a plan for a sting operation in \nwhich the confidential informant would drive his own car to \nmeet Cherry with sham cocaine concealed in the car’s drug‐\nhiding trap compartment. Under the plan, the informant \nwould signal the agents by stepping out of the car once he and \nCherry had engaged in a conversation about the exchange of \nthe cocaine. For their own safety, the agents had the confiden‐\ntial informant change the meeting spot to a parking lot further \naway from gang activity. They then outfitted the informant \nwith hidden audio and video recording equipment, and \nsearched and inventoried the informant’s vehicle (as is the \nprotocol for such operations). \n At around 7:50 p.m. on May 31, 2012, the confidential in‐\nformant placed a recorded call to Cherry. The informant told \nCherry that he was approximately ten minutes away from the \nagreed upon meeting place in Harvey, and Cherry responded \nthat he would meet him there. A few minutes later the confi‐\ndential informant, under direction of the agents, called \nCherry and changed the rendezvous spot to a parking lot in \nnearby Markham, Illinois. Shortly thereafter, a 2012 white \nMercedes SUV (later determined to be registered to Cherry) \nentered the nearly empty parking lot, circled the lot, and then \nparked next to the confidential informant.1 \n In a conversation that was recorded, but not monitored in \nreal time by agents, the confidential informant told Cherry \n \n1 The testimony of the agents was inconsistent as to whether Cherry \n\nparked directly next to the informant’s car, one parking spot away, or one‐\nand‐a‐half parking spots away. We find this discrepancy to be immaterial. \n\f4 No. 17‐3018 \n\nthat “it” (meaning the thirteen kilograms of cocaine) was in \nthe “spot”—the hidden compartment in the back of the car. \nOnce Cherry responded affirmatively that he wanted to see \nthe drugs, the informant opened the compartment and then \nexited the car—the pre‐arranged signal to law enforcement. \nCherry did not handle nor take physical possession of the \ndrugs. \n The district court credited the testimony of the DEA \nagents at the scene who testified that as they approached the \ncar and Cherry saw them, he dashed the short distance be‐\ntween the informant’s car and his SUV, opened the front door \nof the SUV, and attempted to get in. One agent testified that \nCherry opened the door and “tried to get into the vehicle as \nwe jumped on him so— … [h]e had his hand and his arm got \ninto it, but we pulled him back out.” Tr. 11/27/12 at 77 (R. 58). \n As one agent subdued Cherry and placed him under ar‐\nrest, a second agent quickly looked into the Mercedes to make \nsure no one else was hiding in the vehicle. A third agent went \nthrough the motions of arresting the confidential informant to \nprotect him as an informant, and after doing so returned to \nthe Mercedes where, along with two other agents, he saw, \nthrough the open door, a black messenger‐type satchel with \nthe flap open and clear plastic bags containing what looked to \nbe heroin or cocaine. Cherry testified at the suppression hear‐\ning that the drugs were not, in fact, in plain sight, but that they \nwere in a black plastic bag contained within the closed and \nlocked satchel, and the cash was also concealed in a black \nplastic bag stuffed under the driver’s seat. Later testing con‐\nfirmed that the satchel held baggies containing 348.1 grams of \nheroin and 13.7 grams of cocaine base (crack). Agents also \nfound $19,495 in cash in the SUV. Eventually Chicago Police \n\fNo. 17‐3018 5\n\nOfficer and DEA task force officer Jose Castaneda photo‐\ngraphed the car and the satchel, taking photographs of the \nsatchel both open and closed, the cash, and other items in the \ncar. All of the photographs had the same time stamp—8:48 \np.m. Officer Castanada testified that he could not recall the \norder in which he took the photographs and could not say \nwhether the satchel was open or closed when Cherry was ar‐\nrested.2 \n After agents read Cherry his Miranda rights, Cherry \nagreed to talk to one of the agents and told him that three \nweeks earlier the confidential informant, who he knew as “Fat \nMan” fronted him half of a kilogram of heroin for $31,500, but \nthe heroin was not of good quality and his customers were \ncomplaining. On the night he was arrested, Cherry was bring‐\ning approximately 300 grams of heroin back to the confiden‐\ntial informant to exchange for an equivalent amount of co‐\ncaine. The government charged Cherry with possession with \nintent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, in viola‐\ntion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). \n Cherry filed two motions to suppress the evidence before \ntrial. In the first motion he claimed that the agents lacked \nprobable cause to arrest him. In the second motion he argued \nthat the agents had no authority to search his bag within the \nvehicle as the drugs were not in plain view. Following a No‐\nvember 27, 2012 suppression hearing in which the court heard \nfrom Cherry and from four DEA agents, the district court \n\n \n2 From this point forward we will refer to all law enforcement officers col‐\n\nlectively as “agents” unless specifically noted otherwise. Technically, Of‐\nficer Castaneda was employed as a City of Chicago police officer and as‐\nsigned to the DEA as a task force officer. \n\f6 No. 17‐3018 \n\nfound that the agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry and \nthat the subsequent search of the vehicle was lawful as the \ndrugs were in plain sight. In the alternative, the district court \nheld that the narcotics inevitably would have been discovered \nafter Cherry’s arrest, subsequent to an inventory search of his \nvehicle. \n Cherry twice moved to reconsider the district court deci‐\nsion, arguing, on September 8, 2014, that a new Seventh Cir‐\ncuit decision indicated that a court must have more corrobo‐\nration from an informant’s tip and that an enhanced version \nof the recording from the confidential informant’s body cam‐\nera did not support an agreement by Cherry to accept the co‐\ncaine. The district court rejected both arguments. \n Almost two years after the suppression hearing, on \nSeptember 8, 2014, Cherry filed another motion—this time \nseeking to inspect the camera used to photograph the satchel \nand the metadata associated with the photographs in order to \ndetermine in what order the photographs were taken. \nBecause Castaneda took all of the photographs of the satchel, \nboth open and closed, within the same minute (and the time \nstamp did not reveal seconds), the court and parties could not \ndetermine in what order the agent took the photographs. \nCherry’s counsel argued that the data sought would reveal \nthe order in which the pictures were taken, and thus would \nuncover the truth about whether the drugs had been in plain \nsight in an open bag, or not visible in a closed bag when the \nagents arrived at the vehicle. After a search, however, the \ngovernment determined that neither the camera nor any \nmetadata was available because Agent Castaneda took the \nphotographs with a personal camera which he subsequently \nsold at a yard sale in the summer of 2013. Cherry filed a \n\fNo. 17‐3018 7\n\nrenewed motion to reconsider, arguing that because the \ngovernment failed to retain the metadata from the camera, the \ncourt should be precluded from relying on the photographs \nin making its probable cause determination. After the trial, \nCherry also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the \nbasis of an alleged Brady violation—that is, that the \ngovernment failed to preserve the exculpatory evidence of the \nphotographic metadata from the camera. The district court \nrejected this argument as well, noting that Cherry had failed \nto demonstrate any bad faith on the government’s part, that \nthe court had already found that the heroin was in plain view, \nand inevitably the drugs would have been discovered during \nan inventory search. \n The case proceeded to trial where the jury convicted \nCherry of the single count of the superseding indictment. Af‐\nter trial, Cherry filed another motion in which he repeated his \npre‐trial arguments. The district court found no reason to alter \nits rulings. Cherry was sentenced to 240 months’ imprison‐\nment, and now appeals. In this court he again argues that his \narrest was not supported by probable cause and that the dis‐\ntrict court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained \nduring the warrantless search of his vehicle. He also argues \nthat the district court erred by determining that the govern‐\nment did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) \nwhen it failed to preserve the potentially exculpatory \nmetadata associated with the photographs of the evidence. \n II. \n1. Probable cause to arrest \n The main crux of Cherry’s defense is that the DEA agents \nhad so little reliable information either from the confidential \n\f8 No. 17‐3018 \n\ninformant or from their own investigations that they could \nnot have had probable cause either to arrest him or to search \nhis vehicle. In pursuit of this defense, shortly after his original \nindictment, Cherry filed a motion to suppress the evidence \nobtained from his allegedly illegal arrest and the subsequent \nsearch of his SUV. The district court, however, denied his mo‐\ntion to suppress. When considering a district court’s denial of \na motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error \nand questions of law de novo. United States v. Velazquez, 906 \nF.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2018). We will not overturn a district \ncourt’s credibility finding unless we find clear error. United \nStates v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018). Cherry also \nfiled post‐trial motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce‐\ndure 29(a) and (c), repeating these arguments and challenging \nthe sufficiency of the evidence that the government relied \nupon to establish probable cause. R. 177, 196. When a defend‐\nant challenges the sufficiency of the government’s evidence in \na Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, as Cherry did \nbelow, we review de novo, viewing the evidence in the light \nmost favorable to the government. United States v. Cruse, 805 \nF.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2015). We must affirm if any rational \ntrier of fact could have found the elements of the crime be‐\nyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We have often said that “after a \nguilty verdict, a defendant seeking a judgment of acquittal \nfaces a ‘nearly insurmountable hurdle.’” United States v. Jones, \n713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Moore, \n115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir. 1997)). Yet even under the rela‐\ntively easier standard of review of the motion to dismiss, we \nfind the DEA agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry. \n Cherry’s claims require us to go back to the core of the \nFourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitu‐\ntion prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, including \n\fNo. 17‐3018 9\n\narrests made without either a warrant or probable cause. U.S. \nConst. Amend. IV. A police officer has probable cause to \nmake an arrest if a reasonable person, knowing all of the facts \nand circumstances known to this officer, would believe that \nthe individual in question has committed or is committing a \ncrime. Seiser v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2014). \nThere is no checklist that can determine probable cause, par‐\nticularly when evaluating probable cause based on an inform‐\nant’s tip. \n [P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on \n the assessment of probabilities in particular fac‐\n tual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, re‐\n duced to a neat set of legal rules. Informants’ \n tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes \n from many different types of persons. … In‐\n formants’ tips, like all other clues and evidence \n coming to a policeman on the scene may vary \n greatly in their value and reliability. Rigid legal \n rules are ill‐suited to an area of such diversity. \n One simple rule will not cover every situation. \nIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (internal citations \nomitted). And, as the general standards of review remind us, \nwhen we look at the value and reliability of any particular tip, \nwe give deference to the district court’s determinations of the \nfacts (and inferences therefrom) that feed into the finding of \nprobable cause and review the legal determination of proba‐\nble cause de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 \n(1996). When reviewing probable cause in the case where an \ninformant has provided a tip, therefore, we look at the totality \nof the circumstances, noting that “a deficiency in one may be \ncompensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, \n\f10 No. 17‐3018 \n\nby a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia \nof reliability.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. For this reason, direct \ncomparisons of indicia of probable cause from one informant \ncase to the next can be difficult. \n Despite the inability to reduce the analysis to a neat set of \nrules, the Supreme Court has mentioned factors that might go \ninto the decision‐making hopper, while warning against any \ntemptation to be confined to a rigid test. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234–\n35. Those factors include an informant’s past reliability, her \nreputation for honesty, the basis of her knowledge, and her \npotential motive. Id. In United States v. Searcy, a case which \ninvolved a warrant application to a magistrate judge, our \ncourt, like the Supreme Court, stressed the importance of con‐\nsidering the totality of the circumstances, but noted that a \nmagistrate might consider: “first, the degree to which the in‐\nformant acquired knowledge of the events through firsthand \nobservation; second, the detail and specificity of the infor‐\nmation provided by the informant; third, the interval between \nthe date of the events and a police officer’s application for the \nsearch warrant; and fourth, the extent to which law enforce‐\nment corroborated the informant’s statements.” United States \nv. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). \n Anonymous tips, of course, require more corroboration \nthen those where the honesty, motivation, and reliability of \nthe informant can be assessed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244–46; Ad‐\nams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (“Some tips, com‐\npletely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant \nno police response or require further investigation before a \nforcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.”). The ability \nof an informant to predict future actions of others with speci‐\nficity is one indicator of reliability. Gates, 462 U.S. at 245–46. \n\fNo. 17‐3018 11\n\nWhen a suspect engages in the behaviors and actions that an \ninformant has predicted, “[t]hat is exactly the type of corrob‐\noration that counts.” United States v. Oliva, 385 F.3d 1111, 1114 \n(7th Cir. 2004). See also, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 \n(1990) (“What was important was the caller’s ability to predict \nrespondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated inside \ninformation.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. Navarro, \n90 F.3d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1996) (“because the surveillance \npreceding the stop corroborated the information from the in‐\nformant, the law enforcement officers had probable cause for \nboth the arrest and search.”). But see United States v. Lopez, 907 \nF.3d 472, 483 (7th Cir. 2018) (informant who later disappeared \nwas not reliable and “[t]he officers’ observations that day [of \nthe arrest] did not corroborate, even roughly, the informant’s \nstory.”) Moreover, because the “Fourth Amendment, bal‐\nances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal se‐\ncurity against the importance of the governmental interests \nalleged to justify the intrusion … [a] stop to investigate an al‐\nready completed crime does not necessarily promote the in‐\nterest of crime prevention as directly as a stop to investigate \nsuspected ongoing criminal activity.” United States v. Hensley, \n469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985). \n In this case, the informant did not have a long (or any) his‐\ntory of cooperating with law enforcement, and had not been \nknown to them for long, but he was not an anonymous tipster. \nHe had agreed to cooperate with law enforcement after being \narrested earlier that day picking up a very large quantity of \ncocaine at the airport—more cocaine than anyone could use \nfor personal consumption. The confidential informant pro‐\nvided significant incriminating information including that he \nhad a pre‐arranged plan to deliver thirteen kilograms of co‐\ncaine to Cherry. The informant also told the agents that \n\f12 No. 17‐3018 \n\nCherry was a member of the Black P Stone gang in Chicago \nand regularly trafficked in drugs. The informant then pre‐\ndicted to the DEA agents that Cherry, an African‐American \nman, who he knew as “Mo” and who was of average height \nand weighed about 200 pounds would be arriving at a partic‐\nular parking lot in Markham, Illinois at a particular time, and \nwas known to drive a white Mercedes SUV. The phone calls \nbetween Cherry and the informant corroborated some of this \ninformation—Cherry appeared to agree to follow the inform‐\nant’s instructions given in the phone calls. The agents were \nable to corroborate more of this information when a man, \nmeeting the informant’s description, arrived in the predicted \nplace at the predicted time, driving the make, model, and \ncolor of vehicle that the informant said he would be driving. \nCherry’s own behavior added to their confidence when he ar‐\nrived at the agreed‐upon parking lot, circled the parking lot \nas though assessing the safety and privacy of the situation, \nand then parked next to the confidential informant’s car. He \nexited his own car and got into the front passenger seat of the \ninformant’s car. Law enforcement agents instructed the in‐\nformant to signal them after having a certain conversation \nwith Cherry and showing him the sham cocaine in the hidden \ncompartment. The informant subsequently gave the agents \nthe signal indicating that he had completed the prerequisite \ntasks. As the agents announced themselves, Cherry made in‐\nitial moves to flee either by running toward or taking steps \ntoward his vehicle. \n The confidential informant was not an anonymous tipster \nand continued to cooperate with the agents after his arrest \nand throughout the sting operation—following all of the \nagents’ commands and instructions. His earlier arrest meant \nthat he had motivation to help the agents in order to receive \n\fNo. 17‐3018 13\n\nleniency in his own case. We recognize that this can be a dou‐\nble edge sword—it gives informants motivation to assist law \nenforcement officers, but perhaps also gives them motivation \nto assist law enforcement without regard to the accuracy of \nthe information. In any event, we have noted that the fact that \na desire for leniency motivates an informant does not make \nthe information he provides inherently unreliable. United \nStates v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2010). And in fact, \nour court has noted that informant tips that involve inculpa‐\ntory statements add great weight to an assessment of proba‐\nble cause to arrest. United States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456, 459 \n(7th Cir. 2004) (also noting that “several circuits have held that \nsuch statements are so presumptively reliable that they may \nsupport a probable cause determination even if uncorrobo‐\nrated.”). It is true that there is always a risk that an informant \nis setting up an innocent rival or enemy, but this is less of a \nrisk when the informant is known and trying to lessen his \nown sentence. Surely the informant knew that he would not \nhave engendered the good will of the agents had Cherry ar‐\nrived and stated on the recorded wire that he had just come \nto meet the informant for pizza. See United States v. Olson, 408 \nF.3d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A motive to curry favor, how‐\never, does not necessarily render an informant unreliable. In‐\ndeed, even informants ‘attempting to strike a bargain with the \npolice have a strong incentive to provide accurate and specific \ninformation rather than false information about a defendant’s \nillegal activity.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 870 \n(2002)) (cleaned up). \n As we have just noted, there is no formula for determining \nthe requisite degree of reliability of an informant’s tip that \nwill provide probable cause to arrest. Other cases can give us \nguide posts. And so, for example, we might look to United \n\f14 No. 17‐3018 \n\nStates v. Freeman, 691 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2012), where the police \nhad analogous facts from an informant about a similar pre‐\narranged drug deal. In Freeman, an arrested drug dealer \nagreed to assist the police in a sting. He telephoned a raspy‐\nvoiced man who agreed to meet him and sell him crack at a \nSav‐A‐Lot parking lot. At the agreed upon time, a minivan \npulled into the nearly empty parking lot and waited by the \ndoor of the store. The informant called the defendant who re‐\nsponded that he was waiting by that same door. The van, \nhowever, suddenly pulled out of the lot. After the van failed \nto engage a turn signal, police officers initiated a traffic stop \nand encountered a raspy‐voiced man. A dog alerted to the \nscent of drugs, giving the police probable cause to search the \nvan, but when they did, they found no drugs. The officers \nasked the informant to redial the number he had just used to \nset up the drug deal, and when he did, the call came through \non a cell phone located in the armrest on the passenger‐side \ndoor of the van. The men were arrested and, during a strip \nsearch at the jail, officers found crack cocaine hidden in the \nman’s buttocks. The district court found that “[t]he police had \ncredible information about Freeman’s drug‐trafficking habits \nfrom the cooperating informants, and his activities just prior \nto his arrest coincided perfectly with the details of the under‐\ncover operation, thus supplying probable cause to arrest de‐\nspite the fact that no drugs were found in the search during \nthe stop.” Id. at 896. The police watched the silver van pull \ninto the parking lot, the van matched the description given by \nan earlier informant, it arrived at the time that the drug dealer \non the phone said it would, and then the drug dealer on the \nphone stated that he was parked just outside a Sav‐A‐Lot \nstore, right where the van was parked. Id. at 899–900. When \npulled over, the passenger met physical descriptions given by \n\fNo. 17‐3018 15\n\nprevious informants and the phone number used to arrange \nthe transaction rang a phone located within the silver van. \nJust as in this case, the police had little independent corrobo‐\nration other than the informants’ accurate descriptions and \nhis ability to predict the defendant’s actions. This, the court \nheld, was sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 896. \n Cherry argues that this case is not like Freeman, because in \nFreeman the police were monitoring the calls in real‐time and \nknew that the defendant had agreed to sell crack to an \ninformant at the precise location where he then appeared. But \nthe agents in this case likewise knew that Cherry planned to \nmeet the informant in the parking lot to participate in a drug \ndeal. It is true that they did not listen to the phone calls in real \ntime, but during the first call the officers were present with \nthe informant. Tr. 11/26/12 at 23 (R. 58 at 23). In Freeman, our \ncourt noted that “the police on the scene had plenty of \ninformation to give them probable cause to believe that [the \ndefendant] had committed the crime,” including the fact that \nthe events unfolded just as the informant had said they \nwould—a raspy‐voiced man arrived at a pre‐arranged \nlocation at the pre‐arranged time in a vehicle he was known \nto drive.” Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900. Sometimes having a \ndrug buyer appear on the scene precisely when expected is \nsufficient to supply probable cause for an arrest. See United \nStates v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2008). In Colon the \ncourt upheld the finding of probable cause where one drug \ndealer telephoned another to tell him that a man would be \narriving at a particular house in fifteen minutes to purchase \ndrugs, and the police arrested that man as he left the house. \nId. In this case the agents had far more: they had a man who \nmatched the predicted description, arriving in a vehicle that \nmatched descriptions of the drug dealer’s vehicle, at the \n\f16 No. 17‐3018 \n\npredicted place and time. They had the informant’s \nconfirmatory signal, and the defendant’s preliminary attempt \nto flee.3 \n It is true that the facts in this case are not the same as they \nwere in Freeman. No two cases ever are. But Freeman empha‐\nsizes the value to law enforcement of an informant’s \nknowledge when the events the informant predicted come to \nlight in the manner the informant forecasted, particularly \nwhen those events would not have been known to the general \npublic. See Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900; White, 496 U.S. at 332 \n(noting that an informant’s predictions gain some degree of \nreliability when the police see the events unfold as the inform‐\nant predicted, particularly when it demonstrates inside infor‐\nmation of which the general public would not be aware). Of \ncourse, there is always a risk that a confidential informant has \nulterior motives and is leading law enforcement astray. Prob‐\nable cause, however, does not require certainty in an inform‐\nant’s tip, just sufficient probability. Seiser, 762 F.3d at 654. In \nBrown, 366 F.3d at 460–61, for example, our court found suffi‐\ncient probable cause to arrest despite a small risk that the in‐\nformant “had simply spotted [the defendant] while fleeing \nfrom the bank and then falsely implicated him in the bank \nrobbery.” Id. at 460–61. In that case a bank robber caught in \nthe act described the getaway car awaiting him, the exact \n \n3 Although flight cannot, on its own, provide probable cause to arrest, the \n\ndetermination of probable cause depends on a totality of circumstances \nthat may take into account “commonsense judgments and inferences \nabout human behavior,” including unprovoked flight. Illinois v. Wardlow, \n528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (explaining that a “refusal to cooperate, without \nmore, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed \nfor a detention or seizure,” but unprovoked flight could factor into rea‐\nsonable suspicion) (internal citations omitted). \n\fNo. 17‐3018 17\n\nlocation where it would be waiting, the color and make of the \ncar, the first letter of the license plate, and a name and descrip‐\ntion of the driver. Id. at 457. When the police were able to ver‐\nify these details, “the entirety of [the informant’s] story, in‐\ncluding his statements about Mr. Brown’s role in the rob‐\nberies, assumed a high degree of reliability.” Id. at 460. It is \ntrue that the informant in Brown, like the informant here, \ncould have been setting up an innocent person. As we noted, \nhowever, probable cause does not require “hard certainties,” \nonly probabilities. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (citing United States v. \nCortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). Cherry argues that the in‐\nformant’s information in Brown was far more detailed and the \npolice were able to corroborate more of it. We do not think the \nlevel of detail in these two cases is materially different in a \nmanner that affects probable cause. \n Undoubtedly more certainty is better where a defendant’s \nliberty is at stake, but we do not require incontrovertible evi‐\ndence for probable cause. Of course, it would have been better \nhad the agents done more independent corroboration; had \nthey been monitoring the conversations in real time (and cer‐\ntainly the technology was so readily available, even in 2012, \nthat one wonders why it was not used); and if they had seen \nCherry take possession of the drugs. Because probable cause \nis fact specific, it might happen that, in another case, a court \nwould require this sort of corroboration before finding prob‐\nable cause. We cannot conclude, however, that in this case \nthese deficiencies eviscerated probable cause. The DEA \nagents had multiple pieces of detailed information from an \ninformant who was implicating himself in a drug deal—infor‐\nmation corroborated as the predictions came true. This was \nsufficient probable cause to support the arrest of Cherry. \n\f18 No. 17‐3018 \n\n2. Probable cause to search the vehicle \n We also conclude that the DEA agents lawfully searched \nCherry’s vehicle, including the satchel, and lawfully seized \nthe narcotics. Like a warrantless arrest, a warrantless search \nand seizure violates the Fourth Amendment unless it falls \nwithin certain exceptions to the warrant requirement. Katz v. \nUnited States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “The ‘plain‐view’ doc‐\ntrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that \nwarrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but \nthis characterization overlooks the important difference be‐\ntween searches and seizures. If an article is already in plain \nview, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve \nany invasion of privacy.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 \n(1990). Under this plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure \nis justified if first, the law enforcement officer did not violate \nthe Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which \nthe evidence could be plainly viewed; second, the item was in \nplain view; and third, its incriminating character was imme‐\ndiately apparent. United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 262 \n(7th Cir. 2016). \n After hearing testimony from the agents and Cherry, the \ncourt concluded that the drugs were in plain view after \nCherry opened the driver’s side door to his car while trying \nto flee. We see no reason not to give deference to this credibil‐\nity and factual finding. As the district court concluded, the \nagents’ testimony was substantially consistent: they arrested \nthe defendant after he opened the door to his SUV, and \nthrough that open door they were able to see the messenger \nbag with a plastic bag containing a substance the agents rea‐\nsonably suspected was illegal drugs. The district court con‐\ncluded that the agents’ version of events, was more likely true \n\fNo. 17‐3018 19\n\nthan Cherry’s, and that any minor discrepancies were imma‐\nterial. R. 60 at 4–6. The district court did not believe Cherry’s \ntestimony that he hid the drugs at the bottom of the satchel, \nbelow several car titles and then placed the satchel on the \nfloor of the front passenger side of the car. The district court \nreasoned that a drug dealer coming to exchange drugs would \nwant to minimize his vulnerability and thus the time for the \nexchange, and therefore would place the drugs where they \nwould be readily accessible. As we have noted, “we must ac‐\ncept the district court’s credibility determination unless the \nfacts, as testified to by the police officers, were so unbelievable \nthat no reasonable factfinder could credit them.” Contreras, \n820 F.3d at 263. \n Cherry does not seem to dispute the prerequisites to the \nplain view doctrine—that the agents were lawfully in the \nparking lot and that the incriminating nature of the evidence \nwould have been readily apparent. Cherry argues instead that \nhis version of events is the one to be believed—the drugs were \nhidden inside the satchel on the floor of the Mercedes where \nthe agents could not have seen them and the agents’ reports \nto the contrary were inconsistent and thus unbelievable. We \ncan make short shrift of this argument. “A district court’s \ncredibility assessment based on live testimony will not be dis‐\nturbed unless it is completely without foundation.” Freeman, \n691 F.3d at 900 (internal citations omitted). \n Even if we were to perseverate on the inconsistencies in \nthe agents’ testimony, none makes it impossible that the \ndrugs were in plain view. At the suppression hearing, Agent \nO’Reilly testified that Cherry “ran across the parking spot to \nhis vehicle” and opened the drivers’ side door, and had his \nhand and arm inside the car when he was arrested. 11/27/12 \n\f20 No. 17‐3018 \n\nTr. at 76–77, 95 (R. 58). Agent Brazao testified that although \nhe did not see who opened the door to the SUV, after he se‐\ncured the informant, he walked back to the SUV one minute \nafter the agents moved in to arrest Cherry, noticed the doors \nwere open, and saw a black satchel and drugs through the \nopen door. Id. at 14, 35–36, 48–49. Agent Crawford testified \nthat he did not see who initially opened the door, but when \nhe arrived at the SUV, the other agents had already arrested \nCherry and he was on the ground and the door was open. Id. \nat 53–54, 56–61, 65–66. Crawford looked into the SUV to make \ncertain there were no other people in the SUV who might be \na threat to the agents and saw the satchel and drugs in plain \nview. Id. Those agents testified consistently at trial. Tr. 6/28/16 \na.m. at 193–202, 242–43 (R. 184); Tr. 6/28/16 p.m. at 296, 307–\n08, 310–11 (R. 179). Cherry points accusatorily to Chicago po‐\nlice officer Gamboa’s testimony. Officer Gamboa did not tes‐\ntify at the suppression hearing, but he did testify at trial and \nhis testimony was less clear about the door. He testified that \nCherry “very quickly tried to get into his vehicle,” Tr. 6/28/16 \nat 390, 391 (R. 179) and that he was handcuffed outside of the \nvehicle. Id. at 391. His testimony about whether the door to \nthe SUV was open or closed, however, was a bit equivocal. \nCherry hangs his hat on the fact that Officer Gamboa testified \nat trial that the agents grabbed Cherry before he could open \nhis car. Gamboa’s testimony, however, was not as clear as \nCherry presents it to be: \n Gamboa: He tried to go in the car. I tried not to \n let him go in the car. \n Q. And you grabbed him? \n A. From the shoulders and his arm, yeah. \n\fNo. 17‐3018 21\n\n Q. So he wasn’t in the car at the time that you \n grabbed him? \n A. No. He was trying to get into the car. \n Q. Door was open? \n A. Trying to open it, yeah. \n Q. Oh, so the door—he hadn’t been able to—he \n wasn’t successful in opening the door? \n A. He didn’t get in. If he did open it, I wasn’t pay‐\n ing attention. I was just trying to make sure he \n didn’t get in. \n Q. So you don’t recall whether it was open or \n closed? \n A. It wasnʹt open— he didnʹt get in. Letʹs put it that \n way. He couldn’t get his foot in, so it wasn’t. \n Q. Okay. So you donʹt think it was open? \n A. No. \nId. at 391–92 (emphasis ours). \n None of the testimony gives rise to an irreconcilable dif‐\nference. In fact, none of it is inherently inconsistent. Testi‐\nmony is not incredible as a matter of law \n “only because the witness may have been im‐\n peached by certain discrepancies in [her] story, \n by prior inconsistent statements, or by the exist‐\n ence of a motive to provide evidence favorable \n to the government.” To find a witness’s testi‐\n mony to be incredible as a matter of law, it must \n have been “physically impossible for the wit‐\n ness to have observed that which he claims \n\f22 No. 17‐3018 \n\n occurred, or impossible under the laws of na‐\n ture for the occurrence to have taken place at \n all.” \nContreras, 820 F.3d at 264 (citing Freeman, 691 F.3d at 900 and \nUnited States v. Taylor, 701 F.3d 1166, 1174 (7th Cir.2012)). \n The district court certainly did not err by accepting the tes‐\ntimony of the three agents who were clear on the matter that \nthe door was open allowing the agents to view the drugs in \nplain view on the seat. This was particularly true after the \nsuppression hearing when the district court had only the tes‐\ntimony of Agents Brazao, Crawford and O’Reilly to consider. \nBut this was also true even when the court reviewed the post‐\ntrial motion for acquittal. We cannot say that no reasonable \njury could have concluded that the door was open and the \ndrugs in plain view. We see no reason to disturb the credibil‐\nity and factual findings of the district court on the motion to \nsuppress and certainly no reason to upset the jury’s conclu‐\nsion. \n In any event, even if the door to the Mercedes was closed, \nthere were two other avenues to admit the evidence. First, the \nagents were entitled to open the door to conduct a limited \nprotective sweep in case there were other occupants who \nwere not visible through the tinted windows or hiding in the \nrear seat. Traffic stops are dangerous for officers and the “le‐\ngitimate and weighty” interest in officer safety allows officers \nto perform protective searches and frisks of other passengers. \nArizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331 (2009). \n And finally, the district court was correct to hold, in the \nalternative, that the drugs were admissible under the inevita‐\nble discovery doctrine. As the Supreme Court has held, “[i]f \n\fNo. 17‐3018 23\n\nthe prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evi‐\ndence that the information ultimately or inevitably would \nhave been discovered by lawful means … then the deterrence \nrationale has so little basis that the evidence should be re‐\nceived.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Cherry \nhad been arrested, the agents would have removed his car \nfrom the parking lot and it would have been subject to an in‐\nventory search, as is the usual protocol. As we noted before, \nonce a defendant is in custody, “the arresting officers would \nnot have allowed the truck to just sit on the street after” a de‐\nfendant has been taken away. United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d \n935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010). Agent Brazao confirmed this in his \ntestimony at the suppression hearing: “it was determined by \nthe case agents that we were not going to seize the vehicle, \nand we didn’t want to leave it there in an open parking lot so \nthat someone would steal it or damage it. So we wanted to \nsecure it. So we asked Markham police can we secure it in \ntheir parking lot until someone can come pick it up.” \nTr. 11/27/12 at 66 (R. 58). Although Cherry was arrested in a \nprivate parking lot, it seems unlikely that a police department \nwould have allowed a car, potentially filled with drugs, to sit \nin a parking lot indefinitely. The drugs, therefore, inevitably \nwould have been discovered during an inventory search. \n3. Photographic metadata. \n Finally, Cherry’s motion to dismiss the superseding in‐\ndictment and the motion for judgment of acquittal argued \nthat the government violated its affirmative duty to disclose \nevidence favorable to him as required by the Supreme Court \nin Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady requires that the \ngovernment disclose evidence materially favorable to the ac‐\ncused, whether that evidence is impeachment evidence or \n\f24 No. 17‐3018 \n\nexculpatory. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 \n(2006). Upon review of a motion to dismiss which alleges a \nBrady violation, we look only to see if the district court abused \nits discretion. United States v. King, 910 F.3d 320, 326 (7th Cir. \n2018). \n When a defendant alleges that the government failed to \npreserve potentially exculpatory evidence, as Cherry has \ndone here, we apply the standard articulated in Arizona v. \nYoungblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), which states that there is no \ndenial of due process “unless a criminal defendant can show \nbad faith on the part of the police.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. \nSee also United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 407 (7th Cir. \n2011), as amended (Feb. 23, 2011). In short, our precedent de‐\nmands that Cherry demonstrate: “(1) bad faith by the govern‐\nment, (2) that the exculpatory nature of the evidence was ap‐\nparent before its destruction, and (3) that he could not obtain \nthe same evidence anywhere else.” Fletcher, 634 F.3d at 407 \n(citing United States v. Kimoto, 588 F.3d 464, 475 (7th Cir. \n2009)). Bad faith, in turn, requires proof of an “‘official ani‐\nmus’ or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evi‐\ndence,’” and necessarily turns on an official’s subjective \nknowledge that the evidence in question had exculpatory \nvalue at the time it was lost or destroyed.” United States v. Bell, \n819 F.3d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones v. \nMcCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1992)). \n In this case, the first two factors overlap. The district court \ndid not abuse its discretion in determining that the camera \nwas not sold in bad faith, in part because the exculpatory na‐\nture would not have been obvious to the officer at the time the \ncamera was sold. Agent Castaneda sold the camera, which \nwas his personal property, at a garage sale in the summer of \n\fNo. 17‐3018 25\n\n2013, months after the suppression hearing. During the sup‐\npression hearing, the defense counsel asked Castaneda about \nthe order of the photographs but never sought to inspect the \ncamera or its metadata until almost two years after that hear‐\ning. Cherry’s counsel was well aware of the existence of this \ndata, but at no point before or during the suppression hearing \ndid Cherry ask for the camera or the metadata. Nor did \nCherry ask the government to preserve the data. The district \ncourt concluded that “[n]o evidence supports Defendant’s po‐\nsition (nor is it likely) that after the motion to suppress, during \nwhich metadata was not even mentioned, law enforcement \nofficers anticipated that such information would someday be \nrequested and intentionally destroyed it in order to deprive \nDefendant of the evidence.” R. 106 at 4. \n Moreover, as we noted above, the contents of the vehicle, \nincluding the satchel and the drugs within it, would have \nbeen discovered in a lawful inventory search once the agents \ntook custody of the vehicle. This makes any debate about the \norder in which the photographs were taken and whether the \nbag was opened or closed irrelevant. \n III. \n For all the reasons asserted above, we AFFIRM the opinion \nof the district court in all respects.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deandre CHERRY, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3018 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nDEANDRE CHERRY, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:12‐cr‐00415‐1 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Deandre Cherry’s heroin customers \\nhad been complaining about the poor quality of his supply, \\nso on a rainy night in May 2012, he drove into a parking lot in \\nMarkham, Illinois hoping to exchange his inventory of low‐\\nquality heroin for a better supply of cocaine that his supplier \\nhad just picked up at O’Hare airport. Unbeknownst to \\nCherry, however, his supplier had just been arrested picking \\nup the cocaine and, since his hopes were for a better deal for \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nhimself, decided to cooperate and help the Drug Enforcement \\nAgency (DEA) agents ensnare another dealer down the line. \\nInstead of the exchange, Cherry was arrested mid‐deal and \\neventually sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. Cherry \\nappeals, claiming the agents lacked probable cause to arrest \\nhim and search his vehicle. He also claims they failed to pre‐\\nserve exculpatory evidence. We affirm the holding of the dis‐\\ntrict court in all respects. \\n I. \\n In the course of an investigation into cocaine importation \\nfrom Mexico to Chicago, DEA agents arrested a man who was \\nattempting to take possession of twenty‐six kilograms of co‐\\ncaine near Chicago’s O’Hare airport. During an interview af‐\\nter that arrest, the man told Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) \\nagents that he was scheduled to deliver thirteen kilograms of \\ncocaine to a man he called “Mo” that night. “Mo” was later \\nidentified as Cherry. According to the arrested man, Cherry \\nwas a high‐ranking member of the Black P Stone street gang \\nin Chicago who distributed many kilograms of cocaine each \\nmonth. The arrested man agreed to become a confidential in‐\\nformant for the DEA and help the agents execute a sting op‐\\neration. \\n The confidential informant told the agents that, through \\nprior conversations, he and Cherry had agreed that the in‐\\nformant would drive the cocaine to a residence in Harvey, Il‐\\nlinois, that Cherry would meet him there, take custody of the \\ncocaine, and then a few hours later another member of \\nCherry’s organization would pay the informant for the co‐\\ncaine. The confidential informant provided agents with \\nCherry’s cell phone number and a physical description: an \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 3\\n\\naverage height black man, weighing about 200 pounds, and \\ndriving a white Mercedes SUV. \\n The agents formulated a plan for a sting operation in \\nwhich the confidential informant would drive his own car to \\nmeet Cherry with sham cocaine concealed in the car’s drug‐\\nhiding trap compartment. Under the plan, the informant \\nwould signal the agents by stepping out of the car once he and \\nCherry had engaged in a conversation about the exchange of \\nthe cocaine. For their own safety, the agents had the confiden‐\\ntial informant change the meeting spot to a parking lot further \\naway from gang activity. They then outfitted the informant \\nwith hidden audio and video recording equipment, and \\nsearched and inventoried the informant’s vehicle (as is the \\nprotocol for such operations). \\n At around 7:50 p.m. on May 31, 2012, the confidential in‐\\nformant placed a recorded call to Cherry. The informant told \\nCherry that he was approximately ten minutes away from the \\nagreed upon meeting place in Harvey, and Cherry responded \\nthat he would meet him there. A few minutes later the confi‐\\ndential informant, under direction of the agents, called \\nCherry and changed the rendezvous spot to a parking lot in \\nnearby Markham, Illinois. Shortly thereafter, a 2012 white \\nMercedes SUV (later determined to be registered to Cherry) \\nentered the nearly empty parking lot, circled the lot, and then \\nparked next to the confidential informant.1 \\n In a conversation that was recorded, but not monitored in \\nreal time by agents, the confidential informant told Cherry \\n \\n1 The testimony of the agents was inconsistent as to whether Cherry \\n\\nparked directly next to the informant’s car, one parking spot away, or one‐\\nand‐a‐half parking spots away. We find this discrepancy to be immaterial. \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nthat “it” (meaning the thirteen kilograms of cocaine) was in \\nthe “spot”—the hidden compartment in the back of the car. \\nOnce Cherry responded affirmatively that he wanted to see \\nthe drugs, the informant opened the compartment and then \\nexited the car—the pre‐arranged signal to law enforcement. \\nCherry did not handle nor take physical possession of the \\ndrugs. \\n The district court credited the testimony of the DEA \\nagents at the scene who testified that as they approached the \\ncar and Cherry saw them, he dashed the short distance be‐\\ntween the informant’s car and his SUV, opened the front door \\nof the SUV, and attempted to get in. One agent testified that \\nCherry opened the door and “tried to get into the vehicle as \\nwe jumped on him so— … [h]e had his hand and his arm got \\ninto it, but we pulled him back out.” Tr. 11/27/12 at 77 (R. 58). \\n As one agent subdued Cherry and placed him under ar‐\\nrest, a second agent quickly looked into the Mercedes to make \\nsure no one else was hiding in the vehicle. A third agent went \\nthrough the motions of arresting the confidential informant to \\nprotect him as an informant, and after doing so returned to \\nthe Mercedes where, along with two other agents, he saw, \\nthrough the open door, a black messenger‐type satchel with \\nthe flap open and clear plastic bags containing what looked to \\nbe heroin or cocaine. Cherry testified at the suppression hear‐\\ning that the drugs were not, in fact, in plain sight, but that they \\nwere in a black plastic bag contained within the closed and \\nlocked satchel, and the cash was also concealed in a black \\nplastic bag stuffed under the driver’s seat. Later testing con‐\\nfirmed that the satchel held baggies containing 348.1 grams of \\nheroin and 13.7 grams of cocaine base (crack). Agents also \\nfound $19,495 in cash in the SUV. Eventually Chicago Police \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 5\\n\\nOfficer and DEA task force officer Jose Castaneda photo‐\\ngraphed the car and the satchel, taking photographs of the \\nsatchel both open and closed, the cash, and other items in the \\ncar. All of the photographs had the same time stamp—8:48 \\np.m. Officer Castanada testified that he could not recall the \\norder in which he took the photographs and could not say \\nwhether the satchel was open or closed when Cherry was ar‐\\nrested.2 \\n After agents read Cherry his Miranda rights, Cherry \\nagreed to talk to one of the agents and told him that three \\nweeks earlier the confidential informant, who he knew as “Fat \\nMan” fronted him half of a kilogram of heroin for $31,500, but \\nthe heroin was not of good quality and his customers were \\ncomplaining. On the night he was arrested, Cherry was bring‐\\ning approximately 300 grams of heroin back to the confiden‐\\ntial informant to exchange for an equivalent amount of co‐\\ncaine. The government charged Cherry with possession with \\nintent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, in viola‐\\ntion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). \\n Cherry filed two motions to suppress the evidence before \\ntrial. In the first motion he claimed that the agents lacked \\nprobable cause to arrest him. In the second motion he argued \\nthat the agents had no authority to search his bag within the \\nvehicle as the drugs were not in plain view. Following a No‐\\nvember 27, 2012 suppression hearing in which the court heard \\nfrom Cherry and from four DEA agents, the district court \\n\\n \\n2 From this point forward we will refer to all law enforcement officers col‐\\n\\nlectively as “agents” unless specifically noted otherwise. Technically, Of‐\\nficer Castaneda was employed as a City of Chicago police officer and as‐\\nsigned to the DEA as a task force officer. \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nfound that the agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry and \\nthat the subsequent search of the vehicle was lawful as the \\ndrugs were in plain sight. In the alternative, the district court \\nheld that the narcotics inevitably would have been discovered \\nafter Cherry’s arrest, subsequent to an inventory search of his \\nvehicle. \\n Cherry twice moved to reconsider the district court deci‐\\nsion, arguing, on September 8, 2014, that a new Seventh Cir‐\\ncuit decision indicated that a court must have more corrobo‐\\nration from an informant’s tip and that an enhanced version \\nof the recording from the confidential informant’s body cam‐\\nera did not support an agreement by Cherry to accept the co‐\\ncaine. The district court rejected both arguments. \\n Almost two years after the suppression hearing, on \\nSeptember 8, 2014, Cherry filed another motion—this time \\nseeking to inspect the camera used to photograph the satchel \\nand the metadata associated with the photographs in order to \\ndetermine in what order the photographs were taken. \\nBecause Castaneda took all of the photographs of the satchel, \\nboth open and closed, within the same minute (and the time \\nstamp did not reveal seconds), the court and parties could not \\ndetermine in what order the agent took the photographs. \\nCherry’s counsel argued that the data sought would reveal \\nthe order in which the pictures were taken, and thus would \\nuncover the truth about whether the drugs had been in plain \\nsight in an open bag, or not visible in a closed bag when the \\nagents arrived at the vehicle. After a search, however, the \\ngovernment determined that neither the camera nor any \\nmetadata was available because Agent Castaneda took the \\nphotographs with a personal camera which he subsequently \\nsold at a yard sale in the summer of 2013. Cherry filed a \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 7\\n\\nrenewed motion to reconsider, arguing that because the \\ngovernment failed to retain the metadata from the camera, the \\ncourt should be precluded from relying on the photographs \\nin making its probable cause determination. After the trial, \\nCherry also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the \\nbasis of an alleged Brady violation—that is, that the \\ngovernment failed to preserve the exculpatory evidence of the \\nphotographic metadata from the camera. The district court \\nrejected this argument as well, noting that Cherry had failed \\nto demonstrate any bad faith on the government’s part, that \\nthe court had already found that the heroin was in plain view, \\nand inevitably the drugs would have been discovered during \\nan inventory search. \\n The case proceeded to trial where the jury convicted \\nCherry of the single count of the superseding indictment. Af‐\\nter trial, Cherry filed another motion in which he repeated his \\npre‐trial arguments. The district court found no reason to alter \\nits rulings. Cherry was sentenced to 240 months’ imprison‐\\nment, and now appeals. In this court he again argues that his \\narrest was not supported by probable cause and that the dis‐\\ntrict court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained \\nduring the warrantless search of his vehicle. He also argues \\nthat the district court erred by determining that the govern‐\\nment did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) \\nwhen it failed to preserve the potentially exculpatory \\nmetadata associated with the photographs of the evidence. \\n II. \\n1. Probable cause to arrest \\n The main crux of Cherry’s defense is that the DEA agents \\nhad so little reliable information either from the confidential \\n\\f8 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\ninformant or from their own investigations that they could \\nnot have had probable cause either to arrest him or to search \\nhis vehicle. In pursuit of this defense, shortly after his original \\nindictment, Cherry filed a motion to suppress the evidence \\nobtained from his allegedly illegal arrest and the subsequent \\nsearch of his SUV. The district court, however, denied his mo‐\\ntion to suppress. When considering a district court’s denial of \\na motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error \\nand questions of law de novo. United States v. Velazquez, 906 \\nF.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2018). We will not overturn a district \\ncourt’s credibility finding unless we find clear error. United \\nStates v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018). Cherry also \\nfiled post‐trial motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce‐\\ndure 29(a) and (c), repeating these arguments and challenging \\nthe sufficiency of the evidence that the government relied \\nupon to establish probable cause. R. 177, 196. When a defend‐\\nant challenges the sufficiency of the government’s evidence in \\na Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, as Cherry did \\nbelow, we review de novo, viewing the evidence in the light \\nmost favorable to the government. United States v. Cruse, 805 \\nF.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2015). We must affirm if any rational \\ntrier of fact could have found the elements of the crime be‐\\nyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We have often said that “after a \\nguilty verdict, a defendant seeking a judgment of acquittal \\nfaces a ‘nearly insurmountable hurdle.’” United States v. Jones, \\n713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Moore, \\n115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir. 1997)). Yet even under the rela‐\\ntively easier standard of review of the motion to dismiss, we \\nfind the DEA agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry. \\n Cherry’s claims require us to go back to the core of the \\nFourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitu‐\\ntion prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, including \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 9\\n\\narrests made without either a warrant or probable cause. U.S. \\nConst. Amend. IV. A police officer has probable cause to \\nmake an arrest if a reasonable person, knowing all of the facts \\nand circumstances known to this officer, would believe that \\nthe individual in question has committed or is committing a \\ncrime. Seiser v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2014). \\nThere is no checklist that can determine probable cause, par‐\\nticularly when evaluating probable cause based on an inform‐\\nant’s tip. \\n [P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on \\n the assessment of probabilities in particular fac‐\\n tual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, re‐\\n duced to a neat set of legal rules. Informants’ \\n tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes \\n from many different types of persons. … In‐\\n formants’ tips, like all other clues and evidence \\n coming to a policeman on the scene may vary \\n greatly in their value and reliability. Rigid legal \\n rules are ill‐suited to an area of such diversity. \\n One simple rule will not cover every situation. \\nIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (internal citations \\nomitted). And, as the general standards of review remind us, \\nwhen we look at the value and reliability of any particular tip, \\nwe give deference to the district court’s determinations of the \\nfacts (and inferences therefrom) that feed into the finding of \\nprobable cause and review the legal determination of proba‐\\nble cause de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 \\n(1996). When reviewing probable cause in the case where an \\ninformant has provided a tip, therefore, we look at the totality \\nof the circumstances, noting that “a deficiency in one may be \\ncompensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, \\n\\f10 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nby a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia \\nof reliability.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. For this reason, direct \\ncomparisons of indicia of probable cause from one informant \\ncase to the next can be difficult. \\n Despite the inability to reduce the analysis to a neat set of \\nrules, the Supreme Court has mentioned factors that might go \\ninto the decision‐making hopper, while warning against any \\ntemptation to be confined to a rigid test. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234–\\n35. Those factors include an informant’s past reliability, her \\nreputation for honesty, the basis of her knowledge, and her \\npotential motive. Id. In United States v. Searcy, a case which \\ninvolved a warrant application to a magistrate judge, our \\ncourt, like the Supreme Court, stressed the importance of con‐\\nsidering the totality of the circumstances, but noted that a \\nmagistrate might consider: “first, the degree to which the in‐\\nformant acquired knowledge of the events through firsthand \\nobservation; second, the detail and specificity of the infor‐\\nmation provided by the informant; third, the interval between \\nthe date of the events and a police officer’s application for the \\nsearch warrant; and fourth, the extent to which law enforce‐\\nment corroborated the informant’s statements.” United States \\nv. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). \\n Anonymous tips, of course, require more corroboration \\nthen those where the honesty, motivation, and reliability of \\nthe informant can be assessed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244–46; Ad‐\\nams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (“Some tips, com‐\\npletely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant \\nno police response or require further investigation before a \\nforcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.”). The ability \\nof an informant to predict future actions of others with speci‐\\nficity is one indicator of reliability. Gates, 462 U.S. at 245–46. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 11\\n\\nWhen a suspect engages in the behaviors and actions that an \\ninformant has predicted, “[t]hat is exactly the type of corrob‐\\noration that counts.” United States v. Oliva, 385 F.3d 1111, 1114 \\n(7th Cir. 2004). See also, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 \\n(1990) (“What was important was the caller’s ability to predict \\nrespondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated inside \\ninformation.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. Navarro, \\n90 F.3d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1996) (“because the surveillance \\npreceding the stop corroborated the information from the in‐\\nformant, the law enforcement officers had probable cause for \\nboth the arrest and search.”). But see United States v. Lopez, 907 \\nF.3d 472, 483 (7th Cir. 2018) (informant who later disappeared \\nwas not reliable and “[t]he officers’ observations that day [of \\nthe arrest] did not corroborate, even roughly, the informant’s \\nstory.”) Moreover, because the “Fourth Amendment, bal‐\\nances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal se‐\\ncurity against the importance of the governmental interests \\nalleged to justify the intrusion … [a] stop to investigate an al‐\\nready completed crime does not necessarily promote the in‐\\nterest of crime prevention as directly as a stop to investigate \\nsuspected ongoing criminal activity.” United States v. Hensley, \\n469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985). \\n In this case, the informant did not have a long (or any) his‐\\ntory of cooperating with law enforcement, and had not been \\nknown to them for long, but he was not an anonymous tipster. \\nHe had agreed to cooperate with law enforcement after being \\narrested earlier that day picking up a very large quantity of \\ncocaine at the airport—more cocaine than anyone could use \\nfor personal consumption. The confidential informant pro‐\\nvided significant incriminating information including that he \\nhad a pre‐arranged plan to deliver thirteen kilograms of co‐\\ncaine to Cherry. The informant also told the agents that \\n\\f12 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nCherry was a member of the Black P Stone gang in Chicago \\nand regularly trafficked in drugs. The informant then pre‐\\ndicted to the DEA agents that Cherry, an African‐American \\nman, who he knew as “Mo” and who was of average height \\nand weighed about 200 pounds would be arriving at a partic‐\\nular parking lot in Markham, Illinois at a particular time, and \\nwas known to drive a white Mercedes SUV. The phone calls \\nbetween Cherry and the informant corroborated some of this \\ninformation—Cherry appeared to agree to follow the inform‐\\nant’s instructions given in the phone calls. The agents were \\nable to corroborate more of this information when a man, \\nmeeting the informant’s description, arrived in the predicted \\nplace at the predicted time, driving the make, model, and \\ncolor of vehicle that the informant said he would be driving. \\nCherry’s own behavior added to their confidence when he ar‐\\nrived at the agreed‐upon parking lot, circled the parking lot \\nas though assessing the safety and privacy of the situation, \\nand then parked next to the confidential informant’s car. He \\nexited his own car and got into the front passenger seat of the \\ninformant’s car. Law enforcement agents instructed the in‐\\nformant to signal them after having a certain conversation \\nwith Cherry and showing him the sham cocaine in the hidden \\ncompartment. The informant subsequently gave the agents \\nthe signal indicating that he had completed the prerequisite \\ntasks. As the agents announced themselves, Cherry made in‐\\nitial moves to flee either by running toward or taking steps \\ntoward his vehicle. \\n The confidential informant was not an anonymous tipster \\nand continued to cooperate with the agents after his arrest \\nand throughout the sting operation—following all of the \\nagents’ commands and instructions. His earlier arrest meant \\nthat he had motivation to help the agents in order to receive \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 13\\n\\nleniency in his own case. We recognize that this can be a dou‐\\nble edge sword—it gives informants motivation to assist law \\nenforcement officers, but perhaps also gives them motivation \\nto assist law enforcement without regard to the accuracy of \\nthe information. In any event, we have noted that the fact that \\na desire for leniency motivates an informant does not make \\nthe information he provides inherently unreliable. United \\nStates v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2010). And in fact, \\nour court has noted that informant tips that involve inculpa‐\\ntory statements add great weight to an assessment of proba‐\\nble cause to arrest. United States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456, 459 \\n(7th Cir. 2004) (also noting that “several circuits have held that \\nsuch statements are so presumptively reliable that they may \\nsupport a probable cause determination even if uncorrobo‐\\nrated.”). It is true that there is always a risk that an informant \\nis setting up an innocent rival or enemy, but this is less of a \\nrisk when the informant is known and trying to lessen his \\nown sentence. Surely the informant knew that he would not \\nhave engendered the good will of the agents had Cherry ar‐\\nrived and stated on the recorded wire that he had just come \\nto meet the informant for pizza. See United States v. Olson, 408 \\nF.3d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A motive to curry favor, how‐\\never, does not necessarily render an informant unreliable. In‐\\ndeed, even informants ‘attempting to strike a bargain with the \\npolice have a strong incentive to provide accurate and specific \\ninformation rather than false information about a defendant’s \\nillegal activity.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 870 \\n(2002)) (cleaned up). \\n As we have just noted, there is no formula for determining \\nthe requisite degree of reliability of an informant’s tip that \\nwill provide probable cause to arrest. Other cases can give us \\nguide posts. And so, for example, we might look to United \\n\\f14 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nStates v. Freeman, 691 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2012), where the police \\nhad analogous facts from an informant about a similar pre‐\\narranged drug deal. In Freeman, an arrested drug dealer \\nagreed to assist the police in a sting. He telephoned a raspy‐\\nvoiced man who agreed to meet him and sell him crack at a \\nSav‐A‐Lot parking lot. At the agreed upon time, a minivan \\npulled into the nearly empty parking lot and waited by the \\ndoor of the store. The informant called the defendant who re‐\\nsponded that he was waiting by that same door. The van, \\nhowever, suddenly pulled out of the lot. After the van failed \\nto engage a turn signal, police officers initiated a traffic stop \\nand encountered a raspy‐voiced man. A dog alerted to the \\nscent of drugs, giving the police probable cause to search the \\nvan, but when they did, they found no drugs. The officers \\nasked the informant to redial the number he had just used to \\nset up the drug deal, and when he did, the call came through \\non a cell phone located in the armrest on the passenger‐side \\ndoor of the van. The men were arrested and, during a strip \\nsearch at the jail, officers found crack cocaine hidden in the \\nman’s buttocks. The district court found that “[t]he police had \\ncredible information about Freeman’s drug‐trafficking habits \\nfrom the cooperating informants, and his activities just prior \\nto his arrest coincided perfectly with the details of the under‐\\ncover operation, thus supplying probable cause to arrest de‐\\nspite the fact that no drugs were found in the search during \\nthe stop.” Id. at 896. The police watched the silver van pull \\ninto the parking lot, the van matched the description given by \\nan earlier informant, it arrived at the time that the drug dealer \\non the phone said it would, and then the drug dealer on the \\nphone stated that he was parked just outside a Sav‐A‐Lot \\nstore, right where the van was parked. Id. at 899–900. When \\npulled over, the passenger met physical descriptions given by \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 15\\n\\nprevious informants and the phone number used to arrange \\nthe transaction rang a phone located within the silver van. \\nJust as in this case, the police had little independent corrobo‐\\nration other than the informants’ accurate descriptions and \\nhis ability to predict the defendant’s actions. This, the court \\nheld, was sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 896. \\n Cherry argues that this case is not like Freeman, because in \\nFreeman the police were monitoring the calls in real‐time and \\nknew that the defendant had agreed to sell crack to an \\ninformant at the precise location where he then appeared. But \\nthe agents in this case likewise knew that Cherry planned to \\nmeet the informant in the parking lot to participate in a drug \\ndeal. It is true that they did not listen to the phone calls in real \\ntime, but during the first call the officers were present with \\nthe informant. Tr. 11/26/12 at 23 (R. 58 at 23). In Freeman, our \\ncourt noted that “the police on the scene had plenty of \\ninformation to give them probable cause to believe that [the \\ndefendant] had committed the crime,” including the fact that \\nthe events unfolded just as the informant had said they \\nwould—a raspy‐voiced man arrived at a pre‐arranged \\nlocation at the pre‐arranged time in a vehicle he was known \\nto drive.” Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900. Sometimes having a \\ndrug buyer appear on the scene precisely when expected is \\nsufficient to supply probable cause for an arrest. See United \\nStates v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2008). In Colon the \\ncourt upheld the finding of probable cause where one drug \\ndealer telephoned another to tell him that a man would be \\narriving at a particular house in fifteen minutes to purchase \\ndrugs, and the police arrested that man as he left the house. \\nId. In this case the agents had far more: they had a man who \\nmatched the predicted description, arriving in a vehicle that \\nmatched descriptions of the drug dealer’s vehicle, at the \\n\\f16 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\npredicted place and time. They had the informant’s \\nconfirmatory signal, and the defendant’s preliminary attempt \\nto flee.3 \\n It is true that the facts in this case are not the same as they \\nwere in Freeman. No two cases ever are. But Freeman empha‐\\nsizes the value to law enforcement of an informant’s \\nknowledge when the events the informant predicted come to \\nlight in the manner the informant forecasted, particularly \\nwhen those events would not have been known to the general \\npublic. See Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900; White, 496 U.S. at 332 \\n(noting that an informant’s predictions gain some degree of \\nreliability when the police see the events unfold as the inform‐\\nant predicted, particularly when it demonstrates inside infor‐\\nmation of which the general public would not be aware). Of \\ncourse, there is always a risk that a confidential informant has \\nulterior motives and is leading law enforcement astray. Prob‐\\nable cause, however, does not require certainty in an inform‐\\nant’s tip, just sufficient probability. Seiser, 762 F.3d at 654. In \\nBrown, 366 F.3d at 460–61, for example, our court found suffi‐\\ncient probable cause to arrest despite a small risk that the in‐\\nformant “had simply spotted [the defendant] while fleeing \\nfrom the bank and then falsely implicated him in the bank \\nrobbery.” Id. at 460–61. In that case a bank robber caught in \\nthe act described the getaway car awaiting him, the exact \\n \\n3 Although flight cannot, on its own, provide probable cause to arrest, the \\n\\ndetermination of probable cause depends on a totality of circumstances \\nthat may take into account “commonsense judgments and inferences \\nabout human behavior,” including unprovoked flight. Illinois v. Wardlow, \\n528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (explaining that a “refusal to cooperate, without \\nmore, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed \\nfor a detention or seizure,” but unprovoked flight could factor into rea‐\\nsonable suspicion) (internal citations omitted). \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 17\\n\\nlocation where it would be waiting, the color and make of the \\ncar, the first letter of the license plate, and a name and descrip‐\\ntion of the driver. Id. at 457. When the police were able to ver‐\\nify these details, “the entirety of [the informant’s] story, in‐\\ncluding his statements about Mr. Brown’s role in the rob‐\\nberies, assumed a high degree of reliability.” Id. at 460. It is \\ntrue that the informant in Brown, like the informant here, \\ncould have been setting up an innocent person. As we noted, \\nhowever, probable cause does not require “hard certainties,” \\nonly probabilities. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (citing United States v. \\nCortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). Cherry argues that the in‐\\nformant’s information in Brown was far more detailed and the \\npolice were able to corroborate more of it. We do not think the \\nlevel of detail in these two cases is materially different in a \\nmanner that affects probable cause. \\n Undoubtedly more certainty is better where a defendant’s \\nliberty is at stake, but we do not require incontrovertible evi‐\\ndence for probable cause. Of course, it would have been better \\nhad the agents done more independent corroboration; had \\nthey been monitoring the conversations in real time (and cer‐\\ntainly the technology was so readily available, even in 2012, \\nthat one wonders why it was not used); and if they had seen \\nCherry take possession of the drugs. Because probable cause \\nis fact specific, it might happen that, in another case, a court \\nwould require this sort of corroboration before finding prob‐\\nable cause. We cannot conclude, however, that in this case \\nthese deficiencies eviscerated probable cause. The DEA \\nagents had multiple pieces of detailed information from an \\ninformant who was implicating himself in a drug deal—infor‐\\nmation corroborated as the predictions came true. This was \\nsufficient probable cause to support the arrest of Cherry. \\n\\f18 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\n2. Probable cause to search the vehicle \\n We also conclude that the DEA agents lawfully searched \\nCherry’s vehicle, including the satchel, and lawfully seized \\nthe narcotics. Like a warrantless arrest, a warrantless search \\nand seizure violates the Fourth Amendment unless it falls \\nwithin certain exceptions to the warrant requirement. Katz v. \\nUnited States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “The ‘plain‐view’ doc‐\\ntrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that \\nwarrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but \\nthis characterization overlooks the important difference be‐\\ntween searches and seizures. If an article is already in plain \\nview, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve \\nany invasion of privacy.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 \\n(1990). Under this plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure \\nis justified if first, the law enforcement officer did not violate \\nthe Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which \\nthe evidence could be plainly viewed; second, the item was in \\nplain view; and third, its incriminating character was imme‐\\ndiately apparent. United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 262 \\n(7th Cir. 2016). \\n After hearing testimony from the agents and Cherry, the \\ncourt concluded that the drugs were in plain view after \\nCherry opened the driver’s side door to his car while trying \\nto flee. We see no reason not to give deference to this credibil‐\\nity and factual finding. As the district court concluded, the \\nagents’ testimony was substantially consistent: they arrested \\nthe defendant after he opened the door to his SUV, and \\nthrough that open door they were able to see the messenger \\nbag with a plastic bag containing a substance the agents rea‐\\nsonably suspected was illegal drugs. The district court con‐\\ncluded that the agents’ version of events, was more likely true \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 19\\n\\nthan Cherry’s, and that any minor discrepancies were imma‐\\nterial. R. 60 at 4–6. The district court did not believe Cherry’s \\ntestimony that he hid the drugs at the bottom of the satchel, \\nbelow several car titles and then placed the satchel on the \\nfloor of the front passenger side of the car. The district court \\nreasoned that a drug dealer coming to exchange drugs would \\nwant to minimize his vulnerability and thus the time for the \\nexchange, and therefore would place the drugs where they \\nwould be readily accessible. As we have noted, “we must ac‐\\ncept the district court’s credibility determination unless the \\nfacts, as testified to by the police officers, were so unbelievable \\nthat no reasonable factfinder could credit them.” Contreras, \\n820 F.3d at 263. \\n Cherry does not seem to dispute the prerequisites to the \\nplain view doctrine—that the agents were lawfully in the \\nparking lot and that the incriminating nature of the evidence \\nwould have been readily apparent. Cherry argues instead that \\nhis version of events is the one to be believed—the drugs were \\nhidden inside the satchel on the floor of the Mercedes where \\nthe agents could not have seen them and the agents’ reports \\nto the contrary were inconsistent and thus unbelievable. We \\ncan make short shrift of this argument. “A district court’s \\ncredibility assessment based on live testimony will not be dis‐\\nturbed unless it is completely without foundation.” Freeman, \\n691 F.3d at 900 (internal citations omitted). \\n Even if we were to perseverate on the inconsistencies in \\nthe agents’ testimony, none makes it impossible that the \\ndrugs were in plain view. At the suppression hearing, Agent \\nO’Reilly testified that Cherry “ran across the parking spot to \\nhis vehicle” and opened the drivers’ side door, and had his \\nhand and arm inside the car when he was arrested. 11/27/12 \\n\\f20 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nTr. at 76–77, 95 (R. 58). Agent Brazao testified that although \\nhe did not see who opened the door to the SUV, after he se‐\\ncured the informant, he walked back to the SUV one minute \\nafter the agents moved in to arrest Cherry, noticed the doors \\nwere open, and saw a black satchel and drugs through the \\nopen door. Id. at 14, 35–36, 48–49. Agent Crawford testified \\nthat he did not see who initially opened the door, but when \\nhe arrived at the SUV, the other agents had already arrested \\nCherry and he was on the ground and the door was open. Id. \\nat 53–54, 56–61, 65–66. Crawford looked into the SUV to make \\ncertain there were no other people in the SUV who might be \\na threat to the agents and saw the satchel and drugs in plain \\nview. Id. Those agents testified consistently at trial. Tr. 6/28/16 \\na.m. at 193–202, 242–43 (R. 184); Tr. 6/28/16 p.m. at 296, 307–\\n08, 310–11 (R. 179). Cherry points accusatorily to Chicago po‐\\nlice officer Gamboa’s testimony. Officer Gamboa did not tes‐\\ntify at the suppression hearing, but he did testify at trial and \\nhis testimony was less clear about the door. He testified that \\nCherry “very quickly tried to get into his vehicle,” Tr. 6/28/16 \\nat 390, 391 (R. 179) and that he was handcuffed outside of the \\nvehicle. Id. at 391. His testimony about whether the door to \\nthe SUV was open or closed, however, was a bit equivocal. \\nCherry hangs his hat on the fact that Officer Gamboa testified \\nat trial that the agents grabbed Cherry before he could open \\nhis car. Gamboa’s testimony, however, was not as clear as \\nCherry presents it to be: \\n Gamboa: He tried to go in the car. I tried not to \\n let him go in the car. \\n Q. And you grabbed him? \\n A. From the shoulders and his arm, yeah. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 21\\n\\n Q. So he wasn’t in the car at the time that you \\n grabbed him? \\n A. No. He was trying to get into the car. \\n Q. Door was open? \\n A. Trying to open it, yeah. \\n Q. Oh, so the door—he hadn’t been able to—he \\n wasn’t successful in opening the door? \\n A. He didn’t get in. If he did open it, I wasn’t pay‐\\n ing attention. I was just trying to make sure he \\n didn’t get in. \\n Q. So you don’t recall whether it was open or \\n closed? \\n A. It wasnʹt open— he didnʹt get in. Letʹs put it that \\n way. He couldn’t get his foot in, so it wasn’t. \\n Q. Okay. So you donʹt think it was open? \\n A. No. \\nId. at 391–92 (emphasis ours). \\n None of the testimony gives rise to an irreconcilable dif‐\\nference. In fact, none of it is inherently inconsistent. Testi‐\\nmony is not incredible as a matter of law \\n “only because the witness may have been im‐\\n peached by certain discrepancies in [her] story, \\n by prior inconsistent statements, or by the exist‐\\n ence of a motive to provide evidence favorable \\n to the government.” To find a witness’s testi‐\\n mony to be incredible as a matter of law, it must \\n have been “physically impossible for the wit‐\\n ness to have observed that which he claims \\n\\f22 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\n occurred, or impossible under the laws of na‐\\n ture for the occurrence to have taken place at \\n all.” \\nContreras, 820 F.3d at 264 (citing Freeman, 691 F.3d at 900 and \\nUnited States v. Taylor, 701 F.3d 1166, 1174 (7th Cir.2012)). \\n The district court certainly did not err by accepting the tes‐\\ntimony of the three agents who were clear on the matter that \\nthe door was open allowing the agents to view the drugs in \\nplain view on the seat. This was particularly true after the \\nsuppression hearing when the district court had only the tes‐\\ntimony of Agents Brazao, Crawford and O’Reilly to consider. \\nBut this was also true even when the court reviewed the post‐\\ntrial motion for acquittal. We cannot say that no reasonable \\njury could have concluded that the door was open and the \\ndrugs in plain view. We see no reason to disturb the credibil‐\\nity and factual findings of the district court on the motion to \\nsuppress and certainly no reason to upset the jury’s conclu‐\\nsion. \\n In any event, even if the door to the Mercedes was closed, \\nthere were two other avenues to admit the evidence. First, the \\nagents were entitled to open the door to conduct a limited \\nprotective sweep in case there were other occupants who \\nwere not visible through the tinted windows or hiding in the \\nrear seat. Traffic stops are dangerous for officers and the “le‐\\ngitimate and weighty” interest in officer safety allows officers \\nto perform protective searches and frisks of other passengers. \\nArizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331 (2009). \\n And finally, the district court was correct to hold, in the \\nalternative, that the drugs were admissible under the inevita‐\\nble discovery doctrine. As the Supreme Court has held, “[i]f \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 23\\n\\nthe prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evi‐\\ndence that the information ultimately or inevitably would \\nhave been discovered by lawful means … then the deterrence \\nrationale has so little basis that the evidence should be re‐\\nceived.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Cherry \\nhad been arrested, the agents would have removed his car \\nfrom the parking lot and it would have been subject to an in‐\\nventory search, as is the usual protocol. As we noted before, \\nonce a defendant is in custody, “the arresting officers would \\nnot have allowed the truck to just sit on the street after” a de‐\\nfendant has been taken away. United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d \\n935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010). Agent Brazao confirmed this in his \\ntestimony at the suppression hearing: “it was determined by \\nthe case agents that we were not going to seize the vehicle, \\nand we didn’t want to leave it there in an open parking lot so \\nthat someone would steal it or damage it. So we wanted to \\nsecure it. So we asked Markham police can we secure it in \\ntheir parking lot until someone can come pick it up.” \\nTr. 11/27/12 at 66 (R. 58). Although Cherry was arrested in a \\nprivate parking lot, it seems unlikely that a police department \\nwould have allowed a car, potentially filled with drugs, to sit \\nin a parking lot indefinitely. The drugs, therefore, inevitably \\nwould have been discovered during an inventory search. \\n3. Photographic metadata. \\n Finally, Cherry’s motion to dismiss the superseding in‐\\ndictment and the motion for judgment of acquittal argued \\nthat the government violated its affirmative duty to disclose \\nevidence favorable to him as required by the Supreme Court \\nin Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady requires that the \\ngovernment disclose evidence materially favorable to the ac‐\\ncused, whether that evidence is impeachment evidence or \\n\\f24 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nexculpatory. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 \\n(2006). Upon review of a motion to dismiss which alleges a \\nBrady violation, we look only to see if the district court abused \\nits discretion. United States v. King, 910 F.3d 320, 326 (7th Cir. \\n2018). \\n When a defendant alleges that the government failed to \\npreserve potentially exculpatory evidence, as Cherry has \\ndone here, we apply the standard articulated in Arizona v. \\nYoungblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), which states that there is no \\ndenial of due process “unless a criminal defendant can show \\nbad faith on the part of the police.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. \\nSee also United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 407 (7th Cir. \\n2011), as amended (Feb. 23, 2011). In short, our precedent de‐\\nmands that Cherry demonstrate: “(1) bad faith by the govern‐\\nment, (2) that the exculpatory nature of the evidence was ap‐\\nparent before its destruction, and (3) that he could not obtain \\nthe same evidence anywhere else.” Fletcher, 634 F.3d at 407 \\n(citing United States v. Kimoto, 588 F.3d 464, 475 (7th Cir. \\n2009)). Bad faith, in turn, requires proof of an “‘official ani‐\\nmus’ or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evi‐\\ndence,’” and necessarily turns on an official’s subjective \\nknowledge that the evidence in question had exculpatory \\nvalue at the time it was lost or destroyed.” United States v. Bell, \\n819 F.3d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones v. \\nMcCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1992)). \\n In this case, the first two factors overlap. The district court \\ndid not abuse its discretion in determining that the camera \\nwas not sold in bad faith, in part because the exculpatory na‐\\nture would not have been obvious to the officer at the time the \\ncamera was sold. Agent Castaneda sold the camera, which \\nwas his personal property, at a garage sale in the summer of \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 25\\n\\n2013, months after the suppression hearing. During the sup‐\\npression hearing, the defense counsel asked Castaneda about \\nthe order of the photographs but never sought to inspect the \\ncamera or its metadata until almost two years after that hear‐\\ning. Cherry’s counsel was well aware of the existence of this \\ndata, but at no point before or during the suppression hearing \\ndid Cherry ask for the camera or the metadata. Nor did \\nCherry ask the government to preserve the data. The district \\ncourt concluded that “[n]o evidence supports Defendant’s po‐\\nsition (nor is it likely) that after the motion to suppress, during \\nwhich metadata was not even mentioned, law enforcement \\nofficers anticipated that such information would someday be \\nrequested and intentionally destroyed it in order to deprive \\nDefendant of the evidence.” R. 106 at 4. \\n Moreover, as we noted above, the contents of the vehicle, \\nincluding the satchel and the drugs within it, would have \\nbeen discovered in a lawful inventory search once the agents \\ntook custody of the vehicle. This makes any debate about the \\norder in which the photographs were taken and whether the \\nbag was opened or closed irrelevant. \\n III. \\n For all the reasons asserted above, we AFFIRM the opinion \\nof the district court in all respects.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1695,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607955,"string":"4,607,955"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Deandre Cherry"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3018"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3018 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nDEANDRE CHERRY, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:12‐cr‐00415‐1 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Deandre Cherry’s heroin customers \\nhad been complaining about the poor quality of his supply, \\nso on a rainy night in May 2012, he drove into a parking lot in \\nMarkham, Illinois hoping to exchange his inventory of low‐\\nquality heroin for a better supply of cocaine that his supplier \\nhad just picked up at O’Hare airport. Unbeknownst to \\nCherry, however, his supplier had just been arrested picking \\nup the cocaine and, since his hopes were for a better deal for \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nhimself, decided to cooperate and help the Drug Enforcement \\nAgency (DEA) agents ensnare another dealer down the line. \\nInstead of the exchange, Cherry was arrested mid‐deal and \\neventually sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. Cherry \\nappeals, claiming the agents lacked probable cause to arrest \\nhim and search his vehicle. He also claims they failed to pre‐\\nserve exculpatory evidence. We affirm the holding of the dis‐\\ntrict court in all respects. \\n I. \\n In the course of an investigation into cocaine importation \\nfrom Mexico to Chicago, DEA agents arrested a man who was \\nattempting to take possession of twenty‐six kilograms of co‐\\ncaine near Chicago’s O’Hare airport. During an interview af‐\\nter that arrest, the man told Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) \\nagents that he was scheduled to deliver thirteen kilograms of \\ncocaine to a man he called “Mo” that night. “Mo” was later \\nidentified as Cherry. According to the arrested man, Cherry \\nwas a high‐ranking member of the Black P Stone street gang \\nin Chicago who distributed many kilograms of cocaine each \\nmonth. The arrested man agreed to become a confidential in‐\\nformant for the DEA and help the agents execute a sting op‐\\neration. \\n The confidential informant told the agents that, through \\nprior conversations, he and Cherry had agreed that the in‐\\nformant would drive the cocaine to a residence in Harvey, Il‐\\nlinois, that Cherry would meet him there, take custody of the \\ncocaine, and then a few hours later another member of \\nCherry’s organization would pay the informant for the co‐\\ncaine. The confidential informant provided agents with \\nCherry’s cell phone number and a physical description: an \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 3\\n\\naverage height black man, weighing about 200 pounds, and \\ndriving a white Mercedes SUV. \\n The agents formulated a plan for a sting operation in \\nwhich the confidential informant would drive his own car to \\nmeet Cherry with sham cocaine concealed in the car’s drug‐\\nhiding trap compartment. Under the plan, the informant \\nwould signal the agents by stepping out of the car once he and \\nCherry had engaged in a conversation about the exchange of \\nthe cocaine. For their own safety, the agents had the confiden‐\\ntial informant change the meeting spot to a parking lot further \\naway from gang activity. They then outfitted the informant \\nwith hidden audio and video recording equipment, and \\nsearched and inventoried the informant’s vehicle (as is the \\nprotocol for such operations). \\n At around 7:50 p.m. on May 31, 2012, the confidential in‐\\nformant placed a recorded call to Cherry. The informant told \\nCherry that he was approximately ten minutes away from the \\nagreed upon meeting place in Harvey, and Cherry responded \\nthat he would meet him there. A few minutes later the confi‐\\ndential informant, under direction of the agents, called \\nCherry and changed the rendezvous spot to a parking lot in \\nnearby Markham, Illinois. Shortly thereafter, a 2012 white \\nMercedes SUV (later determined to be registered to Cherry) \\nentered the nearly empty parking lot, circled the lot, and then \\nparked next to the confidential informant.1 \\n In a conversation that was recorded, but not monitored in \\nreal time by agents, the confidential informant told Cherry \\n \\n1 The testimony of the agents was inconsistent as to whether Cherry \\n\\nparked directly next to the informant’s car, one parking spot away, or one‐\\nand‐a‐half parking spots away. We find this discrepancy to be immaterial. \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nthat “it” (meaning the thirteen kilograms of cocaine) was in \\nthe “spot”—the hidden compartment in the back of the car. \\nOnce Cherry responded affirmatively that he wanted to see \\nthe drugs, the informant opened the compartment and then \\nexited the car—the pre‐arranged signal to law enforcement. \\nCherry did not handle nor take physical possession of the \\ndrugs. \\n The district court credited the testimony of the DEA \\nagents at the scene who testified that as they approached the \\ncar and Cherry saw them, he dashed the short distance be‐\\ntween the informant’s car and his SUV, opened the front door \\nof the SUV, and attempted to get in. One agent testified that \\nCherry opened the door and “tried to get into the vehicle as \\nwe jumped on him so— … [h]e had his hand and his arm got \\ninto it, but we pulled him back out.” Tr. 11/27/12 at 77 (R. 58). \\n As one agent subdued Cherry and placed him under ar‐\\nrest, a second agent quickly looked into the Mercedes to make \\nsure no one else was hiding in the vehicle. A third agent went \\nthrough the motions of arresting the confidential informant to \\nprotect him as an informant, and after doing so returned to \\nthe Mercedes where, along with two other agents, he saw, \\nthrough the open door, a black messenger‐type satchel with \\nthe flap open and clear plastic bags containing what looked to \\nbe heroin or cocaine. Cherry testified at the suppression hear‐\\ning that the drugs were not, in fact, in plain sight, but that they \\nwere in a black plastic bag contained within the closed and \\nlocked satchel, and the cash was also concealed in a black \\nplastic bag stuffed under the driver’s seat. Later testing con‐\\nfirmed that the satchel held baggies containing 348.1 grams of \\nheroin and 13.7 grams of cocaine base (crack). Agents also \\nfound $19,495 in cash in the SUV. Eventually Chicago Police \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 5\\n\\nOfficer and DEA task force officer Jose Castaneda photo‐\\ngraphed the car and the satchel, taking photographs of the \\nsatchel both open and closed, the cash, and other items in the \\ncar. All of the photographs had the same time stamp—8:48 \\np.m. Officer Castanada testified that he could not recall the \\norder in which he took the photographs and could not say \\nwhether the satchel was open or closed when Cherry was ar‐\\nrested.2 \\n After agents read Cherry his Miranda rights, Cherry \\nagreed to talk to one of the agents and told him that three \\nweeks earlier the confidential informant, who he knew as “Fat \\nMan” fronted him half of a kilogram of heroin for $31,500, but \\nthe heroin was not of good quality and his customers were \\ncomplaining. On the night he was arrested, Cherry was bring‐\\ning approximately 300 grams of heroin back to the confiden‐\\ntial informant to exchange for an equivalent amount of co‐\\ncaine. The government charged Cherry with possession with \\nintent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, in viola‐\\ntion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). \\n Cherry filed two motions to suppress the evidence before \\ntrial. In the first motion he claimed that the agents lacked \\nprobable cause to arrest him. In the second motion he argued \\nthat the agents had no authority to search his bag within the \\nvehicle as the drugs were not in plain view. Following a No‐\\nvember 27, 2012 suppression hearing in which the court heard \\nfrom Cherry and from four DEA agents, the district court \\n\\n \\n2 From this point forward we will refer to all law enforcement officers col‐\\n\\nlectively as “agents” unless specifically noted otherwise. Technically, Of‐\\nficer Castaneda was employed as a City of Chicago police officer and as‐\\nsigned to the DEA as a task force officer. \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nfound that the agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry and \\nthat the subsequent search of the vehicle was lawful as the \\ndrugs were in plain sight. In the alternative, the district court \\nheld that the narcotics inevitably would have been discovered \\nafter Cherry’s arrest, subsequent to an inventory search of his \\nvehicle. \\n Cherry twice moved to reconsider the district court deci‐\\nsion, arguing, on September 8, 2014, that a new Seventh Cir‐\\ncuit decision indicated that a court must have more corrobo‐\\nration from an informant’s tip and that an enhanced version \\nof the recording from the confidential informant’s body cam‐\\nera did not support an agreement by Cherry to accept the co‐\\ncaine. The district court rejected both arguments. \\n Almost two years after the suppression hearing, on \\nSeptember 8, 2014, Cherry filed another motion—this time \\nseeking to inspect the camera used to photograph the satchel \\nand the metadata associated with the photographs in order to \\ndetermine in what order the photographs were taken. \\nBecause Castaneda took all of the photographs of the satchel, \\nboth open and closed, within the same minute (and the time \\nstamp did not reveal seconds), the court and parties could not \\ndetermine in what order the agent took the photographs. \\nCherry’s counsel argued that the data sought would reveal \\nthe order in which the pictures were taken, and thus would \\nuncover the truth about whether the drugs had been in plain \\nsight in an open bag, or not visible in a closed bag when the \\nagents arrived at the vehicle. After a search, however, the \\ngovernment determined that neither the camera nor any \\nmetadata was available because Agent Castaneda took the \\nphotographs with a personal camera which he subsequently \\nsold at a yard sale in the summer of 2013. Cherry filed a \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 7\\n\\nrenewed motion to reconsider, arguing that because the \\ngovernment failed to retain the metadata from the camera, the \\ncourt should be precluded from relying on the photographs \\nin making its probable cause determination. After the trial, \\nCherry also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the \\nbasis of an alleged Brady violation—that is, that the \\ngovernment failed to preserve the exculpatory evidence of the \\nphotographic metadata from the camera. The district court \\nrejected this argument as well, noting that Cherry had failed \\nto demonstrate any bad faith on the government’s part, that \\nthe court had already found that the heroin was in plain view, \\nand inevitably the drugs would have been discovered during \\nan inventory search. \\n The case proceeded to trial where the jury convicted \\nCherry of the single count of the superseding indictment. Af‐\\nter trial, Cherry filed another motion in which he repeated his \\npre‐trial arguments. The district court found no reason to alter \\nits rulings. Cherry was sentenced to 240 months’ imprison‐\\nment, and now appeals. In this court he again argues that his \\narrest was not supported by probable cause and that the dis‐\\ntrict court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained \\nduring the warrantless search of his vehicle. He also argues \\nthat the district court erred by determining that the govern‐\\nment did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) \\nwhen it failed to preserve the potentially exculpatory \\nmetadata associated with the photographs of the evidence. \\n II. \\n1. Probable cause to arrest \\n The main crux of Cherry’s defense is that the DEA agents \\nhad so little reliable information either from the confidential \\n\\f8 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\ninformant or from their own investigations that they could \\nnot have had probable cause either to arrest him or to search \\nhis vehicle. In pursuit of this defense, shortly after his original \\nindictment, Cherry filed a motion to suppress the evidence \\nobtained from his allegedly illegal arrest and the subsequent \\nsearch of his SUV. The district court, however, denied his mo‐\\ntion to suppress. When considering a district court’s denial of \\na motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error \\nand questions of law de novo. United States v. Velazquez, 906 \\nF.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2018). We will not overturn a district \\ncourt’s credibility finding unless we find clear error. United \\nStates v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018). Cherry also \\nfiled post‐trial motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce‐\\ndure 29(a) and (c), repeating these arguments and challenging \\nthe sufficiency of the evidence that the government relied \\nupon to establish probable cause. R. 177, 196. When a defend‐\\nant challenges the sufficiency of the government’s evidence in \\na Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, as Cherry did \\nbelow, we review de novo, viewing the evidence in the light \\nmost favorable to the government. United States v. Cruse, 805 \\nF.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2015). We must affirm if any rational \\ntrier of fact could have found the elements of the crime be‐\\nyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We have often said that “after a \\nguilty verdict, a defendant seeking a judgment of acquittal \\nfaces a ‘nearly insurmountable hurdle.’” United States v. Jones, \\n713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Moore, \\n115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir. 1997)). Yet even under the rela‐\\ntively easier standard of review of the motion to dismiss, we \\nfind the DEA agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry. \\n Cherry’s claims require us to go back to the core of the \\nFourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitu‐\\ntion prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, including \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 9\\n\\narrests made without either a warrant or probable cause. U.S. \\nConst. Amend. IV. A police officer has probable cause to \\nmake an arrest if a reasonable person, knowing all of the facts \\nand circumstances known to this officer, would believe that \\nthe individual in question has committed or is committing a \\ncrime. Seiser v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2014). \\nThere is no checklist that can determine probable cause, par‐\\nticularly when evaluating probable cause based on an inform‐\\nant’s tip. \\n [P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on \\n the assessment of probabilities in particular fac‐\\n tual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, re‐\\n duced to a neat set of legal rules. Informants’ \\n tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes \\n from many different types of persons. … In‐\\n formants’ tips, like all other clues and evidence \\n coming to a policeman on the scene may vary \\n greatly in their value and reliability. Rigid legal \\n rules are ill‐suited to an area of such diversity. \\n One simple rule will not cover every situation. \\nIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (internal citations \\nomitted). And, as the general standards of review remind us, \\nwhen we look at the value and reliability of any particular tip, \\nwe give deference to the district court’s determinations of the \\nfacts (and inferences therefrom) that feed into the finding of \\nprobable cause and review the legal determination of proba‐\\nble cause de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 \\n(1996). When reviewing probable cause in the case where an \\ninformant has provided a tip, therefore, we look at the totality \\nof the circumstances, noting that “a deficiency in one may be \\ncompensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, \\n\\f10 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nby a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia \\nof reliability.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. For this reason, direct \\ncomparisons of indicia of probable cause from one informant \\ncase to the next can be difficult. \\n Despite the inability to reduce the analysis to a neat set of \\nrules, the Supreme Court has mentioned factors that might go \\ninto the decision‐making hopper, while warning against any \\ntemptation to be confined to a rigid test. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234–\\n35. Those factors include an informant’s past reliability, her \\nreputation for honesty, the basis of her knowledge, and her \\npotential motive. Id. In United States v. Searcy, a case which \\ninvolved a warrant application to a magistrate judge, our \\ncourt, like the Supreme Court, stressed the importance of con‐\\nsidering the totality of the circumstances, but noted that a \\nmagistrate might consider: “first, the degree to which the in‐\\nformant acquired knowledge of the events through firsthand \\nobservation; second, the detail and specificity of the infor‐\\nmation provided by the informant; third, the interval between \\nthe date of the events and a police officer’s application for the \\nsearch warrant; and fourth, the extent to which law enforce‐\\nment corroborated the informant’s statements.” United States \\nv. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). \\n Anonymous tips, of course, require more corroboration \\nthen those where the honesty, motivation, and reliability of \\nthe informant can be assessed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244–46; Ad‐\\nams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (“Some tips, com‐\\npletely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant \\nno police response or require further investigation before a \\nforcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.”). The ability \\nof an informant to predict future actions of others with speci‐\\nficity is one indicator of reliability. Gates, 462 U.S. at 245–46. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 11\\n\\nWhen a suspect engages in the behaviors and actions that an \\ninformant has predicted, “[t]hat is exactly the type of corrob‐\\noration that counts.” United States v. Oliva, 385 F.3d 1111, 1114 \\n(7th Cir. 2004). See also, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 \\n(1990) (“What was important was the caller’s ability to predict \\nrespondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated inside \\ninformation.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. Navarro, \\n90 F.3d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1996) (“because the surveillance \\npreceding the stop corroborated the information from the in‐\\nformant, the law enforcement officers had probable cause for \\nboth the arrest and search.”). But see United States v. Lopez, 907 \\nF.3d 472, 483 (7th Cir. 2018) (informant who later disappeared \\nwas not reliable and “[t]he officers’ observations that day [of \\nthe arrest] did not corroborate, even roughly, the informant’s \\nstory.”) Moreover, because the “Fourth Amendment, bal‐\\nances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal se‐\\ncurity against the importance of the governmental interests \\nalleged to justify the intrusion … [a] stop to investigate an al‐\\nready completed crime does not necessarily promote the in‐\\nterest of crime prevention as directly as a stop to investigate \\nsuspected ongoing criminal activity.” United States v. Hensley, \\n469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985). \\n In this case, the informant did not have a long (or any) his‐\\ntory of cooperating with law enforcement, and had not been \\nknown to them for long, but he was not an anonymous tipster. \\nHe had agreed to cooperate with law enforcement after being \\narrested earlier that day picking up a very large quantity of \\ncocaine at the airport—more cocaine than anyone could use \\nfor personal consumption. The confidential informant pro‐\\nvided significant incriminating information including that he \\nhad a pre‐arranged plan to deliver thirteen kilograms of co‐\\ncaine to Cherry. The informant also told the agents that \\n\\f12 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nCherry was a member of the Black P Stone gang in Chicago \\nand regularly trafficked in drugs. The informant then pre‐\\ndicted to the DEA agents that Cherry, an African‐American \\nman, who he knew as “Mo” and who was of average height \\nand weighed about 200 pounds would be arriving at a partic‐\\nular parking lot in Markham, Illinois at a particular time, and \\nwas known to drive a white Mercedes SUV. The phone calls \\nbetween Cherry and the informant corroborated some of this \\ninformation—Cherry appeared to agree to follow the inform‐\\nant’s instructions given in the phone calls. The agents were \\nable to corroborate more of this information when a man, \\nmeeting the informant’s description, arrived in the predicted \\nplace at the predicted time, driving the make, model, and \\ncolor of vehicle that the informant said he would be driving. \\nCherry’s own behavior added to their confidence when he ar‐\\nrived at the agreed‐upon parking lot, circled the parking lot \\nas though assessing the safety and privacy of the situation, \\nand then parked next to the confidential informant’s car. He \\nexited his own car and got into the front passenger seat of the \\ninformant’s car. Law enforcement agents instructed the in‐\\nformant to signal them after having a certain conversation \\nwith Cherry and showing him the sham cocaine in the hidden \\ncompartment. The informant subsequently gave the agents \\nthe signal indicating that he had completed the prerequisite \\ntasks. As the agents announced themselves, Cherry made in‐\\nitial moves to flee either by running toward or taking steps \\ntoward his vehicle. \\n The confidential informant was not an anonymous tipster \\nand continued to cooperate with the agents after his arrest \\nand throughout the sting operation—following all of the \\nagents’ commands and instructions. His earlier arrest meant \\nthat he had motivation to help the agents in order to receive \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 13\\n\\nleniency in his own case. We recognize that this can be a dou‐\\nble edge sword—it gives informants motivation to assist law \\nenforcement officers, but perhaps also gives them motivation \\nto assist law enforcement without regard to the accuracy of \\nthe information. In any event, we have noted that the fact that \\na desire for leniency motivates an informant does not make \\nthe information he provides inherently unreliable. United \\nStates v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2010). And in fact, \\nour court has noted that informant tips that involve inculpa‐\\ntory statements add great weight to an assessment of proba‐\\nble cause to arrest. United States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456, 459 \\n(7th Cir. 2004) (also noting that “several circuits have held that \\nsuch statements are so presumptively reliable that they may \\nsupport a probable cause determination even if uncorrobo‐\\nrated.”). It is true that there is always a risk that an informant \\nis setting up an innocent rival or enemy, but this is less of a \\nrisk when the informant is known and trying to lessen his \\nown sentence. Surely the informant knew that he would not \\nhave engendered the good will of the agents had Cherry ar‐\\nrived and stated on the recorded wire that he had just come \\nto meet the informant for pizza. See United States v. Olson, 408 \\nF.3d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A motive to curry favor, how‐\\never, does not necessarily render an informant unreliable. In‐\\ndeed, even informants ‘attempting to strike a bargain with the \\npolice have a strong incentive to provide accurate and specific \\ninformation rather than false information about a defendant’s \\nillegal activity.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 870 \\n(2002)) (cleaned up). \\n As we have just noted, there is no formula for determining \\nthe requisite degree of reliability of an informant’s tip that \\nwill provide probable cause to arrest. Other cases can give us \\nguide posts. And so, for example, we might look to United \\n\\f14 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nStates v. Freeman, 691 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2012), where the police \\nhad analogous facts from an informant about a similar pre‐\\narranged drug deal. In Freeman, an arrested drug dealer \\nagreed to assist the police in a sting. He telephoned a raspy‐\\nvoiced man who agreed to meet him and sell him crack at a \\nSav‐A‐Lot parking lot. At the agreed upon time, a minivan \\npulled into the nearly empty parking lot and waited by the \\ndoor of the store. The informant called the defendant who re‐\\nsponded that he was waiting by that same door. The van, \\nhowever, suddenly pulled out of the lot. After the van failed \\nto engage a turn signal, police officers initiated a traffic stop \\nand encountered a raspy‐voiced man. A dog alerted to the \\nscent of drugs, giving the police probable cause to search the \\nvan, but when they did, they found no drugs. The officers \\nasked the informant to redial the number he had just used to \\nset up the drug deal, and when he did, the call came through \\non a cell phone located in the armrest on the passenger‐side \\ndoor of the van. The men were arrested and, during a strip \\nsearch at the jail, officers found crack cocaine hidden in the \\nman’s buttocks. The district court found that “[t]he police had \\ncredible information about Freeman’s drug‐trafficking habits \\nfrom the cooperating informants, and his activities just prior \\nto his arrest coincided perfectly with the details of the under‐\\ncover operation, thus supplying probable cause to arrest de‐\\nspite the fact that no drugs were found in the search during \\nthe stop.” Id. at 896. The police watched the silver van pull \\ninto the parking lot, the van matched the description given by \\nan earlier informant, it arrived at the time that the drug dealer \\non the phone said it would, and then the drug dealer on the \\nphone stated that he was parked just outside a Sav‐A‐Lot \\nstore, right where the van was parked. Id. at 899–900. When \\npulled over, the passenger met physical descriptions given by \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 15\\n\\nprevious informants and the phone number used to arrange \\nthe transaction rang a phone located within the silver van. \\nJust as in this case, the police had little independent corrobo‐\\nration other than the informants’ accurate descriptions and \\nhis ability to predict the defendant’s actions. This, the court \\nheld, was sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 896. \\n Cherry argues that this case is not like Freeman, because in \\nFreeman the police were monitoring the calls in real‐time and \\nknew that the defendant had agreed to sell crack to an \\ninformant at the precise location where he then appeared. But \\nthe agents in this case likewise knew that Cherry planned to \\nmeet the informant in the parking lot to participate in a drug \\ndeal. It is true that they did not listen to the phone calls in real \\ntime, but during the first call the officers were present with \\nthe informant. Tr. 11/26/12 at 23 (R. 58 at 23). In Freeman, our \\ncourt noted that “the police on the scene had plenty of \\ninformation to give them probable cause to believe that [the \\ndefendant] had committed the crime,” including the fact that \\nthe events unfolded just as the informant had said they \\nwould—a raspy‐voiced man arrived at a pre‐arranged \\nlocation at the pre‐arranged time in a vehicle he was known \\nto drive.” Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900. Sometimes having a \\ndrug buyer appear on the scene precisely when expected is \\nsufficient to supply probable cause for an arrest. See United \\nStates v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2008). In Colon the \\ncourt upheld the finding of probable cause where one drug \\ndealer telephoned another to tell him that a man would be \\narriving at a particular house in fifteen minutes to purchase \\ndrugs, and the police arrested that man as he left the house. \\nId. In this case the agents had far more: they had a man who \\nmatched the predicted description, arriving in a vehicle that \\nmatched descriptions of the drug dealer’s vehicle, at the \\n\\f16 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\npredicted place and time. They had the informant’s \\nconfirmatory signal, and the defendant’s preliminary attempt \\nto flee.3 \\n It is true that the facts in this case are not the same as they \\nwere in Freeman. No two cases ever are. But Freeman empha‐\\nsizes the value to law enforcement of an informant’s \\nknowledge when the events the informant predicted come to \\nlight in the manner the informant forecasted, particularly \\nwhen those events would not have been known to the general \\npublic. See Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900; White, 496 U.S. at 332 \\n(noting that an informant’s predictions gain some degree of \\nreliability when the police see the events unfold as the inform‐\\nant predicted, particularly when it demonstrates inside infor‐\\nmation of which the general public would not be aware). Of \\ncourse, there is always a risk that a confidential informant has \\nulterior motives and is leading law enforcement astray. Prob‐\\nable cause, however, does not require certainty in an inform‐\\nant’s tip, just sufficient probability. Seiser, 762 F.3d at 654. In \\nBrown, 366 F.3d at 460–61, for example, our court found suffi‐\\ncient probable cause to arrest despite a small risk that the in‐\\nformant “had simply spotted [the defendant] while fleeing \\nfrom the bank and then falsely implicated him in the bank \\nrobbery.” Id. at 460–61. In that case a bank robber caught in \\nthe act described the getaway car awaiting him, the exact \\n \\n3 Although flight cannot, on its own, provide probable cause to arrest, the \\n\\ndetermination of probable cause depends on a totality of circumstances \\nthat may take into account “commonsense judgments and inferences \\nabout human behavior,” including unprovoked flight. Illinois v. Wardlow, \\n528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (explaining that a “refusal to cooperate, without \\nmore, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed \\nfor a detention or seizure,” but unprovoked flight could factor into rea‐\\nsonable suspicion) (internal citations omitted). \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 17\\n\\nlocation where it would be waiting, the color and make of the \\ncar, the first letter of the license plate, and a name and descrip‐\\ntion of the driver. Id. at 457. When the police were able to ver‐\\nify these details, “the entirety of [the informant’s] story, in‐\\ncluding his statements about Mr. Brown’s role in the rob‐\\nberies, assumed a high degree of reliability.” Id. at 460. It is \\ntrue that the informant in Brown, like the informant here, \\ncould have been setting up an innocent person. As we noted, \\nhowever, probable cause does not require “hard certainties,” \\nonly probabilities. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (citing United States v. \\nCortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). Cherry argues that the in‐\\nformant’s information in Brown was far more detailed and the \\npolice were able to corroborate more of it. We do not think the \\nlevel of detail in these two cases is materially different in a \\nmanner that affects probable cause. \\n Undoubtedly more certainty is better where a defendant’s \\nliberty is at stake, but we do not require incontrovertible evi‐\\ndence for probable cause. Of course, it would have been better \\nhad the agents done more independent corroboration; had \\nthey been monitoring the conversations in real time (and cer‐\\ntainly the technology was so readily available, even in 2012, \\nthat one wonders why it was not used); and if they had seen \\nCherry take possession of the drugs. Because probable cause \\nis fact specific, it might happen that, in another case, a court \\nwould require this sort of corroboration before finding prob‐\\nable cause. We cannot conclude, however, that in this case \\nthese deficiencies eviscerated probable cause. The DEA \\nagents had multiple pieces of detailed information from an \\ninformant who was implicating himself in a drug deal—infor‐\\nmation corroborated as the predictions came true. This was \\nsufficient probable cause to support the arrest of Cherry. \\n\\f18 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\n2. Probable cause to search the vehicle \\n We also conclude that the DEA agents lawfully searched \\nCherry’s vehicle, including the satchel, and lawfully seized \\nthe narcotics. Like a warrantless arrest, a warrantless search \\nand seizure violates the Fourth Amendment unless it falls \\nwithin certain exceptions to the warrant requirement. Katz v. \\nUnited States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “The ‘plain‐view’ doc‐\\ntrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that \\nwarrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but \\nthis characterization overlooks the important difference be‐\\ntween searches and seizures. If an article is already in plain \\nview, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve \\nany invasion of privacy.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 \\n(1990). Under this plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure \\nis justified if first, the law enforcement officer did not violate \\nthe Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which \\nthe evidence could be plainly viewed; second, the item was in \\nplain view; and third, its incriminating character was imme‐\\ndiately apparent. United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 262 \\n(7th Cir. 2016). \\n After hearing testimony from the agents and Cherry, the \\ncourt concluded that the drugs were in plain view after \\nCherry opened the driver’s side door to his car while trying \\nto flee. We see no reason not to give deference to this credibil‐\\nity and factual finding. As the district court concluded, the \\nagents’ testimony was substantially consistent: they arrested \\nthe defendant after he opened the door to his SUV, and \\nthrough that open door they were able to see the messenger \\nbag with a plastic bag containing a substance the agents rea‐\\nsonably suspected was illegal drugs. The district court con‐\\ncluded that the agents’ version of events, was more likely true \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 19\\n\\nthan Cherry’s, and that any minor discrepancies were imma‐\\nterial. R. 60 at 4–6. The district court did not believe Cherry’s \\ntestimony that he hid the drugs at the bottom of the satchel, \\nbelow several car titles and then placed the satchel on the \\nfloor of the front passenger side of the car. The district court \\nreasoned that a drug dealer coming to exchange drugs would \\nwant to minimize his vulnerability and thus the time for the \\nexchange, and therefore would place the drugs where they \\nwould be readily accessible. As we have noted, “we must ac‐\\ncept the district court’s credibility determination unless the \\nfacts, as testified to by the police officers, were so unbelievable \\nthat no reasonable factfinder could credit them.” Contreras, \\n820 F.3d at 263. \\n Cherry does not seem to dispute the prerequisites to the \\nplain view doctrine—that the agents were lawfully in the \\nparking lot and that the incriminating nature of the evidence \\nwould have been readily apparent. Cherry argues instead that \\nhis version of events is the one to be believed—the drugs were \\nhidden inside the satchel on the floor of the Mercedes where \\nthe agents could not have seen them and the agents’ reports \\nto the contrary were inconsistent and thus unbelievable. We \\ncan make short shrift of this argument. “A district court’s \\ncredibility assessment based on live testimony will not be dis‐\\nturbed unless it is completely without foundation.” Freeman, \\n691 F.3d at 900 (internal citations omitted). \\n Even if we were to perseverate on the inconsistencies in \\nthe agents’ testimony, none makes it impossible that the \\ndrugs were in plain view. At the suppression hearing, Agent \\nO’Reilly testified that Cherry “ran across the parking spot to \\nhis vehicle” and opened the drivers’ side door, and had his \\nhand and arm inside the car when he was arrested. 11/27/12 \\n\\f20 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nTr. at 76–77, 95 (R. 58). Agent Brazao testified that although \\nhe did not see who opened the door to the SUV, after he se‐\\ncured the informant, he walked back to the SUV one minute \\nafter the agents moved in to arrest Cherry, noticed the doors \\nwere open, and saw a black satchel and drugs through the \\nopen door. Id. at 14, 35–36, 48–49. Agent Crawford testified \\nthat he did not see who initially opened the door, but when \\nhe arrived at the SUV, the other agents had already arrested \\nCherry and he was on the ground and the door was open. Id. \\nat 53–54, 56–61, 65–66. Crawford looked into the SUV to make \\ncertain there were no other people in the SUV who might be \\na threat to the agents and saw the satchel and drugs in plain \\nview. Id. Those agents testified consistently at trial. Tr. 6/28/16 \\na.m. at 193–202, 242–43 (R. 184); Tr. 6/28/16 p.m. at 296, 307–\\n08, 310–11 (R. 179). Cherry points accusatorily to Chicago po‐\\nlice officer Gamboa’s testimony. Officer Gamboa did not tes‐\\ntify at the suppression hearing, but he did testify at trial and \\nhis testimony was less clear about the door. He testified that \\nCherry “very quickly tried to get into his vehicle,” Tr. 6/28/16 \\nat 390, 391 (R. 179) and that he was handcuffed outside of the \\nvehicle. Id. at 391. His testimony about whether the door to \\nthe SUV was open or closed, however, was a bit equivocal. \\nCherry hangs his hat on the fact that Officer Gamboa testified \\nat trial that the agents grabbed Cherry before he could open \\nhis car. Gamboa’s testimony, however, was not as clear as \\nCherry presents it to be: \\n Gamboa: He tried to go in the car. I tried not to \\n let him go in the car. \\n Q. And you grabbed him? \\n A. From the shoulders and his arm, yeah. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 21\\n\\n Q. So he wasn’t in the car at the time that you \\n grabbed him? \\n A. No. He was trying to get into the car. \\n Q. Door was open? \\n A. Trying to open it, yeah. \\n Q. Oh, so the door—he hadn’t been able to—he \\n wasn’t successful in opening the door? \\n A. He didn’t get in. If he did open it, I wasn’t pay‐\\n ing attention. I was just trying to make sure he \\n didn’t get in. \\n Q. So you don’t recall whether it was open or \\n closed? \\n A. It wasnʹt open— he didnʹt get in. Letʹs put it that \\n way. He couldn’t get his foot in, so it wasn’t. \\n Q. Okay. So you donʹt think it was open? \\n A. No. \\nId. at 391–92 (emphasis ours). \\n None of the testimony gives rise to an irreconcilable dif‐\\nference. In fact, none of it is inherently inconsistent. Testi‐\\nmony is not incredible as a matter of law \\n “only because the witness may have been im‐\\n peached by certain discrepancies in [her] story, \\n by prior inconsistent statements, or by the exist‐\\n ence of a motive to provide evidence favorable \\n to the government.” To find a witness’s testi‐\\n mony to be incredible as a matter of law, it must \\n have been “physically impossible for the wit‐\\n ness to have observed that which he claims \\n\\f22 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\n occurred, or impossible under the laws of na‐\\n ture for the occurrence to have taken place at \\n all.” \\nContreras, 820 F.3d at 264 (citing Freeman, 691 F.3d at 900 and \\nUnited States v. Taylor, 701 F.3d 1166, 1174 (7th Cir.2012)). \\n The district court certainly did not err by accepting the tes‐\\ntimony of the three agents who were clear on the matter that \\nthe door was open allowing the agents to view the drugs in \\nplain view on the seat. This was particularly true after the \\nsuppression hearing when the district court had only the tes‐\\ntimony of Agents Brazao, Crawford and O’Reilly to consider. \\nBut this was also true even when the court reviewed the post‐\\ntrial motion for acquittal. We cannot say that no reasonable \\njury could have concluded that the door was open and the \\ndrugs in plain view. We see no reason to disturb the credibil‐\\nity and factual findings of the district court on the motion to \\nsuppress and certainly no reason to upset the jury’s conclu‐\\nsion. \\n In any event, even if the door to the Mercedes was closed, \\nthere were two other avenues to admit the evidence. First, the \\nagents were entitled to open the door to conduct a limited \\nprotective sweep in case there were other occupants who \\nwere not visible through the tinted windows or hiding in the \\nrear seat. Traffic stops are dangerous for officers and the “le‐\\ngitimate and weighty” interest in officer safety allows officers \\nto perform protective searches and frisks of other passengers. \\nArizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331 (2009). \\n And finally, the district court was correct to hold, in the \\nalternative, that the drugs were admissible under the inevita‐\\nble discovery doctrine. As the Supreme Court has held, “[i]f \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 23\\n\\nthe prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evi‐\\ndence that the information ultimately or inevitably would \\nhave been discovered by lawful means … then the deterrence \\nrationale has so little basis that the evidence should be re‐\\nceived.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Cherry \\nhad been arrested, the agents would have removed his car \\nfrom the parking lot and it would have been subject to an in‐\\nventory search, as is the usual protocol. As we noted before, \\nonce a defendant is in custody, “the arresting officers would \\nnot have allowed the truck to just sit on the street after” a de‐\\nfendant has been taken away. United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d \\n935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010). Agent Brazao confirmed this in his \\ntestimony at the suppression hearing: “it was determined by \\nthe case agents that we were not going to seize the vehicle, \\nand we didn’t want to leave it there in an open parking lot so \\nthat someone would steal it or damage it. So we wanted to \\nsecure it. So we asked Markham police can we secure it in \\ntheir parking lot until someone can come pick it up.” \\nTr. 11/27/12 at 66 (R. 58). Although Cherry was arrested in a \\nprivate parking lot, it seems unlikely that a police department \\nwould have allowed a car, potentially filled with drugs, to sit \\nin a parking lot indefinitely. The drugs, therefore, inevitably \\nwould have been discovered during an inventory search. \\n3. Photographic metadata. \\n Finally, Cherry’s motion to dismiss the superseding in‐\\ndictment and the motion for judgment of acquittal argued \\nthat the government violated its affirmative duty to disclose \\nevidence favorable to him as required by the Supreme Court \\nin Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady requires that the \\ngovernment disclose evidence materially favorable to the ac‐\\ncused, whether that evidence is impeachment evidence or \\n\\f24 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nexculpatory. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 \\n(2006). Upon review of a motion to dismiss which alleges a \\nBrady violation, we look only to see if the district court abused \\nits discretion. United States v. King, 910 F.3d 320, 326 (7th Cir. \\n2018). \\n When a defendant alleges that the government failed to \\npreserve potentially exculpatory evidence, as Cherry has \\ndone here, we apply the standard articulated in Arizona v. \\nYoungblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), which states that there is no \\ndenial of due process “unless a criminal defendant can show \\nbad faith on the part of the police.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. \\nSee also United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 407 (7th Cir. \\n2011), as amended (Feb. 23, 2011). In short, our precedent de‐\\nmands that Cherry demonstrate: “(1) bad faith by the govern‐\\nment, (2) that the exculpatory nature of the evidence was ap‐\\nparent before its destruction, and (3) that he could not obtain \\nthe same evidence anywhere else.” Fletcher, 634 F.3d at 407 \\n(citing United States v. Kimoto, 588 F.3d 464, 475 (7th Cir. \\n2009)). Bad faith, in turn, requires proof of an “‘official ani‐\\nmus’ or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evi‐\\ndence,’” and necessarily turns on an official’s subjective \\nknowledge that the evidence in question had exculpatory \\nvalue at the time it was lost or destroyed.” United States v. Bell, \\n819 F.3d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones v. \\nMcCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1992)). \\n In this case, the first two factors overlap. The district court \\ndid not abuse its discretion in determining that the camera \\nwas not sold in bad faith, in part because the exculpatory na‐\\nture would not have been obvious to the officer at the time the \\ncamera was sold. Agent Castaneda sold the camera, which \\nwas his personal property, at a garage sale in the summer of \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 25\\n\\n2013, months after the suppression hearing. During the sup‐\\npression hearing, the defense counsel asked Castaneda about \\nthe order of the photographs but never sought to inspect the \\ncamera or its metadata until almost two years after that hear‐\\ning. Cherry’s counsel was well aware of the existence of this \\ndata, but at no point before or during the suppression hearing \\ndid Cherry ask for the camera or the metadata. Nor did \\nCherry ask the government to preserve the data. The district \\ncourt concluded that “[n]o evidence supports Defendant’s po‐\\nsition (nor is it likely) that after the motion to suppress, during \\nwhich metadata was not even mentioned, law enforcement \\nofficers anticipated that such information would someday be \\nrequested and intentionally destroyed it in order to deprive \\nDefendant of the evidence.” R. 106 at 4. \\n Moreover, as we noted above, the contents of the vehicle, \\nincluding the satchel and the drugs within it, would have \\nbeen discovered in a lawful inventory search once the agents \\ntook custody of the vehicle. This makes any debate about the \\norder in which the photographs were taken and whether the \\nbag was opened or closed irrelevant. \\n III. \\n For all the reasons asserted above, we AFFIRM the opinion \\nof the district court in all respects.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385208/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607955/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Deandre Cherry\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐3018 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nDEANDRE CHERRY, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 1:12‐cr‐00415‐1 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Deandre Cherry’s heroin customers \nhad been complaining about the poor quality of his supply, \nso on a rainy night in May 2012, he drove into a parking lot in \nMarkham, Illinois hoping to exchange his inventory of low‐\nquality heroin for a better supply of cocaine that his supplier \nhad just picked up at O’Hare airport. Unbeknownst to \nCherry, however, his supplier had just been arrested picking \nup the cocaine and, since his hopes were for a better deal for \n\f2 No. 17‐3018 \n\nhimself, decided to cooperate and help the Drug Enforcement \nAgency (DEA) agents ensnare another dealer down the line. \nInstead of the exchange, Cherry was arrested mid‐deal and \neventually sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. Cherry \nappeals, claiming the agents lacked probable cause to arrest \nhim and search his vehicle. He also claims they failed to pre‐\nserve exculpatory evidence. We affirm the holding of the dis‐\ntrict court in all respects. \n I. \n In the course of an investigation into cocaine importation \nfrom Mexico to Chicago, DEA agents arrested a man who was \nattempting to take possession of twenty‐six kilograms of co‐\ncaine near Chicago’s O’Hare airport. During an interview af‐\nter that arrest, the man told Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) \nagents that he was scheduled to deliver thirteen kilograms of \ncocaine to a man he called “Mo” that night. “Mo” was later \nidentified as Cherry. According to the arrested man, Cherry \nwas a high‐ranking member of the Black P Stone street gang \nin Chicago who distributed many kilograms of cocaine each \nmonth. The arrested man agreed to become a confidential in‐\nformant for the DEA and help the agents execute a sting op‐\neration. \n The confidential informant told the agents that, through \nprior conversations, he and Cherry had agreed that the in‐\nformant would drive the cocaine to a residence in Harvey, Il‐\nlinois, that Cherry would meet him there, take custody of the \ncocaine, and then a few hours later another member of \nCherry’s organization would pay the informant for the co‐\ncaine. The confidential informant provided agents with \nCherry’s cell phone number and a physical description: an \n\fNo. 17‐3018 3\n\naverage height black man, weighing about 200 pounds, and \ndriving a white Mercedes SUV. \n The agents formulated a plan for a sting operation in \nwhich the confidential informant would drive his own car to \nmeet Cherry with sham cocaine concealed in the car’s drug‐\nhiding trap compartment. Under the plan, the informant \nwould signal the agents by stepping out of the car once he and \nCherry had engaged in a conversation about the exchange of \nthe cocaine. For their own safety, the agents had the confiden‐\ntial informant change the meeting spot to a parking lot further \naway from gang activity. They then outfitted the informant \nwith hidden audio and video recording equipment, and \nsearched and inventoried the informant’s vehicle (as is the \nprotocol for such operations). \n At around 7:50 p.m. on May 31, 2012, the confidential in‐\nformant placed a recorded call to Cherry. The informant told \nCherry that he was approximately ten minutes away from the \nagreed upon meeting place in Harvey, and Cherry responded \nthat he would meet him there. A few minutes later the confi‐\ndential informant, under direction of the agents, called \nCherry and changed the rendezvous spot to a parking lot in \nnearby Markham, Illinois. Shortly thereafter, a 2012 white \nMercedes SUV (later determined to be registered to Cherry) \nentered the nearly empty parking lot, circled the lot, and then \nparked next to the confidential informant.1 \n In a conversation that was recorded, but not monitored in \nreal time by agents, the confidential informant told Cherry \n \n1 The testimony of the agents was inconsistent as to whether Cherry \n\nparked directly next to the informant’s car, one parking spot away, or one‐\nand‐a‐half parking spots away. We find this discrepancy to be immaterial. \n\f4 No. 17‐3018 \n\nthat “it” (meaning the thirteen kilograms of cocaine) was in \nthe “spot”—the hidden compartment in the back of the car. \nOnce Cherry responded affirmatively that he wanted to see \nthe drugs, the informant opened the compartment and then \nexited the car—the pre‐arranged signal to law enforcement. \nCherry did not handle nor take physical possession of the \ndrugs. \n The district court credited the testimony of the DEA \nagents at the scene who testified that as they approached the \ncar and Cherry saw them, he dashed the short distance be‐\ntween the informant’s car and his SUV, opened the front door \nof the SUV, and attempted to get in. One agent testified that \nCherry opened the door and “tried to get into the vehicle as \nwe jumped on him so— … [h]e had his hand and his arm got \ninto it, but we pulled him back out.” Tr. 11/27/12 at 77 (R. 58). \n As one agent subdued Cherry and placed him under ar‐\nrest, a second agent quickly looked into the Mercedes to make \nsure no one else was hiding in the vehicle. A third agent went \nthrough the motions of arresting the confidential informant to \nprotect him as an informant, and after doing so returned to \nthe Mercedes where, along with two other agents, he saw, \nthrough the open door, a black messenger‐type satchel with \nthe flap open and clear plastic bags containing what looked to \nbe heroin or cocaine. Cherry testified at the suppression hear‐\ning that the drugs were not, in fact, in plain sight, but that they \nwere in a black plastic bag contained within the closed and \nlocked satchel, and the cash was also concealed in a black \nplastic bag stuffed under the driver’s seat. Later testing con‐\nfirmed that the satchel held baggies containing 348.1 grams of \nheroin and 13.7 grams of cocaine base (crack). Agents also \nfound $19,495 in cash in the SUV. Eventually Chicago Police \n\fNo. 17‐3018 5\n\nOfficer and DEA task force officer Jose Castaneda photo‐\ngraphed the car and the satchel, taking photographs of the \nsatchel both open and closed, the cash, and other items in the \ncar. All of the photographs had the same time stamp—8:48 \np.m. Officer Castanada testified that he could not recall the \norder in which he took the photographs and could not say \nwhether the satchel was open or closed when Cherry was ar‐\nrested.2 \n After agents read Cherry his Miranda rights, Cherry \nagreed to talk to one of the agents and told him that three \nweeks earlier the confidential informant, who he knew as “Fat \nMan” fronted him half of a kilogram of heroin for $31,500, but \nthe heroin was not of good quality and his customers were \ncomplaining. On the night he was arrested, Cherry was bring‐\ning approximately 300 grams of heroin back to the confiden‐\ntial informant to exchange for an equivalent amount of co‐\ncaine. The government charged Cherry with possession with \nintent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, in viola‐\ntion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). \n Cherry filed two motions to suppress the evidence before \ntrial. In the first motion he claimed that the agents lacked \nprobable cause to arrest him. In the second motion he argued \nthat the agents had no authority to search his bag within the \nvehicle as the drugs were not in plain view. Following a No‐\nvember 27, 2012 suppression hearing in which the court heard \nfrom Cherry and from four DEA agents, the district court \n\n \n2 From this point forward we will refer to all law enforcement officers col‐\n\nlectively as “agents” unless specifically noted otherwise. Technically, Of‐\nficer Castaneda was employed as a City of Chicago police officer and as‐\nsigned to the DEA as a task force officer. \n\f6 No. 17‐3018 \n\nfound that the agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry and \nthat the subsequent search of the vehicle was lawful as the \ndrugs were in plain sight. In the alternative, the district court \nheld that the narcotics inevitably would have been discovered \nafter Cherry’s arrest, subsequent to an inventory search of his \nvehicle. \n Cherry twice moved to reconsider the district court deci‐\nsion, arguing, on September 8, 2014, that a new Seventh Cir‐\ncuit decision indicated that a court must have more corrobo‐\nration from an informant’s tip and that an enhanced version \nof the recording from the confidential informant’s body cam‐\nera did not support an agreement by Cherry to accept the co‐\ncaine. The district court rejected both arguments. \n Almost two years after the suppression hearing, on \nSeptember 8, 2014, Cherry filed another motion—this time \nseeking to inspect the camera used to photograph the satchel \nand the metadata associated with the photographs in order to \ndetermine in what order the photographs were taken. \nBecause Castaneda took all of the photographs of the satchel, \nboth open and closed, within the same minute (and the time \nstamp did not reveal seconds), the court and parties could not \ndetermine in what order the agent took the photographs. \nCherry’s counsel argued that the data sought would reveal \nthe order in which the pictures were taken, and thus would \nuncover the truth about whether the drugs had been in plain \nsight in an open bag, or not visible in a closed bag when the \nagents arrived at the vehicle. After a search, however, the \ngovernment determined that neither the camera nor any \nmetadata was available because Agent Castaneda took the \nphotographs with a personal camera which he subsequently \nsold at a yard sale in the summer of 2013. Cherry filed a \n\fNo. 17‐3018 7\n\nrenewed motion to reconsider, arguing that because the \ngovernment failed to retain the metadata from the camera, the \ncourt should be precluded from relying on the photographs \nin making its probable cause determination. After the trial, \nCherry also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the \nbasis of an alleged Brady violation—that is, that the \ngovernment failed to preserve the exculpatory evidence of the \nphotographic metadata from the camera. The district court \nrejected this argument as well, noting that Cherry had failed \nto demonstrate any bad faith on the government’s part, that \nthe court had already found that the heroin was in plain view, \nand inevitably the drugs would have been discovered during \nan inventory search. \n The case proceeded to trial where the jury convicted \nCherry of the single count of the superseding indictment. Af‐\nter trial, Cherry filed another motion in which he repeated his \npre‐trial arguments. The district court found no reason to alter \nits rulings. Cherry was sentenced to 240 months’ imprison‐\nment, and now appeals. In this court he again argues that his \narrest was not supported by probable cause and that the dis‐\ntrict court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained \nduring the warrantless search of his vehicle. He also argues \nthat the district court erred by determining that the govern‐\nment did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) \nwhen it failed to preserve the potentially exculpatory \nmetadata associated with the photographs of the evidence. \n II. \n1. Probable cause to arrest \n The main crux of Cherry’s defense is that the DEA agents \nhad so little reliable information either from the confidential \n\f8 No. 17‐3018 \n\ninformant or from their own investigations that they could \nnot have had probable cause either to arrest him or to search \nhis vehicle. In pursuit of this defense, shortly after his original \nindictment, Cherry filed a motion to suppress the evidence \nobtained from his allegedly illegal arrest and the subsequent \nsearch of his SUV. The district court, however, denied his mo‐\ntion to suppress. When considering a district court’s denial of \na motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error \nand questions of law de novo. United States v. Velazquez, 906 \nF.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2018). We will not overturn a district \ncourt’s credibility finding unless we find clear error. United \nStates v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018). Cherry also \nfiled post‐trial motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce‐\ndure 29(a) and (c), repeating these arguments and challenging \nthe sufficiency of the evidence that the government relied \nupon to establish probable cause. R. 177, 196. When a defend‐\nant challenges the sufficiency of the government’s evidence in \na Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, as Cherry did \nbelow, we review de novo, viewing the evidence in the light \nmost favorable to the government. United States v. Cruse, 805 \nF.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2015). We must affirm if any rational \ntrier of fact could have found the elements of the crime be‐\nyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We have often said that “after a \nguilty verdict, a defendant seeking a judgment of acquittal \nfaces a ‘nearly insurmountable hurdle.’” United States v. Jones, \n713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Moore, \n115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir. 1997)). Yet even under the rela‐\ntively easier standard of review of the motion to dismiss, we \nfind the DEA agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry. \n Cherry’s claims require us to go back to the core of the \nFourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitu‐\ntion prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, including \n\fNo. 17‐3018 9\n\narrests made without either a warrant or probable cause. U.S. \nConst. Amend. IV. A police officer has probable cause to \nmake an arrest if a reasonable person, knowing all of the facts \nand circumstances known to this officer, would believe that \nthe individual in question has committed or is committing a \ncrime. Seiser v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2014). \nThere is no checklist that can determine probable cause, par‐\nticularly when evaluating probable cause based on an inform‐\nant’s tip. \n [P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on \n the assessment of probabilities in particular fac‐\n tual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, re‐\n duced to a neat set of legal rules. Informants’ \n tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes \n from many different types of persons. … In‐\n formants’ tips, like all other clues and evidence \n coming to a policeman on the scene may vary \n greatly in their value and reliability. Rigid legal \n rules are ill‐suited to an area of such diversity. \n One simple rule will not cover every situation. \nIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (internal citations \nomitted). And, as the general standards of review remind us, \nwhen we look at the value and reliability of any particular tip, \nwe give deference to the district court’s determinations of the \nfacts (and inferences therefrom) that feed into the finding of \nprobable cause and review the legal determination of proba‐\nble cause de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 \n(1996). When reviewing probable cause in the case where an \ninformant has provided a tip, therefore, we look at the totality \nof the circumstances, noting that “a deficiency in one may be \ncompensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, \n\f10 No. 17‐3018 \n\nby a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia \nof reliability.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. For this reason, direct \ncomparisons of indicia of probable cause from one informant \ncase to the next can be difficult. \n Despite the inability to reduce the analysis to a neat set of \nrules, the Supreme Court has mentioned factors that might go \ninto the decision‐making hopper, while warning against any \ntemptation to be confined to a rigid test. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234–\n35. Those factors include an informant’s past reliability, her \nreputation for honesty, the basis of her knowledge, and her \npotential motive. Id. In United States v. Searcy, a case which \ninvolved a warrant application to a magistrate judge, our \ncourt, like the Supreme Court, stressed the importance of con‐\nsidering the totality of the circumstances, but noted that a \nmagistrate might consider: “first, the degree to which the in‐\nformant acquired knowledge of the events through firsthand \nobservation; second, the detail and specificity of the infor‐\nmation provided by the informant; third, the interval between \nthe date of the events and a police officer’s application for the \nsearch warrant; and fourth, the extent to which law enforce‐\nment corroborated the informant’s statements.” United States \nv. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). \n Anonymous tips, of course, require more corroboration \nthen those where the honesty, motivation, and reliability of \nthe informant can be assessed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244–46; Ad‐\nams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (“Some tips, com‐\npletely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant \nno police response or require further investigation before a \nforcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.”). The ability \nof an informant to predict future actions of others with speci‐\nficity is one indicator of reliability. Gates, 462 U.S. at 245–46. \n\fNo. 17‐3018 11\n\nWhen a suspect engages in the behaviors and actions that an \ninformant has predicted, “[t]hat is exactly the type of corrob‐\noration that counts.” United States v. Oliva, 385 F.3d 1111, 1114 \n(7th Cir. 2004). See also, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 \n(1990) (“What was important was the caller’s ability to predict \nrespondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated inside \ninformation.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. Navarro, \n90 F.3d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1996) (“because the surveillance \npreceding the stop corroborated the information from the in‐\nformant, the law enforcement officers had probable cause for \nboth the arrest and search.”). But see United States v. Lopez, 907 \nF.3d 472, 483 (7th Cir. 2018) (informant who later disappeared \nwas not reliable and “[t]he officers’ observations that day [of \nthe arrest] did not corroborate, even roughly, the informant’s \nstory.”) Moreover, because the “Fourth Amendment, bal‐\nances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal se‐\ncurity against the importance of the governmental interests \nalleged to justify the intrusion … [a] stop to investigate an al‐\nready completed crime does not necessarily promote the in‐\nterest of crime prevention as directly as a stop to investigate \nsuspected ongoing criminal activity.” United States v. Hensley, \n469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985). \n In this case, the informant did not have a long (or any) his‐\ntory of cooperating with law enforcement, and had not been \nknown to them for long, but he was not an anonymous tipster. \nHe had agreed to cooperate with law enforcement after being \narrested earlier that day picking up a very large quantity of \ncocaine at the airport—more cocaine than anyone could use \nfor personal consumption. The confidential informant pro‐\nvided significant incriminating information including that he \nhad a pre‐arranged plan to deliver thirteen kilograms of co‐\ncaine to Cherry. The informant also told the agents that \n\f12 No. 17‐3018 \n\nCherry was a member of the Black P Stone gang in Chicago \nand regularly trafficked in drugs. The informant then pre‐\ndicted to the DEA agents that Cherry, an African‐American \nman, who he knew as “Mo” and who was of average height \nand weighed about 200 pounds would be arriving at a partic‐\nular parking lot in Markham, Illinois at a particular time, and \nwas known to drive a white Mercedes SUV. The phone calls \nbetween Cherry and the informant corroborated some of this \ninformation—Cherry appeared to agree to follow the inform‐\nant’s instructions given in the phone calls. The agents were \nable to corroborate more of this information when a man, \nmeeting the informant’s description, arrived in the predicted \nplace at the predicted time, driving the make, model, and \ncolor of vehicle that the informant said he would be driving. \nCherry’s own behavior added to their confidence when he ar‐\nrived at the agreed‐upon parking lot, circled the parking lot \nas though assessing the safety and privacy of the situation, \nand then parked next to the confidential informant’s car. He \nexited his own car and got into the front passenger seat of the \ninformant’s car. Law enforcement agents instructed the in‐\nformant to signal them after having a certain conversation \nwith Cherry and showing him the sham cocaine in the hidden \ncompartment. The informant subsequently gave the agents \nthe signal indicating that he had completed the prerequisite \ntasks. As the agents announced themselves, Cherry made in‐\nitial moves to flee either by running toward or taking steps \ntoward his vehicle. \n The confidential informant was not an anonymous tipster \nand continued to cooperate with the agents after his arrest \nand throughout the sting operation—following all of the \nagents’ commands and instructions. His earlier arrest meant \nthat he had motivation to help the agents in order to receive \n\fNo. 17‐3018 13\n\nleniency in his own case. We recognize that this can be a dou‐\nble edge sword—it gives informants motivation to assist law \nenforcement officers, but perhaps also gives them motivation \nto assist law enforcement without regard to the accuracy of \nthe information. In any event, we have noted that the fact that \na desire for leniency motivates an informant does not make \nthe information he provides inherently unreliable. United \nStates v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2010). And in fact, \nour court has noted that informant tips that involve inculpa‐\ntory statements add great weight to an assessment of proba‐\nble cause to arrest. United States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456, 459 \n(7th Cir. 2004) (also noting that “several circuits have held that \nsuch statements are so presumptively reliable that they may \nsupport a probable cause determination even if uncorrobo‐\nrated.”). It is true that there is always a risk that an informant \nis setting up an innocent rival or enemy, but this is less of a \nrisk when the informant is known and trying to lessen his \nown sentence. Surely the informant knew that he would not \nhave engendered the good will of the agents had Cherry ar‐\nrived and stated on the recorded wire that he had just come \nto meet the informant for pizza. See United States v. Olson, 408 \nF.3d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A motive to curry favor, how‐\never, does not necessarily render an informant unreliable. In‐\ndeed, even informants ‘attempting to strike a bargain with the \npolice have a strong incentive to provide accurate and specific \ninformation rather than false information about a defendant’s \nillegal activity.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 870 \n(2002)) (cleaned up). \n As we have just noted, there is no formula for determining \nthe requisite degree of reliability of an informant’s tip that \nwill provide probable cause to arrest. Other cases can give us \nguide posts. And so, for example, we might look to United \n\f14 No. 17‐3018 \n\nStates v. Freeman, 691 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2012), where the police \nhad analogous facts from an informant about a similar pre‐\narranged drug deal. In Freeman, an arrested drug dealer \nagreed to assist the police in a sting. He telephoned a raspy‐\nvoiced man who agreed to meet him and sell him crack at a \nSav‐A‐Lot parking lot. At the agreed upon time, a minivan \npulled into the nearly empty parking lot and waited by the \ndoor of the store. The informant called the defendant who re‐\nsponded that he was waiting by that same door. The van, \nhowever, suddenly pulled out of the lot. After the van failed \nto engage a turn signal, police officers initiated a traffic stop \nand encountered a raspy‐voiced man. A dog alerted to the \nscent of drugs, giving the police probable cause to search the \nvan, but when they did, they found no drugs. The officers \nasked the informant to redial the number he had just used to \nset up the drug deal, and when he did, the call came through \non a cell phone located in the armrest on the passenger‐side \ndoor of the van. The men were arrested and, during a strip \nsearch at the jail, officers found crack cocaine hidden in the \nman’s buttocks. The district court found that “[t]he police had \ncredible information about Freeman’s drug‐trafficking habits \nfrom the cooperating informants, and his activities just prior \nto his arrest coincided perfectly with the details of the under‐\ncover operation, thus supplying probable cause to arrest de‐\nspite the fact that no drugs were found in the search during \nthe stop.” Id. at 896. The police watched the silver van pull \ninto the parking lot, the van matched the description given by \nan earlier informant, it arrived at the time that the drug dealer \non the phone said it would, and then the drug dealer on the \nphone stated that he was parked just outside a Sav‐A‐Lot \nstore, right where the van was parked. Id. at 899–900. When \npulled over, the passenger met physical descriptions given by \n\fNo. 17‐3018 15\n\nprevious informants and the phone number used to arrange \nthe transaction rang a phone located within the silver van. \nJust as in this case, the police had little independent corrobo‐\nration other than the informants’ accurate descriptions and \nhis ability to predict the defendant’s actions. This, the court \nheld, was sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 896. \n Cherry argues that this case is not like Freeman, because in \nFreeman the police were monitoring the calls in real‐time and \nknew that the defendant had agreed to sell crack to an \ninformant at the precise location where he then appeared. But \nthe agents in this case likewise knew that Cherry planned to \nmeet the informant in the parking lot to participate in a drug \ndeal. It is true that they did not listen to the phone calls in real \ntime, but during the first call the officers were present with \nthe informant. Tr. 11/26/12 at 23 (R. 58 at 23). In Freeman, our \ncourt noted that “the police on the scene had plenty of \ninformation to give them probable cause to believe that [the \ndefendant] had committed the crime,” including the fact that \nthe events unfolded just as the informant had said they \nwould—a raspy‐voiced man arrived at a pre‐arranged \nlocation at the pre‐arranged time in a vehicle he was known \nto drive.” Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900. Sometimes having a \ndrug buyer appear on the scene precisely when expected is \nsufficient to supply probable cause for an arrest. See United \nStates v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2008). In Colon the \ncourt upheld the finding of probable cause where one drug \ndealer telephoned another to tell him that a man would be \narriving at a particular house in fifteen minutes to purchase \ndrugs, and the police arrested that man as he left the house. \nId. In this case the agents had far more: they had a man who \nmatched the predicted description, arriving in a vehicle that \nmatched descriptions of the drug dealer’s vehicle, at the \n\f16 No. 17‐3018 \n\npredicted place and time. They had the informant’s \nconfirmatory signal, and the defendant’s preliminary attempt \nto flee.3 \n It is true that the facts in this case are not the same as they \nwere in Freeman. No two cases ever are. But Freeman empha‐\nsizes the value to law enforcement of an informant’s \nknowledge when the events the informant predicted come to \nlight in the manner the informant forecasted, particularly \nwhen those events would not have been known to the general \npublic. See Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900; White, 496 U.S. at 332 \n(noting that an informant’s predictions gain some degree of \nreliability when the police see the events unfold as the inform‐\nant predicted, particularly when it demonstrates inside infor‐\nmation of which the general public would not be aware). Of \ncourse, there is always a risk that a confidential informant has \nulterior motives and is leading law enforcement astray. Prob‐\nable cause, however, does not require certainty in an inform‐\nant’s tip, just sufficient probability. Seiser, 762 F.3d at 654. In \nBrown, 366 F.3d at 460–61, for example, our court found suffi‐\ncient probable cause to arrest despite a small risk that the in‐\nformant “had simply spotted [the defendant] while fleeing \nfrom the bank and then falsely implicated him in the bank \nrobbery.” Id. at 460–61. In that case a bank robber caught in \nthe act described the getaway car awaiting him, the exact \n \n3 Although flight cannot, on its own, provide probable cause to arrest, the \n\ndetermination of probable cause depends on a totality of circumstances \nthat may take into account “commonsense judgments and inferences \nabout human behavior,” including unprovoked flight. Illinois v. Wardlow, \n528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (explaining that a “refusal to cooperate, without \nmore, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed \nfor a detention or seizure,” but unprovoked flight could factor into rea‐\nsonable suspicion) (internal citations omitted). \n\fNo. 17‐3018 17\n\nlocation where it would be waiting, the color and make of the \ncar, the first letter of the license plate, and a name and descrip‐\ntion of the driver. Id. at 457. When the police were able to ver‐\nify these details, “the entirety of [the informant’s] story, in‐\ncluding his statements about Mr. Brown’s role in the rob‐\nberies, assumed a high degree of reliability.” Id. at 460. It is \ntrue that the informant in Brown, like the informant here, \ncould have been setting up an innocent person. As we noted, \nhowever, probable cause does not require “hard certainties,” \nonly probabilities. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (citing United States v. \nCortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). Cherry argues that the in‐\nformant’s information in Brown was far more detailed and the \npolice were able to corroborate more of it. We do not think the \nlevel of detail in these two cases is materially different in a \nmanner that affects probable cause. \n Undoubtedly more certainty is better where a defendant’s \nliberty is at stake, but we do not require incontrovertible evi‐\ndence for probable cause. Of course, it would have been better \nhad the agents done more independent corroboration; had \nthey been monitoring the conversations in real time (and cer‐\ntainly the technology was so readily available, even in 2012, \nthat one wonders why it was not used); and if they had seen \nCherry take possession of the drugs. Because probable cause \nis fact specific, it might happen that, in another case, a court \nwould require this sort of corroboration before finding prob‐\nable cause. We cannot conclude, however, that in this case \nthese deficiencies eviscerated probable cause. The DEA \nagents had multiple pieces of detailed information from an \ninformant who was implicating himself in a drug deal—infor‐\nmation corroborated as the predictions came true. This was \nsufficient probable cause to support the arrest of Cherry. \n\f18 No. 17‐3018 \n\n2. Probable cause to search the vehicle \n We also conclude that the DEA agents lawfully searched \nCherry’s vehicle, including the satchel, and lawfully seized \nthe narcotics. Like a warrantless arrest, a warrantless search \nand seizure violates the Fourth Amendment unless it falls \nwithin certain exceptions to the warrant requirement. Katz v. \nUnited States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “The ‘plain‐view’ doc‐\ntrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that \nwarrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but \nthis characterization overlooks the important difference be‐\ntween searches and seizures. If an article is already in plain \nview, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve \nany invasion of privacy.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 \n(1990). Under this plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure \nis justified if first, the law enforcement officer did not violate \nthe Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which \nthe evidence could be plainly viewed; second, the item was in \nplain view; and third, its incriminating character was imme‐\ndiately apparent. United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 262 \n(7th Cir. 2016). \n After hearing testimony from the agents and Cherry, the \ncourt concluded that the drugs were in plain view after \nCherry opened the driver’s side door to his car while trying \nto flee. We see no reason not to give deference to this credibil‐\nity and factual finding. As the district court concluded, the \nagents’ testimony was substantially consistent: they arrested \nthe defendant after he opened the door to his SUV, and \nthrough that open door they were able to see the messenger \nbag with a plastic bag containing a substance the agents rea‐\nsonably suspected was illegal drugs. The district court con‐\ncluded that the agents’ version of events, was more likely true \n\fNo. 17‐3018 19\n\nthan Cherry’s, and that any minor discrepancies were imma‐\nterial. R. 60 at 4–6. The district court did not believe Cherry’s \ntestimony that he hid the drugs at the bottom of the satchel, \nbelow several car titles and then placed the satchel on the \nfloor of the front passenger side of the car. The district court \nreasoned that a drug dealer coming to exchange drugs would \nwant to minimize his vulnerability and thus the time for the \nexchange, and therefore would place the drugs where they \nwould be readily accessible. As we have noted, “we must ac‐\ncept the district court’s credibility determination unless the \nfacts, as testified to by the police officers, were so unbelievable \nthat no reasonable factfinder could credit them.” Contreras, \n820 F.3d at 263. \n Cherry does not seem to dispute the prerequisites to the \nplain view doctrine—that the agents were lawfully in the \nparking lot and that the incriminating nature of the evidence \nwould have been readily apparent. Cherry argues instead that \nhis version of events is the one to be believed—the drugs were \nhidden inside the satchel on the floor of the Mercedes where \nthe agents could not have seen them and the agents’ reports \nto the contrary were inconsistent and thus unbelievable. We \ncan make short shrift of this argument. “A district court’s \ncredibility assessment based on live testimony will not be dis‐\nturbed unless it is completely without foundation.” Freeman, \n691 F.3d at 900 (internal citations omitted). \n Even if we were to perseverate on the inconsistencies in \nthe agents’ testimony, none makes it impossible that the \ndrugs were in plain view. At the suppression hearing, Agent \nO’Reilly testified that Cherry “ran across the parking spot to \nhis vehicle” and opened the drivers’ side door, and had his \nhand and arm inside the car when he was arrested. 11/27/12 \n\f20 No. 17‐3018 \n\nTr. at 76–77, 95 (R. 58). Agent Brazao testified that although \nhe did not see who opened the door to the SUV, after he se‐\ncured the informant, he walked back to the SUV one minute \nafter the agents moved in to arrest Cherry, noticed the doors \nwere open, and saw a black satchel and drugs through the \nopen door. Id. at 14, 35–36, 48–49. Agent Crawford testified \nthat he did not see who initially opened the door, but when \nhe arrived at the SUV, the other agents had already arrested \nCherry and he was on the ground and the door was open. Id. \nat 53–54, 56–61, 65–66. Crawford looked into the SUV to make \ncertain there were no other people in the SUV who might be \na threat to the agents and saw the satchel and drugs in plain \nview. Id. Those agents testified consistently at trial. Tr. 6/28/16 \na.m. at 193–202, 242–43 (R. 184); Tr. 6/28/16 p.m. at 296, 307–\n08, 310–11 (R. 179). Cherry points accusatorily to Chicago po‐\nlice officer Gamboa’s testimony. Officer Gamboa did not tes‐\ntify at the suppression hearing, but he did testify at trial and \nhis testimony was less clear about the door. He testified that \nCherry “very quickly tried to get into his vehicle,” Tr. 6/28/16 \nat 390, 391 (R. 179) and that he was handcuffed outside of the \nvehicle. Id. at 391. His testimony about whether the door to \nthe SUV was open or closed, however, was a bit equivocal. \nCherry hangs his hat on the fact that Officer Gamboa testified \nat trial that the agents grabbed Cherry before he could open \nhis car. Gamboa’s testimony, however, was not as clear as \nCherry presents it to be: \n Gamboa: He tried to go in the car. I tried not to \n let him go in the car. \n Q. And you grabbed him? \n A. From the shoulders and his arm, yeah. \n\fNo. 17‐3018 21\n\n Q. So he wasn’t in the car at the time that you \n grabbed him? \n A. No. He was trying to get into the car. \n Q. Door was open? \n A. Trying to open it, yeah. \n Q. Oh, so the door—he hadn’t been able to—he \n wasn’t successful in opening the door? \n A. He didn’t get in. If he did open it, I wasn’t pay‐\n ing attention. I was just trying to make sure he \n didn’t get in. \n Q. So you don’t recall whether it was open or \n closed? \n A. It wasnʹt open— he didnʹt get in. Letʹs put it that \n way. He couldn’t get his foot in, so it wasn’t. \n Q. Okay. So you donʹt think it was open? \n A. No. \nId. at 391–92 (emphasis ours). \n None of the testimony gives rise to an irreconcilable dif‐\nference. In fact, none of it is inherently inconsistent. Testi‐\nmony is not incredible as a matter of law \n “only because the witness may have been im‐\n peached by certain discrepancies in [her] story, \n by prior inconsistent statements, or by the exist‐\n ence of a motive to provide evidence favorable \n to the government.” To find a witness’s testi‐\n mony to be incredible as a matter of law, it must \n have been “physically impossible for the wit‐\n ness to have observed that which he claims \n\f22 No. 17‐3018 \n\n occurred, or impossible under the laws of na‐\n ture for the occurrence to have taken place at \n all.” \nContreras, 820 F.3d at 264 (citing Freeman, 691 F.3d at 900 and \nUnited States v. Taylor, 701 F.3d 1166, 1174 (7th Cir.2012)). \n The district court certainly did not err by accepting the tes‐\ntimony of the three agents who were clear on the matter that \nthe door was open allowing the agents to view the drugs in \nplain view on the seat. This was particularly true after the \nsuppression hearing when the district court had only the tes‐\ntimony of Agents Brazao, Crawford and O’Reilly to consider. \nBut this was also true even when the court reviewed the post‐\ntrial motion for acquittal. We cannot say that no reasonable \njury could have concluded that the door was open and the \ndrugs in plain view. We see no reason to disturb the credibil‐\nity and factual findings of the district court on the motion to \nsuppress and certainly no reason to upset the jury’s conclu‐\nsion. \n In any event, even if the door to the Mercedes was closed, \nthere were two other avenues to admit the evidence. First, the \nagents were entitled to open the door to conduct a limited \nprotective sweep in case there were other occupants who \nwere not visible through the tinted windows or hiding in the \nrear seat. Traffic stops are dangerous for officers and the “le‐\ngitimate and weighty” interest in officer safety allows officers \nto perform protective searches and frisks of other passengers. \nArizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331 (2009). \n And finally, the district court was correct to hold, in the \nalternative, that the drugs were admissible under the inevita‐\nble discovery doctrine. As the Supreme Court has held, “[i]f \n\fNo. 17‐3018 23\n\nthe prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evi‐\ndence that the information ultimately or inevitably would \nhave been discovered by lawful means … then the deterrence \nrationale has so little basis that the evidence should be re‐\nceived.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Cherry \nhad been arrested, the agents would have removed his car \nfrom the parking lot and it would have been subject to an in‐\nventory search, as is the usual protocol. As we noted before, \nonce a defendant is in custody, “the arresting officers would \nnot have allowed the truck to just sit on the street after” a de‐\nfendant has been taken away. United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d \n935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010). Agent Brazao confirmed this in his \ntestimony at the suppression hearing: “it was determined by \nthe case agents that we were not going to seize the vehicle, \nand we didn’t want to leave it there in an open parking lot so \nthat someone would steal it or damage it. So we wanted to \nsecure it. So we asked Markham police can we secure it in \ntheir parking lot until someone can come pick it up.” \nTr. 11/27/12 at 66 (R. 58). Although Cherry was arrested in a \nprivate parking lot, it seems unlikely that a police department \nwould have allowed a car, potentially filled with drugs, to sit \nin a parking lot indefinitely. The drugs, therefore, inevitably \nwould have been discovered during an inventory search. \n3. Photographic metadata. \n Finally, Cherry’s motion to dismiss the superseding in‐\ndictment and the motion for judgment of acquittal argued \nthat the government violated its affirmative duty to disclose \nevidence favorable to him as required by the Supreme Court \nin Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady requires that the \ngovernment disclose evidence materially favorable to the ac‐\ncused, whether that evidence is impeachment evidence or \n\f24 No. 17‐3018 \n\nexculpatory. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 \n(2006). Upon review of a motion to dismiss which alleges a \nBrady violation, we look only to see if the district court abused \nits discretion. United States v. King, 910 F.3d 320, 326 (7th Cir. \n2018). \n When a defendant alleges that the government failed to \npreserve potentially exculpatory evidence, as Cherry has \ndone here, we apply the standard articulated in Arizona v. \nYoungblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), which states that there is no \ndenial of due process “unless a criminal defendant can show \nbad faith on the part of the police.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. \nSee also United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 407 (7th Cir. \n2011), as amended (Feb. 23, 2011). In short, our precedent de‐\nmands that Cherry demonstrate: “(1) bad faith by the govern‐\nment, (2) that the exculpatory nature of the evidence was ap‐\nparent before its destruction, and (3) that he could not obtain \nthe same evidence anywhere else.” Fletcher, 634 F.3d at 407 \n(citing United States v. Kimoto, 588 F.3d 464, 475 (7th Cir. \n2009)). Bad faith, in turn, requires proof of an “‘official ani‐\nmus’ or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evi‐\ndence,’” and necessarily turns on an official’s subjective \nknowledge that the evidence in question had exculpatory \nvalue at the time it was lost or destroyed.” United States v. Bell, \n819 F.3d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones v. \nMcCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1992)). \n In this case, the first two factors overlap. The district court \ndid not abuse its discretion in determining that the camera \nwas not sold in bad faith, in part because the exculpatory na‐\nture would not have been obvious to the officer at the time the \ncamera was sold. Agent Castaneda sold the camera, which \nwas his personal property, at a garage sale in the summer of \n\fNo. 17‐3018 25\n\n2013, months after the suppression hearing. During the sup‐\npression hearing, the defense counsel asked Castaneda about \nthe order of the photographs but never sought to inspect the \ncamera or its metadata until almost two years after that hear‐\ning. Cherry’s counsel was well aware of the existence of this \ndata, but at no point before or during the suppression hearing \ndid Cherry ask for the camera or the metadata. Nor did \nCherry ask the government to preserve the data. The district \ncourt concluded that “[n]o evidence supports Defendant’s po‐\nsition (nor is it likely) that after the motion to suppress, during \nwhich metadata was not even mentioned, law enforcement \nofficers anticipated that such information would someday be \nrequested and intentionally destroyed it in order to deprive \nDefendant of the evidence.” R. 106 at 4. \n Moreover, as we noted above, the contents of the vehicle, \nincluding the satchel and the drugs within it, would have \nbeen discovered in a lawful inventory search once the agents \ntook custody of the vehicle. This makes any debate about the \norder in which the photographs were taken and whether the \nbag was opened or closed irrelevant. \n III. \n For all the reasons asserted above, we AFFIRM the opinion \nof the district court in all respects.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Deandre Cherry\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3018 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nDEANDRE CHERRY, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:12‐cr‐00415‐1 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Deandre Cherry’s heroin customers \\nhad been complaining about the poor quality of his supply, \\nso on a rainy night in May 2012, he drove into a parking lot in \\nMarkham, Illinois hoping to exchange his inventory of low‐\\nquality heroin for a better supply of cocaine that his supplier \\nhad just picked up at O’Hare airport. Unbeknownst to \\nCherry, however, his supplier had just been arrested picking \\nup the cocaine and, since his hopes were for a better deal for \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nhimself, decided to cooperate and help the Drug Enforcement \\nAgency (DEA) agents ensnare another dealer down the line. \\nInstead of the exchange, Cherry was arrested mid‐deal and \\neventually sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. Cherry \\nappeals, claiming the agents lacked probable cause to arrest \\nhim and search his vehicle. He also claims they failed to pre‐\\nserve exculpatory evidence. We affirm the holding of the dis‐\\ntrict court in all respects. \\n I. \\n In the course of an investigation into cocaine importation \\nfrom Mexico to Chicago, DEA agents arrested a man who was \\nattempting to take possession of twenty‐six kilograms of co‐\\ncaine near Chicago’s O’Hare airport. During an interview af‐\\nter that arrest, the man told Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) \\nagents that he was scheduled to deliver thirteen kilograms of \\ncocaine to a man he called “Mo” that night. “Mo” was later \\nidentified as Cherry. According to the arrested man, Cherry \\nwas a high‐ranking member of the Black P Stone street gang \\nin Chicago who distributed many kilograms of cocaine each \\nmonth. The arrested man agreed to become a confidential in‐\\nformant for the DEA and help the agents execute a sting op‐\\neration. \\n The confidential informant told the agents that, through \\nprior conversations, he and Cherry had agreed that the in‐\\nformant would drive the cocaine to a residence in Harvey, Il‐\\nlinois, that Cherry would meet him there, take custody of the \\ncocaine, and then a few hours later another member of \\nCherry’s organization would pay the informant for the co‐\\ncaine. The confidential informant provided agents with \\nCherry’s cell phone number and a physical description: an \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 3\\n\\naverage height black man, weighing about 200 pounds, and \\ndriving a white Mercedes SUV. \\n The agents formulated a plan for a sting operation in \\nwhich the confidential informant would drive his own car to \\nmeet Cherry with sham cocaine concealed in the car’s drug‐\\nhiding trap compartment. Under the plan, the informant \\nwould signal the agents by stepping out of the car once he and \\nCherry had engaged in a conversation about the exchange of \\nthe cocaine. For their own safety, the agents had the confiden‐\\ntial informant change the meeting spot to a parking lot further \\naway from gang activity. They then outfitted the informant \\nwith hidden audio and video recording equipment, and \\nsearched and inventoried the informant’s vehicle (as is the \\nprotocol for such operations). \\n At around 7:50 p.m. on May 31, 2012, the confidential in‐\\nformant placed a recorded call to Cherry. The informant told \\nCherry that he was approximately ten minutes away from the \\nagreed upon meeting place in Harvey, and Cherry responded \\nthat he would meet him there. A few minutes later the confi‐\\ndential informant, under direction of the agents, called \\nCherry and changed the rendezvous spot to a parking lot in \\nnearby Markham, Illinois. Shortly thereafter, a 2012 white \\nMercedes SUV (later determined to be registered to Cherry) \\nentered the nearly empty parking lot, circled the lot, and then \\nparked next to the confidential informant.1 \\n In a conversation that was recorded, but not monitored in \\nreal time by agents, the confidential informant told Cherry \\n \\n1 The testimony of the agents was inconsistent as to whether Cherry \\n\\nparked directly next to the informant’s car, one parking spot away, or one‐\\nand‐a‐half parking spots away. We find this discrepancy to be immaterial. \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nthat “it” (meaning the thirteen kilograms of cocaine) was in \\nthe “spot”—the hidden compartment in the back of the car. \\nOnce Cherry responded affirmatively that he wanted to see \\nthe drugs, the informant opened the compartment and then \\nexited the car—the pre‐arranged signal to law enforcement. \\nCherry did not handle nor take physical possession of the \\ndrugs. \\n The district court credited the testimony of the DEA \\nagents at the scene who testified that as they approached the \\ncar and Cherry saw them, he dashed the short distance be‐\\ntween the informant’s car and his SUV, opened the front door \\nof the SUV, and attempted to get in. One agent testified that \\nCherry opened the door and “tried to get into the vehicle as \\nwe jumped on him so— … [h]e had his hand and his arm got \\ninto it, but we pulled him back out.” Tr. 11/27/12 at 77 (R. 58). \\n As one agent subdued Cherry and placed him under ar‐\\nrest, a second agent quickly looked into the Mercedes to make \\nsure no one else was hiding in the vehicle. A third agent went \\nthrough the motions of arresting the confidential informant to \\nprotect him as an informant, and after doing so returned to \\nthe Mercedes where, along with two other agents, he saw, \\nthrough the open door, a black messenger‐type satchel with \\nthe flap open and clear plastic bags containing what looked to \\nbe heroin or cocaine. Cherry testified at the suppression hear‐\\ning that the drugs were not, in fact, in plain sight, but that they \\nwere in a black plastic bag contained within the closed and \\nlocked satchel, and the cash was also concealed in a black \\nplastic bag stuffed under the driver’s seat. Later testing con‐\\nfirmed that the satchel held baggies containing 348.1 grams of \\nheroin and 13.7 grams of cocaine base (crack). Agents also \\nfound $19,495 in cash in the SUV. Eventually Chicago Police \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 5\\n\\nOfficer and DEA task force officer Jose Castaneda photo‐\\ngraphed the car and the satchel, taking photographs of the \\nsatchel both open and closed, the cash, and other items in the \\ncar. All of the photographs had the same time stamp—8:48 \\np.m. Officer Castanada testified that he could not recall the \\norder in which he took the photographs and could not say \\nwhether the satchel was open or closed when Cherry was ar‐\\nrested.2 \\n After agents read Cherry his Miranda rights, Cherry \\nagreed to talk to one of the agents and told him that three \\nweeks earlier the confidential informant, who he knew as “Fat \\nMan” fronted him half of a kilogram of heroin for $31,500, but \\nthe heroin was not of good quality and his customers were \\ncomplaining. On the night he was arrested, Cherry was bring‐\\ning approximately 300 grams of heroin back to the confiden‐\\ntial informant to exchange for an equivalent amount of co‐\\ncaine. The government charged Cherry with possession with \\nintent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, in viola‐\\ntion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). \\n Cherry filed two motions to suppress the evidence before \\ntrial. In the first motion he claimed that the agents lacked \\nprobable cause to arrest him. In the second motion he argued \\nthat the agents had no authority to search his bag within the \\nvehicle as the drugs were not in plain view. Following a No‐\\nvember 27, 2012 suppression hearing in which the court heard \\nfrom Cherry and from four DEA agents, the district court \\n\\n \\n2 From this point forward we will refer to all law enforcement officers col‐\\n\\nlectively as “agents” unless specifically noted otherwise. Technically, Of‐\\nficer Castaneda was employed as a City of Chicago police officer and as‐\\nsigned to the DEA as a task force officer. \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nfound that the agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry and \\nthat the subsequent search of the vehicle was lawful as the \\ndrugs were in plain sight. In the alternative, the district court \\nheld that the narcotics inevitably would have been discovered \\nafter Cherry’s arrest, subsequent to an inventory search of his \\nvehicle. \\n Cherry twice moved to reconsider the district court deci‐\\nsion, arguing, on September 8, 2014, that a new Seventh Cir‐\\ncuit decision indicated that a court must have more corrobo‐\\nration from an informant’s tip and that an enhanced version \\nof the recording from the confidential informant’s body cam‐\\nera did not support an agreement by Cherry to accept the co‐\\ncaine. The district court rejected both arguments. \\n Almost two years after the suppression hearing, on \\nSeptember 8, 2014, Cherry filed another motion—this time \\nseeking to inspect the camera used to photograph the satchel \\nand the metadata associated with the photographs in order to \\ndetermine in what order the photographs were taken. \\nBecause Castaneda took all of the photographs of the satchel, \\nboth open and closed, within the same minute (and the time \\nstamp did not reveal seconds), the court and parties could not \\ndetermine in what order the agent took the photographs. \\nCherry’s counsel argued that the data sought would reveal \\nthe order in which the pictures were taken, and thus would \\nuncover the truth about whether the drugs had been in plain \\nsight in an open bag, or not visible in a closed bag when the \\nagents arrived at the vehicle. After a search, however, the \\ngovernment determined that neither the camera nor any \\nmetadata was available because Agent Castaneda took the \\nphotographs with a personal camera which he subsequently \\nsold at a yard sale in the summer of 2013. Cherry filed a \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 7\\n\\nrenewed motion to reconsider, arguing that because the \\ngovernment failed to retain the metadata from the camera, the \\ncourt should be precluded from relying on the photographs \\nin making its probable cause determination. After the trial, \\nCherry also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the \\nbasis of an alleged Brady violation—that is, that the \\ngovernment failed to preserve the exculpatory evidence of the \\nphotographic metadata from the camera. The district court \\nrejected this argument as well, noting that Cherry had failed \\nto demonstrate any bad faith on the government’s part, that \\nthe court had already found that the heroin was in plain view, \\nand inevitably the drugs would have been discovered during \\nan inventory search. \\n The case proceeded to trial where the jury convicted \\nCherry of the single count of the superseding indictment. Af‐\\nter trial, Cherry filed another motion in which he repeated his \\npre‐trial arguments. The district court found no reason to alter \\nits rulings. Cherry was sentenced to 240 months’ imprison‐\\nment, and now appeals. In this court he again argues that his \\narrest was not supported by probable cause and that the dis‐\\ntrict court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained \\nduring the warrantless search of his vehicle. He also argues \\nthat the district court erred by determining that the govern‐\\nment did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) \\nwhen it failed to preserve the potentially exculpatory \\nmetadata associated with the photographs of the evidence. \\n II. \\n1. Probable cause to arrest \\n The main crux of Cherry’s defense is that the DEA agents \\nhad so little reliable information either from the confidential \\n\\f8 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\ninformant or from their own investigations that they could \\nnot have had probable cause either to arrest him or to search \\nhis vehicle. In pursuit of this defense, shortly after his original \\nindictment, Cherry filed a motion to suppress the evidence \\nobtained from his allegedly illegal arrest and the subsequent \\nsearch of his SUV. The district court, however, denied his mo‐\\ntion to suppress. When considering a district court’s denial of \\na motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error \\nand questions of law de novo. United States v. Velazquez, 906 \\nF.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2018). We will not overturn a district \\ncourt’s credibility finding unless we find clear error. United \\nStates v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018). Cherry also \\nfiled post‐trial motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce‐\\ndure 29(a) and (c), repeating these arguments and challenging \\nthe sufficiency of the evidence that the government relied \\nupon to establish probable cause. R. 177, 196. When a defend‐\\nant challenges the sufficiency of the government’s evidence in \\na Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, as Cherry did \\nbelow, we review de novo, viewing the evidence in the light \\nmost favorable to the government. United States v. Cruse, 805 \\nF.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2015). We must affirm if any rational \\ntrier of fact could have found the elements of the crime be‐\\nyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We have often said that “after a \\nguilty verdict, a defendant seeking a judgment of acquittal \\nfaces a ‘nearly insurmountable hurdle.’” United States v. Jones, \\n713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Moore, \\n115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir. 1997)). Yet even under the rela‐\\ntively easier standard of review of the motion to dismiss, we \\nfind the DEA agents had probable cause to arrest Cherry. \\n Cherry’s claims require us to go back to the core of the \\nFourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitu‐\\ntion prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, including \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 9\\n\\narrests made without either a warrant or probable cause. U.S. \\nConst. Amend. IV. A police officer has probable cause to \\nmake an arrest if a reasonable person, knowing all of the facts \\nand circumstances known to this officer, would believe that \\nthe individual in question has committed or is committing a \\ncrime. Seiser v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2014). \\nThere is no checklist that can determine probable cause, par‐\\nticularly when evaluating probable cause based on an inform‐\\nant’s tip. \\n [P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on \\n the assessment of probabilities in particular fac‐\\n tual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, re‐\\n duced to a neat set of legal rules. Informants’ \\n tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes \\n from many different types of persons. … In‐\\n formants’ tips, like all other clues and evidence \\n coming to a policeman on the scene may vary \\n greatly in their value and reliability. Rigid legal \\n rules are ill‐suited to an area of such diversity. \\n One simple rule will not cover every situation. \\nIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (internal citations \\nomitted). And, as the general standards of review remind us, \\nwhen we look at the value and reliability of any particular tip, \\nwe give deference to the district court’s determinations of the \\nfacts (and inferences therefrom) that feed into the finding of \\nprobable cause and review the legal determination of proba‐\\nble cause de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 \\n(1996). When reviewing probable cause in the case where an \\ninformant has provided a tip, therefore, we look at the totality \\nof the circumstances, noting that “a deficiency in one may be \\ncompensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, \\n\\f10 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nby a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia \\nof reliability.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. For this reason, direct \\ncomparisons of indicia of probable cause from one informant \\ncase to the next can be difficult. \\n Despite the inability to reduce the analysis to a neat set of \\nrules, the Supreme Court has mentioned factors that might go \\ninto the decision‐making hopper, while warning against any \\ntemptation to be confined to a rigid test. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234–\\n35. Those factors include an informant’s past reliability, her \\nreputation for honesty, the basis of her knowledge, and her \\npotential motive. Id. In United States v. Searcy, a case which \\ninvolved a warrant application to a magistrate judge, our \\ncourt, like the Supreme Court, stressed the importance of con‐\\nsidering the totality of the circumstances, but noted that a \\nmagistrate might consider: “first, the degree to which the in‐\\nformant acquired knowledge of the events through firsthand \\nobservation; second, the detail and specificity of the infor‐\\nmation provided by the informant; third, the interval between \\nthe date of the events and a police officer’s application for the \\nsearch warrant; and fourth, the extent to which law enforce‐\\nment corroborated the informant’s statements.” United States \\nv. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). \\n Anonymous tips, of course, require more corroboration \\nthen those where the honesty, motivation, and reliability of \\nthe informant can be assessed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244–46; Ad‐\\nams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (“Some tips, com‐\\npletely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant \\nno police response or require further investigation before a \\nforcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.”). The ability \\nof an informant to predict future actions of others with speci‐\\nficity is one indicator of reliability. Gates, 462 U.S. at 245–46. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 11\\n\\nWhen a suspect engages in the behaviors and actions that an \\ninformant has predicted, “[t]hat is exactly the type of corrob‐\\noration that counts.” United States v. Oliva, 385 F.3d 1111, 1114 \\n(7th Cir. 2004). See also, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 \\n(1990) (“What was important was the caller’s ability to predict \\nrespondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated inside \\ninformation.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. Navarro, \\n90 F.3d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1996) (“because the surveillance \\npreceding the stop corroborated the information from the in‐\\nformant, the law enforcement officers had probable cause for \\nboth the arrest and search.”). But see United States v. Lopez, 907 \\nF.3d 472, 483 (7th Cir. 2018) (informant who later disappeared \\nwas not reliable and “[t]he officers’ observations that day [of \\nthe arrest] did not corroborate, even roughly, the informant’s \\nstory.”) Moreover, because the “Fourth Amendment, bal‐\\nances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal se‐\\ncurity against the importance of the governmental interests \\nalleged to justify the intrusion … [a] stop to investigate an al‐\\nready completed crime does not necessarily promote the in‐\\nterest of crime prevention as directly as a stop to investigate \\nsuspected ongoing criminal activity.” United States v. Hensley, \\n469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985). \\n In this case, the informant did not have a long (or any) his‐\\ntory of cooperating with law enforcement, and had not been \\nknown to them for long, but he was not an anonymous tipster. \\nHe had agreed to cooperate with law enforcement after being \\narrested earlier that day picking up a very large quantity of \\ncocaine at the airport—more cocaine than anyone could use \\nfor personal consumption. The confidential informant pro‐\\nvided significant incriminating information including that he \\nhad a pre‐arranged plan to deliver thirteen kilograms of co‐\\ncaine to Cherry. The informant also told the agents that \\n\\f12 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nCherry was a member of the Black P Stone gang in Chicago \\nand regularly trafficked in drugs. The informant then pre‐\\ndicted to the DEA agents that Cherry, an African‐American \\nman, who he knew as “Mo” and who was of average height \\nand weighed about 200 pounds would be arriving at a partic‐\\nular parking lot in Markham, Illinois at a particular time, and \\nwas known to drive a white Mercedes SUV. The phone calls \\nbetween Cherry and the informant corroborated some of this \\ninformation—Cherry appeared to agree to follow the inform‐\\nant’s instructions given in the phone calls. The agents were \\nable to corroborate more of this information when a man, \\nmeeting the informant’s description, arrived in the predicted \\nplace at the predicted time, driving the make, model, and \\ncolor of vehicle that the informant said he would be driving. \\nCherry’s own behavior added to their confidence when he ar‐\\nrived at the agreed‐upon parking lot, circled the parking lot \\nas though assessing the safety and privacy of the situation, \\nand then parked next to the confidential informant’s car. He \\nexited his own car and got into the front passenger seat of the \\ninformant’s car. Law enforcement agents instructed the in‐\\nformant to signal them after having a certain conversation \\nwith Cherry and showing him the sham cocaine in the hidden \\ncompartment. The informant subsequently gave the agents \\nthe signal indicating that he had completed the prerequisite \\ntasks. As the agents announced themselves, Cherry made in‐\\nitial moves to flee either by running toward or taking steps \\ntoward his vehicle. \\n The confidential informant was not an anonymous tipster \\nand continued to cooperate with the agents after his arrest \\nand throughout the sting operation—following all of the \\nagents’ commands and instructions. His earlier arrest meant \\nthat he had motivation to help the agents in order to receive \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 13\\n\\nleniency in his own case. We recognize that this can be a dou‐\\nble edge sword—it gives informants motivation to assist law \\nenforcement officers, but perhaps also gives them motivation \\nto assist law enforcement without regard to the accuracy of \\nthe information. In any event, we have noted that the fact that \\na desire for leniency motivates an informant does not make \\nthe information he provides inherently unreliable. United \\nStates v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2010). And in fact, \\nour court has noted that informant tips that involve inculpa‐\\ntory statements add great weight to an assessment of proba‐\\nble cause to arrest. United States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456, 459 \\n(7th Cir. 2004) (also noting that “several circuits have held that \\nsuch statements are so presumptively reliable that they may \\nsupport a probable cause determination even if uncorrobo‐\\nrated.”). It is true that there is always a risk that an informant \\nis setting up an innocent rival or enemy, but this is less of a \\nrisk when the informant is known and trying to lessen his \\nown sentence. Surely the informant knew that he would not \\nhave engendered the good will of the agents had Cherry ar‐\\nrived and stated on the recorded wire that he had just come \\nto meet the informant for pizza. See United States v. Olson, 408 \\nF.3d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A motive to curry favor, how‐\\never, does not necessarily render an informant unreliable. In‐\\ndeed, even informants ‘attempting to strike a bargain with the \\npolice have a strong incentive to provide accurate and specific \\ninformation rather than false information about a defendant’s \\nillegal activity.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 870 \\n(2002)) (cleaned up). \\n As we have just noted, there is no formula for determining \\nthe requisite degree of reliability of an informant’s tip that \\nwill provide probable cause to arrest. Other cases can give us \\nguide posts. And so, for example, we might look to United \\n\\f14 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nStates v. Freeman, 691 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2012), where the police \\nhad analogous facts from an informant about a similar pre‐\\narranged drug deal. In Freeman, an arrested drug dealer \\nagreed to assist the police in a sting. He telephoned a raspy‐\\nvoiced man who agreed to meet him and sell him crack at a \\nSav‐A‐Lot parking lot. At the agreed upon time, a minivan \\npulled into the nearly empty parking lot and waited by the \\ndoor of the store. The informant called the defendant who re‐\\nsponded that he was waiting by that same door. The van, \\nhowever, suddenly pulled out of the lot. After the van failed \\nto engage a turn signal, police officers initiated a traffic stop \\nand encountered a raspy‐voiced man. A dog alerted to the \\nscent of drugs, giving the police probable cause to search the \\nvan, but when they did, they found no drugs. The officers \\nasked the informant to redial the number he had just used to \\nset up the drug deal, and when he did, the call came through \\non a cell phone located in the armrest on the passenger‐side \\ndoor of the van. The men were arrested and, during a strip \\nsearch at the jail, officers found crack cocaine hidden in the \\nman’s buttocks. The district court found that “[t]he police had \\ncredible information about Freeman’s drug‐trafficking habits \\nfrom the cooperating informants, and his activities just prior \\nto his arrest coincided perfectly with the details of the under‐\\ncover operation, thus supplying probable cause to arrest de‐\\nspite the fact that no drugs were found in the search during \\nthe stop.” Id. at 896. The police watched the silver van pull \\ninto the parking lot, the van matched the description given by \\nan earlier informant, it arrived at the time that the drug dealer \\non the phone said it would, and then the drug dealer on the \\nphone stated that he was parked just outside a Sav‐A‐Lot \\nstore, right where the van was parked. Id. at 899–900. When \\npulled over, the passenger met physical descriptions given by \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 15\\n\\nprevious informants and the phone number used to arrange \\nthe transaction rang a phone located within the silver van. \\nJust as in this case, the police had little independent corrobo‐\\nration other than the informants’ accurate descriptions and \\nhis ability to predict the defendant’s actions. This, the court \\nheld, was sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 896. \\n Cherry argues that this case is not like Freeman, because in \\nFreeman the police were monitoring the calls in real‐time and \\nknew that the defendant had agreed to sell crack to an \\ninformant at the precise location where he then appeared. But \\nthe agents in this case likewise knew that Cherry planned to \\nmeet the informant in the parking lot to participate in a drug \\ndeal. It is true that they did not listen to the phone calls in real \\ntime, but during the first call the officers were present with \\nthe informant. Tr. 11/26/12 at 23 (R. 58 at 23). In Freeman, our \\ncourt noted that “the police on the scene had plenty of \\ninformation to give them probable cause to believe that [the \\ndefendant] had committed the crime,” including the fact that \\nthe events unfolded just as the informant had said they \\nwould—a raspy‐voiced man arrived at a pre‐arranged \\nlocation at the pre‐arranged time in a vehicle he was known \\nto drive.” Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900. Sometimes having a \\ndrug buyer appear on the scene precisely when expected is \\nsufficient to supply probable cause for an arrest. See United \\nStates v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2008). In Colon the \\ncourt upheld the finding of probable cause where one drug \\ndealer telephoned another to tell him that a man would be \\narriving at a particular house in fifteen minutes to purchase \\ndrugs, and the police arrested that man as he left the house. \\nId. In this case the agents had far more: they had a man who \\nmatched the predicted description, arriving in a vehicle that \\nmatched descriptions of the drug dealer’s vehicle, at the \\n\\f16 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\npredicted place and time. They had the informant’s \\nconfirmatory signal, and the defendant’s preliminary attempt \\nto flee.3 \\n It is true that the facts in this case are not the same as they \\nwere in Freeman. No two cases ever are. But Freeman empha‐\\nsizes the value to law enforcement of an informant’s \\nknowledge when the events the informant predicted come to \\nlight in the manner the informant forecasted, particularly \\nwhen those events would not have been known to the general \\npublic. See Freeman, 691 F.3d at 899–900; White, 496 U.S. at 332 \\n(noting that an informant’s predictions gain some degree of \\nreliability when the police see the events unfold as the inform‐\\nant predicted, particularly when it demonstrates inside infor‐\\nmation of which the general public would not be aware). Of \\ncourse, there is always a risk that a confidential informant has \\nulterior motives and is leading law enforcement astray. Prob‐\\nable cause, however, does not require certainty in an inform‐\\nant’s tip, just sufficient probability. Seiser, 762 F.3d at 654. In \\nBrown, 366 F.3d at 460–61, for example, our court found suffi‐\\ncient probable cause to arrest despite a small risk that the in‐\\nformant “had simply spotted [the defendant] while fleeing \\nfrom the bank and then falsely implicated him in the bank \\nrobbery.” Id. at 460–61. In that case a bank robber caught in \\nthe act described the getaway car awaiting him, the exact \\n \\n3 Although flight cannot, on its own, provide probable cause to arrest, the \\n\\ndetermination of probable cause depends on a totality of circumstances \\nthat may take into account “commonsense judgments and inferences \\nabout human behavior,” including unprovoked flight. Illinois v. Wardlow, \\n528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (explaining that a “refusal to cooperate, without \\nmore, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed \\nfor a detention or seizure,” but unprovoked flight could factor into rea‐\\nsonable suspicion) (internal citations omitted). \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 17\\n\\nlocation where it would be waiting, the color and make of the \\ncar, the first letter of the license plate, and a name and descrip‐\\ntion of the driver. Id. at 457. When the police were able to ver‐\\nify these details, “the entirety of [the informant’s] story, in‐\\ncluding his statements about Mr. Brown’s role in the rob‐\\nberies, assumed a high degree of reliability.” Id. at 460. It is \\ntrue that the informant in Brown, like the informant here, \\ncould have been setting up an innocent person. As we noted, \\nhowever, probable cause does not require “hard certainties,” \\nonly probabilities. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (citing United States v. \\nCortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). Cherry argues that the in‐\\nformant’s information in Brown was far more detailed and the \\npolice were able to corroborate more of it. We do not think the \\nlevel of detail in these two cases is materially different in a \\nmanner that affects probable cause. \\n Undoubtedly more certainty is better where a defendant’s \\nliberty is at stake, but we do not require incontrovertible evi‐\\ndence for probable cause. Of course, it would have been better \\nhad the agents done more independent corroboration; had \\nthey been monitoring the conversations in real time (and cer‐\\ntainly the technology was so readily available, even in 2012, \\nthat one wonders why it was not used); and if they had seen \\nCherry take possession of the drugs. Because probable cause \\nis fact specific, it might happen that, in another case, a court \\nwould require this sort of corroboration before finding prob‐\\nable cause. We cannot conclude, however, that in this case \\nthese deficiencies eviscerated probable cause. The DEA \\nagents had multiple pieces of detailed information from an \\ninformant who was implicating himself in a drug deal—infor‐\\nmation corroborated as the predictions came true. This was \\nsufficient probable cause to support the arrest of Cherry. \\n\\f18 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\n2. Probable cause to search the vehicle \\n We also conclude that the DEA agents lawfully searched \\nCherry’s vehicle, including the satchel, and lawfully seized \\nthe narcotics. Like a warrantless arrest, a warrantless search \\nand seizure violates the Fourth Amendment unless it falls \\nwithin certain exceptions to the warrant requirement. Katz v. \\nUnited States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “The ‘plain‐view’ doc‐\\ntrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that \\nwarrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but \\nthis characterization overlooks the important difference be‐\\ntween searches and seizures. If an article is already in plain \\nview, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve \\nany invasion of privacy.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 \\n(1990). Under this plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure \\nis justified if first, the law enforcement officer did not violate \\nthe Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which \\nthe evidence could be plainly viewed; second, the item was in \\nplain view; and third, its incriminating character was imme‐\\ndiately apparent. United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 262 \\n(7th Cir. 2016). \\n After hearing testimony from the agents and Cherry, the \\ncourt concluded that the drugs were in plain view after \\nCherry opened the driver’s side door to his car while trying \\nto flee. We see no reason not to give deference to this credibil‐\\nity and factual finding. As the district court concluded, the \\nagents’ testimony was substantially consistent: they arrested \\nthe defendant after he opened the door to his SUV, and \\nthrough that open door they were able to see the messenger \\nbag with a plastic bag containing a substance the agents rea‐\\nsonably suspected was illegal drugs. The district court con‐\\ncluded that the agents’ version of events, was more likely true \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 19\\n\\nthan Cherry’s, and that any minor discrepancies were imma‐\\nterial. R. 60 at 4–6. The district court did not believe Cherry’s \\ntestimony that he hid the drugs at the bottom of the satchel, \\nbelow several car titles and then placed the satchel on the \\nfloor of the front passenger side of the car. The district court \\nreasoned that a drug dealer coming to exchange drugs would \\nwant to minimize his vulnerability and thus the time for the \\nexchange, and therefore would place the drugs where they \\nwould be readily accessible. As we have noted, “we must ac‐\\ncept the district court’s credibility determination unless the \\nfacts, as testified to by the police officers, were so unbelievable \\nthat no reasonable factfinder could credit them.” Contreras, \\n820 F.3d at 263. \\n Cherry does not seem to dispute the prerequisites to the \\nplain view doctrine—that the agents were lawfully in the \\nparking lot and that the incriminating nature of the evidence \\nwould have been readily apparent. Cherry argues instead that \\nhis version of events is the one to be believed—the drugs were \\nhidden inside the satchel on the floor of the Mercedes where \\nthe agents could not have seen them and the agents’ reports \\nto the contrary were inconsistent and thus unbelievable. We \\ncan make short shrift of this argument. “A district court’s \\ncredibility assessment based on live testimony will not be dis‐\\nturbed unless it is completely without foundation.” Freeman, \\n691 F.3d at 900 (internal citations omitted). \\n Even if we were to perseverate on the inconsistencies in \\nthe agents’ testimony, none makes it impossible that the \\ndrugs were in plain view. At the suppression hearing, Agent \\nO’Reilly testified that Cherry “ran across the parking spot to \\nhis vehicle” and opened the drivers’ side door, and had his \\nhand and arm inside the car when he was arrested. 11/27/12 \\n\\f20 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nTr. at 76–77, 95 (R. 58). Agent Brazao testified that although \\nhe did not see who opened the door to the SUV, after he se‐\\ncured the informant, he walked back to the SUV one minute \\nafter the agents moved in to arrest Cherry, noticed the doors \\nwere open, and saw a black satchel and drugs through the \\nopen door. Id. at 14, 35–36, 48–49. Agent Crawford testified \\nthat he did not see who initially opened the door, but when \\nhe arrived at the SUV, the other agents had already arrested \\nCherry and he was on the ground and the door was open. Id. \\nat 53–54, 56–61, 65–66. Crawford looked into the SUV to make \\ncertain there were no other people in the SUV who might be \\na threat to the agents and saw the satchel and drugs in plain \\nview. Id. Those agents testified consistently at trial. Tr. 6/28/16 \\na.m. at 193–202, 242–43 (R. 184); Tr. 6/28/16 p.m. at 296, 307–\\n08, 310–11 (R. 179). Cherry points accusatorily to Chicago po‐\\nlice officer Gamboa’s testimony. Officer Gamboa did not tes‐\\ntify at the suppression hearing, but he did testify at trial and \\nhis testimony was less clear about the door. He testified that \\nCherry “very quickly tried to get into his vehicle,” Tr. 6/28/16 \\nat 390, 391 (R. 179) and that he was handcuffed outside of the \\nvehicle. Id. at 391. His testimony about whether the door to \\nthe SUV was open or closed, however, was a bit equivocal. \\nCherry hangs his hat on the fact that Officer Gamboa testified \\nat trial that the agents grabbed Cherry before he could open \\nhis car. Gamboa’s testimony, however, was not as clear as \\nCherry presents it to be: \\n Gamboa: He tried to go in the car. I tried not to \\n let him go in the car. \\n Q. And you grabbed him? \\n A. From the shoulders and his arm, yeah. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 21\\n\\n Q. So he wasn’t in the car at the time that you \\n grabbed him? \\n A. No. He was trying to get into the car. \\n Q. Door was open? \\n A. Trying to open it, yeah. \\n Q. Oh, so the door—he hadn’t been able to—he \\n wasn’t successful in opening the door? \\n A. He didn’t get in. If he did open it, I wasn’t pay‐\\n ing attention. I was just trying to make sure he \\n didn’t get in. \\n Q. So you don’t recall whether it was open or \\n closed? \\n A. It wasnʹt open— he didnʹt get in. Letʹs put it that \\n way. He couldn’t get his foot in, so it wasn’t. \\n Q. Okay. So you donʹt think it was open? \\n A. No. \\nId. at 391–92 (emphasis ours). \\n None of the testimony gives rise to an irreconcilable dif‐\\nference. In fact, none of it is inherently inconsistent. Testi‐\\nmony is not incredible as a matter of law \\n “only because the witness may have been im‐\\n peached by certain discrepancies in [her] story, \\n by prior inconsistent statements, or by the exist‐\\n ence of a motive to provide evidence favorable \\n to the government.” To find a witness’s testi‐\\n mony to be incredible as a matter of law, it must \\n have been “physically impossible for the wit‐\\n ness to have observed that which he claims \\n\\f22 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\n occurred, or impossible under the laws of na‐\\n ture for the occurrence to have taken place at \\n all.” \\nContreras, 820 F.3d at 264 (citing Freeman, 691 F.3d at 900 and \\nUnited States v. Taylor, 701 F.3d 1166, 1174 (7th Cir.2012)). \\n The district court certainly did not err by accepting the tes‐\\ntimony of the three agents who were clear on the matter that \\nthe door was open allowing the agents to view the drugs in \\nplain view on the seat. This was particularly true after the \\nsuppression hearing when the district court had only the tes‐\\ntimony of Agents Brazao, Crawford and O’Reilly to consider. \\nBut this was also true even when the court reviewed the post‐\\ntrial motion for acquittal. We cannot say that no reasonable \\njury could have concluded that the door was open and the \\ndrugs in plain view. We see no reason to disturb the credibil‐\\nity and factual findings of the district court on the motion to \\nsuppress and certainly no reason to upset the jury’s conclu‐\\nsion. \\n In any event, even if the door to the Mercedes was closed, \\nthere were two other avenues to admit the evidence. First, the \\nagents were entitled to open the door to conduct a limited \\nprotective sweep in case there were other occupants who \\nwere not visible through the tinted windows or hiding in the \\nrear seat. Traffic stops are dangerous for officers and the “le‐\\ngitimate and weighty” interest in officer safety allows officers \\nto perform protective searches and frisks of other passengers. \\nArizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331 (2009). \\n And finally, the district court was correct to hold, in the \\nalternative, that the drugs were admissible under the inevita‐\\nble discovery doctrine. As the Supreme Court has held, “[i]f \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 23\\n\\nthe prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evi‐\\ndence that the information ultimately or inevitably would \\nhave been discovered by lawful means … then the deterrence \\nrationale has so little basis that the evidence should be re‐\\nceived.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Once Cherry \\nhad been arrested, the agents would have removed his car \\nfrom the parking lot and it would have been subject to an in‐\\nventory search, as is the usual protocol. As we noted before, \\nonce a defendant is in custody, “the arresting officers would \\nnot have allowed the truck to just sit on the street after” a de‐\\nfendant has been taken away. United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d \\n935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010). Agent Brazao confirmed this in his \\ntestimony at the suppression hearing: “it was determined by \\nthe case agents that we were not going to seize the vehicle, \\nand we didn’t want to leave it there in an open parking lot so \\nthat someone would steal it or damage it. So we wanted to \\nsecure it. So we asked Markham police can we secure it in \\ntheir parking lot until someone can come pick it up.” \\nTr. 11/27/12 at 66 (R. 58). Although Cherry was arrested in a \\nprivate parking lot, it seems unlikely that a police department \\nwould have allowed a car, potentially filled with drugs, to sit \\nin a parking lot indefinitely. The drugs, therefore, inevitably \\nwould have been discovered during an inventory search. \\n3. Photographic metadata. \\n Finally, Cherry’s motion to dismiss the superseding in‐\\ndictment and the motion for judgment of acquittal argued \\nthat the government violated its affirmative duty to disclose \\nevidence favorable to him as required by the Supreme Court \\nin Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady requires that the \\ngovernment disclose evidence materially favorable to the ac‐\\ncused, whether that evidence is impeachment evidence or \\n\\f24 No. 17‐3018 \\n\\nexculpatory. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 \\n(2006). Upon review of a motion to dismiss which alleges a \\nBrady violation, we look only to see if the district court abused \\nits discretion. United States v. King, 910 F.3d 320, 326 (7th Cir. \\n2018). \\n When a defendant alleges that the government failed to \\npreserve potentially exculpatory evidence, as Cherry has \\ndone here, we apply the standard articulated in Arizona v. \\nYoungblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), which states that there is no \\ndenial of due process “unless a criminal defendant can show \\nbad faith on the part of the police.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. \\nSee also United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 407 (7th Cir. \\n2011), as amended (Feb. 23, 2011). In short, our precedent de‐\\nmands that Cherry demonstrate: “(1) bad faith by the govern‐\\nment, (2) that the exculpatory nature of the evidence was ap‐\\nparent before its destruction, and (3) that he could not obtain \\nthe same evidence anywhere else.” Fletcher, 634 F.3d at 407 \\n(citing United States v. Kimoto, 588 F.3d 464, 475 (7th Cir. \\n2009)). Bad faith, in turn, requires proof of an “‘official ani‐\\nmus’ or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evi‐\\ndence,’” and necessarily turns on an official’s subjective \\nknowledge that the evidence in question had exculpatory \\nvalue at the time it was lost or destroyed.” United States v. Bell, \\n819 F.3d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones v. \\nMcCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1992)). \\n In this case, the first two factors overlap. The district court \\ndid not abuse its discretion in determining that the camera \\nwas not sold in bad faith, in part because the exculpatory na‐\\nture would not have been obvious to the officer at the time the \\ncamera was sold. Agent Castaneda sold the camera, which \\nwas his personal property, at a garage sale in the summer of \\n\\fNo. 17‐3018 25\\n\\n2013, months after the suppression hearing. During the sup‐\\npression hearing, the defense counsel asked Castaneda about \\nthe order of the photographs but never sought to inspect the \\ncamera or its metadata until almost two years after that hear‐\\ning. Cherry’s counsel was well aware of the existence of this \\ndata, but at no point before or during the suppression hearing \\ndid Cherry ask for the camera or the metadata. Nor did \\nCherry ask the government to preserve the data. The district \\ncourt concluded that “[n]o evidence supports Defendant’s po‐\\nsition (nor is it likely) that after the motion to suppress, during \\nwhich metadata was not even mentioned, law enforcement \\nofficers anticipated that such information would someday be \\nrequested and intentionally destroyed it in order to deprive \\nDefendant of the evidence.” R. 106 at 4. \\n Moreover, as we noted above, the contents of the vehicle, \\nincluding the satchel and the drugs within it, would have \\nbeen discovered in a lawful inventory search once the agents \\ntook custody of the vehicle. This makes any debate about the \\norder in which the photographs were taken and whether the \\nbag was opened or closed irrelevant. \\n III. \\n For all the reasons asserted above, we AFFIRM the opinion \\nof the district court in all respects.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1696,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607956,"string":"4,607,956"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"BROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee, v. LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA CONSTRUCTION & GENERAL LABORERS LOCAL 100, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Brock Indus. Servs., LLC v. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. Constr."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2597 & 17-2688"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Sykes, Barrett\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\nBROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant/\\n Cross-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nLABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION\\nOF NORTH AMERICA CONSTRUCTION\\n& GENERAL LABORERS LOCAL 100,\\n Defendant-Appellee/\\n Cross-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 16-CV-780-NJR-DGW — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Brock Industrial Services, LLC, is an\\nIllinois-based provider of industrial services, including\\nscaffolding, painting, insulation, and shoring. In January\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\n2016 it entered into a labor agreement with Local 100 of the\\nLaborers’ International Union 1 (“the Laborers Union” or\\n“the Laborers”). The agreement requires arbitration of\\ngrievances and establishes a bipartite arbitration procedure\\nfor resolving most disputes. But work-jurisdiction dis-\\nputes—disputes over whether the Laborers or another union\\nis entitled to perform work—are instead subject to a tripar-\\ntite arbitration procedure involving the company and the\\ncontending unions.\\n Sometime prior to signing the agreement, Brock hired the\\nLaborers to perform scaffolding work at a chemical plant.\\nOn the day after the agreement became effective, Brock\\ninformed the Laborers Union that it was reassigning the\\nwork to the International Brotherhood of Carpenters (“the\\nCarpenters Union” or “the Carpenters”). Invoking the\\nbipartite arbitration procedure, the Laborers Union filed a\\ngrievance with the Grievance Review Subcommittee of the\\nNational Maintenance Agreement Policy Committee (“the\\nSubcommittee”). Brock responded that the grievance in-\\nvolved a work-jurisdiction dispute subject to tripartite\\narbitration and therefore the Subcommittee lacked authority\\nto arbitrate the matter. The Subcommittee disagreed and\\nsustained the grievance.\\n Brock filed suit under section 301 of the Labor Manage-\\nment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking to vacate the\\nSubcommittee’s decision. The Laborers Union responded\\nwith a request to enforce the decision. After a flurry of\\nmotions on both sides, the district judge determined that the\\n\\n\\n1 Formally, the Laborers’ International Union of North America\\nConstruction & General Laborers Local 100.\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 3\\n\\nSubcommittee had authority to resolve the dispute and\\nissued an order enforcing its decision. Brock appealed.\\nUnder the mistaken impression that the judge had denied\\nthe motion to enforce, the Laborers Union also appealed.\\n We reverse. At bottom, this grievance concerns which of\\ntwo unions was entitled to perform the scaffolding work at\\nthe chemical plant. That’s a jurisdictional dispute, and the\\nlabor agreement calls for tripartite arbitration of jurisdiction-\\nal disputes. Accordingly, the Subcommittee had no authority\\nover the matter and its decision must be vacated.\\n I. Background\\n Brock and the Laborers Union entered into a labor\\nagreement effective January 7, 2016. The agreement pro-\\nvides: “Except for jurisdictional disputes and those involv-\\ning general wage rates, all disputes and grievances arising\\nout of work performed under this [a]greement … shall be\\nresolved” through the procedures outlined in Article VI.\\nArticle VI requires Brock and the Laborers to submit unre-\\nsolved grievances to the Subcommittee for arbitration. We\\nrefer to this grievance process as bipartite arbitration.\\n Article I of the agreement provides a separate procedure\\nfor resolving work-jurisdiction disputes. A work-jurisdiction\\ndispute is “a dispute between two or more groups of em-\\nployees over which is entitled to do certain work for an\\nemployer.” Hutter Constr. Co. v. Int’l Union of Operating\\nEng’rs, Local 139, 862 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1988) (quotation\\nmarks omitted). Under Article I of the labor contract, unre-\\nsolved work-jurisdiction disputes must be submitted to a\\nPermanent Umpire. Because this process typically involves\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nthree parties—the employer plus the two competing un-\\nions—we refer to it as tripartite arbitration.\\n Prior to signing the agreement, Brock assigned several\\nLaborers to construct scaffolding at the Afton Chemical\\nPlant. On January 8, 2016—the day after the operative labor\\nagreement became effective—Brock notified the Laborers\\nUnion that its services were no longer required because the\\nproject was assigned to the Carpenters Union. On January 11\\nthe Laborers Union sent a letter to the National Maintenance\\nAgreement Policy Committee claiming that Brock violated\\nthe agreement when it reassigned the work to the Carpen-\\nters. On January 21 the Laborers notified the Carpenters\\nUnion of a work-jurisdiction dispute between the unions\\nover the project.\\n Invoking the bipartite arbitration procedure specified in\\nArticle VI, the Laborers filed a grievance with the Subcom-\\nmittee complaining that Brock violated the agreement by\\nterminating the Laborers and assigning work to the Carpen-\\nters. The grievance requested reinstatement and backpay as\\na remedy. Brock responded that the Subcommittee had no\\narbitral authority over the grievance because it constituted a\\nwork-jurisdiction dispute and requested that the grievance\\nbe dismissed or denied.\\n The Subcommittee denied Brock’s request and sustained\\nthe grievance, finding that Brock violated Article I, Section 5\\nof the labor contract. That provisions states: “During the\\nexistence of the [a]greement, there shall be no strikes, lock-\\nouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising out of any juris-\\ndictional dispute. Work will continue as originally assigned,\\npending resolution of the dispute.” The Subcommittee\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 5\\n\\ndetermined that Brock violated this section by making “a\\nchange of assignment.”\\n Brock brought this suit under section 301 seeking to va-\\ncate the arbitral award as void because the grievance consti-\\ntuted a jurisdictional dispute and thus was outside the\\nSubcommittee’s arbitral authority. A bevy of motions fol-\\nlowed. The Laborers moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)\\nof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Brock moved to\\nvacate the award; the Laborers moved to “dismiss” the\\nmotion to vacate on timeliness grounds; and the Laborers\\nmoved to enforce the award.\\n The judge denied all four motions. She acknowledged\\nthat the Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority if the griev-\\nance concerned a jurisdictional dispute. She concluded,\\nhowever, that if the grievance concerned both a jurisdictional\\ndispute and a wrongful-termination claim, then the Sub-\\ncommittee could properly adjudicate the latter dispute. But a\\nmaterial issue of fact—namely, whether the Laborers were\\never assigned the project to begin with—prevented the judge\\nfrom resolving the case at that time.\\n Brock sought reconsideration, and the Laborers moved\\nfor summary judgment. The judge denied reconsideration\\nand entered summary judgment for the Laborers Union,\\nruling that Brock had indeed assigned the scaffolding work\\nto the Laborers and the Subcommittee’s decision is enforcea-\\nble. Both sides appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a summary judgment de novo. Hooper v. Proc-\\ntor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2015). We\\nbegin by addressing the Laborers’ cross-appeal, which seeks\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nreview of the judge’s initial order denying the motion to\\nenforce the arbitral award. The cross-appeal rests on the\\nmistaken assumption that the judge never issued an order\\nenforcing the award. But the summary-judgment order\\nclearly states that the “award is enforceable as a matter of\\nlaw.” Because the Laborers prevailed, we dismiss the cross-\\nappeal.\\n With that out of the way, we turn to the main event:\\nBrock’s argument that the Subcommittee lacked the authori-\\nty to arbitrate the grievance because it raised a work-\\njurisdiction dispute. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract[,]\\nand a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any\\ndispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” AT&T Techs.,\\nInc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)\\n(quotation marks omitted). “[T]he question of arbitrability—\\nwhether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for\\nthe parties to arbitrate the particular grievance—is undenia-\\nbly an issue for judicial determination.” Id. at 649.\\n By signing the agreement, Brock agreed to submit some\\ndisputes—but not all—to arbitration by the Subcommittee.\\nArticle VI of the agreement creates a bipartite arbitration\\nprocedure and vests the Subcommittee with arbitral authori-\\nty. Subject to two exceptions, the bilateral procedure applies\\nto “all disputes and grievances arising out of work per-\\nformed under [the] [a]greement involving the meaning or\\ninterpretation of any provision in [the] [a]greement.” Juris-\\ndictional disputes are one of the exceptions. Article I creates\\na separate, tripartite arbitration procedure to resolve work-\\njurisdiction disputes and vests arbitral authority in the\\nPermanent Umpire rather than the Subcommittee. Accord-\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 7\\n\\ningly, the Subcommittee exceeded its authority if the griev-\\nance raised a work-jurisdiction dispute.\\n The gravamen of the grievance is work jurisdiction. The\\ngrievance and its supporting documents all complain that\\nBrock improperly assigned work to the Carpenters instead\\nof the Laborers. The Grievance Form Fact Sheet demanded\\nthat Brock “make proper assignment of work to the Labor-\\ners’ Union,” “reinstate the Laborers,” and compensate\\nworkers for “lost wages and benefits.” Indeed, the Subcom-\\nmittee sustained the grievance because Brock “made a\\nchange of assignment.” In other words, the Laborers com-\\nplained (and the Subcommittee found) that Brock assigned\\nwork to the wrong union. That’s the definition of a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute. The Subcommittee therefore had no authority\\nto arbitrate the grievance. The contract required tripartite\\narbitration in which the competing unions and the employer\\ncould be heard.\\n Our previous decisions amply support this conclusion. In\\nLocal 416, Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n v. Helgesteel\\nCorp., 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1974), Helgesteel Corporation\\n(a contractor) and the Sheet Metal Workers were parties to a\\nlabor contract that provided for tripartite arbitration of\\njurisdictional disputes in Article XI and bipartite arbitration\\nfor almost all others in Article X. Id. at 1054–56. A dispute\\narose when Helgesteel reassigned work to an Ironworkers’\\nunion. The Sheet Metal Workers filed a grievance under\\nArticle X complaining about this reassignment; the arbitrator\\nsustained the grievance and awarded damages. When\\nHelgesteel refused to pay, the Sheet Metal Workers filed suit\\nin federal court to enforce the award. Helgesteel told the\\nIronworkers it would likely need to give the work back to\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nthe Sheet Metal Workers, so the Ironworkers filed their own\\ngrievance, which the arbitrator sustained. Id. The Ironwork-\\ners then filed suit in federal court seeking to compel the\\nSheet Metal Workers and Helgesteel to submit the entire\\ncontroversy to tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1055.\\n We held that the entire controversy constituted a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute requiring tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1057. The\\nSheet Metal Workers insisted that the agreement permitted\\nthem to seek damages under the bipartite process of\\nArticle X even if tripartite arbitration was also required\\nunder Article XI. Id. at 1058. We rejected that argument,\\nexplaining that such an interpretation of the contract “would\\nallow inconsistent final arbitration awards; the national joint\\nboard may say that the work should be assigned to the\\nironworkers while the local joint board has awarded damag-\\nes to the sheet metal workers.” Id.\\n Likewise, in William Charles Construction Co. v Teamsters\\nLocal Union 627, 827 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2016), we confronted a\\nsimilar agreement featuring bifurcated arbitration proce-\\ndures. The William Charles Construction Company per-\\nformed work on a highway expansion for the State of\\nIllinois. Id. at 674. During construction, a dispute broke out\\nbetween the Teamsters and the International Union of\\nOperating Engineers Local 649 over who was entitled to\\noperate the trucks required for the excavation work. The\\nTeamsters initiated tripartite arbitration, arguing that the\\nwork had been improperly assigned to the engineers. The\\narbitrator ruled in the Teamsters’ favor but awarded no\\nbackpay or damages. Id. The Teamsters then filed a second\\ngrievance under bipartite arbitration, complaining again of\\nthe improper assignment but this time seeking damages. Id.\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 9\\n\\nat 676. The second arbitrator also sided with the Teamsters\\nand awarded lost wages and benefits. Id. at 677. The compa-\\nny filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the second\\naward was void. Id. We agreed that the second grievance\\nwas not arbitrable because it was jurisdictional in nature and\\ntherefore not subject to bipartite arbitration. Id.\\n So too here. The Laborers Union complains that Brock\\nimproperly reassigned the project to another union, so the\\ngrievance must be resolved in tripartite arbitration. Allow-\\ning the Laborers to seek damages through bipartite arbitra-\\ntion could produce “inconsistent final arbitration awards,”\\nHelgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1058, so the Subcommittee lacked\\nauthority and its award must be vacated.\\n This conclusion accords with the reasoning of cases in\\nwhich we declined to find a jurisdictional dispute reserved\\nfor tripartite arbitration. For instance, in Hutter v. Local 139,\\n862 F.2d 641, Hutter (a general contractor) had a labor\\nagreement with the International Union of Operating Engi-\\nneers (“the Operators” or “the Operators Union”). Id. at 642.\\nThe agreement gave the Operators exclusive jurisdiction\\nover most forklift jobs in Wisconsin; it also provided that\\nwork could be subcontracted only to signatories to the\\nagreement. When Hutter was awarded work on a prison\\ncontract in Oshkosh, it subcontracted the masonry work to\\nBDI, which was not a signatory to the agreement. BDI\\nthereafter assigned forklift duties to the Wisconsin Laborers\\nDistrict Council and Laborers Local Union No. 1086 rather\\nthan the Operators. The Operators Union submitted a griev-\\nance to bipartite arbitration, complaining that Hutter had\\nimproperly subcontracted the work to a nonsignatory. Id.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nThe arbitrator agreed and ordered backpay, and the Opera-\\ntors filed suit in federal court to enforce the award. Id. at 643.\\n Hutter argued that the Operators’ grievance was really a\\n“disguised jurisdictional dispute” subject to tripartite arbi-\\ntration and that the bipartite arbitration award should be\\nvacated. Id. We disagreed, concluding that the subcontracting\\ngrievance “was a distinct non-jurisdictional claim” because it\\ndid not turn on who was ultimately assigned the work. Id. at\\n644. For example, BDI could have assigned the work to the\\nOperators, and in that case there would have been no juris-\\ndictional dispute even though Hutter violated the subcon-\\ntracting provision. Id. Because the subcontracting dispute\\nwas nonjurisdictional, the arbitrator had the authority to\\nresolve the grievance under the bipartite procedure. Id. at\\n645.\\n Although Hutter held that the dispute in question was\\nnonjurisdictional, its reasoning supports the opposite con-\\nclusion here. We emphasized in Hutter that the subcontract-\\ning grievance “arose independently” of the work\\nassignment; its validity was “not dependent upon the identi-\\nty of the party that ultimately performed the forklift work.”\\nId. at 644. In contrast, here the Laborers’ grievance is entirely\\ndependent on the work assignment. Under the reasoning in\\nHutter, the Laborers’ grievance is really just a “disguised\\njurisdictional dispute.” Id. at 643.\\n Our conclusion finds additional support in Miron Con-\\nstruction Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers,\\nLocal 139, 44 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1995). The facts there are\\nstrikingly similar to those in Hutter. Miron (a general con-\\ntractor) signed a labor agreement granting the Operators\\nUnion exclusive jurisdiction over forklift jobs in Wisconsin\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 11\\n\\nand stipulated that work could be subcontracted only to\\nsignatories to the agreement. Id. A dispute arose when\\nMiron twice subcontracted work to nonsignatories, each of\\nwhich assigned forklifting work to the Wisconsin Laborers\\nDistrict Council. Id. at 561. The Operators filed grievances\\nunder the bipartite procedure complaining that Miron had\\nviolated the subcontracting provision. The Laborers District\\nCouncil filed its own grievances to resolve the proper work\\nassignment and threatened to strike. This threat got the\\nNLRB involved, which held a § 10(k) hearing to resolve the\\njurisdictional dispute. The Board eventually awarded the\\nfirst project to the Laborers District Council. Id.\\n Miron filed a complaint in federal court seeking tripartite\\narbitration. Id. at 561–62. We affirmed the district court’s\\ndenial of that relief. While the Laborers’ grievance concerned\\nwork jurisdiction, the Operators’ grievance alleged only a\\nsubcontracting violation. And under Hutter a subcontracting\\ndispute is distinct and independent of a jurisdictional dis-\\npute. Id. In a subcontracting grievance, “[t]he identity of the\\nemployees who ultimately perform the work is irrelevant.”\\nId. at 566 (citing Hutter, 862 F.2d at 644). A subcontracting\\ngrievance does not conflict with a work-jurisdiction award\\nso long as there is no “demand that the subcontractor reas-\\nsign the work … . Since the subcontractor has complete\\ncontrol over which union actually performs the work,\\nmaintenance of an action against the general contractor\\ncannot be viewed as a veiled attempt to force a reassignment\\nof the work.” Id.\\n Miron too is factually distinguishable from this case,\\nthough like Hutter its reasoning supports our conclusion. In\\nMiron we focused on whether the bipartite proceeding could\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\ngenerate an award that conflicts with the resolution of a\\njurisdictional dispute. A bipartite arbitration award is valid\\nso long as the grievance “cannot be viewed as a veiled\\nattempt to force a reassignment of the work.” Id. Here the\\nLaborers explicitly attempted to force reassignment—the\\nunion demanded that Brock “make [a] proper assignment of\\nwork [back] to the Laborers’ Union.”\\n One case cuts in the opposite direction. In Alberici–Eby v.\\nLocal 520, International Union of Operating Engineers, 992 F.2d\\n727 (7th Cir. 1993), we affirmed awards entered in bipartite\\narbitration for improper work assignment. Alberici–Eby (a\\ngeneral contractor) hired six unions to construct a lock on\\nthe Mississippi River in Illinois. Id. at 728. The unions made\\ncompeting claims to each part of the work, and Alberici–Eby\\ndid its best to divide the work fairly. Id. at 729. After the\\nproject was completed, two unions—the Engineers and the\\nLaborers—filed separate grievances under their respective\\ncollective-bargaining agreements alleging that Alberici–Eby\\nhad improperly assigned their work to other unions.\\nAlberici–Eby responded that the grievances raised jurisdic-\\ntional disputes, so the arbitrators had no authority to hear\\nthem. Id. One arbitrator heard the Engineers’ grievance and\\ndecided in their favor, and a second arbitrator heard the\\nLaborers’ grievance and refused to stay the proceeding.\\nAlberici–Eby then filed suit in federal court asking that the\\njudge set aside the first arbitrator’s award, stay the proceed-\\ning before the second arbitrator, and require any unions\\nseeking relief to submit to multiparty arbitration to settle the\\njurisdictional dispute. Id.\\n We denied Alberici–Eby’s request. We first noted that\\nAlberici–Eby failed to timely invoke the multiparty arbitra-\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 13\\n\\ntion mechanism even though it “was on notice that it faced\\nthe strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards.” Id. at\\n730. We then determined that the first arbitrator had authori-\\nty to resolve the Engineers’ grievance. Id. at 733. The relevant\\nlabor agreement created a separate arbitration process for\\njurisdictional disputes, but we noted that the agreement\\n“[did] not tell us whether the subject of the grievance … was\\nor was not a jurisdictional dispute.” Id. However, the agree-\\nment provided that “any difference or dispute arising out of\\nthe interpretation or application of any of the provisions\\ncontained in th[e] [a]greement” was to be decided by an\\narbitrator. Id. The agreement further provided that the\\nEngineers had exclusive jurisdiction over the relevant work,\\nso we concluded that the dispute “ar[ose] out of the interpre-\\ntation or application of the [agreement].” Id. We also refused\\nto stay the proceedings before the second arbitrator, again\\nemphasizing that Alberici–Eby failed to timely invoke\\nmultiparty arbitration, so it “would be manifestly unjust to\\ndeny the Laborers an opportunity to be heard by way of\\nbipartite arbitration.” Id. at 734.\\n Alberici–Eby is hard to reconcile with Helgesteel, Hutter,\\nMiron, and William Charles. The grievances concerned work-\\nassignment disputes, but we permitted bipartite arbitration\\nto proceed. We based our decision in part on the language in\\nthe agreement between Alberici–Eby and the Engineers, but\\nthat language cannot be meaningfully distinguished from\\nvirtually identical language in Helgesteel. Compare Alberici–\\nEby, 992 F.2d at 733 (providing for bipartite arbitration over\\n“any difference or dispute arising out of the interpretation or\\napplication of any of the provisions contained in th[e]\\n[a]greement”) with Helgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1055 (providing for\\nbipartite arbitration over any “[g]rievance of the [e]mployer\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nor the [u]nion[] arising out of interpretation or enforcement\\nof th[e] [a]greement”).\\n Because Alberici–Eby is an obvious outlier, we limit the\\ncase to its peculiar facts. We emphasized there that the\\ncontractor waited too long to request multiparty arbitration.\\nThat defeated the purpose of the multiparty arbitration\\nprocess, “which was carefully designed to produce a speedy\\nresolution of jurisdictional disputes in order to permit work\\nto be properly allocated before that work is performed.”\\nAlberici–Eby, 992 F.2d at 731. The mistake was inexcusable in\\nlight of “the strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards”\\nwhen the unions filed their separate grievances. Id. at 730.\\nMoreover, the project had already been completed. As a\\nconsequence the multiparty arbitration would have done\\nlittle good: “[T]he work ha[d] already been performed,” and\\nthe multiparty procedure had “no authority to award dam-\\nages for misassigned work.” Id. at 730 n.2. We specifically\\nhighlighted these facts when we refused to stay arbitration\\nof the Laborers’ grievance. Id. at 734 (“In … light of Alberici–\\nEby’s failure to move in a timely fashion to achieve multi-\\nparty arbitration (assuming that such was available), it\\nwould be manifestly unjust to deny the Laborers an oppor-\\ntunity to be heard by way of bipartite arbitration.”). None of\\nthese circumstances are present here. The Laborers Union\\nnotified the Carpenters of the work-jurisdiction dispute ten\\ndays after it filed its bipartite grievance. And Brock chal-\\nlenged the propriety of bipartite arbitration at the earliest\\nopportunity.\\n The district judge offered two reasons to affirm the arbi-\\ntral award but neither holds up under the caselaw we’ve just\\nsurveyed. First, the judge reasoned that because several\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 15\\n\\nLaborers were already working on the project, removing\\nthose workers from the job gave rise to a wrongful-\\ntermination claim distinct from the jurisdictional dispute.\\nNot so. The Laborers were terminated because the work was\\nassigned to the Carpenters; a finding of wrongful termina-\\ntion necessarily implies that the work was misassigned. That\\nputs this grievance squarely on the work-jurisdiction side of\\nthe line. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration.\\n Second, the judge held that the grievance arose out of\\nArticle I, Section 5, which provides a separate contractual\\nbasis for bipartite arbitrability. The provision in question\\nstates: “During the existence of the [a]greement, there shall\\nbe no strikes, lockouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising\\nout of any jurisdictional dispute. Work will continue as\\noriginally assigned, pending resolution of the dispute.”\\n Grievances arising under this provision are indeed sub-\\nject to bipartite arbitration. Like the subcontracting provi-\\nsions in Hutter and Miron, a dispute under this provision can\\nbe separately arbitrated without interfering with a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute. Suppose for a moment that the Laborers and\\nthe Carpenters submitted a jurisdictional dispute to tripartite\\narbitration, and to pressure Brock into taking its side, the\\nLaborers Union called a strike, prompting Brock to file a\\ngrievance under Section 5. It would be completely consistent\\nfor one arbitrator to award the work assignment to the\\nLaborers and another to sanction the Laborers for initiating a\\nstrike. Neither award would call the other into question.\\n But bipartite arbitration was not appropriate just because\\nthe Laborers labeled the grievance as one arising under\\nSection 5. We look instead to the substance of the grievance.\\nAnd in substance, this grievance is a work-jurisdiction\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\ndispute. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration, and\\nthe Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority.\\n REVERSED; CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385209/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607956/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: BROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee, v. LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA CONSTRUCTION & GENERAL LABORERS LOCAL 100, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\nBROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant/\n Cross-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nLABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION\nOF NORTH AMERICA CONSTRUCTION\n& GENERAL LABORERS LOCAL 100,\n Defendant-Appellee/\n Cross-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Illinois.\n No. 16-CV-780-NJR-DGW — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019\n ____________________\n\n\n Before BAUER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Brock Industrial Services, LLC, is an\nIllinois-based provider of industrial services, including\nscaffolding, painting, insulation, and shoring. In January\n\f2 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\n2016 it entered into a labor agreement with Local 100 of the\nLaborers’ International Union 1 (“the Laborers Union” or\n“the Laborers”). The agreement requires arbitration of\ngrievances and establishes a bipartite arbitration procedure\nfor resolving most disputes. But work-jurisdiction dis-\nputes—disputes over whether the Laborers or another union\nis entitled to perform work—are instead subject to a tripar-\ntite arbitration procedure involving the company and the\ncontending unions.\n Sometime prior to signing the agreement, Brock hired the\nLaborers to perform scaffolding work at a chemical plant.\nOn the day after the agreement became effective, Brock\ninformed the Laborers Union that it was reassigning the\nwork to the International Brotherhood of Carpenters (“the\nCarpenters Union” or “the Carpenters”). Invoking the\nbipartite arbitration procedure, the Laborers Union filed a\ngrievance with the Grievance Review Subcommittee of the\nNational Maintenance Agreement Policy Committee (“the\nSubcommittee”). Brock responded that the grievance in-\nvolved a work-jurisdiction dispute subject to tripartite\narbitration and therefore the Subcommittee lacked authority\nto arbitrate the matter. The Subcommittee disagreed and\nsustained the grievance.\n Brock filed suit under section 301 of the Labor Manage-\nment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking to vacate the\nSubcommittee’s decision. The Laborers Union responded\nwith a request to enforce the decision. After a flurry of\nmotions on both sides, the district judge determined that the\n\n\n1 Formally, the Laborers’ International Union of North America\nConstruction & General Laborers Local 100.\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 3\n\nSubcommittee had authority to resolve the dispute and\nissued an order enforcing its decision. Brock appealed.\nUnder the mistaken impression that the judge had denied\nthe motion to enforce, the Laborers Union also appealed.\n We reverse. At bottom, this grievance concerns which of\ntwo unions was entitled to perform the scaffolding work at\nthe chemical plant. That’s a jurisdictional dispute, and the\nlabor agreement calls for tripartite arbitration of jurisdiction-\nal disputes. Accordingly, the Subcommittee had no authority\nover the matter and its decision must be vacated.\n I. Background\n Brock and the Laborers Union entered into a labor\nagreement effective January 7, 2016. The agreement pro-\nvides: “Except for jurisdictional disputes and those involv-\ning general wage rates, all disputes and grievances arising\nout of work performed under this [a]greement … shall be\nresolved” through the procedures outlined in Article VI.\nArticle VI requires Brock and the Laborers to submit unre-\nsolved grievances to the Subcommittee for arbitration. We\nrefer to this grievance process as bipartite arbitration.\n Article I of the agreement provides a separate procedure\nfor resolving work-jurisdiction disputes. A work-jurisdiction\ndispute is “a dispute between two or more groups of em-\nployees over which is entitled to do certain work for an\nemployer.” Hutter Constr. Co. v. Int’l Union of Operating\nEng’rs, Local 139, 862 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1988) (quotation\nmarks omitted). Under Article I of the labor contract, unre-\nsolved work-jurisdiction disputes must be submitted to a\nPermanent Umpire. Because this process typically involves\n\f4 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\nthree parties—the employer plus the two competing un-\nions—we refer to it as tripartite arbitration.\n Prior to signing the agreement, Brock assigned several\nLaborers to construct scaffolding at the Afton Chemical\nPlant. On January 8, 2016—the day after the operative labor\nagreement became effective—Brock notified the Laborers\nUnion that its services were no longer required because the\nproject was assigned to the Carpenters Union. On January 11\nthe Laborers Union sent a letter to the National Maintenance\nAgreement Policy Committee claiming that Brock violated\nthe agreement when it reassigned the work to the Carpen-\nters. On January 21 the Laborers notified the Carpenters\nUnion of a work-jurisdiction dispute between the unions\nover the project.\n Invoking the bipartite arbitration procedure specified in\nArticle VI, the Laborers filed a grievance with the Subcom-\nmittee complaining that Brock violated the agreement by\nterminating the Laborers and assigning work to the Carpen-\nters. The grievance requested reinstatement and backpay as\na remedy. Brock responded that the Subcommittee had no\narbitral authority over the grievance because it constituted a\nwork-jurisdiction dispute and requested that the grievance\nbe dismissed or denied.\n The Subcommittee denied Brock’s request and sustained\nthe grievance, finding that Brock violated Article I, Section 5\nof the labor contract. That provisions states: “During the\nexistence of the [a]greement, there shall be no strikes, lock-\nouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising out of any juris-\ndictional dispute. Work will continue as originally assigned,\npending resolution of the dispute.” The Subcommittee\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 5\n\ndetermined that Brock violated this section by making “a\nchange of assignment.”\n Brock brought this suit under section 301 seeking to va-\ncate the arbitral award as void because the grievance consti-\ntuted a jurisdictional dispute and thus was outside the\nSubcommittee’s arbitral authority. A bevy of motions fol-\nlowed. The Laborers moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)\nof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Brock moved to\nvacate the award; the Laborers moved to “dismiss” the\nmotion to vacate on timeliness grounds; and the Laborers\nmoved to enforce the award.\n The judge denied all four motions. She acknowledged\nthat the Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority if the griev-\nance concerned a jurisdictional dispute. She concluded,\nhowever, that if the grievance concerned both a jurisdictional\ndispute and a wrongful-termination claim, then the Sub-\ncommittee could properly adjudicate the latter dispute. But a\nmaterial issue of fact—namely, whether the Laborers were\never assigned the project to begin with—prevented the judge\nfrom resolving the case at that time.\n Brock sought reconsideration, and the Laborers moved\nfor summary judgment. The judge denied reconsideration\nand entered summary judgment for the Laborers Union,\nruling that Brock had indeed assigned the scaffolding work\nto the Laborers and the Subcommittee’s decision is enforcea-\nble. Both sides appealed.\n II. Discussion\n We review a summary judgment de novo. Hooper v. Proc-\ntor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2015). We\nbegin by addressing the Laborers’ cross-appeal, which seeks\n\f6 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\nreview of the judge’s initial order denying the motion to\nenforce the arbitral award. The cross-appeal rests on the\nmistaken assumption that the judge never issued an order\nenforcing the award. But the summary-judgment order\nclearly states that the “award is enforceable as a matter of\nlaw.” Because the Laborers prevailed, we dismiss the cross-\nappeal.\n With that out of the way, we turn to the main event:\nBrock’s argument that the Subcommittee lacked the authori-\nty to arbitrate the grievance because it raised a work-\njurisdiction dispute. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract[,]\nand a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any\ndispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” AT&T Techs.,\nInc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)\n(quotation marks omitted). “[T]he question of arbitrability—\nwhether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for\nthe parties to arbitrate the particular grievance—is undenia-\nbly an issue for judicial determination.” Id. at 649.\n By signing the agreement, Brock agreed to submit some\ndisputes—but not all—to arbitration by the Subcommittee.\nArticle VI of the agreement creates a bipartite arbitration\nprocedure and vests the Subcommittee with arbitral authori-\nty. Subject to two exceptions, the bilateral procedure applies\nto “all disputes and grievances arising out of work per-\nformed under [the] [a]greement involving the meaning or\ninterpretation of any provision in [the] [a]greement.” Juris-\ndictional disputes are one of the exceptions. Article I creates\na separate, tripartite arbitration procedure to resolve work-\njurisdiction disputes and vests arbitral authority in the\nPermanent Umpire rather than the Subcommittee. Accord-\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 7\n\ningly, the Subcommittee exceeded its authority if the griev-\nance raised a work-jurisdiction dispute.\n The gravamen of the grievance is work jurisdiction. The\ngrievance and its supporting documents all complain that\nBrock improperly assigned work to the Carpenters instead\nof the Laborers. The Grievance Form Fact Sheet demanded\nthat Brock “make proper assignment of work to the Labor-\ners’ Union,” “reinstate the Laborers,” and compensate\nworkers for “lost wages and benefits.” Indeed, the Subcom-\nmittee sustained the grievance because Brock “made a\nchange of assignment.” In other words, the Laborers com-\nplained (and the Subcommittee found) that Brock assigned\nwork to the wrong union. That’s the definition of a jurisdic-\ntional dispute. The Subcommittee therefore had no authority\nto arbitrate the grievance. The contract required tripartite\narbitration in which the competing unions and the employer\ncould be heard.\n Our previous decisions amply support this conclusion. In\nLocal 416, Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n v. Helgesteel\nCorp., 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1974), Helgesteel Corporation\n(a contractor) and the Sheet Metal Workers were parties to a\nlabor contract that provided for tripartite arbitration of\njurisdictional disputes in Article XI and bipartite arbitration\nfor almost all others in Article X. Id. at 1054–56. A dispute\narose when Helgesteel reassigned work to an Ironworkers’\nunion. The Sheet Metal Workers filed a grievance under\nArticle X complaining about this reassignment; the arbitrator\nsustained the grievance and awarded damages. When\nHelgesteel refused to pay, the Sheet Metal Workers filed suit\nin federal court to enforce the award. Helgesteel told the\nIronworkers it would likely need to give the work back to\n\f8 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\nthe Sheet Metal Workers, so the Ironworkers filed their own\ngrievance, which the arbitrator sustained. Id. The Ironwork-\ners then filed suit in federal court seeking to compel the\nSheet Metal Workers and Helgesteel to submit the entire\ncontroversy to tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1055.\n We held that the entire controversy constituted a jurisdic-\ntional dispute requiring tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1057. The\nSheet Metal Workers insisted that the agreement permitted\nthem to seek damages under the bipartite process of\nArticle X even if tripartite arbitration was also required\nunder Article XI. Id. at 1058. We rejected that argument,\nexplaining that such an interpretation of the contract “would\nallow inconsistent final arbitration awards; the national joint\nboard may say that the work should be assigned to the\nironworkers while the local joint board has awarded damag-\nes to the sheet metal workers.” Id.\n Likewise, in William Charles Construction Co. v Teamsters\nLocal Union 627, 827 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2016), we confronted a\nsimilar agreement featuring bifurcated arbitration proce-\ndures. The William Charles Construction Company per-\nformed work on a highway expansion for the State of\nIllinois. Id. at 674. During construction, a dispute broke out\nbetween the Teamsters and the International Union of\nOperating Engineers Local 649 over who was entitled to\noperate the trucks required for the excavation work. The\nTeamsters initiated tripartite arbitration, arguing that the\nwork had been improperly assigned to the engineers. The\narbitrator ruled in the Teamsters’ favor but awarded no\nbackpay or damages. Id. The Teamsters then filed a second\ngrievance under bipartite arbitration, complaining again of\nthe improper assignment but this time seeking damages. Id.\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 9\n\nat 676. The second arbitrator also sided with the Teamsters\nand awarded lost wages and benefits. Id. at 677. The compa-\nny filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the second\naward was void. Id. We agreed that the second grievance\nwas not arbitrable because it was jurisdictional in nature and\ntherefore not subject to bipartite arbitration. Id.\n So too here. The Laborers Union complains that Brock\nimproperly reassigned the project to another union, so the\ngrievance must be resolved in tripartite arbitration. Allow-\ning the Laborers to seek damages through bipartite arbitra-\ntion could produce “inconsistent final arbitration awards,”\nHelgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1058, so the Subcommittee lacked\nauthority and its award must be vacated.\n This conclusion accords with the reasoning of cases in\nwhich we declined to find a jurisdictional dispute reserved\nfor tripartite arbitration. For instance, in Hutter v. Local 139,\n862 F.2d 641, Hutter (a general contractor) had a labor\nagreement with the International Union of Operating Engi-\nneers (“the Operators” or “the Operators Union”). Id. at 642.\nThe agreement gave the Operators exclusive jurisdiction\nover most forklift jobs in Wisconsin; it also provided that\nwork could be subcontracted only to signatories to the\nagreement. When Hutter was awarded work on a prison\ncontract in Oshkosh, it subcontracted the masonry work to\nBDI, which was not a signatory to the agreement. BDI\nthereafter assigned forklift duties to the Wisconsin Laborers\nDistrict Council and Laborers Local Union No. 1086 rather\nthan the Operators. The Operators Union submitted a griev-\nance to bipartite arbitration, complaining that Hutter had\nimproperly subcontracted the work to a nonsignatory. Id.\n\f10 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\nThe arbitrator agreed and ordered backpay, and the Opera-\ntors filed suit in federal court to enforce the award. Id. at 643.\n Hutter argued that the Operators’ grievance was really a\n“disguised jurisdictional dispute” subject to tripartite arbi-\ntration and that the bipartite arbitration award should be\nvacated. Id. We disagreed, concluding that the subcontracting\ngrievance “was a distinct non-jurisdictional claim” because it\ndid not turn on who was ultimately assigned the work. Id. at\n644. For example, BDI could have assigned the work to the\nOperators, and in that case there would have been no juris-\ndictional dispute even though Hutter violated the subcon-\ntracting provision. Id. Because the subcontracting dispute\nwas nonjurisdictional, the arbitrator had the authority to\nresolve the grievance under the bipartite procedure. Id. at\n645.\n Although Hutter held that the dispute in question was\nnonjurisdictional, its reasoning supports the opposite con-\nclusion here. We emphasized in Hutter that the subcontract-\ning grievance “arose independently” of the work\nassignment; its validity was “not dependent upon the identi-\nty of the party that ultimately performed the forklift work.”\nId. at 644. In contrast, here the Laborers’ grievance is entirely\ndependent on the work assignment. Under the reasoning in\nHutter, the Laborers’ grievance is really just a “disguised\njurisdictional dispute.” Id. at 643.\n Our conclusion finds additional support in Miron Con-\nstruction Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers,\nLocal 139, 44 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1995). The facts there are\nstrikingly similar to those in Hutter. Miron (a general con-\ntractor) signed a labor agreement granting the Operators\nUnion exclusive jurisdiction over forklift jobs in Wisconsin\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 11\n\nand stipulated that work could be subcontracted only to\nsignatories to the agreement. Id. A dispute arose when\nMiron twice subcontracted work to nonsignatories, each of\nwhich assigned forklifting work to the Wisconsin Laborers\nDistrict Council. Id. at 561. The Operators filed grievances\nunder the bipartite procedure complaining that Miron had\nviolated the subcontracting provision. The Laborers District\nCouncil filed its own grievances to resolve the proper work\nassignment and threatened to strike. This threat got the\nNLRB involved, which held a § 10(k) hearing to resolve the\njurisdictional dispute. The Board eventually awarded the\nfirst project to the Laborers District Council. Id.\n Miron filed a complaint in federal court seeking tripartite\narbitration. Id. at 561–62. We affirmed the district court’s\ndenial of that relief. While the Laborers’ grievance concerned\nwork jurisdiction, the Operators’ grievance alleged only a\nsubcontracting violation. And under Hutter a subcontracting\ndispute is distinct and independent of a jurisdictional dis-\npute. Id. In a subcontracting grievance, “[t]he identity of the\nemployees who ultimately perform the work is irrelevant.”\nId. at 566 (citing Hutter, 862 F.2d at 644). A subcontracting\ngrievance does not conflict with a work-jurisdiction award\nso long as there is no “demand that the subcontractor reas-\nsign the work … . Since the subcontractor has complete\ncontrol over which union actually performs the work,\nmaintenance of an action against the general contractor\ncannot be viewed as a veiled attempt to force a reassignment\nof the work.” Id.\n Miron too is factually distinguishable from this case,\nthough like Hutter its reasoning supports our conclusion. In\nMiron we focused on whether the bipartite proceeding could\n\f12 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\ngenerate an award that conflicts with the resolution of a\njurisdictional dispute. A bipartite arbitration award is valid\nso long as the grievance “cannot be viewed as a veiled\nattempt to force a reassignment of the work.” Id. Here the\nLaborers explicitly attempted to force reassignment—the\nunion demanded that Brock “make [a] proper assignment of\nwork [back] to the Laborers’ Union.”\n One case cuts in the opposite direction. In Alberici–Eby v.\nLocal 520, International Union of Operating Engineers, 992 F.2d\n727 (7th Cir. 1993), we affirmed awards entered in bipartite\narbitration for improper work assignment. Alberici–Eby (a\ngeneral contractor) hired six unions to construct a lock on\nthe Mississippi River in Illinois. Id. at 728. The unions made\ncompeting claims to each part of the work, and Alberici–Eby\ndid its best to divide the work fairly. Id. at 729. After the\nproject was completed, two unions—the Engineers and the\nLaborers—filed separate grievances under their respective\ncollective-bargaining agreements alleging that Alberici–Eby\nhad improperly assigned their work to other unions.\nAlberici–Eby responded that the grievances raised jurisdic-\ntional disputes, so the arbitrators had no authority to hear\nthem. Id. One arbitrator heard the Engineers’ grievance and\ndecided in their favor, and a second arbitrator heard the\nLaborers’ grievance and refused to stay the proceeding.\nAlberici–Eby then filed suit in federal court asking that the\njudge set aside the first arbitrator’s award, stay the proceed-\ning before the second arbitrator, and require any unions\nseeking relief to submit to multiparty arbitration to settle the\njurisdictional dispute. Id.\n We denied Alberici–Eby’s request. We first noted that\nAlberici–Eby failed to timely invoke the multiparty arbitra-\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 13\n\ntion mechanism even though it “was on notice that it faced\nthe strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards.” Id. at\n730. We then determined that the first arbitrator had authori-\nty to resolve the Engineers’ grievance. Id. at 733. The relevant\nlabor agreement created a separate arbitration process for\njurisdictional disputes, but we noted that the agreement\n“[did] not tell us whether the subject of the grievance … was\nor was not a jurisdictional dispute.” Id. However, the agree-\nment provided that “any difference or dispute arising out of\nthe interpretation or application of any of the provisions\ncontained in th[e] [a]greement” was to be decided by an\narbitrator. Id. The agreement further provided that the\nEngineers had exclusive jurisdiction over the relevant work,\nso we concluded that the dispute “ar[ose] out of the interpre-\ntation or application of the [agreement].” Id. We also refused\nto stay the proceedings before the second arbitrator, again\nemphasizing that Alberici–Eby failed to timely invoke\nmultiparty arbitration, so it “would be manifestly unjust to\ndeny the Laborers an opportunity to be heard by way of\nbipartite arbitration.” Id. at 734.\n Alberici–Eby is hard to reconcile with Helgesteel, Hutter,\nMiron, and William Charles. The grievances concerned work-\nassignment disputes, but we permitted bipartite arbitration\nto proceed. We based our decision in part on the language in\nthe agreement between Alberici–Eby and the Engineers, but\nthat language cannot be meaningfully distinguished from\nvirtually identical language in Helgesteel. Compare Alberici–\nEby, 992 F.2d at 733 (providing for bipartite arbitration over\n“any difference or dispute arising out of the interpretation or\napplication of any of the provisions contained in th[e]\n[a]greement”) with Helgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1055 (providing for\nbipartite arbitration over any “[g]rievance of the [e]mployer\n\f14 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\nor the [u]nion[] arising out of interpretation or enforcement\nof th[e] [a]greement”).\n Because Alberici–Eby is an obvious outlier, we limit the\ncase to its peculiar facts. We emphasized there that the\ncontractor waited too long to request multiparty arbitration.\nThat defeated the purpose of the multiparty arbitration\nprocess, “which was carefully designed to produce a speedy\nresolution of jurisdictional disputes in order to permit work\nto be properly allocated before that work is performed.”\nAlberici–Eby, 992 F.2d at 731. The mistake was inexcusable in\nlight of “the strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards”\nwhen the unions filed their separate grievances. Id. at 730.\nMoreover, the project had already been completed. As a\nconsequence the multiparty arbitration would have done\nlittle good: “[T]he work ha[d] already been performed,” and\nthe multiparty procedure had “no authority to award dam-\nages for misassigned work.” Id. at 730 n.2. We specifically\nhighlighted these facts when we refused to stay arbitration\nof the Laborers’ grievance. Id. at 734 (“In … light of Alberici–\nEby’s failure to move in a timely fashion to achieve multi-\nparty arbitration (assuming that such was available), it\nwould be manifestly unjust to deny the Laborers an oppor-\ntunity to be heard by way of bipartite arbitration.”). None of\nthese circumstances are present here. The Laborers Union\nnotified the Carpenters of the work-jurisdiction dispute ten\ndays after it filed its bipartite grievance. And Brock chal-\nlenged the propriety of bipartite arbitration at the earliest\nopportunity.\n The district judge offered two reasons to affirm the arbi-\ntral award but neither holds up under the caselaw we’ve just\nsurveyed. First, the judge reasoned that because several\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 15\n\nLaborers were already working on the project, removing\nthose workers from the job gave rise to a wrongful-\ntermination claim distinct from the jurisdictional dispute.\nNot so. The Laborers were terminated because the work was\nassigned to the Carpenters; a finding of wrongful termina-\ntion necessarily implies that the work was misassigned. That\nputs this grievance squarely on the work-jurisdiction side of\nthe line. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration.\n Second, the judge held that the grievance arose out of\nArticle I, Section 5, which provides a separate contractual\nbasis for bipartite arbitrability. The provision in question\nstates: “During the existence of the [a]greement, there shall\nbe no strikes, lockouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising\nout of any jurisdictional dispute. Work will continue as\noriginally assigned, pending resolution of the dispute.”\n Grievances arising under this provision are indeed sub-\nject to bipartite arbitration. Like the subcontracting provi-\nsions in Hutter and Miron, a dispute under this provision can\nbe separately arbitrated without interfering with a jurisdic-\ntional dispute. Suppose for a moment that the Laborers and\nthe Carpenters submitted a jurisdictional dispute to tripartite\narbitration, and to pressure Brock into taking its side, the\nLaborers Union called a strike, prompting Brock to file a\ngrievance under Section 5. It would be completely consistent\nfor one arbitrator to award the work assignment to the\nLaborers and another to sanction the Laborers for initiating a\nstrike. Neither award would call the other into question.\n But bipartite arbitration was not appropriate just because\nthe Laborers labeled the grievance as one arising under\nSection 5. We look instead to the substance of the grievance.\nAnd in substance, this grievance is a work-jurisdiction\n\f16 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\ndispute. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration, and\nthe Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority.\n REVERSED; CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: BROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee, v. LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA CONSTRUCTION & GENERAL LABORERS LOCAL 100, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\nBROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant/\\n Cross-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nLABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION\\nOF NORTH AMERICA CONSTRUCTION\\n& GENERAL LABORERS LOCAL 100,\\n Defendant-Appellee/\\n Cross-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 16-CV-780-NJR-DGW — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Brock Industrial Services, LLC, is an\\nIllinois-based provider of industrial services, including\\nscaffolding, painting, insulation, and shoring. In January\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\n2016 it entered into a labor agreement with Local 100 of the\\nLaborers’ International Union 1 (“the Laborers Union” or\\n“the Laborers”). The agreement requires arbitration of\\ngrievances and establishes a bipartite arbitration procedure\\nfor resolving most disputes. But work-jurisdiction dis-\\nputes—disputes over whether the Laborers or another union\\nis entitled to perform work—are instead subject to a tripar-\\ntite arbitration procedure involving the company and the\\ncontending unions.\\n Sometime prior to signing the agreement, Brock hired the\\nLaborers to perform scaffolding work at a chemical plant.\\nOn the day after the agreement became effective, Brock\\ninformed the Laborers Union that it was reassigning the\\nwork to the International Brotherhood of Carpenters (“the\\nCarpenters Union” or “the Carpenters”). Invoking the\\nbipartite arbitration procedure, the Laborers Union filed a\\ngrievance with the Grievance Review Subcommittee of the\\nNational Maintenance Agreement Policy Committee (“the\\nSubcommittee”). Brock responded that the grievance in-\\nvolved a work-jurisdiction dispute subject to tripartite\\narbitration and therefore the Subcommittee lacked authority\\nto arbitrate the matter. The Subcommittee disagreed and\\nsustained the grievance.\\n Brock filed suit under section 301 of the Labor Manage-\\nment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking to vacate the\\nSubcommittee’s decision. The Laborers Union responded\\nwith a request to enforce the decision. After a flurry of\\nmotions on both sides, the district judge determined that the\\n\\n\\n1 Formally, the Laborers’ International Union of North America\\nConstruction & General Laborers Local 100.\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 3\\n\\nSubcommittee had authority to resolve the dispute and\\nissued an order enforcing its decision. Brock appealed.\\nUnder the mistaken impression that the judge had denied\\nthe motion to enforce, the Laborers Union also appealed.\\n We reverse. At bottom, this grievance concerns which of\\ntwo unions was entitled to perform the scaffolding work at\\nthe chemical plant. That’s a jurisdictional dispute, and the\\nlabor agreement calls for tripartite arbitration of jurisdiction-\\nal disputes. Accordingly, the Subcommittee had no authority\\nover the matter and its decision must be vacated.\\n I. Background\\n Brock and the Laborers Union entered into a labor\\nagreement effective January 7, 2016. The agreement pro-\\nvides: “Except for jurisdictional disputes and those involv-\\ning general wage rates, all disputes and grievances arising\\nout of work performed under this [a]greement … shall be\\nresolved” through the procedures outlined in Article VI.\\nArticle VI requires Brock and the Laborers to submit unre-\\nsolved grievances to the Subcommittee for arbitration. We\\nrefer to this grievance process as bipartite arbitration.\\n Article I of the agreement provides a separate procedure\\nfor resolving work-jurisdiction disputes. A work-jurisdiction\\ndispute is “a dispute between two or more groups of em-\\nployees over which is entitled to do certain work for an\\nemployer.” Hutter Constr. Co. v. Int’l Union of Operating\\nEng’rs, Local 139, 862 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1988) (quotation\\nmarks omitted). Under Article I of the labor contract, unre-\\nsolved work-jurisdiction disputes must be submitted to a\\nPermanent Umpire. Because this process typically involves\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nthree parties—the employer plus the two competing un-\\nions—we refer to it as tripartite arbitration.\\n Prior to signing the agreement, Brock assigned several\\nLaborers to construct scaffolding at the Afton Chemical\\nPlant. On January 8, 2016—the day after the operative labor\\nagreement became effective—Brock notified the Laborers\\nUnion that its services were no longer required because the\\nproject was assigned to the Carpenters Union. On January 11\\nthe Laborers Union sent a letter to the National Maintenance\\nAgreement Policy Committee claiming that Brock violated\\nthe agreement when it reassigned the work to the Carpen-\\nters. On January 21 the Laborers notified the Carpenters\\nUnion of a work-jurisdiction dispute between the unions\\nover the project.\\n Invoking the bipartite arbitration procedure specified in\\nArticle VI, the Laborers filed a grievance with the Subcom-\\nmittee complaining that Brock violated the agreement by\\nterminating the Laborers and assigning work to the Carpen-\\nters. The grievance requested reinstatement and backpay as\\na remedy. Brock responded that the Subcommittee had no\\narbitral authority over the grievance because it constituted a\\nwork-jurisdiction dispute and requested that the grievance\\nbe dismissed or denied.\\n The Subcommittee denied Brock’s request and sustained\\nthe grievance, finding that Brock violated Article I, Section 5\\nof the labor contract. That provisions states: “During the\\nexistence of the [a]greement, there shall be no strikes, lock-\\nouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising out of any juris-\\ndictional dispute. Work will continue as originally assigned,\\npending resolution of the dispute.” The Subcommittee\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 5\\n\\ndetermined that Brock violated this section by making “a\\nchange of assignment.”\\n Brock brought this suit under section 301 seeking to va-\\ncate the arbitral award as void because the grievance consti-\\ntuted a jurisdictional dispute and thus was outside the\\nSubcommittee’s arbitral authority. A bevy of motions fol-\\nlowed. The Laborers moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)\\nof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Brock moved to\\nvacate the award; the Laborers moved to “dismiss” the\\nmotion to vacate on timeliness grounds; and the Laborers\\nmoved to enforce the award.\\n The judge denied all four motions. She acknowledged\\nthat the Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority if the griev-\\nance concerned a jurisdictional dispute. She concluded,\\nhowever, that if the grievance concerned both a jurisdictional\\ndispute and a wrongful-termination claim, then the Sub-\\ncommittee could properly adjudicate the latter dispute. But a\\nmaterial issue of fact—namely, whether the Laborers were\\never assigned the project to begin with—prevented the judge\\nfrom resolving the case at that time.\\n Brock sought reconsideration, and the Laborers moved\\nfor summary judgment. The judge denied reconsideration\\nand entered summary judgment for the Laborers Union,\\nruling that Brock had indeed assigned the scaffolding work\\nto the Laborers and the Subcommittee’s decision is enforcea-\\nble. Both sides appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a summary judgment de novo. Hooper v. Proc-\\ntor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2015). We\\nbegin by addressing the Laborers’ cross-appeal, which seeks\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nreview of the judge’s initial order denying the motion to\\nenforce the arbitral award. The cross-appeal rests on the\\nmistaken assumption that the judge never issued an order\\nenforcing the award. But the summary-judgment order\\nclearly states that the “award is enforceable as a matter of\\nlaw.” Because the Laborers prevailed, we dismiss the cross-\\nappeal.\\n With that out of the way, we turn to the main event:\\nBrock’s argument that the Subcommittee lacked the authori-\\nty to arbitrate the grievance because it raised a work-\\njurisdiction dispute. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract[,]\\nand a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any\\ndispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” AT&T Techs.,\\nInc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)\\n(quotation marks omitted). “[T]he question of arbitrability—\\nwhether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for\\nthe parties to arbitrate the particular grievance—is undenia-\\nbly an issue for judicial determination.” Id. at 649.\\n By signing the agreement, Brock agreed to submit some\\ndisputes—but not all—to arbitration by the Subcommittee.\\nArticle VI of the agreement creates a bipartite arbitration\\nprocedure and vests the Subcommittee with arbitral authori-\\nty. Subject to two exceptions, the bilateral procedure applies\\nto “all disputes and grievances arising out of work per-\\nformed under [the] [a]greement involving the meaning or\\ninterpretation of any provision in [the] [a]greement.” Juris-\\ndictional disputes are one of the exceptions. Article I creates\\na separate, tripartite arbitration procedure to resolve work-\\njurisdiction disputes and vests arbitral authority in the\\nPermanent Umpire rather than the Subcommittee. Accord-\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 7\\n\\ningly, the Subcommittee exceeded its authority if the griev-\\nance raised a work-jurisdiction dispute.\\n The gravamen of the grievance is work jurisdiction. The\\ngrievance and its supporting documents all complain that\\nBrock improperly assigned work to the Carpenters instead\\nof the Laborers. The Grievance Form Fact Sheet demanded\\nthat Brock “make proper assignment of work to the Labor-\\ners’ Union,” “reinstate the Laborers,” and compensate\\nworkers for “lost wages and benefits.” Indeed, the Subcom-\\nmittee sustained the grievance because Brock “made a\\nchange of assignment.” In other words, the Laborers com-\\nplained (and the Subcommittee found) that Brock assigned\\nwork to the wrong union. That’s the definition of a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute. The Subcommittee therefore had no authority\\nto arbitrate the grievance. The contract required tripartite\\narbitration in which the competing unions and the employer\\ncould be heard.\\n Our previous decisions amply support this conclusion. In\\nLocal 416, Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n v. Helgesteel\\nCorp., 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1974), Helgesteel Corporation\\n(a contractor) and the Sheet Metal Workers were parties to a\\nlabor contract that provided for tripartite arbitration of\\njurisdictional disputes in Article XI and bipartite arbitration\\nfor almost all others in Article X. Id. at 1054–56. A dispute\\narose when Helgesteel reassigned work to an Ironworkers’\\nunion. The Sheet Metal Workers filed a grievance under\\nArticle X complaining about this reassignment; the arbitrator\\nsustained the grievance and awarded damages. When\\nHelgesteel refused to pay, the Sheet Metal Workers filed suit\\nin federal court to enforce the award. Helgesteel told the\\nIronworkers it would likely need to give the work back to\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nthe Sheet Metal Workers, so the Ironworkers filed their own\\ngrievance, which the arbitrator sustained. Id. The Ironwork-\\ners then filed suit in federal court seeking to compel the\\nSheet Metal Workers and Helgesteel to submit the entire\\ncontroversy to tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1055.\\n We held that the entire controversy constituted a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute requiring tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1057. The\\nSheet Metal Workers insisted that the agreement permitted\\nthem to seek damages under the bipartite process of\\nArticle X even if tripartite arbitration was also required\\nunder Article XI. Id. at 1058. We rejected that argument,\\nexplaining that such an interpretation of the contract “would\\nallow inconsistent final arbitration awards; the national joint\\nboard may say that the work should be assigned to the\\nironworkers while the local joint board has awarded damag-\\nes to the sheet metal workers.” Id.\\n Likewise, in William Charles Construction Co. v Teamsters\\nLocal Union 627, 827 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2016), we confronted a\\nsimilar agreement featuring bifurcated arbitration proce-\\ndures. The William Charles Construction Company per-\\nformed work on a highway expansion for the State of\\nIllinois. Id. at 674. During construction, a dispute broke out\\nbetween the Teamsters and the International Union of\\nOperating Engineers Local 649 over who was entitled to\\noperate the trucks required for the excavation work. The\\nTeamsters initiated tripartite arbitration, arguing that the\\nwork had been improperly assigned to the engineers. The\\narbitrator ruled in the Teamsters’ favor but awarded no\\nbackpay or damages. Id. The Teamsters then filed a second\\ngrievance under bipartite arbitration, complaining again of\\nthe improper assignment but this time seeking damages. Id.\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 9\\n\\nat 676. The second arbitrator also sided with the Teamsters\\nand awarded lost wages and benefits. Id. at 677. The compa-\\nny filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the second\\naward was void. Id. We agreed that the second grievance\\nwas not arbitrable because it was jurisdictional in nature and\\ntherefore not subject to bipartite arbitration. Id.\\n So too here. The Laborers Union complains that Brock\\nimproperly reassigned the project to another union, so the\\ngrievance must be resolved in tripartite arbitration. Allow-\\ning the Laborers to seek damages through bipartite arbitra-\\ntion could produce “inconsistent final arbitration awards,”\\nHelgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1058, so the Subcommittee lacked\\nauthority and its award must be vacated.\\n This conclusion accords with the reasoning of cases in\\nwhich we declined to find a jurisdictional dispute reserved\\nfor tripartite arbitration. For instance, in Hutter v. Local 139,\\n862 F.2d 641, Hutter (a general contractor) had a labor\\nagreement with the International Union of Operating Engi-\\nneers (“the Operators” or “the Operators Union”). Id. at 642.\\nThe agreement gave the Operators exclusive jurisdiction\\nover most forklift jobs in Wisconsin; it also provided that\\nwork could be subcontracted only to signatories to the\\nagreement. When Hutter was awarded work on a prison\\ncontract in Oshkosh, it subcontracted the masonry work to\\nBDI, which was not a signatory to the agreement. BDI\\nthereafter assigned forklift duties to the Wisconsin Laborers\\nDistrict Council and Laborers Local Union No. 1086 rather\\nthan the Operators. The Operators Union submitted a griev-\\nance to bipartite arbitration, complaining that Hutter had\\nimproperly subcontracted the work to a nonsignatory. Id.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nThe arbitrator agreed and ordered backpay, and the Opera-\\ntors filed suit in federal court to enforce the award. Id. at 643.\\n Hutter argued that the Operators’ grievance was really a\\n“disguised jurisdictional dispute” subject to tripartite arbi-\\ntration and that the bipartite arbitration award should be\\nvacated. Id. We disagreed, concluding that the subcontracting\\ngrievance “was a distinct non-jurisdictional claim” because it\\ndid not turn on who was ultimately assigned the work. Id. at\\n644. For example, BDI could have assigned the work to the\\nOperators, and in that case there would have been no juris-\\ndictional dispute even though Hutter violated the subcon-\\ntracting provision. Id. Because the subcontracting dispute\\nwas nonjurisdictional, the arbitrator had the authority to\\nresolve the grievance under the bipartite procedure. Id. at\\n645.\\n Although Hutter held that the dispute in question was\\nnonjurisdictional, its reasoning supports the opposite con-\\nclusion here. We emphasized in Hutter that the subcontract-\\ning grievance “arose independently” of the work\\nassignment; its validity was “not dependent upon the identi-\\nty of the party that ultimately performed the forklift work.”\\nId. at 644. In contrast, here the Laborers’ grievance is entirely\\ndependent on the work assignment. Under the reasoning in\\nHutter, the Laborers’ grievance is really just a “disguised\\njurisdictional dispute.” Id. at 643.\\n Our conclusion finds additional support in Miron Con-\\nstruction Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers,\\nLocal 139, 44 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1995). The facts there are\\nstrikingly similar to those in Hutter. Miron (a general con-\\ntractor) signed a labor agreement granting the Operators\\nUnion exclusive jurisdiction over forklift jobs in Wisconsin\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 11\\n\\nand stipulated that work could be subcontracted only to\\nsignatories to the agreement. Id. A dispute arose when\\nMiron twice subcontracted work to nonsignatories, each of\\nwhich assigned forklifting work to the Wisconsin Laborers\\nDistrict Council. Id. at 561. The Operators filed grievances\\nunder the bipartite procedure complaining that Miron had\\nviolated the subcontracting provision. The Laborers District\\nCouncil filed its own grievances to resolve the proper work\\nassignment and threatened to strike. This threat got the\\nNLRB involved, which held a § 10(k) hearing to resolve the\\njurisdictional dispute. The Board eventually awarded the\\nfirst project to the Laborers District Council. Id.\\n Miron filed a complaint in federal court seeking tripartite\\narbitration. Id. at 561–62. We affirmed the district court’s\\ndenial of that relief. While the Laborers’ grievance concerned\\nwork jurisdiction, the Operators’ grievance alleged only a\\nsubcontracting violation. And under Hutter a subcontracting\\ndispute is distinct and independent of a jurisdictional dis-\\npute. Id. In a subcontracting grievance, “[t]he identity of the\\nemployees who ultimately perform the work is irrelevant.”\\nId. at 566 (citing Hutter, 862 F.2d at 644). A subcontracting\\ngrievance does not conflict with a work-jurisdiction award\\nso long as there is no “demand that the subcontractor reas-\\nsign the work … . Since the subcontractor has complete\\ncontrol over which union actually performs the work,\\nmaintenance of an action against the general contractor\\ncannot be viewed as a veiled attempt to force a reassignment\\nof the work.” Id.\\n Miron too is factually distinguishable from this case,\\nthough like Hutter its reasoning supports our conclusion. In\\nMiron we focused on whether the bipartite proceeding could\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\ngenerate an award that conflicts with the resolution of a\\njurisdictional dispute. A bipartite arbitration award is valid\\nso long as the grievance “cannot be viewed as a veiled\\nattempt to force a reassignment of the work.” Id. Here the\\nLaborers explicitly attempted to force reassignment—the\\nunion demanded that Brock “make [a] proper assignment of\\nwork [back] to the Laborers’ Union.”\\n One case cuts in the opposite direction. In Alberici–Eby v.\\nLocal 520, International Union of Operating Engineers, 992 F.2d\\n727 (7th Cir. 1993), we affirmed awards entered in bipartite\\narbitration for improper work assignment. Alberici–Eby (a\\ngeneral contractor) hired six unions to construct a lock on\\nthe Mississippi River in Illinois. Id. at 728. The unions made\\ncompeting claims to each part of the work, and Alberici–Eby\\ndid its best to divide the work fairly. Id. at 729. After the\\nproject was completed, two unions—the Engineers and the\\nLaborers—filed separate grievances under their respective\\ncollective-bargaining agreements alleging that Alberici–Eby\\nhad improperly assigned their work to other unions.\\nAlberici–Eby responded that the grievances raised jurisdic-\\ntional disputes, so the arbitrators had no authority to hear\\nthem. Id. One arbitrator heard the Engineers’ grievance and\\ndecided in their favor, and a second arbitrator heard the\\nLaborers’ grievance and refused to stay the proceeding.\\nAlberici–Eby then filed suit in federal court asking that the\\njudge set aside the first arbitrator’s award, stay the proceed-\\ning before the second arbitrator, and require any unions\\nseeking relief to submit to multiparty arbitration to settle the\\njurisdictional dispute. Id.\\n We denied Alberici–Eby’s request. We first noted that\\nAlberici–Eby failed to timely invoke the multiparty arbitra-\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 13\\n\\ntion mechanism even though it “was on notice that it faced\\nthe strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards.” Id. at\\n730. We then determined that the first arbitrator had authori-\\nty to resolve the Engineers’ grievance. Id. at 733. The relevant\\nlabor agreement created a separate arbitration process for\\njurisdictional disputes, but we noted that the agreement\\n“[did] not tell us whether the subject of the grievance … was\\nor was not a jurisdictional dispute.” Id. However, the agree-\\nment provided that “any difference or dispute arising out of\\nthe interpretation or application of any of the provisions\\ncontained in th[e] [a]greement” was to be decided by an\\narbitrator. Id. The agreement further provided that the\\nEngineers had exclusive jurisdiction over the relevant work,\\nso we concluded that the dispute “ar[ose] out of the interpre-\\ntation or application of the [agreement].” Id. We also refused\\nto stay the proceedings before the second arbitrator, again\\nemphasizing that Alberici–Eby failed to timely invoke\\nmultiparty arbitration, so it “would be manifestly unjust to\\ndeny the Laborers an opportunity to be heard by way of\\nbipartite arbitration.” Id. at 734.\\n Alberici–Eby is hard to reconcile with Helgesteel, Hutter,\\nMiron, and William Charles. The grievances concerned work-\\nassignment disputes, but we permitted bipartite arbitration\\nto proceed. We based our decision in part on the language in\\nthe agreement between Alberici–Eby and the Engineers, but\\nthat language cannot be meaningfully distinguished from\\nvirtually identical language in Helgesteel. Compare Alberici–\\nEby, 992 F.2d at 733 (providing for bipartite arbitration over\\n“any difference or dispute arising out of the interpretation or\\napplication of any of the provisions contained in th[e]\\n[a]greement”) with Helgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1055 (providing for\\nbipartite arbitration over any “[g]rievance of the [e]mployer\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nor the [u]nion[] arising out of interpretation or enforcement\\nof th[e] [a]greement”).\\n Because Alberici–Eby is an obvious outlier, we limit the\\ncase to its peculiar facts. We emphasized there that the\\ncontractor waited too long to request multiparty arbitration.\\nThat defeated the purpose of the multiparty arbitration\\nprocess, “which was carefully designed to produce a speedy\\nresolution of jurisdictional disputes in order to permit work\\nto be properly allocated before that work is performed.”\\nAlberici–Eby, 992 F.2d at 731. The mistake was inexcusable in\\nlight of “the strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards”\\nwhen the unions filed their separate grievances. Id. at 730.\\nMoreover, the project had already been completed. As a\\nconsequence the multiparty arbitration would have done\\nlittle good: “[T]he work ha[d] already been performed,” and\\nthe multiparty procedure had “no authority to award dam-\\nages for misassigned work.” Id. at 730 n.2. We specifically\\nhighlighted these facts when we refused to stay arbitration\\nof the Laborers’ grievance. Id. at 734 (“In … light of Alberici–\\nEby’s failure to move in a timely fashion to achieve multi-\\nparty arbitration (assuming that such was available), it\\nwould be manifestly unjust to deny the Laborers an oppor-\\ntunity to be heard by way of bipartite arbitration.”). None of\\nthese circumstances are present here. The Laborers Union\\nnotified the Carpenters of the work-jurisdiction dispute ten\\ndays after it filed its bipartite grievance. And Brock chal-\\nlenged the propriety of bipartite arbitration at the earliest\\nopportunity.\\n The district judge offered two reasons to affirm the arbi-\\ntral award but neither holds up under the caselaw we’ve just\\nsurveyed. First, the judge reasoned that because several\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 15\\n\\nLaborers were already working on the project, removing\\nthose workers from the job gave rise to a wrongful-\\ntermination claim distinct from the jurisdictional dispute.\\nNot so. The Laborers were terminated because the work was\\nassigned to the Carpenters; a finding of wrongful termina-\\ntion necessarily implies that the work was misassigned. That\\nputs this grievance squarely on the work-jurisdiction side of\\nthe line. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration.\\n Second, the judge held that the grievance arose out of\\nArticle I, Section 5, which provides a separate contractual\\nbasis for bipartite arbitrability. The provision in question\\nstates: “During the existence of the [a]greement, there shall\\nbe no strikes, lockouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising\\nout of any jurisdictional dispute. Work will continue as\\noriginally assigned, pending resolution of the dispute.”\\n Grievances arising under this provision are indeed sub-\\nject to bipartite arbitration. Like the subcontracting provi-\\nsions in Hutter and Miron, a dispute under this provision can\\nbe separately arbitrated without interfering with a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute. Suppose for a moment that the Laborers and\\nthe Carpenters submitted a jurisdictional dispute to tripartite\\narbitration, and to pressure Brock into taking its side, the\\nLaborers Union called a strike, prompting Brock to file a\\ngrievance under Section 5. It would be completely consistent\\nfor one arbitrator to award the work assignment to the\\nLaborers and another to sanction the Laborers for initiating a\\nstrike. Neither award would call the other into question.\\n But bipartite arbitration was not appropriate just because\\nthe Laborers labeled the grievance as one arising under\\nSection 5. We look instead to the substance of the grievance.\\nAnd in substance, this grievance is a work-jurisdiction\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\ndispute. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration, and\\nthe Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority.\\n REVERSED; CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1697,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4607975,"string":"4,607,975"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Brock Industrial Services, LLC v. Laborers' International Union"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2688"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\nBROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant/\\n Cross-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nLABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION\\nOF NORTH AMERICA CONSTRUCTION\\n& GENERAL LABORERS LOCAL 100,\\n Defendant-Appellee/\\n Cross-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 16-CV-780-NJR-DGW — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Brock Industrial Services, LLC, is an\\nIllinois-based provider of industrial services, including\\nscaffolding, painting, insulation, and shoring. In January\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\n2016 it entered into a labor agreement with Local 100 of the\\nLaborers’ International Union 1 (“the Laborers Union” or\\n“the Laborers”). The agreement requires arbitration of\\ngrievances and establishes a bipartite arbitration procedure\\nfor resolving most disputes. But work-jurisdiction dis-\\nputes—disputes over whether the Laborers or another union\\nis entitled to perform work—are instead subject to a tripar-\\ntite arbitration procedure involving the company and the\\ncontending unions.\\n Sometime prior to signing the agreement, Brock hired the\\nLaborers to perform scaffolding work at a chemical plant.\\nOn the day after the agreement became effective, Brock\\ninformed the Laborers Union that it was reassigning the\\nwork to the International Brotherhood of Carpenters (“the\\nCarpenters Union” or “the Carpenters”). Invoking the\\nbipartite arbitration procedure, the Laborers Union filed a\\ngrievance with the Grievance Review Subcommittee of the\\nNational Maintenance Agreement Policy Committee (“the\\nSubcommittee”). Brock responded that the grievance in-\\nvolved a work-jurisdiction dispute subject to tripartite\\narbitration and therefore the Subcommittee lacked authority\\nto arbitrate the matter. The Subcommittee disagreed and\\nsustained the grievance.\\n Brock filed suit under section 301 of the Labor Manage-\\nment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking to vacate the\\nSubcommittee’s decision. The Laborers Union responded\\nwith a request to enforce the decision. After a flurry of\\nmotions on both sides, the district judge determined that the\\n\\n\\n1 Formally, the Laborers’ International Union of North America\\nConstruction & General Laborers Local 100.\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 3\\n\\nSubcommittee had authority to resolve the dispute and\\nissued an order enforcing its decision. Brock appealed.\\nUnder the mistaken impression that the judge had denied\\nthe motion to enforce, the Laborers Union also appealed.\\n We reverse. At bottom, this grievance concerns which of\\ntwo unions was entitled to perform the scaffolding work at\\nthe chemical plant. That’s a jurisdictional dispute, and the\\nlabor agreement calls for tripartite arbitration of jurisdiction-\\nal disputes. Accordingly, the Subcommittee had no authority\\nover the matter and its decision must be vacated.\\n I. Background\\n Brock and the Laborers Union entered into a labor\\nagreement effective January 7, 2016. The agreement pro-\\nvides: “Except for jurisdictional disputes and those involv-\\ning general wage rates, all disputes and grievances arising\\nout of work performed under this [a]greement … shall be\\nresolved” through the procedures outlined in Article VI.\\nArticle VI requires Brock and the Laborers to submit unre-\\nsolved grievances to the Subcommittee for arbitration. We\\nrefer to this grievance process as bipartite arbitration.\\n Article I of the agreement provides a separate procedure\\nfor resolving work-jurisdiction disputes. A work-jurisdiction\\ndispute is “a dispute between two or more groups of em-\\nployees over which is entitled to do certain work for an\\nemployer.” Hutter Constr. Co. v. Int’l Union of Operating\\nEng’rs, Local 139, 862 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1988) (quotation\\nmarks omitted). Under Article I of the labor contract, unre-\\nsolved work-jurisdiction disputes must be submitted to a\\nPermanent Umpire. Because this process typically involves\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nthree parties—the employer plus the two competing un-\\nions—we refer to it as tripartite arbitration.\\n Prior to signing the agreement, Brock assigned several\\nLaborers to construct scaffolding at the Afton Chemical\\nPlant. On January 8, 2016—the day after the operative labor\\nagreement became effective—Brock notified the Laborers\\nUnion that its services were no longer required because the\\nproject was assigned to the Carpenters Union. On January 11\\nthe Laborers Union sent a letter to the National Maintenance\\nAgreement Policy Committee claiming that Brock violated\\nthe agreement when it reassigned the work to the Carpen-\\nters. On January 21 the Laborers notified the Carpenters\\nUnion of a work-jurisdiction dispute between the unions\\nover the project.\\n Invoking the bipartite arbitration procedure specified in\\nArticle VI, the Laborers filed a grievance with the Subcom-\\nmittee complaining that Brock violated the agreement by\\nterminating the Laborers and assigning work to the Carpen-\\nters. The grievance requested reinstatement and backpay as\\na remedy. Brock responded that the Subcommittee had no\\narbitral authority over the grievance because it constituted a\\nwork-jurisdiction dispute and requested that the grievance\\nbe dismissed or denied.\\n The Subcommittee denied Brock’s request and sustained\\nthe grievance, finding that Brock violated Article I, Section 5\\nof the labor contract. That provisions states: “During the\\nexistence of the [a]greement, there shall be no strikes, lock-\\nouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising out of any juris-\\ndictional dispute. Work will continue as originally assigned,\\npending resolution of the dispute.” The Subcommittee\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 5\\n\\ndetermined that Brock violated this section by making “a\\nchange of assignment.”\\n Brock brought this suit under section 301 seeking to va-\\ncate the arbitral award as void because the grievance consti-\\ntuted a jurisdictional dispute and thus was outside the\\nSubcommittee’s arbitral authority. A bevy of motions fol-\\nlowed. The Laborers moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)\\nof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Brock moved to\\nvacate the award; the Laborers moved to “dismiss” the\\nmotion to vacate on timeliness grounds; and the Laborers\\nmoved to enforce the award.\\n The judge denied all four motions. She acknowledged\\nthat the Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority if the griev-\\nance concerned a jurisdictional dispute. She concluded,\\nhowever, that if the grievance concerned both a jurisdictional\\ndispute and a wrongful-termination claim, then the Sub-\\ncommittee could properly adjudicate the latter dispute. But a\\nmaterial issue of fact—namely, whether the Laborers were\\never assigned the project to begin with—prevented the judge\\nfrom resolving the case at that time.\\n Brock sought reconsideration, and the Laborers moved\\nfor summary judgment. The judge denied reconsideration\\nand entered summary judgment for the Laborers Union,\\nruling that Brock had indeed assigned the scaffolding work\\nto the Laborers and the Subcommittee’s decision is enforcea-\\nble. Both sides appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a summary judgment de novo. Hooper v. Proc-\\ntor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2015). We\\nbegin by addressing the Laborers’ cross-appeal, which seeks\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nreview of the judge’s initial order denying the motion to\\nenforce the arbitral award. The cross-appeal rests on the\\nmistaken assumption that the judge never issued an order\\nenforcing the award. But the summary-judgment order\\nclearly states that the “award is enforceable as a matter of\\nlaw.” Because the Laborers prevailed, we dismiss the cross-\\nappeal.\\n With that out of the way, we turn to the main event:\\nBrock’s argument that the Subcommittee lacked the authori-\\nty to arbitrate the grievance because it raised a work-\\njurisdiction dispute. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract[,]\\nand a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any\\ndispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” AT&T Techs.,\\nInc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)\\n(quotation marks omitted). “[T]he question of arbitrability—\\nwhether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for\\nthe parties to arbitrate the particular grievance—is undenia-\\nbly an issue for judicial determination.” Id. at 649.\\n By signing the agreement, Brock agreed to submit some\\ndisputes—but not all—to arbitration by the Subcommittee.\\nArticle VI of the agreement creates a bipartite arbitration\\nprocedure and vests the Subcommittee with arbitral authori-\\nty. Subject to two exceptions, the bilateral procedure applies\\nto “all disputes and grievances arising out of work per-\\nformed under [the] [a]greement involving the meaning or\\ninterpretation of any provision in [the] [a]greement.” Juris-\\ndictional disputes are one of the exceptions. Article I creates\\na separate, tripartite arbitration procedure to resolve work-\\njurisdiction disputes and vests arbitral authority in the\\nPermanent Umpire rather than the Subcommittee. Accord-\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 7\\n\\ningly, the Subcommittee exceeded its authority if the griev-\\nance raised a work-jurisdiction dispute.\\n The gravamen of the grievance is work jurisdiction. The\\ngrievance and its supporting documents all complain that\\nBrock improperly assigned work to the Carpenters instead\\nof the Laborers. The Grievance Form Fact Sheet demanded\\nthat Brock “make proper assignment of work to the Labor-\\ners’ Union,” “reinstate the Laborers,” and compensate\\nworkers for “lost wages and benefits.” Indeed, the Subcom-\\nmittee sustained the grievance because Brock “made a\\nchange of assignment.” In other words, the Laborers com-\\nplained (and the Subcommittee found) that Brock assigned\\nwork to the wrong union. That’s the definition of a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute. The Subcommittee therefore had no authority\\nto arbitrate the grievance. The contract required tripartite\\narbitration in which the competing unions and the employer\\ncould be heard.\\n Our previous decisions amply support this conclusion. In\\nLocal 416, Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n v. Helgesteel\\nCorp., 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1974), Helgesteel Corporation\\n(a contractor) and the Sheet Metal Workers were parties to a\\nlabor contract that provided for tripartite arbitration of\\njurisdictional disputes in Article XI and bipartite arbitration\\nfor almost all others in Article X. Id. at 1054–56. A dispute\\narose when Helgesteel reassigned work to an Ironworkers’\\nunion. The Sheet Metal Workers filed a grievance under\\nArticle X complaining about this reassignment; the arbitrator\\nsustained the grievance and awarded damages. When\\nHelgesteel refused to pay, the Sheet Metal Workers filed suit\\nin federal court to enforce the award. Helgesteel told the\\nIronworkers it would likely need to give the work back to\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nthe Sheet Metal Workers, so the Ironworkers filed their own\\ngrievance, which the arbitrator sustained. Id. The Ironwork-\\ners then filed suit in federal court seeking to compel the\\nSheet Metal Workers and Helgesteel to submit the entire\\ncontroversy to tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1055.\\n We held that the entire controversy constituted a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute requiring tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1057. The\\nSheet Metal Workers insisted that the agreement permitted\\nthem to seek damages under the bipartite process of\\nArticle X even if tripartite arbitration was also required\\nunder Article XI. Id. at 1058. We rejected that argument,\\nexplaining that such an interpretation of the contract “would\\nallow inconsistent final arbitration awards; the national joint\\nboard may say that the work should be assigned to the\\nironworkers while the local joint board has awarded damag-\\nes to the sheet metal workers.” Id.\\n Likewise, in William Charles Construction Co. v Teamsters\\nLocal Union 627, 827 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2016), we confronted a\\nsimilar agreement featuring bifurcated arbitration proce-\\ndures. The William Charles Construction Company per-\\nformed work on a highway expansion for the State of\\nIllinois. Id. at 674. During construction, a dispute broke out\\nbetween the Teamsters and the International Union of\\nOperating Engineers Local 649 over who was entitled to\\noperate the trucks required for the excavation work. The\\nTeamsters initiated tripartite arbitration, arguing that the\\nwork had been improperly assigned to the engineers. The\\narbitrator ruled in the Teamsters’ favor but awarded no\\nbackpay or damages. Id. The Teamsters then filed a second\\ngrievance under bipartite arbitration, complaining again of\\nthe improper assignment but this time seeking damages. Id.\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 9\\n\\nat 676. The second arbitrator also sided with the Teamsters\\nand awarded lost wages and benefits. Id. at 677. The compa-\\nny filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the second\\naward was void. Id. We agreed that the second grievance\\nwas not arbitrable because it was jurisdictional in nature and\\ntherefore not subject to bipartite arbitration. Id.\\n So too here. The Laborers Union complains that Brock\\nimproperly reassigned the project to another union, so the\\ngrievance must be resolved in tripartite arbitration. Allow-\\ning the Laborers to seek damages through bipartite arbitra-\\ntion could produce “inconsistent final arbitration awards,”\\nHelgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1058, so the Subcommittee lacked\\nauthority and its award must be vacated.\\n This conclusion accords with the reasoning of cases in\\nwhich we declined to find a jurisdictional dispute reserved\\nfor tripartite arbitration. For instance, in Hutter v. Local 139,\\n862 F.2d 641, Hutter (a general contractor) had a labor\\nagreement with the International Union of Operating Engi-\\nneers (“the Operators” or “the Operators Union”). Id. at 642.\\nThe agreement gave the Operators exclusive jurisdiction\\nover most forklift jobs in Wisconsin; it also provided that\\nwork could be subcontracted only to signatories to the\\nagreement. When Hutter was awarded work on a prison\\ncontract in Oshkosh, it subcontracted the masonry work to\\nBDI, which was not a signatory to the agreement. BDI\\nthereafter assigned forklift duties to the Wisconsin Laborers\\nDistrict Council and Laborers Local Union No. 1086 rather\\nthan the Operators. The Operators Union submitted a griev-\\nance to bipartite arbitration, complaining that Hutter had\\nimproperly subcontracted the work to a nonsignatory. Id.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nThe arbitrator agreed and ordered backpay, and the Opera-\\ntors filed suit in federal court to enforce the award. Id. at 643.\\n Hutter argued that the Operators’ grievance was really a\\n“disguised jurisdictional dispute” subject to tripartite arbi-\\ntration and that the bipartite arbitration award should be\\nvacated. Id. We disagreed, concluding that the subcontracting\\ngrievance “was a distinct non-jurisdictional claim” because it\\ndid not turn on who was ultimately assigned the work. Id. at\\n644. For example, BDI could have assigned the work to the\\nOperators, and in that case there would have been no juris-\\ndictional dispute even though Hutter violated the subcon-\\ntracting provision. Id. Because the subcontracting dispute\\nwas nonjurisdictional, the arbitrator had the authority to\\nresolve the grievance under the bipartite procedure. Id. at\\n645.\\n Although Hutter held that the dispute in question was\\nnonjurisdictional, its reasoning supports the opposite con-\\nclusion here. We emphasized in Hutter that the subcontract-\\ning grievance “arose independently” of the work\\nassignment; its validity was “not dependent upon the identi-\\nty of the party that ultimately performed the forklift work.”\\nId. at 644. In contrast, here the Laborers’ grievance is entirely\\ndependent on the work assignment. Under the reasoning in\\nHutter, the Laborers’ grievance is really just a “disguised\\njurisdictional dispute.” Id. at 643.\\n Our conclusion finds additional support in Miron Con-\\nstruction Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers,\\nLocal 139, 44 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1995). The facts there are\\nstrikingly similar to those in Hutter. Miron (a general con-\\ntractor) signed a labor agreement granting the Operators\\nUnion exclusive jurisdiction over forklift jobs in Wisconsin\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 11\\n\\nand stipulated that work could be subcontracted only to\\nsignatories to the agreement. Id. A dispute arose when\\nMiron twice subcontracted work to nonsignatories, each of\\nwhich assigned forklifting work to the Wisconsin Laborers\\nDistrict Council. Id. at 561. The Operators filed grievances\\nunder the bipartite procedure complaining that Miron had\\nviolated the subcontracting provision. The Laborers District\\nCouncil filed its own grievances to resolve the proper work\\nassignment and threatened to strike. This threat got the\\nNLRB involved, which held a § 10(k) hearing to resolve the\\njurisdictional dispute. The Board eventually awarded the\\nfirst project to the Laborers District Council. Id.\\n Miron filed a complaint in federal court seeking tripartite\\narbitration. Id. at 561–62. We affirmed the district court’s\\ndenial of that relief. While the Laborers’ grievance concerned\\nwork jurisdiction, the Operators’ grievance alleged only a\\nsubcontracting violation. And under Hutter a subcontracting\\ndispute is distinct and independent of a jurisdictional dis-\\npute. Id. In a subcontracting grievance, “[t]he identity of the\\nemployees who ultimately perform the work is irrelevant.”\\nId. at 566 (citing Hutter, 862 F.2d at 644). A subcontracting\\ngrievance does not conflict with a work-jurisdiction award\\nso long as there is no “demand that the subcontractor reas-\\nsign the work … . Since the subcontractor has complete\\ncontrol over which union actually performs the work,\\nmaintenance of an action against the general contractor\\ncannot be viewed as a veiled attempt to force a reassignment\\nof the work.” Id.\\n Miron too is factually distinguishable from this case,\\nthough like Hutter its reasoning supports our conclusion. In\\nMiron we focused on whether the bipartite proceeding could\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\ngenerate an award that conflicts with the resolution of a\\njurisdictional dispute. A bipartite arbitration award is valid\\nso long as the grievance “cannot be viewed as a veiled\\nattempt to force a reassignment of the work.” Id. Here the\\nLaborers explicitly attempted to force reassignment—the\\nunion demanded that Brock “make [a] proper assignment of\\nwork [back] to the Laborers’ Union.”\\n One case cuts in the opposite direction. In Alberici–Eby v.\\nLocal 520, International Union of Operating Engineers, 992 F.2d\\n727 (7th Cir. 1993), we affirmed awards entered in bipartite\\narbitration for improper work assignment. Alberici–Eby (a\\ngeneral contractor) hired six unions to construct a lock on\\nthe Mississippi River in Illinois. Id. at 728. The unions made\\ncompeting claims to each part of the work, and Alberici–Eby\\ndid its best to divide the work fairly. Id. at 729. After the\\nproject was completed, two unions—the Engineers and the\\nLaborers—filed separate grievances under their respective\\ncollective-bargaining agreements alleging that Alberici–Eby\\nhad improperly assigned their work to other unions.\\nAlberici–Eby responded that the grievances raised jurisdic-\\ntional disputes, so the arbitrators had no authority to hear\\nthem. Id. One arbitrator heard the Engineers’ grievance and\\ndecided in their favor, and a second arbitrator heard the\\nLaborers’ grievance and refused to stay the proceeding.\\nAlberici–Eby then filed suit in federal court asking that the\\njudge set aside the first arbitrator’s award, stay the proceed-\\ning before the second arbitrator, and require any unions\\nseeking relief to submit to multiparty arbitration to settle the\\njurisdictional dispute. Id.\\n We denied Alberici–Eby’s request. We first noted that\\nAlberici–Eby failed to timely invoke the multiparty arbitra-\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 13\\n\\ntion mechanism even though it “was on notice that it faced\\nthe strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards.” Id. at\\n730. We then determined that the first arbitrator had authori-\\nty to resolve the Engineers’ grievance. Id. at 733. The relevant\\nlabor agreement created a separate arbitration process for\\njurisdictional disputes, but we noted that the agreement\\n“[did] not tell us whether the subject of the grievance … was\\nor was not a jurisdictional dispute.” Id. However, the agree-\\nment provided that “any difference or dispute arising out of\\nthe interpretation or application of any of the provisions\\ncontained in th[e] [a]greement” was to be decided by an\\narbitrator. Id. The agreement further provided that the\\nEngineers had exclusive jurisdiction over the relevant work,\\nso we concluded that the dispute “ar[ose] out of the interpre-\\ntation or application of the [agreement].” Id. We also refused\\nto stay the proceedings before the second arbitrator, again\\nemphasizing that Alberici–Eby failed to timely invoke\\nmultiparty arbitration, so it “would be manifestly unjust to\\ndeny the Laborers an opportunity to be heard by way of\\nbipartite arbitration.” Id. at 734.\\n Alberici–Eby is hard to reconcile with Helgesteel, Hutter,\\nMiron, and William Charles. The grievances concerned work-\\nassignment disputes, but we permitted bipartite arbitration\\nto proceed. We based our decision in part on the language in\\nthe agreement between Alberici–Eby and the Engineers, but\\nthat language cannot be meaningfully distinguished from\\nvirtually identical language in Helgesteel. Compare Alberici–\\nEby, 992 F.2d at 733 (providing for bipartite arbitration over\\n“any difference or dispute arising out of the interpretation or\\napplication of any of the provisions contained in th[e]\\n[a]greement”) with Helgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1055 (providing for\\nbipartite arbitration over any “[g]rievance of the [e]mployer\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nor the [u]nion[] arising out of interpretation or enforcement\\nof th[e] [a]greement”).\\n Because Alberici–Eby is an obvious outlier, we limit the\\ncase to its peculiar facts. We emphasized there that the\\ncontractor waited too long to request multiparty arbitration.\\nThat defeated the purpose of the multiparty arbitration\\nprocess, “which was carefully designed to produce a speedy\\nresolution of jurisdictional disputes in order to permit work\\nto be properly allocated before that work is performed.”\\nAlberici–Eby, 992 F.2d at 731. The mistake was inexcusable in\\nlight of “the strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards”\\nwhen the unions filed their separate grievances. Id. at 730.\\nMoreover, the project had already been completed. As a\\nconsequence the multiparty arbitration would have done\\nlittle good: “[T]he work ha[d] already been performed,” and\\nthe multiparty procedure had “no authority to award dam-\\nages for misassigned work.” Id. at 730 n.2. We specifically\\nhighlighted these facts when we refused to stay arbitration\\nof the Laborers’ grievance. Id. at 734 (“In … light of Alberici–\\nEby’s failure to move in a timely fashion to achieve multi-\\nparty arbitration (assuming that such was available), it\\nwould be manifestly unjust to deny the Laborers an oppor-\\ntunity to be heard by way of bipartite arbitration.”). None of\\nthese circumstances are present here. The Laborers Union\\nnotified the Carpenters of the work-jurisdiction dispute ten\\ndays after it filed its bipartite grievance. And Brock chal-\\nlenged the propriety of bipartite arbitration at the earliest\\nopportunity.\\n The district judge offered two reasons to affirm the arbi-\\ntral award but neither holds up under the caselaw we’ve just\\nsurveyed. First, the judge reasoned that because several\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 15\\n\\nLaborers were already working on the project, removing\\nthose workers from the job gave rise to a wrongful-\\ntermination claim distinct from the jurisdictional dispute.\\nNot so. The Laborers were terminated because the work was\\nassigned to the Carpenters; a finding of wrongful termina-\\ntion necessarily implies that the work was misassigned. That\\nputs this grievance squarely on the work-jurisdiction side of\\nthe line. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration.\\n Second, the judge held that the grievance arose out of\\nArticle I, Section 5, which provides a separate contractual\\nbasis for bipartite arbitrability. The provision in question\\nstates: “During the existence of the [a]greement, there shall\\nbe no strikes, lockouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising\\nout of any jurisdictional dispute. Work will continue as\\noriginally assigned, pending resolution of the dispute.”\\n Grievances arising under this provision are indeed sub-\\nject to bipartite arbitration. Like the subcontracting provi-\\nsions in Hutter and Miron, a dispute under this provision can\\nbe separately arbitrated without interfering with a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute. Suppose for a moment that the Laborers and\\nthe Carpenters submitted a jurisdictional dispute to tripartite\\narbitration, and to pressure Brock into taking its side, the\\nLaborers Union called a strike, prompting Brock to file a\\ngrievance under Section 5. It would be completely consistent\\nfor one arbitrator to award the work assignment to the\\nLaborers and another to sanction the Laborers for initiating a\\nstrike. Neither award would call the other into question.\\n But bipartite arbitration was not appropriate just because\\nthe Laborers labeled the grievance as one arising under\\nSection 5. We look instead to the substance of the grievance.\\nAnd in substance, this grievance is a work-jurisdiction\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\ndispute. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration, and\\nthe Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority.\\n REVERSED; CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385228/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607975/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Brock Industrial Services, LLC v. Laborers' International Union\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\nBROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant/\n Cross-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nLABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION\nOF NORTH AMERICA CONSTRUCTION\n& GENERAL LABORERS LOCAL 100,\n Defendant-Appellee/\n Cross-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Illinois.\n No. 16-CV-780-NJR-DGW — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019\n ____________________\n\n\n Before BAUER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Brock Industrial Services, LLC, is an\nIllinois-based provider of industrial services, including\nscaffolding, painting, insulation, and shoring. In January\n\f2 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\n2016 it entered into a labor agreement with Local 100 of the\nLaborers’ International Union 1 (“the Laborers Union” or\n“the Laborers”). The agreement requires arbitration of\ngrievances and establishes a bipartite arbitration procedure\nfor resolving most disputes. But work-jurisdiction dis-\nputes—disputes over whether the Laborers or another union\nis entitled to perform work—are instead subject to a tripar-\ntite arbitration procedure involving the company and the\ncontending unions.\n Sometime prior to signing the agreement, Brock hired the\nLaborers to perform scaffolding work at a chemical plant.\nOn the day after the agreement became effective, Brock\ninformed the Laborers Union that it was reassigning the\nwork to the International Brotherhood of Carpenters (“the\nCarpenters Union” or “the Carpenters”). Invoking the\nbipartite arbitration procedure, the Laborers Union filed a\ngrievance with the Grievance Review Subcommittee of the\nNational Maintenance Agreement Policy Committee (“the\nSubcommittee”). Brock responded that the grievance in-\nvolved a work-jurisdiction dispute subject to tripartite\narbitration and therefore the Subcommittee lacked authority\nto arbitrate the matter. The Subcommittee disagreed and\nsustained the grievance.\n Brock filed suit under section 301 of the Labor Manage-\nment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking to vacate the\nSubcommittee’s decision. The Laborers Union responded\nwith a request to enforce the decision. After a flurry of\nmotions on both sides, the district judge determined that the\n\n\n1 Formally, the Laborers’ International Union of North America\nConstruction & General Laborers Local 100.\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 3\n\nSubcommittee had authority to resolve the dispute and\nissued an order enforcing its decision. Brock appealed.\nUnder the mistaken impression that the judge had denied\nthe motion to enforce, the Laborers Union also appealed.\n We reverse. At bottom, this grievance concerns which of\ntwo unions was entitled to perform the scaffolding work at\nthe chemical plant. That’s a jurisdictional dispute, and the\nlabor agreement calls for tripartite arbitration of jurisdiction-\nal disputes. Accordingly, the Subcommittee had no authority\nover the matter and its decision must be vacated.\n I. Background\n Brock and the Laborers Union entered into a labor\nagreement effective January 7, 2016. The agreement pro-\nvides: “Except for jurisdictional disputes and those involv-\ning general wage rates, all disputes and grievances arising\nout of work performed under this [a]greement … shall be\nresolved” through the procedures outlined in Article VI.\nArticle VI requires Brock and the Laborers to submit unre-\nsolved grievances to the Subcommittee for arbitration. We\nrefer to this grievance process as bipartite arbitration.\n Article I of the agreement provides a separate procedure\nfor resolving work-jurisdiction disputes. A work-jurisdiction\ndispute is “a dispute between two or more groups of em-\nployees over which is entitled to do certain work for an\nemployer.” Hutter Constr. Co. v. Int’l Union of Operating\nEng’rs, Local 139, 862 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1988) (quotation\nmarks omitted). Under Article I of the labor contract, unre-\nsolved work-jurisdiction disputes must be submitted to a\nPermanent Umpire. Because this process typically involves\n\f4 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\nthree parties—the employer plus the two competing un-\nions—we refer to it as tripartite arbitration.\n Prior to signing the agreement, Brock assigned several\nLaborers to construct scaffolding at the Afton Chemical\nPlant. On January 8, 2016—the day after the operative labor\nagreement became effective—Brock notified the Laborers\nUnion that its services were no longer required because the\nproject was assigned to the Carpenters Union. On January 11\nthe Laborers Union sent a letter to the National Maintenance\nAgreement Policy Committee claiming that Brock violated\nthe agreement when it reassigned the work to the Carpen-\nters. On January 21 the Laborers notified the Carpenters\nUnion of a work-jurisdiction dispute between the unions\nover the project.\n Invoking the bipartite arbitration procedure specified in\nArticle VI, the Laborers filed a grievance with the Subcom-\nmittee complaining that Brock violated the agreement by\nterminating the Laborers and assigning work to the Carpen-\nters. The grievance requested reinstatement and backpay as\na remedy. Brock responded that the Subcommittee had no\narbitral authority over the grievance because it constituted a\nwork-jurisdiction dispute and requested that the grievance\nbe dismissed or denied.\n The Subcommittee denied Brock’s request and sustained\nthe grievance, finding that Brock violated Article I, Section 5\nof the labor contract. That provisions states: “During the\nexistence of the [a]greement, there shall be no strikes, lock-\nouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising out of any juris-\ndictional dispute. Work will continue as originally assigned,\npending resolution of the dispute.” The Subcommittee\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 5\n\ndetermined that Brock violated this section by making “a\nchange of assignment.”\n Brock brought this suit under section 301 seeking to va-\ncate the arbitral award as void because the grievance consti-\ntuted a jurisdictional dispute and thus was outside the\nSubcommittee’s arbitral authority. A bevy of motions fol-\nlowed. The Laborers moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)\nof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Brock moved to\nvacate the award; the Laborers moved to “dismiss” the\nmotion to vacate on timeliness grounds; and the Laborers\nmoved to enforce the award.\n The judge denied all four motions. She acknowledged\nthat the Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority if the griev-\nance concerned a jurisdictional dispute. She concluded,\nhowever, that if the grievance concerned both a jurisdictional\ndispute and a wrongful-termination claim, then the Sub-\ncommittee could properly adjudicate the latter dispute. But a\nmaterial issue of fact—namely, whether the Laborers were\never assigned the project to begin with—prevented the judge\nfrom resolving the case at that time.\n Brock sought reconsideration, and the Laborers moved\nfor summary judgment. The judge denied reconsideration\nand entered summary judgment for the Laborers Union,\nruling that Brock had indeed assigned the scaffolding work\nto the Laborers and the Subcommittee’s decision is enforcea-\nble. Both sides appealed.\n II. Discussion\n We review a summary judgment de novo. Hooper v. Proc-\ntor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2015). We\nbegin by addressing the Laborers’ cross-appeal, which seeks\n\f6 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\nreview of the judge’s initial order denying the motion to\nenforce the arbitral award. The cross-appeal rests on the\nmistaken assumption that the judge never issued an order\nenforcing the award. But the summary-judgment order\nclearly states that the “award is enforceable as a matter of\nlaw.” Because the Laborers prevailed, we dismiss the cross-\nappeal.\n With that out of the way, we turn to the main event:\nBrock’s argument that the Subcommittee lacked the authori-\nty to arbitrate the grievance because it raised a work-\njurisdiction dispute. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract[,]\nand a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any\ndispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” AT&T Techs.,\nInc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)\n(quotation marks omitted). “[T]he question of arbitrability—\nwhether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for\nthe parties to arbitrate the particular grievance—is undenia-\nbly an issue for judicial determination.” Id. at 649.\n By signing the agreement, Brock agreed to submit some\ndisputes—but not all—to arbitration by the Subcommittee.\nArticle VI of the agreement creates a bipartite arbitration\nprocedure and vests the Subcommittee with arbitral authori-\nty. Subject to two exceptions, the bilateral procedure applies\nto “all disputes and grievances arising out of work per-\nformed under [the] [a]greement involving the meaning or\ninterpretation of any provision in [the] [a]greement.” Juris-\ndictional disputes are one of the exceptions. Article I creates\na separate, tripartite arbitration procedure to resolve work-\njurisdiction disputes and vests arbitral authority in the\nPermanent Umpire rather than the Subcommittee. Accord-\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 7\n\ningly, the Subcommittee exceeded its authority if the griev-\nance raised a work-jurisdiction dispute.\n The gravamen of the grievance is work jurisdiction. The\ngrievance and its supporting documents all complain that\nBrock improperly assigned work to the Carpenters instead\nof the Laborers. The Grievance Form Fact Sheet demanded\nthat Brock “make proper assignment of work to the Labor-\ners’ Union,” “reinstate the Laborers,” and compensate\nworkers for “lost wages and benefits.” Indeed, the Subcom-\nmittee sustained the grievance because Brock “made a\nchange of assignment.” In other words, the Laborers com-\nplained (and the Subcommittee found) that Brock assigned\nwork to the wrong union. That’s the definition of a jurisdic-\ntional dispute. The Subcommittee therefore had no authority\nto arbitrate the grievance. The contract required tripartite\narbitration in which the competing unions and the employer\ncould be heard.\n Our previous decisions amply support this conclusion. In\nLocal 416, Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n v. Helgesteel\nCorp., 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1974), Helgesteel Corporation\n(a contractor) and the Sheet Metal Workers were parties to a\nlabor contract that provided for tripartite arbitration of\njurisdictional disputes in Article XI and bipartite arbitration\nfor almost all others in Article X. Id. at 1054–56. A dispute\narose when Helgesteel reassigned work to an Ironworkers’\nunion. The Sheet Metal Workers filed a grievance under\nArticle X complaining about this reassignment; the arbitrator\nsustained the grievance and awarded damages. When\nHelgesteel refused to pay, the Sheet Metal Workers filed suit\nin federal court to enforce the award. Helgesteel told the\nIronworkers it would likely need to give the work back to\n\f8 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\nthe Sheet Metal Workers, so the Ironworkers filed their own\ngrievance, which the arbitrator sustained. Id. The Ironwork-\ners then filed suit in federal court seeking to compel the\nSheet Metal Workers and Helgesteel to submit the entire\ncontroversy to tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1055.\n We held that the entire controversy constituted a jurisdic-\ntional dispute requiring tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1057. The\nSheet Metal Workers insisted that the agreement permitted\nthem to seek damages under the bipartite process of\nArticle X even if tripartite arbitration was also required\nunder Article XI. Id. at 1058. We rejected that argument,\nexplaining that such an interpretation of the contract “would\nallow inconsistent final arbitration awards; the national joint\nboard may say that the work should be assigned to the\nironworkers while the local joint board has awarded damag-\nes to the sheet metal workers.” Id.\n Likewise, in William Charles Construction Co. v Teamsters\nLocal Union 627, 827 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2016), we confronted a\nsimilar agreement featuring bifurcated arbitration proce-\ndures. The William Charles Construction Company per-\nformed work on a highway expansion for the State of\nIllinois. Id. at 674. During construction, a dispute broke out\nbetween the Teamsters and the International Union of\nOperating Engineers Local 649 over who was entitled to\noperate the trucks required for the excavation work. The\nTeamsters initiated tripartite arbitration, arguing that the\nwork had been improperly assigned to the engineers. The\narbitrator ruled in the Teamsters’ favor but awarded no\nbackpay or damages. Id. The Teamsters then filed a second\ngrievance under bipartite arbitration, complaining again of\nthe improper assignment but this time seeking damages. Id.\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 9\n\nat 676. The second arbitrator also sided with the Teamsters\nand awarded lost wages and benefits. Id. at 677. The compa-\nny filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the second\naward was void. Id. We agreed that the second grievance\nwas not arbitrable because it was jurisdictional in nature and\ntherefore not subject to bipartite arbitration. Id.\n So too here. The Laborers Union complains that Brock\nimproperly reassigned the project to another union, so the\ngrievance must be resolved in tripartite arbitration. Allow-\ning the Laborers to seek damages through bipartite arbitra-\ntion could produce “inconsistent final arbitration awards,”\nHelgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1058, so the Subcommittee lacked\nauthority and its award must be vacated.\n This conclusion accords with the reasoning of cases in\nwhich we declined to find a jurisdictional dispute reserved\nfor tripartite arbitration. For instance, in Hutter v. Local 139,\n862 F.2d 641, Hutter (a general contractor) had a labor\nagreement with the International Union of Operating Engi-\nneers (“the Operators” or “the Operators Union”). Id. at 642.\nThe agreement gave the Operators exclusive jurisdiction\nover most forklift jobs in Wisconsin; it also provided that\nwork could be subcontracted only to signatories to the\nagreement. When Hutter was awarded work on a prison\ncontract in Oshkosh, it subcontracted the masonry work to\nBDI, which was not a signatory to the agreement. BDI\nthereafter assigned forklift duties to the Wisconsin Laborers\nDistrict Council and Laborers Local Union No. 1086 rather\nthan the Operators. The Operators Union submitted a griev-\nance to bipartite arbitration, complaining that Hutter had\nimproperly subcontracted the work to a nonsignatory. Id.\n\f10 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\nThe arbitrator agreed and ordered backpay, and the Opera-\ntors filed suit in federal court to enforce the award. Id. at 643.\n Hutter argued that the Operators’ grievance was really a\n“disguised jurisdictional dispute” subject to tripartite arbi-\ntration and that the bipartite arbitration award should be\nvacated. Id. We disagreed, concluding that the subcontracting\ngrievance “was a distinct non-jurisdictional claim” because it\ndid not turn on who was ultimately assigned the work. Id. at\n644. For example, BDI could have assigned the work to the\nOperators, and in that case there would have been no juris-\ndictional dispute even though Hutter violated the subcon-\ntracting provision. Id. Because the subcontracting dispute\nwas nonjurisdictional, the arbitrator had the authority to\nresolve the grievance under the bipartite procedure. Id. at\n645.\n Although Hutter held that the dispute in question was\nnonjurisdictional, its reasoning supports the opposite con-\nclusion here. We emphasized in Hutter that the subcontract-\ning grievance “arose independently” of the work\nassignment; its validity was “not dependent upon the identi-\nty of the party that ultimately performed the forklift work.”\nId. at 644. In contrast, here the Laborers’ grievance is entirely\ndependent on the work assignment. Under the reasoning in\nHutter, the Laborers’ grievance is really just a “disguised\njurisdictional dispute.” Id. at 643.\n Our conclusion finds additional support in Miron Con-\nstruction Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers,\nLocal 139, 44 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1995). The facts there are\nstrikingly similar to those in Hutter. Miron (a general con-\ntractor) signed a labor agreement granting the Operators\nUnion exclusive jurisdiction over forklift jobs in Wisconsin\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 11\n\nand stipulated that work could be subcontracted only to\nsignatories to the agreement. Id. A dispute arose when\nMiron twice subcontracted work to nonsignatories, each of\nwhich assigned forklifting work to the Wisconsin Laborers\nDistrict Council. Id. at 561. The Operators filed grievances\nunder the bipartite procedure complaining that Miron had\nviolated the subcontracting provision. The Laborers District\nCouncil filed its own grievances to resolve the proper work\nassignment and threatened to strike. This threat got the\nNLRB involved, which held a § 10(k) hearing to resolve the\njurisdictional dispute. The Board eventually awarded the\nfirst project to the Laborers District Council. Id.\n Miron filed a complaint in federal court seeking tripartite\narbitration. Id. at 561–62. We affirmed the district court’s\ndenial of that relief. While the Laborers’ grievance concerned\nwork jurisdiction, the Operators’ grievance alleged only a\nsubcontracting violation. And under Hutter a subcontracting\ndispute is distinct and independent of a jurisdictional dis-\npute. Id. In a subcontracting grievance, “[t]he identity of the\nemployees who ultimately perform the work is irrelevant.”\nId. at 566 (citing Hutter, 862 F.2d at 644). A subcontracting\ngrievance does not conflict with a work-jurisdiction award\nso long as there is no “demand that the subcontractor reas-\nsign the work … . Since the subcontractor has complete\ncontrol over which union actually performs the work,\nmaintenance of an action against the general contractor\ncannot be viewed as a veiled attempt to force a reassignment\nof the work.” Id.\n Miron too is factually distinguishable from this case,\nthough like Hutter its reasoning supports our conclusion. In\nMiron we focused on whether the bipartite proceeding could\n\f12 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\ngenerate an award that conflicts with the resolution of a\njurisdictional dispute. A bipartite arbitration award is valid\nso long as the grievance “cannot be viewed as a veiled\nattempt to force a reassignment of the work.” Id. Here the\nLaborers explicitly attempted to force reassignment—the\nunion demanded that Brock “make [a] proper assignment of\nwork [back] to the Laborers’ Union.”\n One case cuts in the opposite direction. In Alberici–Eby v.\nLocal 520, International Union of Operating Engineers, 992 F.2d\n727 (7th Cir. 1993), we affirmed awards entered in bipartite\narbitration for improper work assignment. Alberici–Eby (a\ngeneral contractor) hired six unions to construct a lock on\nthe Mississippi River in Illinois. Id. at 728. The unions made\ncompeting claims to each part of the work, and Alberici–Eby\ndid its best to divide the work fairly. Id. at 729. After the\nproject was completed, two unions—the Engineers and the\nLaborers—filed separate grievances under their respective\ncollective-bargaining agreements alleging that Alberici–Eby\nhad improperly assigned their work to other unions.\nAlberici–Eby responded that the grievances raised jurisdic-\ntional disputes, so the arbitrators had no authority to hear\nthem. Id. One arbitrator heard the Engineers’ grievance and\ndecided in their favor, and a second arbitrator heard the\nLaborers’ grievance and refused to stay the proceeding.\nAlberici–Eby then filed suit in federal court asking that the\njudge set aside the first arbitrator’s award, stay the proceed-\ning before the second arbitrator, and require any unions\nseeking relief to submit to multiparty arbitration to settle the\njurisdictional dispute. Id.\n We denied Alberici–Eby’s request. We first noted that\nAlberici–Eby failed to timely invoke the multiparty arbitra-\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 13\n\ntion mechanism even though it “was on notice that it faced\nthe strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards.” Id. at\n730. We then determined that the first arbitrator had authori-\nty to resolve the Engineers’ grievance. Id. at 733. The relevant\nlabor agreement created a separate arbitration process for\njurisdictional disputes, but we noted that the agreement\n“[did] not tell us whether the subject of the grievance … was\nor was not a jurisdictional dispute.” Id. However, the agree-\nment provided that “any difference or dispute arising out of\nthe interpretation or application of any of the provisions\ncontained in th[e] [a]greement” was to be decided by an\narbitrator. Id. The agreement further provided that the\nEngineers had exclusive jurisdiction over the relevant work,\nso we concluded that the dispute “ar[ose] out of the interpre-\ntation or application of the [agreement].” Id. We also refused\nto stay the proceedings before the second arbitrator, again\nemphasizing that Alberici–Eby failed to timely invoke\nmultiparty arbitration, so it “would be manifestly unjust to\ndeny the Laborers an opportunity to be heard by way of\nbipartite arbitration.” Id. at 734.\n Alberici–Eby is hard to reconcile with Helgesteel, Hutter,\nMiron, and William Charles. The grievances concerned work-\nassignment disputes, but we permitted bipartite arbitration\nto proceed. We based our decision in part on the language in\nthe agreement between Alberici–Eby and the Engineers, but\nthat language cannot be meaningfully distinguished from\nvirtually identical language in Helgesteel. Compare Alberici–\nEby, 992 F.2d at 733 (providing for bipartite arbitration over\n“any difference or dispute arising out of the interpretation or\napplication of any of the provisions contained in th[e]\n[a]greement”) with Helgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1055 (providing for\nbipartite arbitration over any “[g]rievance of the [e]mployer\n\f14 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\nor the [u]nion[] arising out of interpretation or enforcement\nof th[e] [a]greement”).\n Because Alberici–Eby is an obvious outlier, we limit the\ncase to its peculiar facts. We emphasized there that the\ncontractor waited too long to request multiparty arbitration.\nThat defeated the purpose of the multiparty arbitration\nprocess, “which was carefully designed to produce a speedy\nresolution of jurisdictional disputes in order to permit work\nto be properly allocated before that work is performed.”\nAlberici–Eby, 992 F.2d at 731. The mistake was inexcusable in\nlight of “the strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards”\nwhen the unions filed their separate grievances. Id. at 730.\nMoreover, the project had already been completed. As a\nconsequence the multiparty arbitration would have done\nlittle good: “[T]he work ha[d] already been performed,” and\nthe multiparty procedure had “no authority to award dam-\nages for misassigned work.” Id. at 730 n.2. We specifically\nhighlighted these facts when we refused to stay arbitration\nof the Laborers’ grievance. Id. at 734 (“In … light of Alberici–\nEby’s failure to move in a timely fashion to achieve multi-\nparty arbitration (assuming that such was available), it\nwould be manifestly unjust to deny the Laborers an oppor-\ntunity to be heard by way of bipartite arbitration.”). None of\nthese circumstances are present here. The Laborers Union\nnotified the Carpenters of the work-jurisdiction dispute ten\ndays after it filed its bipartite grievance. And Brock chal-\nlenged the propriety of bipartite arbitration at the earliest\nopportunity.\n The district judge offered two reasons to affirm the arbi-\ntral award but neither holds up under the caselaw we’ve just\nsurveyed. First, the judge reasoned that because several\n\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 15\n\nLaborers were already working on the project, removing\nthose workers from the job gave rise to a wrongful-\ntermination claim distinct from the jurisdictional dispute.\nNot so. The Laborers were terminated because the work was\nassigned to the Carpenters; a finding of wrongful termina-\ntion necessarily implies that the work was misassigned. That\nputs this grievance squarely on the work-jurisdiction side of\nthe line. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration.\n Second, the judge held that the grievance arose out of\nArticle I, Section 5, which provides a separate contractual\nbasis for bipartite arbitrability. The provision in question\nstates: “During the existence of the [a]greement, there shall\nbe no strikes, lockouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising\nout of any jurisdictional dispute. Work will continue as\noriginally assigned, pending resolution of the dispute.”\n Grievances arising under this provision are indeed sub-\nject to bipartite arbitration. Like the subcontracting provi-\nsions in Hutter and Miron, a dispute under this provision can\nbe separately arbitrated without interfering with a jurisdic-\ntional dispute. Suppose for a moment that the Laborers and\nthe Carpenters submitted a jurisdictional dispute to tripartite\narbitration, and to pressure Brock into taking its side, the\nLaborers Union called a strike, prompting Brock to file a\ngrievance under Section 5. It would be completely consistent\nfor one arbitrator to award the work assignment to the\nLaborers and another to sanction the Laborers for initiating a\nstrike. Neither award would call the other into question.\n But bipartite arbitration was not appropriate just because\nthe Laborers labeled the grievance as one arising under\nSection 5. We look instead to the substance of the grievance.\nAnd in substance, this grievance is a work-jurisdiction\n\f16 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\n\ndispute. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration, and\nthe Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority.\n REVERSED; CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Brock Industrial Services, LLC v. Laborers' International Union\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\nBROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant/\\n Cross-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nLABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION\\nOF NORTH AMERICA CONSTRUCTION\\n& GENERAL LABORERS LOCAL 100,\\n Defendant-Appellee/\\n Cross-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 16-CV-780-NJR-DGW — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 11, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Brock Industrial Services, LLC, is an\\nIllinois-based provider of industrial services, including\\nscaffolding, painting, insulation, and shoring. In January\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\n2016 it entered into a labor agreement with Local 100 of the\\nLaborers’ International Union 1 (“the Laborers Union” or\\n“the Laborers”). The agreement requires arbitration of\\ngrievances and establishes a bipartite arbitration procedure\\nfor resolving most disputes. But work-jurisdiction dis-\\nputes—disputes over whether the Laborers or another union\\nis entitled to perform work—are instead subject to a tripar-\\ntite arbitration procedure involving the company and the\\ncontending unions.\\n Sometime prior to signing the agreement, Brock hired the\\nLaborers to perform scaffolding work at a chemical plant.\\nOn the day after the agreement became effective, Brock\\ninformed the Laborers Union that it was reassigning the\\nwork to the International Brotherhood of Carpenters (“the\\nCarpenters Union” or “the Carpenters”). Invoking the\\nbipartite arbitration procedure, the Laborers Union filed a\\ngrievance with the Grievance Review Subcommittee of the\\nNational Maintenance Agreement Policy Committee (“the\\nSubcommittee”). Brock responded that the grievance in-\\nvolved a work-jurisdiction dispute subject to tripartite\\narbitration and therefore the Subcommittee lacked authority\\nto arbitrate the matter. The Subcommittee disagreed and\\nsustained the grievance.\\n Brock filed suit under section 301 of the Labor Manage-\\nment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking to vacate the\\nSubcommittee’s decision. The Laborers Union responded\\nwith a request to enforce the decision. After a flurry of\\nmotions on both sides, the district judge determined that the\\n\\n\\n1 Formally, the Laborers’ International Union of North America\\nConstruction & General Laborers Local 100.\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 3\\n\\nSubcommittee had authority to resolve the dispute and\\nissued an order enforcing its decision. Brock appealed.\\nUnder the mistaken impression that the judge had denied\\nthe motion to enforce, the Laborers Union also appealed.\\n We reverse. At bottom, this grievance concerns which of\\ntwo unions was entitled to perform the scaffolding work at\\nthe chemical plant. That’s a jurisdictional dispute, and the\\nlabor agreement calls for tripartite arbitration of jurisdiction-\\nal disputes. Accordingly, the Subcommittee had no authority\\nover the matter and its decision must be vacated.\\n I. Background\\n Brock and the Laborers Union entered into a labor\\nagreement effective January 7, 2016. The agreement pro-\\nvides: “Except for jurisdictional disputes and those involv-\\ning general wage rates, all disputes and grievances arising\\nout of work performed under this [a]greement … shall be\\nresolved” through the procedures outlined in Article VI.\\nArticle VI requires Brock and the Laborers to submit unre-\\nsolved grievances to the Subcommittee for arbitration. We\\nrefer to this grievance process as bipartite arbitration.\\n Article I of the agreement provides a separate procedure\\nfor resolving work-jurisdiction disputes. A work-jurisdiction\\ndispute is “a dispute between two or more groups of em-\\nployees over which is entitled to do certain work for an\\nemployer.” Hutter Constr. Co. v. Int’l Union of Operating\\nEng’rs, Local 139, 862 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1988) (quotation\\nmarks omitted). Under Article I of the labor contract, unre-\\nsolved work-jurisdiction disputes must be submitted to a\\nPermanent Umpire. Because this process typically involves\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nthree parties—the employer plus the two competing un-\\nions—we refer to it as tripartite arbitration.\\n Prior to signing the agreement, Brock assigned several\\nLaborers to construct scaffolding at the Afton Chemical\\nPlant. On January 8, 2016—the day after the operative labor\\nagreement became effective—Brock notified the Laborers\\nUnion that its services were no longer required because the\\nproject was assigned to the Carpenters Union. On January 11\\nthe Laborers Union sent a letter to the National Maintenance\\nAgreement Policy Committee claiming that Brock violated\\nthe agreement when it reassigned the work to the Carpen-\\nters. On January 21 the Laborers notified the Carpenters\\nUnion of a work-jurisdiction dispute between the unions\\nover the project.\\n Invoking the bipartite arbitration procedure specified in\\nArticle VI, the Laborers filed a grievance with the Subcom-\\nmittee complaining that Brock violated the agreement by\\nterminating the Laborers and assigning work to the Carpen-\\nters. The grievance requested reinstatement and backpay as\\na remedy. Brock responded that the Subcommittee had no\\narbitral authority over the grievance because it constituted a\\nwork-jurisdiction dispute and requested that the grievance\\nbe dismissed or denied.\\n The Subcommittee denied Brock’s request and sustained\\nthe grievance, finding that Brock violated Article I, Section 5\\nof the labor contract. That provisions states: “During the\\nexistence of the [a]greement, there shall be no strikes, lock-\\nouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising out of any juris-\\ndictional dispute. Work will continue as originally assigned,\\npending resolution of the dispute.” The Subcommittee\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 5\\n\\ndetermined that Brock violated this section by making “a\\nchange of assignment.”\\n Brock brought this suit under section 301 seeking to va-\\ncate the arbitral award as void because the grievance consti-\\ntuted a jurisdictional dispute and thus was outside the\\nSubcommittee’s arbitral authority. A bevy of motions fol-\\nlowed. The Laborers moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)\\nof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Brock moved to\\nvacate the award; the Laborers moved to “dismiss” the\\nmotion to vacate on timeliness grounds; and the Laborers\\nmoved to enforce the award.\\n The judge denied all four motions. She acknowledged\\nthat the Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority if the griev-\\nance concerned a jurisdictional dispute. She concluded,\\nhowever, that if the grievance concerned both a jurisdictional\\ndispute and a wrongful-termination claim, then the Sub-\\ncommittee could properly adjudicate the latter dispute. But a\\nmaterial issue of fact—namely, whether the Laborers were\\never assigned the project to begin with—prevented the judge\\nfrom resolving the case at that time.\\n Brock sought reconsideration, and the Laborers moved\\nfor summary judgment. The judge denied reconsideration\\nand entered summary judgment for the Laborers Union,\\nruling that Brock had indeed assigned the scaffolding work\\nto the Laborers and the Subcommittee’s decision is enforcea-\\nble. Both sides appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a summary judgment de novo. Hooper v. Proc-\\ntor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2015). We\\nbegin by addressing the Laborers’ cross-appeal, which seeks\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nreview of the judge’s initial order denying the motion to\\nenforce the arbitral award. The cross-appeal rests on the\\nmistaken assumption that the judge never issued an order\\nenforcing the award. But the summary-judgment order\\nclearly states that the “award is enforceable as a matter of\\nlaw.” Because the Laborers prevailed, we dismiss the cross-\\nappeal.\\n With that out of the way, we turn to the main event:\\nBrock’s argument that the Subcommittee lacked the authori-\\nty to arbitrate the grievance because it raised a work-\\njurisdiction dispute. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract[,]\\nand a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any\\ndispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” AT&T Techs.,\\nInc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)\\n(quotation marks omitted). “[T]he question of arbitrability—\\nwhether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for\\nthe parties to arbitrate the particular grievance—is undenia-\\nbly an issue for judicial determination.” Id. at 649.\\n By signing the agreement, Brock agreed to submit some\\ndisputes—but not all—to arbitration by the Subcommittee.\\nArticle VI of the agreement creates a bipartite arbitration\\nprocedure and vests the Subcommittee with arbitral authori-\\nty. Subject to two exceptions, the bilateral procedure applies\\nto “all disputes and grievances arising out of work per-\\nformed under [the] [a]greement involving the meaning or\\ninterpretation of any provision in [the] [a]greement.” Juris-\\ndictional disputes are one of the exceptions. Article I creates\\na separate, tripartite arbitration procedure to resolve work-\\njurisdiction disputes and vests arbitral authority in the\\nPermanent Umpire rather than the Subcommittee. Accord-\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 7\\n\\ningly, the Subcommittee exceeded its authority if the griev-\\nance raised a work-jurisdiction dispute.\\n The gravamen of the grievance is work jurisdiction. The\\ngrievance and its supporting documents all complain that\\nBrock improperly assigned work to the Carpenters instead\\nof the Laborers. The Grievance Form Fact Sheet demanded\\nthat Brock “make proper assignment of work to the Labor-\\ners’ Union,” “reinstate the Laborers,” and compensate\\nworkers for “lost wages and benefits.” Indeed, the Subcom-\\nmittee sustained the grievance because Brock “made a\\nchange of assignment.” In other words, the Laborers com-\\nplained (and the Subcommittee found) that Brock assigned\\nwork to the wrong union. That’s the definition of a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute. The Subcommittee therefore had no authority\\nto arbitrate the grievance. The contract required tripartite\\narbitration in which the competing unions and the employer\\ncould be heard.\\n Our previous decisions amply support this conclusion. In\\nLocal 416, Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n v. Helgesteel\\nCorp., 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1974), Helgesteel Corporation\\n(a contractor) and the Sheet Metal Workers were parties to a\\nlabor contract that provided for tripartite arbitration of\\njurisdictional disputes in Article XI and bipartite arbitration\\nfor almost all others in Article X. Id. at 1054–56. A dispute\\narose when Helgesteel reassigned work to an Ironworkers’\\nunion. The Sheet Metal Workers filed a grievance under\\nArticle X complaining about this reassignment; the arbitrator\\nsustained the grievance and awarded damages. When\\nHelgesteel refused to pay, the Sheet Metal Workers filed suit\\nin federal court to enforce the award. Helgesteel told the\\nIronworkers it would likely need to give the work back to\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nthe Sheet Metal Workers, so the Ironworkers filed their own\\ngrievance, which the arbitrator sustained. Id. The Ironwork-\\ners then filed suit in federal court seeking to compel the\\nSheet Metal Workers and Helgesteel to submit the entire\\ncontroversy to tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1055.\\n We held that the entire controversy constituted a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute requiring tripartite arbitration. Id. at 1057. The\\nSheet Metal Workers insisted that the agreement permitted\\nthem to seek damages under the bipartite process of\\nArticle X even if tripartite arbitration was also required\\nunder Article XI. Id. at 1058. We rejected that argument,\\nexplaining that such an interpretation of the contract “would\\nallow inconsistent final arbitration awards; the national joint\\nboard may say that the work should be assigned to the\\nironworkers while the local joint board has awarded damag-\\nes to the sheet metal workers.” Id.\\n Likewise, in William Charles Construction Co. v Teamsters\\nLocal Union 627, 827 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2016), we confronted a\\nsimilar agreement featuring bifurcated arbitration proce-\\ndures. The William Charles Construction Company per-\\nformed work on a highway expansion for the State of\\nIllinois. Id. at 674. During construction, a dispute broke out\\nbetween the Teamsters and the International Union of\\nOperating Engineers Local 649 over who was entitled to\\noperate the trucks required for the excavation work. The\\nTeamsters initiated tripartite arbitration, arguing that the\\nwork had been improperly assigned to the engineers. The\\narbitrator ruled in the Teamsters’ favor but awarded no\\nbackpay or damages. Id. The Teamsters then filed a second\\ngrievance under bipartite arbitration, complaining again of\\nthe improper assignment but this time seeking damages. Id.\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 9\\n\\nat 676. The second arbitrator also sided with the Teamsters\\nand awarded lost wages and benefits. Id. at 677. The compa-\\nny filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the second\\naward was void. Id. We agreed that the second grievance\\nwas not arbitrable because it was jurisdictional in nature and\\ntherefore not subject to bipartite arbitration. Id.\\n So too here. The Laborers Union complains that Brock\\nimproperly reassigned the project to another union, so the\\ngrievance must be resolved in tripartite arbitration. Allow-\\ning the Laborers to seek damages through bipartite arbitra-\\ntion could produce “inconsistent final arbitration awards,”\\nHelgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1058, so the Subcommittee lacked\\nauthority and its award must be vacated.\\n This conclusion accords with the reasoning of cases in\\nwhich we declined to find a jurisdictional dispute reserved\\nfor tripartite arbitration. For instance, in Hutter v. Local 139,\\n862 F.2d 641, Hutter (a general contractor) had a labor\\nagreement with the International Union of Operating Engi-\\nneers (“the Operators” or “the Operators Union”). Id. at 642.\\nThe agreement gave the Operators exclusive jurisdiction\\nover most forklift jobs in Wisconsin; it also provided that\\nwork could be subcontracted only to signatories to the\\nagreement. When Hutter was awarded work on a prison\\ncontract in Oshkosh, it subcontracted the masonry work to\\nBDI, which was not a signatory to the agreement. BDI\\nthereafter assigned forklift duties to the Wisconsin Laborers\\nDistrict Council and Laborers Local Union No. 1086 rather\\nthan the Operators. The Operators Union submitted a griev-\\nance to bipartite arbitration, complaining that Hutter had\\nimproperly subcontracted the work to a nonsignatory. Id.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nThe arbitrator agreed and ordered backpay, and the Opera-\\ntors filed suit in federal court to enforce the award. Id. at 643.\\n Hutter argued that the Operators’ grievance was really a\\n“disguised jurisdictional dispute” subject to tripartite arbi-\\ntration and that the bipartite arbitration award should be\\nvacated. Id. We disagreed, concluding that the subcontracting\\ngrievance “was a distinct non-jurisdictional claim” because it\\ndid not turn on who was ultimately assigned the work. Id. at\\n644. For example, BDI could have assigned the work to the\\nOperators, and in that case there would have been no juris-\\ndictional dispute even though Hutter violated the subcon-\\ntracting provision. Id. Because the subcontracting dispute\\nwas nonjurisdictional, the arbitrator had the authority to\\nresolve the grievance under the bipartite procedure. Id. at\\n645.\\n Although Hutter held that the dispute in question was\\nnonjurisdictional, its reasoning supports the opposite con-\\nclusion here. We emphasized in Hutter that the subcontract-\\ning grievance “arose independently” of the work\\nassignment; its validity was “not dependent upon the identi-\\nty of the party that ultimately performed the forklift work.”\\nId. at 644. In contrast, here the Laborers’ grievance is entirely\\ndependent on the work assignment. Under the reasoning in\\nHutter, the Laborers’ grievance is really just a “disguised\\njurisdictional dispute.” Id. at 643.\\n Our conclusion finds additional support in Miron Con-\\nstruction Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers,\\nLocal 139, 44 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1995). The facts there are\\nstrikingly similar to those in Hutter. Miron (a general con-\\ntractor) signed a labor agreement granting the Operators\\nUnion exclusive jurisdiction over forklift jobs in Wisconsin\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 11\\n\\nand stipulated that work could be subcontracted only to\\nsignatories to the agreement. Id. A dispute arose when\\nMiron twice subcontracted work to nonsignatories, each of\\nwhich assigned forklifting work to the Wisconsin Laborers\\nDistrict Council. Id. at 561. The Operators filed grievances\\nunder the bipartite procedure complaining that Miron had\\nviolated the subcontracting provision. The Laborers District\\nCouncil filed its own grievances to resolve the proper work\\nassignment and threatened to strike. This threat got the\\nNLRB involved, which held a § 10(k) hearing to resolve the\\njurisdictional dispute. The Board eventually awarded the\\nfirst project to the Laborers District Council. Id.\\n Miron filed a complaint in federal court seeking tripartite\\narbitration. Id. at 561–62. We affirmed the district court’s\\ndenial of that relief. While the Laborers’ grievance concerned\\nwork jurisdiction, the Operators’ grievance alleged only a\\nsubcontracting violation. And under Hutter a subcontracting\\ndispute is distinct and independent of a jurisdictional dis-\\npute. Id. In a subcontracting grievance, “[t]he identity of the\\nemployees who ultimately perform the work is irrelevant.”\\nId. at 566 (citing Hutter, 862 F.2d at 644). A subcontracting\\ngrievance does not conflict with a work-jurisdiction award\\nso long as there is no “demand that the subcontractor reas-\\nsign the work … . Since the subcontractor has complete\\ncontrol over which union actually performs the work,\\nmaintenance of an action against the general contractor\\ncannot be viewed as a veiled attempt to force a reassignment\\nof the work.” Id.\\n Miron too is factually distinguishable from this case,\\nthough like Hutter its reasoning supports our conclusion. In\\nMiron we focused on whether the bipartite proceeding could\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\ngenerate an award that conflicts with the resolution of a\\njurisdictional dispute. A bipartite arbitration award is valid\\nso long as the grievance “cannot be viewed as a veiled\\nattempt to force a reassignment of the work.” Id. Here the\\nLaborers explicitly attempted to force reassignment—the\\nunion demanded that Brock “make [a] proper assignment of\\nwork [back] to the Laborers’ Union.”\\n One case cuts in the opposite direction. In Alberici–Eby v.\\nLocal 520, International Union of Operating Engineers, 992 F.2d\\n727 (7th Cir. 1993), we affirmed awards entered in bipartite\\narbitration for improper work assignment. Alberici–Eby (a\\ngeneral contractor) hired six unions to construct a lock on\\nthe Mississippi River in Illinois. Id. at 728. The unions made\\ncompeting claims to each part of the work, and Alberici–Eby\\ndid its best to divide the work fairly. Id. at 729. After the\\nproject was completed, two unions—the Engineers and the\\nLaborers—filed separate grievances under their respective\\ncollective-bargaining agreements alleging that Alberici–Eby\\nhad improperly assigned their work to other unions.\\nAlberici–Eby responded that the grievances raised jurisdic-\\ntional disputes, so the arbitrators had no authority to hear\\nthem. Id. One arbitrator heard the Engineers’ grievance and\\ndecided in their favor, and a second arbitrator heard the\\nLaborers’ grievance and refused to stay the proceeding.\\nAlberici–Eby then filed suit in federal court asking that the\\njudge set aside the first arbitrator’s award, stay the proceed-\\ning before the second arbitrator, and require any unions\\nseeking relief to submit to multiparty arbitration to settle the\\njurisdictional dispute. Id.\\n We denied Alberici–Eby’s request. We first noted that\\nAlberici–Eby failed to timely invoke the multiparty arbitra-\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 13\\n\\ntion mechanism even though it “was on notice that it faced\\nthe strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards.” Id. at\\n730. We then determined that the first arbitrator had authori-\\nty to resolve the Engineers’ grievance. Id. at 733. The relevant\\nlabor agreement created a separate arbitration process for\\njurisdictional disputes, but we noted that the agreement\\n“[did] not tell us whether the subject of the grievance … was\\nor was not a jurisdictional dispute.” Id. However, the agree-\\nment provided that “any difference or dispute arising out of\\nthe interpretation or application of any of the provisions\\ncontained in th[e] [a]greement” was to be decided by an\\narbitrator. Id. The agreement further provided that the\\nEngineers had exclusive jurisdiction over the relevant work,\\nso we concluded that the dispute “ar[ose] out of the interpre-\\ntation or application of the [agreement].” Id. We also refused\\nto stay the proceedings before the second arbitrator, again\\nemphasizing that Alberici–Eby failed to timely invoke\\nmultiparty arbitration, so it “would be manifestly unjust to\\ndeny the Laborers an opportunity to be heard by way of\\nbipartite arbitration.” Id. at 734.\\n Alberici–Eby is hard to reconcile with Helgesteel, Hutter,\\nMiron, and William Charles. The grievances concerned work-\\nassignment disputes, but we permitted bipartite arbitration\\nto proceed. We based our decision in part on the language in\\nthe agreement between Alberici–Eby and the Engineers, but\\nthat language cannot be meaningfully distinguished from\\nvirtually identical language in Helgesteel. Compare Alberici–\\nEby, 992 F.2d at 733 (providing for bipartite arbitration over\\n“any difference or dispute arising out of the interpretation or\\napplication of any of the provisions contained in th[e]\\n[a]greement”) with Helgesteel, 507 F.2d at 1055 (providing for\\nbipartite arbitration over any “[g]rievance of the [e]mployer\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\nor the [u]nion[] arising out of interpretation or enforcement\\nof th[e] [a]greement”).\\n Because Alberici–Eby is an obvious outlier, we limit the\\ncase to its peculiar facts. We emphasized there that the\\ncontractor waited too long to request multiparty arbitration.\\nThat defeated the purpose of the multiparty arbitration\\nprocess, “which was carefully designed to produce a speedy\\nresolution of jurisdictional disputes in order to permit work\\nto be properly allocated before that work is performed.”\\nAlberici–Eby, 992 F.2d at 731. The mistake was inexcusable in\\nlight of “the strong possibility of conflicting arbitral awards”\\nwhen the unions filed their separate grievances. Id. at 730.\\nMoreover, the project had already been completed. As a\\nconsequence the multiparty arbitration would have done\\nlittle good: “[T]he work ha[d] already been performed,” and\\nthe multiparty procedure had “no authority to award dam-\\nages for misassigned work.” Id. at 730 n.2. We specifically\\nhighlighted these facts when we refused to stay arbitration\\nof the Laborers’ grievance. Id. at 734 (“In … light of Alberici–\\nEby’s failure to move in a timely fashion to achieve multi-\\nparty arbitration (assuming that such was available), it\\nwould be manifestly unjust to deny the Laborers an oppor-\\ntunity to be heard by way of bipartite arbitration.”). None of\\nthese circumstances are present here. The Laborers Union\\nnotified the Carpenters of the work-jurisdiction dispute ten\\ndays after it filed its bipartite grievance. And Brock chal-\\nlenged the propriety of bipartite arbitration at the earliest\\nopportunity.\\n The district judge offered two reasons to affirm the arbi-\\ntral award but neither holds up under the caselaw we’ve just\\nsurveyed. First, the judge reasoned that because several\\n\\fNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688 15\\n\\nLaborers were already working on the project, removing\\nthose workers from the job gave rise to a wrongful-\\ntermination claim distinct from the jurisdictional dispute.\\nNot so. The Laborers were terminated because the work was\\nassigned to the Carpenters; a finding of wrongful termina-\\ntion necessarily implies that the work was misassigned. That\\nputs this grievance squarely on the work-jurisdiction side of\\nthe line. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration.\\n Second, the judge held that the grievance arose out of\\nArticle I, Section 5, which provides a separate contractual\\nbasis for bipartite arbitrability. The provision in question\\nstates: “During the existence of the [a]greement, there shall\\nbe no strikes, lockouts, work stoppages, or picketing arising\\nout of any jurisdictional dispute. Work will continue as\\noriginally assigned, pending resolution of the dispute.”\\n Grievances arising under this provision are indeed sub-\\nject to bipartite arbitration. Like the subcontracting provi-\\nsions in Hutter and Miron, a dispute under this provision can\\nbe separately arbitrated without interfering with a jurisdic-\\ntional dispute. Suppose for a moment that the Laborers and\\nthe Carpenters submitted a jurisdictional dispute to tripartite\\narbitration, and to pressure Brock into taking its side, the\\nLaborers Union called a strike, prompting Brock to file a\\ngrievance under Section 5. It would be completely consistent\\nfor one arbitrator to award the work assignment to the\\nLaborers and another to sanction the Laborers for initiating a\\nstrike. Neither award would call the other into question.\\n But bipartite arbitration was not appropriate just because\\nthe Laborers labeled the grievance as one arising under\\nSection 5. We look instead to the substance of the grievance.\\nAnd in substance, this grievance is a work-jurisdiction\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\\n\\ndispute. As such, it was subject to tripartite arbitration, and\\nthe Subcommittee lacked arbitral authority.\\n REVERSED; CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1698,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4608714,"string":"4,608,714"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Sanchelima International, Inc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Com"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1823"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐1823 \\nSANCHELIMA INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, \\n v. \\n\\nWALKER STAINLESS EQUIPMENT CO., LLC, et al., \\n Defendants‐Appellants. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Western District of Wisconsin. \\n No. 16‐cv‐644‐jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 10, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. \\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Decades ago, the Wisconsin Su‐\\npreme Court interpreted two limited remedy provisions of \\nthe Uniform Commercial Code in Murray v. Holiday Rambler, \\nInc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978). Wisconsin courts, and this \\ncourt, have faithfully applied Murray since. But several other \\nstates have interpreted the same UCC provisions differently. \\nOn this basis alone, appellants ask us to overturn Murray, or \\nat the least to certify the question to the Wisconsin Supreme \\n\\f2 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nCourt. We cannot overturn established state precedent simply \\nbecause it may be out of step with modern trends. A Japanese \\nproverb may teach that “the nail that sticks out gets ham‐\\nmered down.” But federal courts wield no such hammer \\nwhen it comes to issues of state law. Murray remains the bind‐\\ning interpretation under Wisconsin law until and unless the \\nWisconsin Supreme Court decides to overturn it. \\n I. \\n This case comes to us in diversity. The defendants, Walker \\nStainless Equipment Co., LLC and its affiliates, manufacture \\ndairy silos. The plaintiffs, Sanchelima International, Inc. and \\nits affiliate, sell dairy silos in Latin America.1 In 2013, after \\ndecades of doing business together, the parties entered into a \\ndistribution agreement providing that Sanchelima would \\nserve as Walker’s exclusive distributor of dairy silos in thir‐\\nteen Latin American countries. Walker agreed not to sell silos \\ndirectly to third parties in those thirteen countries. \\n The contract contained a limited remedies provision and a \\ndamages disclaimer. Section X(F) of the distribution agree‐\\nment reads: \\n Manufacturer Liability Limitations. To the ex‐\\n tent a … claim … arises out of any purchase or‐\\n der … or otherwise aris[es] out of this agree‐\\n ment, [Walker’s] aggregate total liability for any \\n and all such claims shall be capped at, and \\n [Walker] shall have no liability to \\n Sanchelima … in excess of, the amount(s) paid \\n \\n 1 Walker and its affiliate co‐defendants are all citizens of Delaware \\n\\nand Indiana. Sanchelima and its affiliate co‐plaintiff are citizens of Florida \\nand Mexico. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 3\\n\\n by [Sanchelima] to [Walker] under such pur‐\\n chase order, subject to section X(G). Except for \\n the foregoing liabilities, [Walker] … shall have \\n no liability to [Sanchelima] for any \\n claim … arising out of or in connection with this \\n agreement, the products, [Walker] trademarks, \\n documentation, or any business activity of \\n [Sanchelima]. \\n Section X(G) of the distribution agreement reads: \\n Liability Exclusions. No [Walker‐affiliated \\n company] shall be liable to any [Sanchelima‐af‐\\n filiated company] for any special, indirect, inci‐\\n dental or consequential losses or damages includ‐\\n ing, without limitation, any lost profits or punitive \\n damages, arising out of or in connection with \\n this agreement, the products, documentation, \\n [Walker] trademarks or any business activity of \\n [Sanchelima]. \\n(emphasis added). We refer to sections X(F) and X(G) collec‐\\ntively as the limited remedies provision. The contract’s choice \\nof law provision selected Wisconsin law. \\n After the agreement was signed, Sanchelima started to \\nmarket Walker products in Mexico. Sanchelima hired sales \\nrepresentatives for its Mexico office and attended Mexican \\ntrade shows. Walker assigned a representative to work with \\nSanchelima in Mexico, but otherwise took no affirmative \\nsteps to market its products in the thirteen countries covered \\nby the distribution agreement. \\n Walker’s lack of marketing did not prevent it from making \\nsignificant direct sales in Latin America, cutting out \\n\\f4 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nSanchelima as the distribution middle man. In 2014, Walker \\nsold over $600,000 worth of dairy silos, for distribution to a \\nfactory in Monterrey, Mexico. A few days later, Walker sold a \\nsilo to a Nicaraguan company for over $66,000. In 2015, \\nWalker sold silos to a Nestlé plant in Mexico for almost \\n$3 million. And in 2017, Walker sold two processor tanks to a \\nMexican juice company for almost $160,000. \\n Sanchelima learned of the Nestlé sale and notified Walker \\nthat it considered it to be a breach of the distribution agree‐\\nment. When mediation talks broke down, Sanchelima filed \\nthis suit in 2016.2 Six months later, Walker notified \\nSanchelima it was terminating their agreement without cause. \\nSanchelima sought lost profits of more than $600,000 on its \\nbreach of contract claims. Walker denied breaching the distri‐\\nbution agreement and raised several affirmative defenses and \\ncounterclaims. On appeal, only one is relevant: Walker raised \\nthe limited remedies provision of the distribution agreement \\nas an affirmative defense and noted it explicitly precludes re‐\\ncovery of “any lost profits … arising out of or in connection \\nwith the Distributor Agreement … .” \\n Walker moved for summary judgment relying on the con‐\\ntract’s limited remedies provision. The district court denied \\nthe motion and held that provision violates Wisconsin’s ver‐\\nsion of the UCC § 2‐719, codified at Wis. Stat. § 402.719,3 \\nwhich reads in relevant part: \\n\\n\\n \\n 2 \\n Though the original suit concerned only the 2016 Nestlé sale, \\nSanchelima added claims relating to the 2014 and 2017 sales after discov‐\\nery revealed them. \\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 402.719 uses language identical to that in UCC § 2‐719. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 5\\n\\n (2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or \\n limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, rem‐\\n edy may be had as provided in chs. 401 to 411. \\n (3) Consequential damages may be limited or ex‐\\n cluded unless the limitation or exclusion is uncon‐\\n scionable. Limitation of consequential damages \\n for injury to the person in the case of consumer \\n goods is prima facie unconscionable but limita‐\\n tion of damages where the loss is commercial is \\n not. \\n(emphases added). Because the limited remedy provision \\nprovided no relief for Walker’s breach of the exclusivity pro‐\\nvision, the court held it failed of its essential purpose and was \\nunconscionable. The district court therefore considered all \\nUCC remedies, including consequential damages for lost \\nprofits. \\n The case was tried to the bench. The court found that \\nWalker breached the parties’ contract and that, but for \\nWalker’s breach, Sanchelima would have made all of the sales \\nWalker made in Mexico.4 Applying Sanchelima’s average \\ngross profit margin on Walker products to Walker’s gross rev‐\\nenue on the sales in question, the district court awarded \\nSanchelima $778,306.70 in damages for lost profits. Walker \\nappealed. \\n II. \\n Only damages are at issue here. The district court held that \\nthe consequential damages disclaimer in Section X(G) did not \\n\\n \\n 4 The court found Sanchelima would not have made the sale in Nica‐\\n\\nragua because Sanchelima has no presence in that country. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\napply because the limited remedies provision failed of its es‐\\nsential purpose to provide Sanchelima relief for Walker’s \\nbreach of exclusivity. The court so ruled based on Wisconsin’s \\ninterpretation of UCC § 2‐719. \\n Although UCC § 2‐719(3) allows contracting parties to \\nlimit remedies for breach of contract and disclaim consequen‐\\ntial damages (provided the limitations are not unconsciona‐\\nble), UCC § 2‐719(2) makes all UCC remedies available when \\nsuch a limited remedies provision “fail[s] of its essential pur‐\\npose.” In interpreting these two provisions, the Wisconsin Su‐\\npreme Court has adopted the “dependent approach.” See \\nMurray, 265 N.W.2d at 519–20. Under the dependent ap‐\\nproach, if a litigant proves the limited remedy fails of its es‐\\nsential purpose under UCC § 2‐719(2), any accompanying \\nconsequential damages disclaimer is per se unconscionable \\nunder UCC § 2‐719(3). Murray, 265 N.W.2d at 526 (“Thus, alt‐\\nhough an express warranty excludes consequential damages, \\nwhen the exclusive contractual remedy fails, the buyer may \\nrecover consequential damages … as though the limitation \\nhad never existed.”). \\n When the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Murray, a \\nmajority of states had adopted the dependent approach in in‐\\nterpreting UCC § 2‐719(2) and (3). See, e.g., Ehlers v. Chrysler \\nMotor Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157, 160–62 (S.D. 1975); Adams v. J.I. \\nCase Co., 261 N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); see also Debra \\nL. Goetz et al., Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transac‐\\ntions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1307 (1987) (“A ma‐\\njority of cases have answered correctly that the failure of an \\nexclusive remedy voids the consequential damages exclusion \\nclause … .”). \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 7\\n\\n But in the intervening decades since Murray, many courts \\nhave shifted to the “independent approach,” where even if a \\nlimited remedy fails of its essential purpose under UCC \\n§ 2‐719(2), an accompanying consequential damages dis‐\\nclaimer is not necessarily “unconscionable” under UCC \\n§ 2‐719(3). The litigant must still prove procedural and \\nsubstantive unconscionability to invalidate a limitation on \\nconsequential damages. Today, most state courts use the \\nindependent approach, including states whose earlier adop‐\\ntions of the dependent approach were relied on by the Wis‐\\nconsin Supreme Court in Murray. See, e.g., Razor v. Hyundai \\nMotor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 616–18 (Ill. 2006) (overturning \\nAdams, relied on in Murray); Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating \\n& Air Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 947–52 (Ind. 2001); see \\nalso 1 WHITE, SUMMERS, & HILLMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL \\nCODE § 13:22 (6th ed.) (endorsing the independent approach, \\nidentifying it as the “majority view,” and citing dozens of \\nstate and federal cases adopting it). \\n Walker argues this court should use the independent ap‐\\nproach when applying Wisconsin law. Walker claims \\nMurray’s discussion of § 402.719(2) and (3) was mere dicta \\nand that Wisconsin has never adopted the dependent \\napproach (or the independent approach). \\n Walker’s contention is contradicted by a series of cases \\nfrom Wisconsin and this court which have consistently held \\nthat Murray adopted the dependent approach. See, e.g., Trinkle \\nv. Schumacher Co., 301 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Wis. 1980) (awarding \\nconsequential damages when a limited warranty in a fabric \\nsales contract failed of its essential purpose); Phillips Petroleum \\nCo. v. Bucyrus‐Erie Co., 388 N.W.2d 584, 592 (Wis. 1986) (strik‐\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\ning a remedy limitation from the contract and applying all or‐\\ndinary UCC remedies because of a violation of § 402.719(2)); \\nsee also Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Industrial Engineering, Inc., 91 \\nF.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If a buyer demonstrates the \\nimpotence of the contractually established remedy under sec‐\\ntion 2‐719(2), he may then avail himself of the remedies pro‐\\nvided elsewhere in the UCC.”); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. \\nKrebs Engineers, 859 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Other \\ncourts have given effect to consequential damages disclaim‐\\ners even when exclusive remedies failed of their essential pur‐\\nposes. … But whatever the merit of Krebs’ argument as an \\noriginal matter, it is now Wisconsin law.”). Every case on \\npoint we found in Wisconsin and from our court holds that \\nMurray affirmatively adopted the dependent approach. \\n Walker next argues if the Wisconsin Supreme Court were \\nto hear this case today, it would adopt the independent \\napproach, so we should overturn Murray on the state court’s \\nbehalf. Walker suggests if we are hesitant to do so, we should \\ncertify the question to that court. \\n Federal courts sitting in diversity can decide cases involv‐\\ning unresolved issues of state law by predicting how the rele‐\\nvant state court would rule. See, e.g., Straits Financial LLC v. \\nTen Sleep Cattle Co., 900 F.3d 359, 369 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f a \\nquestion of law has not yet been decided by that court, we are \\nto make a prediction of how the Supreme Court of [the state] \\nwould rule on it … .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But \\nabsent a conflict with the Constitution or a federal law, we \\ncannot overturn established state precedent. The so‐called \\n“Erie guess” is not an Erie veto. \\n Nor may we certify this question to the Wisconsin \\nSupreme Court to check if that court has changed its mind on \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 9\\n\\n§ 402.719. We certify a question to a state court only if “the \\nrules of the highest court of [the] state provide for certification \\nto that court … .” 7TH CIR. R. 52(a); see also In re Hernandez, No. \\n18‐1789, slip op. at 12 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2019) (applying Circuit \\nRule 52(a)). The Wisconsin Supreme Court may answer only \\ncertified questions “to which it appears to the certifying court \\nthere is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme \\ncourt and the court of appeals of this state.” Wis. Stat. § 821.01 \\n(emphasis added). Here, the controlling precedent is Murray. \\nBecause the Wisconsin Supreme Court would have no juris‐\\ndiction to answer a certified question from this court on \\n§ 402.719, we have no authority to certify it under 7TH CIR. R. \\n52(a). If Wisconsin is to adopt the independent approach, its \\nown courts must do so. \\n III. \\n Typically, this would not end our inquiry, because we \\nwould still need to examine whether the limited remedies \\nprovision actually failed of its essential purpose under \\n§ 402.719(2). But here, Walker argued in its summary judg‐\\nment brief that the distribution agreement gave Sanchelima \\n“no recoverable damages.” Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its \\nMotion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Sanchelima Int’l \\nInc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Co., No. 16‐cv‐00644‐jdp, \\n2018 WL 1401195 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 19, 2018), ECF No. 45. As \\nthe district court stated in denying summary judgment, \\n“[t]his is exactly the type of limitation that § 402.719 renders \\nunenforceable.” Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary \\nJudgment at 6, Sanchelima, 2018 WL 1401195, ECF No. 66. \\nThough Walker later sought to reverse course in its motion \\nfor reconsideration, claiming other damages were available \\nunder the contract, the district court correctly noted that \\n\\f10 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nWalker “should have adduced this evidence and advanced \\nthis argument in [its] summary judgment motion …” Order \\nDenying Motion for Reconsideration at 3, Sanchelima, 2018 \\nWL 1401195, ECF No. 78. As such, the issue is waived. See \\nCaisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d \\n1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Reconsideration is not an appro‐\\npriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or \\narguing matters that could have been heard during the pen‐\\ndency of the previous motion.”). \\n The district court correctly decided the only issue pre‐\\nsented in this appeal, so we AFFIRM its judgment.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4385967/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608714/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Sanchelima International, Inc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Com\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1823 \nSANCHELIMA INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., \n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, \n v. \n\nWALKER STAINLESS EQUIPMENT CO., LLC, et al., \n Defendants‐Appellants. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Western District of Wisconsin. \n No. 16‐cv‐644‐jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 10, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. \n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Decades ago, the Wisconsin Su‐\npreme Court interpreted two limited remedy provisions of \nthe Uniform Commercial Code in Murray v. Holiday Rambler, \nInc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978). Wisconsin courts, and this \ncourt, have faithfully applied Murray since. But several other \nstates have interpreted the same UCC provisions differently. \nOn this basis alone, appellants ask us to overturn Murray, or \nat the least to certify the question to the Wisconsin Supreme \n\f2 No. 18‐1823 \n\nCourt. We cannot overturn established state precedent simply \nbecause it may be out of step with modern trends. A Japanese \nproverb may teach that “the nail that sticks out gets ham‐\nmered down.” But federal courts wield no such hammer \nwhen it comes to issues of state law. Murray remains the bind‐\ning interpretation under Wisconsin law until and unless the \nWisconsin Supreme Court decides to overturn it. \n I. \n This case comes to us in diversity. The defendants, Walker \nStainless Equipment Co., LLC and its affiliates, manufacture \ndairy silos. The plaintiffs, Sanchelima International, Inc. and \nits affiliate, sell dairy silos in Latin America.1 In 2013, after \ndecades of doing business together, the parties entered into a \ndistribution agreement providing that Sanchelima would \nserve as Walker’s exclusive distributor of dairy silos in thir‐\nteen Latin American countries. Walker agreed not to sell silos \ndirectly to third parties in those thirteen countries. \n The contract contained a limited remedies provision and a \ndamages disclaimer. Section X(F) of the distribution agree‐\nment reads: \n Manufacturer Liability Limitations. To the ex‐\n tent a … claim … arises out of any purchase or‐\n der … or otherwise aris[es] out of this agree‐\n ment, [Walker’s] aggregate total liability for any \n and all such claims shall be capped at, and \n [Walker] shall have no liability to \n Sanchelima … in excess of, the amount(s) paid \n \n 1 Walker and its affiliate co‐defendants are all citizens of Delaware \n\nand Indiana. Sanchelima and its affiliate co‐plaintiff are citizens of Florida \nand Mexico. \n\fNo. 18‐1823 3\n\n by [Sanchelima] to [Walker] under such pur‐\n chase order, subject to section X(G). Except for \n the foregoing liabilities, [Walker] … shall have \n no liability to [Sanchelima] for any \n claim … arising out of or in connection with this \n agreement, the products, [Walker] trademarks, \n documentation, or any business activity of \n [Sanchelima]. \n Section X(G) of the distribution agreement reads: \n Liability Exclusions. No [Walker‐affiliated \n company] shall be liable to any [Sanchelima‐af‐\n filiated company] for any special, indirect, inci‐\n dental or consequential losses or damages includ‐\n ing, without limitation, any lost profits or punitive \n damages, arising out of or in connection with \n this agreement, the products, documentation, \n [Walker] trademarks or any business activity of \n [Sanchelima]. \n(emphasis added). We refer to sections X(F) and X(G) collec‐\ntively as the limited remedies provision. The contract’s choice \nof law provision selected Wisconsin law. \n After the agreement was signed, Sanchelima started to \nmarket Walker products in Mexico. Sanchelima hired sales \nrepresentatives for its Mexico office and attended Mexican \ntrade shows. Walker assigned a representative to work with \nSanchelima in Mexico, but otherwise took no affirmative \nsteps to market its products in the thirteen countries covered \nby the distribution agreement. \n Walker’s lack of marketing did not prevent it from making \nsignificant direct sales in Latin America, cutting out \n\f4 No. 18‐1823 \n\nSanchelima as the distribution middle man. In 2014, Walker \nsold over $600,000 worth of dairy silos, for distribution to a \nfactory in Monterrey, Mexico. A few days later, Walker sold a \nsilo to a Nicaraguan company for over $66,000. In 2015, \nWalker sold silos to a Nestlé plant in Mexico for almost \n$3 million. And in 2017, Walker sold two processor tanks to a \nMexican juice company for almost $160,000. \n Sanchelima learned of the Nestlé sale and notified Walker \nthat it considered it to be a breach of the distribution agree‐\nment. When mediation talks broke down, Sanchelima filed \nthis suit in 2016.2 Six months later, Walker notified \nSanchelima it was terminating their agreement without cause. \nSanchelima sought lost profits of more than $600,000 on its \nbreach of contract claims. Walker denied breaching the distri‐\nbution agreement and raised several affirmative defenses and \ncounterclaims. On appeal, only one is relevant: Walker raised \nthe limited remedies provision of the distribution agreement \nas an affirmative defense and noted it explicitly precludes re‐\ncovery of “any lost profits … arising out of or in connection \nwith the Distributor Agreement … .” \n Walker moved for summary judgment relying on the con‐\ntract’s limited remedies provision. The district court denied \nthe motion and held that provision violates Wisconsin’s ver‐\nsion of the UCC § 2‐719, codified at Wis. Stat. § 402.719,3 \nwhich reads in relevant part: \n\n\n \n 2 \n Though the original suit concerned only the 2016 Nestlé sale, \nSanchelima added claims relating to the 2014 and 2017 sales after discov‐\nery revealed them. \n 3 Wis. Stat. § 402.719 uses language identical to that in UCC § 2‐719. \n\fNo. 18‐1823 5\n\n (2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or \n limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, rem‐\n edy may be had as provided in chs. 401 to 411. \n (3) Consequential damages may be limited or ex‐\n cluded unless the limitation or exclusion is uncon‐\n scionable. Limitation of consequential damages \n for injury to the person in the case of consumer \n goods is prima facie unconscionable but limita‐\n tion of damages where the loss is commercial is \n not. \n(emphases added). Because the limited remedy provision \nprovided no relief for Walker’s breach of the exclusivity pro‐\nvision, the court held it failed of its essential purpose and was \nunconscionable. The district court therefore considered all \nUCC remedies, including consequential damages for lost \nprofits. \n The case was tried to the bench. The court found that \nWalker breached the parties’ contract and that, but for \nWalker’s breach, Sanchelima would have made all of the sales \nWalker made in Mexico.4 Applying Sanchelima’s average \ngross profit margin on Walker products to Walker’s gross rev‐\nenue on the sales in question, the district court awarded \nSanchelima $778,306.70 in damages for lost profits. Walker \nappealed. \n II. \n Only damages are at issue here. The district court held that \nthe consequential damages disclaimer in Section X(G) did not \n\n \n 4 The court found Sanchelima would not have made the sale in Nica‐\n\nragua because Sanchelima has no presence in that country. \n\f6 No. 18‐1823 \n\napply because the limited remedies provision failed of its es‐\nsential purpose to provide Sanchelima relief for Walker’s \nbreach of exclusivity. The court so ruled based on Wisconsin’s \ninterpretation of UCC § 2‐719. \n Although UCC § 2‐719(3) allows contracting parties to \nlimit remedies for breach of contract and disclaim consequen‐\ntial damages (provided the limitations are not unconsciona‐\nble), UCC § 2‐719(2) makes all UCC remedies available when \nsuch a limited remedies provision “fail[s] of its essential pur‐\npose.” In interpreting these two provisions, the Wisconsin Su‐\npreme Court has adopted the “dependent approach.” See \nMurray, 265 N.W.2d at 519–20. Under the dependent ap‐\nproach, if a litigant proves the limited remedy fails of its es‐\nsential purpose under UCC § 2‐719(2), any accompanying \nconsequential damages disclaimer is per se unconscionable \nunder UCC § 2‐719(3). Murray, 265 N.W.2d at 526 (“Thus, alt‐\nhough an express warranty excludes consequential damages, \nwhen the exclusive contractual remedy fails, the buyer may \nrecover consequential damages … as though the limitation \nhad never existed.”). \n When the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Murray, a \nmajority of states had adopted the dependent approach in in‐\nterpreting UCC § 2‐719(2) and (3). See, e.g., Ehlers v. Chrysler \nMotor Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157, 160–62 (S.D. 1975); Adams v. J.I. \nCase Co., 261 N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); see also Debra \nL. Goetz et al., Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transac‐\ntions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1307 (1987) (“A ma‐\njority of cases have answered correctly that the failure of an \nexclusive remedy voids the consequential damages exclusion \nclause … .”). \n\fNo. 18‐1823 7\n\n But in the intervening decades since Murray, many courts \nhave shifted to the “independent approach,” where even if a \nlimited remedy fails of its essential purpose under UCC \n§ 2‐719(2), an accompanying consequential damages dis‐\nclaimer is not necessarily “unconscionable” under UCC \n§ 2‐719(3). The litigant must still prove procedural and \nsubstantive unconscionability to invalidate a limitation on \nconsequential damages. Today, most state courts use the \nindependent approach, including states whose earlier adop‐\ntions of the dependent approach were relied on by the Wis‐\nconsin Supreme Court in Murray. See, e.g., Razor v. Hyundai \nMotor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 616–18 (Ill. 2006) (overturning \nAdams, relied on in Murray); Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating \n& Air Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 947–52 (Ind. 2001); see \nalso 1 WHITE, SUMMERS, & HILLMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL \nCODE § 13:22 (6th ed.) (endorsing the independent approach, \nidentifying it as the “majority view,” and citing dozens of \nstate and federal cases adopting it). \n Walker argues this court should use the independent ap‐\nproach when applying Wisconsin law. Walker claims \nMurray’s discussion of § 402.719(2) and (3) was mere dicta \nand that Wisconsin has never adopted the dependent \napproach (or the independent approach). \n Walker’s contention is contradicted by a series of cases \nfrom Wisconsin and this court which have consistently held \nthat Murray adopted the dependent approach. See, e.g., Trinkle \nv. Schumacher Co., 301 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Wis. 1980) (awarding \nconsequential damages when a limited warranty in a fabric \nsales contract failed of its essential purpose); Phillips Petroleum \nCo. v. Bucyrus‐Erie Co., 388 N.W.2d 584, 592 (Wis. 1986) (strik‐\n\f8 No. 18‐1823 \n\ning a remedy limitation from the contract and applying all or‐\ndinary UCC remedies because of a violation of § 402.719(2)); \nsee also Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Industrial Engineering, Inc., 91 \nF.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If a buyer demonstrates the \nimpotence of the contractually established remedy under sec‐\ntion 2‐719(2), he may then avail himself of the remedies pro‐\nvided elsewhere in the UCC.”); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. \nKrebs Engineers, 859 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Other \ncourts have given effect to consequential damages disclaim‐\ners even when exclusive remedies failed of their essential pur‐\nposes. … But whatever the merit of Krebs’ argument as an \noriginal matter, it is now Wisconsin law.”). Every case on \npoint we found in Wisconsin and from our court holds that \nMurray affirmatively adopted the dependent approach. \n Walker next argues if the Wisconsin Supreme Court were \nto hear this case today, it would adopt the independent \napproach, so we should overturn Murray on the state court’s \nbehalf. Walker suggests if we are hesitant to do so, we should \ncertify the question to that court. \n Federal courts sitting in diversity can decide cases involv‐\ning unresolved issues of state law by predicting how the rele‐\nvant state court would rule. See, e.g., Straits Financial LLC v. \nTen Sleep Cattle Co., 900 F.3d 359, 369 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f a \nquestion of law has not yet been decided by that court, we are \nto make a prediction of how the Supreme Court of [the state] \nwould rule on it … .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But \nabsent a conflict with the Constitution or a federal law, we \ncannot overturn established state precedent. The so‐called \n“Erie guess” is not an Erie veto. \n Nor may we certify this question to the Wisconsin \nSupreme Court to check if that court has changed its mind on \n\fNo. 18‐1823 9\n\n§ 402.719. We certify a question to a state court only if “the \nrules of the highest court of [the] state provide for certification \nto that court … .” 7TH CIR. R. 52(a); see also In re Hernandez, No. \n18‐1789, slip op. at 12 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2019) (applying Circuit \nRule 52(a)). The Wisconsin Supreme Court may answer only \ncertified questions “to which it appears to the certifying court \nthere is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme \ncourt and the court of appeals of this state.” Wis. Stat. § 821.01 \n(emphasis added). Here, the controlling precedent is Murray. \nBecause the Wisconsin Supreme Court would have no juris‐\ndiction to answer a certified question from this court on \n§ 402.719, we have no authority to certify it under 7TH CIR. R. \n52(a). If Wisconsin is to adopt the independent approach, its \nown courts must do so. \n III. \n Typically, this would not end our inquiry, because we \nwould still need to examine whether the limited remedies \nprovision actually failed of its essential purpose under \n§ 402.719(2). But here, Walker argued in its summary judg‐\nment brief that the distribution agreement gave Sanchelima \n“no recoverable damages.” Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its \nMotion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Sanchelima Int’l \nInc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Co., No. 16‐cv‐00644‐jdp, \n2018 WL 1401195 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 19, 2018), ECF No. 45. As \nthe district court stated in denying summary judgment, \n“[t]his is exactly the type of limitation that § 402.719 renders \nunenforceable.” Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary \nJudgment at 6, Sanchelima, 2018 WL 1401195, ECF No. 66. \nThough Walker later sought to reverse course in its motion \nfor reconsideration, claiming other damages were available \nunder the contract, the district court correctly noted that \n\f10 No. 18‐1823 \n\nWalker “should have adduced this evidence and advanced \nthis argument in [its] summary judgment motion …” Order \nDenying Motion for Reconsideration at 3, Sanchelima, 2018 \nWL 1401195, ECF No. 78. As such, the issue is waived. See \nCaisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d \n1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Reconsideration is not an appro‐\npriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or \narguing matters that could have been heard during the pen‐\ndency of the previous motion.”). \n The district court correctly decided the only issue pre‐\nsented in this appeal, so we AFFIRM its judgment.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Sanchelima International, Inc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Com\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐1823 \\nSANCHELIMA INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, \\n v. \\n\\nWALKER STAINLESS EQUIPMENT CO., LLC, et al., \\n Defendants‐Appellants. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Western District of Wisconsin. \\n No. 16‐cv‐644‐jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 10, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. \\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Decades ago, the Wisconsin Su‐\\npreme Court interpreted two limited remedy provisions of \\nthe Uniform Commercial Code in Murray v. Holiday Rambler, \\nInc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978). Wisconsin courts, and this \\ncourt, have faithfully applied Murray since. But several other \\nstates have interpreted the same UCC provisions differently. \\nOn this basis alone, appellants ask us to overturn Murray, or \\nat the least to certify the question to the Wisconsin Supreme \\n\\f2 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nCourt. We cannot overturn established state precedent simply \\nbecause it may be out of step with modern trends. A Japanese \\nproverb may teach that “the nail that sticks out gets ham‐\\nmered down.” But federal courts wield no such hammer \\nwhen it comes to issues of state law. Murray remains the bind‐\\ning interpretation under Wisconsin law until and unless the \\nWisconsin Supreme Court decides to overturn it. \\n I. \\n This case comes to us in diversity. The defendants, Walker \\nStainless Equipment Co., LLC and its affiliates, manufacture \\ndairy silos. The plaintiffs, Sanchelima International, Inc. and \\nits affiliate, sell dairy silos in Latin America.1 In 2013, after \\ndecades of doing business together, the parties entered into a \\ndistribution agreement providing that Sanchelima would \\nserve as Walker’s exclusive distributor of dairy silos in thir‐\\nteen Latin American countries. Walker agreed not to sell silos \\ndirectly to third parties in those thirteen countries. \\n The contract contained a limited remedies provision and a \\ndamages disclaimer. Section X(F) of the distribution agree‐\\nment reads: \\n Manufacturer Liability Limitations. To the ex‐\\n tent a … claim … arises out of any purchase or‐\\n der … or otherwise aris[es] out of this agree‐\\n ment, [Walker’s] aggregate total liability for any \\n and all such claims shall be capped at, and \\n [Walker] shall have no liability to \\n Sanchelima … in excess of, the amount(s) paid \\n \\n 1 Walker and its affiliate co‐defendants are all citizens of Delaware \\n\\nand Indiana. Sanchelima and its affiliate co‐plaintiff are citizens of Florida \\nand Mexico. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 3\\n\\n by [Sanchelima] to [Walker] under such pur‐\\n chase order, subject to section X(G). Except for \\n the foregoing liabilities, [Walker] … shall have \\n no liability to [Sanchelima] for any \\n claim … arising out of or in connection with this \\n agreement, the products, [Walker] trademarks, \\n documentation, or any business activity of \\n [Sanchelima]. \\n Section X(G) of the distribution agreement reads: \\n Liability Exclusions. No [Walker‐affiliated \\n company] shall be liable to any [Sanchelima‐af‐\\n filiated company] for any special, indirect, inci‐\\n dental or consequential losses or damages includ‐\\n ing, without limitation, any lost profits or punitive \\n damages, arising out of or in connection with \\n this agreement, the products, documentation, \\n [Walker] trademarks or any business activity of \\n [Sanchelima]. \\n(emphasis added). We refer to sections X(F) and X(G) collec‐\\ntively as the limited remedies provision. The contract’s choice \\nof law provision selected Wisconsin law. \\n After the agreement was signed, Sanchelima started to \\nmarket Walker products in Mexico. Sanchelima hired sales \\nrepresentatives for its Mexico office and attended Mexican \\ntrade shows. Walker assigned a representative to work with \\nSanchelima in Mexico, but otherwise took no affirmative \\nsteps to market its products in the thirteen countries covered \\nby the distribution agreement. \\n Walker’s lack of marketing did not prevent it from making \\nsignificant direct sales in Latin America, cutting out \\n\\f4 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nSanchelima as the distribution middle man. In 2014, Walker \\nsold over $600,000 worth of dairy silos, for distribution to a \\nfactory in Monterrey, Mexico. A few days later, Walker sold a \\nsilo to a Nicaraguan company for over $66,000. In 2015, \\nWalker sold silos to a Nestlé plant in Mexico for almost \\n$3 million. And in 2017, Walker sold two processor tanks to a \\nMexican juice company for almost $160,000. \\n Sanchelima learned of the Nestlé sale and notified Walker \\nthat it considered it to be a breach of the distribution agree‐\\nment. When mediation talks broke down, Sanchelima filed \\nthis suit in 2016.2 Six months later, Walker notified \\nSanchelima it was terminating their agreement without cause. \\nSanchelima sought lost profits of more than $600,000 on its \\nbreach of contract claims. Walker denied breaching the distri‐\\nbution agreement and raised several affirmative defenses and \\ncounterclaims. On appeal, only one is relevant: Walker raised \\nthe limited remedies provision of the distribution agreement \\nas an affirmative defense and noted it explicitly precludes re‐\\ncovery of “any lost profits … arising out of or in connection \\nwith the Distributor Agreement … .” \\n Walker moved for summary judgment relying on the con‐\\ntract’s limited remedies provision. The district court denied \\nthe motion and held that provision violates Wisconsin’s ver‐\\nsion of the UCC § 2‐719, codified at Wis. Stat. § 402.719,3 \\nwhich reads in relevant part: \\n\\n\\n \\n 2 \\n Though the original suit concerned only the 2016 Nestlé sale, \\nSanchelima added claims relating to the 2014 and 2017 sales after discov‐\\nery revealed them. \\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 402.719 uses language identical to that in UCC § 2‐719. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 5\\n\\n (2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or \\n limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, rem‐\\n edy may be had as provided in chs. 401 to 411. \\n (3) Consequential damages may be limited or ex‐\\n cluded unless the limitation or exclusion is uncon‐\\n scionable. Limitation of consequential damages \\n for injury to the person in the case of consumer \\n goods is prima facie unconscionable but limita‐\\n tion of damages where the loss is commercial is \\n not. \\n(emphases added). Because the limited remedy provision \\nprovided no relief for Walker’s breach of the exclusivity pro‐\\nvision, the court held it failed of its essential purpose and was \\nunconscionable. The district court therefore considered all \\nUCC remedies, including consequential damages for lost \\nprofits. \\n The case was tried to the bench. The court found that \\nWalker breached the parties’ contract and that, but for \\nWalker’s breach, Sanchelima would have made all of the sales \\nWalker made in Mexico.4 Applying Sanchelima’s average \\ngross profit margin on Walker products to Walker’s gross rev‐\\nenue on the sales in question, the district court awarded \\nSanchelima $778,306.70 in damages for lost profits. Walker \\nappealed. \\n II. \\n Only damages are at issue here. The district court held that \\nthe consequential damages disclaimer in Section X(G) did not \\n\\n \\n 4 The court found Sanchelima would not have made the sale in Nica‐\\n\\nragua because Sanchelima has no presence in that country. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\napply because the limited remedies provision failed of its es‐\\nsential purpose to provide Sanchelima relief for Walker’s \\nbreach of exclusivity. The court so ruled based on Wisconsin’s \\ninterpretation of UCC § 2‐719. \\n Although UCC § 2‐719(3) allows contracting parties to \\nlimit remedies for breach of contract and disclaim consequen‐\\ntial damages (provided the limitations are not unconsciona‐\\nble), UCC § 2‐719(2) makes all UCC remedies available when \\nsuch a limited remedies provision “fail[s] of its essential pur‐\\npose.” In interpreting these two provisions, the Wisconsin Su‐\\npreme Court has adopted the “dependent approach.” See \\nMurray, 265 N.W.2d at 519–20. Under the dependent ap‐\\nproach, if a litigant proves the limited remedy fails of its es‐\\nsential purpose under UCC § 2‐719(2), any accompanying \\nconsequential damages disclaimer is per se unconscionable \\nunder UCC § 2‐719(3). Murray, 265 N.W.2d at 526 (“Thus, alt‐\\nhough an express warranty excludes consequential damages, \\nwhen the exclusive contractual remedy fails, the buyer may \\nrecover consequential damages … as though the limitation \\nhad never existed.”). \\n When the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Murray, a \\nmajority of states had adopted the dependent approach in in‐\\nterpreting UCC § 2‐719(2) and (3). See, e.g., Ehlers v. Chrysler \\nMotor Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157, 160–62 (S.D. 1975); Adams v. J.I. \\nCase Co., 261 N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); see also Debra \\nL. Goetz et al., Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transac‐\\ntions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1307 (1987) (“A ma‐\\njority of cases have answered correctly that the failure of an \\nexclusive remedy voids the consequential damages exclusion \\nclause … .”). \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 7\\n\\n But in the intervening decades since Murray, many courts \\nhave shifted to the “independent approach,” where even if a \\nlimited remedy fails of its essential purpose under UCC \\n§ 2‐719(2), an accompanying consequential damages dis‐\\nclaimer is not necessarily “unconscionable” under UCC \\n§ 2‐719(3). The litigant must still prove procedural and \\nsubstantive unconscionability to invalidate a limitation on \\nconsequential damages. Today, most state courts use the \\nindependent approach, including states whose earlier adop‐\\ntions of the dependent approach were relied on by the Wis‐\\nconsin Supreme Court in Murray. See, e.g., Razor v. Hyundai \\nMotor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 616–18 (Ill. 2006) (overturning \\nAdams, relied on in Murray); Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating \\n& Air Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 947–52 (Ind. 2001); see \\nalso 1 WHITE, SUMMERS, & HILLMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL \\nCODE § 13:22 (6th ed.) (endorsing the independent approach, \\nidentifying it as the “majority view,” and citing dozens of \\nstate and federal cases adopting it). \\n Walker argues this court should use the independent ap‐\\nproach when applying Wisconsin law. Walker claims \\nMurray’s discussion of § 402.719(2) and (3) was mere dicta \\nand that Wisconsin has never adopted the dependent \\napproach (or the independent approach). \\n Walker’s contention is contradicted by a series of cases \\nfrom Wisconsin and this court which have consistently held \\nthat Murray adopted the dependent approach. See, e.g., Trinkle \\nv. Schumacher Co., 301 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Wis. 1980) (awarding \\nconsequential damages when a limited warranty in a fabric \\nsales contract failed of its essential purpose); Phillips Petroleum \\nCo. v. Bucyrus‐Erie Co., 388 N.W.2d 584, 592 (Wis. 1986) (strik‐\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\ning a remedy limitation from the contract and applying all or‐\\ndinary UCC remedies because of a violation of § 402.719(2)); \\nsee also Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Industrial Engineering, Inc., 91 \\nF.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If a buyer demonstrates the \\nimpotence of the contractually established remedy under sec‐\\ntion 2‐719(2), he may then avail himself of the remedies pro‐\\nvided elsewhere in the UCC.”); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. \\nKrebs Engineers, 859 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Other \\ncourts have given effect to consequential damages disclaim‐\\ners even when exclusive remedies failed of their essential pur‐\\nposes. … But whatever the merit of Krebs’ argument as an \\noriginal matter, it is now Wisconsin law.”). Every case on \\npoint we found in Wisconsin and from our court holds that \\nMurray affirmatively adopted the dependent approach. \\n Walker next argues if the Wisconsin Supreme Court were \\nto hear this case today, it would adopt the independent \\napproach, so we should overturn Murray on the state court’s \\nbehalf. Walker suggests if we are hesitant to do so, we should \\ncertify the question to that court. \\n Federal courts sitting in diversity can decide cases involv‐\\ning unresolved issues of state law by predicting how the rele‐\\nvant state court would rule. See, e.g., Straits Financial LLC v. \\nTen Sleep Cattle Co., 900 F.3d 359, 369 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f a \\nquestion of law has not yet been decided by that court, we are \\nto make a prediction of how the Supreme Court of [the state] \\nwould rule on it … .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But \\nabsent a conflict with the Constitution or a federal law, we \\ncannot overturn established state precedent. The so‐called \\n“Erie guess” is not an Erie veto. \\n Nor may we certify this question to the Wisconsin \\nSupreme Court to check if that court has changed its mind on \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 9\\n\\n§ 402.719. We certify a question to a state court only if “the \\nrules of the highest court of [the] state provide for certification \\nto that court … .” 7TH CIR. R. 52(a); see also In re Hernandez, No. \\n18‐1789, slip op. at 12 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2019) (applying Circuit \\nRule 52(a)). The Wisconsin Supreme Court may answer only \\ncertified questions “to which it appears to the certifying court \\nthere is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme \\ncourt and the court of appeals of this state.” Wis. Stat. § 821.01 \\n(emphasis added). Here, the controlling precedent is Murray. \\nBecause the Wisconsin Supreme Court would have no juris‐\\ndiction to answer a certified question from this court on \\n§ 402.719, we have no authority to certify it under 7TH CIR. R. \\n52(a). If Wisconsin is to adopt the independent approach, its \\nown courts must do so. \\n III. \\n Typically, this would not end our inquiry, because we \\nwould still need to examine whether the limited remedies \\nprovision actually failed of its essential purpose under \\n§ 402.719(2). But here, Walker argued in its summary judg‐\\nment brief that the distribution agreement gave Sanchelima \\n“no recoverable damages.” Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its \\nMotion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Sanchelima Int’l \\nInc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Co., No. 16‐cv‐00644‐jdp, \\n2018 WL 1401195 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 19, 2018), ECF No. 45. As \\nthe district court stated in denying summary judgment, \\n“[t]his is exactly the type of limitation that § 402.719 renders \\nunenforceable.” Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary \\nJudgment at 6, Sanchelima, 2018 WL 1401195, ECF No. 66. \\nThough Walker later sought to reverse course in its motion \\nfor reconsideration, claiming other damages were available \\nunder the contract, the district court correctly noted that \\n\\f10 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nWalker “should have adduced this evidence and advanced \\nthis argument in [its] summary judgment motion …” Order \\nDenying Motion for Reconsideration at 3, Sanchelima, 2018 \\nWL 1401195, ECF No. 78. As such, the issue is waived. See \\nCaisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d \\n1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Reconsideration is not an appro‐\\npriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or \\narguing matters that could have been heard during the pen‐\\ndency of the previous motion.”). \\n The district court correctly decided the only issue pre‐\\nsented in this appeal, so we AFFIRM its judgment.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1699,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4608749,"string":"4,608,749"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Sanchelima International, Inc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Com"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-04-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1823"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐1823 \\nSANCHELIMA INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, \\n v. \\n\\nWALKER STAINLESS EQUIPMENT CO., LLC, et al., \\n Defendants‐Appellants. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Western District of Wisconsin. \\n No. 16‐cv‐644‐jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 10, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. \\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Decades ago, the Wisconsin Su‐\\npreme Court interpreted two limited remedy provisions of \\nthe Uniform Commercial Code in Murray v. Holiday Rambler, \\nInc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978). Wisconsin courts, and this \\ncourt, have faithfully applied Murray since. But several other \\nstates have interpreted the same UCC provisions differently. \\nOn this basis alone, appellants ask us to overturn Murray, or \\nat the least to certify the question to the Wisconsin Supreme \\n\\f2 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nCourt. We cannot overturn established state precedent simply \\nbecause it may be out of step with modern trends. A Japanese \\nproverb may teach that “the nail that sticks out gets ham‐\\nmered down.” But federal courts wield no such hammer \\nwhen it comes to issues of state law. Murray remains the bind‐\\ning interpretation under Wisconsin law until and unless the \\nWisconsin Supreme Court decides to overturn it. \\n I. \\n This case comes to us in diversity. The defendants, Walker \\nStainless Equipment Co., LLC and its affiliates, manufacture \\ndairy silos. The plaintiffs, Sanchelima International, Inc. and \\nits affiliate, sell dairy silos in Latin America.1 In 2013, after \\ndecades of doing business together, the parties entered into a \\ndistribution agreement providing that Sanchelima would \\nserve as Walker’s exclusive distributor of dairy silos in thir‐\\nteen Latin American countries. Walker agreed not to sell silos \\ndirectly to third parties in those thirteen countries. \\n The contract contained a limited remedies provision and a \\ndamages disclaimer. Section X(F) of the distribution agree‐\\nment reads: \\n Manufacturer Liability Limitations. To the ex‐\\n tent a … claim … arises out of any purchase or‐\\n der … or otherwise aris[es] out of this agree‐\\n ment, [Walker’s] aggregate total liability for any \\n and all such claims shall be capped at, and \\n [Walker] shall have no liability to \\n Sanchelima … in excess of, the amount(s) paid \\n \\n 1 Walker and its affiliate co‐defendants are all citizens of Delaware \\n\\nand Indiana. Sanchelima and its affiliate co‐plaintiff are citizens of Florida \\nand Mexico. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 3\\n\\n by [Sanchelima] to [Walker] under such pur‐\\n chase order, subject to section X(G). Except for \\n the foregoing liabilities, [Walker] … shall have \\n no liability to [Sanchelima] for any \\n claim … arising out of or in connection with this \\n agreement, the products, [Walker] trademarks, \\n documentation, or any business activity of \\n [Sanchelima]. \\n Section X(G) of the distribution agreement reads: \\n Liability Exclusions. No [Walker‐affiliated \\n company] shall be liable to any [Sanchelima‐af‐\\n filiated company] for any special, indirect, inci‐\\n dental or consequential losses or damages includ‐\\n ing, without limitation, any lost profits or punitive \\n damages, arising out of or in connection with \\n this agreement, the products, documentation, \\n [Walker] trademarks or any business activity of \\n [Sanchelima]. \\n(emphasis added). We refer to sections X(F) and X(G) collec‐\\ntively as the limited remedies provision. The contract’s choice \\nof law provision selected Wisconsin law. \\n After the agreement was signed, Sanchelima started to \\nmarket Walker products in Mexico. Sanchelima hired sales \\nrepresentatives for its Mexico office and attended Mexican \\ntrade shows. Walker assigned a representative to work with \\nSanchelima in Mexico, but otherwise took no affirmative \\nsteps to market its products in the thirteen countries covered \\nby the distribution agreement. \\n Walker’s lack of marketing did not prevent it from making \\nsignificant direct sales in Latin America, cutting out \\n\\f4 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nSanchelima as the distribution middle man. In 2014, Walker \\nsold over $600,000 worth of dairy silos, for distribution to a \\nfactory in Monterrey, Mexico. A few days later, Walker sold a \\nsilo to a Nicaraguan company for over $66,000. In 2015, \\nWalker sold silos to a Nestlé plant in Mexico for almost \\n$3 million. And in 2017, Walker sold two processor tanks to a \\nMexican juice company for almost $160,000. \\n Sanchelima learned of the Nestlé sale and notified Walker \\nthat it considered it to be a breach of the distribution agree‐\\nment. When mediation talks broke down, Sanchelima filed \\nthis suit in 2016.2 Six months later, Walker notified \\nSanchelima it was terminating their agreement without cause. \\nSanchelima sought lost profits of more than $600,000 on its \\nbreach of contract claims. Walker denied breaching the distri‐\\nbution agreement and raised several affirmative defenses and \\ncounterclaims. On appeal, only one is relevant: Walker raised \\nthe limited remedies provision of the distribution agreement \\nas an affirmative defense and noted it explicitly precludes re‐\\ncovery of “any lost profits … arising out of or in connection \\nwith the Distributor Agreement … .” \\n Walker moved for summary judgment relying on the con‐\\ntract’s limited remedies provision. The district court denied \\nthe motion and held that provision violates Wisconsin’s ver‐\\nsion of the UCC § 2‐719, codified at Wis. Stat. § 402.719,3 \\nwhich reads in relevant part: \\n\\n\\n \\n 2 \\n Though the original suit concerned only the 2016 Nestlé sale, \\nSanchelima added claims relating to the 2014 and 2017 sales after discov‐\\nery revealed them. \\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 402.719 uses language identical to that in UCC § 2‐719. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 5\\n\\n (2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or \\n limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, rem‐\\n edy may be had as provided in chs. 401 to 411. \\n (3) Consequential damages may be limited or ex‐\\n cluded unless the limitation or exclusion is uncon‐\\n scionable. Limitation of consequential damages \\n for injury to the person in the case of consumer \\n goods is prima facie unconscionable but limita‐\\n tion of damages where the loss is commercial is \\n not. \\n(emphases added). Because the limited remedy provision \\nprovided no relief for Walker’s breach of the exclusivity pro‐\\nvision, the court held it failed of its essential purpose and was \\nunconscionable. The district court therefore considered all \\nUCC remedies, including consequential damages for lost \\nprofits. \\n The case was tried to the bench. The court found that \\nWalker breached the parties’ contract and that, but for \\nWalker’s breach, Sanchelima would have made all of the sales \\nWalker made in Mexico.4 Applying Sanchelima’s average \\ngross profit margin on Walker products to Walker’s gross rev‐\\nenue on the sales in question, the district court awarded \\nSanchelima $778,306.70 in damages for lost profits. Walker \\nappealed. \\n II. \\n Only damages are at issue here. The district court held that \\nthe consequential damages disclaimer in Section X(G) did not \\n\\n \\n 4 The court found Sanchelima would not have made the sale in Nica‐\\n\\nragua because Sanchelima has no presence in that country. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\napply because the limited remedies provision failed of its es‐\\nsential purpose to provide Sanchelima relief for Walker’s \\nbreach of exclusivity. The court so ruled based on Wisconsin’s \\ninterpretation of UCC § 2‐719. \\n Although UCC § 2‐719(3) allows contracting parties to \\nlimit remedies for breach of contract and disclaim consequen‐\\ntial damages (provided the limitations are not unconsciona‐\\nble), UCC § 2‐719(2) makes all UCC remedies available when \\nsuch a limited remedies provision “fail[s] of its essential pur‐\\npose.” In interpreting these two provisions, the Wisconsin Su‐\\npreme Court has adopted the “dependent approach.” See \\nMurray, 265 N.W.2d at 519–20. Under the dependent ap‐\\nproach, if a litigant proves the limited remedy fails of its es‐\\nsential purpose under UCC § 2‐719(2), any accompanying \\nconsequential damages disclaimer is per se unconscionable \\nunder UCC § 2‐719(3). Murray, 265 N.W.2d at 526 (“Thus, alt‐\\nhough an express warranty excludes consequential damages, \\nwhen the exclusive contractual remedy fails, the buyer may \\nrecover consequential damages … as though the limitation \\nhad never existed.”). \\n When the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Murray, a \\nmajority of states had adopted the dependent approach in in‐\\nterpreting UCC § 2‐719(2) and (3). See, e.g., Ehlers v. Chrysler \\nMotor Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157, 160–62 (S.D. 1975); Adams v. J.I. \\nCase Co., 261 N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); see also Debra \\nL. Goetz et al., Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transac‐\\ntions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1307 (1987) (“A ma‐\\njority of cases have answered correctly that the failure of an \\nexclusive remedy voids the consequential damages exclusion \\nclause … .”). \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 7\\n\\n But in the intervening decades since Murray, many courts \\nhave shifted to the “independent approach,” where even if a \\nlimited remedy fails of its essential purpose under UCC \\n§ 2‐719(2), an accompanying consequential damages dis‐\\nclaimer is not necessarily “unconscionable” under UCC \\n§ 2‐719(3). The litigant must still prove procedural and \\nsubstantive unconscionability to invalidate a limitation on \\nconsequential damages. Today, most state courts use the \\nindependent approach, including states whose earlier adop‐\\ntions of the dependent approach were relied on by the Wis‐\\nconsin Supreme Court in Murray. See, e.g., Razor v. Hyundai \\nMotor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 616–18 (Ill. 2006) (overturning \\nAdams, relied on in Murray); Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating \\n& Air Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 947–52 (Ind. 2001); see \\nalso 1 WHITE, SUMMERS, & HILLMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL \\nCODE § 13:22 (6th ed.) (endorsing the independent approach, \\nidentifying it as the “majority view,” and citing dozens of \\nstate and federal cases adopting it). \\n Walker argues this court should use the independent ap‐\\nproach when applying Wisconsin law. Walker claims \\nMurray’s discussion of § 402.719(2) and (3) was mere dicta \\nand that Wisconsin has never adopted the dependent \\napproach (or the independent approach). \\n Walker’s contention is contradicted by a series of cases \\nfrom Wisconsin and this court which have consistently held \\nthat Murray adopted the dependent approach. See, e.g., Trinkle \\nv. Schumacher Co., 301 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Wis. 1980) (awarding \\nconsequential damages when a limited warranty in a fabric \\nsales contract failed of its essential purpose); Phillips Petroleum \\nCo. v. Bucyrus‐Erie Co., 388 N.W.2d 584, 592 (Wis. 1986) (strik‐\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\ning a remedy limitation from the contract and applying all or‐\\ndinary UCC remedies because of a violation of § 402.719(2)); \\nsee also Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Industrial Engineering, Inc., 91 \\nF.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If a buyer demonstrates the \\nimpotence of the contractually established remedy under sec‐\\ntion 2‐719(2), he may then avail himself of the remedies pro‐\\nvided elsewhere in the UCC.”); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. \\nKrebs Engineers, 859 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Other \\ncourts have given effect to consequential damages disclaim‐\\ners even when exclusive remedies failed of their essential pur‐\\nposes. … But whatever the merit of Krebs’ argument as an \\noriginal matter, it is now Wisconsin law.”). Every case on \\npoint we found in Wisconsin and from our court holds that \\nMurray affirmatively adopted the dependent approach. \\n Walker next argues if the Wisconsin Supreme Court were \\nto hear this case today, it would adopt the independent \\napproach, so we should overturn Murray on the state court’s \\nbehalf. Walker suggests if we are hesitant to do so, we should \\ncertify the question to that court. \\n Federal courts sitting in diversity can decide cases involv‐\\ning unresolved issues of state law by predicting how the rele‐\\nvant state court would rule. See, e.g., Straits Financial LLC v. \\nTen Sleep Cattle Co., 900 F.3d 359, 369 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f a \\nquestion of law has not yet been decided by that court, we are \\nto make a prediction of how the Supreme Court of [the state] \\nwould rule on it … .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But \\nabsent a conflict with the Constitution or a federal law, we \\ncannot overturn established state precedent. The so‐called \\n“Erie guess” is not an Erie veto. \\n Nor may we certify this question to the Wisconsin \\nSupreme Court to check if that court has changed its mind on \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 9\\n\\n§ 402.719. We certify a question to a state court only if “the \\nrules of the highest court of [the] state provide for certification \\nto that court … .” 7TH CIR. R. 52(a); see also In re Hernandez, No. \\n18‐1789, slip op. at 12 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2019) (applying Circuit \\nRule 52(a)). The Wisconsin Supreme Court may answer only \\ncertified questions “to which it appears to the certifying court \\nthere is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme \\ncourt and the court of appeals of this state.” Wis. Stat. § 821.01 \\n(emphasis added). Here, the controlling precedent is Murray. \\nBecause the Wisconsin Supreme Court would have no juris‐\\ndiction to answer a certified question from this court on \\n§ 402.719, we have no authority to certify it under 7TH CIR. R. \\n52(a). If Wisconsin is to adopt the independent approach, its \\nown courts must do so. \\n III. \\n Typically, this would not end our inquiry, because we \\nwould still need to examine whether the limited remedies \\nprovision actually failed of its essential purpose under \\n§ 402.719(2). But here, Walker argued in its summary judg‐\\nment brief that the distribution agreement gave Sanchelima \\n“no recoverable damages.” Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its \\nMotion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Sanchelima Int’l \\nInc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Co., No. 16‐cv‐00644‐jdp, \\n2018 WL 1401195 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 19, 2018), ECF No. 45. As \\nthe district court stated in denying summary judgment, \\n“[t]his is exactly the type of limitation that § 402.719 renders \\nunenforceable.” Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary \\nJudgment at 6, Sanchelima, 2018 WL 1401195, ECF No. 66. \\nThough Walker later sought to reverse course in its motion \\nfor reconsideration, claiming other damages were available \\nunder the contract, the district court correctly noted that \\n\\f10 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nWalker “should have adduced this evidence and advanced \\nthis argument in [its] summary judgment motion …” Order \\nDenying Motion for Reconsideration at 3, Sanchelima, 2018 \\nWL 1401195, ECF No. 78. As such, the issue is waived. See \\nCaisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d \\n1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Reconsideration is not an appro‐\\npriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or \\narguing matters that could have been heard during the pen‐\\ndency of the previous motion.”). \\n The district court correctly decided the only issue pre‐\\nsented in this appeal, so we AFFIRM its judgment.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4386002/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608749/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Sanchelima International, Inc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Com\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1823 \nSANCHELIMA INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., \n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, \n v. \n\nWALKER STAINLESS EQUIPMENT CO., LLC, et al., \n Defendants‐Appellants. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Western District of Wisconsin. \n No. 16‐cv‐644‐jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 10, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. \n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Decades ago, the Wisconsin Su‐\npreme Court interpreted two limited remedy provisions of \nthe Uniform Commercial Code in Murray v. Holiday Rambler, \nInc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978). Wisconsin courts, and this \ncourt, have faithfully applied Murray since. But several other \nstates have interpreted the same UCC provisions differently. \nOn this basis alone, appellants ask us to overturn Murray, or \nat the least to certify the question to the Wisconsin Supreme \n\f2 No. 18‐1823 \n\nCourt. We cannot overturn established state precedent simply \nbecause it may be out of step with modern trends. A Japanese \nproverb may teach that “the nail that sticks out gets ham‐\nmered down.” But federal courts wield no such hammer \nwhen it comes to issues of state law. Murray remains the bind‐\ning interpretation under Wisconsin law until and unless the \nWisconsin Supreme Court decides to overturn it. \n I. \n This case comes to us in diversity. The defendants, Walker \nStainless Equipment Co., LLC and its affiliates, manufacture \ndairy silos. The plaintiffs, Sanchelima International, Inc. and \nits affiliate, sell dairy silos in Latin America.1 In 2013, after \ndecades of doing business together, the parties entered into a \ndistribution agreement providing that Sanchelima would \nserve as Walker’s exclusive distributor of dairy silos in thir‐\nteen Latin American countries. Walker agreed not to sell silos \ndirectly to third parties in those thirteen countries. \n The contract contained a limited remedies provision and a \ndamages disclaimer. Section X(F) of the distribution agree‐\nment reads: \n Manufacturer Liability Limitations. To the ex‐\n tent a … claim … arises out of any purchase or‐\n der … or otherwise aris[es] out of this agree‐\n ment, [Walker’s] aggregate total liability for any \n and all such claims shall be capped at, and \n [Walker] shall have no liability to \n Sanchelima … in excess of, the amount(s) paid \n \n 1 Walker and its affiliate co‐defendants are all citizens of Delaware \n\nand Indiana. Sanchelima and its affiliate co‐plaintiff are citizens of Florida \nand Mexico. \n\fNo. 18‐1823 3\n\n by [Sanchelima] to [Walker] under such pur‐\n chase order, subject to section X(G). Except for \n the foregoing liabilities, [Walker] … shall have \n no liability to [Sanchelima] for any \n claim … arising out of or in connection with this \n agreement, the products, [Walker] trademarks, \n documentation, or any business activity of \n [Sanchelima]. \n Section X(G) of the distribution agreement reads: \n Liability Exclusions. No [Walker‐affiliated \n company] shall be liable to any [Sanchelima‐af‐\n filiated company] for any special, indirect, inci‐\n dental or consequential losses or damages includ‐\n ing, without limitation, any lost profits or punitive \n damages, arising out of or in connection with \n this agreement, the products, documentation, \n [Walker] trademarks or any business activity of \n [Sanchelima]. \n(emphasis added). We refer to sections X(F) and X(G) collec‐\ntively as the limited remedies provision. The contract’s choice \nof law provision selected Wisconsin law. \n After the agreement was signed, Sanchelima started to \nmarket Walker products in Mexico. Sanchelima hired sales \nrepresentatives for its Mexico office and attended Mexican \ntrade shows. Walker assigned a representative to work with \nSanchelima in Mexico, but otherwise took no affirmative \nsteps to market its products in the thirteen countries covered \nby the distribution agreement. \n Walker’s lack of marketing did not prevent it from making \nsignificant direct sales in Latin America, cutting out \n\f4 No. 18‐1823 \n\nSanchelima as the distribution middle man. In 2014, Walker \nsold over $600,000 worth of dairy silos, for distribution to a \nfactory in Monterrey, Mexico. A few days later, Walker sold a \nsilo to a Nicaraguan company for over $66,000. In 2015, \nWalker sold silos to a Nestlé plant in Mexico for almost \n$3 million. And in 2017, Walker sold two processor tanks to a \nMexican juice company for almost $160,000. \n Sanchelima learned of the Nestlé sale and notified Walker \nthat it considered it to be a breach of the distribution agree‐\nment. When mediation talks broke down, Sanchelima filed \nthis suit in 2016.2 Six months later, Walker notified \nSanchelima it was terminating their agreement without cause. \nSanchelima sought lost profits of more than $600,000 on its \nbreach of contract claims. Walker denied breaching the distri‐\nbution agreement and raised several affirmative defenses and \ncounterclaims. On appeal, only one is relevant: Walker raised \nthe limited remedies provision of the distribution agreement \nas an affirmative defense and noted it explicitly precludes re‐\ncovery of “any lost profits … arising out of or in connection \nwith the Distributor Agreement … .” \n Walker moved for summary judgment relying on the con‐\ntract’s limited remedies provision. The district court denied \nthe motion and held that provision violates Wisconsin’s ver‐\nsion of the UCC § 2‐719, codified at Wis. Stat. § 402.719,3 \nwhich reads in relevant part: \n\n\n \n 2 \n Though the original suit concerned only the 2016 Nestlé sale, \nSanchelima added claims relating to the 2014 and 2017 sales after discov‐\nery revealed them. \n 3 Wis. Stat. § 402.719 uses language identical to that in UCC § 2‐719. \n\fNo. 18‐1823 5\n\n (2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or \n limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, rem‐\n edy may be had as provided in chs. 401 to 411. \n (3) Consequential damages may be limited or ex‐\n cluded unless the limitation or exclusion is uncon‐\n scionable. Limitation of consequential damages \n for injury to the person in the case of consumer \n goods is prima facie unconscionable but limita‐\n tion of damages where the loss is commercial is \n not. \n(emphases added). Because the limited remedy provision \nprovided no relief for Walker’s breach of the exclusivity pro‐\nvision, the court held it failed of its essential purpose and was \nunconscionable. The district court therefore considered all \nUCC remedies, including consequential damages for lost \nprofits. \n The case was tried to the bench. The court found that \nWalker breached the parties’ contract and that, but for \nWalker’s breach, Sanchelima would have made all of the sales \nWalker made in Mexico.4 Applying Sanchelima’s average \ngross profit margin on Walker products to Walker’s gross rev‐\nenue on the sales in question, the district court awarded \nSanchelima $778,306.70 in damages for lost profits. Walker \nappealed. \n II. \n Only damages are at issue here. The district court held that \nthe consequential damages disclaimer in Section X(G) did not \n\n \n 4 The court found Sanchelima would not have made the sale in Nica‐\n\nragua because Sanchelima has no presence in that country. \n\f6 No. 18‐1823 \n\napply because the limited remedies provision failed of its es‐\nsential purpose to provide Sanchelima relief for Walker’s \nbreach of exclusivity. The court so ruled based on Wisconsin’s \ninterpretation of UCC § 2‐719. \n Although UCC § 2‐719(3) allows contracting parties to \nlimit remedies for breach of contract and disclaim consequen‐\ntial damages (provided the limitations are not unconsciona‐\nble), UCC § 2‐719(2) makes all UCC remedies available when \nsuch a limited remedies provision “fail[s] of its essential pur‐\npose.” In interpreting these two provisions, the Wisconsin Su‐\npreme Court has adopted the “dependent approach.” See \nMurray, 265 N.W.2d at 519–20. Under the dependent ap‐\nproach, if a litigant proves the limited remedy fails of its es‐\nsential purpose under UCC § 2‐719(2), any accompanying \nconsequential damages disclaimer is per se unconscionable \nunder UCC § 2‐719(3). Murray, 265 N.W.2d at 526 (“Thus, alt‐\nhough an express warranty excludes consequential damages, \nwhen the exclusive contractual remedy fails, the buyer may \nrecover consequential damages … as though the limitation \nhad never existed.”). \n When the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Murray, a \nmajority of states had adopted the dependent approach in in‐\nterpreting UCC § 2‐719(2) and (3). See, e.g., Ehlers v. Chrysler \nMotor Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157, 160–62 (S.D. 1975); Adams v. J.I. \nCase Co., 261 N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); see also Debra \nL. Goetz et al., Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transac‐\ntions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1307 (1987) (“A ma‐\njority of cases have answered correctly that the failure of an \nexclusive remedy voids the consequential damages exclusion \nclause … .”). \n\fNo. 18‐1823 7\n\n But in the intervening decades since Murray, many courts \nhave shifted to the “independent approach,” where even if a \nlimited remedy fails of its essential purpose under UCC \n§ 2‐719(2), an accompanying consequential damages dis‐\nclaimer is not necessarily “unconscionable” under UCC \n§ 2‐719(3). The litigant must still prove procedural and \nsubstantive unconscionability to invalidate a limitation on \nconsequential damages. Today, most state courts use the \nindependent approach, including states whose earlier adop‐\ntions of the dependent approach were relied on by the Wis‐\nconsin Supreme Court in Murray. See, e.g., Razor v. Hyundai \nMotor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 616–18 (Ill. 2006) (overturning \nAdams, relied on in Murray); Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating \n& Air Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 947–52 (Ind. 2001); see \nalso 1 WHITE, SUMMERS, & HILLMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL \nCODE § 13:22 (6th ed.) (endorsing the independent approach, \nidentifying it as the “majority view,” and citing dozens of \nstate and federal cases adopting it). \n Walker argues this court should use the independent ap‐\nproach when applying Wisconsin law. Walker claims \nMurray’s discussion of § 402.719(2) and (3) was mere dicta \nand that Wisconsin has never adopted the dependent \napproach (or the independent approach). \n Walker’s contention is contradicted by a series of cases \nfrom Wisconsin and this court which have consistently held \nthat Murray adopted the dependent approach. See, e.g., Trinkle \nv. Schumacher Co., 301 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Wis. 1980) (awarding \nconsequential damages when a limited warranty in a fabric \nsales contract failed of its essential purpose); Phillips Petroleum \nCo. v. Bucyrus‐Erie Co., 388 N.W.2d 584, 592 (Wis. 1986) (strik‐\n\f8 No. 18‐1823 \n\ning a remedy limitation from the contract and applying all or‐\ndinary UCC remedies because of a violation of § 402.719(2)); \nsee also Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Industrial Engineering, Inc., 91 \nF.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If a buyer demonstrates the \nimpotence of the contractually established remedy under sec‐\ntion 2‐719(2), he may then avail himself of the remedies pro‐\nvided elsewhere in the UCC.”); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. \nKrebs Engineers, 859 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Other \ncourts have given effect to consequential damages disclaim‐\ners even when exclusive remedies failed of their essential pur‐\nposes. … But whatever the merit of Krebs’ argument as an \noriginal matter, it is now Wisconsin law.”). Every case on \npoint we found in Wisconsin and from our court holds that \nMurray affirmatively adopted the dependent approach. \n Walker next argues if the Wisconsin Supreme Court were \nto hear this case today, it would adopt the independent \napproach, so we should overturn Murray on the state court’s \nbehalf. Walker suggests if we are hesitant to do so, we should \ncertify the question to that court. \n Federal courts sitting in diversity can decide cases involv‐\ning unresolved issues of state law by predicting how the rele‐\nvant state court would rule. See, e.g., Straits Financial LLC v. \nTen Sleep Cattle Co., 900 F.3d 359, 369 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f a \nquestion of law has not yet been decided by that court, we are \nto make a prediction of how the Supreme Court of [the state] \nwould rule on it … .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But \nabsent a conflict with the Constitution or a federal law, we \ncannot overturn established state precedent. The so‐called \n“Erie guess” is not an Erie veto. \n Nor may we certify this question to the Wisconsin \nSupreme Court to check if that court has changed its mind on \n\fNo. 18‐1823 9\n\n§ 402.719. We certify a question to a state court only if “the \nrules of the highest court of [the] state provide for certification \nto that court … .” 7TH CIR. R. 52(a); see also In re Hernandez, No. \n18‐1789, slip op. at 12 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2019) (applying Circuit \nRule 52(a)). The Wisconsin Supreme Court may answer only \ncertified questions “to which it appears to the certifying court \nthere is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme \ncourt and the court of appeals of this state.” Wis. Stat. § 821.01 \n(emphasis added). Here, the controlling precedent is Murray. \nBecause the Wisconsin Supreme Court would have no juris‐\ndiction to answer a certified question from this court on \n§ 402.719, we have no authority to certify it under 7TH CIR. R. \n52(a). If Wisconsin is to adopt the independent approach, its \nown courts must do so. \n III. \n Typically, this would not end our inquiry, because we \nwould still need to examine whether the limited remedies \nprovision actually failed of its essential purpose under \n§ 402.719(2). But here, Walker argued in its summary judg‐\nment brief that the distribution agreement gave Sanchelima \n“no recoverable damages.” Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its \nMotion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Sanchelima Int’l \nInc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Co., No. 16‐cv‐00644‐jdp, \n2018 WL 1401195 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 19, 2018), ECF No. 45. As \nthe district court stated in denying summary judgment, \n“[t]his is exactly the type of limitation that § 402.719 renders \nunenforceable.” Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary \nJudgment at 6, Sanchelima, 2018 WL 1401195, ECF No. 66. \nThough Walker later sought to reverse course in its motion \nfor reconsideration, claiming other damages were available \nunder the contract, the district court correctly noted that \n\f10 No. 18‐1823 \n\nWalker “should have adduced this evidence and advanced \nthis argument in [its] summary judgment motion …” Order \nDenying Motion for Reconsideration at 3, Sanchelima, 2018 \nWL 1401195, ECF No. 78. As such, the issue is waived. See \nCaisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d \n1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Reconsideration is not an appro‐\npriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or \narguing matters that could have been heard during the pen‐\ndency of the previous motion.”). \n The district court correctly decided the only issue pre‐\nsented in this appeal, so we AFFIRM its judgment.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Sanchelima International, Inc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Com\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-04-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐1823 \\nSANCHELIMA INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, \\n v. \\n\\nWALKER STAINLESS EQUIPMENT CO., LLC, et al., \\n Defendants‐Appellants. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Western District of Wisconsin. \\n No. 16‐cv‐644‐jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 10, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. \\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Decades ago, the Wisconsin Su‐\\npreme Court interpreted two limited remedy provisions of \\nthe Uniform Commercial Code in Murray v. Holiday Rambler, \\nInc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978). Wisconsin courts, and this \\ncourt, have faithfully applied Murray since. But several other \\nstates have interpreted the same UCC provisions differently. \\nOn this basis alone, appellants ask us to overturn Murray, or \\nat the least to certify the question to the Wisconsin Supreme \\n\\f2 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nCourt. We cannot overturn established state precedent simply \\nbecause it may be out of step with modern trends. A Japanese \\nproverb may teach that “the nail that sticks out gets ham‐\\nmered down.” But federal courts wield no such hammer \\nwhen it comes to issues of state law. Murray remains the bind‐\\ning interpretation under Wisconsin law until and unless the \\nWisconsin Supreme Court decides to overturn it. \\n I. \\n This case comes to us in diversity. The defendants, Walker \\nStainless Equipment Co., LLC and its affiliates, manufacture \\ndairy silos. The plaintiffs, Sanchelima International, Inc. and \\nits affiliate, sell dairy silos in Latin America.1 In 2013, after \\ndecades of doing business together, the parties entered into a \\ndistribution agreement providing that Sanchelima would \\nserve as Walker’s exclusive distributor of dairy silos in thir‐\\nteen Latin American countries. Walker agreed not to sell silos \\ndirectly to third parties in those thirteen countries. \\n The contract contained a limited remedies provision and a \\ndamages disclaimer. Section X(F) of the distribution agree‐\\nment reads: \\n Manufacturer Liability Limitations. To the ex‐\\n tent a … claim … arises out of any purchase or‐\\n der … or otherwise aris[es] out of this agree‐\\n ment, [Walker’s] aggregate total liability for any \\n and all such claims shall be capped at, and \\n [Walker] shall have no liability to \\n Sanchelima … in excess of, the amount(s) paid \\n \\n 1 Walker and its affiliate co‐defendants are all citizens of Delaware \\n\\nand Indiana. Sanchelima and its affiliate co‐plaintiff are citizens of Florida \\nand Mexico. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 3\\n\\n by [Sanchelima] to [Walker] under such pur‐\\n chase order, subject to section X(G). Except for \\n the foregoing liabilities, [Walker] … shall have \\n no liability to [Sanchelima] for any \\n claim … arising out of or in connection with this \\n agreement, the products, [Walker] trademarks, \\n documentation, or any business activity of \\n [Sanchelima]. \\n Section X(G) of the distribution agreement reads: \\n Liability Exclusions. No [Walker‐affiliated \\n company] shall be liable to any [Sanchelima‐af‐\\n filiated company] for any special, indirect, inci‐\\n dental or consequential losses or damages includ‐\\n ing, without limitation, any lost profits or punitive \\n damages, arising out of or in connection with \\n this agreement, the products, documentation, \\n [Walker] trademarks or any business activity of \\n [Sanchelima]. \\n(emphasis added). We refer to sections X(F) and X(G) collec‐\\ntively as the limited remedies provision. The contract’s choice \\nof law provision selected Wisconsin law. \\n After the agreement was signed, Sanchelima started to \\nmarket Walker products in Mexico. Sanchelima hired sales \\nrepresentatives for its Mexico office and attended Mexican \\ntrade shows. Walker assigned a representative to work with \\nSanchelima in Mexico, but otherwise took no affirmative \\nsteps to market its products in the thirteen countries covered \\nby the distribution agreement. \\n Walker’s lack of marketing did not prevent it from making \\nsignificant direct sales in Latin America, cutting out \\n\\f4 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nSanchelima as the distribution middle man. In 2014, Walker \\nsold over $600,000 worth of dairy silos, for distribution to a \\nfactory in Monterrey, Mexico. A few days later, Walker sold a \\nsilo to a Nicaraguan company for over $66,000. In 2015, \\nWalker sold silos to a Nestlé plant in Mexico for almost \\n$3 million. And in 2017, Walker sold two processor tanks to a \\nMexican juice company for almost $160,000. \\n Sanchelima learned of the Nestlé sale and notified Walker \\nthat it considered it to be a breach of the distribution agree‐\\nment. When mediation talks broke down, Sanchelima filed \\nthis suit in 2016.2 Six months later, Walker notified \\nSanchelima it was terminating their agreement without cause. \\nSanchelima sought lost profits of more than $600,000 on its \\nbreach of contract claims. Walker denied breaching the distri‐\\nbution agreement and raised several affirmative defenses and \\ncounterclaims. On appeal, only one is relevant: Walker raised \\nthe limited remedies provision of the distribution agreement \\nas an affirmative defense and noted it explicitly precludes re‐\\ncovery of “any lost profits … arising out of or in connection \\nwith the Distributor Agreement … .” \\n Walker moved for summary judgment relying on the con‐\\ntract’s limited remedies provision. The district court denied \\nthe motion and held that provision violates Wisconsin’s ver‐\\nsion of the UCC § 2‐719, codified at Wis. Stat. § 402.719,3 \\nwhich reads in relevant part: \\n\\n\\n \\n 2 \\n Though the original suit concerned only the 2016 Nestlé sale, \\nSanchelima added claims relating to the 2014 and 2017 sales after discov‐\\nery revealed them. \\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 402.719 uses language identical to that in UCC § 2‐719. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 5\\n\\n (2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or \\n limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, rem‐\\n edy may be had as provided in chs. 401 to 411. \\n (3) Consequential damages may be limited or ex‐\\n cluded unless the limitation or exclusion is uncon‐\\n scionable. Limitation of consequential damages \\n for injury to the person in the case of consumer \\n goods is prima facie unconscionable but limita‐\\n tion of damages where the loss is commercial is \\n not. \\n(emphases added). Because the limited remedy provision \\nprovided no relief for Walker’s breach of the exclusivity pro‐\\nvision, the court held it failed of its essential purpose and was \\nunconscionable. The district court therefore considered all \\nUCC remedies, including consequential damages for lost \\nprofits. \\n The case was tried to the bench. The court found that \\nWalker breached the parties’ contract and that, but for \\nWalker’s breach, Sanchelima would have made all of the sales \\nWalker made in Mexico.4 Applying Sanchelima’s average \\ngross profit margin on Walker products to Walker’s gross rev‐\\nenue on the sales in question, the district court awarded \\nSanchelima $778,306.70 in damages for lost profits. Walker \\nappealed. \\n II. \\n Only damages are at issue here. The district court held that \\nthe consequential damages disclaimer in Section X(G) did not \\n\\n \\n 4 The court found Sanchelima would not have made the sale in Nica‐\\n\\nragua because Sanchelima has no presence in that country. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\napply because the limited remedies provision failed of its es‐\\nsential purpose to provide Sanchelima relief for Walker’s \\nbreach of exclusivity. The court so ruled based on Wisconsin’s \\ninterpretation of UCC § 2‐719. \\n Although UCC § 2‐719(3) allows contracting parties to \\nlimit remedies for breach of contract and disclaim consequen‐\\ntial damages (provided the limitations are not unconsciona‐\\nble), UCC § 2‐719(2) makes all UCC remedies available when \\nsuch a limited remedies provision “fail[s] of its essential pur‐\\npose.” In interpreting these two provisions, the Wisconsin Su‐\\npreme Court has adopted the “dependent approach.” See \\nMurray, 265 N.W.2d at 519–20. Under the dependent ap‐\\nproach, if a litigant proves the limited remedy fails of its es‐\\nsential purpose under UCC § 2‐719(2), any accompanying \\nconsequential damages disclaimer is per se unconscionable \\nunder UCC § 2‐719(3). Murray, 265 N.W.2d at 526 (“Thus, alt‐\\nhough an express warranty excludes consequential damages, \\nwhen the exclusive contractual remedy fails, the buyer may \\nrecover consequential damages … as though the limitation \\nhad never existed.”). \\n When the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Murray, a \\nmajority of states had adopted the dependent approach in in‐\\nterpreting UCC § 2‐719(2) and (3). See, e.g., Ehlers v. Chrysler \\nMotor Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157, 160–62 (S.D. 1975); Adams v. J.I. \\nCase Co., 261 N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); see also Debra \\nL. Goetz et al., Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transac‐\\ntions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1307 (1987) (“A ma‐\\njority of cases have answered correctly that the failure of an \\nexclusive remedy voids the consequential damages exclusion \\nclause … .”). \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 7\\n\\n But in the intervening decades since Murray, many courts \\nhave shifted to the “independent approach,” where even if a \\nlimited remedy fails of its essential purpose under UCC \\n§ 2‐719(2), an accompanying consequential damages dis‐\\nclaimer is not necessarily “unconscionable” under UCC \\n§ 2‐719(3). The litigant must still prove procedural and \\nsubstantive unconscionability to invalidate a limitation on \\nconsequential damages. Today, most state courts use the \\nindependent approach, including states whose earlier adop‐\\ntions of the dependent approach were relied on by the Wis‐\\nconsin Supreme Court in Murray. See, e.g., Razor v. Hyundai \\nMotor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 616–18 (Ill. 2006) (overturning \\nAdams, relied on in Murray); Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating \\n& Air Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 947–52 (Ind. 2001); see \\nalso 1 WHITE, SUMMERS, & HILLMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL \\nCODE § 13:22 (6th ed.) (endorsing the independent approach, \\nidentifying it as the “majority view,” and citing dozens of \\nstate and federal cases adopting it). \\n Walker argues this court should use the independent ap‐\\nproach when applying Wisconsin law. Walker claims \\nMurray’s discussion of § 402.719(2) and (3) was mere dicta \\nand that Wisconsin has never adopted the dependent \\napproach (or the independent approach). \\n Walker’s contention is contradicted by a series of cases \\nfrom Wisconsin and this court which have consistently held \\nthat Murray adopted the dependent approach. See, e.g., Trinkle \\nv. Schumacher Co., 301 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Wis. 1980) (awarding \\nconsequential damages when a limited warranty in a fabric \\nsales contract failed of its essential purpose); Phillips Petroleum \\nCo. v. Bucyrus‐Erie Co., 388 N.W.2d 584, 592 (Wis. 1986) (strik‐\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\ning a remedy limitation from the contract and applying all or‐\\ndinary UCC remedies because of a violation of § 402.719(2)); \\nsee also Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Industrial Engineering, Inc., 91 \\nF.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If a buyer demonstrates the \\nimpotence of the contractually established remedy under sec‐\\ntion 2‐719(2), he may then avail himself of the remedies pro‐\\nvided elsewhere in the UCC.”); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. \\nKrebs Engineers, 859 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Other \\ncourts have given effect to consequential damages disclaim‐\\ners even when exclusive remedies failed of their essential pur‐\\nposes. … But whatever the merit of Krebs’ argument as an \\noriginal matter, it is now Wisconsin law.”). Every case on \\npoint we found in Wisconsin and from our court holds that \\nMurray affirmatively adopted the dependent approach. \\n Walker next argues if the Wisconsin Supreme Court were \\nto hear this case today, it would adopt the independent \\napproach, so we should overturn Murray on the state court’s \\nbehalf. Walker suggests if we are hesitant to do so, we should \\ncertify the question to that court. \\n Federal courts sitting in diversity can decide cases involv‐\\ning unresolved issues of state law by predicting how the rele‐\\nvant state court would rule. See, e.g., Straits Financial LLC v. \\nTen Sleep Cattle Co., 900 F.3d 359, 369 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f a \\nquestion of law has not yet been decided by that court, we are \\nto make a prediction of how the Supreme Court of [the state] \\nwould rule on it … .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But \\nabsent a conflict with the Constitution or a federal law, we \\ncannot overturn established state precedent. The so‐called \\n“Erie guess” is not an Erie veto. \\n Nor may we certify this question to the Wisconsin \\nSupreme Court to check if that court has changed its mind on \\n\\fNo. 18‐1823 9\\n\\n§ 402.719. We certify a question to a state court only if “the \\nrules of the highest court of [the] state provide for certification \\nto that court … .” 7TH CIR. R. 52(a); see also In re Hernandez, No. \\n18‐1789, slip op. at 12 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2019) (applying Circuit \\nRule 52(a)). The Wisconsin Supreme Court may answer only \\ncertified questions “to which it appears to the certifying court \\nthere is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme \\ncourt and the court of appeals of this state.” Wis. Stat. § 821.01 \\n(emphasis added). Here, the controlling precedent is Murray. \\nBecause the Wisconsin Supreme Court would have no juris‐\\ndiction to answer a certified question from this court on \\n§ 402.719, we have no authority to certify it under 7TH CIR. R. \\n52(a). If Wisconsin is to adopt the independent approach, its \\nown courts must do so. \\n III. \\n Typically, this would not end our inquiry, because we \\nwould still need to examine whether the limited remedies \\nprovision actually failed of its essential purpose under \\n§ 402.719(2). But here, Walker argued in its summary judg‐\\nment brief that the distribution agreement gave Sanchelima \\n“no recoverable damages.” Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its \\nMotion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Sanchelima Int’l \\nInc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Co., No. 16‐cv‐00644‐jdp, \\n2018 WL 1401195 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 19, 2018), ECF No. 45. As \\nthe district court stated in denying summary judgment, \\n“[t]his is exactly the type of limitation that § 402.719 renders \\nunenforceable.” Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary \\nJudgment at 6, Sanchelima, 2018 WL 1401195, ECF No. 66. \\nThough Walker later sought to reverse course in its motion \\nfor reconsideration, claiming other damages were available \\nunder the contract, the district court correctly noted that \\n\\f10 No. 18‐1823 \\n\\nWalker “should have adduced this evidence and advanced \\nthis argument in [its] summary judgment motion …” Order \\nDenying Motion for Reconsideration at 3, Sanchelima, 2018 \\nWL 1401195, ECF No. 78. As such, the issue is waived. See \\nCaisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d \\n1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Reconsideration is not an appro‐\\npriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or \\narguing matters that could have been heard during the pen‐\\ndency of the previous motion.”). \\n The district court correctly decided the only issue pre‐\\nsented in this appeal, so we AFFIRM its judgment.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":16,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":1600,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSJ9.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc3ODc5ODgwMCwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3Nzg4MDI0MDAsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.6suHpH8E8tGfktDqC0DhjRrMHDfcteypsij7JjUYVlwWt7Cc7Z-yZYNF3fnC7ROGmp01Gh_nWze3K-7PKpJcCg","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
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4,607,967 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Joseph Bret LAWRENCE, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Joseph Lawrence | 2019-04-08 | 18-20149 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Wiener, Dennis, Owen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WIENER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-20149 Document: 00514907255 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/08/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUI... | WIENER | DENNIS | OWEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607967/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,969 | Christopher FREY, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent | Frey v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. | 2019-04-08 | 18-60205 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Wiener, Dennis, Owen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WIENER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60205 Document: 00514906578 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/08/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | WIENER | DENNIS | OWEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607969/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,286 | The INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellant v. LINCOLN PROPERTY COMPANY; Legacy Multifamily North III, L.L.C.; CPF PC Riverwalk, L.L.C.; HLI White Rock, L.L.C.; Brick Row Apartments, L.L.C., Defendants-Appellees | Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co. | 2019-04-09 | 17-10943 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Davis, Jones, Engelhardt", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KURT D. ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-10943 Document: 00514909026 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/09/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ... | DAVIS | JONES | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608286/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,287 | CLAIMANT ID 100081155, Requesting Party-Appellant, v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; BP America Production Company; BP, P.L.C., Objecting Parties-Appellees. | ID 100081155 v. BP Exploration & Prodn, I | 2019-04-09 | 18-30268; C/w 18-30269; 18-30270; 18-30271; 18-30281 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Reavley, Elrod, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30268 Document: 00514909641 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/09/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ... | REAVLEY | ELROD | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608287/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,512 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Latroy Leon BURRIS, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Latroy Burris | 2019-04-10 | 17-10478 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before WIENER, GRAVES, and HO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WIENER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-10478 Document: 00514910195 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/10/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FO... | WIENER | GRAVES | HO | 1 | {"WIENER": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608512/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,515 | FISHBACK NURSERY, INCORPORATED; Surface Nursery, Incorporated, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant - Appellee | Fishback Nursery, Inc. v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n | 2019-04-10 | 18-10090 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Duncan, Engelhardt", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-10090 Document: 00514910089 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/10/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ... | SMITH | DUNCAN | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608515/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,728 | WASTE MANAGEMENT OF LOUISIANA, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant v. RIVER BIRCH, INCORPORATED; Albert J. Ward, Jr.; Frederick R. Heebe; Highway 90, L.L.C., Defendants-Appellees. | Waste Management of Louisiana v. River Birch, Inco | 2019-04-10 | 18-30139 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Davis, Costa, Oldham", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30139 Document: 00514910831 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/10/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n ... | DAVIS | COSTA | OLDHAM | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608728/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,409 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald Lee HATHORN, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Donald Hathorn | 2019-04-11 | 18-60380 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Smith, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60380 Document: 00514912763 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/11/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIR... | HIGGINBOTHAM | SMITH | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609409/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,789 | Zille SHAH, Medical Doctor; Zille Huma Zaim, Medical Doctor, Physicians Assistant, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Alex M. AZAR, II, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee Mohammad Nawaz, Medical Doctor; Mohammad Zaim, Medical Doctor, Physicians Assistant, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Alex M. ... | Zille Shah v. Alex Azar, Secretary, HHS | 2019-04-12 | 17-40897; Consolidated With 17-40898 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Dennis, Costa", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, CIRCUIT JUDGE:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-40897 Document: 00514913759 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/12/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH C... | HIGGINBOTHAM | DENNIS | COSTA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609789/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,838 | SOUTHWESTERN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY; Utility Water Act Group; Union Electric Company, Doing Business as Ameren Missouri; Waterkeeper Alliance, Incorporated; Environmental Integrity Project; Sierra Club; American Water Works Association; National Association of Water Companies; City of Springfield, Missouri, by and Thro... | Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. U.S. E.P.A. | 2019-04-12 | 15-60821 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAYNES, HO, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 15-60821 Document: 00514914192 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/12/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FO... | HAYNES | HO | DUNCAN | 1 | {"HAYNES": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", "DUNCAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609838/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,839 | Ikechukwu Hyginus OKORIE, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant v. Virginia M. CRAWFORD, M.D.; Charles D. Miles, M.D.; Rickey L. Chance, D.O.; Claude D. Brunson, M.D.; John C. Clay, M.D.; S. Randall Easterling, M.D.; C. Kenneth Lippincott, M.D.; William S. Mayo, D.O.; J. Ann Rea, M.D.; H. Vann Craig, M.D.; Jonathan Dalton; Leslie ... | Ikechukwu Okorie v. Virginia Crawford | 2019-04-12 | 18-60335 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Wiener, Southwick, Costa", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60335 Document: 00514914760 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/12/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | WIENER | SOUTHWICK | COSTA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609839/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,325 | Quintin Phillippe JONES, Petitioner-Appellant v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee | Quintin Jones v. Lorie Davis, Director | 2019-04-15 | 16-70003 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Dennis, Elrod", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 16-70003 Document: 00514916154 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/15/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH ... | HIGGINBOTHAM | DENNIS | ELROD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610325/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,329 | Deanna J. ROBINSON, Plaintiff - Appellant v. HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS ; Randy Meeks, in His Individual Capacity and Official Capacity ; John Does 1-10, in Their Individual Capacities and Their Official Capacities; Jeffery Haines, in His Individual Capacity and Official Capacity ; Destiny Tweedy, in Her Individual Capacity an... | Deanna Robinson v. Hunt County, Texas | 2019-04-15 | 18-10238 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Jolly, Dennis, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-10238 Document: 00514916211 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/15/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT... | JOLLY | DENNIS | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610329/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,558 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Benjamin MARTINEZ ; Giam Nguyen; Anna Bagoumian; Donovan Simmons, Defendants-Appellants | United States v. Benjamin Martinez | 2019-04-16 | 17-20063 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Dennis, Owen, Southwick", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-20063 Document: 00514917762 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/16/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUI... | DENNIS | OWEN | SOUTHWICK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610558/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,559 | Pam MILETELLO, Plaintiff - Appellant v. R M R MECHANICAL, INCORPORATED; Sandra Bellgard Miletello, Defendants - Appellees | Pam Miletello v. R M R Mechanical, Incorporated, e | 2019-04-16 | 18-30942 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Barksdale, Southwick, Haynes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HAYNES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30942 Document: 00514917969 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/16/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | BARKSDALE | SOUTHWICK | HAYNES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610559/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,560 | Maria RAMIREZ, as Representative of the Estate and Statutory Death Beneficiary of Daniel Antonio Ramirez; Pedro Ramirez, as Representative of the Estate and Statutory Death Beneficiary of Daniel Antonio Ramirez, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ruben ESCAJEDA, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. | Maria Ramirez v. Ruben Escajeda, Jr. | 2019-04-16 | 18-50125 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Smith, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-50125 Document: 00514917622 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/16/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRC... | HIGGINBOTHAM | SMITH | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610560/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,701 | Michael BOURNE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael GUNNELS, Lieutenant; Carlos A. Applewhite, Sergeant; Anthony Howard, Jr., Sergeant; Roland C. Weaver, Correctional Officer ; Robert LeBlanc, Correctional Officer; Ernest Price ; Tajudeen Ajisefini; Sascha Ford, Defendants-Appellees. | Michael Bourne v. Michael Gunnels | 2019-04-16 | 17-20418 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "King, Smith, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-20418 Document: 00514918313 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/16/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | KING | SMITH | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610701/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,952 | Official Stanford Invstr Com v. Greenberg T | 2019-04-17 | 17-11464 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before JONES, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-11464 Document: 00514920032 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/17/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | JONES | CLEMENT | SOUTHWICK | 1 | {"JONES": ", Circuit", "CLEMENT": ", Circuit", "SOUTHWICK": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610952/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,610,954 | Alexandro PUGA; Norma Puga, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. RCX SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellant | Alexandro Puga v. About Tyme Transport, Inc | 2019-04-17 | 17-41282 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Stewart, King, Owen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514919929 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/17/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | STEWART | KING | OWEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610954/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,118 | LLOYD'S SYNDICATE 457 ; Lloyd's Syndicate 1036; Lloyd's Syndicate 1084 ; Lloyd's Syndicate 1209 ; Lloyd's Syndicate 1225, Et Al Plaintiffs - Appellants v. FLOATEC, L.L.C., Doing Business as FloaTEC Solutions, L.L.C. Defendant - Appellee | Lloyd's Syndicate 457 v. FloaTEC, L.L.C. | 2019-04-17 | 17-20550 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Duncan, Engelhardt", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-20550 Document: 00514920853 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/17/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ... | SMITH | DUNCAN | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611118/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,120 | HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff - Appellee v. IRONSHORE SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant - Appellant Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company, Defendant - Appellee | Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co. | 2019-04-17 | 17-20678; C/w 18-20239 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Stewart, Southwick, Engelhardt", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-20678 Document: 00514920694 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/17/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | STEWART | SOUTHWICK | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611120/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,963 | Samuel TROICE, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated Michoacan Trust, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated Pam Reed, Putative Class Representative v. GREENBERG TRAURIG, L.L.P. Yolanda Suarez | Troice v. Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P. | 2019-04-17 | No. 17-11464 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Clement, Jones, Southwick", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415397/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CLEMENT | JONES | SOUTHWICK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443963/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,453 | M.C. MOORE, as Father and Next Friend to Minors Joyce Marie Moore, Jerry Moore, and Thelma Louise Moore; Henry Smith, as Father and Next Friend to Minors Bennie Smith, Charles Edward Smith, Shirley Ann Smith, and Earline Smith, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TANGIPAHOA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellant | M. Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board | 2019-04-18 | 18-30115 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "King, Higginson, Costa", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30115 Document: 00514921544 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/18/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United St... | KING | HIGGINSON | COSTA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611453/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,561 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Glen B. CLAY, Also Known as Glenn B. Clay, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Glen Clay | 2019-04-18 | 17-60538 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before JONES, HO, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-60538 Document: 00514922683 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/18/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR ... | JONES | HO | OLDHAM | 1 | {"JONES": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611561/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,565 | ID 100081155 v. BP Exploration & Prodn, I | 2019-04-18 | 18-30281 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30268 Document: 00514922301 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/18/2019\n\n\n\n\n REVISED April 18, 2019\n\n I... | REAVLEY | ELROD | WILLETT | 1 | {"REAVLEY": ", Circuit", "ELROD": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611565/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,611,923 | Bonnie M. O'DANIEL, Plaintiff - Appellant v. INDUSTRIAL SERVICE SOLUTIONS; Plant-N-Power Services, Incorporated; Tex Simoneaux, Jr.; Cindy Huber Defendants - Appellees | Bonnie O'Daniel v. Industrial Service Solutions, e | 2019-04-19 | 18-30136 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Jones, Haynes, Oldham", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30136 Document: 00514923409 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/19/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n... | JONES | HAYNES | OLDHAM | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611923/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,612,151 | Melida Tereza LUNA-GARCIA DE GARCIA, Also Known as Melida Luna-Garcia, Also Known as Melina Luna Garcia De Garcia, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. | Melida Luna-Garcia De Garcia v. William Barr, U. S | 2019-04-22 | 15-60526 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Jolly, Elrod, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 15-60526 Document: 00514924575 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/22/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT... | JOLLY | ELROD | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612151/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,612,302 | CHERRY KNOLL, L.L.C., Plaintiff - Appellant v. Steven JONES; HDR Engineering, Incorporated; The City of Lakeway, Defendants - Appellees | Cherry Knoll, L.L.C. v. HDR Engineering, Incorpora | 2019-04-22 | 18-50494 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Stewart, Davis, Elrod", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-50494 Document: 00514925503 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/22/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR T... | STEWART | DAVIS | ELROD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612302/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,612,773 | In RE: Daniel CLARK, IV, Debtor Alisha Pate; Yvonne Clark-Thigpen, Appellants v. Rodney D. Tow, Trustee; Daniel Clark, IV, Appellees | Alisha Pate v. Rodney Tow | 2019-04-23 | 18-20518 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "King, Per Curiam, Smith, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-20518 Document: 00514927289 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/23/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | KING | SMITH | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612773/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,287 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. James Kenneth GANZER, Jr., Defendant - Appellant | United States v. James Ganzer, Jr. | 2019-04-24 | 17-51042 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Duncan, Engelhardt", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-51042 Document: 00514928710 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/24/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | SMITH | DUNCAN | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613287/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,290 | Officer John DOE, Police Officer, Plaintiff - Appellant v. DeRay MCKESSON; Black Lives Matter; Black Lives Matter Network, Incorporated, Defendants - Appellees | John Doe v. Deray McKesson | 2019-04-24 | 17-30864 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Jolly, Elrod, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-30864 Document: 00514929432 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/24/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | JOLLY | ELROD | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613290/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,294 | Angie WALLER, Individually and in Her Capacity as Independent Executrix of the Estate of Kathleen Margaret Waller; Chris Waller, Plaintiffs - Appellees Terry Wayne Springer; Gayla Wynell Kimbrough, Intervenor Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Benjamin B. HANLON; Richard Hoeppner; B. S. Hardin, Defendants - Appellants | Angie Waller v. City of Fort Worth Texas, e | 2019-04-24 | 18-10561 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "King, Smith, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KING, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-10561 Document: 00514928890 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/24/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States C... | KING | SMITH | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613294/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,805 | United States v. Glen Clay | 2019-04-25 | 17-60538 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before JONES, HO, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-60538 Document: 00514930742 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/25/2019\n\n\n\n\n REVISED April 25, 2019\n\n IN THE UNI... | JONES | HO | OLDHAM | 1 | {"JONES": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613805/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,613,807 | LIGHT-AGE, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Clifford ASHCROFT-SMITH, Defendant - Appellee | Light-Age, Incorporated v. Clifford Ashcroft-Smith | 2019-04-25 | 18-20098 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "King, Per Curiam, Smith, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-20098 Document: 00514930821 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/25/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | KING | SMITH | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613807/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,232 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Michael BAKER, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Michael Baker | 2019-04-26 | 17-51034 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Wiener, Southwick, Costa", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WIENER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-51034 Document: 00514932568 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | WIENER | SOUTHWICK | COSTA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614232/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,233 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Kim RICARD, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Kim Ricard | 2019-04-26 | 18-30047 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Jolly, Dennis, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30047 Document: 00514932907 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\... | JOLLY | DENNIS | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614233/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,234 | Maria ARENAS, Individually, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John CALHOUN, in His Individual Capacity, Defendant-Appellee. | Maria Arenas v. John Calhoun | 2019-04-26 | 18-50194 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Smith, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-50194 Document: 00514932176 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCU... | HIGGINBOTHAM | SMITH | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614234/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,235 | Jose Luis GARZA, Individually and as Representatives of the Estate of Jose Luis Garza, Jr., Deceased; Veronica Garza, Individually and as Representatives of the Estate of Jose Luis Garza, Jr., Deceased; Cynthia Lopez, as Next Friend of Jose Ruben Garza, Minor Son, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. CITY OF DONNA, Defendant-Appel... | Jose Garza v. City of Donna | 2019-04-26 | 18-40044 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Jolly, Dennis, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-40044 Document: 00514932961 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT... | JOLLY | DENNIS | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614235/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,236 | Gustavo Monteon-Camargo v. William Barr, U. S. Att | 2019-04-26 | 17-60345 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SMITH, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-60345 Document: 00514932801 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n REVISED April 26, 2019\n\n IN ... | SMITH | DUNCAN | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {"SMITH": ", Circuit", "DUNCAN": ", Circuit", "ENGELHARDT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614236/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,614,642 | In re: Deepwater Horizon | 2019-04-29 | 18-30008 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before ELROD, WILLETT, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30008 Document: 00514934760 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/29/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | ELROD | WILLETT | DUNCAN | 1 | {"ELROD": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit", "DUNCAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614642/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,980 | IN RE: DEEPWATER HORIZON Sarah Graham Max Murray Richard Wood John Burrus v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated BP America Production Company BP, P.L.C. Transocean, Limited Transocean Offshore, Incorporated Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated Transocean Holdings, Incorporated Anadarko Petroleum Corporation Compan... | Murray v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc. (In re Deepwater Horizon) | 2019-04-29 | No. 18-30008 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Duncan, Elrod, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415414/", "author_raw": ""}]} | DUNCAN | ELROD | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443980/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,888 | Jose Garza v. City of Donna | 2019-04-30 | 18-40044 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-40044 Document: 00514935765 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/30/2019\n\n\n\n\n REVISED April 30, 2019\n\n ... | JOLLY | DENNIS | HIGGINSON | 1 | {"JOLLY": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614888/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,615,153 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Randy CAMPOS, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Randy Campos | 2019-04-30 | 18-50416 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAYNES, GRAVES, and HO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HAYNES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-50416 Document: 00514936968 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/30/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FI... | HAYNES | GRAVES | HO | 1 | {"HAYNES": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615153/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,615,154 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Luis Javier ROCHA FLORES, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Luis Rocha Flores | 2019-04-30 | 17-20666 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAYNES, GRAVES, and HO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-20666 Document: 00514936478 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/30/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIR... | HAYNES | GRAVES | HO | 1 | {"HAYNES": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615154/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,615,156 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elizabeth Garcia DE NIETO, Also Known as Betty, Also Known as Elizabeth Jurado, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Elizabeth Garcia De Nieto | 2019-04-30 | 16-51142 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Graves, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 16-51142 Document: 00514937111 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/30/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | SMITH | GRAVES | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615156/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,615,158 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Adam Alfredo FLORES, Also Known as Adam Flores, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Adam Flores | 2019-04-30 | 18-40334 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAYNES, GRAVES, and HO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-40334 Document: 00514937178 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/30/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIF... | HAYNES | GRAVES | HO | 1 | {"HAYNES": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615158/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,615,160 | Carey Ebert v. Michael Gustin | 2019-04-30 | 18-10382 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before BARKSDALE, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HAYNES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-10382 Document: 00514936875 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/30/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR... | BARKSDALE | SOUTHWICK | HAYNES | 1 | {"BARKSDALE": ", Circuit", "SOUTHWICK": ", Circuit", "HAYNES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615160/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,615,161 | Adam Joseph Resources v. CNA Metals Limited | 2019-04-30 | 17-20685 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-20685 Document: 00514936770 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/30/2019\n\n\n\n\n REVISED APRIL 30, 2019\n\n IN TH... | JOLLY | DENNIS | HIGGINSON | 1 | {"JOLLY": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4615161/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,981 | In the Matter of: LATITUDE SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED, Debtor Carey D. Ebert v. John Paul DEJORIA Howard Miller Appel Earnest A. Bartlett, III Matthew J. Cohen | Latitude Solutions, Incorporated v. DeJoria | 2019-04-30 | No. 18-10382 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Barksdale, Haynes, Southwick", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415415/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BARKSDALE | HAYNES | SOUTHWICK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443981/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,508 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Jamar ARMSTRONG, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. David Armstrong | 2019-04-03 | 18-5079 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Donald, Larsen, Nalbandian", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0058p.06\n\n ... | DONALD | LARSEN | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606508/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,511 | In RE: Earl Benard BLASINGAME; Margaret Gooch Blasingame, Debtors. Church Joint Venture, L.P., on Behalf of Chapter 7 Trustee, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Earl Benard Blasingame and Margaret Gooch Blasingame (18-5549/5623); Blasingame Family Residence Generation Skipping Trust (18-5549); Blasingame Family Business Investme... | Church Joint Venture, L.P. v. Blasingame (In Re Blasingame) | 2019-04-03 | 18-5549/5623 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Griffin, Kethledge, Thapar", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "THAPAR, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0057p.06\n\n ... | GRIFFIN | KETHLEDGE | THAPAR | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606511/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,076 | William Russell GARDNER, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jason EVANS, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. Henry Lee Holsey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Aaron Wieber, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | William Gardner v. Jason Evans | 2019-04-04 | 17-1933 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Merritt, Guy, Moore", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0061p.06\... | MERRITT | GUY | MOORE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607076/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,077 | EMW WOMEN'S SURGICAL CENTER, P.S.C., on Behalf of Itself, Its Staff, and Its Patients; Ernest Marshall, M.D., on Behalf of Himself and His Patients; Ashley Bergin, M.D., on Behalf of Herself and Her Patients; Tanya Franklin, M.D., on Behalf of Herself and Her Patients, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Andrew G. BESHEAR, Attorn... | EMW Women's Surgical Ctr. v. Andrew Beshear | 2019-04-04 | 17-6151/6183 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: NORRIS, DONALD, and BUSH, Circuit Judges; _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: S. Chad Meredith, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-6151.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLI... | NORRIS | DONALD | BUSH | 1 | {"NORRIS": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607077/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,078 | Christopher SULLIVAN; Nathan Haskell; William Gentry, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Sam BENNINGFIELD; Oddie Shoupe, Defendants-Appellees. | Christopher Sullivan v. Sam Benningfield | 2019-04-04 | 18-5643 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Cole, Suhrheinrich", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888314/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinion... | COLE | SUHRHEINRICH | COLE | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607078/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,079 | Carlos Clifford LOWE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. | Carlos Lowe v. United States | 2019-04-04 | 17-5490 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Donald, Thapar", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888316/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinion... | DONALD | THAPAR | DONALD | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607079/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,135 | EMW Women's Surgical Ctr. v. Andrew Beshear | 2019-04-04 | 17-6183 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: NORRIS, DONALD, and BUSH, Circuit Judges; _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: S. Chad Meredith, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant in 17-6151.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLI... | NORRIS | DONALD | BUSH | 1 | {"NORRIS": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607135/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,607,421 | SECRETARY OF LABOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TIMBERLINE SOUTH, LLC; Jim Payne, Defendants-Appellants. | Sec'y Labor v. Timberline S., LLC | 2019-04-05 | 18-1763 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: SUTTON, WHITE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File... | SUTTON | WHITE | DONALD | 1 | {"SUTTON": ", Circuit", "WHITE": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607421/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,424 | Jonathan Cruz-Guzman v. William P. Barr | 2019-04-05 | 18-3520 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: BATCHELDER, ROGERS, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "THAPAR, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | BATCHELDER | ROGERS | THAPAR | 1 | {"BATCHELDER": ", Circuit", "ROGERS": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607424/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,607,687 | K. H., a Minor Child, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. | K. H. v. William P. Barr | 2019-04-08 | 18-3426 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Cole, Suhrheinrich, Moore", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLE, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0065p.06\n\n ... | COLE | SUHRHEINRICH | MOORE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607687/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,688 | BURNETTE FOODS, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; Sonny Perdue, Secretary of Agriculture, Defendants-Appellants. | Burnette Foods, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. | 2019-04-08 | 18-1541 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Griffin, White, Bush", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0066p.06\n\n ... | GRIFFIN | WHITE | BUSH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607688/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,224 | Paul JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IPX INTERNATIONAL EQUATORIAL GUINEA, S.A., Defendant-Appellee. | Paul Jones v. IPX Int'l Equatorial Guinea SA | 2019-04-09 | 18-1405 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: BATCHELDER, McKEAGUE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "McKEAGUE", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0... | BATCHELDER | MCKEAGUE | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {"BATCHELDER": ", Circuit", "McKEAGUE": ", Circuit", "NALBANDIAN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608224/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,516 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmie Eugene WHITE, II, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Jimmie White | 2019-04-10 | 16-1009 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Griffin, Clay", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888338/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "035concurrenceinpart", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/op... | GRIFFIN | CLAY | GRIFFIN | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608516/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,518 | JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry J. WINGET; Larry J. Winget Living Trust, Defendants-Appellants. | JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Larry J. Winget | 2019-04-10 | 18-1143 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Donald, Larsen, Nalbandian", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0069p.06\n\n ... | DONALD | LARSEN | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608518/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,608,519 | GOLD FOREVER MUSIC, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. | Gold Forever Music, Inc. v. United States | 2019-04-10 | 18-1789 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "McKeague, Griffin, Nalbandian", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "McKEAGUE", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0068p.06\n\n ... | MCKEAGUE | GRIFFIN | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608519/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,609,149 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Alvin CHANEY, M.D. (17-6239/6351); Lesa L. Chaney (17-6167/6314); Ace Clinique of Medicine, LLC (17-6240/6315), Defendants-Appellants. | United States v. Lesa Chaney | 2019-04-11 | 17-6314 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Cole, Suhrheinrich, Moore", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0071p.06\n\n... | COLE | SUHRHEINRICH | MOORE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4609149/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,964 | Debra REDLIN v. GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM | Redlin v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys. | 2019-04-16 | No. 18-1641 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Clay, Pearson, Stranch", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415398/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CLAY | PEARSON | STRANCH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443964/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,965 | Earl CROSBY v. TWITTER, INC. Google, LLC Facebook, Inc. | Crosby v. Twitter, Inc. | 2019-04-16 | No. 18-1426 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Gibbons, Merritt, Nalbandian", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415399/", "author_raw": ""}]} | GIBBONS | MERRITT | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443965/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,610,920 | LEXINGTON H-L SERVICES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, Defendant-Appellee. | Lexington H-L Servs., Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't | 2019-04-17 | 18-5851 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Clay, Gibbons, Cook", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0074p.06\n\n UNITED STATES COUR... | CLAY | GIBBONS | COOK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4610920/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,611,254 | United States v. Jeffery Havis | 2019-04-18 | 17-5772 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; MOORE, CLAY, GIBBONS, SUTTON, GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, WHITE, STRANCH, DONALD, THAPAR, BUSH, LARSEN, NALBANDIAN, READLER and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n ... | COLE | MOORE | CLAY | 2 | GIBBONS; SUTTON; GRIFFIN; KETHLEDGE; WHITE; STRANCH; DONALD; THAPAR; BUSH; LARSEN; NALBANDIAN; READLER; MURPHY | {"COLE": ", Chief", "MOORE": ", Circuit", "CLAY": ", Circuit", "GIBBONS": ", Circuit", "SUTTON": ", Circuit", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "KETHLEDGE": ", Circuit", "WHITE": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit", "NALBANDIAN": ", Circuit... | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4611254/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,966 | United States v. Jeffery HAVIS | United States v. Havis | 2019-04-18 | No. 17-5772 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415400/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443966/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
4,612,123 | Alison Patricia TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SAGINAW; Tabitha Hoskins, Defendants-Appellees. | Alison Taylor v. City of Saginaw | 2019-04-25 | 17-2126 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Keith, Kethledge, Donald", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0076p.0... | KEITH | KETHLEDGE | DONALD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4612123/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,618 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Henry ICKES, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Charles Ickes | 2019-04-25 | 18-5708 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Clay, Gilman, Kethledge", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0077p.06\n\... | CLAY | GILMAN | KETHLEDGE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613618/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,613,620 | The MEDICAL CENTER AT ELIZABETH PLACE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ATRIUM HEALTH SYSTEM, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys. | 2019-04-25 | 17-3863 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Batchelder, Sutton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888399/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opi... | BATCHELDER | SUTTON | BATCHELDER | 1 | {} | 5 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4613620/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,614,033 | Derek Rene EDMONDS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Aaron SMITH, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. | Derek Edmonds v. Aaron Smith | 2019-04-26 | 17-5982 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Batchelder, Rogers, Thapar", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ROGERS, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0080p.06\n\n ... | BATCHELDER | ROGERS | THAPAR | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4614033/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,982 | Jesse PIERCE and Michael Pierce, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants v. WYNDHAM VACATION RESORTS, INC. and Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. | Pierce v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. | 2019-04-29 | Nos. 18-5258/5298 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Sutton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415416/", "author_raw": ""}]} | SUTTON | SUTTON | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443982/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,753 | Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. | 2019-04-01 | 18-1889 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1... | WOOD | BRENNAN | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BRENNAN": ", Cir cuit", "ST EVE": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605753/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,767 | Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. | 2019-04-01 | 18-1889 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1... | WOOD | BRENNAN | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BRENNAN": ", Cir cuit", "ST EVE": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605767/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,768 | CRAFTWOOD II, INC., and Craftwood III, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., and Comprehensive Marketing, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. | Craftwood II, Inc. v. Generac Power Systems, Inc. | 2019-04-01 | 18-2883 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Kanne, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2883\nCRAFTWOOD II, INC., and CRAFTWOO... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605768/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,817 | Wendy Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. | 2019-04-01 | 18-1889 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1... | WOOD | BRENNAN | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BRENNAN": ", Cir cuit", "ST EVE": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605817/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,818 | Craftwood II, Inc. v. Generac Power Systems, Inc. | 2019-04-01 | 18-2883 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2883\nCRAF... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605818/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,967 | In the MATTER OF: Steven Robert LISSE, Debtor. Appeals of: Wendy Alison Nora | Matter Of Lisse | 2019-04-01 | Nos. 18-1866 & 18-1889 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Brennan, Eve, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415401/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BRENNAN | WOOD | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443967/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,606,482 | Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill | 2019-04-03 | 18-2228 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Magistrate Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit \n ... | DANIEL A MANION | MICHAEL B BRENNAN | MICHAEL Y SCUDDER | 1 | {"DANIEL A MANION": ", Circuit", "MICHAEL B BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "MICHAEL Y SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606482/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,606,483 | Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill | 2019-04-03 | 18-2228 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐2228 \nRONNIE ... | MANION | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {"MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606483/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,606,659 | Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill | 2019-04-03 | 18-2228 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Magistrate Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit \n ... | DANIEL A MANION | MICHAEL B BRENNAN | MICHAEL Y SCUDDER | 1 | {"DANIEL A MANION": ", Circuit", "MICHAEL B BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "MICHAEL Y SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606659/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,606,660 | Ronnie L. Winsted, Jr. v. Nancy A. Berryhill | 2019-04-03 | 18-2228 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐2228 \nRONNIE ... | MANION | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {"MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606660/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,606,662 | James GASTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Parthasarathi GHOSH, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | James Gaston v. Parthasarathi Ghosh | 2019-04-03 | 17-3618; 18-1281 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Kanne, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888310/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/r... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606662/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,606,672 | United States v. Arriba Lewis | 2019-04-03 | 17-3592 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐3592 \nUNITED STATES ... | FLAUM | RIPPLE | MANION | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606672/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,606,678 | James Gaston v. Parthasarathi Ghosh | 2019-04-03 | 18-1281 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 17-3618 & 18-128... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606678/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,606,731 | United States v. Arriba Lewis | 2019-04-03 | 17-3592 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐3592 \nUNITED STATES ... | FLAUM | RIPPLE | MANION | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4606731/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,950 | United States v. Arriba W. LEWIS | United States v. Lewis | 2019-04-03 | No. 17-3592 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Manion, Ripple", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415381/", "author_raw": ""}]} | FLAUM | MANION | RIPPLE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443950/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,080 | Stephen R. WEST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant, and Charter Communications, Inc., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Stephen West v. Charter Communications, Inc. | 2019-04-04 | 18-1906 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Brennan, Hamilton, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1906\n\nSTEPHEN R. WEST,\n Plaintiff... | BRENNAN | HAMILTON | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607080/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,196 | Stephen West v. Charter Communications, Inc. | 2019-04-04 | 18-1906 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1906\n\nSTEPHEN R. WEST,\n ... | ROVNER | HAMILTON | BRENNAN | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607196/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,607,495 | Bettie BURMESTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. | Bettie Burmester v. Nancy Berryhill | 2019-04-05 | 18-2106 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Kanne, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-2106\n\nBETTIE BURMESTER,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\... | BAUER | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607495/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,573 | Bettie Burmester v. Nancy Berryhill | 2019-04-05 | 18-2106 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-2106\n\nBETTIE BURMESTER,\n ... | BAUER | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607573/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,607,774 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deandre CHERRY, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Deandre Cherry | 2019-04-08 | 17-3018 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Rovner, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐3018 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n ... | FLAUM | ROVNER | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607774/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,955 | United States v. Deandre Cherry | 2019-04-08 | 17-3018 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐3018 \nUNITED ST... | FLAUM | ROVNER | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607955/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,607,956 | BROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee, v. LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA CONSTRUCTION & GENERAL LABORERS LOCAL 100, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. | Brock Indus. Servs., LLC v. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. Constr. | 2019-04-08 | 17-2597 & 17-2688 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Sykes, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\nBROCK INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC,\n ... | BAUER | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607956/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,607,975 | Brock Industrial Services, LLC v. Laborers' International Union | 2019-04-08 | 17-2688 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2597 & 17-2688\nBROCK INDUSTRI... | BAUER | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4607975/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,608,714 | Sanchelima International, Inc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Com | 2019-04-10 | 18-1823 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1823 \nSANCHELIMA... | BAUER | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608714/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,608,749 | Sanchelima International, Inc. v. Walker Stainless Equipment Com | 2019-04-10 | 18-1823 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1823 \nSANCHELIMA... | BAUER | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4608749/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 4 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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